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BARNES, H. E., and others—*Continued*

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TO THE MEMORY OF

ALEXANDER GOLDENWEISER

A GENTLEMAN AND A SCHOLAR

Vox audita perit, litera scripta manet

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Apropos of Proof-Reading

"Have you a pair of eyes, Mr. Weller?"

"Yes, I have a pair of eyes," replied Sam, "and that's just it. If they wos a pair o' patent double million magnifyin' gas microscopes of hextra power, p'raps I might be able to see through a flight o' stairs and a deal door; but bein' only eyes, you see, my wision's limited."

—Dickens' *Pickwick Papers*

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PREFACE

I

This book is the outgrowth of long-continued interest in the history of social and sociological thought. The more general aspects of this interest received generous treatment in *Social Thought from Lore to Science,* published by two of the editors in 1938. At several points in Volume II of this treatise, attention was called to the increasing trend toward diversification of interest and specialization of activity in the field of social theory in general and of sociological theory in particular. Note was also made of the fact that the volumes in question were necessarily confined to a survey of broad scope that unavoidably slights details, particularly with regard to recent developments. This was especially true of the treatment given the American manifestations; had the chapter "Sociology in the United States" been handled in other than cursory fashion, the space devoted to other countries would have been drastically reduced.

The decision was made, therefore, to defer the more thorough treatment above noted until the present volume could be completed. Further, it early became apparent that no two men, however industrious, could hope to keep abreast of all the fields and the ever-mounting literature. Co-operative collaboration proved indispensable. The present editors consequently have drawn upon the assistance of the seventeen specialists whose names are listed in the table of contents. Nothing short of this would provide the necessary surveys and appraisals of the diversified research and formulations which constitute contemporary social theory.

With the exception of a specialized treatment of systematic sociology, social reform, and a few other types of endeavor not directly relevant to the aim of the present volume, an effort has been made to canvass all salient aspects of contemporary social thinking and to assess their significance for the current social scene and for the probable development of social theory in the generation which lies ahead. It is hoped and believed that any adequately prepared person who reads this book will obtain a clear and comprehensive idea of what is going on today and will also secure hints as to what may be expected in the near future. This result, if achieved, is of more than merely academic importance; it may help us to bridge the gulf between contemporary social action and our social thought and institutions —an achievement which the editors hold to be the supreme task of the social sciences.

In spite of the fact that nineteen persons (two of the editors are here included) have contributed the chapters which make up this volume, we have reason to believe that the degree of integration effected has been much higher than is the case with many symposia. Rather than a random collection of disjointed essays, the reader is here presented with a logically organized and well-unified treatment which should constitute the natural conclusion to courses in the history of social and sociological thought. Such courses have all too often ended about where this volume begins, with the unfortunate result that current trends are either ignored or misunderstood. There is no longer any need for such omission or incompleteness. This book will enable teachers and students to round out their courses properly and end up in comprehensive contact with current literature, more especially as selected bibliographies are included within or at the end of every chapter, as well as in a comprehensive Bibliographical Appendix. The book should also prove useful as the basic manual in courses which are given over to a detailed study of the interrelationships of the social sciences in our own day, as well as in those of more narrowly sociological scope.

An even greater service which the book should render, however, was suggested to us by our former colleague, Professor Frank H. Hankins of Smith College. He once expressed the opinion that such a conspectus and evaluation as this volume provides ought to constitute the ideal classroom textbook for the advanced courses in the principles of sociology offered to upperclassmen and graduate students. The more the editors reflect on this suggestion, the more they are convinced of its soundness—making due allowance, of course, for the fact that "every shoemaker thinks there is nothing like leather." It seems logical that this volume should supplant or at least complement the handbooks now being used in courses being devoted to general sociology, i. e., above and beyond the usual introductory course offered to freshmen and sophomores. Little is to be gained by mere repetition of the same general approach and subject-matter, rendered slightly more difficult through greater abstraction, systematization, and completeness.

Acquaintance with the contents of this volume will immunize students against the infectious and often dubious generalizations now made without adequate theoretical orientation, and will bring them directly into contact with what is going on in the whole range of relevant contemporary thought. By the time this treatise has been digested, the students will know what sociology is today, what its interrelations with the other social sciences are, and what it may become tomorrow. Moreover, they will begin to feel at home in the many fields encompassed by sociology, and will have become acquainted with the various ways in which social data may be assembled, analyzed, collated, and appraised. As we have said, they will have acquired a fairly good understanding of what has been accomplished

by sociologists down to the present time, will have an adequate notion of the problems which lie ahead, and will be conversant with the more important literature of contemporary sociology and its applied fields of intellectual endeavor. Surely this is the minimum of equipment and experience which should be demanded of mature students of sociology, and it is something which is rarely provided today by the usual run of advanced courses.

The foregoing statements are not intended as special pleas for the invincibility or immortality of the present volume. The editors have conscientiously endeavored to make it the best extant manual for advanced sociology courses and have the conviction, right or wrong, that it is as yet the only work of its kind in English. Others, of course, may differ, and it is certainly possible that another and better survey may be completed in the near future. When this comes about, this book will lose its place as what we now feel it to be; namely, the most serviceable guide to advanced studies in the sociological field. In the meantime, it is not out of order to extend an invitation to examine and experiment with the present volume in the manner just suggested.

II

Our collaborators have been chosen with great care, and we wish to thank them for the gratifying manner in which our confidence, as manifested in the initial selection, has been repaid. Each writer, realizing that he bears the final responsibility for his presentation of his topic, has done the best that in him lies; no editors could ask more. The present editors, however, are themselves responsible for the choice of collaborators,[1] allocation of topics, distribution of space, and decisions affecting format, footnoting, indexing, and the like. No hard-and-fast rules of style were laid down, but it is believed that a reasonable uniformity of presentation has been achieved.

Special attention should be called to two persons. Edward Alsworth Ross, now the Nestor of American sociology, has given the entire manuscript careful scrutiny and has been directly responsible for numerous improvements. As editor of the series in which this volume appears, his sustained interest and critical judgment have often carried us over difficult spots. Alexander Goldenweiser, to whom the book is dedicated, wrote three chapters of great merit, but died before his contributions had advanced beyond the stage of page proof. In our estimation the most scholarly and gifted, from the standpoint of analytical ability, of all contem-

[1] It should be noted, however, that Harry Elmer Barnes conceived the plan of this symposium, selected Howard and Frances Bennett Becker as co-editors, and secured the services of the greater number of the "symposiasts."

porary American ethnologists, we hope that his swan-song, in the pages now awaiting the reader, will make the profound impression that its distinguished qualities deserve.

Notice should be taken of the fact that we have provided a Bibliographical Appendix. Here a number of topics not dealt with in separate chapters (because of space limits) are listed and selected references furnished. We cannot, as fallible mortals, assert that we have always made the wisest possible choice of topics for chapter exposition, but we can justifiably claim that this Bibliographical Appendix does a good deal to compensate for any errors in judgment.

In addition to the collaborators *per se,* a number of friends, colleagues, and students should be mentioned as having provided help and counsel. Professors Read Bain, Wendell Bennett, Helen Clarke, J. L. Gillin, Paul R. Farnsworth, David Fulcomer, E. T. Hiller, W. W. Howells, Thomas C. McCormick, Selig Perlman, Elmer Sevringhaus, and Kimball Young have given much useful comment. H. Otto Dahlke, Allan Eister, Regina Feiner, William Kolb, Virgil Long, Don Martindale, C. Wright Mills, Robert C. Schmid, Rockwell Smith, Bonita and Preston Valien, and Milton Yinger have done critical reading or special research that have augmented the accuracy and usefulness of the book. Other assistance has come from Mildred Coleman, Florence Gurholt, Fern McCoard, Virginia Parker, and Melvin Tumin; their cheerful and efficient services have lightened the editors' burden.

We also wish to extend thanks to the staff of the D. Appleton-Century Company for considerate treatment and competent supervision of publishing details; here we should mention in particular Dana H. Ferrin, F. S. Pease, and Marjorie Marsh.

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Yale University Press, for quotations from *Observational Studies of Social Behavior,* Vol. I, *Social Behavior Patterns,* by Thomas, Loomis, and Arrington.

The name index was in large measure the responsibility of Elizabeth Fairchild Becker, who hereby makes her initial bow on the stage of books; the subject index was prepared by two of the editors.

HARRY ELMER BARNES HOWARD BECKER FRANCES BENNETT BECKER

Part I

THE SOCIOLOGICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

[1]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

Harry Elmer Barnes *

I. The Movement for Social Betterment and the Origins of Sociology

While the problems with which sociology concerns itself have been discussed by philosophers since Oriental antiquity, sociology first definitely appeared, properly christened as a distinct province of social science, about the middle of the nineteenth century.

Many factors contributed to its origins, among them the growing interest in man and society and an increasing knowledge of the nature of man and his physical environment. Probably the most important, however, was that general groping for social betterment produced by the misery that came in the wake of the industrial revolution and the factory system.

In the writings of certain early sociologists, this impulse to social betterment emerged in concrete utopian plans for a perfect and happy system of social and industrial relations. With certain other writers, like Saint-Simon and Comte, it made its influence felt by suggesting that there should be a science of social progress. Such writers proposed sociology, thus conceived, as a substitute for the well-meant but often naïve contemporary programs for social improvement.

On the other hand, such sociologists as Spencer, Novicow, Gumplowicz and Sumner were chiefly interested in developing the science of sociology to furnish irrefutable proof of man's inability to improve his social surroundings through any conscious effort at an artificial redirection of the trend of social evolution. It is apparent, therefore, that with both the enemies and friends of social reform it was this interest in social reconstruction which gave rise to the drive for sociology.

II. The First Period of Sociology: Analogy, Definition, First Principles, and Systematization

The first half century or more of sociology was given over chiefly to the effort to bring about a transition from social philosophy to social science.

* Each writer represents himself only. This also holds for the editors.

During most of this period writers approached the subject of social origins and social processes primarily from the standpoint of dogmatic *a priori* assumptions, sweeping generalizations and heroic efforts at systematization and at a synthesis of sociological information.

The first generation of sociologists after Comte were influenced chiefly by the effect of Darwinism upon social science. One school represented by Paul Lilienfeld and Albert Schaeffle devoted itself mainly to an elaboration of the analogy between the individual organism and human society. The other group of early biological sociologists led by Gumplowicz devoted their attention primarily to illustrating the alleged similarities between biological evolution and social evolution, laying stress chiefly upon the resemblance between the struggle for existence in biological evolution and the function of war in social evolution. It must be pointed out, however, that Darwin himself never sanctioned any such sociological interpretation of his evolutionary theories, and the term "Social Darwinism" was appropriated by this group without the approval of Darwin himself.

Another group of writers were dissatisfied with this tendency to be absorbed either in elaborating the analogies between the organism and society or in emphasizing the social significance of human warfare. They turned to: (1) a discussion of the scope and methods of sociology and of its relationships with the natural sciences and the other social sciences; (2) definitions of its chief concepts; and (3) the clarification of its province.

The so-called methodological discussions which this trend in sociology produced gave rise to much heated altercation between the exponents of diverse interpretations of the nature, purpose and methods of sociology. It absorbed a great deal of energy in the somewhat sterile and unproductive task of definition, classification and demarcation, but there is no doubt that the net result was a clarification of the sociological atmosphere and a more general agreement as to the subject-matter and objectives of sociology. In other words, sociology went through the essential preliminary period of definition and classification which marks the early stage of every science. Certain writers, such as Simmel and Small, virtually devoted their lives to these problems of definition and methodology.

Paralleling these battles over definitions and methods was a comparable conflict among the sociologists as to the basic factor in the social process and the key to the development of a comprehensive system of sociology. For example, Tarde contended that the elementary social facts are to be discovered in the process of imitation; Durkheim maintained, on the contrary, that the key to society lies in the impression of the group mind upon the individual *psyche;* Alexander Sutherland, Kropotkin and others defended the assertion that the vital fact in the social life of man is to be found in sympathy and mutual aid; Gumplowicz and his disciples expounded the opposite thesis that it is in war and social conflict that one must look

for the core of the social process; Giddings asserted that only in the consciousness of kind and differential reaction to stimulation can one discover a valid basis for the construction of the principles of sociology; Ratzenhofer and Small found in human interests the only rational clue to an understanding of social activity and organization; and DeGreef and Fouillée defended the contention that contractual relationships between individuals and societies constitute the foundations of society.

The discriminating sociologist of the present day takes little stock in the all-sufficiency of any one of these unilateral views of society, but they all helped to create that body of subject-matter out of which a reliable synthesis can now be constructed. The growing recognition of the inadequacy of single-track interpretations of the social process has likewise produced that salutary and desirable tolerance among sociologists which was so notably lacking a generation ago.

The fourth significant characteristic of this early stage of sociological science was the effort of the leading writers to achieve an all-embracing systematization of sociological theory.

Comte's system was given over chiefly to a comprehensive philosophy of history and an elaborate plan for the future reorganization of society along what he believed to be scientific principles. Spencer attempted to interpret the origins and organization of society in terms of his particular formulas of cosmic evolution, incidentally giving some attention to the analogy between the organism and society and demonstrating to his own satisfaction the futility of "social uplift." Ward, taking his departure from Comte, exploited the terminology of natural science, particularly that of botany, to prove the original supremacy of the female sex and to demonstrate the possibility of planned social reform, guided by an ever-improving body of sociological knowledge.

Giddings, more eclectic and less dogmatic than these earlier writers, exploited and synthesized the majority of sociological writings of his day in what was the most impressive and comprehensive system of sociology formulated prior to the opening of the present century. His particularistic emphasis upon the consciousness of kind was worked in as the primary factor in a broad view of the origins and processes of society. Ratzenhofer and Small constructed a system of sociology about a classification of those vital human interests which give rise alike to individual activity and the struggles of human groups. Hobhouse saved from the wreckage of the organismic analogy the basic fact of the desirability of a harmonious coordination of social groups and classes, and argued for a growing control over the processes of social evolution by human knowledge. A similar point of view was elaborated by Ludwig Stein in Germany. One of the latest efforts at a system of sociology, that by Oppenheimer, is devoted to a history of human society and an analysis of the economic elements in the conflict

of social classes. The most elaborate recent system of sociology is that of Leopold von Wiese. He regards sociology as a study of social processes, conceived of mainly as "interhuman" relations and structures. In the treatise by Howard Becker, adapted and augmented on the basis of several of Wiese's books, a system is developed that is free from many of the defects of the earlier "closed" systems.

It is now very generally conceded that most of these efforts to produce a finished system of sociology were premature. The knowledge upon which a fairly secure synthesis could be built was not available when most of these writers formulated their concepts. Further, it is doubtful if the energy or mentality of any individual is adequate to a thorough mastery of the vast range of facts essential to sociological synthesis. Nevertheless, these early systems of sociology were far from a total loss. They called attention to the character of sociological material and vindicated for all time the importance of the sociological type of analysis. They also provided the point of departure for later discussion and criticism, and for the recent "open" systems.

III. Contemporary Sociology and the Trend of Specialization

In the place of ambitious efforts to produce an all-embracing synthesis of sociology in the form of dogmatic systems, the dominant trend in sociological science since about the opening of the twentieth century has been toward the splitting up of sociological endeavor among various groups of scientific men interested in one or another phase of the social process.

Some have given their attention to a consideration of the problems of sociological methodology. Others have become interested in the relation between the physical environment and social processes. Another group has devoted itself to a consideration of the bearing of the facts of modern biology and genetics upon the origins, organization and future of human society. A large number of writers have surveyed and analyzed the wide range of psychological factors affecting the groupings and activities of men.

Other scholars have applied their efforts to tracing the course of cultural and social evolution. They have delimited the various stages in the development of the present-day forms of social organization and cultural expression. They have tried to indicate, as far as possible, the various factors which brought about the transition from the cave-dweller to the modern urban tenant, with all the social and cultural implications involved in this transformation. Then, the problems of social organization have attracted the attention of an able corps of sociologists. Finally, perhaps the most diverse and enthusiastic contribution to the literature of sociology is to be found in the writings of those who are attempting to use the facts assembled by social science in the last century as the basis of more dependable plans

for social and economic reconstruction than could be offered by the Utopian Socialists of the age of Robert Owen.

The progress of scientific method and specialization in the field of sociology can be well illustrated by the advances within each of these divers fields of approach to sociological analysis. In the first place, there has been an enormous improvement in the last twenty-five years with respect to both the precision of method and the extent of knowledge possessed by the so-called specialists in particular fields of sociological study. In the second place, the process of specialization has been carried on so as to embody specialization within specialisms. For example, few social scientists would to-day contend that it is possible for them to master all the geographical factors affecting human society or all the biological processes which are of significance to the sociologists. It has become necessary, in other words, for the anthropogeographer or the social biologist to specialize upon a certain restricted range of problems and interests within his particular field.

In the cultivation of sociological methodology the first generation of students was, as we have seen, absorbed chiefly with problems of definition, classification, and the demarcation of the province of sociology. At the present time, this sort of work is in the hands of a small, though able, minority. We find the majority of those interested in methodology concerned with such problems as the application of statistical measurement to social processes, the analysis of the methods and limitations of the cultural approach to social origins and social organization, and the consideration of the methodology essential for the study and comparison of the intelligence and social interests of particular human groups and cultures.

In other words, the generalized study of methodology has given ground to an examination of the utility and limitations of particular techniques. The important fact is that all of them insist upon an ever greater utilization of the quantitative methods of natural science and an abandonment of the *a priori* and deductive technique of social philosophy. There is a general agreement that sociology can become a true science of society only in the degree to which it is able to appropriate and apply those methods of measurement and analysis which constitute the indispensable instruments of science in general. Vilfredo Pareto, William F. Ogburn, George A. Lundberg, and their sympathizers and followers have been especially earnest in emphasizing this point.

In studying the absorbing problem of the multifarious influences of the geographical environment upon human society we find a corresponding progress away from sweeping generalizations. The older anthropogeographers, from Ritter and Peschel to Ratzel, Reclus, Kirchhoff and Semple, attempted to present a systematic and comprehensive survey of the operation of all the so-called geographical "influences" upon man and society. There

is, however, a growing tendency towards the specialization of writers upon some single type of geographic factor, such as climate, topography, routes of travel, waterways and routes of water communication, meteorological factors, and alteration of geographic influences by the progress of material culture.

But this is not all. Following the suggestions of the great French geographer, Vidal de La Blache, and his disciples in other countries, the most advanced school of anthropogeographers have come to doubt the feasibility of a generalized study of even any one of these special geographic influences. They contend that anthropogeography can become truly scientific only by concentrating upon the effect of specific geographic factors upon a community inhabiting some very definite geographic region. In other words, regional physical geography has been followed by recognition of the inevitability and necessity of regional anthropogeography.

Further, the contemporary scientific anthropogeographer no longer proceeds from the naïve assumption of geographical determinism, but adopts the cultural point of view of the modern critical anthropologist and cultural historian. He recognizes that human culture is the dynamic element in society and civilization, and simply endeavors to discover the various ways in which culture is conditioned by geographical factors operating upon the inhabitants of the particular region studied. When one compares such a summary of the contemporary point of view as Febvre's *Geographical Introduction to History* with one of the best syntheses of the older generalizing anthropogeography, such as Miss Semple's English adaptation of Ratzel, he realizes the extent of the progress made in this field in the last generation with respect to the degree of specialization and the precision of methodology.

The same advance toward detailed specialization and greater exactness of scientific method is to be observed among the biological sociologists. Such interests and activities as characterized them thirty years ago have now become anachronisms in the field. In the first place, we have the demographers, represented by such men as Gini, Willcox, Thompson, Dublin, and Kuczynski, who are interested in gathering and classifying the facts descriptive of the social population, thus collecting the raw materials for theoretical students of the problem. Along with these we have the students of the theory of population. They take their cue from Malthus and are known in general as Neo-Malthusians, though most of them favor birth control, which Malthus refused to sanction. These writers, well represented by Carr-Saunders, by East, author of *Mankind at the Crossroads,* and by Pearl, are concerned with the quantitative aspect of population, namely, (1) the relation between the increase of population and the means of subsistence, and (2) the bearing of this situation upon the prosperity and progress of human society. They are, in general, sympathetic with the birth

control movement as led by Margaret Sanger and others. They hold that the avenue to social well-being is to be found through some practicable method of maintaining the population at the level which will insure a relatively high standard of living, assuming the existence of an adequate technology and an efficient economic system. Certain members of this school, of whom Pearl and Lotka are representative, have endeavored to formulate laws of population, qualifying or supplementing the original generalizations of Malthus.

Another group of writers concentrate their attention upon the *qualitative* aspects of the population. They are concerned with the biological evolution of man, with whether civilization has had a disastrous effect upon the biological quality of the human race, and with the whole issue of eugenics, involving the problem of the possibility of the artificial improvement of the human stock. Writers like Ammon, Pearson, Conklin and Holmes represent discriminating scientific exponents of this point of view, which has been set forth in a more popular and exuberant fashion in the writings of Wiggam.

The geneticists, led by men like Thomas Hunt Morgan, have elucidated the laws of heredity, aided eugenic theory, and disposed effectively of the theory of the inheritability of acquired characteristics.

Finally, there should be noted the physical anthropologists and the scientific students of race and racial characteristics. They devote themselves to the ascertainment of the physical criteria of race and to the accumulation of precise data regarding the physical traits of the major races of mankind. In carrying their researches beyond physical investigations to an analysis of the mental traits of the various races, they link hands with the differential psychologists. The work of the physical anthropologists, admirably represented by men like Keith, Martin, Hrdlička and Hooton, together with that of the differential psychologists and the cultural historians, offers the best possible antidote to the vagaries of Madison Grant and his disciples who have been busy in recent years disseminating the Nordic rehabilitation of the old Aryan myth. Such writers as Hankins, Simar, Julian Huxley, Jacques Barzun, Radin, Snyder, and others have gathered together the relevant facts in the matter of the relation of race to society and history.

These various scientific students of the biological foundations of society are at last making available the relevant facts and processes of biology, so that they may be appropriated in an intelligent fashion by the alert legislator and discriminating social worker. Only superstition and bigotry prevent us to-day from adopting their more significant and demonstrably valid recommendations.

Psychological sociology had its origins in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with writers who dealt in a broad and sweeping manner with such complex and general psychological factors as custom, imitation, fash-

ion, impression, emulation, sympathy, etc. At this time there was little reliable technical psychology to be learned, and these writers possessed only a slight familiarity with even such psychology as existed. While some progress took place in the interval between 1890 and 1910, as exemplified by the sociological interests of psychologists like J. M. Baldwin or the better mastery of psychological principles by a sociologist like C. H. Cooley, it may safely be said that the first treatise on psychological sociology which demonstrated the author's comprehensive familiarity with the facts of scientific psychology was Ellwood's *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects,* published in 1912, and inspired by Dewey, Angell and Thomas.

Yet this ambitious attempt at synthesis to be found in Ellwood's useful book did not set the pattern for the development of psychological sociology in the next decade. Rather, we find a tendency toward further specialization and a more thorough cultivation of technical psychology. The popularity of the instinct hypothesis, launched by the appearance of McDougall's *Social Psychology* in 1908, provoked a vast amount of controversy and resulted in a general clarification of this problem, the best synthesis now existing in the field being L. L. Bernard's monograph on *Instinct.* The behavioristic impulse, emanating from Watson and Max Meyer, has been exploited for social psychology by Allport, Burnham and a number of others who are interested in the important social applications of the theory of the conditioned reflex.

The social significance and applications of Freudianism have been examined and exploited in a discriminating fashion by Martin, Groves, Ogburn, Holt, and Thomas. An extremely promising effort has been made to work out the all-important synthesis of behaviorism and Freudianism by Holt, Thomas, Allport, Martin, Hamilton, Young, and others, a development which has been hampered by the vigorous rhetorical, but somewhat illusory, opposition of Watson to Freudianism. The psychology of the crowd is at last beginning to be studied in a scientific fashion by Martin and others. The significance of habit patterns for psychological sociology has been indicated in detail by Ellwood, Dewey, and Gault. Wundt, Boas, Lévy-Bruhl, Radin, Goldenweiser, Robinson, Barnes, and others have devoted themselves to a study of the psychological history of the race, clarifying the similarities and contrasts between the thinking of primitive and modern man.

The provision of scientific and practicable methods of mental testing by Binet, Simon, Goddard, Yerkes, Terman, Otis, and others has made possible the development of differential psychology, an instrument of the greatest significance for the further analysis of the problems of eugenics, mental hygiene, criminology, immigration, and democracy. Finally, the desirability of abandoning psychological determinism and accepting the notion of cultural conditioning has been recognized by nearly every group

now interested in psychological sociology. The most ardent exponents of this point of view have been the critical anthropologists of the Boas school, and Wallas, Bartlett, Thomas, Ellwood, Ogburn, Znaniecki, Willey, Winston, and Folsom.

The net result of these labors has been to put at our disposal a vast body of relevant psychological information of the greatest practical significance for human betterment and a more adequate conception of social processes. Nothing could more effectively illustrate the progress in psychological sociology in the last generation than a comparison of such books as Le Bon's *The Crowd,* or Tarde's *Laws of Imitation,* with Martin's, Allport's, or Young's books on social psychology.

In the study of the history of human society there has been notable progress away from the *a priori* philosophy of history characteristic of the early stages of historical sociology. Building upon the firm foundation of the principles of cultural development established by critical anthropologists and upon the vast array of facts concerning social and cultural evolution gathered by the conventional historians, the students of social and cultural history have been able to work out a most impressive survey of the history of human culture from the Old Stone Age to the New Deal. There has been an escape both from the inaccuracies of the old philosophy of history and from the irrelevancies of the episodical and anecdotal historians. In this field, as in others, specialization has been necessary, since no single student of social evolution could personally master the technical equipment or the body of facts involved in a survey of the totality of human cultural development. The results of progress in this field are evident in the synthesis by Barnes in his *History of Western Civilization* and his *Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World.*

The study of the facts and problems of social organization has attracted a varied group of authorities. The forms of social organization have been discussed in great theoretical detail by Simmel. Simmel's conclusions have been made intelligible, as well as accessible, to English readers by his expositor, Spykman. The biological basis of social organization has been analyzed by writers such as Gini, Pearson, Carr-Saunders, Ammon, East, Holmes, Kelsey, Reuter, and Hankins. Tarde, Durkheim, Wallas, Cooley, Ross, Ellwood, Bernard, Bogardus, Allport, Young, J. M. Williams and others have devoted their attention to the psychological factors involved in the organization of society. The economic basis of society has been investigated by Loria, Sombart, Max Weber, Schmoller, the Webbs, Hobson, Hammond and Cole, by Veblen and the institutional economists, and by Eldridge, Beard, Hacker, and others interested in the economic basis of politics. The political foundations of social organization have received especial attention from Ratzenhofer, Michels, Wallas, Laski, Small, Bentley, Giddings, and MacLeod.

The most significant fact about all these specialized types of analysis of social organization is that the old obsession with definition and classification has been superseded by interest in the vital and dynamic processes involved in the origins of social groups and their mutual conflicts and adjustments. Much of the credit for this wholesome change is due to the work of Ratzenhofer and Small.

The reaction of these various phases of progress in scientific sociology upon social work and social reform has forwarded the ultimate realization of the ambitions of the founders of sociology to create a scientific guide for the betterment of mankind. On the whole, social work has abandoned the ideal of amelioration and has adopted the slogan of prevention, the achievement of which must be based on a mastery of the scientific facts of sociology.

Sociology, properly understood, does not discourage social "uplift." Indeed, it would seem that the chief vindication of sociology is to be found in its contributions to increasing the happiness of humanity. What sociology does insist is that uplift shall cease to be governed by theological and sentimental motives and shall found its objectives and methods upon the indisputable truths wrought out by sociology in the last quarter of a century.

The extensive advances in the subject-matter of sociology, as well as the increasing tendency towards specialization, which have been all too briefly summarized in the preceding paragraphs, make it obvious that the future of sociology must decisively be a co-operative matter. Any synthesis by a single individual is likely to result in either grotesque inaccuracies or in the superficialities pardonable only in a brief textbook survey.

IV. The Influence of Sociology upon the Special Social Sciences

We should at least make passing mention of the influence of sociology upon the other social sciences. Its effect upon the study of history has been chiefly to emphasize the fact that man does not function as an individual but as a member of a group; to aid the progressive historian in his analysis of the various forms of institutional life in which men participate; and to clarify the conception of civilization as a genetic and dynamic process. Sociology has been particularly useful in promoting a broad and synthetic view of the processes of historical causation.

Sociology has been able to offer a number of helpful suggestions to open-minded economists—for example: emphasis upon the group basis of custom and fashion which determine to so large a degree the trend of economic demand; an indication of the interrelation of the economic with the other factors in the social process; and a clarification of the nature of the social institutions which condition the operation of the economic factors in society.

On no other special social science has the influence of sociology been more significant than upon political science. Sociology has furnished indispensable information as to the nature and foundations of political control and has cleared up many obscure problems related to the origins of the state. It has also given a real *rationale* to politics by indicating the social process which goes on within the state and by making it clear that the real function of the state is to act as an umpire of this social process. The influence of sociology upon jurisprudence is comparable to that upon the science of government. Sociology has emphasized the social origins and function of law, has indicated the fundamental social basis of all valid legal principles, and has emphasized the rôle of progressive jurisprudence in social engineering and the guidance of social change.

The sociological influence upon ethics has been revolutionary in theory, however little it may have affected conduct in practice. It has made clear the group basis of all ethical guides and criteria, however self-assured a social group may be with respect to the allegation of the divinely revealed nature of its ethical concepts and practices. It has also emphasized the necessity of adopting a secular basis for the judgment of human conduct. It insists that the object of ethics should be to produce an ever greater number of happy and efficient human beings here upon the earth, and not to save a vast throng of souls eagerly quitting their earthly misery.

The relationships between sociology and esthetics have not been adequately cultivated thus far, but the group foundation of esthetic judgments is readily apparent, and enough has already been done to indicate the real importance of art as a form of social expression and a mode of social control. With the gradual secularization of human interests we may predict that esthetics will ultimately come to occupy the position held by theology in the interest and affections of the early sociologists. Sorokin has recently given much attention to the social basis of art.

The most important general function which sociology has with all the social sciences is to emphasize constantly the unity of the social process and to promote a synthetic point of view on the part of all types of social scientists. Thus may be avoided the narrowness and superficiality which invariably accompany a partial view of the processes and institutions of society.

V. Obstacles to the Development of Sociology

In spite of the remarkable strides which sociology has made in the volume of its subject-matter and the exactness of its methods, it has been slow to achieve academic recognition, receive adequate consideration from legislators and public officials, and secure the good-will and confidence of the general reading public.

For this there are a number of causes. The first has resulted from the confusion of sociology with socialism because of the similarity in the sound of the two words. This may seem preposterous, but the writer believes it to have been more important than any other influence in prejudicing the average timid and conservative citizen against sociology. Even the librarian of one of our foremost graduate schools in this country fiercely opposed sociology and sociological books for a generation because of his firm belief that a socialist and a sociologist must be one and the same person in each and every case.

Then there is the opposition of pure and pious folk, who look upon sociology as a subject which undermines morality and leads to atheism. At the same time, these "depraved" sociologists, as they appeared to the late Mr. Bryan, Bishop Manning, and not a few college professors, are viewed with a mixture of amusement and pity by those in real touch with life and its problems. Further, most sociologists are "sold" on the capitalistic system and the "theories of the leisure class," a fact which removes them from active contact with the campaign for social and economic reconstruction.

Hence, those on the "firing line" of cultural, social, economic, and ethical advance will have little to do with the majority of the sociologists. What appears to the pious and respectable as unmistakable proof of depravity and revolutionary radicalism on the part of sociologists seems to the realists and radical reformers to be nothing less than pedantry, prudery, hypocrisy and timidity.

Another recent form of opposition to sociology arises from progressives who fear the alleged pernicious influence of foundations and endowments. Much current sociological research is subsidized by the great foundations which have been endowed by very wealthy men interested in preserving the existing social, economic and political order. Naturally, most subsidized research must carefully avoid projects likely to result in unsettling discoveries, or, if such results do emerge, they must be obscured. Such considerations, as Horace Coon, Stolberg and Lindeman have amply demonstrated, both hamstring scientific candor and fatally limit the practical value of sociological research.

Again, we must list among the powerful sources of opposition to the progress of sociology the jealousy of the vested social sciences. History, economics, and political science were established as academic subjects from a half century to a century earlier than sociology. This has given them a stronger hold upon the faculties and administrative boards of the colleges and universities. The opposition of these older vested interests to sociology has been intensified by the fact that the vivid human appeal of sociology has attracted to sociology courses large numbers of students who would otherwise have been swelling the class registers and enhancing the local prestige of solemn and respectable teachers of history, political science or

economics. Therefore, in certain institutions, such as Princeton, Harvard, California, Cornell, and Johns Hopkins, together with most of the aristocratic New England colleges, sociology was long excluded altogether or was offered in an inadequate and misleading fashion by professors of economics. In many institutions, while numerous courses in sociology were tolerated, the instructors in sociology were kept under the general control of the department of economics or government.

To the opposition of the older social sciences must also be added the even more vigorous antipathy of the departments of mathematics, science, literature and other even older and more respectable departments and vested curricular interests.

The future of sociology is a matter for prophecy and not for history, and we are only concerned in this chapter with history. The place that sociology will occupy in the future of human thought and action will depend upon a multitude of factors, some connected with sociology itself and others with general trends in the public mind.

Before sociology can command the unqualified respect and support of intelligent and thoughtful persons it must divest itself of a sentimental adherence to indiscriminate efforts at uplift; it must reject whole-heartedly the impurity-complex which it has inherited from its puritanical and ministerial ancestry; and it must reduce the paralyzing influence of discipleship and dogmatism to which all the social sciences are in differing degrees susceptible. The degree to which it will influence social thought and action will also depend upon how far society surrenders its contemporary submission to rhetoric, convention, tradition, and propaganda, and demands competent technical and scientific guidance.

If it be objected by many that sociology has not yet secured a sufficiently high level of agreement among its various schools, and that it has not yet perfected its methodology with adequate scientific precision, it may safely be answered that it will probably remedy these defects long before society will be willing to accept its constructive assistance.

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[2]

CONSTRUCTIVE TYPOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Howard Becker *

I. The Call of the Esoteric

Denn bei den alten, lieben Toten
Braucht man Erklärung, will man Noten;
Die Neuen glaubt man blank zu verstehn,
Doch ohne Dolmetsch wirds auch nicht gehn.[1]

GOETHE.

The scientist can sometimes be a bigger fool than the layman because the scientist possesses a terrifying capacity for befooling himself consistently. Oftentimes the rank-and-file scientist is possessed of a mind in no wise superior to that of the famous "man in the street"; the difference in their levels of achievement lies primarily in the special training which the scientist has received, and this special training may on occasion do as much harm as good. Contemporary scientists share many of the foibles of their non-scientific fellows, but they grace their fads with the finery of "five-dollar" words and formulas. The preliterate often resorts to word and number magic; so do we, even when we think ourselves ultra-modern. Some social scientists, for example, intone a ritual composed largely of sacred sounds such as "natural," "quantitative," "operational," "objective," and "correlation," and rise in wrath when some hardened skeptic asks, "What does it mean?" Many of these social scientists were reared in religious homes, and in the very act of casting off the Evangelical or the Methodist or the Catholic "yoke," so-called, they laid upon themselves another set of ineffable ultimates miscalled Science. Their delayed-adolescent rebellion only serves to demonstrate their need for a Creed, for a Formula, for The Word.

Of genuine science, instrumental in origin and goal, these dogmatists have no comprehension. They flock in droves to discussions of "conceptual

* Each writer represents himself only. This also holds for the editors.

[1] Translation:

"Where the dear old dead are concerned
We need explanation, we want notes;
The contemporary, however, we think we understand without further ado,
But even here interpretation is necessary."

integration" or of "factor analysis," for example, when it is clear to any informed observer that not one in ten of them possesses the advanced logical or linguistic or mathematical equipment necessary to follow the elaborate demonstrations. Why do they flock? To acquire the feeling of exaltation, of salvation, that comes through a sacrosanct ritual. We need some unterrified infant who will cry out, "The King has no clothes on!"

But let it be clearly understood that *to the genuine scientist who wields his tools with full awareness of their uses and limitations none of these strictures apply.* He is no high-priest, to be sure, and he has no key to the cosmos, but in spite—or perhaps because—of this, he merits the most profound respect. It is only for the Word and Formula worshippers who think to shut off all discussion by invoking the sacred tenets of their Creed that the vials of wrath should be reserved—when wrath is in place.

All this seems necessary by way of preamble to the presentation of "Constructive Typology in the Social Sciences." There is no intention of adding to the stock of magic formulas, no desire to gratify the methodological mystics. Many of us have long been constructive typologists without using the term. To those who seek startling revelations I have nothing to offer; I propound the new term and show its implications simply in order to avoid many of the misunderstandings inevitably evoked by older labels.

My present task, therefore, is to set forth, clearly and plainly, what is meant by "constructive typology." And by "clearly and plainly" I mean just that. Obscurity is not profundity, and in spite of etymology the ponderous is not the weighty. I shall strive to be understandable even at the cost of seeming to be extreme, obvious, superficial, or unduly explicit. Moreover, in spite of the risks involved in the use of analogies, they will be liberally mingled with the other illustrations. The gain in definiteness is worth the hazard. Further, no attempt will be made to take cover in a protecting fort of footnote citation; readers are hereby referred to what I have said, under such index headings as "construct," "type," and "ideal-typical," in Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science,* to my chapter on Historical Sociology, present volume, and to the chapter bibliographies.

II. The Particular and the General

Jeder wandle für sich und wisse nichts von dem andern;
Wandeln nur beide gerad, finden sich beide gewiß.[2]

GOETHE.

The dilemma of the particular and the general has long plagued social scientists of every description. Even the inveterate "other-things-being-

[2] Translation:

"Each should travel his own path, knowing nothing of the other;
If both travel as they should, they will certainly find each other."

equal" generalizer can scarcely fail to be aware that the society he is examining at the moment is unique in spite of all resemblances to other societies. Dismissing Platonic and Nietzschean objections, it is quite safe to assume that the specific configuration of phenomena presented by any given society at any given time will never be repeated—literally, never. And yet we are seldom content with a collection of unrelated snapshots, however startling or otherwise edifying those candid camera glimpses may be. Unless we are intellectual kodak fiends, a particularized description of the culture of the Scottish Lowlands from January 16, 1738, to March 7, 1739, or of the society of Middletown in the years of the Lynds, does not fully satisfy our strictly scientific cravings. Not only do we wish to apprehend the unique, but as social scientists we also want to make a few generalizations. (Under "social scientists" may be included all those who conceive their function in the division of labor to comprise some measure of generalization about social matters—certain heterodox historians,[3] and most anthropologists, economists, political scientists, and psycho-sociologists, as well as the out-and-out sociological generalizers.) If sociology, in particular, means anything at all, it means at least the ability to say wherein the society in question is like other societies and wherein it differs from them.

More is involved here than is apparent at first glance. For example, even those cultural anthropologists who, still following the recent mode, have simply changed allegiance from Morgan to Lowie, and who therefore justify their existence by pointing out intercultural differences rather than similarities, presumably proving thereby that comparison is impossible, have to keep their eyes tightly closed. If they did not, they would be compelled to see that no one can say wherein one society differs from others unless a background of likeness, however vague, is simultaneously presented or tacitly assumed. In other words, absolute anti-comparison is impossible, for assertions of difference inevitably involve comparison, and two entirely discrete entities cannot be compared. The specialists in cultural differentials who maintain that no intercultural comparisons can be made are therefore busily engaged in sawing off the branch on which they sit. After all, however, very few cultural anthropologists belonging to this school take their anti-comparative oaths of allegiance with completely straight faces; the extreme type of particularism is better and more legitimately represented in other quarters.

Instance the orthodox monographic historian sworn to Ranke's dictum

[3] Here the reference is *not* to "the new history," for this much-valued innovation is a methodological wilderness. A little psychiatry, a little Marxism, a little "social-mindedness," a little free thought—"and they all live together in a funny little house." No, I refer to researchers such as Toynbee, Alfred Weber, Xenopol, and other persons interested in "facts of repetition" (within a definite frame of reference) rather than in "facts of succession." See the chapter on Historical Sociology.

that his task is to depict the past "wie es eigentlich gewesen"—"as it actually and peculiarly was." [4] He is firmly convinced, as he rightly should be, that the body of materials which he happens at the moment to be analyzing is *this* body of materials and nothing else. He holds that history does not repeat itself if it is history as the description of things and happenings in their full "thisness." More technically put, the historian correctly maintains that he is a specialist in idiography, in the description of the unique. As the much-despised and little-understood Scholastics say, he deals with the haecceity, the "this-and-no-other" aspect, of time sequences in human affairs. The vitally necessary function of the idiographic historian should be plain to every unprejudiced social scientist; the "thisness" of events *must* be made clear. Even when they merely *suspect* disparagement or allegations of generalizing tendencies, however, many monographic historians energetically rise to defend their particularistic function as narrators of "as it actually and peculiarly was," as expounders of *specific* configurations of men and their doings. Such prompt and vigorous defense is certainly warranted when the disparagement or allegations mentioned are real—although, to be sure, some historians have delusions that the indispensability of their task in the scholarly division of labor is not fully recognized. Under the stress of such delusions, and in the heat of conflict, the embattled historian frequently goes to the extreme of assuming that nothing but the unique, the particularized, can be dealt with in the entire field of the social sciences. His legitimate rejection of generalization for *his own* definitely assigned task may lead him to assert that no generalizations with regard to human conduct should ever be attempted—in short, that there can be no social *science*. He says, in effect, "I know Jock Elliot—intimately. In all the wide world there is no one like him, and consequently you cannot say anything about types of Scottish Lowlander. The history of the stretch 'south of Tay and north of Tweed' is nothing but a collection of individual biographies, and must remain so."

This is certainly forthright enough, but as we shall see, the most orthodox monographic historian is usually compelled to deal with units much larger than the individual. He may single out a few "great men" or "climactic events" as most representative of the given culture and period, and deal with them more or less exhaustively, but he is forced to use highly general terms when laying in the background: medieval Papacy, Calvinism, Whigs, Jacobites, Highland clans, the national state system, or what not. Neverthe-

[4] *Eigentlich* has been translated as "actually and peculiarly" because nothing else seems quite adequate. If Ranke had simply said *wirklich,* then "actually" or "really" would have been sufficient, but *eigentlich* is another story. *Eigen* means "own"; *eigentümlich* means "peculiar" or "unique"; *Eigentum* means "property," "attribute" or "its (or 'his' or 'her') own," as in Max Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum,* customarily translated as "The Ego and His Own." *Eigentlich* therefore has a connotation of "peculiarly" or "uniquely" as well as its more obvious meaning of "really" or "actually."

less, as contrasted with his polar opposite, the sociologist, this historian remains highly particularistic. (See my chapter on Historical Sociology.)

The sociologist, on the other hand, sometimes becomes so engrossed in the forest that he can't see the trees. He couldn't for the life of him tell you whether he is dealing with a pine forest, or a fir forest, or a spruce forest; it is just a forest. This is not in and of itself a handicap; sometimes merely knowing that there is a forest in a given territory, to continue the *cliché,* is scientifically worth while. Nevertheless, neglect of the constituent elements, of the pines, firs, and spruces in the interrelated whole which the forest represents, might make it impossible to say very much that is ultimately worth while—if the specifically scientific criterion of *prediction* determines worthwhileness—about what may happen to that forest in terms of dominance, invasion, succession, and similar ecological sequences. And so too with social life; witness the fact that knowledge of the distribution of population in rural Scotland, in terms of relative sparseness alone, provides very little aid when the immediate task is the prediction of success or failure, not only from the cash-crop standpoint, but also from that of subsistence farming, long-term familial adaptability, and survival. Neglect of typical differences between Scottish Borderers, Lowlanders, Highlanders, and Islanders deprives the sociological analyst of almost every vestige of predictive power. In other words, his general knowledge is sometimes so excessively general that it is of virtually no value in predicting what may recur in certain type situations.

III. Prediction and Purpose

Bewährt den Forscher der Natur
Ein frei und ruhig Schauen,
So folge Meßkunst seiner Spur
Mit Vorsicht und Vertrauen.

Zwar mag in Einem Menschenkind
Sich beides auch vereinen;
Doch, daß es zwei Gewerbe sind,
Das läßt sich nicht verneinen.[5]

GOETHE.

Both directly and by implication the word "predict" has been used. This gives a clue to a definition of science, or of scientific activity, that may per-

[5] Translation:

"If nature has vouchsafed to the researcher
A free and quiet insight,
Then let the art of measurement follow his footsteps
With caution and confidence.

"To be sure, both capacities may be united in one person,
Yet it cannot be denied that they are two different trades."

haps make it possible to bring together these considerations relating to the particular and the general in a somewhat more meaningful way. For the ends now in view, let us define science as *the systematic statement of the probability of the potential or actual* [6] *recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical.* Without attempting in this chapter to define sociology, it may be said that this definition can be applied to any generalizing social science, well enough for present needs, simply by inserting the word "social" immediately before "phenomena." When a high degree of precision seems possible, it is perhaps advisable to insert the word "statistical" just before "probability." The phrase would then run "the statistical probability [7] of the potential or actual recurrence of social phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical."

Let us now go on to analyze the various parts of this definition as they bear on the problem of the general and the particular.

It has been said, in effect, that the scientist is not interested in the unique *as such*. Fully to know Jock Elliot I must respond to him as a total personality whom I shall never meet again under any other guise. He must be responded to emotionally as well as intellectually; indeed, the element of evaluation, of praise or blame, is inevitably involved. But for the scientist *qua* scientist, Jock Elliot in his "ultimate essence" need not be known at all, still less judged on moral grounds. It may be enough to be able to place him at a certain point in a statistical distribution of height or weight. Or again, he may simply represent a good specimen of *Homo europaeus*. Once more, Jock Elliot may have teeth that make a dental mold an object of enthralling study. There are many things about him in which the scientist, necessarily a specialist in greater or lesser degree, is professionally interested —but not because these things are identified with Jock Elliot as *this* person and no other. His "thisness" is not a matter of scientific concern.

And here a warning notice must be posted. *Interest in the unique is in and of itself worth while.* No derogation of such interest is intended by refusing to apply the scientific label. Life as it is *lived* by us assumes final

[6] If it were not for the fact that the contrast between "potential" and "actual" is useful when the question of experimentation is discussed in succeeding sections, the word "conditional" alone might be used instead of "potential or actual."

[7] It seems wise to stress the point that "statistical probability" means just that, and *not* "degree-of-belief" probability. The actuary uses the term in *our* sense when he says, "There is a greater probability that a man of age 30 will attain his 40th birthday than there is that he will attain his 50th." Contrasting with this usage, we have historical statements such as "There is a greater 'probability' (i. e., plausibility) that Caesar visited the site of the present city of London than that he visited the site of the present city of Edinburgh." In the latter case, the word is used by the historian as an indication of his "degree of belief" in the statement. This belief is based on the information available about Caesar's travels, and the statement deals with a journey believed to have been made by this very Caesar. Not this "degree-of-belief" *plausibility*, but "actuarial" *probability*, is what we mean here.

meaning only as a set of altogether ineffable, incommunicably meaningful relations with other persons now alive or dwelling in a past that may be more "real" than the present. Yet, however keenly we may be aware of such ultimates, absorption in them is not justification for a specialized *scientific* activity. The scientist necessarily deals with the general, not the unique.

Take any object turned out in thousands by mass production methods—a Grand Rapids chair, let us say. In pursuit of the ideal of full description of the unique, it would be quite legitimate to include a treatise on the structure of the cosmos. A full description would involve precisely that. To begin with, the observer would have to push beyond the externalities of the wood, its growth, and the soil and climate that nourished it, to its basic cell characteristics, and from there to the atomic structure of the elements making it up. Following this, the periodic table would have to be expounded, for each element can be fully described only in conjunction with its place in the "family" of elements, and behold! the atomic and subatomic "solar systems" loom before us as we gaze "at each other with a wild surmise . . ." But the end is not yet. In analyzing the vagaries of electrons, protons, and all the other "ons," questions of quantum theory and the nature of light arise, and we have arrived at the frontiers of the universe, "where dwell the three Grey Sisters who have but one eye and one tooth between them."

From here let us go back to Grand Rapids. Numerous special histories would be tied in with each stage of this fantastically impossible task of full description. For example, there is no compelling reason, if the goal of *"all* the facts" beckons to us from afar, why the biographies of the multitude of workmen who were engaged in the building of this chair should not be included. Genealogy is an enticing study, too; why not go back to Charlemagne, or at least as far as the records in the College of Heralds will permit? Further, a full description, with no limitations, of "as it actually and peculiarly was," would lead to the question as to how the particular chair came to be dealt with, and why the particular describer made contact with it at a given time and a given place, and at no others. What a nice lot of interesting details for the man who abhors "preconceived limitations" on the scope of his research, and who therefore *says* that he simply gathers *all* the facts, and lets them speak for themselves! Sarcasm aside, all this is very clearly in the realm of the unique, and quite as clearly, little if any of such a non-limited description of "as it actually and peculiarly was" is of scientific concern.

Obviously, too, there are certain aspects of such a chair which can be isolated and dealt with from a specifically scientific standpoint. To refer to the definition of scientific activity presented above: *For the purposes in hand* there are certain things about this chair which can be regarded as iden-

tical with other aspects of other chairs. They are not precisely the same, and they never will be, but for the purposes in hand the scientist can regard the external form of chair no. 2002 as the same as that of all the chairs in the 2000 series. Minute examination will show that the external form is far from the "same" in each case, that determinable differences between chair and chair are inescapably present. If, however, the purposes in hand are of sufficiently general type, it may be quite safe to say that chair 2002 is the same as 2003, even though in the ultimate and final sense it is not and cannot be.

Many persons will grant these conditions where inanimate objects are concerned, but they have mental reservations, to say the least, when human conduct is under scrutiny. It must be granted that some of these reservations are warranted; neglect of "subjectively intended meaning" in the pursuit of fanciful analogies that liken societies to solar systems, organisms, or conglomerations of atoms has oftentimes earned for the "naturalistic" sociologist well-merited contempt. But there are sociologists and sociologists, and in the researches of many of the more penetrating and sober workers (now happily increasing in number) the meaningful aspects of social conduct are never ignored. They would agree that certain aspects of the meaningful conduct of Jock Elliot can be isolated for study, that *for the purposes in hand* it is possible to say that what Jock Elliot is doing at the moment is the same as the conduct in which Abie Rosenblum is simultaneously engaged halfway around the world, or was engaged in two weeks ago, or two years ago, or two centuries ago—under certain typical circumstances. When the idiographic historian says, "Each human being is unique, and the social situations in which he has developed are unique, and history never repeats itself in any ultimate or final sense," the modern sociologist can reply, "I agree with you, quite. True, history never repeats itself. And yet for certain purposes, which are not those of the idiographic historian, it may be entirely legitimate to say that certain phenomena can be regarded as identical with certain other phenomena. Let us each play the part of Candide, each in his own garden, and each in his own way."

The dilemma of the particular and the general, then, can be restated as a question of purpose. What are the purposes in hand? If you wish to appreciate to the full the characteristic essence of the culture of the Scottish Border, let us say, you steep yourself in the folksong, the literature, the poetry, the arts—and how much more!—of that culture. In so doing you acquire kinds of sensitivity and of learning that may enable you to communicate, to others less sensitive or less erudite, some notion of what it meant, and still means, to grow up an heir to The Debateable Land north of the Cheviots, to be born within sight of "three crests against a saffron sky, beyond the purple plain." To be sure, you come to *know,* in a final and irreducible sense, some things about the Border that you can't communicate to anybody directly; only in the nuances of style, the overtones of the writ-

ten word, can the reader sense the fact that in learning to know the Scottish Border you have yourself become akin to the hard-bitten "raiders and reivers" who once made eternal vigilance a necessity for Northumbrian cattle-owners. There is no need to justify such immersion in and absorption of the particular; the only thing to which legitimate objection may be taken is the sometimes-encountered assumption of the idiographic historian, of biographical persuasion especially, that we can never deal with anything but the unique. To such a forthright challenge the reply should be equally direct: "We as sociologists can deal with the general because, if you will, *we are going to construct the general.* You as an idiographic historian wish to saturate yourself in the lore of the Scottish Border and to communicate to others the insights you thereby gain; we want to be able to predict within the framework provided by constructive typology."

The possibility of prediction is in many respects limited, and yet the ultimate criterion of scientific generalization, in sociology at least, is whether or not the goal is the prediction of the recurrence of social phenomena. The purpose in hand must be geared to the problem of predicting what may happen under certain circumstances. There are many other valid purposes, and there is no need unduly to exalt the rôle of the scientist. It is but one of many, and that man is poor indeed, so far as the essential resources of his total personality are concerned, who can be only a scientist. In stating, therefore, that the purpose of prediction is the specific criterion of scientific activity, I do *not* assert that being a scientist is more desirable than being, let us say, a poet, an idiographic historian, or some other disciple of the unique. Is it a question of either—or? Must we choose between Weber and Ranke? Between Adam Smith and Walter Scott? Between Darwin and Shakespeare?

IV. Experimentation and Recurrence

Armer empirischer Teufel! Du kennst nicht einmal das Dumme
In dir selber, es ist, ach! a priori *so dumm.*[8]

GOETHE.

So much for purpose. The next part of the definition of scientific activity to which attention should be directed is the item of recurrence. It will be recalled that "the prediction of the potential or actual recurrence of social phenomena" was the phrase used. Why is it necessary to speak of "potential

[8] Translation:

"Poor empirical devil!
You do not recognize the stupidity within yourself,
For it is, oh! so stupid *a priori.*"

or actual?" Because much of the recurrence with which the sociologist deals is potential only; certain types of social conduct recur *if and when* certain conditions are given, and those conditions may be impossible to reproduce at will. The potentialities of the conduct are there, as it were, but they may never become actual. Could we make them actual whenever we wished, we could carry on sociological experiments, and only then.

In spite of high-sounding phrases in graduate school bulletins about Harlem or rural Iowa or gangland Chicago as "a sociological laboratory," most sociologists know full well that they cannot experiment, that they are not laboratory scientists, and that in the opinion of many competent judges they never will be. There is no real freedom to experiment with human beings, even in the totalitarian states. When we turn to treatises such as Murphys' and Newcomb's *Experimental Social Psychology,* we meet patterns of analysis called "experimental" that lack anything remotely approaching experimental control. Power to manipulate persons and social situations entirely at will, for as long a time as may be necessary, is *perhaps* a desideratum, but it certainly is not in the possession of any sociologist. Almost any practitioner of a genuine experimental science would turn up his nose at the loose and haphazard way in which our psycho-sociological and sociological "experimenters" go about their work. They are not to blame for the conditions making actual control impossible; they are to blame for the direct invitation to criticism which they offer when they talk about "experiment."

If we must liken sociology to other sciences (and the "must" is doubtful), an analogy much to be preferred to that provided by any of the experimental sciences is afforded by geology. The geologist is indubitably a scientist. He attempts to predict where deposits of lead-bearing ore will be found, where oil supplies can be tapped, where earthquakes are likely to occur as results of subsidence or upheaval. The purpose is prediction, but there is no experiment in any real sense of the term. The geologist is confronted by a series of strata that were laid down, we may safely infer, with no thought that geologists would some day make use of them. Analogously, the sociologist may be faced by a socio-cultural structure in which Negroes, Poles, Mexicans, Italians, and a host of other peoples are piled together indiscriminately with no foreordained plan of interrelation. We are confronted with socio-cultural deposits, in other words, very much like the deposits with which the geologist has to deal.

An analogy that may be even more enlightening is presented by language —itself quite as much a socio-cultural as it is a physiological phenomenon. The comparative philologist cannot experiment with the grammatical structure of Greek; he simply knows, for example, that this language has a middle voice and a dual number and turns initial "s" into an aspirate. It represents one stratum, deposited long ago, in the thick crust of the Indo-

European languages. Again, there can be no question of "experiment" where Finno-Ugric is concerned. In Europe one finds it wedged into Hungary and into Finland, and to study it *as functioning, meaningful Finno-Ugric* one goes into the field or the library, not into the phonetics laboratory. The meaning of words as significant symbols cannot be determined adequately apart from their interrelations with numerous other words and with the conduct involved; indeed, sometimes the larger aspects of the structure of the entire language and of the society using it must be taken into account. Here again there is no experiment, but there can well be science. Grimm's "law" of consonantal change in Indo-European is cast in essentially predictive form, and predictions based upon it have been amply verified.

Much of the vogue of sociological "experiment" is explicable in terms of—vogue. The natural science most popular at the moment provides the model: in one generation it is sidereal mechanics; in another, biology; in another, relativity physics. The misguided sociologists who want to construct their science along lines presumably preordained by some other science are very much like the modern Thomists who assume that all phenomena are necessarily amenable to interpretation *à la* the dictates of "right reason." "Orthodoxy is my doxy, and heterodoxy is your doxy." Such essentially *a priori,* speculative methods of approaching the variegated, kaleidoscopic mosaic called the empirical world are barren. To state the issue in terms having contemporary relevance: There is no warrant for assuming in advance that all the data of even the natural sciences are going to be amenable, *without residue,* to "quantitative" formulation. Take the biological science of cytology, in which the growth of cells is described, analyzed, and predicted, but in which complete or even satisfactory quantitative statement has not yet been achieved. There are too many phenomena that don't fit the available formulas. Cytologic prediction *may* eventually be cast in quantitative terms, but to assume that it must *now* be prematurely placed in the quantitative straitjacket ready to hand, without regard to "the damned facts," is again the essentially *a priori,* speculative reasoning already criticized. Any science must develop from the interaction of the scientist's mental processes *and* the data involved.

The sociologist wishes to predict recurrence, potential or actual. The test of his work is its predictive power, not its conformity to an "orthodox" pattern. Judged in this light, a great deal of current sociological effort is wasted, for the purpose of prediction is not held steadfastly in view. For example: What genuinely scientific purpose is served by lifting a collection of definitions of concepts from a secondary writer, then restating them in algebraic terms? Confusion becomes worse confounded, and in addition, whatever predictive utility that may have existed is almost eliminated. Far better than faith in this transubstantiation ritual, because more open to ex-

amination as an act of faith, would be frank avowal of belief in the miracle of the mass. Again, it may be "a lot of fun" to make elaborate, pseudo-scientific diagrams and charts of the social structure of a small town, but if it takes three months to do the job, and three weeks to interpret the pretty pictures to anyone else, when in three hours the local editor and a few of his "sources" could give a verbal sketch better suited to predictive purposes, might it not have been just as enjoyable and more profitable to have spent the extra time in admittedly playing chess? To restate, in more elaborate ways, what informed observers already know, and on the basis of which they can successfully predict, is not necessarily scientific activity. Not only the form of research, but also its purpose, its focus on the prediction of potential or actual recurrence, and the *pragmatic* validation of that prediction, determine its scientific character.

V. Varieties of Constructed Types

Ist denn die Wahrheit ein Zwiebel, von dem man die Häute nur abschält? Was ihr hinein nicht gelegt, ziehet ihr nimmer heraus.[9]

GOETHE.

Faced as the sociologist is by data not susceptible of experimental manipulation, by time deposits analogous to those dealt with by the geologist or the comparative grammarian, his only recourse is to construct types of social conduct, of social organization, of personality—to *construct* them. This is a very far-reaching statement, involving an epistemological position into the analysis of which there is no present opportunity to go. The statement will simply have to stand as an essential part of the abbreviated record.

Even the idiographic historian, dealing as he does with the unique, and sometimes setting for himself the impossible goal of full description, is forced to make use of constructs. As already noted, he refers to the medieval Papacy, Calvinism, or the national state system. These are all constructed types; not one of them conforms exactly to any specific historical instance. Unfortunately, however, most of the historian's construction of types is unconscious. Scorning "schematism" and "rigid definition" as he does, he often takes over the general notions that happen to be present and, but one step removed from journalism, gathers "all the facts" within the fields thus bounded for him, and sorts them into the baskets already provided. In the process the terms of common parlance with which he started slowly acquire altered meanings; new types have been constructed . . . but not planfully, deliberately, with full awareness—there lies the rub.

[9] Translation:

"Is truth then like an onion from which one simply peels layers?
What you have not put in at the beginning you never extract at the end."

The historian's types should perhaps be called "dated and localized types" by way of contrast with those used by the sociologist, which are "undated and non-localized." No socio-cultural types are wholly "timeless" or "spaceless"; like those with which the geologist operates, some chronological and local determinations are always present. Nevertheless, it is possible to speak of *relatively* undated and non-localized types; here the elements of chronology and locality are not in the foreground, as in the case of dated and localized types.

Using his dated types, few of them explicitly formulated, the historian proceeds with his description of the unique. The absolutely unique is of course beyond his grasp, or at least beyond his power to communicate; and, as we have seen, complete description is an impossibility. It remains evident, however, that the historian's goal is the polar opposite of the sociologist's; here the particular, there the general, consequently here the dated and localized type, there the undated and non-localized.

Frequently I have stated that the sociologist's effort is directed toward prediction. To put it more exactly: The sociologist wishes to be able to say, "Given such and such circumstances, these consequences will follow." He may not be able to produce the circumstances—that is oftentimes a matter of accident. He nevertheless wants to have sufficient knowledge to assert that once given configurations of revolutionary phenomena, let us say, that closely approximate certain constructed types, certain consequences have a high probability of ensuing. Revolutions manifestly differ. The English revolution in which Charles I lost his head certainly was not the same as the French revolution in which Louis XVI lost his. This French revolution, in turn, was not closely similar to the American revolution which preceded it, although some revolutionary impetus was undoubtedly derived from the American example. Again, the German revolution of 1918 was in many respects different from the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Each of these represents a configuration of events never again to be exactly duplicated. All that the sociologist has to operate with in this case, to use our geological analogy again, are earthquakes or, at the very least, those slippings and slidings of strata that make earthquakes likely. And when he observes given types of fissure, or of fold, or of volcanic activity, he says, "Under such and such circumstances, these are likely to be the consequences."

After such a preliminary, highly provisional hypothesis has been formed, the sociologist then proceeds to examine as many revolutions as he conveniently can, in the effort to construct a typical set of typical revolutionary personalities, processes, and structures. These constructed types are his tools. No one of them will ever be found concretely exemplified. The reason such a type can't be found in external "nature" is because it has been made in the investigator's mind. It is a *construct,* and hence does not cor-

respond *exactly* to any unique aspect of the French revolution, for if it did, it would be of no comparative value when the English revolution was to be examined. It is built on lines sufficiently general so that it can be set down on this or that portion of the given terrain without tipping over, so to speak, and it then becomes possible to survey that territory. The constructed type is merely a tool. Hence, when the methodologically sophisticated sociologist talks about a type of revolution, his hearers can be very sure that it will never correspond exactly to any empirical instance, to any "real" revolution.[10]

It is perhaps permissible to liken this constructed type to the sort of image of the "pure type" Airedale or Percheron that a judge of dogs or of horses carries around in his head as the basis of his "objective" system of scoring for points. He has never seen a "pure type" Percheron or Airedale, but he has seen numerous close empirical approximations of his constructed types. In fact, he has built up these constructed types on the basis of numerous observations. He has observed Airedales with the desired type of rectangular head, with straight front legs, with diagonal stance of the hind legs, with the required angle and length of tail, with curly coat of suitable color, glossiness, and crispness, with the elusive something called "spirit" or "vitality"—and yet no single Airedale has all these traits in the degree "called for" by the type. The judge combines them and many more, lays the stress peculiar to himself on certain "key" traits, and then has a constructed type in the light of which he judges any empirical Airedale. Now the same would hold for a horse. Our Percheron would have literally dozens of desired traits gleaned from close observation, and refined up to the limits of the objectively possible, but the final configuration never corresponds to any real horse called Dobbin.[11]

[10] In so far as the antithesis "real—ideal" has any instrumental value, it may be said that the constructed type is an ideal type closely similar to, and perhaps identical with, the Max Weber model. I now prefer to avoid the use of "ideal" whenever possible, because in the minds of some sociologists it immediately evokes notions of Berkeleyan idealism, or of perfection in some final sense, or like irrelevancies that should be excluded from the discussion. But in the present context, it is possible to say that the constructed type is an "ideal" type in the sense that it does not fit any single empirical instance. "It is never found on land or sea." The "classical case" of the physician is "ideal" in this sense. The set of revolutionary processes and structures worked out by our hypothetical investigator is an ideal set. He constructed it on the basis of numerous observations of many empirical revolutions, but they never "exactly" fit the type. If they do seem to fit frequently, as a matter of fact, there may be something wrong with the type. It is probably too particular or, what amounts to the same thing, not sufficiently general. But this properly belongs in another context, too lengthy to present here, dealing with the problem of "objective possibility."

[11] Nordic, Mediterranean, Alpine, and like racial classifications are constructs. Ammon, for instance, examined thousands of Rhineland Germans, and never once saw "a real Alpine," although he found many close approximations of the construct.

Constructed types such as these are the tools with which we must work. Laboratory experimentation, as we have seen, is to say the least sharply limited in its possibilities. In most if not all instances the "experimentation" must be *mental*. The process begins with a vaguely defined problem, the framing of a hypothesis, selective observation (and *all* observation is selective in some sense) with reference to it, and eventual construction of a type, or a battery of them, that aids in further research. (Note the implicit distinction between "hypothesis" and "type"; they are all too frequently confused.) The construct may be a type of social organization, a type of personality, or the like. By implication, if not directly, this statement is made: "Under such and such circumstances, this type would probably behave thus and so." And then the researcher looks for cases that provide some kind of comparative checkup on his tentative generalization.

Instance: The existence of contemporary anti-Semitism may set a vaguely defined problem: "What is the source of these 'Jewish' traits to which objection is taken?" The preliminary hypothesis may then be that a number of traits ordinarily regarded as specifically Jewish in the "racial" sense are not the result of biological transmission, but of a peculiar socio-cultural heritage. If the researcher turns first to the past in the quest for data, he may focus on the early contacts with the Phoenicians and other traders, as well as on the "caravaneering" facilitated by the surviving nomadic pattern. Next, perhaps, he may concentrate on the "middleman" locations characteristic of the Jews before as well as after the Diaspora; the ghettoes were splendidly placed for the development of extensive trade with many lands. Once more, he may direct his lens toward the dual ethic separating the members of the in-group from those of the out-group—on the one hand, "the chosen people"; on the other, the unclean Gentile. (Many other traits might be listed, but enough has been said to indicate the procedure.) Looking for like phenomena in nearby areas, our investigator may then discover that the Armenians are strikingly similar to the Jews. They too are a trading people with a long history of widespread culture contacts with other traders. Further, they occupied "middleman" positions for a long period, dwelling the while in ghetto-like seclusion from Arab and Turk. Again, they drew the line between in-group and out-group—you treat the brother Armenian as you would be treated, and you skin the Turk alive, commercially speaking, and nail his hide on the family strongbox.

With two cases parallel, it then seems worth while to go about the construction of a type of "marginal trading people." Using the Jews as a focus-setting point, certain traits regarded as providing adequate causation [12] for the characteristic conduct have come into view. The selected traits seem to be at least partially relevant to Armenian conduct, and they are therefore

[12] The problem of "adequate causation" is of highest importance, but space limits forbid any attempt to grapple with it here.

worked into a guiding pattern that gives some promise of other empirical approximations. Equipped with this device, the researcher finds that the Parsees on the west coast of India draw into focus. They too are traders with a "middleman" position. Also present is the ideology that cleaves the social world in twain: within the fold is the fire-worshipper who gives the corpse of his beloved to the fowls of the air, who has an elaborate Magian ritual, and who is a follower of Zoroaster; in outer darkness is the unclean Hindu on whom the Parsee looks down with great contempt, and whom he remorselessly exploits whenever possible. Rambling into the interior of Egypt, always on the *qui vive,* our researcher there discovers another trading people with many of the traits usually held to be peculiarly Jewish. These turn out to be Greeks who migrated into Egypt, beginning in force with the establishment of the trading center of Naucratis about the seventh century B. C., filtering slowly southward, ceaselessly trading, maintaining the exclusiveness of the Greek culture in spite of surface assimilation, and feeling themselves infinitely superior to the natives. These Greek traders frequently "played both ends against the middle," and in general approximated the characteristics of a marginal trading people. In earlier times they scorned the zoölatry of the Egyptians and held to the Greek pantheon; in later times their faith was Greek Orthodox. At both periods religious exclusiveness was maintained, for even when the wily Greek operated among Christian Egyptians, they belonged to the Coptic sect defining the relation of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in a way quite different from his own.

These approximations are interesting, but an even more arresting result of the survey made possible by the construct is the light thrown on certain Scottish traits. Many Lowland and Border Scots were active in trade from an early period. They even traded sporadically with the Romans along the line of Hadrian's Wall where Pictish "spearmen and charioteers and bowmen charged, and were scattered into spray." And the Wall, it will be remembered, was "one roaring, rioting, cock-fighting, wolf-baiting, horse-taming town, from Ituna in the west to Segedunum on the cold eastern beach." Later the favorably situated Lowlanders dealt with the Lords of the Isles, with Red Hugh of Ulster, with "the King of Norroway," with the hated Southron on his fat acres, with the "uncanny" Hielandman, that "daft body o' the North," with the Dutch, the French, and other queer folk. Comes the Reformation, and Jock Elliot listens to Calvinist Knox, "dingin' the pulpit to blads." Elect, by God's irresistible grace, the Covenanters undergo persecutions that seal their conviction of being dear to Him "who scourgeth every son whom he receiveth." Set apart from the Catholics to the north and the "King-Papist" Anglicans to the south, the Scottish Presbyterians recognize themselves as a chosen people even while droning, with Holy Willie, "O what were we, and what our station, that

we should get sic' exaltation . . . ?" Trade with the worldly reprobate? Of course. Treat him as you would treat one of the elect, a fellow-Calvinist with the outward signs of inward grace? Doctrinally, "Aye"; in terms of rank-and-file mentality, "Pairhops." [13] Shrewd, competitive, rationalistic, an ascetic *within* the world, "principled," industrious, acquisitive, calling many lands his habitation but only Scotland home, the man from "south of Tay and north of Tweed" still retains, in the midst of the Empire, what Stevenson called "a strong Scots accent of the mind."

The "marginal trading people" type has enabled us to range over a considerable body of data looking for certain specific things. The traits with which we started seemed to be linked with others: high degree of rationality, objectivity-fostering detachment where the out-group is concerned, and considerable measure of economic internationalism—not *ubi bene, ibi patria,* but "Wherever my *economic* good is found, there is my country." All these traits are in some degree, *within the limits of the construct,* Jewish, Armenian, Parsee, Greek, Scottish. The complex configurations from which they are extracted cannot be produced in the laboratory. They are geological deposits, the outcomes of the sedimentations, slippings, and slidings of the earth's strata, as it were. To drop the figure: They are sociocultural structures built up by the slow accumulation of folkways and mores, by rapid, catastrophic changes in the form of wars, migrations, and rise of charismatic leadership, by rational systematization of essentially irrational values, and so on. Willy-nilly, the social scientist must work with what he can get. Instead of guiding research in terms of a virtually unattainable ideal, the laboratory experiment, he must accept the data as they are and adapt his method to the chasms and outcroppings they present. In many instances he will eventually find that he can declare what is likely to happen when certain typical traits turn up in typical relation with each other. He has made one indispensable stride toward realizing his purpose, which is the prediction of the potential or actual recurrence of phenomena which for the purposes in hand are regarded as identical. He does not say that a Scotsman is a Jew; he does say that the existence of certain Scottish characteristics can be predicted ("retrospectively," at least) [14] by means of

[13] No Calvinist "sure" of election would *consciously* hold a dual ethic.

[14] Prediction in our sense may be "retrospective" rather than "prospective." In other words, we may verify or refute our hypotheses and constructs by searching the record of the *past* for setups in which the "if and when" proviso is fulfilled. Suppose we have framed a hypothesis and built a set of revolutionary types on the basis provided by the study of ten revolutions. Ten other revolutions meeting the "if and when" requirements are found—all the way from 800 B. C. to 1940 A. D. Checkup shows that the initial hypothesis is valid. The important point is this: Verification or refutation of predictions may come from events that have *already* occurred. We are not *prophesying* the future; we are *predicting* "if and when" recurrence. Hence the term "retrospective prediction." And also, hence the importance of historical data for the sociologist. The "geological strata" of history take the place of the laboratory.

a construct that takes the Jew as one of its points of departure, and that for the purposes in hand those Scottish traits can be regarded as identical with these Jewish traits. Jock Elliot and Abie Rosenblum, with "a great gulf between them fixed" in many, many respects, nevertheless draw close together in certain phases of their conduct when these are framed within the outlines of a constructed type, the "marginal trading people." [15]

The initial hypothesis that certain characteristics often regarded as "biologically Jewish" are in reality of socio-cultural derivation has in some measure been substantiated, and in addition the constructed type has revealed the possible relevance of traits other than those originally listed. As a means of more definitive checkup, it may next prove desirable to refine the hypothesis by constructing subtypes discriminating more sharply between various kinds of marginal trading and related conduct, and then to seek statistical demonstration of the high empirical frequency of the conduct isolated as significant. Whatever method of testing the hypothesis is chosen, it should be clear that the constructed type is not itself a hypothesis, and that it is not self-validating. Facts are stubborn things, and constructed types must be drawn from them and continually thrown back upon them if empty speculation is not to replace sound generalization. Constructive typology offers neither aid nor comfort to wishful thinking.

This "marginal trading people" type is well over toward the undated and non-localized pole; it is therefore of markedly sociological rather than historical character. It now seems well to consider certain other types which, although primarily sociological in nature, are somewhat closer to the dated and localized variety with which the historian often operates; their greatest applicability lies within the Christian era. In addition to this element of chronological determination, these types are "spatially" limited; they are designed to aid in the analysis of religious conduct in the Western world. (Some such quasi-spatial limitation must be imposed because of the sharply differing culture base of many Eastern faiths; see the discussion in the chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 527–9.) In spite of restrictions in scope, however, it must be emphasized that the types to be presented are still sufficiently general to be called sociological; they are

[15] It should go without saying that this brief illustrative sketch of the "marginal trading people" is not intended to stand the fire of criticism. A first-rate monograph along the lines of Sombart's second-rate *The Quintessence of Capitalism* would be needed to meet the protests of Elliots who don't like to be called Rosenblums, or of Rosenblums who don't like to be called Sergenians. (May I note that my maternal ancestry is Lowland Scottish?) To forestall some of the clamor, let me say that any adequate typology of a "marginal trading people" would necessarily include subtypes manifesting traits not characteristic of the type most relevant for the purposes in hand. Further, nothing has been said about the numerical frequency of the type discussed.

introduced here in order to show that particularity and generality are matters of *degree*. If everything is *absolutely* different, there can be no analysis; if everything is *absolutely* identical, there can be no analysis. Sociological types are *relatively* general, but the exact point at which the *relatively* general becomes the *relatively* particular can be determined only in the light of the purposes in hand. Since the purpose in formulating the types to be presented was prediction, they should be regarded as relatively general, and hence as sociological. Quoting from one of the writer's earlier efforts at type construction:

> In order properly to deal with this vast maze of [Western religious] phenomena, it will be necessary to distinguish several sub-varieties of the [construct] . . . of the church (in the narrower sense); these sub-varieties are: (1) the ecclesia, (2) the sect, (3) the denomination, and (4) the cult.
>
> (1) The social structure known as the ecclesia is a predominantly conservative body, not in open conflict with the secular aspects of social life, and professedly universal in its aims. The phrase "Come out from among them and be ye separate" has no place in the ideology of the genuine ecclesiastic; "Force them to come in" is likely to characterize his thinking. The fully developed ecclesia attempts to amalgamate itself with the state and the dominant classes, and strives to exercise control over every person in the population. Members are *born into* the ecclesia; they do not have to *join* it. It is therefore a social structure somewhat, although remotely, akin to the nation or the state, and is in no sense elective. Membership in an ecclesia is a necessary consequence of birth into a family, folk, or similar structure, and no special requirements condition its privileges.
>
> The ecclesia naturally attaches a high importance to the means of grace which it administers, to the system of doctrine which it has formulated, and to the official administration of sacraments and teaching by its official clergy. It is in a . . . sense an educational institution which, when functioning properly, trains its youthful members to conformity in thought and practice, and thus fits them for the exercise of the religious "rights" they have automatically inherited.
>
> The ecclesia as an inclusive social structure is closely allied with national and economic interests; as a plurality pattern its very nature commits it to adjustment of its ethics to the ethics of the secular world; it must represent the morality of the respectable majority.
>
> Two main varieties of the ecclesia may be distinguished: international and national. The Catholic Church is the most outstanding example of the first, whereas the Lutheran and Anglican varieties illustrate the second.
>
> It should not be supposed, however, that a sharp line can [empirically] be drawn between the two. Catholicism, nominally international, as a matter of fact is pervaded by a great many minor nationalistic rivalries that sometimes flare out in controversy. French Catholicism, for example, sometimes maintains an attitude of marked aloofness toward the Vatican; just before the Reformation it was so thoroughly detached from the papacy that one could justifiably speak of two Catholicisms: French and "other." When all the necessary qualifications are

made, however, there is no doubt that the Catholic ecclesia is much more international in character than is any other.

Lutheranism and Anglicanism, to mention . . . two varieties of the national ecclesia, are and have been extremely nationalistic; they are types which began to flourish when the isolated sacred structures of the Middle Ages began to give way to the new ethnic cultures born . . . soon after the Commercial Revolution had shattered the agrarian basis of medieval life.

(2) The sect is in marked contrast to the ecclesia. In the first place, it is a relatively small plurality pattern that has abandoned the attempt to win the whole world over to its doctrines; the phrase "Come ye out from among them and be ye separate" is followed literally. It is readily seen that the sect is a . . . body which one must *join* in order to become a member; [it is elective]. At bottom, the sect is exclusive in character, appeals to strictly personal trends, and emphasizes ethical demands; it frequently requires some definite type of religious experience as a prerequisite of acceptance. It therefore attaches primary importance to the religious experience of its members prior to their fellowship with the plurality pattern, to the so-called "priesthood of all believers." It frequently rejects an official clergy, preferring to trust for guidance to lay inspiration rather than to theological or liturgical expertness.

In many instances sects are persecuted, but this persecution only reinforces the separatist and semi-ascetic attitude toward the world inherent in the sect as a social structure. At times it refuses participation in the government, . . . rejects war and other resort to force, and . . . seeks to sever as much as possible the bonds which tie it to the common life of the larger . . . [society] within which it develops. In general, the sect prefers isolation to compromise.

Sects exist in great variety at the present time, but they were to be found even before the period of the Reformation, as evidenced by the Cathari, the Waldensians, the Wyckliffites, and others. Since the Reformation, of course, many such bodies have come into being: Anabaptists, Mennonites, Huguenots, Presbyterians, Baptists, and scores of others dot the pages of history.

(3) Denominations are simply sects in an advanced stage of development and adjustment to each other and the secular world. The early fervor of the self-conscious sect has disappeared, as a general thing, by the second or third generation, and the problem of training the children of the believers almost inevitably causes some compromise to be made in the rigid requirements for membership characteristic of the early phases of sectarian development. Thus, for example, the Presbyterians inaugurated the Half-Way Covenant in order that children whose "calling and election" was not yet sure could be held within the fold, with the consequence that in time the greater proportion of professing Presbyterians were those who had gone no further than the Half-Way Covenant. Similarly, the Baptists have gradually lowered the age of "adult baptism" so that at the present time, in some branches of the denomination, it is possible for children only twelve years old to be baptized. Similar instances can be gleaned from the history of almost any sect one cares to name; time inevitably brings compromise.

A further factor in mitigating the mutually exclusive tendency of sects in Western Christendom is the common opposition of all genuinely Protestant

bodies to Roman Catholicism. In the early phases of the Reformation members of rival Protestant sects detested each other just as thoroughly as they detested adherents of "Babylon the Mighty"; the burning of Servetus by Calvin is a case in point. With the passage of time, however, opposition to the common foe has gradually drawn the Protestant sects, especially of the evangelical variety, into a vague sort of mutual adjustment; it is tacitly agreed that Protestants should engage in polemics with Rome rather than with each other . . .

(4) Tendencies toward religion of a strictly private, personal character—tendencies fairly well marked in the sect—come to full fruition in the cult as here defined. The goal of the adherent of this very amorphous, loose-textured, uncondensed type of social structure is not the maintenance of the structure itself, as in the case of the church and sect, but is that of purely personal ecstatic experience, salvation, comfort, and mental or physical healing. Instead of *joining* a cult, an act which implies the consent of others, one simply chooses to believe particular theories or follow certain practices, and the consent of other members of the cult is not necessary. . . . The religious mystic of the Catholic or Protestant varieties has marked leanings toward the cult, although his mystical practices may be later incorporated in the general body of sanctioned behavior.

The sources of emotional satisfaction for the cult believer lie wholly within himself; the injustices or good fortune which others may suffer affect him, to be sure, but the center of his cosmos is his "I."

Only a highly atomized and essentially secular social order gives rise to extensive cult belief. The frontier cities of Ionia, Athens in the famous fifth century . . . , the cities of the Italian Renaissance, and the urban centers of the modern world have been and are the fertile soil from which new cults arise in rank profusion. The cult is the most ephemeral of all types of religious structure—indeed, it is usually so loosely integrated and so transitory that the term "structure" is almost a misnomer.

Cults frequently are much like sects, and it is extremely difficult to draw a line between the two—just as it is difficult [empirically speaking] to draw a line between the sect and the denomination. At the same time, the following . . . [empirical approximations] of the cult are quite close: Spiritualism, Theosophy, New Thought, Christian Science, Unity, Buchmanism, and the various pseudo-Hinduisms associated with Swamis and Yogis who consent, for a consideration, to carry their messages to the materialistic Western world.[16]

Each one of the empirical groups mentioned above manifestly differs from the constructed type, even though I had not yet reached the stage of conscious, explicit construction at the time (1929) when the above passage was written. A good deal can be said, from the standpoint of prediction, when we have a suitable hypothesis and a set of constructs such as the ecclesia, the sect, the denomination, and the cult. It becomes

[16] Howard Becker, "Protestantism and Religious Differentiation," mimeographed "assignment" written for Soc. 4, *Social Institutions,* University of Pennsylvania, 1929. This was published in Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (1932), pp. 619–44.

possible, for example, to construct a hypothetical cycle, and to say that, beginning as a cult, the sect eventually changes into a denomination, and finally becomes an ecclesia. This essentially predictive statement can then be verified, either through a search of the past for religious structures not taken into account when the type was formulated ("retrospective prediction"—footnote 14) or through examination of contemporary religious conduct. In the latter instance, we can say just about when Christian Science, for example, shifts from cult to sect, and that now it begins to show signs of becoming a denomination.

The constructed type, in conjunction with an appropriate hypothesis, therefore may have predictive power, but certainly not in the sense of enabling us to say positively that on June 28, 1940, this or that will occur. Being neither market forecasters nor prophets, we can never cast predictions in such unconditional terms. We can say, however, that "*If and when* these typical factors are given in this typical relation, these will probably be the typical consequences." That is oftentimes as far as we can or should go. The geologist, to analogize once more, will seldom if ever hazard an assertion such as this: "If you bore here, at exactly 3182 feet below the surface you will find a deposit of oil totalling 4,182,692 barrels in amount, flowing at the rate of 76 cubic feet per second." After much investigation, he may say, "The indications are pretty good, considering what is happening in comparable fields, that by boring somewhere within a half-mile radius of this point you may strike oil in paying quantities at about a three-quarter mile depth." And then the man who has been paying for the geologist's advice goes ahead, and verifies or refutes the generalization.

The verification or refutation is always pragmatic; so too is the verification or refutation of a sociological generalization—when it is verified or refuted at all. Often preoccupation with orthodoxy of method leads to the neglect of the search for crucial checks. Many of us, for example, continue to follow the alliterative lilt of "cultural lag" as an all-sufficient explanation of changes in American divorce rates, blithely ignoring the fact that such changes have been proceeding in *reverse* direction in Japan under conditions of even greater "discrepancy" between non-material and material culture. But when we are careful constructive typologists, we say, "Given such and such circumstances, these consequences are likely to ensue," *and* we then inspect the "historical" record and/or the record of "contemporary" events to find out whether our generalizations, necessarily cast in terms about as vague as those of the geologist, are pragmatically verified or refuted.

The constructed type is an indispensable tool for analysis in the social sciences generally, and in no science is it more useful than in sociology. It is indispensable when one deals with longitudinal sections or time-

series—that is, with the "same" set of processes and structures followed over a dated period of years. It is also indispensable from the cross-sectional standpoint, i. e., the study of the interrelations of a number of processes and structures in a given cross-section of the "existing" and/or "realizable" record. Finally, it is indispensable when the phenomena concerned are relatively undated.

VI. Dangers Faced by Constructive Typology

Das ist doch nur der alte Dreck,
Werdet doch gescheiter!
Tretet nicht immer denselben Fleck,
So geht doch weiter! [17]

GOETHE.

But if the high promise of the future is to be reaped by constructive typology, potential "despoilers of the harvest" must be closely watched. Not only must we be on guard against misuse of the method by the well-intentioned but ill-informed, but also against the vulgar misunderstanding that sometimes arises from passive indifference or active hostility.

Case in point: Someone is always saying, "Your constructed type is no good because several exceptions to it can be found." The obvious reply is, "You can never expect anything other than exceptions. If construct and 'reality' exactly correspond, you are in the morass of the particular. You are talking about *this* thing at *this* time in such a way that explicit comparison with anything else becomes virtually impossible." The belief that the constructed type is rendered useless because exceptions to it can be found is childishly naïve. Exceptions *must* be found; in the realm of the particular, as our discussion of the Grand Rapids chairs may have done something to show, only "exceptions" can be expected.

Present-day cultural anthropologists of Lowie's type, now fortunately waning in prestige, are the most frequent perpetrators of the methodological *naïveté* just mentioned, in part because some of them, deceived by the limited spatial extent and numerical scope of the societies they investigate, attempt "full description" of the unique. This tendency is

[17] Translation:

"That is only the old mess,
Try to become more clever!
Don't tread perpetually on the same spot,
Travel a little farther!"

also furthered by the fact that preliterates have no written records that enable adequate investigation of long-term changes, and hence it seems possible to "gather *all* the facts." The resulting failure to focus on definite problems that conform to the criterion of attempted scientific prediction causes these anthropologists to bog down in the particularistic swamp and, unaware of their own sad plight, to deride all efforts at generalization by croaking "Exception." But let *us* try to avoid limiting ourselves to the frog's-eye view of things.

Another vulgar misunderstanding which predictions based on constructed types frequently encounter is that the conditional character of the generalizations is disregarded. All that the constructive typologist ever says is that "if and when" certain factors, which have been isolated as significant, recur in configurations which can be regarded as identical for the purposes in hand, then this in turn probably will ensue. He does not say in advance, nor can he *ever* say in advance, whether the factors which are essential for the results *actually* will recur in the required configuration. Socio-cultural structures cannot be concocted in the laboratory; Calvinistic Scottish society or Frankfort Jewry cannot be made to order. The constructive typologist, like the geologist, must depend on the accidents of past "deposit" or of future "stratification." If it is only clearly held in mind that these generalizations are cast in "if and when" terms, a considerable amount of misunderstanding can be avoided.

Still another kind of misunderstanding arises from the belief that constructed types are all of equal generality. Nothing could be further from the truth, as we tried to show in the discussion of dated and localized as over against undated and non-localized types, as well as in the presentation of ecclesia, sect, denomination, and cult. It is worth stressing again, however, that constructed types in the social sciences are of many forms. The purposes in hand determine what they are going to be like.

It may be necessary, for example, to construct a type that is highly relative, quasi-"historical," for the purposes of short-term prediction. To wit: The American Middlewestern State university is a possible construct. Reference will not be to the University of Minnesota, nor to the University of Illinois, but it will nonetheless be a highly relative and regional type. The more limited the type, the greater the degree of short-term predictive power—*and* the greater the degree of error to be expected in prediction even with the "if and when" proviso, for the problems posed oftentimes require unduly prophetic answers. Nevertheless, it is possible to say a great deal about the immediate future of the Middlewestern State university if your type is constructed on the basis of relatively specific factors, and not with prime regard to "the university in general." In the latter case, you would be forced to include private institutions all over the United

States and the rest of the world, and the national universities in addition.

For some purposes, of course, the construction of a type that is not so relative would be in order; to be tied down to a construct based only on the Middlewestern State university would stultify the projected research. The goal in view is more general, hence the Euro-American university is constructed. On the basis of such a type, a number of far-reaching "if and when" generalizations can be made. This construct, however, is less relative, and the more general it becomes, the less detailed can be the predictions based upon it. Illegitimate and foolhardy, to speak mildly, would be a prophecy to the effect that the near future of the University of Wisconsin points in the direction of a larger crop of Ph.D's, for the constructed type with which operations are being carried on includes factors gleaned from German, French, and British as well as American universities, and moreover, specific prophecy is not our business. The generalizations made with the aid of the more general constructed type are necessarily of relatively indefinite character. In a certain sense, generalization is omission. The more ground a type covers, the less adequately it covers it so far as minor humps and hollows are concerned. Yet for some purposes the construct should cover a great deal of ground.

Analogy: Suppose that the face of some hero is being carved on the side of a mountain. The engineer-sculptor did not determine the form and composition of that mountain, but he must nevertheless go to work. He begins by building a scaffold in order to reach the surface of the mountain with hammer, drill, and dynamite. For preliminary purposes the scaffold can be of very open construction, without a great many stages, because the first step is to remove irregularities and prepare suitable working areas; such a purpose is entire justification for a scaffold of highly general character. Later on it will be necessary to rough out the features, and later still, to chisel the delicate folds and lines surrounding the eye. When these phases of the work are reached, the scaffold must be built in such a way that it gives access to the precise points of importance. Eventually every facility of position must be provided for the workman who puts on the finishing touches. The scaffold, manifestly, becomes more intricate and detailed as the purpose it serves changes.

Although "no analogy will go on all fours," it may be said that our constructed types are often altered or revised to bring them into line with changed purposes. In terms of our earlier illustration: For some purposes it is enough to use a construct of the ecclesia predicated on the hypothesis that it tends to be identified with the *status quo,* with the ruling political and economic organizations, with the powers that be. For other purposes, however, it will seem desirable to know whether

Calvinism in Scotland tended toward the ecclesia or toward the sect, and whether constructed types usable in the ecclesia ⇆ *status quo?* problem are also usable in the ecclesia? ← Scottish Calvinism → sect? problem. The precise way in which the constructs are delineated will make a tremendous difference. In one case the side of the mountain is being hewn off, as it were; in the other, the expressive folds about the eye are receiving their last strokes.

The purpose in hand determines how the type is to be constructed. That is the all-important criterion. There is no way of saying in advance of the setting of the problem and the framing of the hypothesis exactly what a constructed type should be like. You must know the purposes of the study, the empirical data, and what kind of pragmatic verification or refutation is to be sought. Statistics may be called upon for this checkup function, or data drawn from history may be used to shape crucial culture case studies of societies and cultural blocs *à la* Toynbee, or psycho-sociology, with its resources of personality study, may carry out the tester's task. In short, the data from which the type is distilled and on which it and its initiating hypothesis depend for validation may be drawn from many different sources. Only when the researcher knows clearly what his purpose is, and only when he has tested the possible utility of his constructs in the light of that purpose, does he know whether his generalizations are likely to be worth the effort of pragmatic validation. If he decides "to put them to the touch," the final question is, "Does the construct work, within the limits set by the purpose, on the whole and in the long run?"

William James is not yet buried; for his ghost still hovers close at hand.

VII. Truth and Fiction

"Du kommst nicht ins Ideen-Land!"
So bin ich doch am Ufer bekannt.
Wer die Inseln nicht zu erobern glaubt,
Dem ist Ankerwerfen doch wohl erlaubt.[18]

GOETHE.

And under ghostly influence, I am led to further utterances: Generalizations in constructive typology are not True, if by this is meant the controlling, ultimate, ineffable capital T. All that the social scientist can mean by truth is some amount, however slight, of predictive power.

[18] Translation:

"'You must not enter the land of ideas'!"
Well, I am known on the shore.
If one does not intend to conquer the island,
Casting anchor is certainly permitted."

Truth as insight into the essence of things, as apprehension of first causes or final reasons, cannot be delivered by the scientist.

After all, the scientist does not seek for Truth. His task is not to inquire into the "Why?" of things, but into the "How?" *"Why* should there be a cosmos?" is not a scientifically answerable question. *"How* has the cosmos changed throughout determinable time?" is certainly a large order, but the attempt to answer it does not carry us beyond the confines of science. These considerations, however, range too far afield; let us return to the nearby task.

"Common sense" to the contrary, it seems to me that the scientist in a very real sense operates with fictions—or, if that term is unpalatable, with planned modifications or simplifications of the "empirically given," i. e., of the configurations he first perceives.[19] The working fiction of the scientist—any scientist—is a construct of the type I have already characterized.

Evidence: When the physicist works out a formula for the bending strength of beams, he posits a homogeneous beam of determinate cross-section, supported on fulcrums at certain definite points. On the basis of a constructed type of this sort, grounded on empirical observation, but to which no single two-by-four or channel iron exactly corresponds, he develops a formula that may be of the highest utility, but which, again, no "real" beam ever fits. The physicist also makes use of working fictions in theories of atomic process and structure. As someone has put it: "On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday we use a wave theory of light, and on Tuesday and Thursday we use a particle theory." Both of these theories work for the specific purposes for which they were intended; they procure prediction. What light *is,* in any final sense, is never revealed by a scientific theory; it merely tells how something called "light" acts under given conditions. Most of us tend to think in spatial terms, and the result is the construction of models envisaging either wave motion or the bombardment of minute particles, depending on which model works out best under the terms of the problem and the data confronted.

Now it is entirely possible that in the future someone will construct a theory of light that will reconcile the wave and the particle assump-

[19] Manifestly, the "empirically given" is not "raw fact"; indeed, we cook and season all our facts to taste. Strictly speaking, there are no facts as such; the very act of perceiving, if our perceptions are to be communicable, depends on articulate or inarticulate constructs. Here, however, we draw a line between (1) facts "known as such" to all normal human beings who have undergone like general socio-cultural training, and (2) constructs planfully developed by specialists for their particular purposes. This distinction is merely a substitute for an involved epistemological analysis into which there seems no present desirability of going. Further, I am all too keenly aware of my technical incompetence; the task is one for a first-rate epistemologist, not a sociologist.

tions.[20] This reconciliation of present contradictions would be no warrant, however, for believing that the reconciling theory is finally and absolutely True. Attainment of such Truth would not be the purpose of the reconciliatory achievement; instead, the general principle of economy of effort would probably enter into consideration. It is much easier to use one theory in which apparent contradictions are reconciled than it is to keep one's mind in separate compartments, as it were, using one theory in one situation and the other in another. The scientist *qua* scientist has no yearning for Truth in this or any similar case; he is simply trying to get a tool that works better, more economically, with less effort and more precision, than the two somewhat awkward implements that he is now forced to manipulate. The reconciling theory is just as much a working fiction as were the two he was struggling with before—unless we wish to assume that at the day and hour when the discrepant theories are reconciled the scientist knows all that he ever can know, in the predictive sense, about the phenomena in question.

In the late nineteenth century, of course, some physicists did think that they had "the feel of the fur on the tail of the world"; one of them even said, "From this time on, all that will ever be done will be to introduce refinements into the already existing body of physical theory." And yet within twenty-five years that whole body of theory was revolutionized through the new "extra-dimensional" geometries and the work of mathematical astronomers. It is unlikely that the physicists will again think that they have a tailhold on the cosmos; it remains to be seen how the "common sensers" in the social sciences will conduct themselves.

In the search for Truth as the Last Word, the working scientist is merely a blood brother of Pilate.

Let it be shouted from the housetops, however, that the working fictions of which we make use are not "just any" fictions. They should not involve the social scientist in conflict with established principles in other sciences. Exhibit: No sociologist in his senses would follow Freud[21] and Jung in postulating a phylogenetic memory, a "racial unconscious," based on the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The long battle of the biologists has apparently entered a quiescent stage, with victory at least provisionally resting on the banners of the anti-Lamarckians. True, the palaeontologists, among others, raise timid pro-Lamarckian objections now and then, only to see them crushed under the weight of countervailing evidence. Unless the biologists eventually make discoveries that over-

[20] I am informed by my physicist friends that a fairly satisfactory reconciliation has already been effected.

[21] I say Freud advisedly; see *Totem and Tabu* and its 1939 revival in *Moses and Monotheism*.

turn what they hold to be one of their most firmly established generalizations, no construct that assumes the inheritance of acquired characteristics can be regarded as a usable tool. Certainly the foolhardy alone would attempt to build their scientific houses on rejected theories, more especially when they derive from fields where the word of the qualified specialist is the only trustworthy guide. Most of us will feel that the conclusions of these specialists stake off the plots within which our constructs must be built. Even when these limits seem relatively narrow, there is usually space enough to tax the constructive endurance of the most assiduous typologist.

Finally, note that the constructed type *as such* is not necessarily a statistical mean or mode, nor even a homogeneous universe as ordinarily understood.[22] True, it can be developed in such a way that it corresponds to any of these, but as a result its utility will be sharply limited. The instrumentally valuable construct is like a Frans Hals portrait rather than like a composite photograph printed from a large number of superimposed negatives. We might even say that a construct may be as selective as a sketch. The ordinary stereotype affords an instructive contrast: it is an unconscious, unplanned exaggeration of the "empirically given," mixed with much that has not been observed at all, and includes a large emotional freight of praise or blame; the constructed type is a conscious, planned selection, combination, and accentuation of the "empirically given," relatively free from value-judgment. Difference most important of all: the stereotype ministers to non-scientific ideologies; whereas the constructed type serves scientific activity, which is nothing more *and nothing less* than "the systematic statement of the probability of the potential or actual recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical."

"In my end is my beginning."

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[3]

THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO SOCIOLOGY

Earle Edward Eubank

I. The Meaning of the Conceptual Approach to Science [1]

The underlying thesis of this chapter is that the development of any science coincides with the development of its distinctive concepts. This should be stated strongly: until a given field of inquiry shall have developed characteristic concepts of its own we must deny its right to the status of a real science, whatever may be its claims to the contrary.

The reason for this is not far to seek. Scientific procedure calls for (1) an adequate body of verified data, and (2) dependable generalizations upon the basis of those data. Underlying the attainment of both of these is the necessity for a special equipment and method derived from logic whereby to recognize, correlate, and explain the phenomena with which it is dealing. By the *conceptual approach* is meant this unique and indispensable procedure of logic whereby concepts are developed, and being developed, are utilized as aids to further knowledge. "Science" without concepts would be mere data without interpretation, hence not science at all, but at best mere description.

To make more clear its meaning and basic importance for science, we may review briefly certain fundamental steps in the development of human understanding in general.

The first requisite of human understanding is that the mind shall be capable of receiving impressions from the external world. The brain is the recording station, the afferent neural system is the mechanism for transforming objective fact to subjective awareness. The recorded impressions we call perceptions, or more briefly, *percepts*. They are, in the language of William James, "the consciousness of particular material things present to sense." Without the ability to form percepts the mind would be blank and lifeless.

But percepts alone are not enough. Each item perceived by itself and unrelated to any other thing, would be without significance. A particular

[1] For a fuller development of this topic see Eubank, "Concepts in General," *The Concepts of Sociology* (1931), chap. iii. See also Herbert Blumer, "Science without Concepts," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, XXXVI, No. 4 (Jan., 1931), 515–33.

stone, or shrub, or dog, or man, observed through the senses is merely an object, as meaningless as it is nameless, until it is discovered to belong to a set or class of objects having similar characteristics. The second stage of understanding, therefore, is the establishment in the mind of the kinship between the particular thing perceived and a general category of percepts which are like it. By this means we proceed from particularization to generalization or conception. Generalizations abstracted from their particular percepts we call *concepts*. All cognition is in reality *re*-cognition, or the discovery of the resemblance of the immediate object of experience to other objects previously known. Kant pointed out long ago that no true understanding is possible without both of these: there can be no thought, but merely sensory awareness, until conceptual abstractions appear; and there can be no such abstractions without a previously established body of perceptions upon which to generalize. Knowledge is a combination of both: of percepts organized under concepts. Not until sensory experience has been translated into meaning can the mind be said to "understand."

Because language is indispensable to ideation it is at once apparent that an essential connection exists between language and concepts. A concept is in effect the connecting link, or better, the meeting ground, of thought and speech, a "crystallization" of thought into a form which makes it transferable from one mind to another.

Durkheim, noting this dual characteristic, describes concepts as "collective representations," each of which stands for a class or category rather than for a particular object. In this capacity, then, concepts become devices whereby one's thinking, and the expression of that thinking, may proceed by logical inference from the particular to the general, and from the less general to the more general. "Knowing is classifying"; and classifying means the distribution of items in such a way that those which are alike shall be thought of together. Logic is its essential foundation. But without concepts we could not classify; therefore we should have no logic, nor logical thought, for we should have no way to generalize, nor any means of establishing a relationship between the new and the already known. For these reasons concepts are of fundamental significance for all forms of scientific thought.

The procedure for the attainment of scientific understanding is identical in principle with that of understanding in general which we have just outlined, though more complicated in technique. Every field into which man is driven by the spirit of inquiry repays his intrusion by presenting to his senses an array of new phenomena, or new aspects of the old. Moreover, within each field certain factual data appear which are special to it and which have no exact counterpart elsewhere. *Fossil* and *glaciation*

in geology, *proton* and *electron* in chemistry, *germination* and *metabolism* in biology, *consciousness* and *sensitivity* in psychology, *capital* and *distribution* in economics; these are examples. The first step in the conscious groping toward new knowledge in any science is to receive and record the new impressions—*percepts*—that arise as investigation proceeds; the second is to organize and correlate these in such a way that new generalizations—*concepts*—may be derived from them. The emergence of new and distinctive conceptions, unique to that particular field, is what makes possible a new division of science; they are also the elements that differentiate one division from another.

As scientific knowledge progresses, therefore, it is marked by a continuous modification and expansion of its conceptology, whereby to express more accurately its findings. Science would not be possible without the instrumentality of an adequate body of somewhat stable and standardized concepts in which its knowledge could be embodied. Note, however, that such linguistic expression involves vastly more than the name of a thing. Implicit within each concept is the whole set of implied characteristics, traits, qualities, and special relationships, which comprise and are associated with the thing it names. By connotation it implies the presence of characteristic and distinctive features, features which were not previously appreciated.

Furthermore, each new concept, as it becomes verified and sharpened by repeated testing, does much more than to place a new item of knowledge on the shelves; it also gives keener and deeper insight into the body of already familiar reality which it touches. For example, Weismann in developing the concept of the continuity of the germ plasm not only made that particular contribution to knowledge, but in so doing he opened up a new point of view which led to an understanding of a number of other facts about heredity that were previously obscure. Because of this function, each concept, when it has been authenticated, becomes the starting point of new perceptions—which in course of time give rise to new conceptions—which in their turn make possible still other perceptions—and so on indefinitely.

The procedure of geometry gives one of our clearest illustrations of this. Each proposition that it advances requires for its proof the aid of certain other propositions which have been previously established. The new proposition, when it has been demonstrated in its turn, then becomes an instrumentality which is used in the establishment of still further propositions. Thus, step by step, additional geometrical knowledge is built up and verified, each element becoming in its turn a factor of demonstration in what follows. This function is what is implied in the familiar statement that concepts are "tools" of analysis.

The history of a science, then, may be accurately written in terms of its conceptual evolution. At first there will be a hazy notion of realities somewhat akin to others already known, but differing from them in some as yet unanalyzed way. These new considerations it endeavors to express in language already at hand. At first, it will lack precise words, and must indicate by similes or figures how the new is similar to something already known. As its own ideas become more distinct a new vocabulary, or old words with specialized meanings, will be brought into play to correspond to the new implications that have been discovered.

The logical stages, then, that a science passes through in its making are the following: (1) *The receiving and recording of individual perceptions;* and (2) the *formulation of conceptions* whereby those perceptions become intelligently unified and integrated into general experience. To these another must be added before it can be properly called a science, that of (3) the *organization of its concepts into a definite and logical system whereby the various parts are correlated into a consistent whole.*[2]

The conceptual approach is, of course, not a new approach at all, but one that is exactly as old as science itself, of which it is not only the necessary accompaniment, but the very essence. Although it has not been called by that name, nor indeed consciously recognized as such, it has been the *sine qua non* of every truly scientific discipline that has ever been developed. In so far as we use scientific concepts in any field of study, we are scientific in our procedure implicitly if not explicitly; and to the extent that we do not use them, we are unscientific. They are indispensable, and their use is an identifying mark of scientific method, whatever its field of application.

Our reason for stressing the conceptual approach in connection with the social sciences is not, therefore, to imply the discovery of a new and unique technique peculiar to them, but on the contrary, is to insist that a method long used by the physical sciences should be more generally carried over into the social sciences as well, where its use has been neglected in the past. It has not been wholly lacking, of course; other-

[2] The reader should not be misled by the over-simplified statement as to the process of concept-building, which this brief treatment compels. Neither percept nor concept come to human consciousness in a "pure" or unmodified stage. Every idea developed within each human mind is inextricably bound up and interwoven with previous mental patterns and already established connotations, which condition it in many ways, and which may give it a different meaning from that given to another mind.

Furthermore, what has been written in these pages must not be taken to imply that there is a set and invariable order in which the intellect works, for such is not the case. Logically, it is true, percept precedes concept; but chronologically, the opposite often occurs. Many a mind, wandering amid a fog of bewilderment and speculation, has doubtless glimpsed the beginnings of some conceptual generalization long before clearly perceiving the objective phenomena upon which its demonstration must eventually rest. Darwin's quest for an explanation of evolution is a clear illustration of this.

wise we should not have arrived at our present degree of knowledge, limited as it is.

The inadequacy of the concepts employed by the several social sciences has long been recognized. Speaking for economics as long ago as 1896, H. D. McLeod stated categorically; "If we wish to bring economics to the state of an exact science, we must carefully examine all its fundamental concepts and axioms and reduce them to a state of generality and simplicity." [3]

Speaking for political science, Charles H. Titus has written: "Confusion reigns almost supreme in the field of Political Science, particularly when the meaning of terms is involved. Some of our most commonly used terms have so many meanings, shades of meanings, and connotations, that hearers and readers are frequently at a loss as to the meaning and significance of terms unless the speaker or writer defines them as he uses them . . . The process of communication between political scientists comes to be a guessing game." [4]

From the ranks of sociology also arises a growing chorus of voices to condemn the similar state of anarchy with reference to the concepts of our own discipline.[5] In response to the need, the conceptual approach is at last beginning to come into its own within sociological ranks. For years it played a subordinate, and often almost an incidental part, to others, including such familiar "approaches" as the historical, the descriptive, the institutional, and the nondescript "problems" approach.

Against my study wall yonder is the sociologist's familiar "five foot shelf" of volumes dealing with "introductory" sociology, beginning with Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society,* issued in 1894, and extending down to the latest volume delivered by the postman a few moments ago. All of the approaches mentioned are exemplified in these several dozen volumes, and each has its particular merit. Among the many values found in the rapidly increasing body of non-conceptual materials bearing the imprint of sociology, not the least is the part they have played in making the present generation of students "society-conscious" in a way undreamed of not many years ago. They have brought to our attention a wealth of material intrinsically important, and have forced upon us a consciousness of the necessity for greater intelligence concerning human affairs. But without entering into the particular advantages or disadvantages of any of these other approaches, it is enough here to say that, for the reasons above given, no one of them can be a substitute for the conceptual approach as a means to analytical understanding. "The

[3] *History of Economics* (1896), pp. 24 ff.

[4] "A Nomenclature in Political Science," *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.* (Feb., 1931), p. 45.

[5] Among those other than the present writer who are already on record on this point are: Bain, Finney, House, Lundberg, MacIver, Sorokin, and Wiese.

framing of a conceptual system—will remain eternally necessary to scientific advance." [6]

II. The Historical Development of Sociological Concepts [7]

The conceptions which underlie the scientific concepts of sociology were, of course, in the minds of many men long before Comte declared to the world that a science of human society was forthcoming. Their implications are to be found wherever the records of man's social thinking appear. The folklore of primitives contains many hints of them.[8] Wherever the shrewd generalizations of preliterate men concerning human nature have been crystallized into aphorisms and proverbs, they evidence a recognition of many of the same truths that later take the form of sociological principles.

The most ancient legislative code extant, that of Hammurabi, which according to latest authority goes back to 1850 B.C., is full of decrees which could not have been arrived at without a wide previous knowledge of the underlying uniformities of human association. Wherever the religious or otherwise philosophical thought of man has been preserved, imbedded in it are conceptions, born of long experience, which in modern dress are accepted as foundation stones of sociological understanding.[9] Confucius, Draco, Solon, Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, all of the great lawgivers, teachers, and prophets of the ancient world were men deeply steeped in experience born of contacts with their fellows, and theirs was the wisdom inductively gained through that experience. From their day until now the great philosophies, ancient, medieval and modern, have

[6] Karl N. Llewellyn, in Brookings Institute *Essays on Research in the Social Sciences* (1931), p. 111. In the effort to secure a greater unity in the teaching of the fundamentals of the subject, the American Sociological Society at its annual meeting in 1931 appointed a committee, of which C. C. North was chairman, to study the content of courses in introductory sociology throughout the United States and to report back with recommendations a year later. The recommendation of the committee was to the effect that in all standard introductory courses at least seventy per cent of the attention be directed toward a consideration of the basic concepts of sociology. The adoption of this report by the Society at the annual meeting of 1932 constitutes the most authoritative expression of opinion upon this subject which has been given by American sociologists. (For full details of the North Committee's report, see the *Jour. of Ed. Soc.*, which devoted an entire issue to its work: VII, No. 1, Sept., 1933.)

[7] Some of the more readily accessible summaries of materials bearing on the long period of social thought prior to Comte and the rise of sociology are the following: J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (1923); E. S. Bogardus, *Development of Social Thought* (1940); F. N. House, *The Range of Social Theory* (1929); H. E. Barnes and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (1938), Vol. I.

[8] See J. G. Frazer, *The Folklore of the Old Testament,* for various examples of this.

[9] *The Sacred Books of the East,* edited by Max Müller, are a treasure house of material of this sort.

implicitly accepted much of what has been left to present day sociology to formulate in specific terms.

It would not be difficult to make a list of concepts familiar to modern sociology, based on usages foreshadowed by the ancients long before concrete expression was given them in modern science. Consciousness of kind, control, co-operation, culture, evolution, folkways, force, imitation, personality, process, progress, social self: these are a few samples by way of emphasizing again the familiar point that "modern" thought has long been anticipated by our predecessors. Not until the past century, however, have these age-old ideas been elevated to the position of concretely formulated concepts whereby to analyze and synthesize in scientific fashion our knowledge of human association.

We turn next to the conscious transformation of these materials into the working equipment of the sociologist.

The conscious development of sociological concepts may be conveniently dated from the appearance of the word itself, *sociologie,* as coined in 1838 by Comte, when, in his *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830–1842), he sought to define an order of inquiry transcending that dealing with the individual organism. Comte himself did little to develop the subject, but he perceived the necessity for an organized body of knowledge which should relate to the forms and activities of human association, and he predicted its eventual appearance.

Darwin's *Origin of Species,* appearing in 1859, constituted an intellectual milestone in scientific thinking. This was not a sociological treatise, for both its interest and its subject matter bore directly upon biology; but within its seemingly remote content was contained a conception, together with supporting evidence, that was destined to change human thought concerning the social as well as the physical world. Darwin himself, in his historical introduction to this volume, paid tribute to thirty-four men who had previously grasped the underlying idea of evolution. That we identify the concept with his name is not due to his being the first to suggest it, but to the fact that he gave the first consistent explanation as to how it occurred, together with substantiating testimony, scientifically gathered. Although his researches were in the realm of the organismic, the significance of the idea for every part of the universe soon became apparent.

The concept of social evolution as a philosophical idea is implicit in Comte, whose "hierarchy of the sciences" was also a hierarchy of phenomena. One of its earliest clear and explicit expressions is by H. C. Carey, whose three volume *Principles of Social Science* (1858) is based upon the postulate stated in the first chapter, that "there is but one system of laws for the government of all matter, whether existing in the form of a piece of coal, a tree, a horse, or a man" (Vol. I, p. 39), and that "the laws of

physical science are equally those of social science" (p. 40). In 1862 appeared Spencer's *First Principles,* the first of ten volumes of his monumental *Synthetic Philosophy,* wherein he laid down what he conceived to be the laws of universal on-going for phenomena of every realm—inorganic, organic, and "super-organic" or social—the whole being geared into the one all-inclusive process of universal evolution. Scarcely less impressive in extent is Lilienfeld's five-volume *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft* (1873). Human society, he declares in the opening volume, "is nothing but a continuation of nature, a higher manifestation of the same forces which lie at the basis of all natural phenomena." He outlines five successive stages of integration: (1) the protoplasmic cell, (2) the tissue, composed of cells, (3) the organ, composed of tissues, (4) the individual creature, composed of organs, and finally (5) society, composed of individuals. Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy* (1874), Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* (1876–82), and Volume I of Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), are three outstanding treatises in which the evolutionary process is extended beyond its Darwinian content and made a key to the interpretation of societary phenomena as well.

Closely connected with such considerations as the foregoing was the problem of the *structure* of the social body. It was not difficult for those who saw society as a continuation of the life of nature also to conceive it as an organism. This idea, suggested by Comte, emphasized and developed by Lilienfeld, taken as a point of departure by Schaeffle in his *Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers* (1875), reached its most completely detailed explanation in Spencer's famous biological analogy.[10] The many defects in the analogy—a number of which Spencer himself was at pains to point out—made it impossible to maintain this as a working theory, and the biological analogy as an explanation of structure has long since given place to analysis in terms of the activity and relationships existing between the individuals who comprise the structure.

From Spencer's emphasis on structure, it is but a step to that of function, i. e., the activity and purpose which the structure is by its nature designed to effect. This has been Schaeffle's particular contribution to sociology's widening horizon. As Small points out,[11] it represents the next advance step in the understanding of human society. It represents a shifting of emphasis from the organization of human beings to that of the purposes for which they are organized.

The thirty years following the appearance of Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* were rich in the development of concepts which gave increasing insight into the nature of social reality.

Ward, impressed with the ever-evolving life of mankind, was absorbed

[10] *Principles of Sociology,* Vol. I, Part II, especially chap. ii.
[11] *General Sociology,* especially chap. ii.

by this question: To what extent is this "ongoing" subject to human direction? Corollary to this were other cardinal problems: What are the forces that move it to action? What are its objectives? The answer was sought in his *Dynamic Sociology* (1883). *Telesis* was the keystone concept at which he arrived: the conscious control of society by society. This, he said, is not only possible, but intelligent action upon this basis is the only way in which society can hope to progress. The ultimate *social forces* are human desires, which can be guided and restrained. The *social ends* toward which they must be directed are those which result in human satisfaction. "Happiness is the ultimate end of conation."

Gumplowicz, more specifically than did Ward, singled out *the group* as his center of interest, doing it, however, to the neglect of the individual. Due probably to the unhappy experience of his own country, Poland, and of his own Jewish people, his attention was held particularly by the conflict aspect of human society. His major work, *Der Rassenkampf* (1883), not merely deals with the warfare of races, but deals with it as typical of the conflict universally occurring throughout human affairs everywhere. It is a pessimistic conception of social life, one which sees struggle as the inevitable, permanent condition of humanity, without prospect of eventual adjustment.

Tönnies meantime was carrying analysis of the group in another direction, upon the basis of the bond that holds people together. (1) *Gemeinschaft* ("community") consists of groupings based on "organic" sympathy (*Wesenwille*), in which the accident of kinship or proximity is responsible for an association which no one has particularly sought to arrange. (2) This gradually gives place to *Gesellschaft* ("society") which on the other hand, consists of groupings based on personal preference or will (*Kürwille*), in which mutual selection has led to an association deliberately designed by its participants. (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* 1887. After more than 50 years an English translation has been made, and will soon be published.)

Tarde, recognizing the individual mind as a dynamic and guiding power, explained social phenomena as essentially psychic manifestations. Four concepts summarize his general theory: With necessity as the impulse which gives rise to all human activities, (1) *invention,* or origination, determines the form they take in the beginning; later, they are spread through widening circles of (2) *imitation,* which is the form that repetition, universally occurring throughout the universe, takes in human society; (3) *conflict* occurs when two waves of imitation collide; and their clash is ultimately resolved in some kind of (4) *adaptation.* The second of these is the one most characteristically associated with Tarde's name, because of the particular emphasis which he gave it. (*Les lois d'imitation,* 1890.)

Ranking beyond Tarde in place of influence among modern French

sociologists, Durkheim has advanced our theory along three conceptual lines. *Social solidarity* is the first, by which is meant the unity within the group. The other two make this possible: *collective representations,* or symbols of reality which exist within the group and have a common meaning for all its members; and the *constraint* which is exerted upon the individual by the will of the group. (*De la division du travail social,* 1893; and *Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse,* 1912.)

Novicow (*Les luttes entre sociétés humaines et leurs phases successives,* 1893), somewhat along the lines of Gumplowicz, brings out the importance of *struggle* as a fundamental factor in social progress, defining the latter as "acceleration of adaptation" to whatever conditions exist to thwart or impede desire.

Ratzenhofer stressing the same concept finds that, on the whole, social conflict has eventually found its way toward *co-operation.* (*Die soziologische Erkenntniss,* 1898.) Following Ward's dictum, he substitutes the concept of *interest* for Ward's *desire,* as the mainspring to human action. Going further, also, into an analysis of the social process, he finds *differentiation* (the tendency toward individualization), and *socialization* (the tendency toward group integration), to be its complementary phases.

Kropotkin has gone further than Ratzenhofer in his stress upon co-operation as a factor in social evolution. Gumplowicz, painting with overly black pigments his gloomy pictures of a world in which conflict and hostility are universal, is found to give not more than half the picture, for *mutual aid* is at least as common, and as widespread, as antagonism and opposition. Neither among men nor among beasts is either of these the whole story. Were it not for the friendly assistance which fellow creatures render one another, society of any sort would be impossible. (*Mutual Aid,* 1902.)

Simmel, seeking to bring sociology to a "formal" basis—i. e., to a scientific technology whose "form" will be comparable to that utilized by the nature sciences—centers his analysis of social *processes* about the two complementary movements recognized by Ratzenhofer: *individualization,* which makes for uniqueness and separateness of each particular human being; and its opposite, *socialization,* whereby the individual is made similar to his fellows and becomes a unity with them through conflict and harmonization. While both of these are going on, a fundamental complementary status is established—that of *superordination* and *subordination,* —which defines the basis upon which superior and subordinate shall carry on their associated life, a relationship which he regards as the most important of all in human association. These taken together constitute a fundamental reciprocal influencing, *interaction,* which is the *sine qua non* of all group life. (*Soziologie,* 1908.)

Returning now to our American writers, we find Giddings rich in conceptual contributions. The *socius* is the social man, the associate and member of society, as distinguished from the *individual.* Among socii exist a *consciousness of kind,* or recognition of similarity and dissimilarity, accompanied by some degree of sympathy, which is the universal selective and organizing principle in drawing men together. Out of the collective sympathy which develops among socii comes a common-mindedness, or *social mind,* which dominates individual wills, causing them to feel, think, and often to act together. (*Principles of Sociology,* 1896, and *Inductive Sociology,* 1901.)

Small more than anyone else in sociology is responsible for bringing to attention the importance of the conceptual approach, which he treated under the designation of "methodology." In particular he has developed *interests* as a cardinal center of sociological explanation, carrying them to a point much beyond that of Ratzenhofer, to whom he ascribes an overgenerous share of credit. A second point of particular stress is that of *value,* wherein the ethical element is given first place as the proper determinant of social actions. *Process* has also been basic to his theory. This was implicit among all the writers who preceded him, but he made it explicit; and more, for—in accordance with the trends developed in the natural sciences—he clearly revealed that this is pivotal in all scientific interpretation. His *General Sociology* (1905) is in the main a treatise upon "the" social process, that general "becoming" which includes the whole of human association; but in his *Origins of Sociology* nearly two decades later (1925), he states that the various lesser *processes* (of "being" as contrasted with "becoming"), occurring within "the" general process, constitute the more significant field of analysis.

Cooley (*Human Nature and the Social Order,* 1902, and *Social Organization,* 1909), has not only made fundamental contributions to the development of concepts both in *the individual* and *the group,* but has gone further than others in integrating and establishing the interrelations of the two. *Communication* becomes with him a sociological key of importance, and basic to interpretation of association. His most original contribution, however, and one which is now fundamental to sociological analysis everywhere, is found in his theory of the *primary group,* characterized by that "intimate, face to face association" found within the home, the school, the playground, from whose spontaneously developed contacts arise the basic ideals for society as a whole: truth, service, kindness, and loyalty.

Ross, taking the ideas of *constraint* and *social pressure,* which have been implicit in many of the writers before him, brings *social control* into full view as a key concept in the understanding of society. (*Social Control,* 1901.) *Individual ascendancy* and *social ascendancy* respectively are twin

pillars of its gateway. Taking up the basic ideas of Tarde, he carries them more fully into sociological theory in the United States than they have been before, stressing *suggestion,* however, as the opposite face of the medal on which Tarde has left his imprint of *imitation.*

Sumner is, of course, primarily identified in our scientific literature for his contribution of the concepts of *folkways* and *mores.* (*Folkways,* 1906.) Implicit though these have been in many previous writers, he it was who gave them their clear-cut meaning and a definite place in sociological analysis. Closely identified with this is his utilization of the concepts of the *we-group* and the *they-group* as an explanation of social usages and group attitudes.

III. Contemporary Notions of Sociological Concepts

With the above paragraphs, we have brought certain of the outstanding conceptual contributions to sociological literature down to the period of 1910. Somewhat arbitrarily, this date may be accepted as dividing the body of older writers from the contemporary field. A number of men mentioned, notably Giddings, Small, Cooley, and Ross, in America, have written since, and some of those to become more dominant later were writing at that time; but in the main, this date may be taken as a line of demarcation. Since that time the development of our concepts has been less in the way of presenting organized "systems" of sociology and more in the way of making contributions to particular phases. Taking the period 1910 to 1935 as a unit, therefore, we may indicate some of the more outstanding conceptual contributions that have been made, largely however, by way of special development of ideas already existent. We may arrange them alphabetically for convenience:

Accommodation: Suggested by Baldwin, utilized by Simmel, and given form by Park and Burgess (*Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* 1921).

Adaptation: Bristol (*Social Adaptation,* 1915).

Assimilation: Park and Burgess (*Introduction*).

Attitude: Thomas and Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant,* 1918); Park and Burgess (*Introduction*).

Behavior, Pluralistic: Giddings (*Am. Jour. of Soc.,* January, and March, 1920); Park and Burgess (*Introduction*); Allport (*Social Psychology,* 1924); Bernard (*Social Psychology,* 1926).

Change: Ogburn (*Social Change,* 1923).

Class and Classes: Miller (*Races, Nations and Classes,* 1924).

Coercion, especially non-violent coercion, as a form of social control: Case (*Non-Violent Coercion,* 1923).

Community: MacIver (*Community,* 1921).

Crowd and Public: Sighele (*Psychologie des sectes,* 1898); Le Bon (*The Crowd,* 1911); Park (*Masse und Publikum,* 1904, and in subsequent miscellaneous writings).

Differentiation: North (*Social Differentiation,* 1926).

Distance: Suggested by Park, but developed especially by Bogardus (*Sociology and Social Research*).

Group (*in the newer sense*): Conception stated by Simmel (*Sociologie*); clarified and extended by Park and Burgess (*Introduction*); Brown (*Social Groups,* 1926); and Eubank (*The Concepts of Sociology,* 1931).

Interaction: Implicit in all previous sociological writing, and explicit in the sociology of Simmel, given concrete formulation by Park and Burgess (*Introduction*).

Learning Process, considered as the fundamental means of receiving culture; individual from individual, and generation from generation: Ellwood (*Psychology of Human Society,* 1925).

Mobility: Park and others.

Person: Park and Burgess (*Introduction*); Eubank (*The Concepts of Sociology,* 1931).

Personality and Human Nature: Various psychologists and sociologists, especially James, Baldwin, and Thorndike (*The Original Nature of Man,* 1913). Cooley's contributions previously mentioned, constitute the major contribution from the ranks of professional sociology.

Relationship: No thorough-going treatment of relationship *per se* was developed in sociological literature prior to the appearance of Wiese's *Allgemeine Sociologie.* Vol. I, entitled *Beziehungslehre,* has developed this especially and contains an elaborate "Table of Human Relationships" (1924). (See Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology,* 1932.)

Revolution: Sorokin (*Sociology of Revolution,* 1925); Edwards (*Social Revolution,* 1927).

Socialization: Burgess (*The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution,* 1916).

Wishes: Thomas and Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant,* 1918).

In addition to the more general concepts above listed, two significant developments in conceptual emphasis have taken place in recent years which call for particular mention.

The first grows out of the place of expanding importance which *culture* has come to have for sociological theory. This has long been used as a background for the understanding of human association. Over half a century ago, Spencer spent years in collecting and organizing materials from the culture settings of many peoples as a foundation for his generalizations. More recently, Westermarck, Sumner, and Hobhouse—to mention only three of the most prominent—have done the same. But since 1910, and particularly during the past decade, another form of interpretation has arisen involving the intensive analysis of culture in and of itself. Sociology,

on the one hand, has come into a new appreciation of the treasure house of content which anthropology and ethnology have to offer for its investigation. The latter disciplines, on their part, have come to appreciate the importance of sociological method as a means of deciphering the inner reality of the objective culture-manifestations of different peoples. Influenced by each other, therefore, sociology and ethnology have steadily approached a common ground, until now a point is reached where there are a number of writers—among them Goldenweiser, Kroeber, Sapir, Wissler, Herskovits, Redfield, Wallis, Radcliffe-Brown, Margaret Mead, Linton, Benedict, Robert and Helen Lynd, Warner, Willey, and Malinowski—who are almost equally at home in both fields. Out of their joint labors has developed a body of concepts totally unknown to the sociology of a few years ago. Examples of certain of the more important ones are:

culture accumulation	culture lapse
culture area	culture margin
culture base	culture pattern
culture center	culture penetration
culture complex	culture region
culture configuration	culture thrust
culture conflict	culture trait
culture diffusion	culture type
culture integration	continuity of culture
culture lag	cross-fertilization of culture

Although most of these are already general property, especial reference should be made to Wissler, who has perhaps done more than anyone else to clarify and develop the concepts of culture (*Man and Culture,* 1923); and to Linton, whose definitions have been particularly discriminating (*The Study of Man,* 1936).

The second development, deriving its impetus in large measure from certain biological analyses which have a peculiar suggestiveness for social relationships, is that of *human ecology,* launched by Park and Burgess, and further developed especially by McKenzie.[12] Closely bound up with culture, its distinctive contribution is its analysis of human situations, not in terms of the direct societary actions of man and man, nor of their products, but of their space and sustenance distributions, and successions of these phenomena, as affected by their common dependence upon the limited resources of the same environment. With impersonal ecological interaction *within a given territory* as its central emphasis, the characteristic formulations of ecology involve such concepts as these:[13]

[12] Note Chapter 8 of this volume by J. A. Quinn, which deals at length with Human Ecology.

[13] It will be observed that certain of these terms are the same as those previously given. They are used, however, in a special sense in the field of ecology.

I

IN TERMS OF *Location*

area, natural
boundary and limits
community
center
district
interstate
margin
neighborhood
niche
region

II

IN TERMS OF *Relationship and Structure*

aggregation
barriers
commensalism
contact
distance, ecological
dominance
gradient
mutalism
parasitism
position
space
symbiosis
web of life

III

IN TERMS OF *Activity and Process*

centralization and decentralization
competition
competitive co-operation
concentration
cycle (of existence)
dispersion
fluidity
invasion
isolation
migration
mobility
segregation
succession

In the opening section of this chapter, however, we stated that the development of a science involves more than a body of concepts. Maturity does not appear until a third stage materializes, in which the formulated concepts become co-ordinated into a coherent system, the whole constituting a general frame of reference for the theory as a whole. It is to this third phase of the conceptual approach for sociology that we turn in conclusion.[14]

IV. A Suggested Organization of Sociological Concepts

Science is *organized* knowledge. Because this is true, it is requisite that its materials shall not only be developed by conceptual means, but that they shall also be co-ordinated and synthesized under some systematic frame

[14] The concepts mentioned in the preceding pages are, of course, only a fraction of those which have been developed in the century since Comte proposed his "science of society." For a longer catalog see Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology,* chap. iv. A more extended list by the same writer, of more than thirteen hundred terms, comprising the general "Vocabulary of Sociology," will be found under that title in *Social Forces,* for March, 1931.

of reference in which its various concepts supplement and support each other as integral parts of a coherent whole. This is the third phase in the development of a science which is essential to bring it to fruition.

The preceding section has given brief space to various systems of sociology advanced by various men. Spencer, Ward, Gumplowicz, Tönnies, Tarde, Durkheim, Giddings, Simmel, Small, and others, have advanced explanations of human association which have taken the form of generalized theories. They have, for the most part, however, been explanations built around a few cardinal concepts rather than a systematization of sociological theory as a whole. The importance of certain of their theories cannot be over-estimated, for they have been milestones in general sociological advance; but none of them have been inclusive interpretations. Indeed, of the masters who have brought sociology into being, few have even voiced the necessity for doing this. Notable exceptions are Small, who more than anyone else has stressed the need for a methodology which will permit this to be done; [15] Simmel, who has insisted upon an organization of sociology as a "formal" science, concerned, that is, with definite forms; [16] and Wiese, who has undertaken the systematic organization of a "table of human relations." [17]

One who undertakes the organization of such a framework must of necessity present first of all a classification of the phenomena with which the theory deals, in order that his categories of data will correspond to his categories of thought. Without pausing in the limited scope of this chapter to discuss the steps leading up to our own classification, we present it herewith: [18]

Perhaps the first and most obvious division of phenomena with which the thoughtful mind is confronted when he observed the world is *substance*. The tangible universe is composed of things, physical objects occupying space for a period of time, and which are apprehensible by our physical senses. A second major division is *change,* which is not a thing in itself, but an alteration in the relationship existing between things. This is the activational or movemental aspect of substance. The universe may be characterized in terms of these two basic elements: there is *something* that *changes*. Between the two, however, exists a third, which is the power or capacity for producing a result. This is *causation,* our third major division. Finally, the changes that take place in things lead us to a fourth division, that of the *products* that come into being as a result of those changes.

[15] *General Sociology* (1905), especially chap. xxviii.

[16] *Soziologie* (1908).

[17] *Beziehungslehre* (1924). This is Vol. I of his *Allgemeine Soziologie.*

[18] For a much fuller discussion of this point, with the underlying reasons on which it is based, see Eubank, *The Concepts of Sociology,* chap. v, sec. 2. This same chapter, Section 1, also gives a number of earlier classifications of social phenomena.

These categories, common to all phenomena of the natural world, are also fundamental for societary phenomena. The matter, or substance with which sociology deals, is people. Alone, as societary units, they appear as *single human beings;* plurally, they appear as *human plurels,* whose most important form is that of groups. The changes that occur in society are societary *actions,* processes involving a shift in *relationships.* Causation within human society resolves into societary *energy* or force, and societary *control,* both of which may pertain either to the individual or to the group. Out of their interplay come the products of human association, the attitudes, mores, fashions, beliefs, codes, languages, institutions, and everything that is man-made, artifacts and mentifacts, the whole constituting human *culture.*

Reduced to an outline, these take the following form:

A. Societary Composition: the tangible substance of which society is composed, *viz.,* people, singly and collectively.
   1. the single human being: the individual, especially considered as a person, or situation-self.
   2. the human plurel: especially the group, which is an entity of interacting persons.

B. Societary Causation: the elements responsible for the fact of change, and for the forms which changes take.
   3. societary energy: motivations, conations, psychic impulses to action.
   4. societary control: whatever way any individual or group influences or constrains another individual or group.

C. Societary Change: the alterations and modifications that occur within, or in relation to, societary composition.
   5. societary action: the movements and processes that are participated in by the group and its members.
   6. societary relationship: the connection between the members of a group, especially as manifested in their mutual and reciprocal states of being, whereby they may be examined with reference to each other.

D. Societary Products: whatever comes into being as a result of human association. Especially:
   7. culture: the customary ways of action and the inner feelings of the group, plus its objective creations, both artifacts and mentifacts.

These seven categories are presented, not dogmatically, but tentatively and experimentally, as the grand continental divisions that emerge as one essays to construct a map of the entire planet of sociological theory. They are therefore suggested as the seven major concepts of sociology, in the belief that they provide a logical and systematic scheme whereby to organize the essentials of this field of study.

(For selected references, see footnotes of the chapter and Bibliographical Appendix.)

[4]

THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

H. Otto Dahlke

I. Introduction

With the scepticism which comes to prevail in an individuated and secularized culture, with the efflorescence of mystic cults, of irrationalism, of intellectualism and sophistication, of science and quackery, the "enlightened" periods of history actually tend to become eras of uncertainty and ignorance.[1] During such times the meaning and function of thought to life becomes an important problem. Thought is "debunked" politically, analyzed out of existence scientifically, or is "purified" to an arid rationalism and a sickly estheticism. It is reconstructed periodically by the dominating science of the moment—biology, physics, mathematics, and last but not least, the social sciences. Thinking is made relative, absolute, instrumental, fictional, logical, illogical, *ad infinitum*. Amid this confusion of babbling tongues conceptions of standards or perspectives seem wanting, especially with the disparagement of philosophical and metaphysical thinking, and one man's opinion becomes as good as another's. With the *débacle* of our thought-life there is a like confusion in the life of action. This disorder in practical activity becomes expressed in cries for "planning" or the "leader." It is found in an admitted, almost flaunted, distinction between the theorist and the practical man, a conflict that is more than academic. But action without thought is blind; thought without action is impotent. If one assumes some kind of integral unity or relationship between thought and action, it may be possible to clear up some difficulties with an adequate theory of thought which can further the development of a theory of action, and both may issue into real relations and affect actual practice. It need not be implied, however, that all thinking should be directed to practical ends, but rather that the search for truth and knowledge, or, to speak scientifically, for prediction and control, is a legitimate end itself during the process of which suggestions for practice may present themselves. To understand the

[1] See Howard Becker, "Processes of Secularization," *Sociological Review* (British), XXIV, 138–54; 266–86. It should be noted, by the way, that the present chapter was launched in Professor Becker's seminar at the University of Wisconsin.

nature and function of thought in its relation to life is no mean problem. The sociology of knowledge is an attempt to analyze it.[2]

There are two main ways of interpreting ideas: immanently and extrinsically.[3] To understand something immanently is to understand it according to its meaning. A poem, or a novel, or a philosophical system are meaningful unities of form and content in their own right. The thought-structure of Plato's *Republic* or even of his entire writings may be examined solely in its logical interrelation and development so as to grasp, for instance, the *subjectively* intended meaning, i. e., to interpret the meaning the author had in mind. From this point of view, the world of ideas contains its own unity and continuity. When an idea or set of ideas are referred beyond themselves as components of some other complex, the interpretation is extrinsic: to explain Plato's thought with reference to his dislike of Athenian democracy and his approval of Dorian culture, or Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of compensation for his shyness and constitutional inferiority.[4] This extrinsic type of interpretation is common in everyday life. He does this or says that *because*. Environment, age, race, psychological complex, economic conditions or interest, societal process and/or structure, are the points of reference most frequently used for this extrinsic type of explanation. It represents an attempt to get behind ideas to a more fundamental reality, to penetrate the veil of Maya, as it were, and behold the Ultimate.

The sociology of knowledge deals with the socio-cultural determinants of thinking. There are two approaches. The first regards thought as relative, i. e., the validity of ideas is restricted to particular groups, cultures, and historical epochs. It also implies an epiphenomenalism, for thought is merely the expression of, or an accompaniment to, an underlying reality. Not only the manner of cognition and understanding but also the categories of thought are a function of an independent variable, some social or cultural factor. This approach is an extreme extrinsic interpretation. The second or "substantive" approach does not raise the question of validity nor consider thought as merely epiphenomenal. It does try to show a functional relationship between a socio-cultural context and the theoretical problems formulated and developed. It seeks to demonstrate integration or disintegration in the order of cultural objects, material and non-material, to

[2] Cf. George Boas, *New Ways of Thinking* (1930); Max Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf," *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (1922); Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Morals* (1929), Part I; Hans Speier, "The Social Determination of Ideas," *Soc. Res.* (May, 1938), pp. 182–205.

[3] Karl Mannheim, "Ideologische und soziologische Interpretation der geistigen Gebilde," *Jahrbuch für Soziologie,* II (1926); Ernst Grünwald, *Das Problem der Soziologie des Wissens* (1934), chap. ii. The term "extrinsic" is used in order to avoid the connotations and emotional overtones centering in the words "transcendental" and "ideological."

[4] Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy* (1926), chaps. i and ix.

account for opposition or "a strain toward consistency" among them, to determine the rise, direction, and fall of philosophical, scientific, religious, esthetic creations and creativity.

Forerunners of the sociology of knowledge are strewn over the centuries, beginning with the Sophists of Hellenic Greece, the later Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times—for the general perspective of the sociology of knowledge has a tendency to appear in epochs of marked individuation and secularization.[5] An isolated, earlier, systematic attempt is found in the writings of Johann Martin Chladenius,[6] but it is only in recent times that the general principles and problems of the sociology of knowledge as such has been recognized, formulated, and expanded in research. Though the general perspective is latent in American sociological thought, its systematic expression is primarily a European product despite its voluntaristic, pragmatic emphasis characteristic of American thinking. Priority in formulation and monographic research may be assigned to Durkheim, his collaborators, and his followers.[7] He exerted a very strong influence upon some German thinkers, especially Wilhelm Jerusalem and Max Scheler. The latter may be regarded as the real founder of the sociology of knowledge. The German development as a whole may be characterized as a series of exegetical exercises on Marxian concepts attaining a culmination in Karl Mannheim, who has now supplanted Marx in volume of commentary.

II. Durkheim and the Sociology of Knowledge in France

Durkheim elaborated a sociology of knowledge which represents a development of positivistic agelicism, a theoretical approach rooting in the work of DeBonald and DeMaistre. They formulated among other ideas the conception of society as the real and ultimate being.[8] Since there is only this one real phenomenon, all other phenomena are derivatives, and

[5] Alexander von Schelting, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre* (1934), p. 99; Hans Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 203–5; Ernst Grünwald, *op. cit.*, chap. i. My concern is not as to who actually thought of the sociology of knowledge first; I am interested in those expositions where the sociology of knowledge is recognized as such. As a consequence, men like Pareto, Sorel, Nietzsche, Gumplowicz, and the minor Marxian epigoni are not considered.

[6] *Einleitung zur richtigen Auslegung vernünftigen Reden und Schriften* (1742); *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft* (1752); Cf. Hans Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 204–5.

[7] Rockwell Smith, "Cultural Determinants in Mentality as Discussed in *L'Année Sociologique*, Volumes I–XII" (1938), paper written for Professor Becker's seminar at the University of Wisconsin. Mimeographed copy *gratis* on request.

[8] H. E. Barnes, and Howard Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (1938), I, 490–9. The term "agelicism" refers to a type of doctrine which derives all characteristics of the individual from his group affiliations and makes him wholly dependent in thought and action.

this conception applied to thought means that all thinking is determined by the group. All categories and thought are drawn forth from the temporal, spatial, and morphological integration and change of society.

Durkheim evinced an early interest in the relation between mental categories and social forms. In the first volume of *L'Année Sociologique* he concludes that it is a radical error to consider the evolution of social forms as being like the logical and teleological development of concepts.[9] In the study concerning primitive forms of classification he asserts that the categories of thought have a societal origin, i. e., in the structure of the group and collective experience.[10] The sociological theory of knowledge is sketched in *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. He admits that his conclusions are tentative and that the sociology of knowledge is only in its beginning stages. He even goes so far as to say that the whole theory is a matter of hypothesis, and, though it may be assumed that historical factors influence thought, they are really not known.[11]

According to Durkheim, traditional philosophical thought has never solved an epistemological problem or dilemma. It is admitted that man thinks in certain essential and fundamental categories which are expressed in his judgments. *Empiricism,* arguing from the contingent, variable representation, and the uniqueness of individual experience, denies the universality and the necessity of categories. *Apriorism,* granting categories their necessary and universal status, cannot account for them satisfactorily without supranatural or mystical references. *Society* is a third something which resolves the difficulty. "Every time that we are in the presence of a *type* of thought or action which is imposed uniformly upon particular wills or intelligences, this pressure exercised over the individual betrays the intervention of the group." [12] Since concepts are expressed in language, which is the product of collective elaboration and experience, language and concepts transcend individual experience. They are things outside of the individual and are imposed upon him. It is the collective and supraindividual nature of society which guarantees the binding universality of the categories. The authority of reason is the constraint of society. In so far as society is natural as a part of nature, it meets the empirical demand for a natural origin of the categories. They are *a priori* to the individual but *a posteriori* to society.

The interrelations among society, the individual, and thought are somewhat ambiguous. Society, in the first place, is conceived as another indi-

[9] Émile Durkheim, "La prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines," *L'Année Sociologique,* I, 69.

[10] Durkheim and Mauss, "De quelques formes primitives de classification," *L'Année Sociologique,* VI, 1–72.

[11] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* trans. by Joseph Ward Swain, pp. 13, 432.

[12] Durkheim, *op. cit.,* p. 434.

vidual in addition and superior to the isolated human being. It acts and thinks of its own accord in terms of universals which are "revealed" to the individual.[13] In this sense, thought and action are the revelation of a transcendental being which transforms the minds and ways of men, in spite of the fact that Durkheim admits that society existentially resides in the neuropsychic patterns of the various discrete persons.[14] Since society, however, is another individual, it is also subject to the same deficiencies as the ordinary individual. The old dilemma is back again.[15] This personalistic reification of society as a sort of godhead states more problems than it can solve. The conception implies an absolute dualism between individual and society. The transmission of thought and action from the one being to others is not satisfactorily answered. To say that society exists both inside and outside of the individual and is effective in that way evades the issue. Why society should think in terms of universals, why the individual cannot, remains unexplained. "It does because it does" is no answer. The entire matter becomes still more contradictory when Durkheim admits that the individual is an autonomous source of action at a certain stage of societal evolution and creates concepts himself.[16] It seems that Durkheim is considering categories as objects outside of mind, not in mind, as ways of understanding and communication, for if the individual did not have something *a priori,* i. e., the possibilities of knowing, he could never get at anything and would remain a perfect blank. To attribute societal origin to categories in this formal and obscure way is neither fruitful nor demonstrable. Durkheim's followers have tended to ignore this "solution" and have concentrated upon the substantive aspects of his work.

In contradistinction to the vagaries of his metaphysical entanglement, Durkheim shows some precise relations between certain categories and societal structure. The categories contain important social elements (*grosses d'éléments sociaux*) and are made in the image of social things [17]—in short, a correspondence theory of knowledge in social terms. "They [categories as collective representations] not only come from society but the things which they express are of a social nature. . . . The category of class was at first indistinct from the concept of the human group; it is the rhythm of social life which is at the basis of the category of time; the territory occupied by the society furnishes the material for the category of space; it is the collec-

[13] Durkheim, *op. cit.,* pp. 15–6, p. 435, p. 444; *L'Année Sociologique,* XI, 45.

[14] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* p. 347.

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 444. That Durkheim is merely stating an old philosophical problem and solution in new words is the contention of Dupréel. Cf. E. Dupréel, "La logique et les sociologues," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie,* II (1923–24), 215–39; "La sociologie et les problems de la connaissance," *op. cit.,* II (1924–25), 161–8.

[16] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* p. 423.

[17] Durkheim, *L'Année Sociologique,* XII, 36.

tive force which was the prototype of the concept of efficient force, an essential element in the category of causality." [18] It is this type of functional relationship which Durkheim's followers have elaborated. Even this conception becomes modified, for he admits that "collective life is something more than a mere epiphenomenon of its morphological basis." [19] He then advances the notion of society as ethos, as a vast elaboration of thought and action in which a multitude of individuals in so far as they participate form an integral unity or an "organic act" [20] and that from this perspective action and thought have their own constitutive principles. Thought-structures carry their own meaning and formative principles and are neither societal reflexes nor of societal origin. Durkheim approaches an immanent interpretation of thought. In an individuated and international society "things can no longer be contained in the social molds according to which they were primitively classified. They must be organized according to the principles which are their own, so logical organization differentiates itself from the social organization and becomes autonomous." [21] That logical principles are different in earlier stages of society becomes then a moot question. When Durkheim attributes a societal origin to categories, he confuses origin with essence as well as existential determination with the formal nature of the category—in other words, a confusion of analytical categories with their reference to concrete entities. Though man may first become aware of *social* time, *social* class, *social* space, etc., such cognition does not determine the logical nature of the category of which these may be a genus. Moreover, the fact that cognition oftentimes occurs first of all on the social plane does not wipe out the further fact that there is much unconscious manipulation of non-social categorical relations as, for example, in primitive craftsmanship in the workaday world. Analysis of preliterate grammars will demonstrate an objective status of categorical structure which bears little relation to socio-religious ideas and ceremonies.[22]

Durkheim's analysis proceeds in the following manner: ideas and categories are imputed as part of a religious system which in turn is related to social conditions and structure. The classificatory system of the Australians, for example, is modeled after its juridical and religious organization. The world is classified in terms of the sib system and their totems. The concep-

[18] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 440.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 423.

[20] This conception is very similar to A. F. Bentley's notion of "cross-sectional activity," cf. *Relativity in Man and Society* (1926), pp. 91–109.

[21] Durkheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 423–4; cf. *ibid.*, p. 347, p. 445; *L'Année Sociologique*, XI, 44–5.

[22] Alexander Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (1926), pp. 378–80; Franz Boas, "Anthropology," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, II, 78; Bronislaw Malinowski, "Culture," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*, IV, 634 and 637.

tion of space is circular because the camp is circular, and this spatial circle is divided like the tribal circle. Each region is assigned to a clan and defined by the totem of that clan.

Durkheim solves the question of objectivity and of the validity of these socially derived categories by positing an innate sentiment of truth which leads man to its progressive realization and attainment,[23] and by assuming that the consensus of peoples through the ages must contain a kernel of truth.[24] The applicability of the categories is guaranteed by the assumption of a universal relationship among different phenomena by the concept "natural," a method which illustrates his confusion between the form of a category and its content:

> That which is at the foundation of the category of time is the rhythm of social life; but if there is a rhythm in collective life, one may rest assured that there is another in the life of the individual, and more generally in that of the universe; the first is *merely more apparent* than the others. In the same way, we shall see that the notion of class is founded on that of the human group. But if men form natural groups, it can be assumed that among other things there exist groups which are at once analogous and different. Classes and species are natural groups of things.[25]

Whether the understanding of categories is "merely more apparent" in social life than in the rest of nature is a question-begging proposition and empirically doubtful. Societal priority is a matter of hypothesis. It cannot be denied that preliterate mentality may develop its categories directly from the "natural" data; i. e., from sources other than social. It is clear from Durkheim's statement that the categories are universal by their very nature, and it must also be conceded that the formal categories which make possible any kind of cognition are necessarily given and *a priori* in the Kantian sense. Durkheim admits that preliterates use the law of contradiction, though in a "strange manner."[26] The peculiarity of the content of judgment does not mean that a different logic is, or must be, used. The method of arriving at the conclusion is universal, but the content is particular. That the formal principles of reasoning may be the same in any culture cannot be dogmatically denied. The evolution of logical principles is perhaps a myth, but our increasing awareness of them may have a history.

The conceptions of Durkheim have been applied in several studies. A. Meillet shows that the changing meanings of words have as their principal cause the "differentiation of elements which constitute societies."[27] A theory

[23] *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* pp. 436–7.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 17, p. 438.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 19 (Italics mine).
[26] *L'Année Sociologique,* XII, 36.
[27] A. Meillet, "Comment les mots changent le sens," *L'Année Sociologique,* Vol. IX.

of the collective representation of death among preliterates has been developed by R. Hertz.[28] He points out that death is not a physical but a social fact, that a person incapable of social functioning because of age or infirmity is considered dead, that death as such is a period of social crises in which old status is lost by the individual and his kin, and new status is received through the ceremonies of mourning, i. e., the dead is inducted and receives status in the society of the other world and the living members of the kin are reinstated as effective members of the tribe. He carries Durkheim's thesis a little further by suggesting that the external world is not passive in its acceptance of the projection of the social forms, but that this application to the external world brings into the social forms themselves the fixity and regularity which we observe in natural phenomena.

An orthodox application and examination of Greek culture in terms of Durkheim's approach has been made by Francis Cornford,[29] who traces Greek philosophical conceptions to prior religious notions and relates these to the clan structure of the Greek tribes, and by Jane Harrison,[30] who traces religious notions of daimon, god, hero-worship, soul, drama, and Olympic games to the *dromenon* or ceremony of tribal initiation of youth in conjunction with certain seasonal festivities. In *La Pensée Chinoise,* Marcel Granet [31] not only continues the functional analysis of Durkheim but also adds other cultural items as determinants. If Chinese thought is characterized as a pragmatic humanism in contrast to Occidental analytical scientism, its monosyllabic language, rich in concrete values derived from and flowing into action, is inadequate for conceptual and abstract thinking. The ideographic writing tends to fix language forms as well as to maintain the evocative nature and function of its symbols. Syntax is replaced by rhythm, and literary style characterized by variation, allusion, use of standard forms and themes, contributes to the development and perpetuation of an emotional, value-impregnated language and thought style.

A development with a new twist is Maurice Halbwachs' [32] study of memory in which Freud and Durkheim are combined. From the incoherent and ephemeral nature of dreams and the inadequacy of their recall, he points out that a stable orientation or point of reference is given memory by the stability and continuity as well as the repetitiveness of group life and associations in which the individual participates.

[28] R. Hertz, "Contribution à une étude sur la représentation collective de la mort," *L'Année Sociologique,* Vol. X. Howard Becker has developed this point in his unpublished M. A. thesis, "A Social-Psychological Study of Bereavement," Northwestern University, 1926.

[29] Francis Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (1912).

[30] Jane E. Harrison, *Themis* (2nd ed. rev., 1927).

[31] Marcel Granet, *La Pensée Chinoise* (1934).

[32] Maurice Halbwachs, *Les Cadres Sociaux de la Memoire* (1925).

III. The Sociology of Knowledge in Germany

Durkheim exerted an important influence on those German thinkers who were not engaged in revising or saving Karl Marx from the limbo of ossified concepts. Completely in Durkheim's camp is Wilhelm Jerusalem.[33] He recognizes three main factors in the development of knowledge. The first is sociological and is present in the beginning of all societies. Among primitives it is expressed in forms of collective representations, or to use his term "social crystallizations" (*soziale Verdichtungen*), beliefs arising through social interaction and consensus. These social crystallizations are the necessary and indispensable precondition for the stabilization and practical utilization of knowledge. They are the point of departure for more precise and objective thought. The second is an individual factor which is correlated with a change in the socio-cultural structure. It is a trend which he describes as the individualistic evolutional trend. This factor consists in the rise of self-reliant, independent individuals as a result of social differentiation due to an increasing division of labor and the development of agricultural-commercial communities. This change of societal structure effects an intellectualizing or secularizing of the soul. The stress upon the individual and his ego draws in its wake psychology, apriorism, and phenomenalism. This individualistic tendency, universalized, issues in the doctrines of the "natural state" of things. It also creates a specialized body of objective knowledge with regard to the means and material of work. This new body of knowledge represents the starting point of science. The third is a common-human factor. This gives judgment as the innate form of thinking. The common-human element which develops in a cosmopolitan culture leads to the conception of humanity, which is the greatest abstraction on the social sphere and corresponds to increasing abstraction in the logical. These three factors are sociologically conditioned, as "emancipated" individuals and the idea of humanity are the product of human interaction.

The influence of Durkheim was of less importance to Scheler, perhaps the most fruitful of thinkers in the sociology of knowledge. Certain objectives underlie Scheler's approach to knowledge and the sociology of knowledge: to demonstrate the variety and genesis of the principles of reason; to set forth the nature and system of historical causation and overcome the particularism of the ideological, intellectualistic, and naturalistic conceptions of history; to validate and further genuine metaphysical thinking; and to ascertain the influence and significance of the practical-technological attitude in contrast to the theoretical-contemplative for the categorical forms

[33] Wilhelm, Jerusalem, *An Introduction to Philosophy,* trans. by Charles F. Sanders (1932), sec. 48–9; "Die Soziologie des Erkennens," *Die Zukunft* (1909); "Die soziologische Bedingtheit des Denkens und der Denkformen," *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens,* ed., Max Scheler (1924), pp. 182–202.

and objectives of knowing the world. A wider goal is to produce a synthesis of the life and thought-style of Occidental and Oriental cultures, the pragmatic-activistic with the resigned spiritualistic. This integration is to culminate in a new culture of knowledge, a harmony of the three fundamental ways of knowing inherent in the nature of mind. These types are: utilitarian knowledge (*Leistungswissen*) with humanistic knowledge (*Bildungswissen*) under the guidance of metaphysical salvation-knowledge (*Heilswissen*). Scheler's approach may be characterized as an attempt to unite historicism and a philosophy of absolute validity.[34]

There are three aspects of Scheler's conception of the sociology of knowledge which must be distinguished, for they are not wholly compatible with one another. These are: (1) a theory of historical dependence; (2) a Durkheimian sociological correspondence theory of knowledge; and (3) a theory of the nature of mind involving three valid and fundamental type-forms of thinking.

The theory of historical dependence is a statement concerning the relationship among ideal and real factors. These form two distinct provinces of sociology, the former a cultural sociology under which the sociology of knowledge is subsumed, and the latter a realistic sociology. The distinction between the two rests upon the intentions or purposes of the action, valuation, and thinking of man. In cultural sociology the goal is "ideal," having reference to an ideal world, i. e., the artist, the musician, the pure scientist, change actuality only for ideal purposes, not for practical ends. The major spheres of cultural sociology are religion, philosophy, scientific thought, and art. In realistic sociology motivation is by drives or propensities and is directed to real changes in actuality, as the worker and technical expert in the production of goods. The fundamental drives are reproduction, food, and power, and their societal corollaries are race and kinship relations, economic life, and political relations. A theory of mind is consequently a necessary presupposition for cultural sociology, and a theory of drives for the realistic. The real factors constitute a substructure, and the ideal or cultural a superstructure. It is the aim of sociology to determine a law of the order of interaction between these ideal and real factors. It is a "law of possible becoming" in existential or time-bound activity.

The distinction between these two spheres is not merely methodological but ontological, and there is consequently a metaphysical dualism. Mind or spirit in the subjective and objective sense determines only the subsistent

[34] Max Scheler, "Moralia," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauung* (1923), I, 1–40; *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* and *Arbeit und Erkenntnis* (1926); Ed., *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens* (1924); *Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung* (1925); *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1928); Cf. Nicolaas Diederichs, *Vom Leiden und Dulden* (1930); Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (1922), pp. 596–617.

meaning and value of all possible cultural objects, i. e., their essence and constitution in so far as they are. It is an autonomous sphere, having its own laws of development. The source of ideal objects is transcendental, i. e., in a hypostatized or rather ontologically real realm of ideas and values, an absolute, constant, hierarchical order which becomes realized perspectively or segmentally in history by protruding into the realm of biological and vital impulses. Placed upon an absolute continuum, these values and ideas of religion, law, art, philosophy, and morality may be viewed in their expression in different cultures as a total perspective—as Scheler says, in a *"Sinnzusammenhang eines grandiosen Gemäldes."* In their totality, past, present, and future, they are a "unity in diversity" of the atemporal, absolute order of values and ideas. In this way Scheler tries to escape the implied cultural relativism by keeping the idea of the eternal, objective, *logos* in which the mentality of different cultures takes position. This is exceedingly important, for he considers a plurality of mind-structures related to cultures as unique historical individualities to be the *sine qua non* for sociological research. These different spheres of ideal objects are determinate or essential and are founded upon a conception of mind, but this theory conflicts with the sociologistic epistemology which Scheler also accepts. Now mind or idea is not a realization factor, i. e., an idea does not have an inherent power to become objectified in the world. The purer the mind, the more impotent it is. In order to become effective in life, it must be bound up with some interest or drive and thereby acquire power and influence indirectly.

Negative factors of realization—in so far as the expression of the realm of values itself is concerned, or positive factors of selection to certain aspects of it—are the conditions of life as determined by the drive structure, i. e., the particular combination of real factors—political relations, the economic factors of production, the qualitative and quantitative conditions of the population, and the geographical and geopolitical factors—which are present. Rhythms of cultural creativity, for instance, follow a biological rhythm. They are essentially youth movements. They become effective when a new structure of drives is developed through release from cultural norms or by racial mixture. This drive-structure is the ground for the selection and realization of cultural objects.

History is then the combination of two ahistorical spheres, a biological vitalistic, and an absolute normative. The process of history may be regarded as the intrusion of this sphere of norms into the undirected organismic world. The actual objective development of a culture, however, is never determined by ideal factors but only by the constitution of the previously existing real factors. Mind can have only a directive effect, hindering or speeding up the general trend of real factors. It has a two-fold function: (1) guidance, holding forth a value or idea; (2) directing, restraining, or releasing the instinctive impulses whose movements realize the idea. The "modifiable

fatality" of the real factors, however, does not determine the meaning and content of the intellectual-cultural sphere. It "opens and closes, in determinate way and order, the sluice gates of the stream of thought."

This interaction does not hang in the air, but is mediated through an *élite* or small number of leaders and pioneers in whom both ideal and real factors converge. They grasp phenomenologically the essences of the absolute world of values and ideas, which are then diffused through the masses by the process of imitation. The selection of the thought-forms realized is determined by the real factors. Scheler does not accept any single determinant, as do the three most important naturalistic theories—race and kinship, political domination, economic determinism—but he proceeds with a conception of a dominant motif in cultural integration in which one of these three factors prevails. At different times one predominates in a particular socio-cultural configuration. When intrusive factors are excluded, there is a definite succession of these types of integration: (1) domination of blood and kinship ties—most preliterate groups; (2) a transition to the predominance of political power or factors, the state in particular; (3) the primacy of economic conditions, as in modern times. Recognition of the relative determinative character of real factors and the immanent life of ideas overcomes the onesidedness of both naturalistic and spiritualistic interpretations of history. The real variable, however (and this may be regarded as another absolute) is the drive structure of the leaders in a society and its ethos, i. e., the guiding values and ideas upon which the leaders of a group, and in and through them the group itself, are oriented. Hence it may not be gainsaid that the sociology of knowledge is from one angle the study of the *élite,* its development and change in society. Though the essence of a culture becomes concentrated and conscious in its *élite,* the more general relation between thought categories and societal structure must not be overlooked, for Scheler accepts the Marxian principle that social existence determines the consciousness of man, i. e., in structure, and with reference to content.

That the content of man's consciousness is predominantly cultural and "given" is obvious; that the structure is likewise derived is not so clear. The plurality of mind-structures which are correlated with different cultures implies that there are only relative not absolute conceptions of the world, and that there is an actual genesis of the subjective functional structure of mind. The biomorphic and the mathematical mechanistic interpretations of the world which Scheler conceives as antipodes between which variations of all sort may develop may be illustrative of this change and development in *Weltanschauung.* These views are relative to certain societal structures, of which the former is characteristic of the *Gemeinschaft* (community) and the latter of the *Gesellschaft* (society). Typologically, the thought-style of the community—and by conversion that of the society—is: (1) truth and knowledge are "given" and traditional, the logic being

an *ars demonstrandi* not an *ars inveniendi;* (2) the method predominantly ontological and dogmatic rather than epistomological and critical; (3) the way of thinking realistic rather than nominalistic; (4) the system of categories organismic rather than mechanistic. Scheler is not concerned with the validity of these types of knowing, but with showing their relation to the socio-cultural whole. The implication of a sociologistic epistemology is present, and he elaborates one *à la* Durkheim. He argues from the priority of society and knowledge of others, without which historical analysis is impossible, to a determination of the nature of the categories and the subjective mental processes of cognition. Since explaining means relating the relatively new to what is already known, and since society is always "more known" than anything else, the arrangement and classification of groups which compose society determine the subjective forms of thinking and perception as well as the classificatory arrangement of the world in categories. As a consequence there is a structural identity of the conception of the world, of the soul, of God, with the various types of societal organization, with the three fundamental ways of knowing, and on all stages of the evolution of society. The classical and medieval conception of the world as a hierarchy of goods and values ranging from the material as the lowest to God as the *summum bonum,* rationalized as the consequence of a stable, objective, teleological world order, is actually the projection of communal "estatism" (*ständische Denkart*) upon the world. Not only is there this total determination by the societal structure—even the different classes within a society have different ways of thinking, perceiving, and valuing—but these thought-modes are not imperative and upon analysis and exposure they may be overcome. In order to do this, Scheler presupposes an absolute criterion of truth—without stating what it is—and differentiates accordingly between pseudo-knowledge, i. e., ideology or rationalized interest of class, profession, estate, etc., and real or higher forms of knowledge, as embodied in religion, metaphysics and science.

These three types of knowing are given as constitutive of mind, and as such, though Scheler does not draw the inference, are independent of societal process and form, for each type contains its own essential characteristics. Religion as a type form has its motive in the drive toward spiritual self-maintenance by the salvation of the essence of the person in a holy, personalistic, world-guiding power; its mental processes (hope, fear, love, will) arise in the recognition of the incompleteness of the world and its orientation on something thought of as holy and divine; its goal, the salvation of the person and the group; its personality type, the holy one, the charismatic leader, and in the organized institution, the ecclesiastic, the clergy; its social form, the church, the sect, the communion; its movement, retrospective and completed. Metaphysics has as its motive "that something be rather than not be"; its mental process, knowledge of essences through

intuition (*Vernunft*), not by observation and deduction; its goal, the highest development of personality through wisdom; its personality type, the "wise man"; its social form, the "school of wisdom"; its movement, growth of recurrent types, the expression of individual creativity, not cumulative nor progressive. Science as a type has its motive in the desire to guide nature, society, and the soul; the mental processes, observation, experiment, deduction, induction; its goal, a world picture in mathematical symbols, concerned with functional relations rather than essences; its personality type, the researcher and scholar; its social form, a sort of international scientific republic and its organizations (learned societies, universities, research institutes, etc.); its movement, use of the division of labor, impersonal, international, continuous, cumulative, progressive, with a devaluation of previous achievements.

Students of Scheler have applied his conceptions in research. Much of the symposium which he himself edited [35] is made up of studies of scholasticism, realism, nominalism, psychoanalysis, the Aristotelian school, mysticism, organization and co-operation in German universities. His general law of interaction between ideal and real factors has been applied to Werner Sombart's and Max Weber's analysis of capitalism.[36] The modern trend in the sociology of knowledge seems to swerve into the general position which Scheler outlined.

While Karl Marx antedated Scheler with suggestions for a sociology of knowledge and indeed profoundly influenced him, there is a more direct tradition following Marx of which Scheler is at most an indirect participant.

Young Marx's attitude toward ideas was one of extreme realism, best expressed in his acute, destructive, criticism of Bruno Bauer in *The Holy Family* and of Max Stirner in *The German Ideology*. Pure thought had no relation to actuality; it was unrealistic, abstract, mere verbal juggling, in short, "a ballet of bloodless categories" as Francis Bradley characterized orthodox idealistic machinations. Not only was such thought empty but it was also a good example of complacent bourgeois snobbery. Ideas, thought Marx, were to be hauled from the sacred, spiritualistic haven back to the mundane world in which they had their origin—no longer to contemplate the world but to change it. Change in the world could be accomplished only by considering the "actual historical man," not an abstract category. This historical man is existentially an ensemble of societal relations or conditions and belongs to a determinate form of society. This real social world consists of the economic structure, its class structure and ideologies, and so

[35] *Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens*, ed., Max Scheler (1924); also the series, *Schriften zur Philosophie und Soziologie*, which Scheler edited.

[36] Erich Fechner, "Der Begriff des kapitalistischen Geistes und das Schelersche Gesetz vom Zusammenhang der historischen Wirkfaktoren," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Vol. XXX (1929).

it is not the consciousness of man which determines his existence, but his social existence which determines his consciousness. Indeed, Marx had a low valuation of consciousness, placing it fourth in a series of four fundamental factors: the wants of the organism, reproduction, the means and forms which have been developed to maintain these two, and then consciousness. The familiar thesis of substratum and superstructure takes form. Ideas are imputed to societal structure, i. e., to class, which in turn is the reflex of certain conditions of the modes and relations of production. Class is a collective object, as it were, behind the individual:

> The existence of revolutionary ideas presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class. . . . Is much perspicacity needed to understand that when changes occur in peoples' modes of life, in their social relations or social systems, there will also be changes in their ideas, and outlooks and conceptions—in a word, that their consciousness will change? What does the history of ideas prove, if not that mental production changes concomitantly with material production? In every epoch, the ruling ideas have been the ideas of the ruling class.[37]

It seems that Marx is concerned with those norms which assign social position and give the acceptable definitions of situations. Hence the main ideologies are: religion, law, politics, esthetics. It is in these ideological forms that man becomes conscious of the conflicts and transformations in the economic conditions and fights it out. Such periods constitute social revolutions, which the Marxian regards as the locomotives of history.

Social structure is class structure. There is a dominant class which for a time is in harmony with the mode of economic life that underlies it. This class makes certain definitions of values and conduct which are presented as valid for the entire social system. This class arrangement becomes disturbed and remade by a new ascending class which arises out of the changing conditions of production. The dominant class cannot perceive this change because of the intervening ideological superstructure which it created. It is put on the defensive by the new class in a futile attempt to maintain its system of values and conduct. Marx defines the process of social change. It is one of devaluation of existing institutionalized norms and ideas and a transvaluation or creation of new norms which seek institutionalized sanction. The devaluation of class values (or unmasking of an individual's judgment with reference to his class affiliations) has the sole aim of rendering them ineffective or showing them incapable of practice. The shibboleth of the "false consciousness" refers to a discrepancy between thought and action. It does not mean logical error. Since the new class necessarily perceives the historical trend rightly because it is created by that trend, it must think correctly. In a period dominated by aristocracy, the

[37] Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (Ryazanov ed., 1931), p. 50.

value of conduct is exemplified in such notions as honor or loyalty; whereas in the era of the bourgeoisie, itself once a revolutionary class against feudal aristocracy, the actual values are regarded as freedom, equality, etc. At present the bourgeois have become *déclassé,* and the proletarians wage the ideological struggle:

> Please do not argue with us by using your bourgeois notions of liberty, culture, right, etc., as the standards by which to judge the abolition of bourgeois property. Your ideas are themselves the outcome of bourgeois methods of production and of bourgeois property relations; just as your "right" is only the will of your class writ large as law—a will whose trends are determined by the material conditions under which your class lives. Your interests lead you to think that your methods of production, your property relations, are eternal laws of natural reason, instead of transient outcomes of the course of production. Earlier ruling classes, now fallen from power, shared this delusion. You understand that it was a delusion as regards the property of classical days, and as regards the property of feudal days, but you cannot see that it is no less a delusion as regards bourgeois property.[38]

The time is out of joint for the bourgeoisie, but it is the cursed spite of the proletarian class to be born to set it right. The dominant class thinks wrongly because its thought and action is not in harmony with the historical situation. It is the function of the new class to show that the old definitions are inadequate for action but that its definitions are not. For each new historical epoch there is a new class and a new ideology. Of such epochs there are four: the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the bourgeois which is the "closing chapter of the prehistoric stage of human society."

While Marx and Engels differentiated natural science from social science in relating scientific categories to a societal origin, their later followers made a sharp distinction between a bourgeois and a proletarian science. From the scientific point of view Marx and Engels were anxious to conserve and apply a logical principle to all phenomena, i. e., the dialectic in contradistinction to the concept of causality. They did, moreover, make a distinction between illusion, the unclear ideas of the majority of people, and knowledge, the results of scientific investigation.[39] "In not one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusions that our sense-perceptions, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perception of it."[40] Natural science is not relative, for nature is constant, not man-made. It is possible to penetrate gradually into the essence of natural phenomena and ascertain the laws controlling them. Natural science may be

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 47.
[39] Mandell M. Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (1927), pp. 153–86.
[40] *Ibid.,* quoted p. 131.

relative in a special sense; namely that one productive epoch may stimulate scientific thought more than another. Social science, however, is wholly relative. Its phenomena are man-made and exhibit different characteristics in each era of production. Marx quotes a reviewer approvingly: "It will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or past. . . . Such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion, every historical epoch has laws of its own. . . . As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject to other laws." [41] That is why the theories of classical economics, now *passé,* represent the anatomy of bourgeois society. Laws and concepts, however, may be relative to a historical epoch; that does not impugn their validity unless universalized. The conception of the dialectic, however, is that it transcends all historical eras, essentially because it represents the rhythm of the universe. It is the dialectic which is also the method of investigation, broadly put, as analysis and synthesis.[42] The conception of validity is concisely stated in the second Feuerbach thesis: "The question whether human thinking can arrive at objective truth is not a question of theory but a *practical* question. In practice man must prove the truth, i. e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness (*Diesseitigkeit*) of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thought which is isolated from practice is a purely academic question."

There are some points at which Marx, or at any rate Engels, demonstrates uncertainty. It is admitted that the class struggle is essentially a modern phenomenon revolving around emancipation.[43] It is valid to assume therefore that the universal application of the conception of the class struggle is an unwarranted projection upon the past of a scientific hypothesis derived from modern phenomena. Marx and Engels also imply that the societal structure of past cultures was not necessarily class organization, but estate and caste. The class struggle itself must be relative to a particular historical epoch in accordance with the conception of the historical process and the principle of the dialectic. The concept of ideology as a phenomenon of class organization is therefore also historically limited. The relationships between thought and societal structures which do not exhibit the characteristics of class may be different. The economic origin of ideologies is modified. Law and political relations are considered to be closely connected with the economic "base." Religion and philosophy, however, have non-economic origins and are influenced to some extent in their development by economic conditions. This influence, however, seems to be more pertinent to their

[41] Karl Marx, *Capital,* I, p. xx.

[42] *Ibid.,* p. xxvi; *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,* trans. by N. I. Stone (1904), pp. 265–74, pp. 295–305.

[43] Friedrich Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach,* p. 62.

social doctrines or theories. That ideologies have an immanent life of their own without a particular regard for extrinsic factors is clearly expressed by Engels. "Every ideology, however, once it has risen, develops in connection with the given concept-material and develops this material further; otherwise, it would cease to be ideology, that is, occupation with thoughts as independent entities, developing independently and subject only to their laws." [44] This suggests that thought is not a "mere" reflex of economic conditions in subject matter, development, and principles.

There have been many attempts to revise or change the Marxian theory.[45] An attempt to clarify the conception of the dialectic, and thereby free Marxism from the dregs of "vulgar" Marxism, was made by Georg Lukács.[46] He also sought to point out more clearly the Hegelian elements in the theory. He adds little that is new in principle, but gives a careful exegesis. The dialectic is restricted wholly to the movement of historical reality, and is a method of investigation. Nature is excluded. The sole actuality for man is history. In history man constitutes himself as subject in practice and in reflection as object. It is in the proletarian class that the historical process attains self-consciousness, for it is only in the presupposition of the identity of subject-object that dialectical materialism is meaningful. It is also in the premise that cognition of the object means its change that the dialectic achieves a revolutionary effect; i. e., that it is practical, not contemplative, theory. This revolutionary function is carried out by the class, for individual consciousness can only accept or reject the objective order of things which confront it, and this function is expressed through the attainment of class consciousness. Class consciousness is neither the sum nor the average of the thoughts, actions, impressions of the single individuals who constitute the class. It is the consciousness of the meaning and significance of the historical position of the class. It is composed of thoughts which are adequate to the objective situation in relation to the total societal structure. Only in the proletarian class can such a total perspective be attained, and that is a matter of time. Not all classes have the possibility of a total perspective of their epoch. This partial, or inadequate, or false consciousness of such a class is not caprice but the ideological expression of the objective economic structure. The bourgeois can no longer penetrate into historical reality. He is bound by his position in the class. He *must* think falsely. There is an inherent contradiction or opposition between his ideology and the reality of economic and social life.

Lukács makes a detailed examination of the false consciousness of the bourgeoisie. The fundamental principle of bourgeois mentality he regards as "impersonalization" or "reification" (*Verdinglichung*). It receives its

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[45] Cf. Grünwald, *op. cit.*, chap. iii.
[46] Georg Lukács, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (1923).

most significant expression in the problem of commodities or goods. Relations or conditions among persons receive the character of a thing, i. e., are hypostatized, and in this way receive a pseudo-objectivity as if they were strictly closed systems operating on natural law principles. Hence, bourgeois mentality hypostatizes historical categories as absolute and ascribes atemporal validity to thought-structures which are as little eternal as the actuality from which they grew. These antinomies of bourgeois thinking are the necessary reflex of the competitive societal order of capitalism, of the contradictions inhering in the economic structure. They express the consciousness of the bourgeois class in its relation to the total situation. Lukács is so sure of the inability of the bourgeois to grasp the truth or get right insight into the societal situation, and is so certain that the proletarian always judges objectively, that he holds that even though the bourgeois may make isolated factual judgments which are true, they will be revealed as parts of a "false" consciousness, and though the proletarians may err in part, their consciousness as a whole is accurately directed. It is hence inevitable that the proletarian class should expose and "debunk" bourgeois thought, and at the same reinterpret and reorganize society from a proletarian perspective.

Lukács admits that if ideology is the expression of a historical situation, historical materialism must also be the manifestation of a determinate social actuality. It is not necessary to conclude, therefore, that historical materialism is invalid and that complete relativism prevails. The truths of historical materialism are absolute within a particular socio-economic order. He is also chary about the use of the dialectic as a tool of historical research, insisting that some of the dialectic studies, as of Kautsky and Cunow for instance, have been too crude, though serving a valid propagandistic purpose.

Of the contemporarily prominent is Karl Mannheim,[47] who presents Marx in the garb of a new terminology, with old definitions in current verbiage. The "debunking" tactics of Marx are converted into scientific principles. The main thesis is familiar. Ideas are expressions of situations or groups of which the class is the model, although generation, estate, sect, and occupational groups are also important. This general expansion tends to make the entire thesis trite, though the implied problem of attaining correct insight with so many interpretations in the air is no mean one.

By ideology Mannheim does not mean thinking as lies or rationalizations —what he calls "partial ideology"—or that some think ideologically and others correctly, as Marx held with regard to the contrast between the bourgeois and himself. Ideology means existentially determined thinking, i. e., thinking in order to act in a situation. It also means that thought is

[47] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia,* trans. by L. Wirth and E. Shils (1936); "Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* LIV (1925); "Historismus," *ibid.,* Vol. LII.

influenced by non-logical factors, such as the social group. Man participates in a prior world of thought patterns before his own emerge. These patterns are unconscious collective motives. It is "group-thinking." Man thinks in terms of group expectations. The clank of logic and the whir of syllogism are confined to philosophers. The explanation of ideas is a matter of membership character in groups. This imputation is not a question of right or wrong but a matter of perspective. All thinking is perspective. Given the same subject matter, people see different things because of their group affiliations. The concept of freedom and time differs as between conservatives and progressives. The bureaucrat, the aristocrat, the liberal, and the socialist have different notions of the historical and political process. There are, hence, different thought-styles for various groups which affect even the categories. Since thinking is so definitely related to the group and the historical period, Mannheim concludes that all thinking is ideological. This conception may be true with reference to thought oriented towards practical achievements. It follows then that thought is outmoded or inadequate—and therefore false, argues Mannheim—when not in harmony or impracticable with reference to historical reality. This is a dubious criterion for the validity of thought, which is made worse by an unpardonable *non sequitur;* namely, to conclude from the diversity of thinking among groups that all thinking is false. Further, such a conception misconstrues the nature of that theoretical thinking which transcends society, is not relative to it, and is valid in its own right. Theoretical inquiry develops its own methods, formulations, logic appropriate to the problems at hand. Formal principles of reasoning cannot be impeached by anyone, for they are the ground for any and all thinking whatsoever.

The pragmatic orientation of Mannheim is also expressed in the concept of "utopia." By utopia he does not mean a fictitious or unreal society along the style of Bacon, More, or Campanella. Utopian thought is a type of thinking not yet realized, but to be realized. It necessarily depends upon a historical setting which prepares the way for its development, and a class or group which will realize it in the social order. Utopian thinking implies a revolutionary situation. Utopias, like ideologies, are relative to the culture and its group organization. The concept of the dialectic is linked with that of the utopia. The previously dominant utopia, once realized, becomes the ground for the next utopia which will destroy it, and so *ad infinitum*. The successful utopia or ideology is determined only after the historical act is completed. At the moment the two cannot be differentiated, and hence the actual trend is never ascertainable unless one knows, like Mannheim, the ultimate significance or goal of history, for ideas in which the trend is recognized wait for the prior changes in the societal structure as well as the development of a total synthesis.

Now when ideas in reality, or ideas as transcending reality, are incon-

gruous or utopian, the stable position of truth is dissolved, or "historized" in relation to an epoch, social group, etc. In order to get out of this predicament, Mannheim resolves it in a somewhat nebulous concept of "synthetic thinking," a prerogative of the "socially unbound" or "free" class of intellectuals, who, if his major thesis is correct, should not be able to think at all. The intellectuals, nevertheless, discover the various right or partial truths and synthesize them into a new view. Since this new conception is not a mere combination or addition of bits of truth, the "synthetic resolution" of various perspectives remains somewhat esoteric.

These concepts of ideology and utopia are taken from political conflict and are oriented toward principles of political guidance.[48] As long as Mannheim is concerned with practical problems and regards thought solely from that perspective, he will confuse judgments of fact with judgments of value, and the function of thought in a culture with its logical status. Consequently he engages in a fictitious quest for objectivity in knowledge—a quest entered upon exclusively by social science because it deals with a value-impregnated subject matter which may contaminate its scientific principles and perspectives. That is a familiar warning, and methods of dealing with the problem presented have been developed in historical bibliography and criticism, comparative analysis, etc. A statement in form of a scientific proposition can be invalid only if it can be shown that its premises are contradictory or that it represents a factual contradiction. It is not to be denied that a consideration of the origin of an idea or even placing it in a wider context and under different perspectives is fruitful for its understanding, but to impeach its validity thereby, or even imply a "relative" validity, is a gross *non sequitur*.

The sociology of knowledge as a technique of research is a different matter. Mannheim is aware of the distinction, and differentiates between the evaluative and non-evaluative conception of ideology. It is with the latter that the sociology of knowledge should concern itself, as a "research interest which leads to the raising of the question when and where social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former concretely determines the latter."[49] Mannheim suggests certain techniques and criteria for the sociology of knowledge. There are various steps in the process of imputation: (1) to attribute an idea to a relatively closed *Weltanschauung* and to construct types of thought-styles; (2) to determine the degree to which people actually thought and acted along the lines of these constructed types; (3) to derive the thought systems from the groups and strata expressing them; (4) to examine these groups, etc., with reference to the total socio-cultural configuration. To determine the traits characterizing a statement and to assign it to a definite epoch or situation, he advances the following criteria: "Analysis of the con-

[48] Cf. E. R. Curtius, *Deutscher Geist in Gefahr* (1933), pp. 79–102.

[49] *Ideology and Utopia*, p. 239.

cept being used; the phenomenon of the counter-concept; the absence of certain concepts; the structure of the categorical apparatus; dominant models of thought; and the ontology presupposed." [50] It may also be pointed out that Mannheim has applied his ideas in research.[51]

IV. Concluding Remarks

Within the sociology of knowledge there are different perspectives. Durkheim vacillates between an extreme extrinsic and an immanent interpretation. While he demonstrates a functional relationship between societal structure and the categories of thought, he at the same time implies the autonomy of logical principles. His epistemological problem remains unsolved, and it is left aside in favor of the substantive approach. Scheler's law of interaction between ideal and real factors takes cognizance of the immanent structure and development of thought as well as the selective, compulsive influence of political, economic, and racial factors. Scheler's dualism has a tendency to consider mind as "less real," and in the end, if definitions were closely followed, mind has no influence upon the autonomous sphere of real factors and their various constellations. Were it not for the interposed *élite,* the structural identity between real and ideal factors would be a miracle. The extreme extrinsic interpretation is found in Marx and his followers. Thought and its validity are a reflex of the socio-economic structure. Thought is a mere tool for action and its validity is measured by its success or practicality.

The extrinsic interpretation of thought does not lend itself to the development of an adequate theory of mind. The pragmatic bias tends toward a derogation of contemplative or theoretical thinking, and ascribes a higher value to types of thought which lead to a domination or mastery over natural phenomena and social problems. As a consequence, the award of esteem and honor upon such a basis brings a differential placing and advantage in the social status and functioning of the participants. Since the value of success and practicality means competitive insecurity among groups and persons, thinking which does not tend to support that value is suspect. Practical thinking is "more real," and the rest is escape and rationalization. Such a distinction leads readily to the theory of the substratum which determines the ideological superstructure. The statement of the problem in such a way involves its own success, and it is a mere matter of hunting for the appropriate determinant. That some actions or thought are more real or natural than others is not a demonstrable empirical fact, nor can it be scientifically proven.

[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 244–50.

[51] "Die Bedeutung der Konkurrenz im Gebiete des Geistigen," *Schriften der deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie,* Vol. VI (1929); "Das konservative Denken," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,* Vol. LVII (1927).

Such a differentiation is based upon the axiological perspective of the thinker and depends upon his metaphysical assumptions.[52] The perspectives which can be taken are theoretically unlimited. The theory of substratum and superstructure tends to assume that a hypothetical or possible relation is a real relation. It confuses the hypothetical nature of its judgments with categorical judgments. The "material" substratum can be any variable one desires to choose. Each can be tested only through the efficacy with which it explains or interprets thought systems. There is no priority as such.[53]

The extrinsic analysis of ideas fails to differentiate between thought as a function *of* society and its function *in* society.[54] Analysis can be extended, however, into an elaboration of this notion of function of thought in society, and hence go beyond the "debunking" and class interest conception of the Marxians. As long as mind guides or directs life, this thought can be developed in a much more systematic way, i.e., precisely in and through whatever concrete means—for example, societal organization—mind utilizes for its purpose. It is a notion which can develop into a theory of public action and legislation. The analysis of thought from this perspective can be extended into the practical world—for instance, the press, promotional activities, education. There may be a danger, however, of making the sociology of knowledge a catchall for anything suggestive of social control, logic, social movements, ideologies, dogmas, intelligentsia, etc. It is then not a study of knowledge. The distinctions which Scheler has drawn must hold, or else the sociology of knowledge is a misnomer. The subject matter must be clearly differentiated. There are three main spheres: real factors, the theoretical-contemplative, and the ideal-normative spheres. The interrelations of these three, as well as their own organization, may properly be the sphere of substantive research.[55]

Such analysis will avoid the question of the validity of thought. It is with the conception of thinking as a function of society that its validity has been attacked by some proponents—almost exclusively the Marxists—of the sociology of knowledge. It is toward this point that most of the criticism has been directed. This phase of the sociology of knowledge seems to be the work of the followers rather than the original formulators. Durkheim and Scheler made special efforts to maintain the validity of thinking, and went even so far as to deny the relevancy of that question for their research. They

[52] This interrelation of a thinker's axiology and his conception of the sociology of knowledge is very clear and obvious in the work of Scheler; cf. *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.*

[53] Grünwald, *op. cit.*, chap. ii; Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 182–93.

[54] Schelting, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–17.

[55] Schelting, "Zum Streit über die Wissenssoziologie," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. LXII (1929). The work in the sociology of knowledge conducted by Professor Howard Becker's seminar at the University of Wisconsin is of this "substantive" character.

guarantee the object its truth. The notion of relativism or relationism as developed in Marxism is self-contradictory, for it must presuppose its own absoluteness. The sociology of knowledge from that angle must assume its own validity if it is to have any meaning. The ideal or theoretical realm transcends society and in that sense is ideological, but its unity, continuity, and validity are contained in principles within itself. It is neither contingent nor relative. The function of an idea in a culture must be differentiated from its logical status. As long as the sociology of knowledge confines itself to historical research oriented toward a possible relation of certain thought-forms with the socio-cultural configuration in which they occur, toward extra-theoretical factors "influencing" or remaining ineffective for the perspectives, problems, and formulations of research, it is upon legitimate ground. A specialized science should refrain from being either a philosophy or an epistemology.

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(See also Bibliographical Appendix.)

Part II

INTERACTIONS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

[5]

THE RELATION OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Alexander Goldenweiser

I. Wilhelm Dilthey

Es verlohnte sich nicht, Historiker zu sein, wäre es nicht eine Weise, die Welt auch zu begreifen!

DILTHEY [1]

Dilthey [2] (1833–1911) approached the problem of the social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) as a humanist and an artist. Underlying his sociological outlook is a system of psychology. And, as in the case of Wundt, the former cannot be understood without an insight into the latter. To begin with, Dilthey does not separate the human mind from the world outside, after the fashion of the metaphysicians. Far from it. He insists on a double relationship here. The mind in its manifestations is conditioned by corresponding processes in the neural organization, though we must plead ignorance as to the more precise nature of this relationship. Being teleological in its essence, that is, guided by ends and purposes, the mind

[1] Translation:
"It would not be worth while to be a historian, if this were not also a way to comprehend the world."

[2] Dilthey's most famous work is his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften: Versuch einer Grundlegung für das Studium der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte,* Vol. I (2nd ed.); the work was never completed.

Dilthey's *"Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften," Gesammelte Schriften,* Vol. VII, is almost as important for an understanding of his position as the *Einleitung.* It must be said of these two works as well as of the rest of his literary output that they represent a torso. Completeness, in either form or content, are nowhere to be found. It would almost seem that his vision always outstripped his constructive talents. Dilthey's was what Dewey would call a seminal mind. In culture history he will be remembered as an impregnator rather than a creator. How great his powers were in the former capacity will be gathered from the enormous influence he exercised, especially after his death, on all the social sciences, particularly in Germany. Of modern movements, *Gestalt* psychology and configurationism in anthropology, without articulating directly with Dilthey, are obviously related to him in intellectual orientation, whereas the typological studies of Spranger, Jaspers, Klages, and others contain internal evidence of more direct derivation from the same source.

realizes these by manipulating, in one or another way, the objects supplied by nature. Thus both in its origin and in its achievements mind is irretrievably bound to nature; that is, the objective world with its characteristics and regularities. Holding this view, Dilthey usually refers to the ultimate unit of social life; namely man, not only as a mind (*psyche*) but as a psycho-physical entity.

While the ways of mind are thus found to be limited, if not univocally defined, by its immersion in nature, the realization of this fact does not suffice to give us an understanding of the social sciences, including history, or of the tasks confronting the student of society. The next step cannot be taken without realizing that the relation of the natural sciences to their ultimate units is altogether different from the relation of the social sciences to their ultimate unit—man and his mind. Whereas in the natural sciences such a unit, say the atom or electron, is at least in part an abstraction, reached and defined by an intellectual process, in the social sciences the ultimate unit is also the ultimate reality. The mind and its experiences are not abstractions. In fact, mind, *as experienced,* possesses immediacy and depth beyond any other reality of the social world.[3] If, then, the world of social relations, including history, is to be understood in terms of the experiences of the individual mind, then our problems and our mode of approach in this field must differ radically from those characteristic of the natural sciences.[4]

For a naturalistic or positive approach to the social sciences, such as that of Comte, Dilthey has nothing but pity. The constancy of the external biological organization, says Comte, necessitates a certain fixed psychological structure. "We have recognized"—here Dilthey quotes from Comte—

[3] The basis of Dilthey's ideology appears clearly in the following passage: "The subjects . . . of the natural sciences are elements hypothetically secured by a dismemberment of outer reality, a breaking and splitting of things; in the social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) these elements are real entities given in inner experience as facts. Natural science builds up matter out of small bits of elements incapable of independent existence and thinkable only as components of molecules; the entities, on the contrary, which interact in the wonderfully interwoven whole of history and society, are individuals, psycho-physical wholes, each different from the others, each a world in itself. The world is nowhere different from what it is in the conception of such an individual . . . The singularity of each such individual active at some point of the immeasurable psychic cosmos, can be analyzed into its separate components in accordance with the dicturm: *individuum est ineffabile;* only in this fashion can it be grasped in its full significance" (*Einleitung,* etc., p. 29).

[4] "The circumstances of society," writes Dilthey, "are understandable to us from within; on the basis of awareness of our own psychic states, we can reproduce these circumstances, up to a certain point; our vivid perception of the historical world is suffused with love and hate, with passionate joy, with the free play of our affects. Nature to us is dumb. Only by the might of our imagination can we spread a glow of life and inwardness over it." (*Einleitung,* pp. 36–7.)

"that the general meaning of human evolution consists especially in diminishing more and more the preponderance, inevitable but at first excessive, of the emotional life over the intellectual life, or, following the anatomical formula, of the posterior region of the brain over the frontal region." "Crass, naturalistic metaphysics," exclaims Dilthey, "that is the real foundation of his sociology!" With similar vehemence Dilthey rejects the conclusion reached by John Stuart Mill in his famous chapter on the logic of the social sciences. "If we are to escape from the inevitable failures of social science when compared with the steady progress of the natural sciences," writes Mill, "our only hope lies in generalizing the methods which have proved so fruitful in the natural sciences so as to fit them to the uses of the social sciences." [5] Dilthey, on the contrary, discerns in the social sciences an entirely different "structure" from that characteristic of the sciences of nature. The entities investigated by the social sciences are given, not derived. These entities are human minds which can only be understood from within. Here we begin with the knowledge and understanding of this ultimate structural unit, and only by making use of this acquaintance can we hope to ascend to a comprehension of the social whole.[6]

The reality of social experience and of culture can only be understood through the individual psyche. It is in himself that man finds the key to the social world. This understanding, moreover, must take the form of a re-living. What we can re-live we can understand. The problem of understanding, that perennial mystery of the social scene, has great fascination for Dilthey, and he places it in the center of his scheme.[7] Obviously, un-

[5] *Logic,* II, Book VI, i.

[6] This contrast between the attitude of Comte and Mill, on the one hand, and of Dilthey, on the other, is illumined by the comments of Wundt. "As certainly as it was an error," writes Wundt, "when Mill advanced the proposition that the methods proved valid for the natural sciences . . . must also be applicable to the social sciences, so also it is a mistake to assume without further ado that the two fields of inquiry are rooted in a totally different logical base." (*Logik,* III, 81. Wundt's stricture is aimed specifically at Dilthey, *Einleitung,* p. 136.)

[7] The methods and results of understanding, says Dilthey, differ according to the class of the manifestations of life (*Lebensäusserung*) represented in the particular instance. He distinguishes three such classes. To the first class belong concepts, judgments, and the more complex mental structures. These mental phonomena have a nature of their own independent of the thought-context in which they appear. The second class of life-manifestations is represented by behaviors. These are not intended as communications, but in so far as they are oriented towards a purpose, the latter is revealed through them.

And now the third class which is the core of Dilthey's system! It is expression; the revelation to the understanding of the totality of life as expressed in words, sentences, creative works. Here the one who expresses something is most likely to be himself misled, for the relation between the expression and the expressed is only partially revealed to his consciousness.

derstanding cannot and should not include the whole range of social life, each and every bit of it. There must here be selection and what is selected is the significant.[8]

The culture historian, armed with the tools of understanding, finds himself confronted, according to Dilthey, with structurally unified and, to him, intellectually meaningful types: types of man, of social structure, and of culture, also types of religion, of legal systems, and of art. Now a type to Dilthey is not by any means the most common form—although certain of his passages might be so interpreted—but the most significantly representative form, representative because related to the largest number of other facts or forms connected with the whole, and as such, significant.[9] Further, the real values, contents, meanings, of social life or of history are hidden behind a screen of expression, in action, words, symbols, or institutions. Only by learning to understand these expressions may we hope to discover what lies behind them. In a proposition, for example, presented in the form of words, what is conveyed may be one of two things. Either we attend to the conclusion expressed in the proposition: this conclusion conveys its meaning as consciously intended and, as a conclusion, it can be true or false.

[8] This significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) hinges on the relation of the individual to its *milieu*. Everything here stands in a living relationship (*Lebensbezug*) to the "I": "To the qualities things acquire in their living relationship to me correspond changes in my own condition engendered by this relationship." (*Ibid.*, p. 131.) And again: "Any occurrence can be significant in so far as it reveals to us something of the nature of life" (*"Das Wesen der Philosophie," Gesammelte Schriften,* V, 394). And finally: "Significance is immanent in life, it lies in its 'nature' as a closely knit complex, it is therefore a 'category of life.'" (*Ibid., Fragmente,* VI, 319. Cf. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften* [1928], pp. 269 ff.) "And life," adds Dilthey, "is the ultimate, basic fact beyond which analytical reason itself cannot go."

"Life," he writes, "is the basic fact which must be the point of departure of philosophy. It is that which is known from the inside, that beyond which it is impossible to penetrate. Reason cannot play judge to Life." (*Gesammelte Schriften,* VII, 261.)

[9] "It is essential in the individuation of reality that certain basic forms, to be here designated as types, constantly recur in the play of variations. In such a type several marks, parts, or functions are always found combined. These traits, the combination of which marks the type, are so related to each other that the presence of one implies that of the others, the variation of one, variation of the others. This typical coalescence of traits rises in ascending series of living forms, reaching its culmination in the organic and finally the psychic sphere. The principle of types can be regarded as the second principle which controls individuation, the first being the principle of uniformity" (*ibid.*, V, 270). It will probably be admitted that the concept of types, as formulated by Dilthey, is notable for sweep rather than clarity. Dilthey's student, Eduard Spranger, in his *Lebensformen,* has concretized and elaborated the master's thought, thus achieving clarity. I fear, though, that in this more comprehensible form, at least in Spranger's version of it, Dilthey's position becomes even more questionable. It is, however, impossible here to go beyond this bare statement. See the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 17–46.

Our familiarity with the proposition, again, might make us understand what it was that had prompted it, or what the statement had meant to the individual who made it, or why this particular proposition rather than another—perhaps an opposite one—was made at that particular time and place and by that particular person. The message thus brought by a proposition need not have been intended by the person making it, yet the message is significant and may be revelatory. This second kind of message conveyed by expression cannot be adjudged as true or false. It may, however, be faithful or unfaithful, and if the latter, then illusory, and as such, misleading. For example, a primitive myth may contain predications of fact. These, of course, can be true or false. In either case the myth may also contain a different kind of truth; namely, the truth of its existence or expressiveness or fitness or typicalness for a time and a place and a people. As such, the myth may be a more or less accurate portrayal of something lying behind it; it might, of course, lead us astray in our search for the deeper meaning of that period, but also, it might guide us to the very *sanctum sanctorum,* to the very essence of that life and of that time. It is this latter kind of understanding of expression in life that is most significant for Dilthey.[10]

Dilthey does not deny that a prerequisite of all social or historical study is the discovery, with Ranke, of *"wie es eigentlich gewesen."* [11] To this extent the task of the social scientist corresponds to the factual search of the natural scientist. But he who would establish a foundation for social science must first determine the necessary conditions and the inevitable limitations of such objective inquiry. These conditions and limitations can only be revealed by an analysis of the process of understanding. As already stated, we can objectively visualize the content of a past occurrence only by re-living it. In order to understand it in its uniqueness, in so far, that is, as it differs from other contents, we must be careful not to force it into the categories of thought and value derived from our own time and place and reflected in the apperceptive readiness of our mind. Such an understanding of the past in its uniqueness, then, will always be accompanied by a consciousness of a conflict; namely, the conflict between the uniqueness of the

[10] Dilthey's term "psychic climate" (*geistiger Habitus*) illumines this vicarious message conveyed to the understanding by expression (Landgrebe, *Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie,* etc., p. 341).

[11] As to this often quoted but seldom understood dictum of Ranke's a reference to the source might be in place. What he said, then, was this: "The most important qualification of a historical work remains that it must be true, that *the events should have occurred as represented"* (*Sämmtliche Werke* [3rd ed., 1877], XII, 6). And again: "One has insisted that the function of history was to sit in judgment over the past, to instruct contemporaries for the benefit of future generations. The following pages do not presume to such high office: all they intend to show is *wie es eigentlich gewesen"* (*ibid.,* XXXIII, p. vii). (*Italics* are mine—A. G.). See the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 17–24.

past and that of the present. This very conflict, however, is made possible by a common underlying base. Differences can only be comprehended on a background of similarities. It can therefore be stated as a general proposition that an understanding of the past is only possible in so far as that past stands in some inner relation to the present which attempts to understand it. This common substratum—and here Dilthey speaks with the anthropologists!—lies in the comparability of human nature at all times and places. This common-human psychic make-up Dilthey conceives of as the "ideal human type" with its typical psychic complex. The study of history leads to the gradual revelation of this ideal type displayed in all its psychic possibilities. Dilthey regards our painfully acquired understanding of society and history as an "endless task." We are led on to an ever greater "depth of experience," even as an artist or aesthete ascends, with progressing sophistication and richness of personal content, to ever higher levels of comprehension and insight. The ego or "I," therefore, may become richer, deeper, more sophisticated or responsive, but all understanding is always with reference to that "I." "Understanding," writes Dilthey, "is a rediscovery of the 'I' in the 'thou.' The spirit rediscovers itself on progressively higher levels of experience. It is always the same spirit: in the 'I,' in the 'thou,' in every member of a community, in every system of culture, finally in the spiritual totality of universal history. Thus is laid down a program for all possible ranges of comprehension in the social sciences." [12]

II. Heinrich Rickert

According to Dilthey, as we saw, the distinction between the natural and the social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) lies in the fact that the basic units of the former are physical, those of the latter, psychic. The physical ultimates of the natural sciences, again, are at least in part conceptual abstractions; therefore the subject-matter of the natural sciences is studied indirectly by way of these ultimate units. In the social sciences, on the contrary, the psychic ultimate, the individual mind, represents a microcosm belonging to one level with the social macrocosm; here, therefore, the subject-matter can be approached directly.[13]

This position is attacked by Heinrich Rickert who approaches the problem as a logician. Is the mind, from the angle of logic, really different from external nature, he asks? Is our knowledge of it more direct and immedi-

[12] Ranke, *op. cit.*, *"Plan der Fortsetzung zum Aufbau,"* VII, 191.

[13] Two apt quotations from Dilthey are adduced by Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, I, 3, *n.* 2. "The *Geisteswissenschaften* tend to borrow the methods of the *Naturwissenschaften*, owing to the seniority of these latter disciplines, notwithstanding the fact that their respective *Verfahrungsweisen* differ *ab initio*" (*Gesammelte Schriften*, VII, 130), and: "The 'real' (*realen*) categories are . . . in the *Geisteswissenschaften* nowhere the same as in the *Naturwissenschaften*" (*ibid.*, p. 195).

ate? In this connection, he distinguishes the psychophysical self or subject, which comprises the mind plus its neural and other correlates, and the purely psychological subject, which is mind as an exploring agency. The term "inner," as applied to the psychic as contrasted with the physical, can evidently refer only to the psychophysical subject, not to the mind itself. Mind, which consists of events, cannot as such occupy space; it can, therefore, be neither "outer" nor "inner." [14] Nor is it correct to distinguish our knowledge of the mind from that of the external world by characterizing the former as direct, the latter as vicarious. Whatever its true nature may be, the objective world, as we know it, is given in experience. Only as experienced is it open to investigation, not less so, nor more, than the mind itself when we explore it.

Rickert's stricture might be met by the reflection that in the psychic domain the actual object to be investigated is psychic, whereas in the physical domain what is investigated is merely a reflection of the real object, not its existential form. Apparently, then, there is a distinction. To this Rickert's answer is that mind engaged in self-study must be analyzable into a *percipiens* and a *perceptum*, a subject and an object. A mind cannot at one and the same time be both subject and object of its own exploration, nor could a part of the mind that would never turn a *perceptum* or object, ever be a *percipiens* or subject either, and as such it would fall outside the empirical mind. To resolve this dilemma, Rickert introduces the concept of an "epistemological subject" (*erkenntnistheoretisches Subjekt*) which is neither psychic nor physical. This concept forms no part of empirical reality, merely representing the limit of our efforts when we attempt to make each bit of the mind become in turn an object of exploration for the residual bit. Not being an existential entity, the epistemological subject can, of course, never be isolated. So that, in fact, it is always a bit of the actual mind which plays the subject with reference to another bit of it which plays the object. The definition of mind as the process of consciousness, concludes Rickert, is entirely too broad to be used as a demarcation of the psychic field from the physical. All that could be inferred from this definition with reference to the concept of the psychic, would also apply to the concept of the physical: [15] the physical is also an immediately given reality, that is, *that* physical which serves as material for the objective sciences.

It is for reasons such as these that Rickert cannot accept Dilthey's declaration that the direct and vivid (*anschaulich*) method of exploration peculiar

[14] "Modern empirical psychology knows of no psychic 'thing' that dwells inside the body. It is therefore no longer possible to posit the psychic in a definite spot inside a spatial body" (*Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung: Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften* [1921], p. 100).

[15] With the true logician's almost cruel indifference to irrelevancies Rickert says simply that all objects are psychic that are not physical.

to the social sciences demands a psychological system in which room is made for the full inwardness of psychic life.[16] No such complete psychological system, claims Rickert, is possible in a historical science. "It merely follows from this," he writes, "that when the historian must function as a psychological expert, he cannot achieve this by leaning upon a systematic science of psychology, but that the psychology he uses, in so far as it can be designated as such, has little in common with the psychology which exists as a science." [17] In scientific psychology, the concepts derived from the study of one's own psychic life must be applicable to psychic life in general. Otherwise, no science of mind in general would be possible. The logical structure, therefore, of such self-study of the individual and of a science of psychology must be the same. For this reason an attempt should be made to reduce the study of individual psychology, in so far as it is to be a science, to the smallest possible number of concepts (perhaps only one) paralleling the procedure of the natural sciences in their approach to the objective world.[18] It is true enough that the psychologists have not, in fact, succeeded and probably never will succeed in reducing the psychological field to elements as few in number and conceptually as simple as are the ultimate units of the natural scientists. This, however, is merely a difference in degree of achievement, not in the underlying logical requirements.

Nature, then, as a subject of scientific study is empirical reality with

[16] "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie," *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1894), p. 1326.

[17] *Die Grenzen,* p. 154. In view of the rising conviction among social scientists that a perfected science of psychology will some day provide an adequate background for the social sciences, this well considered judgment of Rickert's deserves special emphasis. The principle is strikingly illustrated in the case of Wundt. Here was a professional psychologist who was also a professional social scientist. His psychological labors, moreover, had filled many busy years before he began to pen the *Völkerpsychologie*. Here, if ever, one was justified in expecting that the abundant psychological wisdom amassed in the *Physiological Psychology* and the *General Psychology* would be systematically exploited in the *Völkerpsychologie*. Far from it! The specific references to his psychological works are very few. The psychological wisdom is there in abundance, to be sure, but it does not hail from the *Physiological Psychology* or the *General Psychology*. Nor is this fact in conflict with Wundt's theoretical position. He draws a sharp distinction between the relation of the theoretical to the applied sciences in the natural scientific field and the relation of technical psychology to the interpretation of social situations, whether these fall into the field of economics, politics, sociology, or history.

[18] Rickert writes: "Of 'ultimate things' there can of course be no question in psychology, but concepts will be formed of 'elements,' that is of simple components of the psyche out of which the limitless manifold of psychic life will be built up. In case one should not discover an ultimate concept of such elements . . . at least their number will be reduced to the minimum, at worst it will be conceived as limited. In no other way . . . can a truly general theory of the psychic come into being, in which every psychic process will find its place" (*Die Grenzen,* etc., p. 123).

reference to the general or to its general relationships. The limit of the utilizability of natural scientific concepts, therefore, is to be looked for not in the character of the material or content—this may be physical or psychic ("or even metaphysical," adds Rickert slyly)—but in the approach adopted by these sciences, which contrasts with what we shall distinguish as the historical approach. From one angle, then, Mill was justified in his attempt to extend the methods of natural science to the sciences of society. But there is a limit to such extension—it is reached when these sciences become historical. The contrast between nature and mind or spirit, concludes Rickert, is useless as a basis for a logical classification of scientific concepts, a classification which is imperative if we are to understand the nature of historical things. With this he clinches his opposition, in this crucial matter, to Dilthey, as well as to Eduard Meyer, historian of antiquity and careful methodologist.[19]

Then Rickert turns to an examination of nature and history. The real limit to the applicability of the concepts of natural science lies in nothing else but empirical reality itself in its singleness, immediacy, and individuality. It is curious in this connection that the two terms which designate the ultimate units in the natural scientific universe, on the one hand, and in the world of empirical reality, on the other—namely the atom and the individual—should have the same meaning, "indivisible." But one should not confuse the indivisibility of simplicity implied in the Greek term with the indivisibility of many-sidedness or complexity designated by the Latin.[20] It is not in the nature of the material, then, that we must look for the difference between natural science and history but in what is selected from the material as significant (*wesentlich*) for the particular type of exploration. It is of the essence of the historical that it occurs once and is what it

[19] Rickert's difference with Meyer in this matter hinges on the latter's view of "free will" as a decisive factor in history. "We must insist," writes Rickert, "that the logical contrast between nature and history has no relation whatsoever to the contrast between causal necessity and freedom, and that the individualizations of history do not imply the assumption of 'individual freedom' in the sense of causelessness" (*Die Grenzen,* etc., pp. 285–6). Now Meyer, to be sure, does not use "individual freedom" in the sense of "causelessness"; in fact, he vigorously combats the tendency so to use it. "Like everything else, the human will is determined, it is a link in a causal chain" (*Kleine Schriften,* pp. 16–7). But also: "This linkage is no longer mechanical, as in the world of matter, but psychic; it is, therefore, no longer the blind effect of natural laws, but an interlacing of images and motives which engender and control the decision of the will" (*ibid.,* p. 17). . . . "Free decision is the *form* taken by this process" (*ibid.,* p. 19).

[20] "One might say," writes Rickert significantly, "that the most comprehensive generalizing concept of natural science would represent its objects in the simplest possible form, whereas the most comprehensive individualizing concept of history would have to comprise the greatest possible heterogeneity of historically significant elements" (*Die Grenzen,* etc., p. 281).

is, in its wholeness, uniqueness, and singularity. Even those of us who are accustomed to apply this concept to historical events or processes, when they refer to human affairs, are not always prepared to think in similar terms of the rest of empirical reality. But is it not obvious that all things in it, including all objects, represent, from this angle, individual histories? Every object, as Dewey has also pointed out, is the end-point of a history.[21]

History and nature thus represent the conceptual expressions of two kinds of interest in empirical reality. When we study reality as nature, we abstract from the individual; but should we also be interested in reality in the fullness of its complexity and uniqueness, then we turn to history in the broadest sense. History is inherently incapable of considering the general. It deals with particulars, that is with the things, and the only things, that have actually occurred (cf. German: *geschehen—Geschichte*). In so far as the domain of history is the unimpaired richness of reality, history may be described with Simmel as "the science of the real" (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*).[22]

To reiterate: Empirical reality can be envisaged as a part of nature or as a part of history. It becomes history when it is envisaged with reference to the particular and individual. It must, however, be remembered that every historical individual is embedded in a wider historical whole. These relations of the singular to the whole of which it is a part are disregarded in natural science, which isolates its ultimate units conceptually. In history, on the other hand, these relations may not be disregarded, for it is only in the setting of such relations that the historical individual, as such, emerges. Historical phenomena also exhibit the relationship of causal linkage which must, however, be strictly distinguished from the causal laws of natural science.[23]

[21] It is of interest that John Dewey, dealing with these matters in an entirely different context, should have voiced very similar thoughts. In a chapter of his *Experience and Nature,* the very name of which is significant ("Nature, Ends, and Histories") Dewey dwells on the historic character of existential processes (nature). He writes: "The genuine implications of natural ends may be brought out by considering beginnings instead of endings. To insist that nature is an affair of beginnings is to assert that there is no one single and all-at-once beginning of everything . . . And since wherever one thing begins something else ends, what is true of beginnings is true of endings" (pp. 97–8). Thus nature is an affair of beginnings and endings, that is of histories.

[22] *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* (1892), p. 43. And Meyer writes: "That there are no laws of history is not due to the intellectual weakness of historians or to insufficient data, but to the very nature of history itself" (*Kleine Schriften,* p. 35). See the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 17–24.

[23] Rickert's discussion of this point is one of the most important contributions of the *Grenzen*. He points out at the outset that there is only one empirical reality which provides the materials for natural science as well as history. This being so, the general forms of this reality, such as causality, must be of significance for the individualizing sciences. But "causal linkage" is one thing, "causal law" another! Especially so, if the

Another concept inherent in the historical view is that of development. But development here must always be envisaged from the standpoint of certain values which determine the selection of the elements linked into a developmental series.[24]

The recognition of historical causality has an obvious bearing on the concept of accident in history. If what is meant by "accidental," argues Rickert, is anything that cannot be subsumed under a causal law, and by "necessary" anything subject to such a law, then all reality is accidental in so far as it is individual and, as such, eludes formulation as part of a natural scientific order. If, on the other hand, "accidental" means uncaused, then nothing in the world is accidental. Causality, as Schopenhauer put it, is not a cab one can stop at will. If its operation is admitted, it cannot be suspended. Everything has a cause, and every cause has an effect. "Necessary," however, can also mean significant or essential (*wesentlich*), in which case the accidental becomes the unessential. In this interpretation, history, as the science of the accidental, would have to be regarded as incapable of determining what is scientifically essential. This, of course, is not the case. "History is not the science of the accidental as unessential; the content of its concepts, on the contrary, is closely and inevitably linked together, in so far as it excludes everything that is accidental, in the sense of being unessential, with reference to the dominant values of the particular presentation." (*Die Grenzen,* etc., pp. 286 ff.) [25]

The contrast between the natural scientist and the historian is further illustrated by the difficulties that beset them with reference to their material. The natural scientist usually has much more of it than he needs for his purpose; the historian, on the other hand, is ever on the lookout for more material. And yet, even though the historian may know too little about a certain event or series of events, he at the same time inevitably knows too much of it, in the sense that not all he knows is part of history. It becomes evident, therefore, that while history deals with the individual and particular and with singular events that do not repeat themselves, it may

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latter term is to be identified with "natural law." To avoid confusion, Rickert designates causality not as a law but a principle or maxim (*Grundsatz*). For a survey of the causal concept see my "The Nature and Tasks of the Social Sciences," *Jour. of Soc. Phil.* (October, 1937), and "The Concept of Causality in the Natural and Social Sciences," *Am. Soc. Rev.* (September, 1938).

[24] "The concept of a representable historical individuality as the carrier of meaningful contents is constituted, in the first place, by the values which cling to culture and the relations of this concept to these cultural values" (*Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* [6th and 7th eds.]; p. 81).

[25] I think that Rickert, whose analysis is usually most discerning, was misguided in accepting this unsatisfactory connotation of "accidental." In this point Meyer's discussion seems vastly superior. He points out the obvious fact that "accident" and "necessity," "cause" and "effect," are categories of thought, not qualities of things or events.

not function merely as a mirror-like reproduction of reality; for, if this were achieved, the result would have no meaning as history but would be as confusing and bewildering as the reality it portrayed. If history is to be a science, then, it must, like other sciences, deal with concepts. The problem of the formation of historical concepts, finally, consists in discovering whether experiential reality could not be scientifically reshaped and simplified in a way that would leave its individuality intact.

It will be seen from the preceding that Rickert does not deny the need for general concepts in history but attempts to give greater precision to their rôle in the historical context. Whereas in the natural sciences general concepts represent the ultimate aim or purpose, in history they are reduced to the function of a method. For the aim here, as we saw, is to understand a concrete individual complex in its wholeness.

Returning once more to the concept of the uniqueness of the historical individual or complex, Rickert points out that here also no sharp line can be drawn between the physical or corporeal and the psychic. The real structural cohesion of the mind must evidently be the same in every person. It can not be seen, therefore, how this trait, made so much of by Dilthey and others, can be used to differentiate between uniqueness in general, and that singular, that is, *indivisible uniqueness* which is characteristic of historic individuality. This applies to situations, persons, things. In the case of the Kohinoor diamond, for example, what makes its individuality historic, compared to an ordinary piece of coal, is not merely its uniqueness but the irreplaceable significance of that uniqueness. Historic individuals, in other words, are such in relation to a value. What constitutes the historic singularity of a personality is, then, not that singularity as "lived," as is claimed by Dilthey, but as indivisible in its relation to a value.

Here Rickert is careful to distinguish the concept of history as a valuational science from the concept of it as a science related to values. This is of importance in view of the fact that Rickert's position has been repeatedly misconstrued as representing the former alternative. "The historical individual is *significant for all* precisely by being *different from all*." This formulation best illustrates that combination of a general concept with an individual context which is the differential of the historic situation. Now, this "significance," though implying a reference to a value, does not imply evaluation. Thus a political personality will be represented as historical by a historian in view of its irreplaceable significance in the political scene, but it will not be incumbent upon him to evaluate that personality as positive or negative, useful or destructive.

From the standpoint of general theory, it is true, the natural scientist is also guided by certain logical values which enable him to separate the essential from the unessential in empirical reality. This, however, has no reference to the methodological problem. What counts here is the following

contrast. In natural science the objects investigated are and must be separated from all values, so as to make them available as pure samples of the relevant concepts. The science of history, on the contrary, while eschewing all *practical* evaluation of its objects as good or evil, can never dispense with a reference of these objects to values in general, else it would be utterly impossible to separate in empirical reality that which is historically significant from that which is not.[26]

It thus becomes clear that history is not a science of reality as such any more than is natural science, for the simple reason that reality as such cannot become the subject of any science. One or another form of selecting is indispensable. Granting this much, history, by contrast with natural science, can nevertheless be designated as a science of reality, in so far as it deals with singular individual realities, the only realities about which we have any knowledge at all. History, moreover, can claim this status also in so far as it assumes a standpoint valid for all [27] and therefore uses as objects of its presentation only such individual realities or historic individuals as are significant with reference to a generally recognized value.

The individualizing nature of the historical approach does not cease to operate when narrower contexts are replaced by wider historical horizons. The history of a town may be brought in relationship to that of a nation, the latter to that of a continent, and even continental history might ultimately be absorbed in a general history of humanity. In all such instances the extension of relations merely leads to further and more comprehensive individuation.

In his attempt to draw a picture of a generally significant and therefore historic reality, the historian must often take recourse to vividness (*Anschaulichkeit*) of depiction. This aspect of historical work, which evidently involves literary or artistic ability, has given rise to the view that this type of luminous description is of the very essence of history which, from this angle, appears as an art rather than as a science. Rickert, though admitting the frequent necessity of *Anschaulichkeit* in depiction, does not regard this feature as an essential part of the logical structure of history. The

[26] "The reference to values," writes Rickert, "should be strictly distinguished from evaluation, if the nature of history as a theoretical discipline is to be made clear. History is interested in values only in so far as these *factually* refer to persons who *factually* designate certain objects as goods (and hence, values). Thus, though history is concerned with values, it is not an evaluating (or normative) discipline. On the contrary, it merely represents what is. . . . Theoretical reference to values remains in the level of the factual, evaluation does not" (*Kulturwissenschaft,* etc., p. 87). See the discussion of "relevance to value" in the chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 491–542.

[27] By "all" in such statements as this, Rickert, of course, means not all people in general, nor even all those of one civilization or country or language, but all those who care about such matters at all, and, therefore, form judgments about them.

historian becomes *anschaulich* merely because this device is so useful in the representation of significant individuality. In doing so he must, of course, make use of imagination, and "when imagination comes into play logic has nothing further to say."

It is therefore also wrong to contend with Dilthey that the historian must make past reality live in the present, or to see the essence of history in an understanding which is a re-living. In a sense these assertions are true, in so far, namely, as the historian must indeed do these things. But the logical particularity of history is not thus revealed. "Understanding" can be of a generalizing as well as of an individualizing type. Only when the two types of understanding are juxtaposed can the true and necessary nature of the historian's procedure come to light, while insight will also be gained into the logic of history.

It will be clear now that the individual or singular must not be confused with the isolated. On the contrary, a historical event, personage or situation must always be envisaged in the setting to which it actually belongs. It has been shown before that general concepts are merely used as means in history and that historic individuals are significant in relation to certain general values. The subsumption of a historical object under a more general context is, then, another kind of generality which we encounter here. The apparent contradiction between this result and the individualizing nature claimed for history can be shown to be illusory. The general, in the sense of the natural sciences, refers to the generality of the content of a concept of which the separate individuals are used as *examples* or *specimens*. The general historical complex, on the other hand, is a comprehensive whole of which the separate individuals or smaller complexes are the *parts* (*Die Grenzen,* p. 272). The logical contrast implied should be obvious enough. Connected with this is the simplification achieved by the natural-scientific method when contrasted with the complexity of the comprehensive concepts of history. Rickert here ventures the following generalization: "The most comprehensive generalizing scientific concept would imply the greatest simplification of its objects, the most comprehensive individualizing concept of history, on the other hand, would comprise the greatest heterogeneity or multiplicity of historically significant objects" (*ibid.,* p. 281).

From this Rickert proceeds to the difficult problem of historical development. To pave the way for the consideration of development in relation to the historic context, he reviews the different possibilities of developmental concepts in general. The simplest and most general concept here is the view of empirical reality as a *becoming: πάντα ρεῖ*, all is in flux. Now, obviously enough, this concept cannot be regarded as a differential of history; it applies, on the contrary, to the whole of empirical reality and in particular to that aspect of it which is subsumed under the so-called laws of nature. A

variant of this concept of development is brought about by the insertion of the notion of change connected with that of succession. But here once more the application of the concept extends to the whole of reality. Repetition and cyclical recurrence, again, taken strictly, are no more a part of reality, as such, than is perfect persistence. The concept here implied originates through abstraction from the individual differences of the several series of changes. We speak, for example, of the succession of the seasons which constitutes an ever recurring annual cycle. The cyclical character here obtains only with reference to the general concept of the four seasons, and the thought of repetition of the real is brought about by taking cognizance of that which is common to the terminologically identical seasons. Strictly speaking, no actual annual cycle has ever been identical with another.

It follows from this that the idea of serial change does not suffice for a true picture of the historic process, for it comprises too much. The concept of a series is not fit to define the particularity of the historical unless it is made to comprise exclusively singular and individual series.[28]

The changes in history, on the other hand, are specific only in so far as each change is singular and individual and therefore contributes something that has never existed before, something new. The question remains: What kind of newness and what special series of successive changes belong to the domain of history? The only possible answer here is that the "new" must also be the "significant," that the newness must be of value from the standpoint of the leading concepts of the historical presentation. This feature—the significant newness—is supplied when the developmental concept becomes teleological, implying a reference to an end, to the wholeness of the particular becoming.[29]

[28] Here Rickert refers to the oft-discussed example of astronomy which combines the characteristics of a science resting on laws—on laws, moreover, of the greatest possible rigor—with the trait of singularity, in so far as it is concerned with individual objects distinguishable by personal names. Closer analysis, however, reveals that what is subsumed under law in astronomy are certain quantitative determinations referring to the cosmic bodies, but that everything qualitative in the singular individual developmental series remains thoroughly incomprehensible from the standpoint of natural science. Any attempt, says Rickert, to subsume a singular and individual development in our solar system under a general law would be as absurd as the attempt to deduce from a general law the singular development of a man like Goethe or Bismarck.

[29] This has an obvious bearing on the problem of vitalism versus mechanism and the broader problem of conceptual levels in its application to the different sciences of reality. Rickert points out here that the irreconcilable contradiction between mechanism and teleology obtains only when the operation of the two principles is unjustifiably identified. If, on the other hand, mechanism is employed in the regressive establishment of causes, whereas the telic view is made to refer to the wholeness of the individual organism regarded as the end of one mechanical series, then the apparent contradiction is dissolved. The same point can be made with reference to all the disciplines to which the concept of levels is applicable.

In view of the spectacular career of the concept of social evolution sketched elsewhere, it is interesting to read Rickert's judgment as logician.

The biological concept of evolution, in its application to the historic or cultural process, suffers from a defect which unfits it to function as a conceptual tool in history. In so far as evolution is conceived as progress from lower to higher forms, all the stages of the process excepting only the highest are demoted in rank. These stages become mere stepping-stones in the advance to the highest stage. To the extent to which this is the case, injustice is done to their individual worth and significance. Such a procedure (here Rickert refers to Ranke) applies a vehicular view to the stages preceding the highest and to that extent is unhistorical (*"Dieses Verfahren würde die früheren Perioden zugunsten der späteren mediatisieren und wäre daher unhistorisch"*). Hence the crucial question: How can a value be so combined with the idea of development as to transform it into a historical concept?

It is often claimed that historical is that which exercises an influence (*Wirkung*) or carries over into the future (Meyer: *"Historisch ist, was wirksam ist oder gewesen ist"*).[30] In and by itself, objects Rickert, this does not suffice to give the concept of the historical sufficient precision. When all is said, everything that occurs, every event, plays its determining part in some causal chain, thus reaching over into the future. In one sense, therefore, everything or anything "counts." It is only when the concept of significance in relation to a general value is added that this "counting" becomes an earmark of the historical. What the historian is interested in is that every historic presentation must contain a series of significant changes. It follows from this that those factors which exercise the same influence on *all* stages of a historical development drop out of the picture, for obviously they cannot render the separate phases of the process individually significant, which is a prime requirement for their historicity. Significance with reference to a general value, then, must attach individually and separately to each stage of the historical process. Only thus can each such stage, as well as the entire development comprising the stages, become conceptually transformed in the direction of individualization, the ear-mark of the historical. If this much can be achieved (or more hopefully: when it is), we shall find ourselves at the portals of a science of history.[31]

[30] "Historical is what is exercising, or has exercised, an influence."

[31] I think this particular conceptualization of Rickert's is not a happy one. The ambitious conception of progress popularized by the classical evolutionists is, of course, to be abandoned. (See pp. 436–59). But a more modest and less abstract concept applicable to relatively narrow series, spatially and temporally, may still prove of value, perhaps permanently so. Such a concept might, for example, be applied to the rise of Gothic architecture in the Middle Ages; or to technology starting, say, with the Industrial Revolution; or to the centralized State, from the XVIIIth century on. In such limited series the separate links or stages would represent an advance

Before closing this exposition of Rickert it will be well to summarize briefly his principal contributions to the logic of the historical standpoint. The customary procedure of drawing a distinction between the natural and the social sciences at the point of the human mind is artificial and not logically significant. The natural-science standpoint is as applicable to the psychological domain as it is to the physical. If our results in the former domain fall short of those in the latter, the difference is one of degree not of logical status. The truly contrasting standpoints, on the other hand, are the natural-scientific and the historical. The former aims at generalization, the latter at individualization. In the former the generalization, or law, is reached after a preliminary dismemberment of the experiential whole into abstract or semi-abstract units or ultimates which are relatively simple, uniform, and therefore subsumable under a law. The units of the historical approach, on the other hand, are wholes, also abstracted from experiential reality but with reference not to their simplicity, as in the natural sciences, but to their individual and singular complexity. When a historical whole is envisaged with reference to its relation to a larger historical whole it is thereby subsumed, not in a simpler and more abstract generalization—as are the conceptual units of science when absorbed in a generalization of a higher order—but in a new individualized whole as singular and unique as are the narrower historical wholes comprised in it. Clearly, then, reality *as experienced* does not enter into the conceptual picture of the historian any more than it does into that of the natural scientist. Here also there is selection. What is selected is the significant. This significance, again, is not based on the causal effectiveness of the feature selected—that, claims Rickert, is a common trait of all things and events—but on the relation of the feature selected to a general value. This does not make history a valuational science—the historian as such does not evaluate—but it does indicate that selection in history proceeds with reference to certain generally accepted values in relation to which the historic feature selected gains its significance. In its bearing on historic development this means that evolutionism is to be condemned as tending to demote all stages in a historic process except the last. Instead, each link in a historic development, every stage, is to be referred individually and singly to a general value. In this way the historic process becomes conceptualized and may thus enter into the structure of a science of history.

(For selected references, see footnotes of the chapter and Bibliographical Appendix.)

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towards the realization of certain ideals (cultural values) determined, within limits, from the start. The only come-back to this, that I can see, would be to say that each one of the series here mentioned already represents a selective handling of history, not history *in toto*. Should Rickert choose to make this reply, as well he might, he would, I think, be right.

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STATISTICS IN MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT

George A. Lundberg

I. Introduction

The expansion of the frontiers of knowledge, through the application of the scientific method and the multiplication of human contacts through an enormous development of the means of communication, is undoubtedly among the more significant events of the last two centuries. These developments have made necessary a large number of changes in man's adjustment techniques, including his methods of thought. In the first place, science relies on *man's experience* as the guide to conduct, instead of on divine revelation or other supernatural intervention. Consequently, adequate records of experience have become increasingly important. In the second place, the expansion of social contacts has enormously increased the quantity and variety of data which must be considered in making our adjustments. A technique adapted to the objective recording of experience in large quantities and its meaningful analysis has, therefore, become increasingly imperative. Statistical methods constitute such a technique. It is not surprising, therefore, that a tremendous development of these methods has taken place during this period.

Records of any kind are, of course, only externally stored experience. In preliterate times, such experience was stored entirely in the neuro-muscular mechanisms of human beings themselves, and was transmitted by word of mouth. But the human organism, unassisted by external devices,

* The present chapter deals with this subject chiefly from the historical viewpoint. No attempt has been made to summarize here the large number of types of statistical attack upon a large variety of sociological problems to which statistical methods have been applied in recent years. The best summary of such applications will be found in S. C. Dodd's *Dimensions of Society* (Macmillan, 1940). This volume presents a sample of about 300 such studies drawn from the entire output of such material in the sociological journals, *The Journal of the American Statistical Association,* and important sociological books during a ten-year period since 1920. Neither have I attempted to review in the present chapter the more important contemporary statistical monographs or the controversial literature on the subject of the application of quantitative methods to sociological problems. Such review will be found in my *Foundations of Sociology* (Macmillan, 1939) especially Chapters 2, 4, 11–13.

has very great limitations both as a repository and a classifier of large numbers of impressions which present themselves simultaneously. Hence, man has developed systems of symbols which may be stored outside of himself but which will serve as a means of recollecting, reinstating, comprehending, and analyzing situations too extensive or involved for his unassisted adjustment-mechanisms. The symbols thus developed are of enormous variety, constituting as they do, all the alphabets, words, and pictorial, grammatical, and mathematical constructions of all languages. Some symbolic systems have been found more suitable for recording some types of experience, others are better adapted to other types. Some records take the form of the poem, the drama, the parable, the story, the biography, and the case history.[1] Other records derive their significance from their quantitative aspects. To record the latter, numerical symbol systems have been evolved. The recording of experience in terms of these symbols and their scientific manipulation for given purposes constitute what is generally called statistics or statistical method.

II. Early Statistics

While statistical method in this sense has, as noted above, been developed chiefly during the last two centuries, and more especially during the last fifty years, its essential contents and form go back to very early times. To establish the antiquity (and consequently the respectability) of statistics it is only necessary to refer to the practice of savages in heaping up pebbles or notching sticks as early forms of statistical records. Clearer historical antecedents appear when tribes began grouping themselves into nations of such numbers that the ruler could have no adequate first-hand knowledge of the number or resources of his subjects. It then became necessary to undertake formal *enumerations, classifications,* and statistical *summarizations* of the desired information. Then as now, it was important to know how many men could actually be counted on to wield destructive weapons in case of war. Again, to levy taxes or extort tribute, it was important then, as now, to know something of the wealth available in order to collect revenue intelligently. Thus Herodotus records the taking of a census of population and wealth in Egypt about 3050 B. C. as a preliminary step toward the building of the pyramids. About 1400 B. C., Rameses II took a census of the same country in order to reapportion the land among his subjects.[2]

[1] Cf. L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist* (April, 1928).

[2] The factual data referred to in this section are, except as otherwise noted, taken from A. Meitzen, *History, Theory, and Technique of Statistics,* trans. by R. P. Falkner (Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., Philadelphia, 1891). The selection, arrangement, and interpretation of these data are, of course, my own.

Ancient and medieval times show a large number of similar inquiries. The enumeration of the tribes of Israel by Moses is recorded in the first and second Books of Numbers. David took a similar census about 1018 B. C. The ancient Greeks made many enumerations, largely for the purpose of levying taxes, classifying the inhabitants, and determining military strength. The same is true of the Romans, who also required the registration of births and deaths at certain specified temples.

The most famous enumerations of the Middle Ages are perhaps those of Charlemagne (807), William the Conqueror (1088), (The Doomsday Book), Edward III of England (1377), and Frederick II of Germany (1741). In each instance, the purpose was to determine taxation, land distribution, and available soldiers. The inquiries were made at irregular periods, and the emphasis was entirely on content and immediate utility. Methodological, mathematical, and scientific considerations were not involved.

The above instances of early statistical activities are, of course, merely examples of scores of similar undertakings from ancient times down to the present century. Our present purpose is not to give a comprehensive account of the entire history of statistics. We shall consider only some of the more important men and events whose direct influence on present thought and activity can be rather clearly traced. In so doing, however, we should not forget the continuity of history, nor overlook the fundamental arbitrariness of the so-called historical "epochs." Like all classifications, the periods of history are, of course, purely constructs for the historian's convenience, determined by the purpose at hand. Our present purpose is merely to give an adequate background and perspective to contemporary statistical thought and practice. For this purpose it is sufficient to confine ourselves to the nationalistic period of the last two centuries.

III. The Beginnings of Modern Statistics

The rapid transformation of medieval society into the form of the modern state is familiar history. By the end of the fifteenth century, monarchy had quite generally superseded feudalism, and reliable data as to military, financial, and political resources of the different powers became highly essential. Indeed, in the period of political intrigue that followed, a régime was successful to the degree that it estimated correctly its own resources and those of other powers. In response to this demand there appeared during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a number of extensive treatises on the geography, political divisions, cities, social organization, rulers, military capacity, wealth, and trade of the existing countries of the world (See Section I of diagram). These compilations were necessarily sketchy and inaccurate in content and crude in method. They were not,



Sources:

A. Meitzen, *History, Theory, and Technique of Statistics* (Translated by R. P. Falkner, Philadelphia, 1891).
Helen M. Walker, *Studies in the History of Statistical Method* (Baltimore, 1929).
Harold Westergaard, *Contributions to the History of Statistics* (London, 1932).

* The tremendous expansion of official and other statistics since the time of Quetelet makes impossible further summarization in this chart. For the best brief treatment, see Westergaard, *op. cit.*, Chapter xvii. For a complete account of developments up to 1900, see Koren, *History of Statistics* (New York, 1918). It is emphasized that the names of contemporary statisticians given in the last part of the chart are merely illustrative and do not constitute an exhaustive list. Also, some of the names could be properly placed in several of the categories used.



in fact, statistical treatises at all in the sense in which we now use the term. They consisted of verbal descriptions of the whole life and organization of the state. Thus, the *Cosmographia* of Sebastian Muenster (part appeared in 1536 and the complete work in 1544) contained maps of all known countries, each of which is then treated under the following heads: boundaries, divisions, principal towns, history, state organization, rulers, nobles, estates, army, military capacity, church relations, laws, customs and manners, and in detail the chief cities with their wealth and trade. The other compilations listed in this section of our diagram were of the same general type. Achenwall compiled all the data to be found in the existing literature for Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, with particular care and conciseness. He also first introduced the word *Statistik,* which he also defined as *Staatsmerkwürdigkeiten* (noteworthy things of the state). His work gained such general recognition that it was translated into all languages and Achenwall was long hailed as the father of statistical science. This work was continued and carried farther by Büsching (1724–1793), a professor at Göttingen, who instead of engaging in general observations and reflections, concerned himself with the careful examination of the completeness and correctness of details of the data, and thus stimulated progress towards critical methods. In 1767 he founded what was perhaps the first statistical periodical.

About this time also there began systematic, periodic collections of statistics by national governments (Section II of diagram). Frederick William of Prussia began, in 1719, to gather semi-annual reports on population, occupations, houses, land ownership, taxes, etc. Frederick II continued and enlarged the scope of these enumerations to include such matters as nationality, age, deaths and their causes and economic data on trade (1747), agriculture (1778), etc. This work was closely related to that of Büsching, on the one hand, and Süssmilch on the other, and, as we shall see, the three strands or tendencies converged and found a brilliant fusion in the work of Quetelet. During the same period the modern census made its appearance in Sweden (1749), and the United States (1790), both of which have been continued without interruption down to the present time.

In the meantime, another line of development took place which is more directly related to what we now consider statistics. This was the interest in statistical data as a basis for scientific generalization. The outstanding names in this development are listed in Section III of our diagram. Capt. John Graunt, F.R.S., shopkeeper and musician, was "permeated with the Baconian philosophy and sought truth through observation rather than speculation." [3] He and his followers consequently devoted themselves chiefly to enumeration and calculation of demographic data. They thus limited their field and confined themselves chiefly to numerical and mathe-

[3] F. H. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician* (1908), p. 45.

matical methods. "I have taken the course," said William Petty, "to express myself in terms of Number, Weight, or Measure, to use only Arguments of Sense and to consider only such Causes as have visible Foundations in Nature." [4] What is now called vital statistics became a major concern of this group, and they did important work in the preparation of mortality tables, statistical prediction, and probability. The development of the latter field provided more adequate bases for life insurance, which, in the form of wagers, existed during the Middle Ages.

Most important of the group was Johann Peter Süssmilch, a military chaplain and member of the Academy. Pondering the work of his predecessors, Süssmilch was much impressed by the regularity and predictability of such events as births, deaths, and other population movements. Süssmilch perceived in these occurrences a striking evidence of "a providential ordinance (Genesis 1:28) contrary to which man cannot act with impunity." In the equality of the numbers of the sexes at the age of marriage, Süssmilch saw monogamy divinely ordained. The higher order of things was likewise revealed in the uniformity of deaths and births for the different age groups. However, he admits that the order thus created by God is subject to disturbance by outward circumstances and wilful acts. Thus he notes that in cities one person dies out of every 25 to 32, whereas in the country the figure is only one out of every 40 to 45. Accordingly, the unnaturalness, immorality, and luxury of the city is earnestly censured. For all its ethical and other recommendations, Süssmilch's *Betrachtungen über die göttliche Ordnung* (1742) was the most important statistical publication up to that time. It laid down certain methodological principles which still stand. He pointed out the significance of large numbers and dominant trends as compared with exceptions. "If I have a hundred cases in support of my conclusion," he said, "then can nothing to the contrary be drawn from one case." [5] He also emphasized the need of taking into consideration extraneous environmental causes of variation in the statistics of a place, thus indicating that social phenomena have natural causes. Finally, he pointed out that the rules governing these phenomena were to be sought in statistical regularities. All of these principles have since become the elements of statistics.

We find, then, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, three principal divisions in statistics. The one, which we have considered as beginning with Muenster and ending with Achenwall and Schlöser, concerned itself chiefly with verbal description and analysis of the whole organization of the state. Even in this group, however, the tendency was constantly toward greater conciseness, precision, comparative, and numerical treatment, as

[4] Quoted in Meitzen, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[5] Quoted in Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

evidenced by their extensive attention to the official statistics which began to appear toward the end of the period (Section II of diagram). The second division was concerned with official statistics. The third school, which we have stated as beginning with Graunt and continuing through Süssmilch, Laplace, and Gauss concerned itself with a much more limited field; namely, the field of demography, and with more refined, critical, and mathematical methods (Section III of diagram). These three tendencies gradually converged and merged in the work of Quetelet.

The development of tabular and graphic statistics should be mentioned in passing. As we have seen, much of the statistical work up to this time consisted of verbal description rather than of numerical and mathematical exposition and analysis. As early as 1741, however, a Dane by name of Anckerson (1700–1765) attempted to portray the most important features of the states of Europe by tables only. In 1782, Crome in Giessen proposed to present statistical results graphically with geometric figures. Before the end of the century a number of such presentations were made by various statisticians in England (Wm. Playfair, 1788), France, and Germany. In the meantime the mathematicians [6] had developed the probability curve and other mathematical and geometric aspects of statistics which in time revolutionized statistical science.

In connection with the concurrent development of descriptive and mathematical statistics, it is interesting to note that there arose essentially the same controversy which today agitates "case" workers with regard to statistics. The Achenwall school were hostile to the "number statisticians" and the increasing numerical treatment of official statistics. In 1806 and 1807 a heated controversy between the two schools arose. It was urged that the numerical statistics had too great limitations. They were regarded as dull rows of figures, a "veritable cadaver on which one could not look without abhorrence" [7] and, in any case, were inapplicable to the "higher" problems of the state. This will perhaps always be the objection to statistical methods, before the data in a given field have been sufficiently clearly defined to make numerical methods in the larger part of the field possible. We shall see later in the chapter further illustrations of the same difficulty at the present time. In the meantime, however, the inevitable development took place, and by the time Quetelet appeared on the scene (about 1825), Achenwall's type of statistics had practically disappeared, or been taken over by

[6] The more significant names in this connection are Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Pierre de Fermat (1608–1655), Jacques Bernoulli (1654–1705), Abraham DeMoivre (1667–1754), Pierre-Simon Marquis de Laplace (1749–1827), and Carl F. Gauss (1777–1885). See Helen M. Walker, *Studies in the History of Statistical Method* (1929), chap. ii.

[7] V. John, *Geschichte der Statistik*, p. 129, as cited in Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

other disciplines, such as political economy, public law, and geography. The number statisticians, heavily reinforced by the rapid development of official statistics, took complete charge of the field.

One important reservation to this statement, however, should be made with reference to a group of writers on sociological and population problems, such as Malthus, who, while not a formal statistician, nevertheless dealt in a fundamental way with the quantitative aspects of population. The same is true of the sociology of Frédéric LePlay (1806–1882). Malthus' "Essay on Population" first appeared in 1798, and must be regarded as an epoch-making contribution both for its own sake and because of its influence on Darwin and his followers. Darwin, again, will not be treated as a statistician for our present purpose, although the quantitative aspects of his work are obvious. But it would be impossible to overestimate his importance as a stimulus to Galton and the large galaxy of brilliant statisticians which have come out of the latter's laboratory under the outstanding leadership of Karl Pearson. These will be discussed in their proper sequence. It is only necessary to note here that, while the verbal-descriptive type of statistician practically disappeared as statisticians about a century ago, they were still of first importance as a source of inspiration for the numerical and mathematical statisticians who are today in virtually complete charge of the field of statistics.

Another group of social scientists who are not regarded as statisticians but whose theories and work were essentially quantitative should be mentioned in passing. These are the social mechanists, e. g., Saint-Simon, Fourier, and others, who attempted to apply the concepts and methodology of physics and mechanics to the study of society. As predecessors to Comte and Darwin, whose work in turn became a tremendous stimulus to this school, they must also be regarded as forerunners of the most advanced mathematical sociologists and economists of recent times such as Walras, Pareto, Edgeworth, and H. L. Moore. Quetelet himself used the terminology of social physics but his chief contribution was in statistics as such. By combining and advancing the various tendencies then in vogue he became the real founder of modern statistics.

IV. Adolphe Quetelet

Adolphe Quetelet was born in Ghent, Belgium, February 22, 1796.[8] Little is known of his parents, save that his father died when Adolphe was only seven years old. Apparently the latter was mainly dependent on his own resources, for at the age of seventeen we find him teaching mathematics

[8] The principal source of this discussion of the work of Quetelet is F. H. Hankins' *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*. Except as otherwise noted the factual data here presented are drawn from this source.

in a private school. On his nineteenth birthday he was made instructor in mathematics at the then newly organized College of Ghent. Here he came under the influence of Garnier, the professor of astronomy and higher mathematics. Up to this time Quetelet's interest had been largely along literary and artistic lines. He wrote and published a number of poems and collaborated in the preparation of a libretto for at least one successful opera. Under Garnier's influence he devoted himself to mathematics and was the first to receive the doctorate from the new university (Ghent, 1817). In the fall of the same year he was elected to the chair of elementary mathematics in the Athenaeum at Brussels and very soon became prominent in mathematical and scientific circles.

From the beginning of his appointment to the Athenaeum he began to arouse interest in an astronomical observatory and finally won the support of the minister of public education. In 1823 he was sent to Paris at the expense of the state to study practical astronomy. Here he came in contact with Laplace, Poisson, Alexander von Humboldt, and Fourier. Under Laplace he received instruction in the theory of probability; this became very prominent in Quetelet's subsequent teaching and writing. On the completion of the observatory he was made astronomer at Brussels but continued to teach at the *Musée*. In this connection he produced a number of elementary treatises on astronomy, at least one of which was translated into several languages and achieved the further distinction of being placed on the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* of the Catholic Church.

During this period (1820–1829) Quetelet confined himself largely to mathematics and physics, to which fields he made numerous and substantial contributions. He was soon elevated to the chair of higher mathematics at the Athenaeum and also gave a course on the history of the sciences at the Brussels Museum. At the opening of the latter course he first enunciated a principle which has become the slogan of statisticians to this day. "The more advanced the sciences have become, the more they have tended to enter the domain of mathematics, which is a sort of center toward which they converge. We can judge of the perfection to which a science has come by the facility, more or less great, with which it may be approached by calculation." [9] During the same period he made important contributions to the theory of probability and expressed the view that "it has seemed to me that the theory of probability ought to serve as the basis for the study of all the sciences, and particularly of the sciences of observation. . . . Since absolute certainty is impossible and we can speak only of the probability of the fulfillment of a scientific expectation, a study of this theory should be a part of every man's education." [10]

It is not possible or relevant here to give a complete account of Quetelet's

[9] Quoted in Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

contributions to mathematics and astronomy. While his contributions in these fields gained him an international reputation early in life, he was destined to be remembered chiefly for his contribution to the theory and applications of statistics. It is important, however, to point out that he brought to his statistical work an unusual background in mathematics and physics.

In spite of the tremendous variety of his interests in mathematics, physics, astronomy, and meteorology he also seems to have been interested in social statistics quite early in his career, and this interest continued. When the statistical bureau of Holland was established in 1826, Quetelet became correspondent for Brabant. He promptly urged that a census be taken, and assisted in the census of 1829. Subsequently he became government supervisor of statistics, and in 1841 was instrumental in the organization of the *Commission centrale de statistique,* of which he remained president until his death. In the meantime as official delegate to the British Association at Cambridge in 1833, he had been the immediate stimulus to the formation of a statistical section. Finding the activities of this section too limited by the rules of the Association, he proposed the formation of a statistical society in London. This was accomplished in 1834 when the Royal Statistical Society [11] was founded. It has continued to grow in importance and distinction to the present day. The organization of the American Statistical Society in 1839 may be regarded as a further result, for the new society immediately elected Quetelet as its first foreign member.[12] He next devoted his attention to securing international uniformity and comparability of statistical data and in this connection first proposed (1851) the meeting of an International Statistical Congress. The Congress met in Brussels in 1853 and elected Quetelet president. Eight additional meetings were held during the following twenty-three years, after which the International Statistical Institute (founded 1885) became the chief agency of international co-operation in this field. The International Statistical Commission of the League of Nations has further continued this work down to the present time.[13]

During the same period (1825–1855), Quetelet's publications dealing with every phase of statistics became increasingly important. A résumé of his more important contributions is attempted below. To conclude this per-

[11] Organized as the London Statistical Society, March 15, 1834, and usually considered the first organization of its kind. It appears, however, that the Manchester Statistical Society had been organized the preceding year. See S. N. D. North, "Seventy-Five Years of Progress in Statistics," in *The History of Statistics,* ed. by John Koren (1918), p. 19.

[12] Hankins, *op. cit.,* p. 4.

[13] For an account of the development of international statistics during the 19th century, see Harold Westergaard, *Contributions to the History of Statistics,* chaps. xiv, xvii.

sonal sketch, it is necessary to record that in 1855 at the height of his career he suffered an attack of apoplexy which greatly impaired his intellectual acuity and the brilliance of his work for a long time, although he continued to work and write with increasing absorption. He died in 1874 crowned with honors of every kind. He was a member of more than a hundred learned societies including the fields of philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, geography, physics, anthropology, and statistics. He appears to have been a man of great personal charm, witty, sociable, tactful, enthusiastic, and prodigiously industrious. His contribution to the spread of scientific knowledge and his stimulation of wide and persistent scientific discussion and inquiry, rather than epoch-making contributions to some single science, entitles him to a high place in the history of science. In the history of statistics he is assured of a pre-eminent place.

V. The Development of Statistics, 1825–1875: Quetelet's Contributions

We have seen (diagram pp. 112–13) that preceding the time of Quetelet two lines of statistical development were clearly defined: (a) the descriptive and practical; and (b) the mathematical and theoretical (political arithmetic). As indicated by the diagram and as previously stated, Quetelet served to unite these two types of statistical endeavor and to show their essential interrelationship. So important, in fact, was Quetelet's contribution in this connection, that the history of statistical development for the second and third quarters of the last century can best be summarized by stating in some detail his contributions with only minor references to other distinguished statisticians working along the same lines.

1. *Descriptive Statistics.* Quetelet contributed in four ways to this aspect of statistics: (1) improvement in the technique of census taking; (2) criticism of sources; (3) arrangement of materials; and (4) promotion of uniformity and comparability of data on an international scale.

As previously noted, Quetelet was appointed correspondent to the statistical bureau of Holland in 1826 and took part in the censuses of 1829 and 1832. In this connection he formulated certain rules which are still guides for census takers. He gave careful consideration to the preparation of the blanks to be used and the questions to be asked. The great importance of considering critically the sources of data and the manner of their collection received more attention than hitherto. Quetelet stressed the necessity of considering whether the numbers on which a conclusion was based were sufficiently large to obliterate accidental variations. He warned against mathematical fallacies in the combination of numbers. Regarding the arrangement of materials and presentation of results, Quetelet not only suggested improved forms for official documents so as to increase their clear-

ness and comprehensibility, but showed new ways of grouping data so as to show the greatest possible number of correlations. As we have seen, Achenwall and his disciples criticized the "number" statisticians because their product consisted merely of dismal rows of figures bearing on no particular problem. Quetelet showed that the proper arrangement of these figures with reference to comparability, trend, and correlation is capable of giving a more vivid and dramatic portrayal of a given point than is a rhetorical description, provided the data are accurate and adequate. This is the essential consideration still overlooked by devotees of the so-called "case" method. But Quetelet's work contributed materially toward a reconciliation and fusion of the two main tendencies in statistics. His prominence in the promotion of uniformity of international statistics has already been described. This was the practical result of his insistence on the necessity for comparability of all data collected under a given schedule at one time and place, as well as for different times and places, and the logical application of his critical attitude toward the whole process of collection and interpretation of statistical data. The wide diffusion which he achieved for these principles undoubtedly constitutes the greatest contribution of any one man to the improvement and development of statistics throughout the Western world.

2. *Mathematical and Theoretical Statistics.* The principal if not the sole object of the descriptive statisticians was, as we have seen, to compile data useful in the administration of the state. The subject matter with which they dealt, therefore, consisted largely of data on population, wealth, trade, etc. Now Graunt, Süssmilch, and others whom we have classified under the mathematical and theoretical school also dealt largely, and in some cases entirely, with demographic data. The immediate and practical significance for the state and social administration of such work as Graunt's mortality rates and Süssmilch's extensive study of vital statistics in general, is obvious. But underlying or at least accompanying the collection and analysis of these practical data was an assumption regarding the *regularity* and *natural order* of social events. This view of the physical world was already widely accepted. But the idea that the same regularity existed in the social world and that it was subject to observation and formulation by essentially the same basic techniques as were applied in physics was a heretical thought which intrigued some of the ablest intellects of the nineteenth century. It was this interest which fundamentally distinguished the "descriptive" from the "mathematical" school.

By virtue of his extensive training in the physical sciences, Quetelet was uniquely qualified to appreciate and contribute to this point of view. His contribution to this school was again four-fold: (1) improvement and extension of the methods of statistical induction and generalization begun by Graunt and Süssmilch on population data; (2) application of statistical

methods to the problems of crime—"moral statistics"; (3) popularization of the law of error (normal frequency curve) and its application to social phenomena; and (4) contribution to the meaning, significance, and applications of the *average* to social statistics—"the average man."

(1) Quetelet's main contributions to the type of population statistics developed by Graunt and Süssmilch are contained in his volume *Sur l'homme* (2 vols., Paris, 1835, trans. by R. Knox, Edinburgh, 1842). His studies in this field may be conveniently summarized under three heads:[14] (a) studies of births, deaths and marriages; (b) treatment of the law of population; and (c) development of population and mortality tables. His treatment of births and deaths is more comprehensive than that of his predecessors. Questions of sex and fecundity; the ratio of males to females throughout Europe, in free and slave populations, in town and country, among legitimate and illegitimate births; the relation of age of parents to the sex of offspring, and to fecundity; and a large number of correlations of these factors with occupational, economic, political, and religious conditions received extensive treatment. With reference to the law of population growth, he advanced, but did not demonstrate, the statement that the resistance to population growth increases as the square of the rate at which population tends to increase, "other things equal." A series of monographs on mortality tables (1826–1853) greatly improved the basis for life insurance in Belgium.

(2) In 1829 Quetelet published one of the first statistical treatises on criminality. In this memoir he compared the sexes with reference to the kinds of crime committed, and formulated a tentative estimate of the tendency to crime at each age, based on an analysis of French statistics. He remarks on the "astounding exactitude with which crimes are reproduced"[15] from year to year, and therefore the possibility of prediction in this field with the same assurance with which we predict the number of births and deaths. These regularities, which Süssmilch and others of his predecessors had interpreted as evidence of a divine order, Quetelet correctly interpreted as social laws of the same fundamental order as the laws of physics. "It seems to me that what relates to the human species, considered *en masse,* is of the order of physical facts."[16] Thus, taking a scientific, rather than a theological, view of the data, he found himself involved in the question of man's free will, which continued to receive attention in the university courses in statistics up to the present century.[17] "This possibility," he said, ". . . must give rise to serious reflections, since it concerns

[14] Westergaard, *op. cit.,* p. 52.

[15] Quoted in Hankins, *op. cit.,* p. 55.

[16] *Nouv. mém.,* VII, 80, as quoted in Hankins, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

[17] See Columbia University Handbook of the period 1880–1899 for outline of the statistical courses of Richmond Mayo-Smith.

the fate of several thousand men who are driven, as it were, in an irresistible manner toward the tribunals and toward the condemnations that await them." [18] Such possibilities led to wide-spread discussion of the nature of statistical regularities and their ethical implications. Although he stressed the regularity of his averages, Quetelet nevertheless was careful to point out that they remained constant only if social conditions remained constant. The social causes of crime were thus emphasized and the possibility of modifying social conditions so as to prevent crime pointed out.

(3) This line of reasoning, of course, led naturally to the application of the theory of probability and the normal frequency curve to other social phenomena. The mathematical aspects of the normal curve and its statistical uses had already been considerably developed by the mathematicians.[19] But it is safe to say that it was Quetelet's writings, which reached a wide public, that led to the general recognition and adoption of these methods. Especially is this true as regards their application to anthropology and the social sciences, in which fields Quetelet was the first to employ them extensively.

(4) The application of the normal curve to man of course involves a consideration of the nature of the central or representative unit around which the variations occur. Here Quetelet advanced his conception of the *average man,* which is perhaps more commonly associated with Quetelet's name than any other of his contributions. This concept and Quetelet's use of it caused extensive discussion by himself and others. Quetelet defined the "average man" in these terms:

> The man that I consider here is analogous to the center of gravity in bodies; he is the mean about which oscillate the social elements; he is, so to speak, a fictitious being for whom all things proceed conformably to the average results obtained for society. If we wish to establish the basis of a social mechanics (*mécanique sociale*), it is he whom we should consider, without stopping to examine particular or anomalous cases.[20]

Around this concept of the "average man" Quetelet assembled an enormous amount of data. He insisted that the normal curve described not only the physical variations in men but their intellectual and moral qualities as well. The chest measurements of 5738 Scottish soldiers and the heights of 100,000 French conscripts, as well as a multitude of other physical measurements of various groups, revealed a very close agreement with the theoretical curve. Data on the propensity to crime, suicide, and marriage were likewise analyzed in support of the theory of normal distribution. That the

[18] *Nouv. mém.,* VII, 23, as quoted in Hankins, *op. cit.,* p. 57.

[19] See above, p. 115, footnote 6. For an account of the development of actuarial statistics, see Westergaard, *Contributions to the History of Statistics,* chaps. vii, xii.

[20] *Nouv. mém.,* Vol. VII, as quoted in Hankins, *op. cit.,* p. 63. Note that this "average man" is a *fiction.* See the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 42–6.

fluctuations revealed by the measurement of a large number of people are simular to the accidental errors in a large number of measurements of the same object, Quetelet demonstrated by measuring the height of the same person 8192 times. From these data he concluded that not only does the average represent a mean or intermediate case in a series but it represents a *type,* representative of the group. The average, according to Quetelet, is the result of "constant" causes while the variations about the average are the result of "perturbative" or "accidental" causes. On this basis we may distinguish in every department of life what is typical and general from what is merely unique and individual.

A complete presentation and evaluation of Quetelet's position on this subject would require a volume in itself.[21] Only a few of the most general considerations regarding it can therefore be noted here. In the first place, we should note the general soundness of the view that the social sciences must be largely concerned with the determination of types. That the notion of a *type* or *typicality,* in Quetelet's sense, is fundamentally a statistical concept and that it can be defined only on a quantitative basis is also undoubtedly sound, although the words are sometimes used to designate merely a pattern. It does not follow, in any case, that the simple average is an adequate statistical device for the representation of a type. On the contrary, it is a matter of elementary knowledge that two distributions with the same average may be entirely different both with respect to their limits and their conformity to the normal curve, hence measures of average and standard deviation and of skewness are usually employed in addition to the simple average. In so far as Quetelet assumed the normal distribution of every characteristic, and especially in his conclusions regarding the perfection or desirability of the type represented by the average, the theory of the average man is largely untenable. But the tremendous impetus which Quetelet's work in this field gave to subsequent investigation and measurement in the fields of biology, psychology, education, and sociology, makes his work on "The Average Man" and the methodological developments connected therewith his most important contribution.

Quetelet was certainly the most prominent statistician of his time, and undoubtedly played the dominating rôle in the development of statistics for half a century (1825–1875). It should not be concluded, however, that all of the rapid expansion and advances in the field during this period were the result of Quetelet's work alone. In the first place, as we have seen, Quetelet is more important for the development and popularization of the ideas of his predecessors, than for the originality of his own contributions. In the second place, we know of the tendency for culture patterns, in-

[21] Quetelet's *Systeme sociale* contains the fullest statement of the position with supporting data. The best short summary and criticism will be found in Hankins, *op. cit.,* chap. iii.

cluding thought patterns, to converge under given conditions, so that whenever an epoch-making idea or invention is advanced by one man, there are a large number of persons about ready to announce the same idea.[22] This is also true in the evolution of statistical thought. Consequently, we find that at the time that Quetelet published his various studies, other statisticians, mathematicians, and philosophers in other countries were working along similar lines.[23] Much of this work was in connection with national statistical bureaus which were established and greatly developed in nearly every country during this period.[24] It is true that one of Quetelet's chief contributions was his agitation for just such development. But in the meantime there was much discussion of the theoretical aspects of statistics. As we have seen, Quetelet was struck with the implications of his reasoning as bearing on the question of free will. These implications he could not deny; he reluctantly accepted them as regards *masses* of men. But to follow the reasoning to its logical conclusion proved too much for him, and he specifically repudiated the doctrine of the constraining force of environment on the individual.[25] This was a philosophical question of long standing, and it continued to receive much attention. The abler students, however, saw the logical weakness of such a position, and Herschel in 1850 concluded that "the freedom of mankind was hardly perceptible." [26] Buckle likewise (1857) took a frankly deterministic position. Toward the end of the period appeared the works of Comte and Darwin, the latter completely revolutionizing the whole concept of man's place in the universe and his assumed immunity to or independence of the influences which govern other phenomena. Under the new doctrine man became more than ever a legitimate object of statistical study. It was logical, therefore, that Darwin's own cousin and intense admirer, Francis Galton, should inaugurate the new

[22] See W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change,* for supporting data.

[23] Some of the most important names of the nineteenth century in this field were William Farr in England; Gioja, Romagnosi and Bodio in Italy; Cournot and Moreau de Jonnès in France; Engel and von Mayr in Germany; Edward Jarvis, Carrol D. Wright, Amasa and Francis A. Walker in the United States. "The honor of introducing the modern census has been claimed for several countries, notably Canada (Quebec, 1664), Sweden (1749), and the United States (Virginia 1624–25 and 1634–35). . . . Whether Canada or Sweden or the United States be regarded as the originator of the modern census, there can be no doubt that the periodic censuses of the United States have been pre-eminently responsible for introducing the practice into other countries" (W. F. Wilcox, "Census," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*). Sweden was the first country to establish a statistical series which has been continued without interruption down to the present.

[24] See Meitzen, *op. cit.,* pp. 55–70. For an extensive treatment of the history of this movement in each country, see John Koren, *The History of Statistics* (1918). For a briefer account see Harold Westergaard, *op. cit.,* chaps. xiv, xv, xvii.

[25] Meitzen, *op. cit.,* p. 75.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 85.

and contemporary epoch in the history of statistics, and that his student and successor, Karl Pearson, should become the dominating personality in the field since Quetelet.

VI. The Galton-Pearson School

Francis Galton (1822–1911) began his career with the study of medicine in his native city of Birmingham and subsequently studied anatomy and botany in London (King's College). At Cambridge he devoted himself chiefly to mathematics.[27] He was, therefore, admirably equipped for his subsequent notable work in the statistical study of the transmission of family traits. This subject might well have suggested itself to him from his own distinguished ancestry. Both of his grandfathers were Fellows of the Royal Society and his father was deeply interested in science and statistics. Galton's work in biometry and statistics did not begin until he was about 40. While still at Cambridge, his health broke and he devoted some ten years to travel, mainly in Africa. As noted above, it was not until after the appearance of *The Origin of Species* that he turned definitely to the work which was to make him the most conspicuous figure in statistics since Quetelet. In the meantime, however, he studied and wrote on exploration, geography, meteorology, medicine, and surgery.

Galton's works are important from two standpoints. In the first place, his contributions to statistical theory and methodology greatly advanced developments in this field. In the second place, he applied his methods to social and psychological, as well as to biological, aspects of man. Some of these applications had not hitherto been attempted. He is credited with being among the first to apply the theory of the normal curve to mental phenomena, and thus became the father of one of the main statistical developments of the first quarter of present century, namely, the mental measurement movement, to which we shall refer later.[28] He appears to

[27] The principal source of this sketch of Galton is Helen M. Walker, *Studies in the History of Statistical Method*. The standard sources are, of course, F. Galton, *Memories of My Life* (London, 1908), and K. Pearson, *Life, Letters, and Labors of Francis Galton*, 3 vols. (1914, 1922, 1930).

[28] This subject was receiving attention at the same time, especially in its theoretical aspects, from Gustav Theodore Fechner (1801–1887), who is undoubtedly the true father of experimental psychology. Galton's influence has perhaps been more widespread in America, through J. McKeen Cattell who was associated with Galton in setting up the Anthropometric Laboratory. The same general interest also developed through American students who studied in Germany during the eighties, of which Franz Boas became the most important influence. Both of these influences converged on E. L. Thorndike, who became the leader in educational statistics in America. It is perhaps fair to regard Galton as the father of mental testing, and if so, there is propriety in the action of one of his most enthusiastic followers in awarding the master an I.Q. of about 200 (L. M. Terman, *Am. Jour. Psych.* XXVIII [1917] 209–15; cited in Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 46).

have been the first to discuss and employ such fundamental and elementary statistical devices as the median, percentiles, and the ogive curve. Above all, he is credited with the invention of modern statistical correlation, the device which has played such a dominating rôle in statistics ever since. These theoretical and methodological contributions are, as a matter of fact, much more important than the practical applications which Galton gave them in the field of heredity and eugenics. The former stimulated Pearson and others to brilliant achievements in statistical methods which have since become applicable to a wide variety of fields. The latter, being based on a naïve biology antedating the development of modern genetics, are of purely historical interest. They have even become a nuisance in perpetuating a superstitious belief in a biological determinism completely at variance with both logic and modern biology.[29] Since the emphasis in the present chapter, however, is on the application of statistics to the social sciences rather than on the development of mathematical or theoretical statistics, we must recognize the vast practical influence as well as the methodological ingenuity of Galton's work. *Hereditary Genius* (1869), *English Men of Science* (1874), *Natural Inheritance* (1889) and many other brilliant results of Galton's prodigious labors not only became the backbone of the eugenics movement but have stimulated the production of an enormous literature, statistical and otherwise, along similar lines.

The full influence of the work begun by Galton is, as noted above, best traced through the work of his student, colleague, and successor as director of the Anthropometric Laboratory, Karl Pearson. As in the case of Galton,

[29] I have reference here not only to such popularizations as those of Albert Edward Wiggam, but to a considerable literature in psychology and sociology of the first two decades of the present century, including the "instinct" school. The fallacy of the "hereditary" studies of this school lies first, in their extremely crude conception of environment, and secondly, in their attempt to attribute a certain percentage of a personality to heredity and a certain percentage to environment. The latter position overlooks the dynamic interrelationship between protoplasm and its environment, namely, that the past responses of protoplasm are an inseparable part of it and determine its capacities as well as its selective responses to new or old stimuli. Even if we accept the conventional and popular notion of genetic determination of certain characteristics, the fact remains that the "accidental" combinations of genes are necessarily themselves environmentally determined. What Galton and his followers measured with great skill and industry was the degree to which a wide variety of traits—physical, mental, and moral—recur in successive generations. These data throw little light on the way in which these traits are transmitted. The latter is a problem to which modern psychology, sociology, and biology are properly devoting themselves. But since modern genetics did not develop until about the time of Galton's death, his contribution to the subject of heredity has received, and is receiving, in some quarters an amount of attention entirely out of proportion to its actual importance. For fuller discussion of this point see G. A. Lundberg, "The Biology of Population Cycles." *Soc. Forces,* IX (1931), 405–8. Also *Foundations of Sociology* (Macmillan, 1939), pp. 446–457.

Pearson's contribution has been of two types. His contributions to theoretical and mathematical statistics, especially in the field of correlation, entitles him to a place with Gauss and Laplace in the history of statistical method. Even more important in its impact upon the social sciences has been his brilliant exposition of the place of statistics in scientific method and the applicability of this method to social phenomena. This influence has been exerted through a series of eloquent papers and addresses, but most of all through his challenging and well-named *Grammar of Science.*

Pearson was not the first to advance the doctrine that the methods of natural science are applicable to the social phenomena. Nor was he the first to point out the relationship between science and quantitative methods. But his profound knowledge of the whole range of scientific theory, and his realistic insight into the nature of the social order, coupled with a rare gift for brilliant exposition, enabled him to bring together and set forth in bold relief the issues already raised by Darwin's work. The time was ripe for an uncompromising statement of the new position—a frank acceptance of a strictly naturalistic view of man and all his works. This the *Grammar of Science* does in a manner so thorough and luminous that today, after fifty years of the most rapid development in the history of statistics and the social sciences, it still stands as a basic work on scientific method. When we consider the tremendous changes in the fundamental theories of practically every science during this period, the fundamental soundness of the *Grammar* is the more remarkable. It has withstood an avalanche of criticism both from obscurantists and scientists (until the latter caught up with it), and remains today a standard work on scientific method, with special reference to the social sciences.

When the first edition of the *Grammar* appeared in 1892, even physicists were very dimly aware of the fundamental nature of their methods. Pearson's insistence that "mechanism is not at the bottom of phenomena," that "objective force and matter have nothing whatever to do with science," was regarded as highly heretical.[30] The idea likewise, that atoms and ether are merely conceptual postulates useful for describing and communicating our experience was shocking to some of the ablest physicists of the time. Again, Pearson boldly asserted that the only explanation known to science is conceptualized description, and that the category of cause and effect is nothing but "a conceptual limit to experience, without any basis in perception beyond a statistical approximation." [31] While this is now generally accepted in physical science, social scientists still labor with long papers designed to prove that scientific and statistical methods can only *describe* but never *explain* social causation.

[30] *The Grammar of Science,* Preface to the Third Edition, p. v. (Black, 1911. The citations that follow refer to this edition.) Quoted by permission of the Macmillan Company, Publishers.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. vi, by permission.

Thus, while Pearson's position in history is secure because of his statistical contributions alone, his full importance lies in a much broader field. He became largely instrumental in renovating the logic of science itself. It is in this connection also that he opened the way for a really scientific approach to the social sciences. As long as the errors mentioned above existed with reference to the nature of science and scientific laws, the quest for social laws would necessarily be a vain one. Indeed, they are the very obstacles that are today at the bottom of the objections to the idea of sociology as a natural science. Not only did Pearson dispel these misconceptions with reference to science in general, but he made specific references to the social sciences. We cannot do better in this connection than to cite a few passages from the *Grammar:* [31a]

The scientific method of examining facts is not peculiar to one class of phenomena and to one class of workers; it is applicable to social as well as to physical problems (p. 6). . . . It must not be supposed that science for a moment denies the existence of some of the problems which have hitherto been classed as philosophical or metaphysical. On the contrary, it recognises that a great variety of physical and biological phenomena lead directly to these problems. But it asserts that the methods hitherto applied to these problems have been futile, because they have been unscientific. The classifications of facts hitherto made by the system-mongers have been hopelessly inadequate or hopelessly prejudiced. . . . Science stands now with regard to the problems of life and mind in much the same position as it stood with regard to cosmical problems in the seventeenth century. . . . The fields of inquiry, where science has not yet penetrated and where the scientist still confesses ignorance, are very like the alchemy, astrology, and witchcraft of the Middle Ages. Either they involve facts which are in themselves unreal—conceptions which are self-contradictory and absurd, and therefore incapable of analysis by the scientific or any other method,—or, on the other hand, our ignorance arises from an inadequate classification and a neglect of scientific method (pp. 19–23). . . .

We have seen that the imagination must not replace the reason in the deduction of relation and law from classified facts. But, none the less, disciplined imagination has been at the bottom of all great scientific discoveries. All great scientists have, in a certain sense, been great artists; the man with no imagination may collect facts, but he cannot make great discoveries. . . . The discovery of law is therefore the peculiar function of the creative imagination. But this imagination has to be a *disciplined* one. It has in the first place to appreciate the whole range of facts, which require to be resumed in a single statement; and then when the law is reached—often by what seems solely the inspired imagination of genius—it must be tested and criticised by its discoverer in every conceivable way, till he is certain that the imagination has not played him false, and that his law is in real agreement with the whole group of phenomena which it resumes (pp. 30–1). . . . There is an insatiable desire in the human breast to resume in

[31a] Quoted from Karl Pearson's *Grammar of Science* by permission of the Macmillan Company, Publishers.

some short formula, some brief statement, the facts of human experience. . . . Science endeavours to provide a mental *résumé* of the universe, and its last great claim to our support is the capacity it has for satisfying our cravings for a brief description of the history of the world (p. 36). . . .

It does not seem necessary to assert that consciousness lies outside the field of science, or must perforce escape the methods of physical experiment and research. We may be far enough removed from knowledge at the present time, but I see no logical hindrance to our asserting that in the dim future we might possibly obtain objective acquaintance with what at present appears merely as an eject (p. 50). . . . We are often told that the scientific method applies only to the external world of phenomena, and that the legitimate field of science lies solely among immediate sense-impressions. The object of the present work is to insist on a directly contrary proposition, namely, that science is in reality a classification and analysis of the contents of the mind; and the scientific method consists in drawing just comparisons and inferences from the stored impresses of past sense-impressions, and from the conceptions based upon them. Not till the immediate sense-impression has reached the level of a conception, or at least a perception, does it become material for science. In truth, the field of science is much more consciousness than an external world. In thus vindicating for science its mission as interpreter of conceptions rather than as investigator of a "natural law" ruling an "external world of material," I must remind the reader that science still considers the whole contents of the mind to be ultimately based on sense-impressions. Without sense-impressions there would be no consciousness, no conceptions for science to deal with. In the next place we must be careful to note that not every conception, still less every inference, has scientific validity (p. 52). . . .

There is no better exercise for the mind than the endeavour to reduce the perceptions we have of "external things" to the simple sense-impressions by which we know them. The arbitrary distinction between outside and inside ourselves is then clearly seen to be one merely of everyday practical convenience (p. 65). . . . The distinction between ourselves and the outside world is thus only an arbitrary, if a practically convenient, division between one type of sense-impression and another. The group of sense-impressions forming what I term *myself* is only a small subdivision of the vast world of sense-impressions (p. 66). . . . There is no necessity, nay, there is want of logic, in the statement that behind sense-impressions there are "things-in-themselves" *producing* sense-impressions. . . . What is behind or beyond sense-impressions may or may not be of the same character as sense-impressions, we cannot say (p. 68). . . . It is idle to postulate shadowy unknowables behind that real world of sense-impression in which we live. So far as they affect us and our conduct they are sense-impressions; what they may be beyond is fantasy, not fact; if indeed it be wise to assume a *beyond,* to postulate that the surface of sense-impressions which shuts us in, must of necessity shut something beyond out (p. 73). . . .

That the universe is a sum of phenomena, some of which are more, others less closely contingent on each other is the conception wider than that of causality, which we may at the present time draw from our widening experience. The aim of science ceases to be the discovery of "cause" and "effect"; in order to

predict future experience it seeks out the phenomena which are most highly correlated. . . . From this standpoint it finds no distinction in kind but only in degree between the data, method of treatment, or the resulting "laws" of chemical, physical, biological, or sociological investigations. They all provide, or should provide, (i.) a conceptual routine, which is a functional expression of average experience, and (ii.) a measure of the possible or probable deviations from this routine, which is a guide to the amount of variation in experience. Because this is small in some physical experiences, it has been often neglected as a matter of little practical value—a routine may vary even considerably without its upsetting conduct. But this neglect is no justification for the assumption that our conceptional routine, a product of the statistical treatment of experience, represents a real functional relationship at the back of phenomena. . . . No phenomena are causal; all phenomena are contingent, and the problem before us is to measure the degree of this contingency, which we have seen lies between the zero of independence and the unity of causation. That is briefly the wider outlook we must now take of the universe as we experience it (pp. 173–4).

Since these points, and procedures based upon them, are still regarded as "radical" in sociology, it may be permissible again to call attention to the fact that Pearson enunciated them nearly fifty years ago, and that they have since become commonplaces in science.

The influence of the Pearsonian school on statistics and on statistical developments in the social sciences cannot be overestimated. *Biometrika,* founded and edited by Galton, Pearson, and W. F. R. Weldon, but owing most of its distinction to Pearson, remains one of the most distinguished scholarly journals in the world. A large number of brilliant students, many of whom have achieved international reputations (such as for example, G. U. Yule), have come from the Pearson laboratory. Pearson's own contributions to statistical theory and practice, plus his vigorous exposition of the applicability of scientific method and statistics to the study of social phenomena, made Karl Pearson one of the greatest statisticians of all time. He will also be accorded a prominent place as one of the real founders of social science. As such, the most fitting tribute to his genius is not in laudatory remarks nor in details of his life, but in an outline of his influence, directly and through his students, upon the development of statistics and statistical method. Suffice it here to say that for the tremendous expansion and advance of statistics to be outlined below, more credit belongs to Karl Pearson than to any other single individual.

VII. Statistical Developments in the Twentieth Century

The turn of the century and the following decades saw such a tremendous expansion of every phase of statistics that we must now limit our discussion to developments in the social sciences, and more especially to what has been

called social statistics. Further, we must confine our account chiefly to the United States.[32]

1. *Official and Institutional Statistics.* The establishment of a permanent Census Bureau in 1902, under the directorship of S. N. D. North, was the culmination of a gradual expansion of the work of the Federal government in this field under the vigorous and capable support of men like Edward Jarvis, S. B. Eliot, Amasa Walker, Carrol D. Wright, Francis A. Walker, E. Dana Durand, and others. The census itself has grown enormously in size and scope. In 1790, 17 marshals and 650 assistant marshals canvassed the country with five inquiries for a period of eighteen months, the results of which were fully stated in an octavo pamphlet of 56 pages. In 1930, about 90,000 enumerators and special agents canvassed the entire United States and its outlying possessions with a schedule of thirty inquiries in about one month; the report on population alone fills four large quarto volumes. In addition, the Census Bureau is constantly engaged, between the decennial censuses, in the collection and analysis of vital, agricultural, business, and commercial data. As a result the United States Census Bureau is now the largest statistical organization in the world. In addition to the Census Bureau, various government departments maintain extensive statistical services, such, for example, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The invention of the Hollerith electric tabulating machine, as well as other statistical machinery, should be mentioned in passing as of the greatest importance in making possible and practicable the tremendous expansion since 1890 of census and other statistical work.

This need of statistical information as a guide to public policy and gov-

[32] The omission in this connection of specific references to the contributions of a large number of Scandinavian, Russian, and Italian statisticians should not be regarded as a reflection on the high quality of those contributions. It is unfortunately true, however, that the writings of these foreign scholars are not widely known in this country and have consequently not been as directly influential in the development of statistics in the United States as have the German and English scholars discussed in the text. I have reference here to such Scandinavians as Opperman, Gram, Thiele, Westergaard, Sundbärg, and Charlier; such Russians as Markov, Tchebycheff, and Tchuproff; and such Italians as L. Bodio, C. Gini, R. Benini, C. B. Turroni, F. Coridore, and F. Savorgnan. For an account of Italian statistics see C. Gini, "Contributions of Italy to Modern Statistical Methods." *Jour. Roy. Stat. Soc.* (July, 1926), pp. 703–24.

For reasons of space, I am compelled also to omit consideration of the important work of Georg von Mayr (1841–1925). In addition to his early contributions to the improvement of the statistics of crime, his *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre* represents a comprehensive attempt to produce a critical compendium of all statistical results achieved up to the present century. Although von Mayr spent a long and laborious life on this project and produced three volumes: *Theoretische Statistik* (Freiburg, 1895); *Bevölkerungsstatistik* (Freiburg, 1897); *Moralstatistik* (Tübingen, 1909–17), he did not live to complete the volume on economic statistics which he had planned. (See Westergaard, *op. cit.*, p. 262.)

ernment which was, as we have seen, the original reason for census taking, has thus continued to increase and has made itself felt in every country. The League of Nations was no sooner organized than it felt the need for comprehensive and comparable statistics of various conditions in the member nations. An International Statistical Commission was appointed and a statistical service was soon established providing, among other publications, a *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*. In addition to the enormous statistical compilations of national governments, there is a vast amount of such data gathered by states, municipalities, industrial corporations, and private social institutions of every kind.

The increasing volume of official and other statistics on social conditions and the increasing interdependence of political units have compelled attention to the problem of uniformity and standardization of statistical data. International action to secure uniformity in the field of vital statistics, as previously noted, was urged by Quetelet from the beginning of his career and has been considerably developed. Similar attempts are under way in other fields for national and international units. In 1930 a national registration system of Social Statistics was adopted by the United States Children's Bureau in an attempt to standardize statistics in the various fields of social work. Similar efforts are under way in the fields of crime, mental hygiene, divorce, and accidents. Administrative improvements as well as scientific advances in these fields are largely dependent upon more adequate statistical information. Finally, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 brought strongly into the foreground the full dependence of intelligent public administration on an adequate statistical service. A Central Statistical Board was established in Washington to co-ordinate the various existing statistical services. Under this Board and with the co-operation of the Bureau of the Census extensive reorganization of official statistics is under way.[33]

2. *Statistics in the Universities.* We have already noted how the German influence working through Franz Boas and the Galton influence working through James McKeen Cattell (who had previously studied in Germany),

[33] See *Government Statistics: A Report of the Committee on Government Statistics and Information Services.* (Social Science Research Council, New York, 1937). See also W. F. Ogburn, "Statistical Trends," *Jour. of the Am. Stat. Assoc.* (Proceedings of the Centenary Celebration 1839–1939) Vol. 35, Part II, 252–260. On account of lack of space, I am compelled to omit entirely the very important field of vital and actuarial statistics and the contributions to these and related fields by members of the Population Association of America and the Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems. See also the recent work of Dorothy S. Thomas, *Migration Differentials* (Social Science Research Council, 1938). The brilliant articles of S. A. Stouffer in this general field should also be noted. For an important monograph illustrating the application of actuarial methods to new fields, see E. W. Burgess and L. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage* (Prentice-Hall, 1939).

operated to cause a tremendous development in the field of educational and psychological statistics. The names of Thorndike, Terman, Thurstone, Kelly, and Holzinger,[34] to mention only a few, are sufficient reminder of the substantial quality of achievements in this field, though they give no indication of its vast quantity. In both respects, educational and psychological statistics must be regarded as one of the three great fields [35] of statistical development in the United States, the other two being economic (business) statistics and social (demographic) statistics. We must confine ourselves for the remainder of this sketch chiefly to the latter.

The most important single event in the history of social statistics in the United States was the appointment of Richmond Mayo-Smith in 1880 to a chair in the newly established School of Political Science at Columbia University. This was also the beginning of university instruction in statistics in this country. Mayo-Smith had done two years of graduate work in Germany [36] and had previously studied under J. W. Burgess at Amherst. As we have already seen, many of the leading universities and colleges in Germany as well as in other countries had offered training in statistics since the time of Quetelet or before. Much of this training was in co-operation with government bureaus, and one of the best of these was that developed by Engel about the middle of the nineteenth century.[37] Statistics were therefore well developed in the social studies in Germany when Burgess (and subsequently, Mayo-Smith) studied there.

As a result, lectures in statistical methods and descriptive statistics were considered at Columbia, from the first, as fundamental subjects both in economics and other social sciences. Outlines of Mayo-Smith's courses, as found in the Columbia College Handbook for the early eighties, indicate that they dealt with demographic, economic, and moral (vice and crime) statistics as well as with statistical methods, the doctrine of free will, and the possibility of discovering social laws. In 1895 Mayo-Smith published *Statistics and Sociology,* which was the first important publication of its kind in America.[38] Its first chapter could be read to great advantage by

[34] The last two of these, at least, have also been directly associated with Pearson.

[35] The history of statistical developments in this field has been more adequately treated than any of the others in Miss Walker's excellent treatise, to which frequent reference has been made.

[36] I am indebted to Professor R. E. Chaddock for most of the data in this section (unpublished paper on "Social Statistics in the Faculty of Political Science"). See also a biographical sketch of Mayo-Smith by E. R. Seligman, *National Academy of Sciences Memoirs,* XVII (1924), 73–6. Mayo-Smith first came to Columbia in 1877 as instructor in history and political science.

[37] For an excellent account of similar developments in Italy, see C. Gini, *op. cit.*

[38] Analyses of United States Census statistics and statistics of the American Prison Association and the National Conference of Charities and Corrections had, of course, appeared before this time. "George Tucker's statistical studies of the United States, first published in Hunt's *Merchants' Magazine* in the eighteen-forties, is the nearest

most sociologists today, and deserves to rank with the opening chapters of *The Grammar of Science* as at once a challenge and a confession of faith in the applicability of the methods of science to social phenomena. *Statistics and Economics* followed in 1899. The author considered these two volumes as two parts of a *Science of Statistics*. Both volumes stimulated wide-spread interest. Mayo-Smith continued to lecture in both economics and sociology until Franklin H. Giddings took over the latter subject in 1894. But Mayo-Smith continued in charge of statistics for both fields until his death in 1901.

When we consider that Columbia was one of the two or three important graduate schools in America during this period, it is clear that Mayo-Smith's influence cannot be over-estimated. His students and those of his successors at Columbia were soon found in the majority of important academic positions in the rapidly developing social science departments of other important universities throughout the country. This influence was especially marked in the case of sociology. Under Giddings this department became the outstanding one in the country, and a large number of his students during the first decade of the century became in turn important influences in nearly every important university in the country. Through men like W. F. Ogburn, R. E. Chaddock, F. S. Chapin, H. B. Woolston, C. E. Gehlke, S. A. Rice, and others, the strong emphasis on statistical methods which Giddings continued after Mayo-Smith made this approach a dominant influence in American sociology.[39] Moore, Seager, Mitchell, and others exercised a similar influence in economics.

Giddings' contribution to the development of statistics in American sociology is unique in that he himself was chiefly devoted to theoretical sociology and made no important contributions either to statistical methods or to their sociological application. Fortunately, his early training in engineering prevented him from being panic-stricken at the sight of a mathematical formula, and convinced him that, on the contrary, this may be the best way of stating complicated relationships between phenomena. On the other hand, he also avoided the error of immature or incompetent statisticians in regarding statistics as a substitute for common sense, logic, and theoretical reflection. He succeeded in imparting to his better students and to his department a respect and enthusiasm for statistical methods and their possibilities to which present developments in sociology, at least, must be largely credited. The nature of Giddings' influence upon his students in this field may be surmised from his extremely vigorous advocacy of the quantitative approach in his *Scientific Study of Human Society* (1924). "It is as

early approach to a statistical sociology" (L. L. Bernard, "An Interpretation of Sociological Research," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXVII [Sept., 1931], 208).

[39] Cf. Bernard, *op. cit.*

necessary," he said, "that the scientific student of human society should know the essentials of statistical theory and method as that he should know the essentials of biology, psychology, and anthropology (p. 208) . . . Physicists and chemists, astronomers and geologists, are tirelessly repeating their observations and their measurement of presumptive fact. Social psychologists and sociologists must get this habit" (p. 58). Elsewhere he said: "The present tendency is to loaf and to generalize. . . . We need men . . . who will get busy at the adding machine and the logarithms and give us *exact studies,* such as we get from the psychological laboratories. *Sociology can be made an exact, quantitative science* if we can get *industrious* men interested in it."[40] Since Giddings was himself primarily a theorist and a philosopher, and since it is frequently assumed that these fields and statistics are in some way mutually exclusive, his outspoken support of quantitative methods is of special interest as bearing upon present ill-defined and futile controversy on this subject.

The development of statistics as a subject of university instruction which began with Mayo-Smith's course at Columbia in 1880 was followed in 1887 by the establishment of a similar course at Pennsylvania under Professor Roland P. Falkner, who was probably the first man in America to be listed as Professor of Statistics. As in the case of Mayo-Smith, Falkner followed the model of the German universities, and the subject-matter of his course was largely concerned with economics. His translation (1891) of Meitzen's *Geschichte, Theorie, und Technik der Statistik* (Berlin 1886) became the first textbook on the subject published in America. The first psychology course to mention statistical method also appeared at Pennsylvania, under Cattell, in 1887. During the last decade of the century courses appeared at Michigan by F. C. Hicks and C. H. Cooley, at Yale by Irving Fisher, at Chicago by E. R. L. Gould, at Johns Hopkins by H. L. Moore, and at Harvard by J. Cummings. In addition to these courses in economics and sociology, a number of statistical courses in psychology appeared in the same and other universities during the same period.

After 1900, courses in statistics multiplied rapidly in psychology, education, mathematics, agriculture, and public health as well as in economics, business, and sociology. By 1925 there were 86 elementary and 8 advanced courses in economics and sociology, and an additional 56 courses (all except 3 were elementary) in business. In mathematics, 57 elementary and 40 advanced courses were listed. In education there were at the same time 34 elementary and 10 advanced courses, and in psychology 12 elementary courses. Agriculture with four elementary courses, and public health with 11 elementary and 3 advanced, complete the total of 321 courses in statistics offered in American colleges and universities in 1925, not to mention 85 ad-

[40] *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XV (1909–10), 196.

ditional related courses.[41] This represents the 45-year growth of the idea embodied in Mayo-Smith's Columbia course of 1880.

3. *Theoretical and Mathematical Statistics.* The great majority of the above courses were designed to acquaint students with the elements of statistical method as applied to special fields such as business, population and mental measurements. During the same period there was, however, a great advance in theoretical and mathematical statistics. From the publication of Laplace's *Théorie Analytique des Probabilités* in 1812 down to 1890 there had been little advance in this field, with the exception of the development of the DeMoivre-Laplace law of error by Gauss. The development of the theory of correlation and the development of generalized frequency curves by Pearson and others to cover the inadequacies, for many types of distributions, of the Gaussian curve, began a new epoch in statistics which has already revolutionized statistical theory and practice. Still more recent developments have been made possible largely by mathematical advances based upon the theory of probability, such, for example, as R. A. Fisher's study (1915) of the distribution in random samples of the correlation coefficient.[42] Further improvement both in the applicability and validity of statistical methods to the more involved problems of the social sciences will undoubtedly depend upon continued refinement of mathematical statistics.

At the same time, the more important immediate problems in the application of statistical methods to sociological data are not so much concerned with a refinement of mathematical methods as with a more careful definition of the data themselves. The methods of summarizing and otherwise manipulating data are largely the same in different fields and consequently can readily be taken over from one subject to another. The matter of careful definition of units of observation, nomenclature, and more refined instruments of observation, on the other hand, are likely to differ widely in different fields. It is in the latter respect that the social sciences are most backward. No refinement of statistical treatment can produce valid results if the original data are themselves defective. Failure to recognize this important consideration has been responsible for many absurdly involved and invalid statistical studies in the social sciences.

[41] "Statistical Teaching in American Colleges and Universities," *Jour. Am. Stat. Assoc.*, XXI (1926), 419–24. For an analysis of the extent to which members of the various social science societies are also members of the American Statistical Association, see S. A. Rice and M. Green, "Interlocking Membership of Social Science Societies," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXV (Nov., 1929), 439–44. For an analysis of the extent of interest in statistics and other specific fields by members of the Am. Soc. Soc., see G. A. Lundberg, "The Interests of Members of the American Sociological Society," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXVII (Nov., 1931), 458–60.

[42] H. Hotelling, "Recent Improvements in Statistical Inference," *Jour. Am. Stat. Assoc.*, XXVI (Supplement, March 1931), pp. 79–87. Hotelling is himself a leader in the field of theoretical and mathematical statistics.

As a result, there is considerable agreement among social statisticians that what is most needed in this field at present is not more refined mathematical statistics but greater care in defining problems and units, and in observing and gathering the original data. A critical and logical, rather than an advanced routine mathematical, treatment of the data is most needed. Says Professor Gini: "The statistical material at our disposal may be too rough to allow of application of exquisite methods, or for the purpose of the research it may appear useless to seek precision beyond a certain limit . . . It is important to bear in mind that, if mathematics represents a necessary instrument, they are not, however, sufficient to ensure success which above all depends upon a kind of statistical intuition helped by wide experience, for which it would be useless to give fixed rules. It is this knowledge and this intuition which makes the good statistician select the right way among thousands of possible ways, the way that will lead him to the most fruitful results." [43] He concludes that our motto should be "Statistics with the least mathematical means possible." "No amount of mathematical training and ability," says another writer, "can take the place of the judgment and common sense that comes from a knowledge of the field in which a problem lies . . . The methodological side has been developed until we can find correlation coefficients by simply turning a crank, but the explanation of the meaning of the result after we find it needs a brain." [44] A former president of the American Statistical Association states his belief that "it should be a matter of fundamental principle for all statistical conclusions to be reached primarily through logical and experimental processes, supplemented by very simple numerical and graphical analysis. The more elaborate mathematical treatment should then be applied, if necessary, as a check and verification of the results that have been arrived at by these other means." [45]

The limitations and dangers of the statistical method have, of course, been most fully recognized and emphasized by the statisticians themselves, both in the social sciences and elsewhere. Says Dorothy Thomas: "The whole emphasis in the writings of Bowley, E. B. Wilson and Yule is that the formulas and methods used in statistics have been developed on strictly limited assumptions, that they are exceedingly useful to investigators but that appeal must always be made to experience, and the assumptions must not go beyond the premises by which the methods were originated. . . . The greater part of the statistical work that has been done in the social sciences, is, from this point of view, of little value. . . . A difficulty in interpreting many of the statistical studies in the social sciences is that, as

[43] C. Gini, *op. cit.*, pp. 706–8.

[44] A. R. Cathorne, "Principles of Statistical Methodology," *Jour. Am. Stat. Assoc.*, XXVI (Supplement, March, 1931), pp. 27–32.

[45] M. C. Rorty, "Statistics and the Scientific Method," *Jour. Am. Stat. Assoc.*, XXVI (March, 1931).

published, they reveal little about the assumptions and compromises the investigator has had to make, and the necessary adjustments between methods and data . . . the author of a study can (if he will) throw a certain amount of light on these processes which may otherwise appear either unduly obscure or unduly clear cut." [46]

In spite of these reservations and warnings by the better statisticians, a large number of researches guilty of these fallacies have continued to appear. Such studies are taken by some sociologists to indicate the fundamental inapplicability of statistical methods to sociological problems. All they indicate, of course, is that incompetent statisticians will draw unwarranted conclusions, just as incompetence in any other field necessarily affects the validity of the results. It is true that when we have to reckon with stupidity, incompetence, and illogic, the more specific the terminology and methods employed the more glaring will be the errors in the result. As a result, the errors of quantitative workers lend themselves more easily to detection and derision. An equivalent blunder by a manipulator of rhetoric may not only appear less flagrant, but may actually go unobserved or become a venerated platitude.

This failure properly to define the issue regarding quantitative methods in the social sciences has given rise to not a little controversy. Like a great many other subjects of controversy in this field, it has only to be more rigidly defined in order to be largely solved. The prevalence of such controversies in the social sciences at present is almost entirely due to the gross inadequacy of the concepts and terminology employed in these fields. Indeed, if the importance of adequate symbols in any intellectual enterprise were realized in anything like its true proportions, social scientists would give more attention to this subject and to statistical methods. It is an anomalous truth that the very studies which are most in need of a highly sensitive system of symbols because of the admittedly multiple, dynamic and simultaneous nature of their phenomena, are the most backward in this respect. The close relationship between the advancement of science and the development of improved symbolic equipment in the form of mathematics is one of the most striking facts in the history of science. The lesson seems to have been largely lost on social scientists. While the terminology of physical science has undergone complete renovation in the last four centuries, social science continues to employ the utterly inadequate literary symbols of the time of Aristotle or before. Again the parallel is striking: knowledge of the social sciences is also practically where it was in the time of Aristotle.

It does not follow that the social sciences must adopt for their purposes the mathematics of the other sciences. I have no doubt that extensive development in this direction is inevitable and that the social sciences will

[46] D. S. Thomas, "Statistics in Social Research," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXV (July, 1929), 2, 3.

greatly profit therefrom. But during this development the social sciences must also develop a symbolism or a mathematics of their own to suit their further needs. Present mathematics, being our most definite and sensitive means of expressing relationships and processes, will undoubtedly be the model for this development. "Statistics must largely replace geometry and the calculus substitute for arithmetic, as used in the physical and lower biological sciences. For here we are describing and we are measuring not merely simple compact physical objects and space relations, but abstractly integrated spatially discrete objects and relationships, that is, people with changing characteristics and attitudes behaving in ever fluid relationships." [47]

VIII. Conclusion

The same forces which gave rise to modern statistics and which have produced their extensive development in recent times will undoubtedly continue to operate in the future. With increasing reliance on man's experience as a guide to conduct, there will be increasing demands for accurate records of this experience in every department of human behavior. Since this experience can be of significance as a guide only when it is generalized on the basis of large numbers of cases, there is no escape from the statistical method.

The need for social planning is today in the foreground of public attention. Such planning can be undertaken intelligently only on the basis of a comprehensive knowledge of present conditions and present social trends. The possibility of gauging social trends and planning in accordance with them depends upon the adequacy of our records of the past as well as of the present. Such undertakings as those of President Hoover's Committees on Recent Economic Changes and on Social Trends and the enormous expansion of governmental statistical agencies during the decade 1930–1940 reflect the growing realization of the need for information on such subjects. These studies can achieve their objective only to the extent that accurate and comparable data, largely statistical, are available.

While the quantity and scope of statistics and the amount of attention given to them is destined to increase enormously, "statistics-consciousness" and controversy over their usefulness, of the kind prevalent at present, will largely disappear. For it will be recognized that statistical methods are only a more refined and formal way of manipulating meaningfully the data of experience, which under simpler conditions were generalized by informal rule-of-thumb methods. Just as pictorial symbols have been found inadequate to represent the more involved data and relationships of phenomena

[47] L. L. Bernard, "The Evolution of Social Consciousness and the Social Sciences," *Psych. Rev.* (March, 1932).

and were, therefore, supplanted by the more abstract rhetorical symbols, so the "literary" symbols in common use in the social sciences today will be largely supplanted by statistical expressions which describe social phenomena and their relationships more adequately. Such a concept as a straight line, for example, is best represented to children and preliterate people by a geometric figure or "picture." Among the literate the same idea can be conveyed by the symbols "straight line." To the statistician the expression $y = a + bx$ represents the same idea. But the last method is susceptible of manipulation so as to express *accurately* a tremendous variety of relationships between the points which make up any curve, as well as the straight line. Again, when we think of the straight line as consisting of a number of points in a plane, and that varied units and values may be assigned to these points, we begin to see some of the possibilities, for scientific purposes, of the mathematical symbols over the others. The significant description and analysis which the mathematical, as contrasted with the other symbols, make possible are almost infinitely varied and intricate. When statistics are thus recognized as merely another type of symbols especially adapted to orienting ourselves in a world of large numbers of factors and relationships, everyone will be equipped with a knowledge of elementary statistics as part of the necessary language of life. The time is perhaps at hand when it will be recognized that for intelligent living in modern society it is as necessary to be able to think in averages, percentages, and deviations as it is to be able to read and write.

(For selected references, see footnotes of the chapter and Bibliographical Appendix.)

Part III

THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE ON HUMAN SOCIETY: ANTHROPOGEOGRAPHY AND HUMAN ECOLOGY

[7]

THE RÔLE OF ANTHROPOGEOGRAPHY IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY

Franklin Thomas

I. Introduction

The importance of anthropogeography for social science has long been recognized. Historians of all time have sensed the relationship between geography and history, as revealed in the work of writers from Herodotus to the present; and a like recognition with regard to their several fields has come, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, from modern and contemporary sociologists, economists and anthropologists, as well as from students of politics, ethics and jurisprudence.[1] Among ancient writers the influence of environment upon man was for the most part regarded as direct and immediate; while today indirect effects receive the greatest attention, and the environment is regarded not as determining the course of human life, but as imposing conditions which limit its development, the extent of such limitation diminishing as man increases his mastery over the forces of nature. Modern writers thus insist that geographical influences must always be viewed in the light of their changing incidence and importance with the development of culture.[2]

The subject matter in the present chapter is presented under five main headings. At the outset consideration will be given to a group of writers in the field of general anthropogeography. These writers, beginning with Ritter and including Peschel, Reclus, Ratzel, Semple, and Herbertson, among others, treat the subject comprehensively, covering all areas and discussing all environmental factors—climate, natural resources, location and accessibility, topography and the "aspects of nature," with varying emphasis upon the question of human control over environment. They *commonly* assume that geography is first and foremost a study of the influence of the physical environment upon man, an assumption accepted among present-day geographers with something less than unanimity. Moreover, in spite of occasional disavowals and frequent references to a

[1] Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society* (1925), chap. i.
[2] *Ibid.*, chap. xii.

reciprocal relationship between man and nature, it is not too much to say that geographic determinism is usual among them.

Among the second group, the regional geographers, we find an insistence that the fundamental principles of geography can be mastered only through the intensive and systematic study of particular areas definite in extent, to be followed by comparative studies of the areas selected. In fact, many of this group hold that these studies should begin with small, familiar localities before proceeding to the more extensive regions, if the larger regions are to be more than vaguely understood. We can discern among them also, especially of late, an increasing tendency to reject extreme geographic determinism; and writers in this field, which Sauer has called "the final goal of all geography," look upon human geography as a study of man's reactions on his environment as well as of environment's influence on man.

The third division comprises a considerable number of writers who, although most of them discuss other phases of human geography and enumerate various factors involved in cultural problems, are, nevertheless, best known for some special emphasis which they place on one environmental influence or class of influences. In this group we find attitudes ranging from extreme geographical determinism to a liberal recognition of the part played by man and culture. Among them are those who, with Demolins, Cowan and Mackinder, devote themselves to factors such as topography, routes of travel, strategic position, and isolation. Others, with Huntington, Ward and Dexter, concern themselves chiefly with climate, seasonal changes and the weather; while still a third group of writers, large in number, finds its main interest centering about food, natural resources and commercial influences.

Fourth, a section by Harry Elmer Barnes deals with the bearing of geographic factors upon history. This mode of treating the topic not only throws some points considered under the first three heads into high relief, but also summarizes certain aspects of the chapter.

Last, in the fifth section, come the critics of geographic determinism. Their name is legion and includes historians, sociologists and anthropologists as well as professional students of geography. Limitations of space prevent consideration here of more than a few representative men. These will include, in addition to the views of certain sociologists, Febvre, who brings to his task the training of the professional historian; Sauer, the scholarly American geographer; and, finally, Boas and his followers in what has been called the historical school of anthropology. Whatever our definition of geographic determinism, it reaches the vanishing point in the Boas group, who sharply criticize the doctrines of the environmentalist and offer concrete examples to show that similar or even identical geographical factors will produce dissimilar cultures among peoples of the same level

of development. In this view, man and culture become the dynamic and determining factors.

II. The General Anthropogeographers

The notion that geographical factors have a definite bearing upon man and culture is probably as old as recorded history; but a comprehensive understanding of this relationship was not possible without a knowledge of the essential facts of biology and a familiarity with the topographical and climatic features of the earth. This knowledge was made available by the scientific studies of Buffon, Cuvier, Lamarck and others, while the explorations carried on by men such as von Humboldt supplied the necessary geographic information.[3] The first man to recognize this newly acquired fund of scientific and geographical data and to utilize it in the service of anthropogeography was Karl Ritter.[4] It is thus clear that any survey of modern anthropogeography must begin with this great German scholar, who, in addition to his pre-eminence as a geographer, was a teacher of history during his entire academic career of forty years. Not only is Ritter the first comprehensive student of the relationship between earth and man, but he is important also as the inspirer of men such as Guyot, Kohl, Peschel, and Reclus, enthusiastic followers who have made valuable contributions of their own.

Looking upon the earth as an organism, whose structural and functional interrelationships he sought to understand, Ritter held that the forces of nature, always deep, highly complex and elusive, nevertheless operate according to definite laws. In language both mystical and poetical in its beauty he tells us that the influences of environment are not obvious, that they move slowly and must be studied in all their aspects, and that "the still power which nature exerts demands a like peaceful soul to watch its workings." In setting himself to the task he proposes to keep clear of *a priori* conceptions and opinions in his search for the truth and "to advance from observation to observation." [5] It is evident that he had ample opportunity for these observations for he traveled extensively before the appearance of the first edition of his *Erdkunde,* one of the most imposing human products in the field of geographical science. Thus, in spite of his atmosphere of mysticism, Ritter's method of study may be described as primarily objective and descriptive.

Nowhere in Ritter's work is *determinism* more in evidence than in the section where he indicates that it is the geographical environment that

[3] Thomas, *op. cit.,* chap. ii.

[4] Ritter's chief contributions have been brought together and translated in a volume entitled *Ritter's Geographical Studies,* by William L. Gage (New York, 1861).

[5] Gage, *op. cit.,* pp. 58–9, 86.

gives individuality to nations. Men and nations, he holds, have qualities peculiar to themselves alone, and it is in the unfolding and perfecting of these qualities that true greatness lies, for nations as well as for men. These qualities, in Ritter's view, are innate but their growth and perfection are brought about by the influence of the geographic surroundings. Thus every organism in its development is a combination of its inner nature and its physical environment and Ritter asserts that "in no way is it subject to chance or accident." [6] In this way nature molds national character, and "men take, therefore, from their surroundings a *stamp,* the peculiarity of which is dependent upon the locality where they live." [7] There is, then, a mutual relationship between geography and history; and "the historical course of every country is read in its natural conditions." [8]

The influence of the configuration of the continents upon their history is accorded great importance by Ritter. In general he finds that the more compact a continent is and the more uniform its geographic conditions, the more backward and homogeneous will be its culture. Africa, both compact and uniform, is conspicuous for its backwardness while Europe, being neither compact nor uniform, "accessible by water even to the very heart" and therefore best adapted to the reception and diffusion of ideas, has developed the highest of all civilizations. Asia, having both uniformity and compactness, on the one hand, and an irregular coast line on the other, has a uniform and backward culture in its great isolated interior, while the peninsulas of the coast have developed some of the famous civilizations of history. If a continent is too much broken up, as is Polynesia, the culture will be backward as well as varied. Europe, midway between compact Africa and diffused Polynesia, has developed a culture both varied and advanced.[9] It may be recalled that Bodin attributed this same superiority to Europe's position midway between the hot and cold zones.

In his discussion of the significance of man's constantly increasing mastery over the forces of nature, Ritter somewhat disarms those who would charge him with extreme geographic determinism. Many regions and localities are important, he holds, chiefly because of changes wrought by man. Through his inventions, obstacles to progress have become its chief aid. Bridges, railroads and canals have brought colossal changes; while navigation has put man in touch with his fellow-men all over the world and changed the relationship of nation to nation.[10] A canal through the Isthmus of Suez would greatly shorten the route to the East Indies, and

[6] Gage, *op. cit.,* pp. 56–60.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 287.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 307.
[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 337–48.
[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 257–63.

one through Panama would bring China six thousand miles nearer to Europe.[11] Ritter also set forth the doctrine, later elaborated by Buckle and others, that environmental influences are most effective upon primitive peoples and that human progress is characterized by a diminishing importance of geographic factors and an increasing importance of mind and culture.[12] The incidence and importance of geographical influences are modified also by the shifting of peoples, which changes the material upon which nature has to work.[13]

Temperate enough for their time were the views of this great German historian and teacher, and many who were to follow could well have profited by his example of moderation. Yet, in spite of his moderation, erudition and insight, Ritter scarcely belonged to the present era in anthropogeography. He was never quite able to free himself from the mystical element which he inherited from Romanticism, especially in his treatment of the relation between geography and history; and he lived too early to avail himself of the evolutionary doctrine of Darwin.

One of Ritter's most prominent followers was Oscar Peschel, professor of geography at Leipzig.[14] He availed himself of the new scientific data brought to light after Ritter, and tended on the whole to place less emphasis on the historical aspects of geography. His contributions to our subject are found in his summary of the relation between environment and the origin and development of civilizations, and in his theory of the relation of environment and religion. His best statement of the relation between environment and history is found in his essay "Über die Bedeutung der Erdkunde für die Kulturgeschichte."[15] Here he reviews conditions surrounding early peoples with reference to the origin and development of civilization, and concludes that in every case it was favorable environmental conditions which led to the development of civilization and unfavorable environments that prevented such development from being universal.

Peschel's theory of environment as conditioning the development of religion is presented in his treatise "The Zone of the Founders of Religion,"[16] and this section summarizes, incidentally, his views on the in-

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 335–6.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 257–8.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 249–50, 273.

[14] Important also in the development of the newer geography between Ritter and Ratzel was Johann Georg Kohl (1808–78). A noted traveler as well as an outstanding geographer, he continued the work of Ritter and Humboldt in the field of exploration. He was influenced by Ritter's view of the relation between geography and history; and his idea of the organic nature of society in turn affected the work of Ratzel. See his *Die geographische Lage der Hauptstädte Europas* (1874).

[15] Found in Vol. I of his *Abhandlungen zur Erd- und Völkerkunde* (1877), pp. 457–72.

[16] Found in his *Races of Man* (New York, 1876).

fluence of the environment upon the psychic traits of a population. He opposes the views expressed by Humboldt and Buckle on the influence of of the "aspects of nature" and denies Buckle's notion that the nature of the food of a population has any perceptible influence on the temperament of the people.[17] He follows the tradition of the Arab geographers that all great philosophers and religious teachers were born between 29° and 33° 49′ north latitude. Here, he says, were born Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Christ, and Mohammed. He asserts that a desert is favorable to the development of religion, particularly monotheism, and holds that a warm desert environment is the most favorable place for the development of high forms of religion generally. Desert life, he says, exposes one to hunger and thirst and hence induces abnormal mental states and oversensitive imaginations. Deserts are clear, dry and have no foliage or varied topography to distract the mind of the dweller therein. As proof of his contention that there is a relation between desert environment and monotheism, he calls attention to the fact that Moses, Elijah, John the Baptist, Christ, and Mohammed all prepared for their religious careers in the desert.[18]

Peschel emphasizes also the influence of commerce on the distribution of nations. The presence of important products of commerce, vegetable or mineral, has had a great influence upon the development of nations. Commerce has caused the massing of populations in certain places, has brought higher civilizations in contact with lower and has drawn all nations into the current of civilization. On the other hand, the absence of important commercial products or good harbors may, and usually does, condemn a locality to cultural stagnation and isolation. As examples of articles of commerce, the presence of which has influenced the distribution of nations and culture, he names horns, shells and obsidian in prehistoric times; tin in early Britain; amber in the Baltic; gold, tobacco and fur in the new world; gold in Australia; and spices in the East Indies. As examples of backward civilizations, due to a lack of commercial products or harbor facilities, he cites Australia up to 1850, and Africa, the latter being due to a lack of harbors and navigable rivers, and to the absence of important products until recent discoveries and explorations.[19]

Peschel's statements on religious developments are open to doubt, for it is a question whether any of the religions mentioned as monotheistic were actually such. The fundamental doctrines of all these religions mentioned can be duplicated in many religious systems of primitive peoples. Indeed, all recent studies seem to indicate that the same vital psychic states and fundamental concepts underlie all religious systems. This universality

[17] Peschel, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–14.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 315–8.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 209–18.

of fundamental conceptions destroys all such contentions as to a monopoly on the origin of religion.[20]

It was the monumental work of Ritter, the progress in science and thought after Ritter, and the increased volume of the data of anthropogeography that supplied the foundations upon which Friedrich Ratzel developed the first great scientific and systematic analysis of the various geographic factors which affect the evolution of man and the nature of society.[21] Ratzel, professor of geography at Leipzig from 1886 to the time of his death, was not the equal of Ritter or Reclus as a geographer, but is outstanding in the study and organization of the relation between man and his physical surroundings. He has become known to American readers mainly through the writings of his faithful pupil, Ellen Semple, to whom uncritical students have assigned credit for ideas that belonged to Ratzel and were never claimed by her.[22]

There are two distinctive features in the Ratzel theory of environment. First, he views the relation between man and his physical surroundings not as a struggle between two conflicting forces, but rather as a process in which man develops himself as a part of the earth's surface. "Man belongs to earth as a portion of the earth," [23] and it is not therefore a question of man versus nature, but of man and nature evolving together through reciprocal influences. Secondly, he looks upon society as an organism reacting to nature like an animal organism to its physical environment, holding that anthropogeography is a branch of biogeography and that the state is a real organism and not merely an analogy. While insisting that it is an actual organism, he points out that the state is the highest of all organic forms of life because individual members have a greater independence, and that this independence increases as the organism develops.[24]

This organic nature of society results in like historical developments where climates and physical surroundings are similar. "Lands, no matter how distant from one another they may be, whenever their climates are similar, are destined to be scenes of analogous historical developments." [25] Need one search farther for an example of geographic determinism or for proof that climate plays an important rôle in Ratzel's general theory? Climate, he holds, affects man directly through its influence upon his body, mind and character, and indirectly through its effects upon the

[20] Cf. J. E. Carpenter, *Comparative Religions* (1914).

[21] J. Brunhes, *Human Geography* (1920), chap. ii.

[22] Ratzel gave the best summary of his views in chapter iii of Volume I of the *Weltgeschichte,* edited by H. F. Helmolt. References here are to an English translation entitled *The History of the World, A Survey of Man's Record* (London, 1901).

[23] Ratzel, *op. cit.,* p. 61.

[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 65–7.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 64.

natural products utilized by man; and he assigns to dwellers in the temperate zones a superiority, in both a political and a military sense, over the inhabitants of both frigid and torrid regions. He even finds that the inhabitants of northern France, Italy, Germany and the United States are superior to those who live in the southern parts of those states, and that within the temperate zone as a whole the most invigorating climate is found where isothermal lines group together, producing a region of varying and contrasting climatic conditions.[26]

Ratzel discusses also what he terms "the historical movements of peoples" or "the struggle for area," a potent factor in social evolution which corresponds to the struggle for existence in biological evolution. This "struggle for area" is the product of "the internal motive forces which are peculiar to life, of the influences of the ground to which the life is attached," and of the "spiritual impulses of the intellect and will of man." Its intensity is dependent upon and directly in proportion to the rate of internal growth and power. As to the direction taken by these movements of peoples there is no general law except that they are toward the weaker or richer neighbor, following the line of least resistance or of greatest attraction. Peoples have moved in all times; and conquest, the older type of movement, has been superseded largely by economic penetration and colonization. This process, by promoting divergencies from the original national type, aids the process of differentiation, which is the "leading factor in organic growth." [27]

The conformation of the earth's surface is, in Ratzel's view, both culturally and politically important. A habitat that is uniform and accessible promotes political unity, while a diversified conformation is a dividing influence, unless the diversities lend themselves to common control. Natural boundaries are assets to any state, not merely as protection, but because they give greater definiteness, distinctiveness, coherence, and unity to its political development. Topography and configuration afford isolation and protection to a people and make possible cultural specialization in distinct regions. This isolation, a boon in the early development of a state, becomes a hindrance later by causing cultural stagnation. Moreover, when these distinct regions are similar they give rise to generally similar types of evolution and political organization, and thus geographical situation has an important bearing upon historical repetition. All in all, according to Ratzel, situation is "the most important of all geographical considerations." [28]

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–80.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–72. For an elaborate classification of types of migration, accompanied by a comprehensive bibliography, see Howard Becker, "Forms of Population Movement: Prolegomena to a Study of Mental Mobility," *Social Forces,* IX, No. 2 (Dec., 1930), and IX, No. 3 (March, 1931).

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 73–103.

Human control of environment is not stressed in the Ratzel system, although his discussion of the development of navigation amounts to the same thing; because the art of navigation, while it has not directly modified the physical environment, has nevertheless been a most potent factor in freeing man from its domination. In fact, Ratzel regarded this conquest of the great bodies of water as one of the most important steps in human progress, as it broke up the tendencies toward an ingrowing culture and greatly hastened the early development of divergence, variegation and differentiation. Culturally, seafaring is of the greatest significance, for it has been a powerful instrument in breaking down provincialism and in adding to existing knowledge. The conquest of the sea broadens the culture of the seafaring states, for it brings all into contact with the same widely differing cultures.[29]

Ratzel's presuppositions in human geography are of significance for cultural ethnology. He was in reality the founder of the "diffusion" interpretation of cultural transmission.[30] His attention drawn to cultural similarities, those which he could not explain by the influence of similar environments were assigned to diffusion from a common source through cultural contact. Evidently he found this attitude more in harmony with his geographical theories and data than was the contending doctrine of independent development. He is important also in that he guarded against the older tendency to find direct geographic influences of a gross character and because he emphasized the indirect influences of environment. In fact, the most prominent feature of his system is its emphasis upon these indirect effects of geographical factors.

Among the students who surrounded Karl Ritter at Berlin none was more brilliant than the lofty, sensitive Reclus, who has been hailed as the greatest of French geographers. Philosophical anarchist and radical extraordinary, he was exiled from France in 1872 and went to live in Switzerland, where much of his work was done. In his writings he emphasized always the importance of the natural environment, and was thus able to minimize the significance of the state, an attitude that is basic in anarchistic doctrines. Although not Ratzel's equal as a stimulator of thought or as a trail blazer in the realm of ideas, he was Ratzel's superior as a geographer, and it is safe to say that his *L'Homme et la Terre* [31] is the most ambitious attempt ever made by an individual to present universal history in its geographical setting. His works, characterized throughout by a preciseness and clarity of thought, are remarkable for

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 89–91.

[30] Cf. A. A. Goldenweiser, "Cultural Anthropology," in H. E. Barnes, *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences* (1925), pp. 232–3.

[31] 6 vols. (Paris, 1905–8).

an enduring literary fascination as well as for their scientific accuracy.[32]

In setting forth his general method Reclus commits himself to the analytical approach by insisting that each geographic factor must be studied separately and in detail in the effort to discover what each contributes to that great complex or resultant of forces, at work all the time, together or in opposition, called the physical environment.[33] Moreover he distinguishes not only between the physical and the social environments, but also between the static aspects of environment and its dynamic phases, as modified by the great historic changes of culture. In his analytical treatment he considers the influence of temperature, humidity and altitude; of various topographic factors such as forests, islands, swamps and lakes; and of river-systems and the sea.[34] In following this procedure he is in agreement with Ratzel, who made a thorough and scientific classification of the chief elements in the physical environment and created the categories of anthropogeography.

Climate plays a more important rôle with Reclus than with Ratzel, who put "situation" above all other geographic factors. With Reclus climate, treated as *temperature* and *humidity,* came first. Density of population, he held, varies roughly with latitude, reaching zero in the polar regions. The white man could never thrive in the frigid zones until aided by modern science, and even the native dwellers in the polar regions have every aspect of their lives rigidly determined by the environment. This is not true of the hot zones. There, when life is excluded or limited it is because of the excessive humidity of the jungle or the dryness of the desert and not because of the heat alone. Thus in warm regions degree of humidity is of greater importance than temperature; and Reclus asserts that there is an ideal of humidity which favors life and social progress, even as Huntington finds ideal climatic conditions that foster human efficiency.[35] Reclus' theory that hot climates give birth to hot tempers is merely the repetition of an old tradition handed down by Bodin and Montesquieu.

In his treatment of topographical factors Reclus, perhaps more clearly than elsewhere, reflects the influence of Ritter. He finds that a mountainous habitat produces in its population characteristics that are unique and easily recognized. Such environments, isolated as a rule, are usually the home of inbred and homogeneous but provincial and backward populations, whose civilizations have been arrested because they have been shut

[32] There are good sketches of Reclus' life and work in the *Geographical Journal* for September, 1905; and by Patrick Geddes in the *Scottish Geographical Magazine* for 1905.

[33] *L'Homme et la Terre* (Paris, 1905–8), I, 4, 40, 114–6.

[34] *Ibid.,* pp. 41–2.

[35] *Ibid.,* pp. 41–68.

off from the rest of the world. In general the same is true of forest, island, lake, swamp and fen habitats which, like mountains, tend to produce highly localized and backward populations. Each of these types of habitat, while it may have served a good purpose as a protective agency in an earlier stage of civilization, ultimately becomes a cause of social stagnation. This tendency toward backwardness is heightened in the case of mountain habitats by the fact that their populations are undoubtedly descended from vanquished peoples, who fled to the mountains for safety. Here one usually finds small local republics, better adapted for defense than for conquest, and thus free but petty in their political organization. Moreover, mountain habitats, like those which are too cold, too hot, too dry or too wet, having too many obstacles to overcome, are not suitable for social progress. For progress, an intermediate type of environment, which has enough obstacles to compel effort, but not enough to discourage or exhaust the people, is best.[36]

Reclus attaches importance to the types of environment which foster the movements of peoples, as did Ratzel; but Reclus stresses the social aspects of such movements, while Ratzel emphasized territory and the "struggle for area," which Vallaux once called an apologetic for German *Welt- und Machtpolitik*. As mountains are associated with isolation, environmental pressure and restrictions, says Reclus, so the plain is correlated with freedom of motion and unlimited horizon. In particular, he regards rivers as best adapted for the development of a progressive civilization because they taught man the art of navigation and provided the great avenues of commerce, the river basins becoming the seats of some of the most advanced cultures. At first isolating barriers between peoples, the influence of rivers has changed with the progress of civilization until they have become the great agencies of inter-communication. As with rivers, so with seas and oceans—barriers once, now the greatest aids to social contact and the exchange of ideas. History has advanced in proportion as man has conquered the seas.[37]

When he considers the question of human control over the physical environment Reclus not only assigns it greater importance than did Ratzel, but he treats the subject more comprehensively and with a finer discrimination. It is necessary to remember, he says, that geographic influences are continually changing and that man is forever conquering the environment, adapting it to his use, and transforming it. This is the *dynamic* aspect of environment, which includes all of the modifications brought about by the great historic changes of culture; and the various factors involved, their changing incidence, their resultant effect, and their relation to society varying with time and social progress, show the

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 68–80.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 80–104.

futility of trying to interpret history in terms of one or all of the influences of man's physical surroundings. One can only realize the vast complex of forces at work and try to understand them, to evaluate them, and to see each in its proper perspective, giving due consideration to nature, culture and the dynamic process of their interrelationship—history.[38]

Although rightly classed with the geographic determinists, Reclus, for all his desire to emphasize nature and minimize the significance of the state, presents an interpretation of environmental influences that is both moderate and well balanced. Comprehensive, synthetic, scrupulous in the matter of accuracy, he ranks among the more liberal of the older school of anthropogeographers. He is best known, perhaps, for the importance he assigns to the effects of social and cultural isolation as caused by various types of environment.

Marked with all the fire of the Celtic spirit, the work *Earth and Man, Comparative Physical Geography,*[39] by Arnold Henry Guyot, is easily the most eloquent presentation of the relation between geography and history that has yet been written. Its dominating influences are the historical geography of Karl Ritter and Hegel's philosophy of history. It is quite possible that Buckle received suggestions from this work, as it appeared in a London edition several years before the publication of the *History of Civilization*. Guyot, a Swiss geographer, joined the faculty at Princeton in 1854 and did much through his lectures, text books and wall charts to arouse popular and scientific interest in the newer geography of Humboldt and Ritter.[40] His own scientific achievements were noteworthy, for in addition to his pre-eminence as a student of glacial motion, he made studies of meteorological phenomena that led to the establishment of the United States Weather Bureau.

Guyot's theories are strongly colored by his mystical and theistic premises. He regarded the earth as the organic result of a purposive creation, "accidental in appearance," yet disclosing a plan in which each continent has a certain part to play. His determinism is revealed not only in his notion "that the continents are made for human societies, as the body is made for the soul," but also in his view that geography owes its importance chiefly to the fact that it is concerned with the external forces which have shaped the development of mankind. Guyot is best known (1) for his ardent espousal of temperate climates as ideal for the production of the finest types of man and the highest forms of social organiza-

[38] Reclus, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–20.

[39] (Boston, 1857.)

[40] For a biographical notice see the "Memoir" by James D. Dana in Vol. II of the *Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences* (Wash., 1886).

tion, and (2) for his analysis of what he calls "the geographical march of history." [41]

Hot climates, according to Guyot, are best for the development of plants and animals but not men; and his statement of the commonly accepted thesis that *temperate* climates are best for the production of men and the development of civilization is one of the classic passages in the literature of human geography. Midway between the surfeit of the tropics, where man does not have to struggle for his existence, and the scarcity of the polar regions, where life is so hard that he cannot accumulate that surplus upon which progress depends, the temperate regions, with their alternating seasons of scarcity and plenty, compel him to struggle but offer him a rich reward for his pains. Add to this the advantages of invigorating air as against the enervating heat of the tropics and we have the conditions which incite man to work, think and accumulate—the essence of all human progress.[42]

While the idea did not originate with him, Guyot was the first to state in a comprehensive manner the fact of a progressive, orderly shifting of the center of highest civilization from ancient times to the present, which he called *the geographical march of history*.[43] Originating in ancient Egypt, Babylonia and Persia, the cultural focus shifted to Greece, then to Rome and finally to northern Europe, with America seemingly destined to be the center of the highest civilization of the future.[44] Why this "march"? Spencer thought that man's increasing knowledge enabled him to conquer more and more difficult environments and move away from the tropics; DeCourcy Ward adds that the increasingly difficult environments have tended to bring out the best in man; GilFillan speaks of the "coldward course of progress" and Huntington, of changing climates. Guyot himself offered no explanation beyond some teleological mysticism regarding a purposive unfolding of human culture.[45] It is obvious, of course, that this famous theory is closely related to the Hegelian philosophy of history and to the teleology of the whole Romantic movement in philosophy.

Miss Semple was an ardent follower of Ratzel and the first to bring his theories to the attention of American readers. Her *American History and Its Geographic Conditions* appeared in 1903; and the *Influences of Geographic Environment* in 1911. The first draws upon Ratzel's work on the United States; while the second is a critical revision and expansion of

[41] See Thomas, *op. cit.*, chap. ix.
[42] Guyot, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–71.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 329.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 305–12, 321 ff.
[45] Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

Volume I of the *Anthropogeographie*. English and American students are indebted to Miss Semple not only for opening up the storehouses of Ratzel's information in their language, but for a substantial contribution of her own. Her first work is likely to have an enduring effect on the writing of American history; her second is one of the most complete and scientific treatises on the theory of environment that has yet appeared.

Nature influences every aspect of man's life, says Miss Semple, the two main forces in history being heredity and environment, or "man and his geographic conditions." She characterizes the geographic element as the stable force which never sleeps and which accounts for historical repetition. Moreover, the influences of this geographic element are so various that there has been a constant temptation, especially among earlier writers, to over-emphasize some one factor; and the problem is further complicated in that environmental effects differ in different stages of civilization. A third complication is found in the fact that geographic influences sometimes co-operate with each other, and, under different circumstances, work in opposition. Thus land and sea co-operate when "the meagre products of the land are eked out by the harvest of the sea," but oppose each other when a vast area of fertile soil prevents the development of sea power.[46]

The importance of the indirect effects of geographic factors is emphasized by the Ratzel-Semple system more than by its predecessors. Mountains, for example, do not retard civilization, as some would have us believe, because they impress the imagination, but because they produce isolation; and the course of India's development has been influenced and limited by its isolation rather than by its awe-inspiring mountains. Many are the effects of isolation—purity of race, ignorance and superstition; while accessibility has the opposite effect, facilitating the mingling of peoples and the free exchange of ideas and commodities.[47] Others have dwelt upon the political and cultural backwardness that accompanies isolation and the progress and enlightenment which result from the contact of many cultures; but, in the Ratzel-Semple system, the most prominent feature is its emphasis upon these indirect effects of environment.

Environmental influences are identified as physical, psychical, economic and social; and as effects on the movements of peoples. Very potent are those factors which affect the vigor of a people, and, as an indirect effect of environment, acclimatization plays an important rôle, influencing the kind and amount of work men can do, their health and social customs. Racial variations come from adaptation to environment. Man is changed, not by each separate geographical influence, but through the survival of useful variations and the elimination of those which have less value in

[46] E. C. Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment* (1911), pp. 1–17.
[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–9, 45.

the struggle for existence.[48] The psychical effects are reflected in man's religion, literature, modes of thought, and figures of speech; while occupations, themselves dependent upon environment, tend to enrich the vocabularies of even primitive peoples.[49]

Highly important are the economic and social aspects of environment. Many social processes can be understood through the medium of geography, even kinship society being conditioned as to its type, organization, and industries by its land and natural resources. A country whose products are abundant and easily obtained may acquire wealth and power, particularly if facilities are present for industry and commerce; the opposite leads to "the dwarfing effects of national poverty." [50] Food powerfully controls the affairs of men; it affects their manner of life, the size of their groups, their place of residence, and the length of their stay in any one place. As industrial evolution progresses the amount of land necessary to support an individual decreases, making possible a larger population with its more highly organized government and social differentiation. When an unproductive environment or poor methods of production retard progress, artificial checks to population, such as polyandry, infanticide, and cannibalism may follow. Progress may increase man's dependence upon nature, for mechanical and scientific improvements can operate only on the materials provided by nature.[51]

Miss Semple's fourth class of environmental influences deals with the movements of peoples. Primitive peoples, living in small bands and without attachment to the soil, wander readily but their movements are guided largely by geographic conditions. Civilized man, although more deeply rooted to his habitat, moves with greater facility because of his mastery over nature, and his moves are purposive. Mountains, swamps and deserts hinder movement, while river valleys and treeless plains facilitate it. Environment helps also to determine the direction which migrations shall take. Peoples tend to follow the latitudes to which they are adapted, and are prompted by economic motives to seek regions superior in natural resources. Migrations also give rise to ethnic mixtures and promote a composite type of civilization. Moreover, environmental influences may modify a people when it seeks a new habitat, according as the new habitat differs from the old. In the case of physical and psychical effects the process is slow, but radical changes may result from a greater abundance of natural resources, from changed facilities for commerce and industry or from climatic changes which affect the character of labor.[52]

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 33–5.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 61–7.
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 43–5, 74–86. Cf. Howard Becker, *op. cit.*

In addition to the effects already mentioned, Miss Semple emphasizes the importance of climate in all forms of environmental influence. It directly affects pigmentation, disease and energy; acts upon man indirectly through the crops, animals and general mode of life of a locality; influences topography, as in glaciation, erosion and changes in drainage systems; determines the limits of human habitability; and promotes commerce and other intercourse through its effect on social differentiation and mode of life. All in all, the influence of climate upon the affairs of man is most profound both in its local variations and in the broader differences between the tropical, temperate and frigid zones. These broader differences are fundamental and their demonstrable effects so thoroughgoing, obvious and lasting as to "give a certain zonal stamp to human development." [53]

Geographical determinism reaches its peak in Alfred Kirchhoff who, admitting man's increased control over nature, contends that even now "the power of our planet over our race is greater than that of the race over the planet." As examples of man's dependence upon earth he submits that man is an organism and a product of the planet; that his abode is limited to its surface, high altitudes being too cold and the earth's interior too warm; that the earth once was and probably will again be unadapted for human habitation; and that man is only a phase in the world's history.[54] The northern hemisphere excells in its civilizations because it has the greatest land mass in the temperate zone and therefore the most stimulating climate. Europe's civilizations are similar because its soils are similar and because its mountains and bays are passable, while Asia, under opposite conditions has no common civilization. Within nations, homogeneity of culture results from adaptation to a common physical environment.[55]

Kirchhoff describes certain biological and psychological adaptations as examples of what he calls "telluric selection." Peoples who live in higher altitudes have developed greater lung capacity than those in lower levels because they must breathe more air to get the proper amount of oxygen. West Indian natives have, from long contact with the disease, built up an immunity to yellow fever. Eskimos, crowded together in their narrow winter quarters, have worked out bloodless methods of settling quarrels, which otherwise might have led to race extinction. Equally good as an example of telluric selection is the close adaptation of desert dwellers to their surroundings.[56] In every case, according to Kirchhoff, intensive

[53] Semple, *op. cit.*, pp. 608–17, 633.

[54] A. Kirchhoff, *Man and Earth: the Reciprocal Relations of Man and His Environment* (London, 1914), pp. 3–5.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 8–14.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–22.

adaptation tends toward conservatism in social customs and institutions as well as in cultural characteristics.

Kirchhoff offers an interesting analysis of the influence of the sea on the life of nations. A barrier in primitive times it has, with the development of navigation, been a significant aid in the progress of culture. It has stimulated exploration and commerce and thereby helped the spread of the material factors of civilization. Particularly has it contributed to the growth of geography and ethnography by making it possible to know the whole face of the earth and its inhabitants. Finally, Kirchhoff discovers important political lessons which may be drawn from a study of the sea in social evolution. Island nations must depend wholly for their defense upon their sea power. An extensive sea coast brings to a state "independence, union and power." Such a state is easily defended, and has that power which comes from unity and prosperity. The lesson for his country is that "the glory of the German Empire lies firmly anchored on the ocean." [57]

Turning to an analysis of man's reaction upon his physical environment Kirchhoff cites the building of railroads and canals, the development of irrigation and drainage projects, the cutting down of forests, the introduction of new crops and animals, and the conquest of inland waters through improved methods of navigation. In this way man has been able to adapt the environment to new uses. He finds that the United States and Australia show a rapid conquest of nature by man, which always proceeds most swiftly when carried on by the technological processes of modern industrial life. He compares the Germany of Tacitus with the Germany of the twentieth century and shows the striking difference in the physical nature of the country due to the progress of civilization. Even so, he concludes that "it is not true to say that the progress of civilization liberates man from the influence of mother earth; on the contrary it is always knitting him with it more and more intimately and comprehensively." [58]

Determinism holds its own, also, in the theories of Herbertson, who insists that the geographical environment has made man and society what they are, and that "almost every problem in politics or history, if examined carefully, would be found to depend at last on simple geographic conditions" . . . He reminds us of Guyot when he speaks of the wealth of nature in the tropics—and the backward peoples. There the climate is enervating, life is too easy, with "nothing to stimulate that co-operation for common ends with which social progress begins." [59] In the Arctic regions, on the other hand, food, shelter and all things

[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–48.
[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–108.
[59] A. J. Herbertson, *Man and His Work* (London, 1899), pp. 1–3.

necessary for life are scarce, and life is a desperate struggle, with no leisure for the satisfaction of higher needs. In the temperate zone life is neither too easy nor too severe, and men neither degenerate through indolence nor spend all their time winning a bare existence. They must prepare for winter and this develops thrift and foresight. They are compelled to work but their efforts are rewarded, and "this combination of caution and thrift with hope and courage is one which never fails to command success." [60]

Seeking the best setting for the development of superior races, progressive countries and the highest type of civilization, Herbertson finds that a location in the temperate zone, moderate in elevation, with a deeply indented sea coast, is ideal. Where seas and rivers penetrate deeply into the land, distances are reduced and commerce is fostered, expediting the exchange of ideas through the contact of many cultures. He extols the advantages of Europe, with its deeply penetrating seas and rivers, over Africa with its compactness and regular sea coast, much as did Ritter when he emphasized the importance of accessibility. Likewise North America, lying in the temperate zone, is favored by Herbertson over South America, so largely tropical; and he concludes with the assertion that Europe and North America are by nature destined to surpass the rest of the world in progressive nations and superior cultures—with the balance in favor of Europe.[61]

If further evidence were needed to establish Herbertson as a contender for supremacy among geographic determinists, he has supplied it in his treatment of occupations, their relation to environment and their bearing upon culture. He finds that "the geographical conditions under which a race lives force it to adopt a particular occupation," and that "the same occupations always produce societies of the same general type." Thus, in their mode of life, hunters are alike wherever found, and the same holds true among herdsmen and husbandmen, and in other callings the world over, the occupation leaving "its mark on the dwellings, the food, and the clothing of a race." [62]

James Fairgrieve, the Scottish geographer, has presented an illuminating review of history in its geographical setting.[63] He contends that history is not merely a *record* of events but "an orderly *relation* of events which show the processes whereby man has gradually come to be able to use more and more energy, together with a statement of the causes and results of these events." His insistence that history is controlled by geography is misleading because he is not an extreme determinist, but regards

[60] Herbertson, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–5.
[63] *Geography and World Power* (London, 1915).

geographic factors rather as conditioning and limiting influences. As to energy and its utilization, this, he says, is chiefly the human appropriation of the energy of the sun, which gives point to a study of the distribution of the solar energy on the earth.[64]

When Fairgrieve glimpses *future possibilities* we find that his *geographical controls* of human activity and what the present writer once included under *human control* of geographic factors are curiously similar.[65] His *controls* vary with "the amount and kind of knowledge and experience which man has accumulated," a view that harmonizes with the definition of *man's control of environment* as including such human achievements as have tended to alter the effect of environment upon man and lessen its control over him. It is suggestive, also, of the view expressed by Ritter, Buckle and some contemporary writers that advancing civilization is characterized by a diminishing importance of physical influences and an increasing importance of psychological and cultural factors.

According to Fairgrieve, progress may come in two ways—first, the controls we now have might act in different ways; and second, supplies of energy not hitherto available might be utilized. Indicating some of these new sources of energy he points out several interesting, even dazzling possibilities. The energy of the tides might be used, and that of the winds more than at present; and means of using the earth's internal heat might be discovered. To these may be added ways of utilizing the energy in the vast growth of vegetation in the tropics, and of turning to account the stupendous amount of solar radiation in the deserts. However, in all of the changes suggested, whether present possibilities or dreams of the future, Fairgrieve insists that "geography would still control the course of history, but it would control it in a different way." [66]

III. The Regional Geographers

Regional geography, sometimes looked upon as a comparatively recent development, is at least as old as Strabo, whose observations on the *Cossaei,* the *Elymaei,* and the *Paraetaceni* in relation to their geographic surroundings, distinctly chorological in character, antedate the Christian era.[67] Regionalism in its modern form, however, received its great impetus on the geographic side from the outstanding achievements of Richthofen and the scholarly work of Vidal de La Blache; and on the economic side, from the monographic studies of LePlay, rightfully regarded as the founder of the social survey method of investigation. An

[64] *Ibid.,* pp. 1–8, 10 ff.
[65] *Ibid.,* chap. xix.
[66] *Ibid.,* pp. 345–55.
[67] Thomas, *op. cit.,* p. 123.

added impetus, also, came from the fact that the newer interest in retional studies represented, in a very real sense, a revolt against the generalized approach of Ratzel.

The regionalists are characterized by their insistence that the basic truths of geography can be discovered only through the inductive study of particular areas,[68] definite in extent; such studies to be followed at last by a comparative study of areas.[69] However, this comparative study, which Sauer has called the "final expression" [70] of regional geography, must not be undertaken until much painstaking work has been done [71]—"the time is hardly ripe for great regional syntheses." [72] The extent of the areas treated varies greatly in the different monographs that have appeared; and Brunhes, doubtless having some of the larger studies in mind, believes that many of them "would have gained if they had been preceded by a more modest and systematic analysis of less complicated and extensive areas." [73] Richthofen's *China;* Vidal's *Tableau de la France;* Hettner's *Grundzüge der Länderkunde;* Vallaux' *Basse-Bretagne;* Demangeon's *Picardie;* Blanchard's *Flanders;* Cvijić's *Balkan Peninsula;* Smith's *North America;* and Bowman's *Andes of Southern Peru* are but a few of the excellent studies that have been made.

Sauer sees a "persistent dualism" throughout the history of geography, i. e. of cosmology or general geography on the one hand, and chorology or regional geography on the other.[74] These two positions have not been entirely reconciled; but, since the days of Richthofen and Vidal, the retional approach, which Fenneman has called "the core of the science," has

[68] Says Hettner: "The thought of a general earth science is impossible of realization; geography can be an independent science only as chorology, that is as knowledge of the varying expression of the different parts of the earth's surface." Quoted in Carl O. Sauer, "The Morphology of Landscape," *University of California Publications in Geography,* II, No. 2 (1925), 21–2.

[69] N. M. Fenneman holds that "regional geography is the *core* of the science," and that "the one thing that is first, last, and always geography and nothing else, is the study of areas in their compositeness or complexity, that is regional geography." Fenneman is sure that geography cannot be destroyed so long as it clings to its regional studies, and that "without regional geography there is no reason why geography should be treated as a separate branch." See his article, "The Circumference of Geography," *Geographical Review,* VII (1919), 172–3.

[70] C. O. Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," in E. C. Hayes, ed., *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences* (1927), p. 191.

[71] Says Febvre: "All the personal mastery of a Ratzel, all his profound and extensive knowledge of the world, all his historical and above all ethnographical learning, cannot take the place of a good century of careful and methodical research." *A Geographical Introduction to History* (1925), p. 27.

[72] Sauer, *loc. cit.*

[73] Jean Brunhes, *Human Geography,* trans. by LeCompte (1920), p. 516.

[74] Carl O. Sauer, "The Morphology of Landscape," *University of California Publications in Geography,* II, No. 2 (1925), 175.

advanced steadily into the foreground; and its advocates, as we have seen, regard the patient, methodical study of area, leading finally to a comparative science of regions, as offering the greatest promise of an ultimate understanding of the relation between man and his environment. This group may be said to include "such geographers as place their major emphasis on area, so as to understand increasingly its properties and expressions and to approach a unified viewpoint of the content and connection of areas in general." [75] Finally, Sauer holds that the regionalists' "contribution to the social sciences is to be sought in a more and more dependable knowledge of the cultural areas." [76] He describes the geographic method thus:

> The distinctive materials with which geography is concerned have been presented as the forms of the landscape. The tools geography has in common in part with other sciences of observation. Above all, the geographer must know how to make observations in the field. This is the first requisite of his training, that he be competent to go out and collect and classify the things he sees in the area. It is not simply a question of taking field notes at interesting points, but of comprehending the areal totality as to form and structure. In consequence he records his immediate observations largely cartographically. The map is the distinctive symbol of geographic science, the chorologic expression *per se*. Although the claim has been rejected that all things that may be shown in terms of areal distribution, that is by a map, are the province of the geographer, he alone is held responsible for the mastery of this medium of presentation. Such map correlation of data does not yet, however, supply the full explanation as to their connection and origin.
>
> There is a certain causal evidence that is directly to be secured from this chorologic method. The agreement in distribution of two kinds of phenomena becomes more and more conclusive as to causal connection, the greater the number of cases in which it is observed. If the distribution of a certain soil corresponds to the extent of a climatic region, evidence to the contrary being lacking we infer that the soil is developed under that climatic condition. This is in a sense a substitute method for the experimental procedure of the laboratory sciences, and is a more or less complete enumeration of a category of phenomena through distributional limits.[77]

To Sauer human geography is first and foremost a study of man's action on his environment; and thus what was to the earlier general anthropogeographers only a part of the problem becomes to him the whole field of study—a position that is usual among regional geographers. He calls man the last and the "most important morphologic factor," who, with his cultures "makes use of the natural forms, in many cases alters them, in

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 212.
[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 210–1.

some destroys them." [78] As man acts upon nature he decides also what direction his action shall take, for "within the wide limits of the physical equipment of area lie many possible choices for man, as Vidal never grew weary of pointing out." [79] Thus, with others in his field, Sauer favors the principles of *utilization* and *possibilism* set forth by Vidal de La Blache as a substitute for the *determinism* of Ratzel.

In his *Principles of Human Geography,*[80] Vidal de La Blache makes much of environment as a conditioning or limiting influence, a position that has been developed by the historical anthropologists, and by Lowie in particular. He grants nothing in the way of any direct influence of nature upon man. He speaks often of geographic influences, however, and in one curious passage asserts "that the sovereign influence of environment has forced all into similar occupations and customs." [81] In another work [82] he discusses the French soil as the "foundation and *raison d'être*" of the social life of the people. But even in these passages the context clearly indicates that Vidal has in mind *limiting* and not *direct* influences. Nature gives man a choice of materials, which have their special values and limitations. She may advise and restrict, but she never compels. It is man, the geographical factor—man, the active agent, who overcomes obstacles and transforms the landscape—he it is who claims Vidal's attention as the leading character in human geography.[83]

Vidal lays great emphasis upon psychological and cultural factors. Through pure inertia, he says, men fail to take advantage of possibilities close at hand, and fail to give up practices and methods no longer advantageous. Man, "sluggish by nature," tends to sink into lethargy in isolation and will often stagnate for ages unless, touched by new ideas or a glimpse of achievements which stimulate his ambition or excite his envy, he may rise up, as did the Japanese, and wipe out much of his ancient culture in a generation or two. Contact or "diffusion"—credit good old Ratzel for that—is here the determining factor. There is nothing of the dynamic in the geographic environment. Civilizations develop, cease to develop, and remain stationary through centuries. Cities rise and fall; dynasties flourish, and decay into a mass of ruins; and yet, "geographical influences have been at work throughout all these vicissitudes." [84]

A notable contribution is made by Jean Brunhes in his *La Geographie*

[78] Sauer, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[80] Trans. by M. T. Bingham (1926).
[81] Vidal de la Blache, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[82] *Tableau de la Geographie de la France* (Paris, 1908), p. 384.
[83] *Principles of Human Geography,* pp. 3–24.
[84] Ibid., chap. vi. See also H. W. Odum, and H. E. Moore, *American Regionalism* (1938), p. 287.

humaine.[85] Brunhes is not an extremist in the environmental interpretation and his generalizations are always guarded. Distinguishing between physical geography and human geography he says that the former treats of features and processes which act independently of man's presence on earth, as, for example, the movement of a glacier or the blowing of sand against rocks; while the latter is concerned with those conditions and changes which are due in part to human participation, such as dyke building, reforestation or the domestication of animals. The one involves relations of causality; the other only relations of connection, the determining element being the form of man's reaction to any purely geographical situation.[86]

This brings us to what is perhaps the outstanding characteristic of Brunhes' work—his presentation of an essentially active and dynamic rather than a passive anthropogeography. He is concerned not only with the various types of control exerted by the physical environment over man, but also with the reaction of man upon his environment, which includes, besides untouched nature, external surroundings which man has himself erected—i. e., not only mountain ranges, but city blocks. Man is affected by environment, but Brunhes admits no *direct* geographic determination of social processes. Influenced at different times by different geographic forces, he controls and directs others to his own use, and this bifold relationship calls for a united study of geography and human achievement. Moreover, the influence of the physical environment is not a simple matter of action and direct reaction, but is rather a complex matter of geographic factors working upon man through the secondary and tertiary agencies of cultural institutions and social organization.[87]

Finally, the relation between man and external nature is highly complex and constantly changing, and thus the scientific student of anthropogeography must not limit himself to a consideration of isolated environmental influences, or to a single set of causes or series of causes. The study of environmental influences must include not only topography, climate and vegetation, but the whole great interrelated geographic complex, the interaction of the animal and vegetable kingdoms upon mankind, and the evolution of states and human societies. Such in broad outline, according to Brunhes, is the comprehensive field of anthropogeography.[88]

Brunhes' place in regional geography is not easily defined. He takes

[85] (2nd ed., Paris, 1912.) There is a good brief review of the first edition by Mark Jefferson in the *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, XLIII, No. 6 (June, 1911), 467–9.

[86] Brunhes, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–6.

[87] *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 58.

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–33.

the generalized approach in *human* geography, but his rejection of determinism and direct environmental "influences," as well as his emphasis upon man as the active agent, is in harmony with the views of the chorologists. Sauer thinks it "rather uncertain how much importance he attaches to regional studies" [89] and Febvre speaks of being unconvinced by Brunhes' assertion that "regional geography should crown and not initiate geographical research." [90] As to Febvre's comment, it should be recalled that Brunhes was at the time expressing the view that regional studies should be "preceded by a more modest and systematic analysis of less complicated and extensive areas." The inclusion of Brunhes among the regional geographers appears to be justified.

Camille Vallaux points out the scientific errors possible in a too thoroughgoing acceptance of the geographic position and thus takes definite issue with the general anthropogeographers.[91] He particularly criticizes the subjectivity of Ratzel, whose emphasis on the political importance of territory he scorns as a mere apology for German dreams of world-power.[92] He does not deny geographic influences, and indeed stresses (1) the importance of rivers and mountain ranges, which aid or obstruct the movements of peoples and the expansion of states; and (2) the fact that no state can exist in surroundings not adequate to support a population large enough to develop permanent political institutions.[93] He holds, however, that the adaptation of society to the physical environment is active as well as passive, and a study of his views makes it clear that he regards the *active* as of far greater significance than the *passive* for human geography.[94]

Vallaux' analysis of the importance of social and political differentiation, as produced by group reaction to geographic factors is the core of his theoretical position. Differentiation is important in that it produces the contrast and diversity in the population which is indispensable to progress; and it is brought about by a varied environment, which promotes diversified occupations and the division of labor. The more perfect the differentiation, the more rapidly will a political organization develop and a strong autonomous state be produced, with its tendency to expand into and absorb adjacent groups that dwell in regions less productive of social and political differentiation. The movement of peoples and the exchange of wealth are additional forces promoting differentiation. They are influenced not only by geographic factors, but also by great cultural changes such as the Industrial Revolution, which have greatly enlarged

[89] Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," p. 181.

[90] Febvre, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[91] Vallaux' chief works are *Géographie sociale: le sol et l'état* (Paris, 1911) and *Géographie sociale: la mer* (Paris, 1908).

[92] *Géographie sociale: le sol et l'état,* pp. 145 ff.

[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–87.

[94] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–21.

the scope if not the nature of social differentiation. But even these newer, enlarged and more advanced forces are still related to the geographic foundations of historical, sociological and economic processes. Greatest concentration of population normally takes place in the regions of greatest geographical diversity, and the greater the concentration the greater the social differentiation.[95]

In his concluding passages Vallaux submits a summary of his theoretical position. Physical geography and the state are two real objects of knowledge which may legitimately be joined in a synthetic study, for the state is a social organism founded upon its soil or territory. Yet anthropogeography cannot hope to reach the absolute correlation or causality attained in the natural sciences. The scientific anthropogeographer must resolutely reject any absolute environmental determinism for social processes, especially a determinism which rests upon the influence of any one physical factor. Yet there is a real conditioning relationship between the state and its territory, particularly that influence which leads to the differentiation of the inhabitants and the production of the distinctly national character.[96]

The Bavarian scholar, Goetz, a highly productive student of anthropogeography,[97] was for many years a teacher of economic and commercial geography in Munich, and was a prominent member of the "Bavarian Society" for German expansion overseas. Instead of surveying the outstanding geographical characteristics of the whole world in their relation to mankind, as did Ratzel, he produced a number of intensive studies of anthropogeographical data drawn from a restricted area. His dissertation on the historic and economic significance of the Danube River, which pointed out the relation between geographical factors and institutional economics, attracted the attention of Ratzel, at whose suggestion Goetz published a study of the royal post-roads of ancient Persia.

Goetz made significant contributions to historical geography and he earned a high place in the commercial aspects of that subject through his emphasis on the importance of channels of intercourse and of barriers to commerce in the development of commercial relations. Most of his earlier work was devoted to the geography of Bavaria, but in his later years he wrote much on both the political and the human geography of lands outside of Bavaria, notably his *Land of the Franks,* which covered the colonization of the area in addition to a study of the land and the fauna.

[95] *Ibid.,* pp. 174 ff.; 244 ff.

[96] *Ibid.,* pp. 395 ff.

[97] There is an excellent article on Wilhelm Goetz in the *Geographische Zeitschrift,* Neunzehnter Jahrgang (Leipzig, 1913), pp. 481–7. It was written by Joseph Reindl and consists of an obituary notice, a sketch of the life, a list of the works, and a summary of the geographical contributions of Goetz.

In 1891 he published his famous manual, *Economic Geography,* in which he dwelt upon the relation of the economic development of Bavaria to the physical characteristics of the region. His *Historical Geography* appeared in 1904—an outstanding contribution to anthropogeography. In this he treated the Mediterranean world and "Mid-Europe," showing how, in historic times, the culture and natural aspects of this area had developed as a result of the combined forces of nature and the work of man.

Important contributions to the data if not to the theory of anthropogeography have been the comprehensive hand-books on commercial and economic geography, a field which Goetz, in particular, had opened up in Germany.[98] Of such works, that of George G. Chisholm is one of the most thorough and widely used.[99] It is an elaborate compendium of facts on commercial geography including climate, topography, natural resources, manufacturing, and commerce. Chisholm contends that the chief end and purpose of commercial geography is not only to describe and classify the data of economic geography, but also to enable one to forecast future economic and commercial progress.[100] He makes no important contributions to environmental theory, but he does state very well the function of commerce in civilization and indicates the geographical foundations of commercial development.

Chisholm holds that the environmental foundations of commerce are the diversified geographical conditions which give various parts of the earth distinct advantages in the production of different commodities, the distribution of these commodities and the equalization of the diverse advantages in productivity being the prime function of commerce. These advantages are of two main types, (1) natural or geographical advantages, such as resources, climate and favorable position; and (2) historical advantages, such as the possession of a stable government or a superior productive technique. Commercial history and geography is a complex resulting from the working out of these two sets of circumstances—geographical and historical. Chisholm preserves a well balanced attitude by refusing to place undue stress upon mere physical geography, and by emphasizing the dynamic agency of human endeavor in extractive industry, manufacturing and commerce. He also maintains that the great-

[98] Another contribution to the field of economic geography is the work of Professor John McFarlane of the University of Manchester. His *Economic Geography* (London, 1915), has the same general approach as that of Chisholm, to whom McFarlane acknowledges his indebtedness. It is an admirable book dealing with the climate, physical resources, and products of the world by nations and regions, but contains little or no theoretical material.

[99] *Handbook of Commercial Geography* (8th ed., London, 1914).

[100] Chisholm, *op. cit.,* Introduction, p. xxiii.

est advantages from commerce can come only "when every kind of production is carried on in the place that has the greatest natural advantages for the supply of a particular market." [101]

IV. Particularistic Interpretations

Demolins was probably the ablest member of the LePlay school and best exemplifies the environmental tendencies of that group.[102] Ross once said of him that he had written a book "as charming as Dumas and as convincing as Euclid." [103] Espousing the geographical explanation of human development, he rejects the racial interpretation as dealing with a *consequence* and not a *cause*—thus opposing Gobineau, who held the theory of original differences between races. In Demolins' view the primary cause of racial and cultural diversity is the *route* which the peoples have followed, the route creating the race and the social type. By the word "route" he means not only the regions traversed by the migrations of the peoples, but also the districts in which they have settled, and thus *la route* becomes identical with the whole physical environment.[104]

The routes transform the peoples who use them and thus act as powerful refineries, tending always to form definite human types. A transformation of the route modifies the racial and social type, and if history were to begin over again with the same human and geographical factors, history, in its larger outlines, would repeat itself. Geography, from this point of view, is no longer a dry repetition of names; it is the fundamental determinant of the constitution and development of human societies. Thus, according to Demolins, history, as a dynamic geography, is the highest and most exact of all sciences.[105]

When he examines his various routes and their human resultants, Demolins speaks always of *types* and not of *races*. It is the steppe "type" rather than the Mongol race; the tundra "type" rather than the Eskimo race; while the forest "type" has reference to the Indian. He explains also the routes which, in his view, created the Mediterranean civilizations; and those which transferred the center of civilization from Asia to Europe —the routes of eastern, central and western Europe. In holding that similar routes will always produce substantially the same racial and social types,

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–7.

[102] Edmund Demolins, *Les grandes routes des peuples, essai de géographie sociale; comment la route crée le type social,* 2 vols., Vol. I, *Les routes de l'antiquité,* Vol. II, *Les routes du monde moderne* (Paris, 1901–3).

[103] See his *Foundations of Sociology* (1905), pp. 312–7.

[104] Demolins, *op. cit.*, Preface, pp. v–vii.

[105] *Ibid.*, pp. vii–x.

Demolins takes his place as a determinist among determinists—and apparently without apology or mental reservation.[106]

In his *Master-Clues in World History* [107] Andrew Reid Cowan presents as his basic theory the view that civilization is a product of group contact, group conflict and racial intermixture. These contacts and intermixtures must be of the right amount, however, if progress is to follow, because too much conflict destroys culture while too little brings stagnation. It is logical, then, for Cowan to devote the major portion of his work to the thesis that geography conditions progress as it facilitates or impedes these conflicts and intermixtures.[108] He finds that progress is blocked in both frigid and torrid regions, in the one case because of the hard struggle for a bare living and the scant opportunities for racial intermixture; in the other because the over-exuberant vegetation of the jungle obstructs social development. Even in the temperate zones, where civilization has been chiefly centered, the development has not been uniform, some regions showing far greater progress than others. Why, for example, was North America with its fertility and abundance of natural resources a backward wilderness before the whites came? [109]

This query leads Cowan to a second generalization, namely, that the salient process in history up to the present has been a struggle between pastoral and agrarian life. Agriculture increased wealth and population, but discouraged initiative, bravery, mobility and the predatory instincts; while the nomadic life supplied far better training for war and pillage. Hence, as soon as agriculture had produced something worth stealing, the nomads began that series of assaults on agricultural communities—the second "master-clue" to world history. As agricultural life is better adapted to the production of the surplus essential to progress, and is thus superior to nomadic life for the development of civilization, it follows logically, says Cowan, that centers of progress in the temperate zones have been located where there was sufficient fertility to promote agricultural prosperity and sufficient geographic protection to prevent destructive invasions by nomadic peoples.[110]

In Cowan's view Egypt and Mesopotamia, the oldest of civilizations, were so, not so much because of their fertility and natural resources, "as because they were the most sheltered and essentially temperate nooks in

[106] See C. W. Veditz in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* XVIII (1901), 525–7, for a review of Volume I of Demolins' work.

[107] (London, 1914.)

[108] This view doubtless reflects the influence of Ratzel. Moreover, the views of Mackinder and the sociological doctrines of Gumplowicz are in distinct harmony with much of Cowan's theory.

[109] Cowan, *op. cit.,* pp. 16–30.

[110] *Ibid.,* pp. 31 ff.

the world." [111] In answering the question regarding the backwardness of America before European colonization, he asserts that because there were no good barriers to protect agrarian communities against the nomadic natives the Americas remained in a state of savagery, except for the relatively protected regions of Mexico and Peru. The overthrow of the nomad came with the invention of fire-arms. Until then, able to keep up with the agrarian in the mechanics of war and always his superior as a fighter, the nomad did not have the wealth to secure an adequate supply of arms and ammunition and was finally subdued on all fronts. In this way there ended the first great epoch in human history.[112]

An enthusiast among modern British anthropogeographers is Halford J. Mackinder, formerly Reader in Geography at Oxford and Director of the London School of Economics. His doctrines are concerned with the geographical factor in domestic and international politics, and with the importance of the Russian-Siberian-Caspian region in the development of world history. The essence of his theory was set forth in 1904 in "The Geographical Pivot of History," an article published in the *Geographical Journal*. He distinguishes three chief historic eras. These are the ancient and medieval era, when European civilization was repeatedly attacked by the inhabitants of the steppe district; the Columbian era from 1500 to 1900, characterized by the expansion of European civilization over-seas; and the future, which will be the era of permanently closed political systems—the era of the world-organism.[113]

In a geographic sense Asiatic history has largely determined the course of European history. The pivotal point in the geographical basis of European history Mackinder holds to be the great Eurasiatic steppe region, uniform in topography, climate and fertility, and, since the territorial expansion of Russia, under a common political control. This region is surrounded by barriers on two sides—ice to the north and deserts to the south. To the west are found great river systems running from the forest region in mid-Europe to the Black and Caspian Seas, thus affording an opening for the horse-riding steppe-peoples to find their way into Europe. From Greek times to the latest Turkish inroads these attacks of the steppe nomads upon European peoples have been an important factor in European history. "A large part of European history might be written as a commentary upon the changes directly or indirectly ensuing from these raids." And such raids have extended also into China, India, Persia and the Near East generally, causing the fall of historic empires.[114]

The progress of discovery and navigation in modern times has made

[111] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–3.
[112] *Ibid.*, pp. 120 ff., 159 ff.
[113] Mackinder, *op. cit.*, pp. 421–2.
[114] *Ibid.*, pp. 422–32.

possible the erection of counterpoises to this perennial expansion of the steppe-peoples. The discovery of the Cape route to India and the East has put western Europe in command of an outer ring of communication not accessible to those in the pivotal area. This has enabled Europeans to get in the rear of the steppe populations and to distribute and utilize their forces with mobility and effectiveness. The building of the Suez Canal has greatly aided this process of encirclement, but both this and the Cape advantage are being offset by the growth of a greater mobility in the pivotal area through the building of railroads. Mackinder is inclined to doubt the influence of the alleged desiccation of the Caspian region, stressed by Huntington as the cause of the movement of the steppe-peoples. He believes that these movements have rather been the outcome of a shifting of centers of social and political equilibrium in this pivotal region.[115]

From these theoretical generalizations Mackinder draws some practical suggestions. Among them is the possibility of a Japan-dominated China conquering the steppe area, which would produce a real "Yellow Peril." And, while Russia is not now equal to the peripheral states, there is great danger in any alliance of that country with Germany which would give the former free and permanent access to the sea. England and Japan should act as forces on the margin to prevent the internal expansion of the pivotal power—Russia.[116] In this way the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 is fortified by arguments from history and geography.

In an article, "Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength," published in 1905 in the *National Review,* Mackinder analyzes the characteristics and strength of the British Empire. These he finds to be chiefly England's insularity and sea-power. But there can be no complete and permanent hope for British supremacy and safety in mere insularity. True, this insularity led Great Britain to develop her sea-power earlier than other modern nations, but other states are now contesting British primacy on the water, and there can be no assurance of perpetual peace in the future. Britain must increase her white man-power and attract a greater loyalty from her dark man-power. This means that she must make alliances with foreign nations, must increase the population of her white colonies, must attract the black population by more sympathetic treatment, and must foster an improved man-power at home by passing needed social legislation.[117]

Mackinder has since combined and expanded the doctrines of these two articles in his *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction,* in which he argues with some justification that

[115] Mackinder *op. cit.,* pp. 432–7.
[116] *Ibid.,* pp. 436–43.
[117] *Ibid.,* pp. 136–42.

World War I vindicated rather than disproved his theories,[118] and insists that those who espouse political and social democracy must understand the bearing of geography upon history. He begins by citing the importance of sea-power throughout history, but points out that one should not overlook the fact that in ancient times the state which possessed the greatest resources ultimately controlled the sea. Land-power closed both the Nile and the Mediterranean. In the empire of Alexander and his successors and in the Roman empire the world-power rested not upon fleets but upon the power to control the coasts. The next great era of historically important sea-power began with the era of colonization by Europeans, which has given a new and most important source of power to western European populations. English sea-power has been especially important and interesting and was based upon the rare union of British industry and commerce with agriculture.[119]

In dealing with the element of land position Mackinder expands the notions set forth in his discussion of the pivotal position of Eurasiatic history. He calls this pivotal area the "Heartland of the Continent." He finds a second heartland in central Africa. The remainder of the Eastern Hemisphere or the "World Island" is confined to the coast lands of Europe and India, the seats of the great historic civilizations, where in one-fifth of the land area of the world dwell four-fifths of the population. These coast-land centers of civilization have certain general resemblances, namely, navigable rivers running into the ocean, high relative fertility, and adaptation to both agriculture and commerce. The heartlands, on the contrary, are adapted chiefly to pastoral industry and nomadic types of existence. The greater part of ancient history is comprehended within the conquest of these agricultural and commercial peoples of the fertile belt of the Nile, the Euphrates and Syria by the more mobile nomads of the heartlands. These inroads have been most significant also for later Eurasiatic history, as may be seen from a study of the invasions of the Huns, the Saracens and the Turks.[120]

The significance of these heartlands in history invites certain reflections. It shows the importance of the meeting-place of these two heartlands. Any power possessing the northern heartland and the Mesopotamian district could take the Suez and be in command of the Old World. This is the way in which land-power is challenging sea-power and was the chief danger in the German *Drang-nach-Osten* plan.[121] Owing to the development of modern fortifications and big guns the Black Sea and the Baltic may now be regarded as a part of the northern heartland. The great

[118] *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (London, 1919), Preface.
[119] *Ibid.*, pp. 36–63, 71 ff.
[120] *Ibid.*, pp. 96–118, 119 ff.
[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 134 ff.

rivalry of empires in modern times has turned on this pivotal region of the Balkans and Mesopotamia. It has been a struggle between eastern and western Europe with Germany the crucial strategic central ground. English sea-power and diplomacy have been attempting to get to the rear of the heartland and check Russian expansion to the south and east. "We have come to the conclusion that the World-Island and the Heartland are the final geographical realities in regard to sea-power and land-power, and that East Europe is essentially a part of the Heartland." . . . "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World." To make the future safe in the light of this geographical reality "it is of vital necessity that there should be a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia." Then there might be some hope of an effective league of nations.[122] This is interesting reading, in 1940!

In this way Mackinder presents a very suggestive and original survey of certain geographical foundations of world-history and modern international problems. It is to a certain extent an explanation of, if not an apologetic for, modern British imperialism. But, for a writer with at least mildly imperialistic leanings, Mackinder curiously does not favor the strongly centralized nation as the basis for the political organization of the future, but contends that "since nations are local societies, their organization *must,* if they are to last, be based dominantly on local communities within them, and not on nation-wide interests." [123]

One of the most energetic and easily the most prolific among American students of anthropogeography is Ellsworth Huntington [124] of Yale, whose chief concern has been to ascertain the bearing of climatic, seasonal and weather conditions upon human efficiency. As an explorer he has been decorated by several governments, and it is here that his most enduring scientific contributions have been made; but he is known chiefly for his theoretical work in the field of climatic influences and changes. His theoretical opinions, while of less certain permanent value than his achievements as an explorer and observer, have been highly influential, and have done much to stimulate interest in the study of environmental influences among social scientists, particularly in England and America. His central theme is that "whatever the motive power of history may be, one of the chief factors in determining its course has been geography; and among geo-

[122] Mackinder, *op. cit.,* pp. 139–94, 205 ff., 215 ff.

[123] *Ibid.,* p. 238.

[124] Huntington's chief works are *The Pulse of Asia* (1907); *Palestine and Its Transformation* (1911); *Civilization and Climate* (1915); *World Power and Evolution* (1919); *Climatic Changes* (1922); *Earth and Sun* (1923); and *The Character of Races* (1924).

graphic forces, changes of climate have been the most potent for both good and bad." [125]

These changes of climate, according to Huntington, have been responsible for the progressive shifting of civilizations which Guyot once called "the geographical march of history." As evidence of climatic changes in ancient Iran, he cites the incredibly numerous ruins of once flourishing cities in localities now arid; the fact that the route followed by Alexander the Great can now barely support a few camels; and the fluctuations in the water supply of Seyistan during historic times. He finds also that "in the days of Herodotus and Alexander" the Caspian Sea stood nearly a hundred and fifty feet higher than now; and that a few centuries later it had fallen to one hundred feet above its present level, with many fluctuations before and since—all of which he insists can be accounted for only on the postulate of a changing climate. Examining the claim that Persian civilization decayed from war and misgovernment, he submits that the provinces which have remained most prosperous are the ones in which there has been most war and misgovernment; while those that have declined are those that have suffered most from the historic decrease of their water supply.[126]

While Huntington's chief interest centers about these great historic changes of climate of the kind he claims has taken place in Iran, he mentions three other types, namely, (1) those of vast duration such as the glacial period, (2) the glacial epochs of some ten thousand years' duration, and (3) the climatic pulsations of approximately thirty-five years in length. As a result of these changes, particularly the historic, there has been a shifting of the centers of civilization; and Huntington believes that the movement has been, on the whole, in a northerly direction rather than the traditional east to west. Egypt and Babylonia reached the peak of their civilizations at about 30° north latitude; Syria, Greece and Carthage at 35° to 40°; Rome at about 45°; while France, Austria and Germany extend from 45° to 50° north latitude. He finds also that in America the higher latitudes of the United States have produced the most advanced civilizations.[127]

Opposing Spencer, Ward and others, who held that the earliest civilizations developed in warm regions and that the progress of civilization has been *coldward,* Huntington contends that, on the basis of his findings, each of the successive centers of civilization had about the same climate

[125] *The Pulse of Asia,* p. 15. Griffith Taylor has gone to greater extremes than Huntington in this matter of climatic changes. See his three articles in the *Geographical Review:* VIII (1919), 289–328; XI (1921), 54–119; and XII (1922), 375–402.

[126] *Ibid.,* pp. 315–39.

[127] *Ibid.,* pp. 365–81.

at the height of its culture. He maintains, in other words, that man everywhere has made his best progress under essentially the same climatic conditions, and that the climate north of the equator has been growing warmer. The conditions most conducive to human progress are summarized thus:

> These ideal conditions apparently are that the summers shall have a sufficient degree of warmth and rainfall to make agriculture easy and profitable, but not enough to be enervating; that the winters shall be cool enough to be bracing, but not deadening; and that the relation of summer and winter shall be such that with foresight every man can support himself and his family in comfort the year around, while without foresight he and his will suffer severely. Comparatively clear, dry air and high barometric pressure appear to be subsidiary conditions favorable to human progress.[128]

In his *Civilization and Climate,* a later work, Huntington attempted to fortify his theory of an *ideal climate* by studying the effects of meteorological conditions upon (1) the output of certain factory piece-workers, (2) the efficiency of various groups of laborers, (3) the work of students at West Point and Annapolis, and (4) the progress of tubercular patients in the Adirondacks. Among the piece-workers there was a very low point in the wage curve in mid-winter, a less pronounced drop in mid-summer, a high point in June, with the peak in October. The efficiency curve of the laborers and of the students confirmed the findings among the piece-workers. The tubercular patients gained most from April to December and their inverted death curve approximated the factory wage curve. Everywhere a slight drop in temperature was stimulating and people worked more rapidly at the end of a storm. The maximum of physical efficiency seemed to be reached at a temperature of from 59° to 65°; that of mental work at about 40°; and the best average temperature for both physical and mental efficiency was found to be about 50°.[129] On the basis of these studies Huntington set forth the ideal climate for human efficiency and cultural progress as one with moderate seasonal changes, average humidity and abundant storms.[130]

In his *World Power and Evolution* Huntington again emphasizes climate, which he introduces as the chief single factor in the matter of man's health. He compares graphs of climate and health in Finland, the United States, Germany, Italy, France and Japan, and concludes that "the human race seems to have the best health when the average temperature for day and night together is 64° F," that is, when it varies through the twenty-four hours from 55° to 70°.[131] Variability is important also, the most

[128] Huntington, *op. cit.,* p. 382.
[129] *Civilization and Climate* (1915), pp. 53–104.
[130] *Ibid.,* pp. 133 ff.
[131] *World Power and Evolution* (1919), p. 71.

healthful climate having frosty but not cold winters, warm but not hot summers and a constant succession of storms—in general, the climate of England, the United States and Germany.[132] This theory of the relation between progress and climatic variability he applies to the periods of Roman expansion, which he correlates with eras of stimulating climate; to periods of Roman decline which were accompanied by depressing climatic conditions; and to Turkish decline, attributable in part to weather conditions. Germany's great power in the World War he attributes to the fact that "no other nation in the world has so many people who live under highly stimulating climate."[133] He does not explain why the Germans were politically and economically backward through two thousand years of similar climate.

Finally, Huntington considers *place* as a factor in human progress.[134] Holding that environment is of primary importance in the development of racial traits, he draws upon the history of diverse peoples—Chinese and Icelanders—to illustrate the process of selection. The famines in north China have caused waves of migration to the south, the energetic types leaving and the less aggressive remaining at home. He finds in this an explanation for the alert and progressive people in the south, and for the dullness and conservatism so common in the north.[135] In Iceland, on the other hand, the selective process has operated through a high death rate among the young men—the potential fathers of the next generation. Many are drowned each year, and many more fall over cliffs or stumble into the bogs and pits in which the country abounds. This number largely includes the careless, the weak and the slow-witted, leaving the more cautious, alert and resourceful ones to beget succeeding generations. This selection, aided by a highly stimulating climate, accounts for the remarkable culture which has prevailed in Iceland for centuries.[136]

Some exceptions may be taken to Huntington's interpretations. In his *Character of Races,* he does not consider the possibility that the conservatism of the northern Chinese may be a product of isolation rather than selection, and therefore a matter of social inheritance. Moreover, to one who is not convinced of the primary importance of climate in social causation, some of the views in his earlier works seem overdrawn. He *recognizes* the other factors involved in human development, for he enumerates them; but he does not evaluate them and proceeds as if climate were the only important factor present. In his *Character of Races,* however, he points out clearly that a complete explanation of historical

[132] *Ibid.,* p. 98.
[133] *Ibid.,* pp. 223, 238.
[134] *The Character of Races* (1924).
[135] *Ibid.,* pp. 184–204.
[136] *Ibid.,* pp. 286–300.

processes must take cognizance of all the factors in social causation.

Among modern treatments of the relation of climate to man and society, perhaps the most satisfactory is that presented by Robert DeC. Ward in his *Climate, Considered Especially in Its Relation to Man.*[137] Moderate in its claims and wholly lacking in dogmatism, it sets forth what can be regarded as assured knowledge on a subject whose systematic discussion is conventionally supposed to have been initiated by Montesquieu. Although he grants that the "climatic environment, in greater or less degree, affects man's clothing, dwellings, food, occupations and customs; his physical and mental characteristics; his systems of government; his migrations and his history," Ward does not claim for climate a supreme position even among environmental influences, but makes it clear that there are many other geographic factors which affect mankind and that social institutions themselves play a prominent part.[138]

Ward directs attention to the fact that man cannot control the climate as he has controlled and modified other factors in his physical environment. He can do much to protect himself against unfavorable climatic conditions, which is a form of control, but beyond a few slight local modifications, he cannot change the conditions.[139] As to the effects of climate upon *man,* they are of two types. There are those direct reactions to climatic stimuli which produce immediate physical or mental changes; and those indirect effects where climate determines or limits the distribution of the flora and fauna upon which man depends for his food, clothing and shelter.[140] After these general observations, Ward turns to the most significant features of his detailed analysis, which are (1) his attempt to prove the general superiority of a temperate climate for social and cultural progress, and (2) his tentative rejection of the view that there have been definite and wide-spread climatic changes during the historical period.

Considering first the effects of the tropics upon man, Ward maintains that there nature is too bountiful to produce the proper stimulation for progress. Will-power and the provident traits are undeveloped. Food is easily provided throughout the year with only the slightest necessity for physical exertion; and the lack of any seasonal changes makes it unnecessary to exercise foresight in providing food, clothing and shelter for a cold and unproductive portion of the year. Nature does so much for man in the tropics that it paralyzes the will to develop a higher civilization.[141]

[137] 1902. Cf. Julius Hann, *Handbook of Climatology,* trans. by Ward (1903). Hann, under whom Ward studied at Vienna, held views similar to Ward's, particularly on the question of climatic changes.

[138] *Op. cit.,* pp. 220–3.

[139] *Ibid.,* pp. 220–1, 226.

[140] *Ibid.,* pp. 223–4.

[141] *Ibid.,* pp. 226–8.

Although Ward denies the suitability of a tropical climate for progressive, intellectual development, he believes, along with Herbert Spencer, that civilization in all probability began in the tropics but achieved its higher levels in more temperate regions:

> There are reasons for thinking that primitive, pre-historic man, in his earliest stages, when most helpless, was an inhabitant of the tropics; that he lived under the mild, uniform, genial climate of that zone, where food was easily obtained and protection against the inclemencies of the weather least necessary. There has been a belief that southern Asia, bordering on the Indian Ocean, with its numerous bays, was probably the cradle of humanity. . . .
>
> Civilized man is believed by many to have appeared first on the delta formed at the head of the Persian Gulf by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, where also wheat was very likely first grown. Ancient civilizations seem to have developed in the dryer portions of the tropics, where irrigation was necessary in order to insure abundant and regular crops, and where lived races more energetic and more hardy than those of the damper and rainier portions of the tropics, with more luxuriant vegetation.
>
> Civilization was thus probably first developed, not where the overwhelming superabundance of nature's gifts seems to offer the best conditions, but where man was under some stress of labor, some spur to effort, in less favorable natural conditions, but such as developed him.[142]

At the opposite extreme, but similar in its discouragement of cultural development, is the cold climate of the polar regions. In no other part of the world is man's life so rigidly determined by climatic conditions. "In whichever portion of the Arctic man is found his general mode of life, his occupations, his dwellings, food, clothing, arts, and so on, are rigidly controlled by climate." [143] In the polar districts the flora and fauna from which man obtains his food and clothing are so meagre and difficult to obtain, and the warm season during which they can be most readily secured is so short that practically all of the time and energy of man is consumed in procuring the most elementary necessities of life or is spent in crowded and unventilated ice houses where he attempts to defend himself against the extreme cold. Whereas in the tropics the very abundance discourages initiative, in a polar environment all of the energy of the inhabitants is spent in obtaining those things which make life barely possible, leaving no surplus for the development of a higher civilization.[144]

Between these extremes of tropical heat and abundance and of polar cold and scarcity lies the temperate zone with its stimulating atmosphere, its change of seasons which require the exercise of foresight, and its potential plenty if man is willing to endure moderate exertion. It is obvious that such an environmental situation is far better adapted to the produc-

[142] *Ibid.*, pp. 232–3.
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 326.
[144] *Ibid.*, p. 324.

tion of civilization than that of either the tropics or the polar regions, and it is not difficult to understand why all the higher civilizations have developed in the temperate zones. "From the temperate zones have come the explorers and adventurers of the past, and are coming the exploiters and colonisers of today." [145]

Ward finds that historically the centers of civilization in the north temperate zone have tended to move northward. This is because man, when he had mastered the milder environments, was able to move into environments more and more difficult and which tended more and more to bring out the best that was in him.[146] This view has been held by many writers past and present and is perhaps most eloquently expressed by Guyot in his theory of the "geographical march of history." Ward, however, held no brief for Guyot's teleological mysticism, nor did he place much confidence in Huntington's view that historic changes of climate are adequate to account for these shifts of civilizations.

Caution and moderation characterize Ward's discussion of the possibility of climatic changes during the historical period. He examines the evidence and finds it wanting. Changes in lake levels, abandoned villages, and traces of once prosperous settlements in the Sahara are given rather unusual weight as arguments because of the great popularity of the idea that climates are continually changing. This contention is not supported by the meteorological record, however, and the popular notion that climate is changing possesses almost no validity. Many people think that this has happened during one or two generations, but human memory is untrustworthy and general impressions are unreliable. Social and economic factors such as changes of residence, improved methods of cultivation, inventions which modify the effects of climate, and changes in the demand for given products, combine to spread the idea of a changing climate.[147]

Other alternatives appear. The basis of changing crops may be economic as well as climatic; desiccation is often due to the lowered efficiency of the inhabitants; and a few years of temporary drought may cause the complete abandonment of a locality. Ward therefore concludes that "the body of facts which has been adduced as evidence of progressive changes of climate within historical times is not yet sufficiently large and complete to warrant any general correlation and study of these facts as a whole, especially from the point of view of possible causation" . . . and that "the fact of permanent, progressive changes in climate during historical times has not yet been definitely established." [148] His skepticism extends also to theories of periodic oscillations of climate, and he denies

[145] Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 272–4.
[146] *Ibid.*, p. 274.
[147] *Ibid.*, pp. 338–47.
[148] *Ibid.*, pp. 346–52.

definitely that the eleven-year cycle in relation to sun-spots and the influence of sun-spots upon climate and the weather have been proved. Finally, the only theory of long-time climatic changes to which Ward grants any substantial validity is the theory of the glacial periods.[149]

Dexter's study of weather influences was an interesting innovation in human geography.[150] By purely inductive methods he sought to discover if any definite correlation exists between various meteorological conditions and certain types of normal and abnormal behavior. Most of his conduct data were gathered in New York City from the records of the coroner, the chief of police and the superintendent of schools and included cases of suicide, arrests for assault and drunkenness, behavior in the penitentiary and deportment in public schools. His data of accuracy and discrimination were obtained from certain national banks and from the psychological laboratory at Columbia. These various facts of behavior were then compared with the exact weather conditions on each given day; the meteorological data, including mean temperature, barometric pressure, humidity, wind, character of the day and precipitation, being taken from the records of the United States Weather Bureau.[151]

In general, Dexter found that those types of behavior which denote a quickened activity are quiescent during cold periods, and most active in very hot weather. Sickness and drunkenness vary inversely with an increase of temperature; crime and insanity directly. All types of behavior, active and passive, seem to be quickened during periods of low barometer; while high humidity intensifies intoxication and inattention, and represses murder and suicide. Winds stimulate energy, while calms aggravate forms of abnormal conduct caused by depleted vitality. All conduct except clerical errors, sickness and death seem to be more intense on fair than on cloudy days. Finally, weather which produces misconduct also produces health and alertness; misconduct being primarily the result of an excess of reserve energy which has been directed into wrong channels.[152]

Albert Leffingwell made a statistical study of the influence of the seasons upon certain phases of human conduct, and he is interesting as a forerunner of Huntington and Dexter, portions of whose work he anticipates.[153] The phases of conduct studied include suicide, insanity, crimes of violence, duels, marriages, and births. In addition to suggestions of great value which he offers, Leffingwell raises a number of interesting questions. His weakness lies in his failure to recognize and evaluate the purely social factors involved in the phenomena under investigation.

[149] *Ibid.*, pp. 352 ff.
[150] E. G. Dexter, *Weather Influences* (1904).
[151] *Ibid.*, p. 58.
[152] *Ibid.*, pp. 247–63.
[153] *Illegitimacy and the Influence of Seasons on Conduct* (London, 1892).

Suicide was found to be most frequent in Europe from early spring to mid-summer, sixty per cent of all cases in England and Wales occurring during the warmer seasons with a gradual increase up to July, and then a steady decline. Insanity and crimes of violence followed the same general course, the admissions to hospitals for the insane rising in the spring, reaching full height in the summer and thereafter steadily falling to a low point in the winter. Fifty-four per cent of cases of assault in England and Wales occurred during the spring and summer and the same was true of riots and other popular outbursts. Births and marriages revealed a similar tendency, the number of births, both legitimate and illegitimate, increasing at a time which indicated conception during the April-September period. Rape, and in fact, all crimes against the person, increased regularly during the warmer months, reaching fifty-five per cent in mid-summer in England and practically the same figure in France.[154]

These observations led Leffingwell to believe "that upon the nervous organization of human bodies (perhaps especially upon dwellers in the temperate zones) there is exerted during the procession of the seasons, from winter's close until midsummer, some undefined, specific influence, which in some manner tends to increase the excitability of emotion and passion, and thus also to increase all actions arising therefrom." In seeking an explanation he expresses the opinion that the increased activity may be due to an increase of solar light and heat or to some other mysterious cause not now fully understood.[155] He surmises that the quantity of blood is increased and that the heart beats are stronger and more rapid. Whatever the explanation, however, he is convinced that an actual increase of nervous energy does appear during the warmer seasons. Why he failed to note the obvious fact that summer allows more social contacts and hence greater opportunity for and temptation to crime against the person is hard to understand. Also, greater opportunity for social intercourse in the summer brings more excitement and may account in part for the increase of insanity; and one could easily believe that purely social considerations might account for the slight increase in cases of assault and for the increase in popular outbursts during the spring and summer. Dr. Leffingwell's conclusions might have been modified had he given proper consideration to the social factor.

The first volume of *The History of Civilisation in England,* the unfinished work of Henry Thomas Buckle, appeared in 1857, and at once aroused tremendous interest in Europe and America.[156] The son of a

[154] Leffingwell, *op. cit.,* pp. 92–124.

[155] *Ibid.,* p. 132.

[156] Only two volumes of this work appeared. See A. H. Huth, *Life and Writings of Buckle* (New York, 1880), and J. M. Robertson, *Buckle and His Critics* (London, 1895).

wealthy London merchant, Buckle was able to travel extensively and to devote his life to literary and scientific pursuits. In this volume he discussed the effects of environment upon man with a charm and a vigor that placed him high among the scholars and writers of his day—a rank now somewhat diminished. It was his hope to give history the exactness of the natural sciences; and, however one may regard his product, few will deny the lofty object of his work, which was to discover and evaluate the mental and physical laws governing social evolution, and to trace the operation of these laws in the development of civilization. With this object in mind, it was logical for him to disregard the dogmas of free-will and predestination and to hold that all historical changes "must be the fruit of a double action; an action of external phenomena upon the mind, and another action of the mind upon the phenomena." [157]

Climate, soil and food, says Buckle—and he treats them together because the influence of any one is so largely dependent upon the others—are, with the "general aspect of nature," the great physical agents by which the human race is most powerfully influenced. It is his aim to show that these agents are the determining factors in social and cultural progress. In his proposal to make a synthetic study of the first three he advances a step beyond Montesquieu, who treated them separately and consequently failed to interpret each in its full significance with regard to the whole.[158] And he has the additional advantage over Montesquieu and his predecessors in that, with fuller data at his command, he is more scientific and comprehensive in his presentation of the subject.

Buckle moves swiftly and logically in the development of his thesis. Cultural progress depends upon the existence of a leisure class which must be supported out of wealth that it does not create. This necessitates a social surplus which arises only when production is greater than consumption; and thus the accumulation of wealth must precede any substantial progress in culture. Although knowledge, when it comes, aids in the further production of wealth, the wealth must come first. It is "the first great step that can be taken, because without wealth there can be no leisure and without leisure there can be no knowledge." And finally, the accumulation of wealth is made possible very largely through the combined influence of climate, soil and food.[159]

In the early history of a people the creation of a surplus depends upon (1) the energy and regularity of man's labor, and (2) nature's returns to that labor. The character of the labor depends upon the climate. A temperate climate invigorates; a hot climate fills the worker with languor; while in the frigid areas the people acquire desultory habits, because "the

[157] Buckle, *op. cit.*, I, 14–15.
[158] *Ibid.*, pp. 30 f.
[159] *Ibid.*

chain of their industry, as it were, is broken" by the long periods of cold when work is suspended.[160] The *returns* to labor depend upon the fertility of the soil, and the relative influence of soil and climate in cultural development varies. In Asia the soil is of primary importance; in Europe, the climate. And civilizations springing from the soil never reach the heights attained by those depending upon climate for their development; for progress depends upon the energy of man, whose powers are not limited like those of nature. There are no doubt other factors, operating at a later period, which are of equal or even greater importance, but, "looking at the history of wealth in its earlier stages, it will be found to depend entirely upon soil and climate." [161]

Attention is next turned to the distribution of wealth, which Buckle believes can be shown in primitive times, and even in recent instances where society is not too complex, to depend upon physical causes. As wealth accumulates, two classes arise, the employers and the employed. Wages will follow the law of supply and demand; if the number of workers exceeds the demand, wages will be low and *vice versa*. With food the all-important factor in growth of population, it follows that where food is most abundant and least needed, population will increase faster than where food is scarce and much is needed to preserve life. In warm and fertile regions, food being more plentiful, less needed and more easily secured than in cold and barren regions, population will tend to increase more rapidly in warm countries than in cold. Hence "there is a strong and constant tendency in hot countries for wages to be low, and in cold countries for them to be high." [162]

To verify his important conclusion regarding the influence of food upon the distribution of wealth, Buckle examines conditions in Ireland, India, Egypt, Central America, and Peru. He undertakes to show that the presence of a cheap national food is correlated with: (1) a rapid increase in population; (2) lower incomes for the workers; (3) a wider gulf between rich and poor; and (4) the subjection of the lower classes. In Ireland, after its introduction in the sixteenth century, the potato was the cheap food, with a consequent rapid increase of population, low wages, and a great mass of poor people. In India, rice was the chief food with the same growth of population, the caste system, and contempt for the working classes; while with the date in Egypt, maize and bananas in Mexico, and maize and potatoes in Peru the resultant social and economic conditions were the same.[163]

Buckle's interesting theory of a direct psychological influence from the

[160] Buckle, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
[161] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[162] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–7.
[163] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–84.

natural surroundings is not widely accepted today. Earlier writers attached importance to what he calls the "general aspect of nature," and Ritter alludes to it sympathetically, although his treatment is brief. Humboldt, a contemporary of Ritter and Buckle, who was profoundly moved by the contemplation of nature, does not credit the *aspects* with any tangible or lasting influence upon the mind. He finds that their actual effects are not easily ascertained and that we often "receive from the external world that with which we have ourselves invested it." [164] Scant consideration is given to the subject by contemporary writers.

Among the "aspects of nature" Buckle includes those *appearances* which have stimulated the imagination and otherwise influenced man's habits of thought, e. g., beautiful scenery, mountains, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and hurricanes. He divides them into two groups: (1) those which stimulate the imagination, and (2) those which affect the understanding. Where the *aspects* are sublime or terrifying the imagination is inflamed and tends to dominate the understanding. Where they are less formidable, man's confidence returns and reason holds sway. Here Buckle contrasts the civilization of India, where the works of nature are of "startling magnitude," with that of Greece, where they are feebler and less terrifying. To the hideous orgies of the Indian religion, he opposes the beautiful conception of the Greeks, where the gods were close to man. In India man is abased; in Greece he is elevated. The natives of India are imaginative and poetical; the Greeks were critical, and in Aristotle furnished one of the greatest thinkers of all time.[165]

Finally, Buckle contends that the influence of environment is most effective upon primitive peoples and that advancing civilization is characterized by a diminishing importance of physical influences and an increasing importance of psychological and cultural factors.[166] Thus the triumph of mind over nature becomes a measure of progress. This view was foreshadowed by Montesquieu, and definitely formulated by Ritter before the *History of Civilisation* was published. In fact, there is little that is original in Buckle's physical interpretation of society, and one may find most of his theories, in less elaborate form, in the works of earlier writers. His contribution was his systematic examination of these influences and his comprehensive treatment of the subject.

In a stimulating contribution to the literature of anthropogeography O. D. von Engeln directs attention to the dependence of economics upon geography.[167] He is interested "not so much to show that human organization and development *have* been determined by geographic conditions,"

[164] A. von Humboldt, *Cosmos,* I (New York, 1859), 5.
[165] Buckle, *op. cit.,* I, 85–94.
[166] *Ibid.,* pp. 112–3.
[167] *Inheriting the Earth* (1922).

as he is in insisting "that in the future they *should* be." *Place,* he says, is the most important consideration, if man is to inherit the earth, and regional geography "the initial field of study." [168] Allowance is made for the cultural factor, however, when he adds that "place" alone does not *determine* the nation, for the character of the people must be taken into consideration. Thus two different peoples would not follow exactly the same development as a nation in the same environment.[169] He emphasizes, also, the need of an understanding of *environmental control* in order that man may learn how to utilize the resources of his environment as intelligently and as completely as possible, and cites the fact that "those lands where the establishment of agriculture is dependent on the practice of irrigation have also been the cradles of civilization and of national culture." [170]

To foster the growth of a great nation three conditions must be present: (1) opportunity, (2) necessity, (3) protection. Only the temperate regions possess all three of these requirements in the proper proportions, the tropics lacking the stimulating urge of necessity and the cold regions suffering from a conspicuous lack of opportunity.[171] Also, the fact that nations are inter-dependent must be recognized before they can exist in harmony and enjoy in full measure the fruits of the earth, as each region must furnish for the common good those products which it is best fitted by nature to supply.[172] The temperate zones should be made to produce maximum crops through improved organization, the application of new inventions and the adoption of increasingly efficient methods; [173] and the enormous untapped resources of the tropics must be developed and utilized to the fullest extent by the peoples of the temperate regions for the benefit of mankind as a whole [174]—an assumption of the cultural supremacy of the white race which reminds us of the theories of Gobineau, Chamberlain and Grant.

Von Engeln fears that the population of the earth at its present rate of increase is bound to outrun the food supply unless heroic preventive measures are taken,[175] but it may be suggested that the stupendous increase in the population of the world since the Industrial Revolution is due to what he himself calls "Opportunity," and that population follows opportunity and advancement in methods of utilizing natural resources rather than the other way around. However, the position taken by not a few recent writers that we are entering a period of diminishing returns

[168] Von Engeln, *op. cit.,* Preface.
[169] *Ibid.,* chap. iii.
[170] *Ibid.,* pp. 74–5.
[171] *Ibid.,* pp. 63 ff.
[172] *Ibid.,* chap. vi.
[173] *Ibid.,* pp. 257 ff.
[174] *Ibid.,* chap. ix.
[175] *Ibid.,* pp. 262 ff.

in agriculture, and that the possible increase of the world's food supply is more definitely limited than the potential increase of population may furnish some substantial basis for this fear.

Continuing the tradition of the general superiority of peoples living in the middle latitudes and emphasizing the stimulating effects of a temperate climate, J. Russell Smith calls attention to the fact that the world's greatest cities—those that exercise leadership among nations and take pre-eminence in world politics, are located in the north temperate zone midway between the tropics and the polar regions.[176] He mentions some nineteen cities, and it is of interest that the average latitude, both mean and median, of these cities is almost exactly 45° north. To the north efficiency declines because it is too cold for production; to the south energy declines because it is too warm for activity, "although the tropics teem with unmatched possibilities." Cold, he says, "is a great stimulus to activity," and the great modern migrations to the north are favorable to progress because "the human race is thus being much more exposed to frost than formerly." [177]

The thought that man needs opposition and a struggle to bring out the best that is in him finds expression in Professor Smith's assertion that "civilization is a product of adversity." Tropical abundance, he holds, does not promote progress, and man thrives best in situations where he must work or starve. Habits of industry are not formed where nature is so lavish that man can satisfy his wants without exertion. The tropical dweller needs little in the way of clothing or shelter; and a few banana plants and a patch of sweet potatoes, with game from the forest and fish from the streams, supply his food. Under such conditions there can be no progress, because, to be at his best, man must have obstacles to overcome. "The great civilizations of all time seem to have arisen where nature made production possible only a part of the year, and thus made it necessary for man to work and save up for the time when he could not produce." [178] Thrift, foresight and the accumulation of a surplus are thus correlated with human progress.

V. Geographical Factors in the Historical Development of Mankind [179]

1. *Introductory Survey.* The German philosopher, Herder, suggested that human history is essentially the diversified expression of *Geist*, as influenced and modified by external surroundings. Of the latter the physical

[176] *Industrial and Commercial Geography* (1913).
[177] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–10.
[178] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–8. See also *The World's Food Resources* (1919), by the same author.
[179] This section was written by Harry Elmer Barnes.

environment is the most important. But historians fell under the influence of Hegel, with his zest for Absolutes and the state, and of Carlyle, with his notion of great men acting as the instruments of Providence. So history, in the nineteenth century, languished under the spell of constitutionalism, nationalism, and the enchantment of biological episodes and anecdotes. Karl Ritter was scarcely noticed, Buckle was laughed to scorn, and Ratzel largely unheeded. Even in our own day, a scholarly American historian has revealed the majestic migration of *Geist* across the American continent, heedless alike of economic interests and geographic sections.[180] Gradually, however, historians have become conscious that the actions of men cannot be fully understood or adequately described when divorced from their physical setting. We have some notable instances of an increasing appreciation by historians of the significance of the impressive body of material being placed at their disposal by the students of physiography and anthropogeography.

The interest in the relation between geographic factors and human culture is almost as old as history itself. The "father of medicine," Hippocrates, a contemporary of Herodotus and Thucydides, contributed the first systematic essay on the subject, incidental to an effort to ascertain the effects of climate and other physical factors on the types and pathogenesis of disease. He ended by discovering reasons why the Greeks, as inhabitants of the "middle climate," were superior to the weaklings of the south and the barbarians of the north. Aristotle confessed his satisfaction with this interpretation, and Cicero indicated how this view really substantiated Roman superiority. Aquinas revived the Aristotelian concepts in the medieval period, and they appeared again slightly later in the writings of Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), this time enriched by the superior Moslem knowledge of geography.

Jean Bodin (1530–96) showed how geography had conspired with God to make the French a great nation, and offered suggestions as to how its study might aid statesmen in avoiding revolutions. Richard Mead and John Arbuthnot, two English physicians of the first half of the eighteenth century, exploited the new discoveries in physics and meteorology in order to build up interesting, if not convincing, interpretations of weather and climatic influences on man. Montesquieu's classic effort to erect a philosophy of history and a science of jurisprudence upon geographic foundations was based chiefly upon the theories of Arbuthnot and the descriptive material brought together in Chardin's *Travels*.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, Karl Ritter, building upon the sound knowledge accumulated as a result of the labors of such explorers

[180] E. D. Adams, *The Power of Ideals in American History* (Yale University Press, 1913). For an even more extreme view, see H. O. Taylor, *The Freedom of the Mind in History* (Macmillan, 1924).

as Alexander von Humboldt, founded the science of anthropogeography in its modern sense. His impulse inspired the work of later systematizers such as Peschel, Guyot, and particularly, Ratzel and Reclus. In addition to the systematic work of these and later writers, such as Richthofen, Brunhes, Vallaux, Vidal de La Blache, Semple and Huntington, many significant contributions have been made to special phases of the subject by Demolins, Cowan, Metchnikoff, Mackinder, LePlay, Geddes, Hahn, Huntington, Ward, Dexter, Hellpach and others. These writings are analyzed in other sections of this chapter.

The bearing of such works upon historical exposition and interpretation is obvious. The anthropogeographers mentioned above have touched upon well-nigh every environmental factor operating upon human society, and have provided a well articulated picture of the relations between man and nature. Demolins and Cowan have laid stress upon the importance of topography and routes of travel, as well as of natural barriers to invasion and contacts. LePlay and Geddes have analyzed the river-basin as the natural geographic region in modern industrial society. Mackinder has indicated the bearing of strategic geographic position on the history of national expansion and international relations. Hahn and Ward have provided systematic manuals touching upon all phases of climatic influences upon man. Huntington has supplemented their contributions by a daring and original hypothesis of climatic oscillations, with which may have been associated many important historic migrations of peoples and the decline of historic cultures. Hellpach, Dexter, Huntington, and Leffingwell have made a beginning in the investigation of the effect of weather and seasonal changes on human energy and activity. Huntington has, in his *Earth and Sun,* set forth the hypothesis of the fundamental unity of solar, climatic, and weather influences upon the course of civilization.

2. *Contributions of Geographers to Our Understanding of the Chief Regions of Human Culture.* In summarizing the writings on the relationship between geography and history, we shall first consider the contributions which students of geography have made to our understanding of the physical setting of the chief sites of human culture from the dawn of history to our own day. First should be listed such representative comprehensive works on the general physical geography of the world as those by H. Wagner, W. Ule, A. G. Supan, A. Philippson, G. Marinelli, G. Schott, E. de Martonne, and W. M. Davis.[181] To these might be added such

[181] H. Wagner, *Lehrbuch der Geographie;* W. Ule, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Erdkunde;* A. Supan, *Grundzüge der physischen Erdkunde;* A. Philippson, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Geographie;* G. Marinelli, *La Terra;* W. M. Davis, *Physical Geography.* For a descriptive bibliography and guide to such works on geography as are listed in this section one should combine D. E. Smith's *Syllabus of Historical*

regional surveys of the world as H. R. Mill's *International Geography,* and H. J. Mackinder's series, *The Regions of the World.* On the borderland between physical and human geography is Elisée Reclus's *Nouvelle géographie universelle,* translated into English as *The Earth and Its Inhabitants.* Next we should put the general works on anthropogeography, such as those by Ratzel, Kirchhoff, Reclus, Vidal de La Blache, Brunhes, Semple and Huntington. Then would come the general surveys of the specific relation of geography to the history of man in such books as A. J. Herbertson's *Man and His Work,* James Fairgrieve's *Geography and World-Power,* E. Protheroe's *The Dominion of Man,* Brunhes and Vallaux's *La Géographie de l'histoire,* and Febvre's *A Geographical Introduction to History.* An admirable theoretical discussion of the subject is contained in an article by Professor John C. Merriam, "The Earth Sciences as the Background of History," in the *Scientific Monthly,* January, 1921. Two recent books give us an admirable summary of the geographic basis of European history as a whole, J. K. Wright's *The Geographical Basis of European History,* and Gordon East's *An Historical Geography of Europe.* Of a more general nature but equally valuable to the historian are R. H. Whitbeck and Oliver J. Thomas's *The Geographical Factor,* and C. C. Carter and H. C. Brentnall's *Man the World Over.*

When we come to the Mediterranean theater of Oriental and Classical history we have the great work of A. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet,* and the more popular work of Miss M. I. Newbigin, *The Mediterranean Lands.* Much the most useful work for students using the English language is E. C. Semple's *The Geography of the Mediterranean Region.*

On the Orient itself should be mentioned the important work of D. G. Hogarth, *The Nearer East,* the best general survey of the region. This should be supplemented by such special studies as Sir William Ramsay's *Historical Geography of Asia Minor,* and Sir George A. Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land.* Léon Metchnikoff, in his *Les grands fleuves historiques,* has presented a socio-geographic study of the great river basins of Oriental antiquity in their relation to the development of civilization in this area.

On the geographical background of the history of Classical antiquity we have the general works of Philippson, Newbigin and Semple on the Mediterranean area as a whole. The only general work on Classical geography is the now somewhat antiquated book of Heinrich Kiepert, *Manual of Ancient Geography.* The geography of the Aegean, Greece and the Balkan peninsula has been dealt with adequately in H. F. Tozer's *Islands of the Aegean,* D. G. Hogarth's *The Nearer East,* M. I. Newbigin's *Geographical Aspects of the Balkans,* and Jovan Cvijić's *La Péninsule bal-*

Geography (1908) and W. L. G. Joerg, "Recent Geographical work in Europe," *Geographical Review* (July, 1922).

kanique, the last of which is an excellent study of human geography as well. For Italy there is J. Conder's old work, *Italy,* H. Nissen's *Italische Landeskunde,* as well as the comprehensive works of the Italian scholars, Guiseppe dalla Vedova, A. R. Toniolo and O. Marinelli. The whole geography of the ancient Roman world is treated in comprehensive fashion by Julius Jung in his *Grundriss der Geographie von Italien und dem Orbis Romanus.* For Spain we have T. Fischer's work on the Balkans, Italy and the Iberic peninsula, *Länderkunde der drei Süd-Europäischen Halbinseln;* A. Blazquez's *España y Portugal,* and J. D. Cereceda's *Resumen fisiográfico de la Peninsula Iberica.* On northern Africa the great authorities are A. Bernard and E. F. Gautier.

When we come to the Middle Ages there are no first-rate comprehensive surveys of medieval historical geography. J. K. Wright's *Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades* is more a study of geographical knowledge in the Middle Ages than of medieval geographical facts. Sir C. R. Beazley's *Dawn of Modern Geography* is an excellent survey of medieval geography and travel. Miss Newbigin's *Mediterranean Lands* contains valuable material on medieval geographical backgrounds. On Germany there is the exhaustive work of B. Knüll, *Historische Geographie Deutschlands im Mittelalter.* The geographical setting of an important Moslem civilization is presented in D. G. Hogarth's *The Penetration of Arabia,* and Guy LeStrange's *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate.* The geographical background of the expansion of Europe, the age of discovery, and colonization is well set forth in M. W. Spilhaus's *The Background of Geography,* and H. B. Wetherill's *The World and Its Discovery.*

When we turn to the geography of the separate states of western Europe, the literature becomes enormous. H. Fleure has covered the whole field in his excellent little work, *Human Geography in Western Europe.* In his standard work on *The Races of Europe,* Professor W. Z. Ripley has discussed the interrelation of the geography and the racial distribution in Europe. C. S. Coon's *The Races of Mankind* brings Ripley up to date in its European sections.

There is an excellent introduction to the geography of France by Raoul Blanchard and Millicent Todd in their *Geography of France.* Far more complete are the classic survey of P. Vidal de La Blache in the first volume of Lavisse's *Histoire de France,* and the more extended treatment in two volumes by J. Brunhes and Pierre Deffontaines, *La Géographie humaine de la France,* which introduces G. Hanotaux's *Histoire de la nation française.* Along with these general surveys must be noted the innumerable special studies of particular French regions, a department of geographical work in which the French excel. Of such works Demangeon's work on Picardy, Vallaux's on Britanny, and Blanchard's on Flanders are characteristic. Then there are the admirable studies of the

geographical factors in the location and growth of the main French cities, of which L. Gallois's work on Paris is perhaps the most notable.

On the historical geography of central Europe there is, as might have been expected, a large amount of material. We have already mentioned Knüll's work on the historical geography of central Europe in the Middle Ages. There is a work of importance on the early modern period by K. Biedermann, *Deutschland im achtzehnten Jahrhundert.* J. Wimmer's *Historische Landschaftskunde* is, perhaps, the best historical geography of Germany. To these works should be added such excellent books as J. Partsch's *Central Europe,* K. Kretschmer's *Historische Geographie von Mitteleuropa,* W. Goetz's *Historische Geographie,* A. Himly's *Histoire de la formation territoriale des États de l'Europe centrale,* W. Ule's *Das deutsche Reich,* G. Braun's, *Deutschland,* A. Penck's *Die Donau,* and Teleki's work on Hungary. Nor must one overlook the admirable studies of the geography of Germany, Austria and Switzerland by A. Penck, A. G. Supan and J. J. Egli respectively in A. Kirchhoff's *Länderkunde des Erdteils Europa.* Then there is the large amount of work done on the regional geography of Germany, where the Germans vie with the French in productivity. On Bohemia there are the many studies of geography and ethnography by L. Niederle. In regard to the historical geography of Poland there are, among other sources, S. Pawlowski's general survey of Polish geography, *Geographia Polski,* E. Romer's monumental works on the political and economic geography of Poland, particularly since World War I, Wunderlich's splendid German survey, and the earlier volumes of the *Polish Encyclopedia* which deal specifically with the geography and ethnography of Poland.

The historical and physical geography of Russia is adequately covered in the work of the brilliant Heidelberg geographer, A. Hettner, *Russland: eine geographische Betrachtung,* and the many monographs of A. Woeikof. On Roumania the best work has been done in the book, *La Valachie,* by the French geographer, E. de Martonne, who has specialized on the regional geography of Roumania. One of his students, G. Valsan, has provided us with a remarkable study of the great plain of Roumania, in his *Câmpia Română.* A. Dimitrescu, in his *Die untere Donau,* has executed an excellent study of the physiography of the lower reaches of this historic stream. We have already mentioned the general work of Cvijić on the Balkan peninsula, to which we might well add mention of the works of G. Gravier and J. Dedijer on Serbia, and of I. Ishirkov on Bulgaria.

On the Scandinavian lands there are the geographical handbook of Denmark, *Danmark: Land og Folk,* edited by D. Bruun, H. W. Ahlmann's survey of the physiography of Norway in his *Geomorphological Studies in Norway,* and Helge Nelson's studies of the human and physical

geography of Sweden. Otto Nordenskjöld, in his *Polarnaturen,* has worked out a general geography of the polar lands. The standard work on the geography of Holland is R. Schuiling's *Nederland: Handboek der Aardrijkskunde.* R. Blanchard's *La Flandre* is probably the most adequate study of the Belgian topography.

The classic treatment of the geography of the British Isles remains Mackinder's *Britain and the British Seas,* though the second volume of Chisholm's *Europe* is highly valuable. On the geologic history of Britain the later editions of the old work of Sir A. C. Ramsay on *The Physical Geology and Geography of Great Britain* is still the most useful book.

For the geography of the Atlantic, which constitutes the connecting link between the Old and the New Worlds, one may consult G. Schott's *Geographie des atlantischen Ozeans,* Vallaux's *La Mer,* the various works of F. Nansen, one of the world's chief authorities on oceanography, D. Bruun's studies of the early Norse voyages to Greenland, and the earlier but still reliable work of J. G. Kohl on the discovery and exploration of North America.

On the physiography, natural resources and human geography of the United States there is a growing body of material. The point of departure may be taken from N. S. Shaler's *Nature and Man in America,* and the composite work which he edited, *The United States of America.* Ratzel himself contributed a survey, *Politische Geographie der Vereinigten Staaten,* and his disciple, Miss Semple, applied his ideas, with a large amount of additional concrete information, to the historical geography of our country in her *American History and Its Geographic Conditions.* Another useful book is A. P. Brigham's *Geographic Influences in American History.* Then there is the volume on North America in Mackinder's *Regions of the World* by I. C. Russell, who has also written a good treatise on *The Rivers of North America;* and there must not be forgotten the excellent work of N. M. Fenneman, *The Physiographic Divisions of the United States.* The most modern and comprehensive work on the subject yet produced is *North America* by J. Russell Smith on the regional geography of North America. R. T. Hill has dealt with the West Indies. South America still awaits adequate study though beginnings have been made in such excellent works as those by Augustus H. Keane, Isaiah Bowman, W. Sievers and A. V. Lavelli. In a stimulating and influential book, *Deserts on the March,* Paul B. Sears has warned of the disastrous implications for the American future of our reckless exploitation of natural resources and the resulting soil erosion.

The economic and geographical basis of the new imperialism has already been surveyed in such books as A. G. Supan's, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien,* C. P. Lucas's *Historical Geography of the British Colonies,* Kermack's *Expansion of Britain,* Geddes's and

Barrow's series on the resources of the Empire, A. Megglé's *Le Domaine Colonial de la France,* G. Assereto's *L'Italia e le sue Colonie,* G. Bevoine's *L'Asie Minore e l'Italia,* and E. J. Vasconcelos's *As Colonias Portuguesas.* And cognizance is being taken of the material basis of world struggles in such books as E. W. Zimmermann's *World Resources and Industries,* E. C. Eckel's *Coal, Iron and War,* M. Olivier's *La Politique de charbon,* P. E. de la Tramerye's *The World Struggle for Oil,* and H. and R. Wolf's *Rubber, a Story of Glory and Greed.*

The importance of the geographic factors in World War I was fully recognized by D. W. Johnson in his *Topography and Strategy in the War,* and *The Battlefields of the World War.* The significance of geography and economic resources was also considered by various authors contributing to Professor J. T. Shotwell's great series on *The Economic and Social History of the World War.* T. H. Holdich, in his *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making,* and C. B. Fawcett, in his *Frontiers,* have dealt with these problems in their geographical and historical setting. The geographical basis of the reconstruction of the world after the war has been admirably set forth in a comprehensive and most useful work by Dr. Isaiah Bowman, *The New World,* and more briefly by H. J. Fleure, *The Treaty Settlement.* Even the salutary propaganda for the League of Nations was put on a geographical basis by J. F. Unstead in his *Citizens of the World* series of geographical handbooks.

3. *The Appreciation by Historians of the Significance of Geographic Factors in History.* Historians have long insisted that a knowledge of geography is essential to any intelligent grasp of the history of a state. It is significant that the first works on method and interpretation in historical study—Polybius' *History of Rome,* the *Prolégomènes historiques* of Ibn Khaldūn, the *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* of Bodin, and the *Méthode pour étudier l'histoire* of Nicolas Lenglet-Dufresnoy—all stressed the assertion that an acquaintance with the geographical background constitutes the indispensable prolegomenon to historical writing. While some of the early modern historians gave evidence of adherence to this doctrine, most of the notable writing on historical geography and geographical history has come about subsequent to the work of Karl Ritter and Arnold Guyot.

Since the days of Montesquieu there have not been lacking historians who showed some awareness of the significance of the geographic setting for both the development of a single culture and the contact of many cultures. The case of Buckle in the 'fifties has already been pointed out.[182] In his *Kulturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart* (1874), A. Hellwald worked out a universal history in which he assigned a very prominent rôle to natural or geographical determin-

[182] See above, pp. 168–74, 182–85, and 188–90.

ism. P. Mougeoulle, in his *Les Problèmes de l'histoire* (1886) also moderately defended the view of geographic determinism. The same general point of view was taken by Otto Henne-am-Rhyn in his voluminous *Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte,* but with more discrimination and insight. A universal history of great merit has been edited by Hans F. Helmolt, his *Weltgeschichte,* which was planned largely in accordance with the historical philosophy of Ratzel. To it Ratzel contributed the section on geography, this being the best brief statement of his doctrines. Helmolt's work was widely exploited by H. G. Wells in his *Outline of History.* H. B. George, in his *The Relation of Geography and History,* has attempted to assess the importance of geographic factors in history, particularly in their relation to political and military history. The general theoretical aspects of the problem of the relation of geography to history have been discussed with erudition and acumen by F. J. Teggart in his stimulating writings, particularly *The Processes of History.*

In beginning a survey of the recognition of geographic influences in particular periods of history we may note that even the "prehistoric" archeologists are coming to recognize the importance of definite physical factors in the location of culture sites in this antique period, as may be seen from the works of P. Deffontaines and O. G. S. Crawford. In tracing the importance of geographic factors in the period of the so-called "dawn of history," first place must unquestionably be assigned to J. L. Myres, who has set forth his views in the stimulating little work, *The Dawn of History,* and in the two magisterial chapters opening the first volume of the *Cambridge Ancient History.* A similar, if less discriminating, attitude has been shown by the industrious archeologist, J. de Morgan, in his *Les premières civilisations.* Professor Breasted not only gave very generous attention to the geographic element in Egyptian history, but even thoroughly acquainted himself with the historical geology of the Nile Valley, in the effort to discover the geographical setting of the prehistoric cultures of Egypt which were unearthed by De Morgan. The monumental works on the history of the ancient Orient by Petrie, Breasted, Rogers, Jastrow, Olmstead and others give ample attention to the operation of environmental forces in the history of these cultural areas. George Adam Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land* remains a classic.

Much important work has been done by historians on the geographical aspects of Greek history since Ernst Curtius, under the influence of Ritter, initiated this type of study more than a half century ago. R. Dussaud, in his *Les Civilisations préhelléniques,* has brought together an admirable summary of the results of recent archeological work and provided us with information concerning the early history and geography of the Greek and Aegean area. In this he shows clearly the importance of the

geographical factors involved in the location of the more important culture sites. Walter Leaf, in two most suggestive works, *Homer and History,* and *Troy: a Study in Homeric Geography,* has attempted a rather convincing geographical interpretation of the rise of Mycenaean civilization and the Trojan War. A. E. Zimmern in his *Greek Commonwealth,* an important study of Greek civilization in the Periclean age, has set forth an excellent appraisal and description of the environmental elements which affected and conditioned this historic culture. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, in his *Alexander the Great,* has given proper attention to the geographical basis of Alexander's conquests and the beginnings of the Hellenistic period. Finally, Karl Julius Beloch, in what is perhaps the ablest of the histories of Greece, has not overlooked the physical stage on which the Greek drama was enacted.

Various distinguished authorities have awarded proper attention to the environmental basis of Roman history. The geographical introduction in Victor Duruy's *History of Rome* has never since been surpassed in any general history of Rome. T. E. Peet, O. Montelius, and V. I. Modestov have presented in detail the geographical basis of the earliest cultures of the Italian peninsula. G. Ferrero, throughout his much discussed work on *The Greatness and Decline of Rome,* was thoroughly alive to the influence exerted by the geography of Italy and the Mediterranean basin. The geographical framework of the Roman Empire has been inadequately appraised by historians, though some good work has been done on particular provinces. E. Gothein has considered with care the geographical factors involved in the Italian culture of the Renaissance period, and of southern Italy in general. And one must not overlook E. A. Freeman's detailed study of the geography of Sicily. Little work has been done by historians on geographic forces in Spanish history, though there has been some recognition of their potency by R. Altamira and R. B. Merriman. Perhaps the best work which has been done in this field is that contained in C. Oman's discussion of the importance of topography for strategy in his *History of the Peninsular War.*

In treating the work of historians on the relation of geography and history during the Middle Ages, one must begin by mentioning the thoroughgoing exposition of the geographical basis and conditioning of the spread of Christianity, which has been the contribution of Adolph Harnack in his great work *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums.* For medieval Europe the incomparable work by a historian is E. A. Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe.* Much important work has been done by specialists on the history of particular areas which cannot be mentioned here.

The classic sketch of French geography in its historic relations by a historian is that contained in the first chapter of the second volume of

Jules Michelet's *History of France*. Camille Jullian has examined with great thoroughness the physical factors involved in the origins of French civilization in pre-Roman and Roman Gaul. Many historians have analyzed, with ample attention, the geographical factors in the history of Germany and Austria. Among these should be named Wilhelm Riehl, Gustav Freytag, Heinrich von Treitschke, Otto Henne-am-Rhyn, Karl Lamprecht, and Kurt Breysig. The most thorough treatment of the influence of geographical factors upon the history of Germany is contained in Albert von Hofmann's *Das deutsche Land und die deutsche Geschichte*. Some little attention is given to the physical setting in the general histories of Russia by A. Leroy-Beaulieu, A. Rambaud, D. M. Wallace, and V. O. Kluchevsky, as well as in the economic history of Russia by J. Mavor, but any adequate consideration of the geographic factors in Russian history by a competent historian is still lacking. An interesting step in this direction was made by C. Sarolea over forty years ago. The best work done by a historian on the geography of England in relation to its historical development remains John Richard Green's *Geography of the British Isles,* and *The Making of England*. Much valuable work by various historians on the geography of the British Empire is contained in Lucas's above-mentioned composite work on *The Historical Geography of the British Colonies*.

The geographical basis of the expansion of Europe overseas after 1450 has never been adequately handled by historians, though there has been some consideration of it in the stimulating works of Lannoy and Linden, W. R. Shepherd, W. C. Abbott, J. E. Gillespie, R. B. Merriman, H. E. Bolton and E. J. Payne.

Much fruitful work has been done with respect to the geographical factors affecting American history. A serviceable atlas containing descriptive and analytical material on the historical geography of America has been prepared by Dixon Ryan Fox. Excellent summary discussions of the geographic factors in American History are to be found in A. M. Schlesinger's *New Viewpoints in American History,* and A. B. Hulbert's *The Increasing Debt of History to Science*.

Far and away the best description of the geographical background of the colonization of America is contained in the remarkable book by E. J. Payne, *A History of the New World Called America*. Livingston Farrand has dealt with the influence of physical features in his incisive work on the anthropological basis of American history in the *American Nation* series. A corrective to the usual approach to colonization through the exclusive study of the settlements of the French and English has been supplied in H. E. Bolton's insistence on both the priority and the primary importance of the Spanish explorations and conquests in the making of the Americas. The routes of travel in the penetration of America have

been studied in great descriptive detail by A. B. Hulbert, in his *Historic Highways of America,* and his *Routes of Inland Travel.* The geographical factors in the Mississippi Valley, and their relation to the history of this section, have been brought together by Justin Winsor in his *Mississippi Basin.* H. H. Bancroft and his associates have described in detail the physiography of the Pacific Coast in its bearing upon the settlement of that area.

The relation of the chief routes of travel to the settlement of the continent has been set forth in such works as those by Benton, Paxson, Baker, Goodwin, Coman, Speed, Johnston, and Inman. J. W. Draper, in his *History of the Civil War,* has offered a suggestive, if exaggerated, interpretation of the effect of climate on American sectionalism.

It is, however, with the work of Frederick Jackson Turner and his more capable disciples that the development of a really dynamic historical geography of the United States is properly associated. Turner had a thorough knowledge of the physical geography of the country, and he envisaged American history as the process of conquering the continent through an ever expanding frontier society, and of welding together in a workable unity a group of diverse sectional societies and cultures produced by the variegated geography of the country. He thus introduced more vitality and realism into the study of American history than any other American historian of his or any earlier generation. And by relating economic interests to geographic resources, and political movements to economic factors he has done more than most of his contemporaries to give a plausible interpretation to the nature of, and changes in, American political life. Yet he cannot be accused of being a crude geographical or economic determinist, since he recognized the importance, if not the primacy, of dominating ideas. He did, however, hold that these ideas have a definite relation to the realities of American life rather than originating *in vacuo,* as seems to be the position of E. D. Adams and others of the more conventional group of historical writers.

A similar realism, if less interest in specific geographical problems, has characterized the approach to American history in the writings of C. A. Beard, W. E. Dodd and Carl Becker. The historians of Latin America have been primarily interested in political and diplomatic history, but there have been not a few who have shown a concern with the physical basis of its history, particularly H. H. Bancroft in his *History of Central America,* and W. H. Koebel in his diverse works on the history and social life of Latin America.

The expansion of Europe overseas has had an extremely important relation to the growth of historical geography. It was the curiosity over the newly discovered lands and peoples that gave rise to both modern geography and the recent interest of historians in geographical data. Owing

in part to the fact that the usual data for conventional historical writing in biographies of statesmen and politicians, anecdotes of court scandals, and military episodes have not been as rich in the history of colonization and the conquest of less developed peoples as in the history of the home countries, the historians of European expansion have been compelled to give more attention to geographic, economic and social factors. In the standard manuals on colonization by H. C. Morris, A. G. Keller, A. Zimmermann, A. Girault and P. Leroy-Beaulieu one will find some attention given to the geographical setting, while in special treatments of particular areas by such writers as H. H. Johnston, C. G. Robertson, A. J. Herbertson, Hans Meyer, Richard Thurnwald and others, the physical environment of colonial expansion is analyzed in some detail.

4. *Concluding Observations.* The fact which probably most impresses the student of historiography is the degree to which the conventional treatment of the subject has lagged behind the more progressive tendencies. This is true with respect to the recognition of the importance of geography. Even among the better type of monographs and textbooks it is rare to find one which gives anything like as much space to the geographical factors underlying historical development as it does to well-nigh irrelevant biographical episodes and anecdotes. Even where a textbook devotes reasonable space to geographical material, the average teacher of history regards this as the least significant portion of the manual and either skips it altogether or passes it over hurriedly.

Further, even where considerable attention is given to so-called "map-studies" in history courses, the work is rarely a consideration of geography in its modern signification, but rather a detailed investigation of what has been well designated as "chromatic politics." Little attention is given to anything except changing political boundaries, which are rarely correlated with geographical factors of any great significance. There is little probability that either teachers or students of history will learn too much about political boundaries and their changes, but mastery of this subject should not be confused with competence in dynamic historical geography.

One might safely hold that truly scientific geography, namely, dynamic and regional geography, has made almost no impression upon historiography when one takes into consideration the number of books written on the subject and the number of teachers engaged. The chief reason for this strange anachronism is doubtless the fact that a knowledge of physical and human geography is not essential to the study of political intrigues and diplomatic duplicity, which has constituted the chief center of historical interest in the past. As soon as historians become interested in the history of civilization they will be forced to take into account the geographic factors operating to condition human cultural development. This

has distinctly been the case with most past and present practitioners of *Kulturgeschichte,* a matter dealt with in a later chapter.

It would seem that one of the chief obstacles to the adequate appreciation of geographical data by professional historians would be removed if we ceased to talk of geographic influences as of a *determining* character and recognized, rather, that they are extremely important *conditioning factors.* The anthropologists and cultural historians have made out a fairly good case against absolute environmental determinism,[183] and the historians still generally adhere to metaphysical doctrines of free-will, and are not by any means free from theological dogmas which oppose every kind of materialistic determinism.

It is not a matter of earth versus man, but, as Ratzel has well insisted, a problem of man and the earth evolving together as the result of reciprocal influences. Moreover, as Ratzel put it, each geographical problem must be studied historically, and each historical problem geographically. Particularly is this true if one accepts Brunhes' view that the human alterations of the natural geographic factors, and the artificial environment, for instance, the modern city, are to be considered as well as the natural environment. Further, one must keep in mind the fact that, with the development of science and technology, man has been able to win a progressively greater mastery over nature. The effect of a geographical factor thus differs during the historic period. The ocean, which a thousand years ago was an insuperable obstacle, has, with the advent of the compass, sextant, cartography, and the steamboat, become one of the foremost aids to progress in the modern world.

However, historians must not forget that, though man has mastered nature, he has not dissociated himself from nature and geographic influences thereby. He simply exploits nature more successfully and in more diverse ways. In one important sense, geographical factors are more important today than ever before, in that our whole industrial system rests fundamentally upon this more thorough utilization of, and control over, geographical resources.

In discussing the desirability of closer relations between history and geography one must take into account the progress evident in both. In geography we have not only that interest in human geography which comes down through Ritter, Ratzel and Brunhes, but also a far better technique for its cultivation in the new regional geography, which originated in France due to the combined influence of the socio-economic impulse of LePlay and the geographic acumen and enthusiasm of Vidal de La Blache. This has gained rapid popularity through the learned world, and has already been adopted by the most progressive geographers.

Paralleling this development in geography has been the growth of a

[183] See below, pp. 206–10.

more dynamic and synthetic history, concerning itself with the whole development of human culture and social institutions, which has taken its initial impulse from the works of such writers as Burkhardt, Henne-am-Rhyn, Lamprecht, Schmoller, Sombart, Rambaud, Seignobos, Ferrero, Green, Pollard, Marvin, Zimmern, Vinogradoff, Maitland, Robinson, Shotwell, Turner, Breasted, Dodd, Carl Becker, and many others.[184] It is in the co-operation of these two lines of progressive development in the two sciences that we may expect the most fruitful developments in the next generation.

There is no doubt that geography has important relations to every type of history, even the most archaic political and military history. Probably no factor has had a greater influence upon English political and diplomatic history than its insular position and, more recently, its imperial responsibilities. The diversity of colonial American political institutions has been shown to depend to a large degree upon geographic differences. Turner has made clear the geographical basis of American sectional politics. Turner, Buck, Haynes and Hicks have indicated the geographical foundations of agrarian politics in the United States since the Civil War. Yet, political history is not the most fertile field in which to study geographical factors. The primary occupation with political boundaries is quite as destructive of good geography as of good history. One point should be noted, however, namely, that even the most perfect political boundaries of the present time—those coinciding with national lines of demarcation—are less fundamental and natural than those which relate to basic geographic regions. Without going into a discussion of "regionalism" as a mode of social and political reconstruction, it may safely be maintained that the only sound history must be that which joins the new geography in the study of fundamentally unified geographic regions, and minimizes, while not ignoring, the artificial political units.

The two branches of the modern historical investigation which seem most likely to have fruitful interrelationship with regional geography are international relations and intellectual, industrial and social history. The expansion of Europe and the resulting international relations have been most intimately bound up with geography. The colonization and imperialistic occupation of extra-European areas have followed and been dependent upon the progress of geographical exploration and discovery and the revelation of resources inviting exploitation. On the other hand, without the subsequent occupation of the explored regions by Europeans, the discoveries would have been devoid of value, except for the incidental additions to scientific knowledge.

Likewise, the progress of geographical knowledge and discovery has been intimately related to intellectual history. Not only have the progress

[184] See below, pp. 543–69.

in the science of geography and the results of geographic discovery been productive of great additions to the history of science and thought. It is also coming to be recognized that the expansion of Europe overseas and its various results did more than anything else to break down the paralyzing medieval order and bring into existence modern times, with its industrialism and critical thought.

Again, regional geography is inseparably connected with economic and social history. Modern industrial civilization is a product of two chief factors, geographic resources and the advanced machine-factory technology which enables us to exploit these resources to an unprecedented extent. It will require no further argument to establish the dependence of industrial history upon regional geography or the necessity of industrial history in order to give *rationale* to regional geography.

It can be demonstrated with equal ease that social history must be associated with geography. Agrarian life is intimately bound up with the natural resources. Prosperity and culture are correlated with areas of fertility, and poverty and backwardness with regions of inferior productiveness. Urban life, which is becoming more and more characteristic of modern civilization, not only depends for its existence on the exploitation of geographic resources by modern industrial technique, but is also normally located at points where this exploitation can proceed with the greatest facility and economy. The chief social processes—migration, conflict, and assimilation—have ever been intimately associated with geographic factors. It so happens that these fields of historical endeavor with which geography is most intimately bound up, namely, international relations, intellectual, social and economic history, are those in which progress is most evident at the present time and in which new and progressive ideas are most readily accepted. This fact cannot but be regarded as auspicious by those who hope for the growth of a *rapport* between history and geography.

While we have been in this section chiefly concerned with the relation of geography to history it may be well to insist that it is not less pertinent to the other social sciences. Professor Giddings has frankly admitted that sociological doctrine has consisted of a combination of psychological and geographical interpretations of the social process, and he has sought to correlate and synthesize these factors in his own interpretation. Economics is most frequently defined as the science of wealth-getting, or, in other words, the science of exploiting the environment. Political scientists from the time of Aristotle have recognized the influence of geographic conditions upon the policies and destinies of states. Wars spring in large part from a desire to secure natural resources, and the degree of natural geographic protection decides the amount of artificial military or naval protection which will be necessary. Again, geographic conditions to a large

degree affect the density and nature of the social population which reacts to shape the state and political policies. Since laws reflect social conditions and pressures, and are the product of political institutions, jurisprudence is also not without its dependence upon geographic factors, something which has long been recognized by the comparative school of jurisprudence. Finally, realistic students of ethics have given up the doctrine of transcendental ethical values and have accepted the pragmatic and comparative doctrine of ethical relativity. Ethical conduct is determined by the mores of the particular group, and these mores are built up through the reaction of a society to the facts of its physical environment, a matter to which William Graham Sumner gave special attention.

VI. Critics of Geographic Determinism

In his *Geographical Introduction to History* [185] Lucien Febvre comes forward as the merciless critic of all environmentalist doctrines. Disavowing any reflection upon human geography itself, he hurls some shafts at those who present what he deems "a vicious and puerile conception of its nature." [186] He rejects the cosmologic approach of Ratzel and the general anthropogeographers, and espouses the regional study, which, since the days of Vidal, has been the chief interest of French geographers. Admitting no *direct* influence from the environment upon man, his general theory parallels that of the historical anthropologists and represents the very antithesis of the determinism of Kirchhoff and Herbertson.

Febvre contends that geography is not ready to discuss the influence of environment upon human society and that research in this field is only in its infancy.[187] An enormous amount of work lies ahead, and time is needed—perhaps a century of painstaking and methodical research. Scientific progress is chiefly the product, not of intuition, but of toil, and "to speak of the influence of geographical environment, or more precisely, of climate, on the character of peoples is to try to explain arbitrarily the unknown." [188] Febvre seems to fear that his co-workers will accept the "formal catechism" which Ratzel has provided, and "fall asleep . . . on the insecure basis of a determinism which is half arrogant, half ashamed." [189]

In the foreword, Henri Berr assures us that Febvre does not deny the direct action of environment upon man; but adds that "he holds no brief for it" and that "he leaves the subject severely alone." True, Febvre ad-

[185] Trans. by Mountford and Paxton (1925).
[186] Febvre, *op. cit.*, p. 359.
[187] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[188] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[189] *Ibid.*, p. 368.

mits that "there is no *a priori* impossibility that the nature of soil and climate have an influence" on the "political, legal or moral tendencies" [190] of nations; and true, also, his book fairly teems with evidence that he holds no brief for direct geographic influences. He merely consigns those who speak of "influences" to the company of astrologers, soothsayers and other "charlatans," [191] and takes his stand squarely on the thesis that "the true and only geographical problem is that of the utilization of possibilities." [192]

Rejecting the determinism of Ratzel, Febvre reveals the *possibilism* of Vidal as his point of departure, a position substantially in accord with that of the historical anthropologists.[193] The environment furnishes the material out of which man molds his culture, but it does not furnish the plan. "It would be really interesting," he says, "if the geographical conditions were not only the material but the cause of the development of societies . . . But we have reached no such conclusion." Man uses what he finds, but "there is no action of necessity." [194] The Tauregs and the Moors, for example, both live in the Sahara under the same climate, with similar soils and topography; and yet the languages, customs and material cultures of these two peoples have very little in common.[195] And again, pastoral nomadism developed in Eurasia, where the requisite conditions existed, but not in America, which possessed the same conditions, until cattle and horses were introduced from Europe.[196] "There are no necessities, but everywhere possibilities, and man, as master of the possibilities, is the judge of their use." [197]

Febvre insists that the relation between man and environment presents a *single* problem, since "to act on his environment, man does not place himself outside it," nor does he "escape its hold at the precise moment when he attempts to exercise his own." [198] Because the question is one of *relation* it would be absurd, he says, to treat the action of man and the effects of environment separately. Yet, it is man, the dynamic geographical agent, who claims his attention, and much space is devoted to man's achievement in modifying his surroundings and mastering the forces of nature. Febvre's interest seems to center about the problem of human control over the physical environment. Faced with the question, "Is the grip of natural conditions on man becoming weaker?"—he calls it the old

[190] Febvre, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[191] *Ibid.*, p. 361.
[192] *Ibid.*, p. 349.
[193] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[194] *Ibid.*, p. 315.
[195] *Ibid.*, p. 286.
[196] *Ibid.*, p. 265.
[197] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[198] *Ibid.*, p. 361.

problem of *influence* bequeathed by the astrologers, and adds that "the real problem is: is the grip of man on the earth becoming stronger? Of the answer to that there can be no doubt." [199]

Still, Febvre admits more than appears in the main current of his argument. Two quotations will suffice. Discussing man as the master of his environment, he says, "This, by the reversal which it involves, puts man in the first place—man, and no longer the earth, nor the influence of climate, nor the determinant conditions of localities." [200] Later, after describing several gigantic human enterprises, he concludes: "So man, civilized today, banished from geography as the patient, reappears in the very forefront of it as dominant agent." [201] These passages, and others, suggest that Febvre's ban on geographic influences may not extend to the earliest societies; and that his general position is compatible with the view that advancing civilization is characterized by a diminishing importance of physical influences and an increasing importance of cultural factors.

Another uncompromising critic of the environmental thesis is Carl O. Sauer. This writer sharply attacks the position taken by certain eminent American [202] geographers that the chief concern of geography is the study of the natural environment in its relation to man—a view known abroad as the "American definition" of the field.[203] He insists that environmental studies are merely a "single theme" of geography; that throughout the entire history of the subject such studies have never dominated its thought; and that "in its extreme form this view is based on a belief that a single natural law can explain the social order." [204] In general, Continental writers, particularly Schlüter, Febvre and Michotte, are in accord with Sauer; while Britons, such as Mackinder and Herbertson, have favored the narrower view.

Opposing all theories of *direct* environmental "influence" upon human culture, Sauer yet recognizes the importance of environment, because "it supplies the materials out of which the cultural landscape is formed." [205] Man and culture, however, are the *dynamic* factors for they determine how the natural resources are to be utilized. He points to the waning confidence of the determinist which manifests itself in a progressive softening of terms. "Control" gives way to "influence" and influence in turn to "adjustment," "response," "connection," or "bearing," which, with meaning unchanged in each case, is nothing but the substitution of "a

[199] *Ibid.*, p. 354.
[200] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[201] *Ibid.*, p. 357.
[202] Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," pp. 165 ff.
[203] Sauer, "Morphology of Landscape," p. 51.
[204] Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," p. 173.
[205] Sauer, "Morphology of Landscape," p. 46.

more cautious term for the ringing declaration of control." [206] Those who use these softer terms but continue to work along *environmentalist* lines are viewed by Sauer with a suspicious eye. To him environment as a "conditioning" influence, and the concept of a "reciprocal relation" between nature and man, are but mild variations of a determinism that has lost its *aplomb*.

In offering his criticisms, Sauer distinguishes between *environmental influences* and the *thesis* of the *environmentalist*. He disclaims any "intention to belittle" the former and adds that those who deny the significance of environment "are as readily refuted as those who exaggerate it." [207] As to the latter, it stands accused of not supplying "geography with sufficient tangible objectives"; of lacking any "distinctive method"; of operating through its emotions and predilections; and of presenting something that is little other than "a theory of value." The geographer will continue to study environment, but will be concerned only with its *"mise en valeur* . . . as expressed in the cultural utilization of natural areas." [208] It is not his task to find evidence of direct geographic influence upon man.

> The direct influence of environmental stimuli is purely somatic. What happens to man through the influence of his physical surroundings is beyond the competence of the geographer; at most he may keep informed as to physiologic research in that field.[209]

While Tylor in England and Bastian in Germany may be regarded as the founders of cultural anthropology, that science owes its subsequent advancement to Boas and his followers in the United States. Tylor and Bastian set out to prove the universality of certain cultural traits and the unilateral nature of cultural evolution; and their observations were colored by their desire to find evidence to support a given scheme of development, an approach that was basic among the so-called classical or comparative anthropologists. Boas and his group, however, begin with no *a priori* theories of cultural evolution, but aim to discover what has actually happened in the development of social and cultural institutions before attempting to formulate any laws. This they would achieve through detailed and objective studies of a large number of specific cultural areas. Thus Boas may be called the founder of the historical school of anthropology, among whose conspicuous representatives are Lowie, Wissler, Goldenweiser, and Kroeber.

The historical anthropologists discuss various attempts that have been made to explain the universality of cultural traits, but we are here con-

[206] Sauer, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[207] Sauer, "Recent Developments in Cultural Geography," p. 172.
[208] *Ibid.*, pp. 172–4.
[209] Sauer, "Morphology of Landscape," p. 52.

cerned only with their analyses of theories which emphasize the influence of the physical environment. Their studies have resulted in some definite conclusions. They recognize the general influence of the environment, not only upon certain forms of material culture, but also upon beliefs and customs. They regard the environment as furnishing the *materials* out of which primitive man develops his culture, but not the *plan*, i. e., they look upon geographic factors as limiting influences rather than as determinants. They find, also, that not only will the same environment be met by different reactions from peoples in different stages of culture, but that similar or identical environments will produce dissimilar cultures among peoples in the same stage of development. Finally, they discover that cultural factors may be quite as effective, or even more effective than geographic factors, and that psychic inertia as the underlying cause of the persistence of cultural traits must always be taken into account.[210]

These writers, as we have seen, recognize the importance of environment as a limiting influence, but even on that point they do not grant much. The Eskimo has his house of snow, and the Indian his wigwam of bark, because these are the materials available in their respective areas; and in mental life the influence of volcanoes and other natural phenomena is reflected in the current myths, beliefs and customs; but the mind is the active agent. Lowie, after pointing out the impossibility of the Eskimo developing a cocoanut culture, or of the East Indians dwelling in snow houses, finds that the environment, although it supplies the materials out of which the human mind molds an existing culture, cannot be said to determine what this culture will be, for "there is a variety of ways in which the same materials can be put together, nay, there is always a range of choice as regards the materials themselves." In every adaptation to environment the mind, as the active factor, is certainly as effective as the inert geographic element.[211]

Goldenweiser takes much the same view. Answering the extremist who would hold that the snow house of the Eskimo is determined by the Arctic environment and that the elaborate wood industry of the northwest coast Indians is directly attributable to the presence of large cedar forests in that region, he points to the Chukchee, who live in the Arctic, yet never build snow houses; and to the California Indians, who are surrounded by huge forests, and have practically no wood industry. With all their forests to draw from, these Indians make baskets. Goldenweiser concludes that the environment may furnish the factors which are utilized

[210] Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), pp. 59–64. See also Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology* (1917), pp. 47–65; and A. A. Goldenweiser, "Culture and Environment," *Am. Jour. of Soc.* (March, 1916), pp. 628–33.

[211] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–5.

in shaping a given material culture, but the way in which these things will be utilized depends very largely upon the cultural technique of the group.[212]

To illustrate how the same environment will be met by greatly different reactions from peoples in different stages of culture, Lowie compares the Indian cultures of North America with the present-day civilization which has developed under identical geographical surroundings. This shows, he says, that in situations involving cultural changes and perhaps racial transformations over long historic periods, that either race, cultural technique, or both, are apparently much more influential than the geographical habitat. Even among peoples in the same stage of development, and often of related racial stocks, the same environment does not of necessity bring about cultural similarity. The Hopi and Navajo Indians have long lived near each other under almost identical environmental conditions, and yet their cultures differ in marked degree; and the few resemblances found have been shown to be the result of social contact and diffusion. A similar case is revealed in South Africa, where the Bushmen and Hottentots occupy practically the same habitat, yet have unlike cultures. Curiously, the Bantus, living near-by, but in a far different type of environment, have cultural traits found among both of the others.[213]

Lowie further weakens the case for geographical determinism in his discussion of the domestication of animals in various localities. Asiatic peoples have domesticated various types of cattle, but the American Indian did not tame the buffalo. The Eskimos have never domesticated the reindeer as have the Chukchee of Siberia. Some tribes use the reindeer for food and transportation, while others use them for transportation only. The ancient Chinese raised sheep and goats in large numbers, but never used their wool for clothing until taught to do so in recent times. Again, many South African tribes keep cattle for their milk, but do not slaughter them except for ceremonial purposes; while peoples in eastern Asia maintain them for meat and leather, but rarely for milk. Thus similar faunas do not produce identical cultures, a fact that is not compatible with the extreme environmental position.[214]

According to Boas, cultural conditions are at least as effective as geographical factors. Customs developed in earlier habitats have frequently been perpetuated by cultural inertia in new surroundings in which the older ways are out of adjustment and ineffective. The expensive and complicated tent of the Chukchee, first used as a permanent abode on the coast, has been carried over into a nomadic existence where it is quite in-

[212] Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, pp. 629–30.
[213] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–53.
[214] *Ibid.*, pp. 53–8.

appropriate.[215] Lowie uses the subterranean huts of the Indians of our own Northwest Coast to illustrate the same point. These huts, extremely warm, might be regarded as an adjustment to climatic conditions in a cold region, but they are used by tribes in an environment so warm that they are clearly out of keeping with their surroundings; while many tribes to the north, through force of tradition and custom, cling to the tent—equally out of keeping.[216] Lowie sums up the matter thus:

> Environment cannot explain culture because the identical environment is consistent with distinct cultures; because cultural traits persist from inertia in an unfavorable environment; because they do not develop where they would be of distinct advantage to a people; and because they may even disappear where one would least expect it on geographical principles.[217]

Goldenweiser insists that man and culture are the dynamic factors, that the environment is mainly static, and that, while the cultures of great historic areas have undergone tremendous changes, the physical surroundings within these same areas have changed but little. He challenges Miss Semple's view that this enduring character of the environment offers valid evidence for geographical supremacy in social and cultural evolution, and contends that "if the same environment conditions a continuous series of cultural transformations, or, to put it differently, a series of slightly different cultures, either the environment in its entirety is active all the time, and then some extra-environmental cause must account for the difference in effect, or different sides of the environment come into action at different periods, in which case some extra-environmental cause must determine the selection." The use to which an environment will be put is largely dependent upon the existing cultural technique. A river may be a barrier in primitive times and an important means of communication to peoples in an advanced stage of civilization, while the barrier vanishes with the erection of a bridge. In like manner, agriculture in a region whose geographic conditions have not changed varies from the crude husbandry of the savage to the most advanced methods of modern cultivation.[218]

Culture, according to Goldenweiser, is much more important than environment in the process of imitation and invention, for great inventors have always been influenced by standards and forms already prevalent in their cultural surroundings. Moreover, although the Ratzel theory of geographic isolation as a cause of social stagnation doubtless possesses validity, the underlying cause of the persistence of cultural traits over long periods of time is psychic inertia. The process of imitation and the specific

[215] Boas, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
[216] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–9.
[217] *Ibid.*, p. 62.
[218] Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, pp. 630–1.

culture that will be imitated are determined by psychic and cultural factors without any extensive influence from the environment. Finally, every advanced culture is a complex of native traits combined with traits borrowed from many cultures that are entirely independent of the local environment.[219]

These brief remarks will suffice to indicate that a large set of environmental influences, while actual, are not significant for culture; that in another set of cultural phenomena culture and environment co-operate and must be regarded as co-determinants; that in two of its fundamental aspects, that of invention and that of imitation, culture is independent of environment; and that, finally, every culture is largely independent of its environment in so far as it is a historical complex.

These considerations should not discourage us from studying the specific influences doubtless exerted by environment upon culture, but they might serve to emphasize the folly of any attempt to interpret any culture in terms of environment alone. Speaking with reservations, culture must be regarded as a closed and to a large extent self-sustaining system.[220]

The contributions of the sociologists to environmental theory have been meagre and incidental to other interests. Spencer, DeGreef, Giddings and others have discussed some of the more important aspects of the question; but their writings, though often excellent in quality, have been mere fragments. It is true that most sociologists attach some importance to the environmental factor in social causation, some putting it high and others low, but they have made no comprehensive study of the problem. However, as *critics* of geographical determinism they have made contributions of value, their general position being that among the forces which make for social progress the geographic factor is only one, and that there has been a tendency in some quarters to ignore or under-estimate the importance of the other factors involved.

The theory that external stimuli *determine* the behavior of an organism is rejected by Ellwood. He contends that the organism *selects* from the great diversity of stimuli a few upon which it reacts, and that through the evolution of its mind it employs an increasingly intelligent selection, thus becoming more and more the master of its environment. Ellwood further holds that environmental theories are usually "too simple to show all of the active factors at work in social progress." The rise and fall of the great historic civilizations, for example, have shown no definite correlation with environmental conditions and changes. "The natural physical environment is, of course, the framework within which man's social evolution has taken place . . . but in itself, it is quite inadequate to explain

[219] Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, pp. 631–2.
[220] *Ibid.*, p. 633.

social progress." [221] The contention that the organism *selects* the external stimuli upon which it reacts is in line with the general attitude of the historical anthropologists and with the "possibilism" of Vidal de La Blache.

Ross sounds a note of caution to those who would evaluate the influence of geographic factors in social causation. The study and analysis of such factors must proceed with care, for much uncritical work has been done, particularly by the early anthropogeographers, who have made sweeping and unwarranted generalizations. Furthermore, he insists that a study of environment cannot furnish a complete theory of social causation, for many of the things that happen can be shown to be in large measure the product of human volition. It is a matter of "telic action," he says. The environment supplies the resources and the opportunities, and man does the choosing. Ross concludes therefore that "it is necessary to regard social phenomena as essentially psychic, and to look for their immediate causes in mind"—a position that is in general accord with that of the psychological sociologists.[222]

The materialistic interpretation of history, while admittedly a fruitful field of investigation, is not acceptable to Charles Horton Cooley as an adequate explanation of cultural development. A satisfactory theory of social causation, he maintains, should concern itself equally with showing how material results grow out of idealistic causes and how ideals arise from material factors. He holds no brief for the idealistic interpretation as complete in itself, but believes that it should not be ruled out of consideration. Against both of these incomplete interpretations Cooley offers what he calls "the organic view of history." By this he means a *synthetic* view of the historical process which would avoid assigning undue prominence to any set of factors, and seek to ascertain the way in which all have contributed to bring about a given cultural situation. "In the organic world, that is to say in real life . . . there is no logical primacy . . . no place where the thread begins. You must see the whole or you do not truly see anything." [223]

(For selected references, see footnotes of the chapter and Bibliographical Appendix.)

[221] C. A. Ellwood, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1917), pp. 287–94.
[222] E. A. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 61, 79, 151–2.
[223] *Publ. of the Am. Econ. Assoc.*, 3d Series, V, No. 2, 182–7.

[8]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN ECOLOGY IN SOCIOLOGY *

James A. Quinn

I. Introductory Considerations

Human ecology, as a branch of sociological theory, investigates the processes and the results of impersonal, sub-social interaction between human beings. It studies the ways in which human individuals or human groups interact through dependence upon limited supplies of their environment to produce (a) typical human space distributions and sustenance chains, and (b) typical successions of these phenomena.[1] Within natural areas such as the community or the region these ecological relations have been designated by the term *symbiosis*.[2]

* This manuscript was accepted for publication early in the nineteen-thirties. It was revised, and additional references were added, in 1940.

[1] R. D. McKenzie, who was the first sociologist to formulate an explicit definition of human ecology, defined it as "a study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment." He added the statement that "Human ecology is fundamentally interested in the effect of *position* both in time and space upon human institutions and human behavior." (Park and Burgess, *The City,* p. 64.) In this same volume, *The City,* Wirth defined ecological organization as the "spatial distribution of population and institutions and the temporal sequences of structure and function following from the operation of selective, distributive, and competitive forces tending to produce typical results wherever they are at work." (*Ibid.,* p. 187.) At a later date McKenzie described human ecology as a study of the human community "as an organic unit in which the symbiotic relations of diverse human and cultural elements are the chief objects of attention." (In L. L. Bernard, *Fields and Methods of Sociology,* p. 52.) R. E. Park said in 1936 that "Human ecology is an attempt to apply to the interrelations of human beings a type of analysis previously applied to the interrelations of plants and animals." (*Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XLII, No. 1.) In the same article he continues, "Human ecology is, fundamentally, an attempt to investigate the processes by which the biotic balance and the social equilibrium (1) are maintained once they are achieved and (2) the processes by which the biotic balance and the social equilibrium are disturbed. The transition is made from one relatively stable order to another." (p. 15.) These definitions of human ecology may be taken as typical of those found in sociological literature. The most comprehensive general survey of the development of social ecology is contained in M. A. Alihan's *Social Ecology: A Critical Analysis* (Columbia University Press, 1938).

[2] The term *symbiosis* has been borrowed from biology where it is used to designate "the living together of dissimilar organisms especially when the relationship is mu-

The ecological approach had its origin and early development in biology. Park indicates this dependence in his statement which reads, "Human ecology is an attempt to apply to the interrelations of human beings a type of analysis previously applied to the interrelations of plants and animals." [3] According to authoritative dictionary and encyclopedia definitions ecology is even yet identified primarily with the biological field. The Encyclopedia Americana, which may be taken as typical, defines ecology as "that phase of biology that considers plants and animals as they exist in nature, and studies their interdependence and the relation of each kind and individual to its environment." [4] But even during the time when the biologists were developing the ecological point of view, other groups of persons—geographers, ethnologists, business men, government planners and administrators, social reformers, and settlement workers—were making studies which, while not explicitly ecological, did contribute directly or indirectly to the rise of human as distinguished from plant and animal ecology. A summary of the major contributions from these diverse fields depicts the background and margins of human ecology and prepares the way for an outline of its development within the realm of sociological theory.

II. Non-sociological Sources of Human Ecology

1. *Plant and Animal Ecology.*[5] Although a zoölogist first formulated and named ecology, the plant ecologists were more important in the origin and early development of human ecology in sociology.[6] Plant ecologists

tually beneficial." (J. R. Carpenter, *An Ecological Glossary* [1938], p. 268.) In sociology it has been extended in meaning to include all of the competitive and co-operative spatial and sustenance relations between organisms of the *same* species within a natural area, so that it embraces all of the impersonal, non-social aspects of interaction which Park and Burgess have attempted to subsume under the concepts of competition and competitive co-operation. Park refers to it as "a type of social relationship that is biotic rather than cultural." (In *Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XLII, No. 1.) The present author prefers to regard it as a sub-social relation rather than as a truly social one.

[3] R. E. Park, "Human Ecology," *Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XLII, No. 1.

[4] IX (1931 ed.), 555.

[5] The following chronologically arranged references should serve to orient the reader in the fields of plant and animal ecology. A. F. W. Schimper, *Plant Geography* (1903); Eugenius Warming, *Oecology of Plants* (1909); F. E. Clements, *Plant Succession* (1916); A. S. Pearse, *Animal Ecology* (1926); W. B. McDougall, *Plant Ecology* (1927); *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* articles on Animal Ecology and Plant Ecology (1929 ed.); W. C. Allee, *Animal Aggregations* (1931); W. C. Allee, *Animal Life and Social Growth* (1932); J. Braun-Blanquet, *Plant Sociology* (1932); Richard Hesse, *Ecological Animal Geography,* rewritten from the German by W. C. Allee (1937).

[6] The term "oecology" was invented by Haeckel in 1869 to refer to the study of animals in their natural habitat. The spelling was later simplified to ecology. (See *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* "Animal Ecology.")

have furnished some of the most basic principles and concepts used by sociologists in interpreting the human community. As late as 1925 Burgess informed a group of sociologists that they could obtain a "more adequate understanding of the basic factors in the natural organization of the community" from the writings of plant ecologists than from any other source.[7]

Plant ecologists have discovered that plants naturally group together in typical communities, each of which displays a more or less definite type of structure and of which the most obvious and most easily measurable aspect is that of space distribution.[8] The nature and limits of the plant community are determined both by the characteristics of the habitat and by the resources demanded by the inhabitants in order that they may grow and reproduce. An area characterized throughout by similar conditions of life and occupied, without significant human control, by a typical formation or association of plants is called a *natural area*. Large natural areas may contain several smaller ones, each of which exhibits some distinguishing feature of habitat and some characteristic trait of plant community. Natural areas are not strictly uniform throughout but are characterized by *gradients,* i.e., regularly increasing or decreasing proportions of given resources.

The plant community is characterized not only by a typical structure, (organization) but by a regular series of changes, each community passing through what corresponds to juvenile, adult, and senile phases of a typical life history. From the point of view of occupancy of the area other typical changes take place, one of which is *invasion*. Invasion occurs when plants from adjacent territory succeed in entering the area and in gradually displacing the former occupants. The result of a successful invasion—the displacement of one plant complex by another—is called *succession*. Clements has described cycles of succession in which the original complex is pushed out by the second, the second by a third, and so on, until finally the last of the series is displaced by the original complex and the cycle of succession is begun again.[9]

The life of the plant is self-centered. Its most significant relation to its fellows is that of commensalism, i.e., eating from a common table. In this relationship each symbiont strives only to satisfy its own demands, but in doing so exerts an influence on its neighbors by increasing or decreasing the supply of resources on which they depend. The most obvious and

[7] In an address delivered before the National Conference of Social Work. Published in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work* (1924). Reprinted with revisions in Park and Burgess, *The City,* p. 145.

[8] For an excellent discussion of the various forms of symbiotic relations found among plants see W. B. McDougall, *Plant Ecology,* chaps. v, vii, viii, ix. Also consult encyclopedia articles for the major concepts and methods of plant and animal ecology. Also see J. Richard Carpenter, *An Ecological Glossary* (1938).

[9] F. E. Clements, *Plant Succession* (Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916).

wide-spread commensalistic relation of plant to plant is that of competition in which each, by securing its own food, moisture, light, or other necessity, automatically decreases the resources available for others who depend upon the same source of supply. This competitive struggle among the members of the same species limits the numbers of the species that can inhabit the area. At the same time this competition gives them a characteristic space distribution within it. Plants which require different sorts of food, or which feed from different levels or at different seasons may live in the same area without competing with one another. Sometimes plants of different species contribute to one another's welfare. For example, a tree casts a dense shade in which moss can grow, while the latter, by preventing erosion, conserves the food and water supply for the tree. This mutualistic benefit consists in the fact that each makes available to the other more resources than it could otherwise obtain. These forms of ecological interaction within the area produce a communal organization which, while close and important, is neither strictly biological nor strictly social.

Animal ecologists have centered their attention chiefly upon food-chains in which each species occupies its distinctive *niche*. Living creatures consume one another. Larger animals eat smaller ones. Parasites live upon larger hosts. The whole animal world tends to settle into balanced sustenance chains in which each species serves both as predator and prey. The numbers of any species within an area depends upon the numbers of those other living creatures upon which it depends for sustenance. The widespread effects which result in nature whenever the ecological sustenance balance becomes disturbed have struck the attention of human ecologists. Insight into nature's ecological balance has helped them to appreciate and to understand the extent, intricacy, and importance of the web of life in which man plays a part. The concepts of *niche, food-chain,* and *pyramid of numbers* have slowly impressed themselves upon human ecologists as valuable aids in explaining the sustenance structure of the modern industrial-commercial community.

The studies of plant and animal ecologists—analyses of food chains, surveys of the environmental control of distribution within natural areas—cannot be used as exact patterns for the guidance of human ecologists, who study culturally defined distributions of highly specialized men and institutions. Human ecology must be studied within a cultural frame of reference.

The major contributions of plant and animal ecology to human ecology consist of concepts which have originated or developed within these fields. These concepts include *symbiosis, competition, migration, invasion, succession, barriers, natural area, gradient, food chain, niche, pyramid of numbers,* and *web of life.*

The first printed book bearing the title *Human Ecology* was written by J. W. Bews, a botanist. Its contribution to sociological theory is perhaps not so great, however, as is that of other biologists noted in the above references.[10]

2. *Other Biologists.* Biologists, other than ecologists, have helped to develop two important ecological concepts. Darwin and others discovered and developed the idea of impersonal competition as a universal process among living organisms. This idea of "struggle for existence," when combined with the economists' conception of competitive co-operation, became a fundamental concept in ecology, viz., *competition.* The idea of biological *gradient,* developed by Child in his study of the individual organism, was influential in the development of a similar concept in the study of the ecological organization of the community.[11]

3. *Geography.* Human geography was defined as human ecology by Barrows in his presidential address before the Association of American Geographers in 1922.[12] Brunhes, in a summary of geographic theories, defined human geography similarly as the study of the relations of various forms of human activity—economic, social, political—and the phenomena of physical geography.[13] Not all geographers agree that human geography, thus defined, is the central field of geographic inquiry. Some of them stress physical geography, others economic geography, but increasing numbers of them have come to regard geography as a study of the mutual relations between man and his environment—the ways in which man's distribution and activities are conditioned by physical factors, and the ways in which his activities transform the environment. This study they regard as human ecology. C. Langdon White and George T. Renner published in 1936 a textbook entitled *Geography—An Introduction to Human Ecology.* They accepted Barrows' statement that geography is human ecology and wrote a standard text on human geography under the ecological title.

Park and McKenzie maintain, in contrast with the geographers, that the geographic conception of the relation of man to his environment is not ecological. They declare that the geographer is interested in the *relations of man to his environment* whereas the ecologist is interested in the *relations of man to man as affected by his environment.*[14]

In so far as human geography is itself human ecology everything that

[10] J. W. Bews, *Human Ecology* (Oxford University Press, 1935). Prior to the appearance of Bews' volume, R. D. McKenzie had published four mimeographed editions of *Readings in Human Ecology* (1931, 1932, 1933, 1934).

[11] C. M. Child, *The Physiological Foundations of Behavior* (1924).

[12] H. H. Barrows, "Geography as Human Ecology," *Annals of the Assoc. of Am. Geogr.* XIII, No. 1 (March, 1923), 1–14.

[13] *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* ed. H. E. Barnes (1925), p. 55.

[14] See Burgess, *Urban Community,* p. 3; McKenzie, in Bernard, *Fields and Methods of Sociology,* p. 52; Park, "Human Ecology," in *Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XLII, 1–15.

the geographers have done must be regarded as a contribution to the ecological field. Since, however, the present concern is limited to the development of human ecology within the realm of sociology, the contributions of geographers have been weighed in relation to this sociological development.

Unfortunately sociologists have not made full use of the materials of their geographic co-workers. Some of them have failed to master the basic principles and points of view of human geography such as may be found in standard elementary texts.[15] Others of them have not made adequate use of the hundreds of geographic articles and monographs which contain valuable basic data, suggest helpful techniques, and afford important insights into the nature and functioning of ecological organization.[16]

The geographic emphasis on *regions,* which is of particular interest to sociological students of human ecology, is relatively new. While geographers have long been interested in the relation of physical environment to men they have only recently become concerned with the study of human activities in natural geographic regions.[17] Ratzel, generally recognized as the originator of human geography, was the first great geographer to declare the necessity for studying natural rather than political units. In his *Anthropogeographie* Ratzel had as his primary problems (a) describing and mapping the regions inhabited by man, and (b) explaining the geographic causes of man's expansion and distribution. He utilized the fundamental ideas of *position, space, barriers, routes, movements* of the individual and the group in space, their *isolation-contact* relations with their neighbors, their economic development, and other aspects of their social life. Ratzel realized that man's culture helps him to modify the geographic barriers as, for example, when the forms of transportation and communication help to determine the activities of an area. Brunhes made Ratzel's approach more specific and exact. His classification of essential human acts affords a more exact method of analysis than had been developed by his predecessors. His use of photographs and maps for documentation set valuable patterns for ecological procedure.

4. *Ethnology.* Ethnologists have emphatically called attention to the fact

[15] See E. C. Case and D. R. Bergsmark, *College Geography;* C. L. White and G. T. Renner, *Geography—An Introduction to Human Ecology.*

[16] Something of the wealth of material available in geographic literature may be indicated by the fact that in 1932, William Applebaum, Streitman Fellow in Geography at the University of Cincinnati, prepared a 72-page bibliography (unpublished) on Urban Geography. It consisted mainly of articles and monographs upon urban communities. Geographic magazines contain a wealth of materials which the sociological student of human ecology cannot afford to neglect.

[17] For a summary of early geographic theories, see Franklin Thomas's contribution in this volume, Chapter 7.

that cultures, especially preliterate cultures, occur in more or less clearly defined areas. The concept of culture area, while implicit in earlier monographic studies of local culture, was first consciously formulated and employed as a tool of research by Wissler.[18] Redfield questions the value of Wissler's emphasis upon geographic factors in explaining the space distribution of culture traits, but he, too, recognizes the importance of studying culture areas and culture distribution.[19]

The ethnologists themselves have made little use of the ecological point of view, but they have stimulated the development of human ecology in sociological theory by (a) emphasizing the area aspect of culture, (b) preparing maps of the space distribution of culture traits, complexes, and areas, (c) calling further attention to problems of determining boundaries of areas, and (d) pointing out the marginal zones of disorganization between the organized areas.

5. *Business Interests.* Although business men have not become explicit in their analysis of impersonal ecological interaction as a basic communal fact, they have studied the urban community from the point of view of their own problems and have incidentally contributed to the development of ecology. An outstanding pre-ecological study was made by R. M. Hurd, a business man, who was employed by a New York firm as an expert in urban mortgages.[20] Because he was unable to find the facts he needed concerning the distribution of and changes in urban land values, Hurd began to amass the data for himself. He collected maps and local histories from numerous cities and with the help of commercial geographies attempted to work out explanations of the point of origin, direction of growth, and types of areas of various urban centers. To supplement these materials he studied the distributions of land values for fifty cities by means of data on rentals and mortgages.

Hurd declared that cities originate at the point of most convenient contact with the outer world and grow along lines either of least resistance or of greatest attraction. The factors which determine the point of origin and the direction of growth include topography, geologic formations, external influences projected into the city, and internal influences from utilities which have already been located. There is constant readjustment and harmonizing of these conflicting elements. The influence of topography, although constantly modified by cutting, filling, and bridging, is most directly effective through its influence on transportation. Growth of the city takes the form of movement away from the point of origin in all directions except as topographically hindered. The growth is the result of

[18] Clark Wissler, *The American Indian* (1917).

[19] Robert Redfield, "The Regional Aspect of Culture," *Publ. ASS.*, XXIV (1930), 33–41.

[20] Richard M. Hurd, *Principles of City Land Values* (1903).

a combination of outward push from the center and aggregation at the edges.

Within the city, according to Hurd, different utilizations compete with one another for locations, success depending upon the highest bid. Residence areas are early driven out from the center of the city by business, banks, and offices. They inevitably become differentiated on economic levels, the rich people choosing the most desirable locations, those of medium wealth locating close to the rich and leaving the poor to take what they can get. Retail shops of different grades tend to follow residences, with wholesalers following the retailers. Wholesale establishments selling articles of large bulk and low value are more dependent for their location upon transportation terminals than are those handling goods of small bulk and high value. Manufacturing, which depends upon labor, raw materials, markets, and transportation lines, tends to locate on the outskirts of cities. Institutions and various mixed utilities tend to fill in the zones between other areas. The value of urban land, determined by the competing utilizations, depends upon superiority of location, the lowest value land serving the smallest number of people of the lowest economic level, the highest value land serving the greatest number of people of the highest economic level. Areas do not remain fixed in value, but change with the invasion of different utilizations. The value of land in an area depends in part upon the existing type of utilization and in part upon the trends of change. The cycle of land values is as follows: small beginning, gradual growth, increase to maximum, decline, disappearance (or new birth).

Many modern industries and utilities have developed research programs dealing with urban population and areas. One of the more important of these programs has been conducted by the Bell Telephone Company, which has made intensive studies of population distribution, growth, and movements both within large metropolitan regions and within local communities.

Business men have contributed voluminous concrete data and penetrating insights to sociologists. Some of these business men have not been aware of the theoretical ecological implications of their research. Back of such projects, however, lies the implicit assumption that the human community may be conceived as a unit distributed in space, organized as a functioning sustenance unit, and operating according to regular laws of interaction which may be formulated and made the basis for prediction.

6. *Social Reform and Settlement Work.* Social reformers and settlement workers have sometimes studied the areas in which they were operating. These studies were often limited to a particular phase of social life—housing, health, mortality, poverty—and were made for the purpose of introducing practical social reforms. Other studies which touched upon

the multiple aspects of neighborhood life were made by settlements,[21] while publicists and muckrakers dramatized and popularized striking phases of city life and inaugurated the social survey movement which, under the leadership of the Russell Sage Foundation, resulted in several extensive studies of cities.[22]

The contributions to human ecology of the leaders who were responsible for social surveys and neighborhood studies may be summarized as follows: They helped to popularize the study of communities; they developed techniques for the collection and interpretation of spatially distributed data, and popularized the presentation of such materials in graphic form; and they helped to develop and spread the notion that the community is a unit which has a growth and history of its own. They did not, however, develop or utilize the ecological frame of reference. The social survey movement has been kept relatively distinct from ecology notwithstanding the fact that there has been considerable cross-fertilization between the two fields.

7. *Government Planning.* Government planners—municipal, regional, state, and national—have made many studies of population growth and movements, housing, transportation, commerce, manufacturing, and other factors in their attempt to provide intelligently for future needs of community, region, and nation. City planners have found, for example, that arbitrarily conceived plans for zones frequently miscarry, and they have gradually come to the realization that in urban growth there are fundamental forces and processes to which their plans must conform. Studies of ideal and satellite cities which have succeeded or failed have revealed the necessity for careful study of the natural community organization. Metropolitan studies have been forced to assume the character of regional projects because it has been found that the city cannot be understood apart from its hinterland.[23] Each modern locality, no matter what its size, cannot be interpreted as an isolated phenomenon, but must be studied in its rôle within the larger area.

8. *Economics.* Adam Smith and other classical economists helped to

[21] See *Hull House Maps and Papers;* Robert Woods, *The City Wilderness,* and *Americans in Process.* See also Charles Booth, *Life and Labour of the People of London,* an elaborate survey which preceded those of the settlements. Booth's study was not of a particular area although he used house to house methods. He tried to understand social conditions and social classes rather than ecological communities.

[22] See e. g., *The Pittsburgh Survey,* ed. P. U. Kellogg, 6 vols. (1909–1914); "Social Conditions in an American City," *The Springfield Survey,* ed. Shelby Harrison (1920), Vol. III. For a summary of the survey movement in England see A. F. Wells, *The Local Social Survey in Great Britain* (1935).

[23] See reports of the New York Regional Plan, 8 vols. (1927–1931). See also Reports of the National Resources Committee, *Regional Factors in National Planning* (1935); *Regional Planning,* 3 vols. (1936); *State Planning* (1935); and *Our Cities* (1937).

formulate the conceptions of competition and competitive co-operation which, distinct from social processes, is basic in the interpretation of ecological organization and changes. These concepts are important in the course of ecological analysis.

The study of land values which is important in ecology has been developed by several economists, notably Ely, and Dorau and Hinman.[24]

Economic studies of trade and transportation contain rich stores of data which human ecologists may use but which have too often been neglected.

9. *Sociology.* The earlier sociologists contributed little to the direct development of human ecology. Spencer did interpret society essentially as the product of competitive co-operation as distinguished from Comte who conceived it in terms of consensus, but his effect upon the development of ecology has been relatively slight. Simmel emphasized the necessity for the study of spatial relations of social forms, but his materials were abstract and theoretical and had little or no influence upon ecological development other than to advertise the importance of the study of space relations. Durkheim emphasized and described the division of labor which is fundamental in any analysis of the ecological relations of the modern industrial-commercial community. LePlay made local community studies.[25] Geddes stimulated work in local and regional surveys. Ecology did not, however, build directly upon these early sociological foundations, with the exception of Geddes, who has influenced the writings of Mukerjee, Dawson, and others.

III. The Development of Human Ecology within the Field of Sociology

Human ecology did not develop *de novo* in sociology. Neither did it emerge as the offspring of any single cultural ancestor. The preceding summary of backgrounds indicates that ecology has developed as marginal to many fields of study and that the notions which are basic to it have arisen out of varied academic and practical interests.

We now turn from the backgrounds of human ecology to seeking the origin and tracing the development of the ecological point of view within the field of sociology.[26]

[24] R. T. Ely, *Elements of Land Economics* (1924); H. B. Dorau and A. G. Hinman, *Urban Land Economics* (1928).

[25] F. LePlay, *Les Ouvriers Europeéns* (1855); Emile Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social* (1893); Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (1882–1897); Nicholas Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel* (1925).

[26] For summaries and evaluations of ecology and for texts which include something of the ecological point of view see the following: Nels Anderson and E. C. Lindeman, *Urban Sociology* (1928); F. N. House, *The Range of Social Theory* (1929), Part I;

1. *The Period of Emergence and Official Recognition—1915–1925.* Human ecology was consciously formulated as a new emphasis in sociology during the decade 1915–1925.[27]

The beginnings of ecological methods were employed by Charles J. Galpin, whose *Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community* marked a significant advance in community study and exerted immediate influence on sociological thought, especially in the study of rural life. But Galpin used these methods without formulating their theoretical nature or significance. Park, Burgess, and McKenzie gave human ecology explicit formulation, enthusiastically imparted it to numerous students, both undergraduate and graduate, advertised it to sociologists, and finally piloted it to official recognition by the American Sociological Society.

Galpin's monographic study of a Wisconsin county, published in 1915,

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C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology* (1929), Part I; Wilson Gee, *Research in the Social Sciences* (1929), chap. i; G. A. Lundberg, Read Bain, and Nels Anderson, *Trends in American Sociological Theory* (1929), chaps. ii and vi; Niles Carpenter, *The Sociology of City Life* (1931); N. P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban Society* (1933); L. L. Bernard, *Fields and Methods of Sociology* (1934); R. E. Park, "Human Ecology," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLII (July, 1936), 1–15, E. S. Bogardus, *Introduction to Social Research* (1936), chap. iii; M. A. Alihan, *Social Ecology: A Critical Analysis* (1938); A. B. Hollingshead, in R. E. Park (ed.), *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology* (1939), pp. 63–168; C. Schmid, in P. V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research* (1939), chaps. xii and xiv; M. C. Elmer, *Social Research* (1939), chap. xii; J. A. Quinn, "Human Ecology—Reëxamination and Redefinition," *Soc. Forces,* XVIII, 161–8 (1939); W. E. Gettys, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Soc. Forces.,* XVIII, 469–476 (1940).

[27] These dates indicate that human ecology is one of the most recent developments in sociological theory. Anderson and Lindeman take an opposing view. (See their *Urban Sociology,* p. 30.) Burgess, McKenzie, Bain, and Young agree that it is quite recent. Although one may recognize that even during the time of the Greek philosophers scholars were concerned with the effects of environment upon man, he can scarcely question the recency of the ecological point of view in sociology if he keeps in mind the dates of the major sources on which it depends. The term ecology (oecology) was not invented until 1869. Ecology was not actively pursued in botany or zoölogy until the last decade of the 19th century. The conceptual ideas underlying competition were formulated by Adam Smith, Malthus, and Darwin. The new emphasis in geography, while implicit in Ritter, was first formulated by Ratzel. The vogue of social surveys developed early in the 20th century. Hurd's pioneer study was published in 1903. Planning studies are relatively recent. Since the development of ecology in sociology depended upon these sources it could hardly have started as a separate distinctive branch of study before the beginning of the present century.

There were, of course, some earlier studies which might in retrospect be regarded as partly ecological. M. C. Elmer so regards some early studies of the distribution of crime and suicide in France. (See his article, "Century-old Ecological Studies in France," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXIX, 63–70.) See also C. H. Cooley, "The Theory of Transportation," *Publ. Am. Econ. Assoc.,* IX, No. 3 (1894). Such studies did contain implicitly many of the notions of ecology, but the distinctive ecological frame of reference was not developed until 1915 or later.

constituted "the first attempt to make a study of the functional groups of a rural community upon what is now called an ecological basis." [28]

Galpin collected data from each family living in the county he surveyed. These data showed where they traded, banked, sold milk, went to church, sent children to school, and so on. Using each of the villages of the county as a center of community life, he prepared maps showing the space distribution of the persons who habitually centered an activity there. Those trading at the same center formed a trade community; those using the same local banking center, a banking community; and those subscribing to the same local paper, a news-reading community. The areas of interest centering in a given village did not coincide—the trade community, for example, included a wider range than the church community. Between competing villages or towns were marginal neutral zones whose inhabitants used the facilities of both centers. By combining the charts of the trade, banking, paper, school, and other interest distributions Galpin found that they included a "comparatively determinable and fixed area of land surrounding each center." [29] It was the village with its surrounding service area that, regardless of political boundaries, formed the actual communities. Such a community, whose inhabitants composed an interrelated unity, was discovered as the basic fact of rural social organization.

Since Galpin does not state either his background or sources, one can only guess at the lines of influence that contributed to his approach. It seems probable, however, that he depended somewhat upon the social survey method which was in vogue at the time. He also recognized the importance of geographic factors in the shaping of rural life, but shows no dependence upon geographic methods for delimiting his community areas. Galpin's contributions to human ecology were (a) the development of concrete methods for delimiting natural communities, (b) emphasis upon the structure of the community as having a center, a tributary area, and boundaries, and (c) analysis of the functional interdependence of the various parts of the community.[30]

[28] This monograph was selected by Young, Ogburn, and Park as the first significant rural ecological study. (C. J. Galpin, "The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community," *Research Bulletin No. 34* [Wisconsin Agri. Exp. Station].) These men were acting in the capacity of advisory committee from the American Sociological Society to select contributions of sociologists for analysis in a case book on method. (Rice, *Methods in Social Science.*)

[29] Galpin, *Rural Life,* p. 84.

[30] Several studies of rural communities have tested and developed Galpin's method. Among them are the following: J. H. Kolb, "Rural Primary Groups," *Research Bul. No. 51* (Wisconsin Agri. Exp. Sta., Dec., 1921); C. C. Zimmerman and C. C. Taylor, "Rural Organization," *Bul. No. 245* (North Carolina Agri. Exp. Sta., August, 1922); Dwight Sanderson and W. S. Thompson, "The Social Areas of Otsego County," *Bul. No. 422* (Cornell Univ. Agri. Exp. Sta., July, 1923); W. S. Baumgartel, "A Social Study of Ravalli County," *Bul. No. 60* (Univ. of Montana Agri. Exp. Sta., Sept., 1923);

During the same year in which Galpin's study appeared, 1915, Park published a significant article on the city.[31] He had not yet arrived at a formulation of human ecology although he was using ideas that were basic to it. In 1915 he described the city as an institution, but interpreted it in such a way that in 1925, after he had become aware of the ecological point of view, he reproduced the article with a new introduction as an article on human ecology.[32] The city was described by him in 1915 as a natural phenomenon, a product of undesigned and uncontrolled forces, organized into typical areas of manufacturing, commerce, and residence. In this description he shows great similarity to Hurd, whom he did not mention by name, but with whose work he may have been familiar. Park added to Hurd's description the observations that people with similar traits tend to be segregated in separate areas, and that each area tends, in time, to take on the characteristics of its typical inhabitants and to exert further influences on the variants to make them conform.

In 1918 Park introduced the influence of plant ecology into sociology.[33] In discussing the unity of the social group, he compared it in its lowest terms to the plant community—using the principles of interpretation of plant ecologists, particularly of Clements, whom he quotes.

During the years 1915–1921 Park was directing the work of graduate students along lines of urban community research. The first important publication to result from this student research was McKenzie's study of

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J. H. Kolb, "Service Relations of Town and Country," *Research Bul. No. 58* (Univ. of Wisconsin Agri. Exp. Sta., Dec., 1923); E. L. Morgan and Owen Howells, "Rural Population Groups," *Research Bul. No. 74* (Univ. of Missouri Agri. Exp. Sta., March, 1925); E. A. Taylor and F. R. Yoder, "Rural Social Organization in Whitman County," *Bul. No. 206* (State College of Washington Agri. Exp. Sta., June, 1926); E. A. Taylor and F. R. Yoder, "Rural Social Organization in Whatcom County," *Bul. No. 215* (State College of Washington Agri. Exp. Sta., June, 1927); R. E. Wakeley, "The Communities of Schuyler County, New York," *Bul. No. 524* (Cornell Univ., Agri. Exp. Sta., June, 1931).

C. C. Taylor, who summarized methods of research in rural sociology in 1927, made ecological analysis synonymous with mapping and plotting data. With this conception he found that ecological methods were used in twenty per cent of the rural studies, principally those which surveyed local communities and those which studied population. (See C. J. Galpin, J. H. Kolb, Dwight Sanderson, and C. C. Taylor, *Rural Sociological Research in the United States* [1927], mimeographed.) Taylor says that "this method of analysis proceeds upon the basis of describing and explaining those social relationships of groups, organizations, or institutions which have to do with locality arrangements. It is in these spatial relationships that the influence of a physical and temporal environment can be studied" (pp. 70–1). Taylor places 1914 as the date of entrance of ecology into rural sociology (p. 70).

[31] R. E. Park, *The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City Environment, Am. Jour. Soc.*, XX, 577–612.

[32] See R. E. Park, in Park and Burgess, *The City* (1925), esp. pp. 1, 2.

[33] R. E. Park, "Education in Its Relation to the Conflict and Fusion of Cultures," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XIII, 38–40.

Columbus, Ohio.[34] McKenzie investigated the areas of the city as a whole by plotting the distribution of certain indices of community life, including dependency, delinquency, color, nationality, and votes on woman suffrage. He used similar methods in a more intensive study of one local urban neighborhood. McKenzie showed his indebtedness to Park, Hurd, Bennett, Fox, and other students of city life. His monograph is significant in that (a) it is the first published ecological study of an urban community, (b) it uses the idea of "culture areas" of the city, (c) it challenges the older conception of the neighborhood as inapplicable to city life and reformulates it in usable form, and (d) it utilizes maps for delimiting and characterizing urban areas. McKenzie's approach was empirical and tentative. His conceptual frame of reference was not yet clearly formulated.

The first explicit formulation and naming of the ecological point of view in sociology appeared in Park and Burgess' introductory text, published in 1921.[35] These authors, whose materials are organized around specific concepts, have been prominent leaders in the early crystallization and promotion of human ecology as a phase of sociological theory.

The feature that distinguishes ecology from other sociological theory rests upon the distinctions which Park and Burgess have made between community and society, and between competition and conflict. The community, which is the center of interest in ecology, is the group in its space-distributive aspect. A society, on the other hand, is characterized by consensus, and may or may not be considered in relation to its habitat.

According to Park and Burgess, the most basic explanatory concept of ecology is the process of "competition," a process which is impersonal and external as distinguished from the processes which involve consensus and the taking of social rôles. This process of "competition" is seen in its pure form only among plants. Each individual strives exclusively to secure the satisfaction of its needs and thereby unwittingly competes with others for resources they both need. Each either utilizes the other for its own purpose or furnishes something which the other needs. This struggle to survive, portrayed graphically by plant ecologists, results in an organization of living communities which, while not biological in the narrow sense, does have a typical structure and life history of its own.

Among human beings who are capable of locomotion and of following specialized lines of activity, "competition" results in the long run in the

[34] R. D. McKenzie, "The Neighborhood," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Vol. XXVII (Sept., 1921; Nov., 1921; Jan., 1922; Mar., 1922; May, 1922). Also reprinted as a doctoral thesis (University of Chicago Press, 1923).

Kimball Young notes that in 1916 he began the first of this series of studies in human ecology. See S. Rice, *Methods in Social Science,* footnote, p. 518.

[35] R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921).

sustenance division of labor and in the selection and segregation of types of persons and institutions within certain areas. "Competition" among humans is restricted and controlled in a degree by the cultural standards of social groups. But no matter how significant this cultural control of "competition" may appear, the ecological organization constitutes the basis upon which the social organization is reared. The sociologist is interested in ecological organization and change principally as they affect the social relations that are based upon them.

The materials on ecology in Park and Burgess' text were not thoroughly organized in 1921, nor were they all even mentioned in any one place. Materials on symbiosis and on plant and animal communities may be found in the chapter on *Society and the Group,* in which materials from zoölogists and botanists were quoted. It is significant that Park and Burgess neither used the term ecology in this chapter nor made reference to the ecological approach. In the chapters on *Isolation* and *Social Contacts* the authors discussed the process of segregation and showed that they understood how geographic factors entered into the competition-segregation-isolation cycle. They quoted Semple, Ratzel, and Brunhes, but again they failed to mention ecology. Neither did they refer in these chapters to *symbiosis* or to the *community* which they had previously discussed. It was in connection with their discussion of "competition" that the authors announced the fact that there is a human as distinct from plant and animal ecology.[36] They identified the ecological organization as the product of "competition" and compared it with the plant community. But it is enlightening to note that in a paragraph entitled *Competition and Human Ecology,* ecology was discussed exclusively in terms of the economic process of competitive co-operation as developed by Adam Smith and his successors, and contained no reference to the biological struggle for existence or to the plant community.[37] While it is thus evident that the treatment of ecology was not thoroughly organized and unified by Park and Burgess in 1921, the reader cannot escape the conviction that this point of view was rapidly crystallizing in their thinking.

The second monographic publication arising from the University of Chicago Research in urban community life was Anderson's study of the hobo which appeared in 1923.[38] This study of a typical culture area offers the reader a vivid picture of the position and rôle of homeless men areas in Chicago and of the types of institutions and personalities that are characteristic of them. Anderson attempted no new ecological generalizations. The specific frame of reference of natural zones of the city which gave his study greater ecological significance had not yet been made public.

[36] Park and Burgess, *op. cit.,* p. 509.
[37] *Ibid.,* p. 558.
[38] Nels Anderson, *The Hobo* (University of Chicago Press, 1923).

Burgess first gave a systematic formulation of the idealized structure of the city.[39] This formulation has played an important part in later ecological studies of the city. Burgess conceived the city as a series of concentric zones centered around the retail-banking-office area. Moving outward from this center the other zones appear successively as the Zone of Transition, an area of high land values, cheap rents and deteriorated buildings; the Zone of Workingmen's Homes; the Zone of Better Residences; and the Commuters' Zone. The ideal concentric circle pattern of zones is distorted in reality by topographic features, as in the case of Chicago where Lake Michigan cuts through the center of the city and makes a series of concentric semi-circles. The ideal plan is further distorted by transportation systems which cause expansion along radial axes and transform the circular city into a star-shaped one.[40] The checker-board street plan, typical of American cities, is a third important distorting influence.[41] Within the major urban zones which Burgess described are found typical local culture areas, each with its characteristic institutions and personality types. In the Zone of Transition, for example, are found homeless men areas, rooming house areas, slums, vice areas, areas of immigrant first settlement, and the beginnings of the "black belt."

Satellite cities and suburbs arise at strategic outlying points and produce important modifications of the areas that surround them.[42] Burgess' article contains the first somewhat systematic statement of the philosophy underlying the ecological research of the Department of Sociology of the University of Chicago. His approach is that of the student who interprets the city, not as a static structure, but as a dynamic growth resulting from the fundamental processes of urban life. The most manifest aspect of urban growth is the physical. Burgess passes over the obvious fact of aggregation and emphasizes radial expansion as one of the most basic notions in the interpretation of the urban community.[43]

[39] E. W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XVIII (1923), 85–97. Also in Park and Burgess, *The City*, pp. 47–62. See M. R. Davie's criticism of Burgess, "The Pattern of Urban Growth," in G. P. Murdock, *Studies in the Science of Society* (1937), pp. 133–61. See also Quinn's criticism of the Burgess theory of zones, and of its critics. J. A. Quinn, "The Burgess Zonal Hypothesis and Its Critics," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, V, 210–8.

[40] See also Hurd, *Principles of City Land Values* (1924 ed.), pp. 14–5.

[41] For a more complete discussion of Burgess' point of view see his article on "Urban Areas," in Smith and White, *Chicago* (University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 113–38.

[42] As an example of recent research in suburbanization, see N. L. Whetten and E. C. Devereux, Jr., "Studies of Suburbanization in Connecticut," *Bul. No. 212* (Storrs Agri. Exp. Sta., 1936).

[43] The process of aggregation had been discussed by Bücher and Weber. Radial expansion had been pointed out by Hurd. Burgess refined, expanded, made usable, and used this latter concept as a tool of research.

In the physical growth of the city radial expansion operates as follows: Increase in the total population of the urban area increases the amount of business at the center. This business area then expands, pressing outward into the zone of transition and pressing some of the inhabitants of the latter outward into the zone of workingmen's homes. Each zone, likewise subjected to pressure on its inner border, invades in turn the area of its outer neighbor. Between the zones are fringes of transition or disorganization, the most pronounced of which is the one immediately outside of the central business area. The owners of property in this central zone of transition, aware of the outward march of business, believe that the sites just outside the present commercial area will sooner or later be in demand as business locations and that the existing buildings will be either remodeled or demolished. They are unwilling, therefore, to keep this property in first-class repair, but prefer to rent it in its deteriorated condition for whatever they can get. They look to the increase in land value rather than to rental as their chief source of gain. This zone tends, as a consequence, to be characterized by physical deterioration, high land values, and cheap rents.

The city may be studied not only in relation to its physical growth but in its effects on social organization and personality. These effects may be analyzed as processes of social metabolism. When the growth of the city is normal metabolism proceeds smoothly with only that amount of disorganization which is the necessary prerequisite of reorganization. When the growth of the city is abnormally rapid the metabolism is disordered and indices of social disorganization—crime, vice, disease, insanity, suicide—become high.

The sorting and segregation of persons into specialized areas may fit them into congenial groups and offer them new possibilities for self expression and development. To the specialized, segregated area as a whole it affords a rôle in the total life of the city.

Burgess proposed *mobility* (change of location that results in new experience and stimulation) as the best index of both urban expansion and metabolism. Land values, in turn, constitute the most sensitive index of mobility.

Burgess' more important contributions and emphases may be summarized as follows: (a) formulating the ideal zonal structure of the city, a natural ecological community, (b) indicating the major influences which distort the zonal pattern, (c) pointing out typical culture areas of each zone, (d) analyzing urban growth and structure in terms of radial expansion, (e) analyzing urban growth as it affects social disorganization and personality types, (f) suggesting several indices of social disorganization, and (g) indicating that land values are the most sensitive index of mobility.

Burgess' interest was limited to the urban community.[44] It was McKenzie who, in 1924, first attempted to formulate a definition of human ecology and to present a systematic outline of the nature and scope of the field to sociologists.[45] In his first presentation McKenzie divided ecological problems into four groups, (a) ecological classification of communities, (b) determination of ecological factors in the growth and decline of the community, (c) investigation of the effects of ecological changes on social organization, and (d) study of the operation of ecological processes in determining the internal structure of the community. Later, in discussing the scope of human ecology, he organized his treatment around the ideas of ecological unit, ecological distribution, mobility and fluidity, ecological distance, ecological processes, and the classification of ecological factors.

Since his work was primarily a summary and systematization of the field of ecology, McKenzie drew heavily upon preceding contributions which need not be repeated. Some new emphases which he developed deserve mention, however. McKenzie indicated that the characteristic differences between the plant and the human community are mobility (the power to select a habitat) and purpose (the ability to modify and control conditions of the habitat). He distinguished between mobility (movement which results in new stimulation) and fluidity (movement which does not lead to new stimulation). He defined ecological distance as a time-cost concept rather than as a purely spatial one. He listed the major ecological processes—*competition, concentration, centralization, segregation, invasion,* and *succession.* He classified communities ecologically as (a) primary service, (b) commercial, (c) industrial, and (d) non-economic.

McKenzie has been a pioneer in the systematization and synthesis of the ecological approach. This interest led him normally to the broader implications of ecology and helped him to formulate regional and world concepts which he helped to introduce at a later time.[46]

The rapidly growing importance of the ecological point of view is evidenced during the years 1924–1925 in several ways. Burgess referred in 1924 to six important ecological studies which were being conducted by graduate students of the University of Chicago.[47] The Chicago council

[44] E. W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City," in Park and Burgess, *The City,* pp. 47–62.

[45] This was done in two articles: (a) "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXX, 287–301; and (b) "The Scope of Human Ecology," a paper presented before the American Sociological Society in December, 1925; *Publ. A.S.S.,* XX, 141–54. Also in Burgess, *Urban Community,* pp. 167–82.

[46] R. D. McKenzie, "The Concept of Dominance and World Organization," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXX, 28–42 (July, 1927). Originally read as a paper before the American Sociological Society in December, 1926.

[47] Nels Anderson, *The Slum;* E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization in Chicago;*

for local community research was organized in the same year. Its five-year report, published in 1929, shows a pronounced ecological interest.[48] The Institute for Social Science Research which met for a ten day session in 1924 allotted one of its four major divisions to human ecology.[49] The discussions of this division centered around methods of determining the boundaries of local areas, the use of indices in measuring community change, and the value of personality studies as a means of understanding the nature of local communities.

During the year 1925 the first volume especially devoted to the analysis of the city with emphasis on the ecological approach was published.[50]

Human ecology received official recognition from sociologists at the 1925 meeting of the American Sociological Society. President Park, in addition to devoting his presidential address to the concept of *position,* introduced a Division of Human Ecology into the program. McKenzie served as the first chairman of this division. Papers were read by McKenzie, Gras, and Reckless.[51] This event marks the culmination of a decade of development, 1915–1925, during which human ecology was first consciously formulated in sociology, made a phenomenal growth, and became officially recognized, in the United States at least, as one of the main divisions of sociological theory.[52]

2. *Developments Since 1925.* Since 1925 the literature of ecology has multiplied rapidly but on the whole the career of the new discipline has been less spectacular than during the earlier period. The development of human ecology within the field of sociology may be briefly traced for this later period by centering attention upon a few significant trends. Rep-

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W. C. Reckless, *The Natural History of Vice Areas in Chicago;* E. H. Shideler, *Retail Business Organization;* F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang;* H. W. Zorbaugh, *The Lower North Side Community.*

[48] T. V. Smith and L. D. White, *Chicago* (1929).

[49] See report of this Institute by E. W. Burgess, "The Trend of Sociological Research," *Jour. of Appl. Soc.,* VIII, 131–40.

[50] R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *The City* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1925).

[51] R. E. Park, "The Concept of Position in Sociology," *Publ. A.S.S.* (1926), XX, 1–14. R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XX, 141–54. N. S. B. Gras, "The Rise of the Metropolitan Community," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XX, 155–63. W. C. Reckless, "The Distribution of Commercialized Vice in the City," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XX, 164–76.

[52] Notwithstanding its rapid development during the previous decade, human ecology was not far advanced in 1925. The paucity of sociological literature in the field may be indicated by Wirth's bibliography on the City, which appeared in 1925. (Park and Burgess, *The City,* pp. 161–228.) One of the eleven main sections of this bibliography is devoted to ecology. Of the sixty-odd references contained in this section only a few are by sociologists. The sources are, for the most part (a) descriptions of local culture areas of the city with practically no theoretical discussion, (b) essays and treatises upon the importance of the neighborhood, and (c) studies in city planning.

resentative studies will be cited to illustrate each of these lines of development, with no attempt to make the bibliographical notes exhaustive.

The materials of the following pages have been organized under six headings which, in a way, represent important trends in recent ecological theory or research. The headings are (1) more precise delimitation and critical examination of the field of human ecology, (2) increased emphasis upon sustenance chains, (3) definition and clarification of ecological concepts, (4) development of more precise methods, (5) emphasis upon large as well as upon small areas, and (6) rapid multiplication of concrete ecological studies.

(1) *More precise delimitation and critical examination of the field of human ecology.* The December, 1932, meeting of the American Sociological Society under the leadership of L. L. Bernard brought forth a series of papers designed to formulate explicitly the fields and problems, the sources and methods of various phases of sociological theory. R. D. McKenzie was invited to outline the field and problems of human ecology. His discussion centered around the human community as the central unit of study. He distinguished between demography, human geography, and human ecology as various approaches to the study of this community. Demography studies the community as a "population aggregate pure and simple." Human geography studies the "relation between the population group and the physical habitat." Human ecology studies the community as a "symbiotic unity." In this way McKenzie pointed out that the sociological student of human ecology is interested in the community only as an interacting unity.

McKenzie pictured the community as arising out of "competition." Its members are bound together by an interdependence which depends upon specialization and the division of labor. Its size, space-distribution, and its occupational distribution all depend upon the basic process of "competition."

McKenzie remarked that ecological research was at that time (1932) limited and fragmentary and that no attempt had been made to give a systematic treatment to the field. He found that the major work which had already been done directly by sociologists fell into two main fields (1) studies of space distribution within cities, and (2) determining the natural boundaries of local communities.[53]

In 1934 Quinn attempted to delimit the field and approach of human ecology more precisely by analyzing the difference between ecological and social interaction.[54] He had found that many sociologists were prone to

[53] R. D. McKenzie, "Demography, Human Geography, and Human Ecology," in L. L. Bernard, *The Fields and Methods of Sociology* (1934), pp. 52–66.

[54] J. A. Quinn, "Ecological versus Social Interaction," *Sociology and Social Research*, XVIII, 565–70.

identify as ecological any study that involved the spatial distribution of phenomena within an area. He maintained that mere description of space distribution is not in itself ecological. Ecological analysis involves the explanation of community phenomena in terms of the processes of ecological interaction.

In the same article Quinn made more precise the nature of the process of ecological interaction as distinguished from social interaction. The former operates through dependence upon some limited supply of environmental resources. It depends upon the fact that each living organism (including man) affects others by increasing or decreasing the supply of resources upon which the others depend. This process is impersonal. It does not involve the exchange of meaning which distinguishes truly social interaction. Therefore this impersonal ecological interaction is not truly social. Instead, it is a sub-social process.

Ecology thus operates within a distinct frame of reference of its own, one that is marked off from social studies by the type of interaction upon which it centers attention. It remains closely related to the social and plays an important part in the analysis of social phenomena, but in itself involves a sub-social point of view. This distinctive frame of reference—impersonal, sub-social interaction—gives ecology its place as a separate division of sociological theory.

In July, 1936, R. E. Park published an article which contained his formulation of the field of human ecology.[55] He says, "The fact seems to be, then, that human society as distinct from plant and animal society, is organized upon two levels—the biotic and the cultural. There is a symbiotic society based on competition and a cultural society based upon communication and consensus." Human ecology is concerned with the "symbiotic" order and not with that which is based upon consensus.

Park thus adds the weight of his authority to the point that ecology investigates a type of human relation that occurs at a level different from the communication and consensus with which the social psychologists deal.

During recent years a critical attitude toward human ecology has appeared in sociological literature. Several writers have become highly skeptical about the validity of ecological presuppositions, hypotheses, and principles, especially about those that have been borrowed from biology. The most destructive criticism appears in the writings of Alihan, who examines the theoretical framework of human ecology, especially as presented by Park, and finds it self-contradictory and inadequate.[56] A more constructive criticism has been made by Quinn, who conceives human ecology as studying only *one abstractable aspect* of unified human relations within an area, and who thereby escapes the necessity for treating "biotic" and

[55] R. E. Park, "Human Ecology," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XLII, 1–15.

[56] M. A. Alihan: *Social Ecology: A Critical Analysis*, 1938.

"social" relations as separate kinds of human phenomena.[57] Gettys has recently criticized the older human ecology which he characterizes as "positivistic, deterministic, mechanistic, and organismic," and he pleads for adequate reorientation of the field.[58] These and other critics recognize the weaknesses of existing ecological theory, but they insist that it will continue to develop as a fruitful branch of sociological study.

(2) *Increased emphasis upon sustenance chains.* Another development which has led to a more precise delimitation of the field of human ecology may be found in the increased emphasis which has been placed upon the analysis of sustenance relations.

The early ecological studies which emphasized space distribution have led many sociologists to regard all spatial studies as ecological and to define human ecology as the study of space-distributive aspects of human phenomena. Such a definition is inaccurate, for ecology is not synonymous with a study of space distributions. The preceding sections have shown that some studies of space distribution are not ecological. The following paragraphs will indicate that ecology includes another important aspect, i. e., the sustenance chains which arise out of ecological interaction and which involve an interdependence based upon the division of labor.

Several studies by sociologists have tended to show that an impersonal sustenance organization exists among men. It tends to assume a natural organization or balance similar in some ways to the food-chains that animal ecologists have described.

The most numerous studies which throw light upon the ecological sustenance organization have been made by rural sociologists. Several of these men have studied the service relations between town and country.[59] They have found that the existence of specialized services depends upon an adequate consuming population. C. R. Hoffer found, for example, that in Minnesota a more or less definite relation exists between the size of a trade center and the types of services it may be expected to have. Trade centers of 1,000 population would have grocery, drug, furniture, and men's

[57] J. A. Quinn, "Human Ecology—Reëxamination and Redefinition," *Soc. Forces,* XVIII, 161–8.

[58] W. E. Gettys, "Human Ecology and Social Theory," *Soc. Forces,* XVIII, 469–76.

[59] See for example, P. P. Denune, "The Social and Economic Relationships of Farmers with Towns in Pickaway County, Ohio," *Monograph No. 9* (Ohio State University Bureau of Business Research); C. R. Hoffer, "A Study of Town-Country Relationships," *Special Bulletin No. 18* (Michigan Agri. Exp. Station); C. R. Hoffer, "Services of Rural Trade Centers," *Soc. Forces,* X, 66–71; J. H. Kolb, "Service Relations of Town and Country," *Research Bulletin No. 58* (Wisconsin Agri. Exp. Sta.); Bruce L. Melvin, "Village Service Agencies in New York, 1925," *Bulletin No. 493* (Cornell Univ. Agri. Exp. Sta.); C. E. Lively, "The Appearance and Disappearance of Minor Trade Centers in Minnesota, 1905–1930," *Soc. Forces,* X, 71–5; H. B. Price and C. R. Hoffer, "Services of Rural Trade Centers in the Distribution of Farm Supplies," *Bulletin No. 249* (Minnesota Agri. Exp. Sta.).

clothing stores. Places of 2,500 would contain specialized shoe stores, while those of 3,000 would contain specialized stores for women's clothing. No lower limit existed for general stores or for hardware stores in the rural Minnesota areas. Hoffer found that services also depend upon an adequate supporting population. Approximately 1,000 persons can support a physician and most towns of 500 actually do so. About 10,000 persons appear necessary to maintain a well equipped hospital.

Hoffer found further that three types of merchandising centers tend to develop in rural areas: (1) primary service centers—in small towns usually under 1,000 population, offering goods that are standardized and frequently demanded; (2) shopping centers—usually in towns of from 1,000–5,000 population, which offer specialty stores in addition to convenience goods; and (3) terminal trade centers—in towns of more than 5,000 population, usually offering most specialized kinds of services.[60]

A study of urban secondary retail centers was made for Cincinnati in 1931 by William Applebaum, Streitman Fellow in Geography at the University of Cincinnati.[61] He also found a definite relation between the size of the consuming population and the types of retail outlets that served it. He noted three types of urban secondary centers which correspond closely with those discovered by Hoffer in rural areas: small centers which sell only standardized, frequently demanded convenience goods; those which contain a few types of "specialty" shops; and the central business area, which affords most of the specialized services that a population demands.

Other studies of the relation of trade and industry to the population of a community have been made. These throw additional light upon the ecological sustenance organization of an area.[62]

McKenzie included some of the theoretical bases for studying the ecological sustenance organization in his *Readings in Human Ecology*.[63] In the chapter on Man's Kinship with Nature, he quotes Elton, an animal ecologist. These materials contain descriptions of *food-chains* which may be found in the natural sustenance organization of the animal community. In these chains each species occupies its particular *niche*. It serves both as predator and prey, and perhaps as parasite and host. These concepts of animal ecology—*food-chain, niche, pyramid of numbers, web of life*—while not directly applicable to the human community without im-

[60] C. R. Hoffer, "Services of Rural Trade Centers," *Soc. Forces,* X, 67–9.

[61] Unpublished manuscript.

[62] See for example, Inez K. Rolph, "The Population Pattern in Relation to Retail Buying" (Baltimore), *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXVIII, 368–76; Joseph Cohen, *The Automobile Industry in Relation to Demographic and Economic Forces in the Development of the Detroit Area* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Michigan, 1936).

[63] R. D. McKenzie, *Readings in Human Ecology* (Rev. ed., 1934).

portant modification, do afford a valuable approach to the study of human sustenance relations. Again, in the chapter on Succession, McKenzie introduces materials dealing with sustenance relations. The inclusion of all of these materials gives further emphasis to the fact that ecology has come to include a study of sustenance organization and cannot be understood as a mere study of space distribution. Ecology includes all of the aspects of both space distribution and sustenance relations that can be explained in terms of the impersonal ecological forms of interaction.

(3) *Definition and clarification of ecological concepts.* Several articles have been written and studies made in the attempt to develop new concepts in ecology or to give greater precision and meaning to old ones. Space does not permit a detailed analysis of this trend of development. The following summary, together with the references which have been appended, will probably prove sufficient to establish the existence of the trend.

In 1927 E. W. Burgess read a paper before the American Sociological Society in which he developed and used the concept of the *gradient.*[64] Shaw, Smith and others have used the concept in the analysis of urban communities and regions.[65] The concept of ecological index has been developed and used by many persons. In 1929 Park published a statement of the nature and importance of the index.[66] He declared that certain ecological data which are objective and easily measured can serve as effective means of discovering the nature of social life which is less objective and less easily measured. Several persons have proposed various indexes of ecological significance—mobility, land values, infant mortality, delinquency, divorce, and many others. The wide variety of indexes may be suggested by the two recent publications which use the concept. Hollingshead proposes "Changes in Land Ownership" as an index of succession in rural communities, and Lind uses the succession of types of land utilization as an index of social changes in Hawaii.[67] Blumer has criticized usage of the concept of index. He declares that many ecological data which have been proposed as such have not been proved to be true indexes of the phenomena they are supposed to accompany.

[64] E. W. Burgess, "Determination of Gradients in the Growth of the City," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXI, 178–84.

[65] Clifford Shaw, *Delinquency Areas* (1929). See also report by Shaw, *Proc. A.S.S.*, XXII, 174–9, and the section of the Wickersham Report which he prepared, *Report of the National Committee on Law Enforcement,* II, No. 13; Mapheus Smith, "Relief Intensity Gradients," *Soc. Forces,* XVI, 208–23; R. C. White, "The Relation of Felonies to Environmental Factors in Indianapolis," *Soc. Forces,* X, 498–509.

[66] Wilson Gee, *Research in the Social Sciences* (1929). See chap. i by R. E. Park.

[67] A. B. Hollingshead, "Changes in Land Ownership as an Index of Succession in Rural Areas," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLIII (Mar., 1938), 764–77. A. W. Lind, *An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1938).

The concept of concentric zones as typical of the ecological organization of the city has been attacked by Davie,[68] and critically examined by Alihan [69] and Quinn.[70]

Park has written articles on the concepts of *position*,[71] *succession*,[72] and *symbiosis*.[73] Mukerjee has published materials on the concepts of *balance* and *organization*,[74] *distribution* and *succession*.[75]

McKenzie's *Readings in Human Ecology* represents the most elaborate attempt to develop and make precise the concepts of human ecology. He organizes many of his chapters and sections around important concepts in the field. His treatment includes among others the concepts of *aggregation, concentration, mobility, selective distribution, ecological organization, dominance,* and *succession*. McKenzie includes materials from other disciplines—plant and animal ecology, economics, geography—which throw light upon the nature of the concepts—also theoretical discussions of his own. This volume represents the most valuable attempt to bring order out of the chaos of ecological concepts.[76]

An outline of human ecology, organized principally around the conceptual organization of McKenzie and Park, has been presented by Hollingshead.[77]

(4) *Development of more precise methods.* Along with the attempt to improve the concepts of ecology has been a closely related effort to develop new and better methods of ecological study. Sometimes the concept itself has been clarified through application to concrete studies. Burgess and Shaw afford excellent examples of this point in their determination of gradients.

Only a few of the outstanding studies can be mentioned in this summary as examples of the trend toward improvement of methods. These examples will center mainly around four headings—determination of

[68] M. R. Davie, "The Patterns of Urban Growth," in G. P. Murdock (ed.), *Studies in the Science of Society,* pp. 133–161.

[69] M. A. Alihan, *op. cit.,* pp. 207–22.

[70] J. A. Quinn, "The Burgess Zonal Hypothesis and Its Critics," *Am. Soc. Rev.,* V, 210–8.

[71] R. E. Park, "The Concept of Position of Sociology," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XX, 1–14.

[72] R. E. Park, "Succession, an Ecological Concept," *Am. Soc. Rev.,* I, 171–9.

[73] R. E. Park, "Succession and Symbioses," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLV, 1–25.

[74] R. Mukerjee, "The Concepts of Balance and Organization in Social Ecology," *Soc. and Soc. Res.,* XVI, 503–16.

[75] R. Mukerjee, "The Concepts of Distribution and Succession in Social Ecology," *Soc. Forces,* XI, 1–7.

[76] R. D. McKenzie, *Readings in Human Ecology* (rev. ed., 1934). See also C. A. Dawson, "The Sources and Methods of Human Ecology," in Bernard, *Fields and Methods of Sociology,* pp. 286–302.

[77] A. B. Hollingshead, in R. E. Park (ed.), *An Outline of the Principles of Sociology,* pp. 63–168.

boundaries, use of maps, measurement of mobility, and study of institutions.

In July, 1929, Park published a paper which he had read before the American Sociological Society of the previous December.[78] This paper used newspaper circulation as a means of marking the limits of metropolitan regions. Menefee also used newspaper circulation in his study of urban regions.[79] Leiffer published in 1932 an article on Methods of Determining Local Urban Boundaries.[80] McKenzie suggested means for studying the boundaries of metropolitan regions in his book by that name.[81] A summary of various methods proposed in marking out the metropolitan regions of the United States was summarized by the Census Bureau.[82]

The ecologist's interest in space distribution has turned his attention to the making of maps. He plots all sorts of social and ecological data on spot maps, cross-hatch maps, and various ingenious devices that he has developed.

Present interest in the development of maps as ecological techniques has been limited to three—the base map, the census tract map, and the isometric map.

The base map was described by Young in 1925.[83] The base map shows certain data that are basic to the interpretation of space distributions within an area. It indicates those portions of the area that are given over to railroad, industrial, commercial, and recreational purposes. These areas often contain little or no population. Unless their location is marked upon a map the spot distributions of such data as delinquency, land values, and congestion of population tend to be misleading. The base map has been utilized in many concrete research projects in large cities.

The census tract map has received considerable attention from the students of city life. Census tracts afford small permanent statistical areas which make possible the correlation of data, both contemporary and historical. The principles which were used in marking out the census tracts for Cincinnati were described by E. E. Eubank.[84] Later Calvin Schmid

[78] R. E. Park, "Urbanization as Measured by Newspaper Circulation," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXV, 60–79.

[79] Selden C. Menefee, "Newspaper Circulation and Urban Regions," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XXI, 63–66.

[80] Murray H. Leiffer, "A Method for Determining Local Urban Boundaries," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXVI, 137–43.

[81] R. D. McKenzie, *The Metropolitan Community* (1933).

[82] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Metropolitan Districts* (1932).

[83] E. F. Young, "The Social Base Map," *Jour. Appl. Soc.*, IX, 202–6. See also E. E. Eubank, "The Base Map as a Device for Community Study," *Soc. Forces*, VI (June, 1928), 602–5.

[84] E. E. Eubank, "A New Census Tract Map for Cincinnati," in *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXIV, 156–8.

canvassed the experiences of census tract users in his attempt to summarize the principles in their use. He published his findings in January, 1938.[85] W. C. Reckless published his comments upon the census tract plan after establishing it in Nashville, Tenn.[86] Hundreds of concrete studies have been made in terms of census tracts in those cities which have established the tract system—Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul—to mention only a few. Some few of these studies will be mentioned in a following section on examples of concrete research and investigation.

In the attempt to locate more accurately the centers of divorce, dependency, or delinquency, ecologists have developed the *isometric* map. This map corresponds in appearance to the isobar weather map with which most persons are familiar. It connects with continuous "equal measurement" lines those points which presumably show an equal rate of the phenomenon to be charted. The various isometric lines, becoming smaller and smaller as one approaches the center, graphically display the location of high and low centers of human phenomena. This map has been described by E. R. Mowrer.[87] Elsa Longmoor and E. F. Young used a similar device in plotting the delinquency and dependency for Long Beach, California.[88]

Several articles deal with the problem of mobility. Three which have given some attention to more adequate means of measuring mobility include two by Albig and one by Corbally.[89] Numerous concrete studies of mobility include suggestions or statements concerning methods of measurement.[90] The article by Sullenger explicitly distinguishes between ecological mobility and social mobility, a distinction which has gradually

[85] Calvin Schmid, "The Theory and Practice of Planning Census Tracts," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XXII, 228–38.

[86] W. C. Reckless, "The Initial Experience with Census Tracts in a Southern City," *Soc. Forces,* XV, 47–54.

[87] E. R. Mowrer, "The Isometric Map as a Technique of Social Research," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLIV, 86–96.

[88] Elsa Longmoor and E. F. Young, "Ecological Interrelationships of Juvenile Delinquency, Dependency, and Population Mobility: A Cartographic Analysis of Data from Long Beach, California," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLI, 598–610.

[89] William Albig, "A Method of Recording Trends in Urban Residential Mobility," *Soc. and Soc. Res.,* XXI (Nov., 1936), 120–7; "A Comparison of Methods of Recording Urban Mobility," *Soc. and Soc. Res.,* XXI (1937), 226–33; J. E. Corbally, "Measures of Intra-urban Mobility," *Soc. and Soc. Res.,* XIV (1930), 547–53.

[90] See for example, William Albig, "The Mobility of Urban Population," *Soc. Forces,* XI, 351–67; W. A. Anderson, "Social Mobility among Farm Owner Operators," *Soc. Forces,* VIII, 378–80; P. G. Beck and C. E. Lively, "Movement of Open Country Population in Ohio," *Bulletin No. 489* (Ohio Agri. Exp. Sta.); C. E. Lively, "Spatial and Occupational Changes of Particular Significance to the Student of Population Mobility," *Soc. Forces,* XV, 351–5; C. E. Lively, "Spatial Mobility of the Rural Population with Respect to Local Areas," *Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XLIII, 89–102; Mapheus Smith,

impressed itself more upon students of the problem of mobility.[91] Howard Becker expresses considerable scepticism about the value of mobility, considered in spatial terms only, as an index to other phenomena, and has begun to develop a theory of "mental mobility." [92]

Human ecology has been concerned with the problem of institutions as well as with that of population. Several attempts have been made to study the ecology of institutions but they have proved to be little more than studies of space distribution. Some few have attempted to give an ecological explanation of the distribution of institutional phenomena. In general, however, the ecologists have not learned to distinguish adequately between the ecological and social analysis of institutional phenomena.[93]

Ecologists have made increasing use of statistical methods in their studies of the space distribution of phenomena. Correlations of data for statistical areas have produced many interesting results. Space limitations prohibit even a summary statement of the increased statistical trend in human ecology. One warning article may be mentioned.[94] It points out some of the dangers into which ecologists have fallen or are likely to fall.

An excellent summary of ecological concepts and methods was made by C. A. Dawson, who read a paper upon the subject before the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society in December, 1932.[95] Bo-

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"The Mobility of Eminent Men," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XXII, 452–61; M. Smith, "Mobility Patterns of Urban Strangers," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XV, 545–9; E. T. Sullenger, "A Study in Intra-urban Mobility," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XVII, 16–24; Donald Taft, *Human Migration* (1936); W. S. Thompson, "Movements of Population," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XL, 713–9; Warren Thornthwaite, *Internal Migration in the United States* (Univ. of Penn. Press, 1934); C. C. Zimmerman, "Selective Rural Urban Migration," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXIII, 104–15. C. Taeuber and I. B. Taeuber, "Short Distance Interstate Migrations," *Soc. Forces,* XVI, 503–6; C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber, *Rural Migration in the United States* (1939).

[91] See Sorokin, *Social Mobility.*

[92] Howard Becker, "Forms of Population Movement: Prolegomena to a Study of Mental Mobility," *Soc. Forces,* IX, 147–60, X, 351–61.

[93] For studies of the ecological aspects of institutions, see E. C. Hughes, "The Ecological Aspect of Institutions," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, I, 180–9, and discussion by R. C. Angell, pp. 189–92. Attempts to make ecological studies of institutions may be illustrated by E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization,* chap. v; J. H. S. Bossard, "Residential Propinquity as a Factor in Marriage," *Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XXXVIII, 219–24; Bossard, "The Spatial Distribution of Divorced Women," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XL, 503–7; E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1932); A. E. Holt, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Church," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, XXXIII, 72–79.

[94] F. A. Ross, "Ecology and the Statistical Method," *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, XXXVIII, 507–22.

[95] C. A. Dawson, "The Sources and Methods of Human Ecology," in Bernard, *Fields and Methods of Sociology,* pp. 286–302.

gardus and Schmid have also summarized various aspects of ecological method.[96]

(5) *Emphasis on large as well as upon small areas.* During the early days of the rise of human ecology sociologists centered their attention upon relatively small areas. Galpin studied local rural communities. McKenzie published his first ecological study on the neighborhood. The ecological emphasis in the Chicago studies was primarily upon local areas within the city. Rural sociologists turned their attention to local rural areas.

Gradually, however, the sociologists extended their attention to wider areas, especially to the region,[97] but sometimes even to the entire world.[98] These emphases may be seen in the accompanying references which speak for themselves.

(6) *Rapid multiplication of concrete ecological studies.* The rapid increase of concrete studies has been one of the outstanding trends of human ecology since 1925. Evidence of this trend may be seen in the numerous studies that have already been cited and in the supplementary lists that appear at the end of the chapter. These supplementary references have been roughly grouped under the following heads: urban studies, rural studies, spatial distributions of certain human phenomena, mobility, problems of adjustment, and studies of invasion and succession. The

[96] E. S. Bogardus, *Introduction to Social Research* (1936), chap. iii; Calvin Schmid, in P. V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research* (1939), chaps, xii and xiv.

[97] As examples of the increased emphasis on regions, see G. H. Hansen, *A Regional Redistricting Plan for the State of Utah* (Brigham Young Univ. Press, 1937), S. M. Harrison, round table discussion on "The Implications of the Regional Concept," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XXIV, 257–8; Mildred Hartsough, "The Concept of Regionalism as Applied to Western Germany," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XXIV, 12–22; W. J. Matherly, "The Emergence of the Metropolitan Community in the South," *Soc. Forces,* XIV, 311–25; S. C. Menefee, "Newspaper Circulation and Urban Regions," *Soc. and Soc. Res.,* XXI, 63–6; H. E. Moore, "Social Scientists Explore the Region," *Soc. Forces,* XVI, 463–74; H. E. Moore, *What is Regionalism?* (Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1937); R. Mukerjee, "The Processes of Regional Balance," *Soc. Rev.,* XXIII, 173–81; R. Mukerjee, Regional Sociology (1926); H. W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States* (Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1936); W. F. Ogburn, "Regions," *Soc. Forces,* XV, 6–11; W. R. Tylor, "The Processes of Change from Neighborhood to Regional Organization and its Effect on Rural Life," *Soc. Forces,* XVI, 530–42; R. B. Vance, "Implications of the Concepts 'Region' and 'Regional Planning,'" *Publ. A.S.S.,* XXIX, 85–93; Louis Wirth, "The Prospects of Regional Research in Relation to Social Planning," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XXIX, 107–14; T. J. Woofter, Jr. "The Subregions of the Southeast," *Soc. Forces,* XIII, 43–50; H. W. Odum and H. E. Moore, *American Regionalism* (1938); C. E. Lively and C. E. Gregory, *Rural Social Areas in Missouri* (1939).

See also the regional reports of planning bodies, e. g., The New York Regional Plan, The National Resources Committee, and the U. S. Census Bureau report on Metropolitan Districts.

[98] R. D. McKenzie, "The Concept of Dominance and World Organization," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXIII, 28–42.

classification is only suggestive. Many of the studies could easily qualify under two or more of the headings. References which have been given earlier have not been repeated in this section.

3. *The Present Status of Human Ecology.* Notwithstanding the rapid advance which human ecology has undergone during its brief span of life, and notwithstanding its official recognition as a major division of sociological theory, it must still travel a considerable distance before it reaches maturity. No general systematic treatment of the field has yet been published by a sociologist. The concepts of the field remain in an almost chaotic condition. Research is limited and fragmentary as compared with the great need for it.

Human ecologists have neglected too much the contributions from other marginal fields. They have not made peace with the other major claimants to this field of study. The present course of neglect can only lead to duplication and controversy.

Only time and further work can clear away the present difficulties which confront sociological students of ecology. This work must continue to emphasize both the detailed concrete research which is the basis for sound progress, and the development and clarification of concepts, methods, and principles of explanation which guide the concrete researches and make them more meaningful.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

A supplementary list of concrete studies of interest to students of human ecology

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———, "The Trend and Ecology of Family Disintegration in Chicago," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, III, 344–53.
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Kensler, Gladys M., and Melvin, B. L., "A Partial Sociological Study of Dryden, New York," *Bulletin No. 504* (Cornell Univ. Agri. Exp. Sta.).
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Part IV

BIOLOGICAL DATA AND SOCIAL THEORY

[9]

PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A HISTORICAL SUMMARY

Harry Elmer Barnes

I. Some Leading Phases of the Development of Physical Anthropology

1. *The Growth of Craniology.* Both the matter of the physical evolution of mankind and its differentiation into several physical types, known as races, involve the problem of exact physical measurements of the human body and a comparative study thereof. A number of phases of such measurement have contributed to the branch of knowledge which we know of as physical anthropology, the subject which comprehends a study of the physical evolution of the human race, the racial differentiation of man, comparative human anatomy, criminal identification, and the like. Among the fields embraced in the development of physical anthropology are Craniology, Phrenology, General Anthropometry, Statistical Method as applied to deviations of physical types, and Paleontology, extended to the human race in the study of the evolution of man as demonstrated by fossil remains. We shall first consider the leading steps in the evolution of craniology, or the measurement of human skulls.

The foundations of craniology, as of all other phases of physical anthropology, were laid by the study of human anatomy. This first arose in connection with art rather than medicine. Some of the leading artists of the Renaissance practiced dissection extensively, among them Albrecht Dürer, Michelangelo and Raphael. But the greatest anatomist of them all was Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), whose anatomical knowledge was exact and extensive and whose anatomical drawings have never been surpassed. In the field of medicine and surgery, dissection had been retarded, due to the opposition of the Church to tampering with the physical envelope of the immortal soul. The first great anatomist was Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564) of Padua, who founded the famous school of anatomists that gave the world its first sound knowledge of the human body. The ablest member of this group after Vesalius was Adriaan van der Spieghel, Latinized as Spigelius (1578–1625). He refined and extended the methods of dissection and his works contain a large number of un-

usually fine anatomical plates. The great classifier, Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778), used the results of anatomical progress to link man to the rest of the animal kingdom on the basis of structural similarities. Man appeared in Linnaeus's classification as *Homo sapiens linnaeus,* of the class of quadrupeds, of the order of primates, of the genus *Homo,* and divided into four species, white, yellow, red and black. Linnaeus held, however, to the orthodox theological distinction between man and the other animals, so far as the soul is concerned.

The application of anatomical technique to the foundation of physical anthropology in general and of craniology in particular was the work of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), a naturalist, anatomist and professor of medicine at the University of Göttingen. His monumental work, *De generis humani varietate nativa,* which appeared in three editions between 1775 and 1795, laid the basis for comparative physical anthropology. He gathered his materials widely from all available museums and collections and measured his skulls and skeletons with great care. He was the first to classify the human races on a physical basis, finding five principal ones, the Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, and Malayan, a classification widely accepted since that time. Blumenbach made special note of the variations in the shape and size of skulls and faces, thus founding scientific craniology. His most important work here was his *Decas collectionis suae craniorum diversarum gentium illustrata,* which came out between 1790 and 1820. In craniological technique his chief contribution was the concept of the *norma verticalis,* or shape of the skull as seen from above. On this basis, he distinguished three major types of skulls, the square skull of the Mongolians, the narrow skull of the Negroes, and the intermediate skull of the Caucasian race. This was an anticipation of the more exact notion of the cephalic index devised by Retzius.

The next important contribution to craniology was the idea of the facial angle, worked out by Peter Camper (1722–1789), a Dutch anatomist and naturalist who was a professor of anatomy at Amsterdam and later at Göttingen. He wrote important anatomical works on the apes, Negroes and children, but his importance in craniology is due to his formulation of the idea of the facial angle. He drew a line from the opening in the ear to the base of the nose, and another from the junction of the lips to the most prominent portions of the forehead and jaw. This gave him what he called the facial angle and the projection of the jaw, both measurements still used by physical anthropologists, when further refined and given greater exactitude.

Skull capacity was another measurement indispensable to craniology. A method of determining this was provided by Friedrich Tiedemann (1781–1861), professor of anatomy at Heidelberg. He filled the skull with

millet seed and then ascertained the capacity by weighing the seed. This method was later supplemented by Morton, who used fine shot, and by Volkoff who filled the skull with water. These methods of determining skull capacity are still employed, along with later refinements.

Previous work in craniology was synthesized by Anders Adolf Retzius (1796–1860), a professor of anatomy in Stockholm and a leading disciple of Linnaeus. As a result, he produced the basic craniological methods and concepts which have dominated the field since Retzius's day and established the accepted craniological nomenclature. In 1842 he formulated the fundamental concept of the cephalic index, namely, the ratio of the breadth of a skull to its length, as expressed in a percentage. He used the term dolichocephalic to describe long narrow skulls and brachycephalic to apply to broad skulls. He employed these notions further in an attempt to classify the European races according to headform. He also brought into systematic craniology the facial angle idea of Camper and divided face forms into two major types. The straight-faced with little jaw projection he called orthognathic, while those with a notably projecting jaw he designated as prognathic. He also later added Tiedemann's notion of skull capacity and thus synthesized and systematized craniology in all fundamental matters.

More detailed cranial measurements and better instruments for computing them were provided by an Irish pharmacist, John Grattan (1800–1871) of Belfast. Many further refinements were added by the classical physical anthropologists, Quatrefages, Broca, Topinard, Virchow, Ranke, Martin, and Keith. Indeed, refinement and detail in craniology went to an extreme which ended in absurdity. A Hungarian anthropologist, Aurel von Török, went so far as seriously to propose five thousand different measurements for every skull. The nonsense in all this obscuring of the woods of principles by the trees of detail was exposed by Professor Alexander Macalister years ago, when he said in his presidential address before the British Association: "When we, in our sesquipedalian jargon, describe an Australian skull as microcephalic, phaenozygous, tapeino-dolichocephalic, prognathic, platyrhine, hypselopalatine, leptostaphyline, dolichuranic, chamaeprosopic, and microseme, we are no nearer to the formulation of any philosophic concept of the general principles which have led to the assumption of these characters by the cranium in question." [1] Yet, when used with reason and modesty, craniology is the indispensable foundation of anthropometry and physical anthropology. We may now turn to the origins of Phrenology, which, in spite of its absurdities, directed attention to that which lies within the skull.

2. *The Origins and Destiny of Phrenology.* Phrenology was a popular brand of psychology during much of the nineteenth century. It rested

[1] A. C. Haddon, *History of Anthropology* (1910), p. 47.

upon the assumption that there is a precise relationship between the various faculties of the mind and special areas of the brain. This led to the charting of the cranium into separate sections, each representing the seat in the brain of some definite mental faculty or moral disposition. With all its vagaries, it represented a vast step in advance in the development of psychology, when compared with the mystical and spiritualistic doctrines that prevailed when phrenology came into existence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was surely something to regard the brain as the seat of thought, for even Aristotle had looked upon the heart as the center of our thinking processes and regarded the brain as a sort of cooling system for the heart.

The founder of phrenology was Franz Josef Gall (1758–1828), a German physician who specialized on brain studies, first in Vienna and later in Germany and France. He first fully presented his new science of mind and morals to the Institute of France in 1808. Gall identified twenty-seven faculties and localized them in appropriate brain areas. His disciple, Spurzheim, did even better by isolating and localizing some thirty-five. Gall's notions were taken up and systematized by the German physician, Johann Friedrich Spurzheim (1776–1832), and by the Scottish brothers Andrew Combe (1797–1847) and George Combe (1788–1858), the latter being the most zealous and ingratiating propagandist for phrenology, introducing it into Britain and the United States, though Spurzheim had made a brief visit to America on the eve of his death. Spurzheim had real talent for systematization and also did much to improve the nomenclature of phrenology.

This whole system of thought has now been discarded, except, perhaps for its realistic approach to brain studies. But it made valuable contributions to a more scientific study of the brain. It rightly stressed the physical basis of thought processes. It maintained a basic truism, namely, that specific functions are localized in the brain. In this way it prepared the way for the later studies of the localization of brain functions by distinguished physical anthropologists like Broca, Schwalbe and Elliot Smith. Recent proponents of behavioristic psychology have also maintained that Gall foreshadowed their general notions. But for the purpose of this historical sketch the main significance of Gall and phrenology is that this episode in the history of psychology aided physical anthropology by stimulating the study of brain functions and their localization.

3. *Anthropometry and Classical Physical Anthropology.* Anthropometry and general physical anthropology absorbed craniology and the study of the localization of brain functions, and then investigated a number of other physical traits, such as a comparative study of arm lengths, pelvic dimensions, eye and skin color, hair color and cross-section, dentition, and the like. They carry on such studies to get a general idea of the physical

characteristics of any population, to show man's relationship to other animals, especially the anthropoid apes, to prove man's physical evolution, especially in the mental processes and in mental powers, to account for physical differences between races, and to discover those bodily and mental changes which are relevant to the problems of eugenics.

The Englishman, Charles White (1728–1813), has been claimed as the father of anthropometry. He made comparative studies of the forearm of Europeans, Negroes and apes. He found that the forearm of the Negro is relatively longer than that of the European, while that of the ape is relatively longer than that of the Negro.

A number of students, especially those interested in the racial distribution of man, began to lay stress on hair texture. The first was Bory de Saint Vincent, who, in 1827, divided man into two main races, the *Leiotrichi* or straight-haired and the *Ulotrichi* or woolly-haired. This classification was immortalized by T. H. Huxley a half-century later. Others who stressed hair texture were Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire, Friedrich Max Müller, Ernst Haeckel and, especially, Pruner Bey, who, in 1863, made the classic defense of hair texture as the best criterion of race.

But the first great figure in physical anthropology was Armand Quatrefages de Bréau (1810–1892), professor of anatomy and ethnology at the Museum of Natural History in Paris. Trained in both mathematics and medicine, he was well prepared for his researches, which fell mainly in the field of comparative morphology and in thorough study of the human race as a physical species. The former took him into exact measurements and comparisons, while the latter led to broader concepts and problems, such as race-crossing, the physical and psychological characteristics of existing races, and the historical ancestors of our present races. One of the first to champion Boucher de Perthes's contentions as to the antiquity of man, Quatrefages helped to link up physical anthropology with prehistoric archeology. His two major works were *Métamorphoses de l'homme et les animaux* (1862); and *L'Espèce humaine* (1877).

Even more important was the work of Pierre Paul Broca (1824–1880), who did more than any other single person to put physical anthropolgy on its feet in France. His original training lay in medicine, anatomy and surgery. In 1867, he became professor of anatomy at the University of Paris. He founded the Paris Anthropological Society in 1859, and the Anthropological Institute in 1868. Like his English contemporary, Thomas Henry Huxley, he was much influenced by Darwinism and gave extended attention to a comparative study of man and the other primates. He contended that the anthropoid apes are closely related to man, being bipeds and not quadrupeds. In his laboratory, detailed studies were made on the comparative anatomy of the primates. Broca was especially famous for his investigation of the localization of brain functions, particularly the control of speech.

He also carried out extensive studies of the comparative morphology of the brain. He and his students devoted much time to improving the instruments and technique of anthropometric measurements. His personal vigor and enthusiasm were also an important factor in the stimulation of anthropological interest in France. His most significant books were *Instructions générales pour les recherches anthropologiques* (1865); and *Instructions craniologiques et craniométriques* (1875). There is no greater name in the history of physical anthropology.

Broca's work was carried on by his able disciple, Paul Topinard (1830–1911), who, like Broca, turned from medicine to anthropology. He held the key position in the promotion of physical anthropology in France after Broca's death, for he was secretary of the Anthropological Society, curator of its collections, editor of the *Revue d'anthropologie,* director of the anthropological laboratory at the *École des Hautes Études,* and professor of anthropology at the *École d'anthropologie,* which Broca had helped to found. Topinard carried on Broca's efforts to refine the methods of physical anthropology, to make measurements more complete and precise, and to provide better instruments for use in the anthropological laboratory. His own anthropological researches were given over mainly to a study of the evolution of the several human races and to the anatomical variations which distinguish them. While a precise methodologist in anthropometry, Topinard was vitally interested in broader philosophical questions, such as the theory of evolution and the idea of the social organism. His *Élements d'anthropologie générale* (1885) was one of the most thoughtful, systematic and influential landmarks in the development of physical anthropology.

The remaining important French contribution to physical anthropology was stimulated by interest in criminology rather than in evolution and the study of races. It was made by Alphonse Bertillon (1853–1914). The so-called "Bertillon system" is usually associated with fingerprinting, but the latter played only a minor part in Bertillon's comprehensive scheme for measurements of the human body through which he hoped to forward the work of criminal identification. In this way he stimulated physical anthropology, and his method of criminal identification is far more reliable than the fingerprint method, taken by itself, in spite of the current craze for the latter, which has been exposed by Beffel, Wehde and others.

Far better known and more influential for a time, in relating criminology to physical anthropology, was the work of the Italian physician and anthropologist, Cesare Lombroso (1836–1909), whose work will be dealt with in a later chapter. He believed that criminals represent a distinct and inferior physical type, representing an atavistic throwback to a more primitive type, characterized by low, slanting forehead, lobeless ears, heavy supra-

orbital ridges and the like. His views were discredited for a generation but have been even more boldly and challengingly revived by Earnest A. Hooton in his *Crime and the Man* (1939). Hooton believes that there is not only a general physical (degenerative) basis for crime, but also definite racial proclivities for particular types of crime.

The founder of systematic physical anthropology in Germany was Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902), one of the outstanding figures in the history of pathology. He became much interested in physical anthropology and took a leading part in creating interest therein in Germany. He founded the German Anthropological Society and the chief anthropological journal in Germany, the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*. He gave a great deal of attention to skull and other bodily measurements, to which he brought customary German thoroughness. He did much to standardize the methods of measurement and to introduce the newer instruments.

The next great name in German physical anthropology is that of Johannes Ranke (1836–1916), professor of anthropology and director of the Anthropological Institute in Munich. He devoted much attention to the comparative study of the nervous system and to the morphology of organs in man and the apes. But his major work was an anthropological survey of the Bavarian population, both past and present, *Beiträge zur physischen Anthropologie der Bayern* (1883). His chief general treatment of physical anthropology, racial origins, and racial differentiation was *Der Mensch* (1887).

Another leader was Gustav Albert Schwalbe (1844–1916) professor of anatomy and director of the Anatomical Institute of the University of Strassburg. His interests lay mainly in neurology, the comparative anatomy of the nervous system, the study of the localization of brain functions, and fossil man. He also offered a constructive criticism of the concept of the facial angle. Schwalbe wrote comprehensive manuals on the neurology and the anatomy of the brain and nervous system. His studies on early man were brought together in his *Die Vorgeschichte der Menschen* (1904). Felix von Luschan (1854–1924) took the lead among early German physical anthropologists in the study and classification of the races of mankind. Chief place among later German anthropologists in this field must be assigned to Egon von Eickstedt.

But the great name in German physical anthropology is that of Ranke's successor in the chair of anthropology at Munich, Rudolf Martin (1864–1925). His *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie in systematischer Darstellung* (1914), which appeared posthumously in an enlarged edition in three volumes in 1928, is the most comprehensive guide and manual ever prepared in the field of physical anthropology. He critically appraised and sifted previous anthropometric methods and synthesized the best. He himself devised better instruments for body and skull measurements, and his

tables of eye colors were widely adopted by other anthropologists. With the publication of this work little more remained to be done in systematizing and perfecting physical anthropology.

This list of physical anthropologists does not exhaust the record by any means. In England, there are such men as the eminent anatomists, Sir Arthur Keith and Grafton Elliot Smith (now deceased), the former an expert on comparative embryology and the morphology of apes and man, and the latter on the comparative anatomy of the brain and nervous system. Another able English physical anthropologist is W. L. H. Duckworth, who has given special attention to the relation of comparative morphology to anthropology and human descent. In the United States, Aleš Hrdlička of the United States National Museum has brought over the best of the European technique in physical anthropology, T. Wingate Todd of Western Reserve University specialized in comparative and historical pathology, Earnest A. Hooton of Harvard has provided the most interesting story of man's physical development from the parental anthropoid stock, Frederick Tilney has given us in his book, *The Brain from Ape to Man,* probably the most satisfactory treatment of this important subject, James Howard McGregor of Columbia University, along with Hrdlička, has been a leader among American students of fossil man, and William King Gregory, a paleontologist interested in evolutionary morphology, has done much to clarify the problem of man's physical evolution. Gregory is the ablest living student of dental evolution, and his colleague in this field, Milo Hellman, deserves honorable mention. Adolph H. Schultz of Johns Hopkins has produced the best works ever written on the comparative anatomy of man and the lower primates. He is the world's leader in metric studies of apes and monkeys. W. H. Sheldon of Harvard has systematized constitutional anthropology as regards body-build classification and laid the basis for a real science of genetics in his *The Varieties of Human Physique* (1940).

4. *Statistical Method in Physical Anthropology.* Since the related facts of uniformity and variation in the physical dimensions of man are of fundamental significance in physical anthropology, it was natural that the mathematical principles related thereunto would be applied in this field. The most relevant mathematical formula was the Gaussian law of normal distribution, and this was first applied in the realm of human measurements by Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874), the Belgian founder of statistical method as applied to social problems. Such concepts were especially important for students of eugenics, who were concerned with individual differences in physique as well as mentality. Here the great pioneer was Sir Francis Galton (1822–1911), the founder of eugenics and an able student of mathematical biology. He applied mathematical methods to physical anthropology in comprehensive and precise fashion. Even more exacting and epoch-making was the work of Galton's famous disciple,

Karl Pearson, especially his use of the coefficient of correlation and his biometrical technique. In Germany, Otto Ammon used similar methods, and in the United States they have been applied to eugenics and population problems by Charles B. Davenport, Samuel J. Holmes, Raymond Pearl, L. J. Reed, L. I. Dublin, A. J. Lotka, and R. R. Kuczynski. The fact of variation is also fundamental to any scientific study of races. The same mathematical laws have been applied to racial differentiation by Franz Boas, W. W. Howells, G. M. Morant, E. A. Hooton, Jan Czekanowski, Egon von Eickstedt and others. This has revealed the significant fact that the variations within the same race are about as great as those differences which are supposed to separate races and, incidentally, exploded the notion of a pure race. Schultz has promoted anthropometric studies in evolutionary morphology.

Since Lundberg has already clearly described the nature of the quantitative method and its application to social science, we shall not discuss this subject further than to conclude that the statistical analysis of laboratory measurements has been as important as the measurements themselves and has often proved the only way of giving general significance to such measurements.

II. Darwinism, Evolution, Fossil Men and Physical Anthropology

In another and later chapter we shall discuss prehistoric archeology and the reconstruction of preliterary culture.[2] Here we shall limit ourselves to a consideration of the evidence of the physical evolution of man and some leading contributions of physical anthropology thereto.

Among the earliest contributors to the task of unfolding the antiquity of man were the geologists and paleontologists, who studied man as they would any other fossil remains. The dean of them all was Sir Charles Lyell, the first geologist to sponsor evolution without qualms. His *Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man* (1863) was a classic and an epoch-making work. It threw the weight of geology behind Darwinism as over against the special creation doctrine. Lyell had been privileged to visit the site of the recovery of the Neandertal skeleton in 1856. In the next generation, W. Boyd Dawkins carried on in his notable *Early Man in Britain* (1880), and in 1913, James Geike brought the geological story down to date in his *Antiquity of Man in Europe*. Arthur Smith Woodward turned frequently from his geological studies to investigate evidences of early man, especially notable being his aid in clarifying the problems connected with the Piltdown skull and the Rhodesian man, and his classification of the materials on fossil men in the British Museum. W. J. Sollas, in his *Ancient Hunters* (1911) presented an excellent summary of primitive man and his culture, set off against the geological background. In France, the next great name, after that of Abbé Louis Bourgeois (1819–1878),

[2] See below, Chapter 14.

is that of the paleontologist, Pierre Marcellin Boule, whose classic study of the Chapelle-aux-Saints skeleton is the ablest analysis of a Neandertal specimen, and whose *Fossil Men* (1923) is a superb synthesis, especially for French materials. In Germany, Ernst Koken set forth the geological facts concerning early man in his section of R. R. Schmidt's *Die diluviale Vorzeit Deutschlands* (1912). In the United States, the leading contributors to physical anthropology from the paleontological field have been John Campbell Merriam and William King Gregory. The former's *Emergence of Man* (1919) is an admirable brief guide to the subject.

Another leading phase of unfolding man's ancestry and evolution has been the tracing of his development from an early parent anthropoid stock and indicating his relation to the anthropoid apes. The man who blazed the trail here, after Darwin himself, was the great English naturalist, Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895). In his *Man's Place in Nature* (1863), he clearly demonstrated man's place among the primates and his genetic relationship with the lower forms of simian life. The same position was taken with equal candor and enthusiasm by Paul Broca in France. They found strong support in Germany in the writings of Ernst Haeckel and Robert Hartmann. The latest evidence has been assembled by such writers as Arthur Keith, C. F. Sonntag, in his *The Morphology and Evolution of the Apes and Man* (1924), F. Woods Jones, in his *Man's Place Among the Mammals* (1929), H. H. Wilder, in his *Pedigree of the Human Race* (1927), W. K. Gregory, in his *Man's Place Among the Anthropoids* (1934), W. E. LeGros Clark, in his *Early Forerunners of Man* (1934), S. Zuckermann, in his *Functional Affinities of Man, Monkeys and Apes* (1933), and especially Earnest Albert Hooton, in his *Up from the Ape* (1931). The fact of man's affinity with the other primates can no longer be doubted by literate persons.

A large number of physical anthropologists have devoted much of their time to a study of the fossil remains of man. The pioneer was Sir John Lubbock (Lord Avebury), the first distinguished English scientist to sponsor the views of Boucher de Perthes as to the antiquity of man in western Europe. Lubbock was as much a sociologist and archeologist as a physical anthropologist. Also in the main an archeologist, but rendering great assistance in the study of the fossil remains of man in France, was the Abbé Henri Breuil, whose work was heavily drawn upon by Henry Fairfield Osborn in his *Men of the Old Stone Age* (1915). René Verneau is the chief authority on the races of the Upper Paleolithic. In Germany, Gustav Schwalbe helped to clarify the facts relative to the *Pithecanthropus erectus* and the Neandertal species; Hermann Klaatsch and Otto Hausser studied both the Neandertal type and the examples of *Homo sapiens* that appeared in the Aurignacian period; Otto Schoetensack investigated the physical traits of the Australian natives, and named and studied in detail

Homo heidelbergensis; Eugen Fischer gave special attention to racial evolution during the Upper Paleolithic; Alfred Schliz has summarized the evidence for early man in Germany in his *Die diluvialen Menschenreste Deutschlands* (1912); Hugo Obermaier, more archeologist than anthropologist, has surveyed the skeletal remains and artifacts of early man in Europe in his *Der Mensch der Vorzeit* (1912); and Hans Weinert has continued work in this field in his *Menschen der Vorzeit* (1930).

In England, W. L. H. Duckworth provided an excellent introduction to the facts about the fossil remains of man in his *Prehistoric Man* (1912); G. Elliot Smith has devoted special attention to the Piltdown skull and to the London skull, found in 1925, and has brought together the evidence relative to the descent of man in his *Evolution of Man* (1927); G. M. Morant has made the most thorough of all studies of the Neandertal skulls and has also analyzed the Rhodesian skull; and Arthur Keith, in his *Antiquity of Man* (1925), and his *New Discoveries Relating to the Antiquity of Man* (1931), has provided us with the best general guide in any language to the facts regarding the ancient skeletal remains of man.

In the United States, Henry Fairfield Osborn brought over the contributions of the French anthropologists and archeologists relative to fossil man; Aleš Hrdlička has kept us up to date in regard to the discoveries of fossil men in his *The Most Ancient Skeletal Remains of Man* (1914), and *The Skeletal Remains of Early Man* (1931); J. H. McGregor has kept us abreast of the discoveries and literature relative to early man; E. A. Hooton has provided the most sprightly of all summaries of the evidence relative to fossil man in his *Up from the Ape;* and George Grant MacCurdy has edited a symposium on *Early Man* (1937), which brings the whole story approximately down to date.

We may now summarize the outstanding achievements of the physical anthropologists in uncovering fossil men and clarifying the physical ancestry of man. We shall describe these finds in the relative order of their antiquity and primitiveness, rather than in the order of the chronological sequence of the discoveries themselves. For example, the most primitive type of human skull ever found was the Java man, *Pithecanthropus erectus,* uncovered in 1891–1892, while the first fossil skeleton to be discovered was a Neandertal skeleton, dug up at Forbes Quarry on the Rock of Gibraltar in 1848.

The German evolutionary biologist, Ernst Haeckel, predicted that we would some day find the missing link between the apes and man, and christened this being in advance, *Pithecanthropus* (ape-man). In 1891–1892, Eugene Dubois, a Dutch anatomist serving as a military surgeon in the East Indies, dug up a skull and some other remains on a river bank amidst the volcanic hills of central Java. The skull was so rudimentary and yet so evidently human that Dubois thought it satisfied Haeckel's

description of the potential ape-man. Since the thigh bone showed that this man had walked erect, Dubois gave the name *Pithecanthropus erectus* (erect-walking ape-man) to this specimen, who is the "Adam of the physical anthropologists." He is the most ape-like in brain and skull of any human type yet found. In this sense, he is an ape-man and a missing link. He may either have been ancestral to modern types of man in the East Indian area, or the end of one line of human evolution. The discovery, since 1931, of about a dozen more highly developed types in that region showing some affinity with *Pithecanthropus,* gives more credibility to the ancestral hypothesis. In 1936, Dr. G. H. von Koenigswald found the skull of a primordial youth in eastern Java. It seems to belong with the *Pithecanthropus* family and thus to dispel any notion that the latter type was unique, isolated or spurious. *Pithecanthropus* probably lived about 500,000 years ago.

Next in the serial order of evolutionary development was a far more recent find, the Peking man, discovered about forty miles southwest of Peking in 1929 by a Chinese paleontologist, W. C. Pei. A second and generally similar skull was found in the summer of 1930. China has been regarded by a number of scientists, such as Henry Fairfield Osborn and Franklin Henry Giddings, as the birthplace of mankind. Some primitive human teeth had been found there in 1926–1927, on the basis of which find a Canadian anatomist, Davidson Black, then teaching in a Peking medical college, postulated a new and rudimentary human type, *Sinanthropus pekinensis* (Chinese man of Peking). Dr. Pei's find vindicated his daring guess to the full. It is the skull of a female, slightly larger than that of *Pithecanthropus* but still a very rudimentary human type. Opinions as to its antiquity vary greatly. The German authority, Hans Weinert, believes that the skull is definitely of the *Pithecanthropus* family, while Hrdlička holds that it is Neandertaloid. The more general judgment is that the Peking man (woman) was the ancestor of both the Neandertal type and *Homo sapiens,* and lived about the same time as *Pithecanthropus*—a half million years ago. The discovery of a number of skeletons after 1929 indicates that these Chinese excavations, if not ruined by war, will prove the most important in the history of physical anthropology. The most scholarly study of the Chinese skeletal remains has been made by Franz Weidenreich, the German who took Davidson Black's post at Peking.

Even more of a puzzle is the skull and jaw found in Sussex, England, by Charles Dawson in 1911–1912, and known variously as *Eoanthropus dawsoni* (Dawson's dawn man) and the Piltdown man (from the Piltdown Common where the find was made). Once again, this "man" was a female, and Professor Hooton has called her "the first female intellectual." Since the skull indicates a brain capacity equal to that of the earlier forms of *Homo sapiens,* while the jaw resembles that of a chimpanzee, the find was long regarded as a freak. But the discovery, in 1915, of

a similar skull two miles away made it seem a perfectly valid type. The anomalies of the find have produced widely different interpretations. Osborn looked upon it as a proof of Tertiary man, the oldest known human fossil, while H. F. Friedrichs thought it might even be of Neolithic recency. Professor Hooton believes that in it we have the true ancestor of *Homo sapiens* in Europe, or at least the closest approximation to such yet uncovered. This type probably lived around 350,000 years ago, though it may have been as recent as 200,000.

An early human type, which lived sometime between 150,000 and 300,000 years ago, was uncovered in a sand pit at Mauer near Heidelberg in 1907. It was a suitable reward for the patient waiting of Professor Otto Schoetensack of the University of Heidelberg, who had visited the pit at frequent intervals for twenty years, in the hope that workmen might unearth a fossil man. The find, a massive lower jaw, was immediately christened *Homo heidelbergensis*. The type is regarded as a definitely pre-Neandertaloid form, probably the ancestor of the Neandertal race, though the absence of the brain-case makes this suggestion partially speculative. Physical anthropologists believe that the closest affinity of Heidelberg man is with the Peking man. Certainly, they resemble each other more than either does the Piltdown lady.

The most profuse collection of skeletons representing any early type of man are those of the Neandertal type, so called because the first publicized skeleton of this race was dug up in 1856 in the Neandertal ravine, near Düsseldorf, Germany. Since then dozens of such skeletons have been unearthed, from the Channel Islands to Palestine, and from Germany to Gibraltar. One reason for this profusion of skeletal remains is that this race, the creator of Mousterian culture, dominated the European scene from about 100,000 years ago until it disappeared some 30,000 years ago. The whole "historic" period is but a fleeting moment, when compared to the Neandertal episode. Another reason is that it was the first type to practice deliberate burial. More Neandertal skeletons have been discovered in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth, especially important being the many finds in Palestine since the Galilee skull was turned up in 1925. It is believed that the Neandertal race was killed off by the "smarter" types of *Homo sapiens* who began to appear about 30,000 years ago. Others think that the two types interbred and amalgamated.

For a time it was believed that the Neandertal type had even invaded Africa and penetrated its entire length, since in 1921 the skull of the so-called Rhodesian man was uncovered by a miner in the Broken Hill mine in Rhodesia. While this bears a superficial resemblance to the Neandertal variety of early man, physical anthropologists are now agreed that it is not a Neandertal form. It seems most reasonable to regard it as a cousin of the Neandertal species, both being descended from "a low Pliocene human stock."

The date of the coming of *Homo sapiens* is a much debated theme. If one accepts as authentic the Galley Hill skeleton, discovered in 1888 in the Thames valley near London, then a type of man with a brain capacity equal to the uncivilized races of today was living in the lower Paleolithic age and the Pleistocene period. This would throw back impressively the primitive human ancestry of man and make types like the Heidelberg man seem mere vestiges. Confirmation of the thesis of the early appearance of *Homo sapiens* was provided in 1935, when the Swanscombe man was discovered in an upper terrace gravel of the Thames. It was found *in situ* along with Acheulean implements. This find has been studied and described by Marston, Keith and Clark. The more common belief is that *Homo sapiens* came into Europe from Africa or Asia and displaced, perhaps absorbing, the Neandertals during the early part of the Upper Paleolithic.

Some early types of assured *Homo sapiens* date from the Aurignacian period. One is the so-called Grimaldi race, discovered in 1901 in the Grimaldi caves near Monaco on the Mediterranean coast. These two skeletons, while showing Negroid traits, had the brain capacity of lower types of modern man. Another Aurignacian inhabitant, devoid of Negroid traits, is exemplified by the nearly complete Combe-Capelle skull, unearthed in France in 1900. The Brünn race, uncovered in Moravia in 1891, was a type of *Homo sapiens* who lived in the Solutrean period. The most famous and prevalent of all Upper Paleolithic types were the Cromagnons, who appeared in the Aurignacian period and dominated the rest of the Old Stone Age. The first of these skeletons were dug up by the geologist, Louis Lartet, in 1868 at the rock shelter of Cromagnon in south central France. The new race was christened the Cromagnons by no less a personage than Quatrefages. They were a tall, well formed type, with a brain capacity equal to the best types of our own day. In the Magdalenian period a new race, called the Chancelade type, made its appearance. The type skeleton was discovered in 1888 in a rock shelter near the village of Chancelade in the Dordogne region of France. It presented some physical traits reminiscent of the Mongoloid characteristics of the Eskimo.

Early types of *Homo sapiens* have also been found in Asia and Africa. The Wadjak man, discovered by Dubois in 1889, seems to be an ancestor of the Australian aborigines. The dozen or more skeletons of the Solo man, dug up in Java recently, indicate an intermediate stage between *Pithecanthropus* and the Wadjak man. The Boskop man, unearthed in the Transvaal in 1913, is definitely an early type of *Homo sapiens*. All races which inhabited the Neolithic period are modern types. America was peopled by *Homo sapiens,* coming in from Asia with an early Neolithic or very late Paleolithic culture anywhere between 20,000 and 12,000 years ago.

III. Some Representative Efforts to Classify Races

One of the major interests of the physical anthropologists has been the classification of races on the basis of a number of physical criteria. Indeed, this has absorbed much of the time of some of the ablest of such scientists, for example, Quatrefages, Topinard, von Luschan, Sergi, Haddon and others.

The first important classification of races was that derived from Holy Writ, namely, the legend of the dispersal of the sons of Noah, Japhet, Shem and Ham, each of whom was supposed to have founded a main race of men. In biblical times, Japhet was credited with founding the Greeks, Romans, and other northern pagans, Shem the Semitic peoples, and Ham the Egyptians and related groups. This general notion of the derivation of the major races from the sons of Noah prevailed right down to modern times. Indeed, the great French naturalist, Georges Cuvier (1769–1832), adopted the scheme, attributing to Japhet the parenthood of the Caucasian race, to Shem that of the Mongolians, and to Ham that of the African races. The fact that some of the Hamites were Negroes was explained by the curse which Noah laid on Canaan, the son of Ham.

The earliest secular classification of the races of man was made by a French savant and traveller, François Bernier (1625–1688), who, in 1684, divided mankind into four main groups: the White race, including the Hindus; the Black or African race; the Mongol Asiatics; and the "little stunted" Lapps. In the first edition of his *System of Nature* (1735), Linnaeus differentiated four main varieties of man—the white Europeans, the yellow Asiatics, the African blacks, and the American redmen. In later editions he elaborated this simple and rational classification into more complex and somewhat fantastic divisions.

We have already referred to the classification set forth by Blumenbach (1775), on the basis of both head-form and skin-color, namely, the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Ethiopian, the American, and the Malayan. The most unfortunate element in this classification was Blumenbach's invention of the term Caucasian to designate the White race, since the Caucasus is a cauldron of mixed and diversified races, about the only one that is absent being the blonde, blue-eyed European (i. e., Caucasian) type.

The classification of the white races of Europe was promoted by Dr. John Beddoe, in his *Races of Britain* (1885) and *The Anthropological History of Europe* (1893), based on studies of skin-, eye- and hair-color, by G. Vacher de Lapouge, by Topinard and others. From their work we have derived the classical three-fold division of Nordic (Baltic, Teutonic), Alpine and Mediterranean.

In the middle of the nineteenth century there was a definite trend away from the simple and rational classification based on head-form and skin-color to one which subordinated these to hair texture and increased the

number of races to a perplexing and indefensible degree. We have already mentioned the attempt to classify races on the basis of hair texture by Saint-Vincent, Saint-Hilaire and others, which was given scientific standing by Huxley's benediction in 1870. The most influential exponent of the hair criterion was Dr. Pruner Bey who, in 1863, went so far as to say that "a single hair presenting the average form characteristic of the race might serve to define it." Relying mainly on hair texture, but combining this with head-form and skin-color, Haeckel postulated thirty-four races in 1879, Topinard some nineteen in 1885, and Deniker no less than twenty-nine in 1900. As late as 1909, A. C. Haddon still relied primarily on hair texture as the criterion of race.

The most widely read of these classifiers who were prodigal with racial groups was Joseph Deniker, a Russian engineer who turned anthropologist and settled down in Paris after extensive European and Asiatic travels. His classification of races, in his oft-reprinted and much translated *Races of Man* (1900), held the field for a generation. Using hair texture as the chief criterion of race, he postulated six main types:

1. Woolly hair, with broad nose.
2. Curly or wavy hair.
3. Wavy brown or black hair, dark eyes.
4. Fair, wavy or straight hair, light eyes.
5. Straight or wavy hair, dark, black eyes.
6. Straight hair.

These he further divided into twenty-nine different races. His work was the culmination of the era of racial obfuscators.

There was a reaction towards simplicity at the turn of the century. Indeed, A. H. Keane in England had, in 1895, returned to the four-fold classification of the first edition of Linnaeus's work. Giuseppe Sergi even reverted to the *norma verticalis* of Blumenbach in classifying races, and devoted most of his attention to the Mediterranean race, whose large rôle in human history he was the first fully to appreciate.

But the bible of the rationalists and simplifiers was the *Races of Europe* (1899), by W. Z. Ripley, a brilliant young American writer who was later to win equal fame as an economist and critic of finance capitalism. Accepting the conventional division of races into three main types, he divided the White race into the Teutonic (Nordic of Deniker), the Alpine and the Mediterranean. His classification is still followed by the moderates in physical anthropology. Incidentally, Ripley blasted the idea of any physical "Aryan" race, showing that the term Aryan is of purely linguistic and literary significance. Ripley's work has been revamped and brought up to date in the light of new evidence and new methods by Carleton S. Coon in his *The Races of Europe* (1939).

In his useful *Racial History of Man* (1922), Roland B. Dixon of Harvard suggested eight major races of man, based upon three physical

criteria—all of them variations of head-form: (1) the cephalic index; (2) the length-height index; and (3) the nasal index. The resulting racial divisions are as follows: Caspian, Mediterranean, Proto-Negroid, Proto-Australoid, Alpine, Ural, Palæ-Alpine, and Mongoloid.

The latest impressive effort at racial classification is that of the German anthropologist Egon von Eickstedt, in his *Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit* (1934). It is an interesting combination of Ripley and Deniker, in which Ripley's major divisions are accepted and then sub-divided roughly in accordance with Deniker's scheme. Another important contribution to racial classification in the present generation is that of the Frenchman, Georges Montandon, in his *L'Ologenèse humaine* (1928). Racial history and physical anthropology have recently been ably linked by Hans Weinert.

The subject of race mixture has been one of the most competently cultivated branches of physical anthropology. Pioneer work was done by Boas, Fischer and Davenport, and later and better studies have been made by Dunn, Tozzer, Shapiro, Williams, Day, Herskovits and Rodenwaldt. Important also are the anthropological studies made of human growth and of changes in physical and racial types allegedly ascribable to environmental influence. Boas did pioneer work here also, and later contributions have been G. T. Bowles's *New Types of Old Americans at Harvard,* and H. L. Shapiro's *Migration and Environment.*

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[10]

PHYSICAL DETERMINATION OF RACE

W. W. Howells

I. Definition and Classification of Races

Race can hardly be defined in an aphorism. "A race," says Hooton,[1] "is a great division of mankind, the members of which, though individually varying, are characterized as a group by a certain combination of morphological and metrical features, principally non-adaptive, which have been derived from their common descent." Though it may be something of a mouthful, this definition nevertheless embraces all of the implications in the present day conception of what the term signifies.

"Race" as a word has been overworked and abused. Originally it signified a lineage, or community of source, much as Wagner used it in speaking of the "Race of the Volsungs." Buffon and later students of natural history pressed it into its present general meaning, but it was Topinard[2] who best expounded the accumulated beliefs which are current today. Race, he stated, is real but intangible. "Race, in the actual state of affairs, is an abstract conception, a notion of continuity in discontinuity, of unity in disunity." "Races are hereditary types; not attributable to the repetition in a series of individuals of the same general influence of environment; types, not of a family, but of an assemblage of families, of a more or less extended group." The reality of a race, he said, depends first, on the determination of its type by the analysis and subsequent synthesis of the characters composing it, and second, on the proof of its continuity in time. From "races" he distinguished "peoples," the actual geographic or tribal groups as they exist at present, without regard to their ethnic composition, and "types," the physical "type" being the average in all measurements and the summation of the distinctive traits of a group, whether the latter be racially simple or not. Thus if the "types" of two "peoples" are found to be the same, they are held to be of the same "race."

Hooton's definition manages to contain the above ideas as succinctly as possible, and without leaving out two important points: the variation of

[1] E. A. Hooton, *Up from the Ape* (1931).

[2] P. Topinard, *Éléments d'anthropologie générale* (Paris, 1885).

the individuals, a primary biological phenomenon, and the fact that racial characters are "principally non-adaptive," which is to say that the typically "racial" features, like hair form or head shape, have little functional significance and are not forced continually through the sieve of natural selection.

However, it is the phrase "a certain combination of morphological and metrical features" which epitomizes the history of racial studies. There is no one key which will unlock all the doors of race, but the earliest attempts at classification nevertheless proceeded on such a belief. The first of these was, naturally, based on skin color, and White, Yellow and Black was for a long time considered a satisfactory division. The form of the hair—straight, wavy or woolly—was also used. Acquaintance with more and more peoples, however, led to the rejection of the supposition that there existed any character whose variations would isolate, in a descriptive sense, all of the varieties of man. Physical features gradually came to be thought of simply as racial attributes, rather than racial distinguishers, especially with the introduction of more sophisticated characters such as the projection of the face, or the cephalic index, expressing the shape of the head, which in turn foreshadowed the full development of the use of measurements.[3] A series of men, beginning with Blumenbach and including Huxley, Topinard and Deniker, saw that to describe a racial type uniquely it was necessary to make use of a considerable number of criteria. The solution of the problem of description did not, however, solve that of classification. As more criteria were used, and as the practise of using measurable features expanded, the fact of individual variation became more obvious, and this, combined with the overlapping between different groups, gave an effect of almost continuous gradation in racial type from one extreme to another. Because of this there is still no fully accepted system of classification and there continues to be a good deal of disagreement as to the number of races and their relationships, while some anthropologists have been led to deprecate the whole significance of race.

Classification is further made difficult by the fact that there are different levels, so to speak, of racial variation, representing more than one stage of differentiation. There are no general terms to distinguish between them, although they are recognized by writers who speak of "major races" and "subraces," of "racial stocks" and races, or of primary and secondary races. Hooton,[4] for example, speaks of the "White group," within which there are such "races" as the Alpine and "sub-races," less distinct, such as the Arab or the Celtic; on the other hand, he defines a primary race as one

[3] This transition was probably retarded by the monogenesis *vs.* polygenesis controversy, since believers in the latter philosophy naturally sought for definite, specific characters by which the races might be told apart.

[4] *Op. cit.*

which is the result only of its own evolution and a secondary race as a mixture of primary races. These last definitions imply knowledge of the origins of races, however; I should prefer to use "primary" and "secondary" to mark the distinction between the principal racial stocks and the special races within, or deriving from, these stocks. The primary races, by general agreement, are the White, Mongoloid, Negroid, and Australian, to which is commonly added the American Indian; the secondary races are those subdivisions of (as well as mixtures between) the primary races which are conspicuous, to ourselves, in the White stock, but which are visible as well in all the others excepting the native Australian. Now, although the period of evolution has been the same for all, some races seem more distinct than others, and Keith [5] once suggested the terms "pandiacritic" and "adiacritic" to imply that certain groups had or had not completed their racial differentiation. It seems likely, however, that these inequalities in clarity of definition, as well as the distinction between primary and secondary races, are of no special significance in themselves, but are the natural outcome of racial history as a whole.

The primary races are probably very old. To Weidenreich,[6] Peking man adumbrates the Mongoloid form in certain ways, but it seems likely that all races sprang from a type which was already *Homo sapiens,* and various evidence, such as the Swanscombe skull,[7] indicates that this itself was ancient, or at least coexistent with some of the other species of man. The types of the Upper Paleolithic in Europe which appeared on the heels of Neandertal man were already of a definitely White character, with an occasional Mongoloid or Negroid form (Chancelade, Grimaldi) to show that the differentiation was consistent with modern types. These races therefore must have undergone a long prior process of development, the vessels undoubtedly being fairly small populations, somewhat isolated from one another, which remained relatively homogeneous as evolution progressed. The native population of Australia, small, semi-nomadic, and poor in culture, suggests the probable circumstances.[8]

The rudimentary bodies, the *anlage,* so to speak, of the primary races did not, however, all bud from the common parent stock at the same time, and they have undergone specialization and progressed in the "hu-

[5] A. Keith, "The Evolution of the Human Races," *Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst.,* LVIII (1928), 305–21.

[6] "The Dentition of Sinanthropus Pekinensis," *Paleontologica Sinica,* No. 101, 2 vols. (1937).

[7] "Report on the Swanscombe Skull," *Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst.,* LXVIII (1938), 17–98.

[8] Bagehot postulated an early "race-making period" of rapid racial evolution, when the absence of culture, or self-domestication, permitted natural selection to act in its full potency. It is doubtful, however, if natural selection has been of prime importance in forming race; be it remembered that the characters of race are "principally non-adaptive."

man" direction to widely different degrees. The native Australian, whose whole frame is a what-not full of primitive human features, is obviously the oldest race (if the phrase has any meaning), having stagnated at this low stage of development while the rest of mankind advanced; he exhibits neither specialization nor progressiveness. The Negro in all likelihood was next to follow the Australian into isolation, physical, and probably geographical as well; he is highly specialized but not particularly progressive. The variable American Indian type was made up of a number of migrant samples given off by a proto-Mongoloid stock [9] which was variable itself and at the time was probably still closely related to a large-faced proto-White stock; the Indian is not specialized but he is moderately progressive. Certain sections of the Mongoloid stock have since become "fully differentiated," and are highly specialized and progressive, while the White races are intermediate in both qualities to these and the Indians.

The tendency toward diversification is constant, and secondary races have arisen by division and specialization within the primary stocks. They have also been formed by interracial mixtures. These processes have accompanied one another with the factor of mixture becoming more important as the human population grew, although in specific cases it is often difficult to say what has taken place. It cannot be said whether the South African Bushman is the result, primarily, of mixture or of specialization. The White stock is the best example of the combined working of both factors, which have undoubtedly been operating against each other for a long period, or ever since the population of the world reached a certain size. The most striking or extreme types (e. g., Nordic) within any racial stock are so fringed about with intermediate or less "differentiated" forms, some of them plainly mixed, that the idea naturally springs to mind that races were formerly "purer" and that mixture has destroyed a once definitely outlined form, whereas all the evidence of biology and archeology makes it probable that the principal races have steadily become more specialized. In other words, it is unlikely that the Nordics have ever been purer or more extreme within their special habitat. The belief in pure races, which can cite only Noah and his sons, supposes that the human stock suddenly fathered several pure and radically different lines, the archetypes of the present races, which have been converging through mixture ever since. This is biologically absurd.

II. Methods and Postulates of Research

With such methods as it has, physical anthropology does not directly approach the primary races or even the secondary races, but only the ultimate divisions of the latter, which are perhaps best described as local types.

[9] Unless the Indian is to be explained, not as a primary race, but as a secondary race composed of a mixture of Mongoloid, White, and other strains. See Hooton, *The Indians of Pecos Pueblo* (1930).

(Examples of such types may be found in the peoples of the several island groups of Polynesia, who are nevertheless thought of as constituting a single "race.") The primary races differ so widely, and their development took place so long ago, that it is difficult to make any of the pertinent facts mesh, and discussion of them is necessarily restricted to theoretical probabilities resting on a little zoölogical and archeological evidence. Paradoxically, the anthropologist is equipped to interpret differences between groups only when these differences are relatively small. He may estimate whether they are significant or not, whether they are due to mixture or to local deviation, and so forth. Accordingly, the scientific working out of racial history must proceed from the smallest groupings to the larger.

The physical anthropologist approaches such problems armed, figuratively speaking, with calipers and a calculating machine. Using the calipers, he makes measurements of a standardized nature on his subjects, doing this as carefully as possible, since inept measuring would make any further handling of the data meaningless. With the calculating machine, he establishes the average type of his subjects in the features he has measured and observed, and he can thus distinguish minute differences between groups which would otherwise not be apparent; not only this, but he can tell from simple statistical devices, the standard deviation and the probable error, what the probabilities are of his making mistakes, either in choosing the subjects of his group or in estimating the significance of the differences between two groups.

This is the standard form of racial investigation, but anthropologists have been pausing lately to consider the value of their methods, and they have found that both in measuring and in statistical treatment there are discouraging flaws. The growth of the use of statistics has emphasized the need for great exactness in measuring, and it has been realized only recently that measurements are very difficult to standardize.[10] There has always been disagreement as to what measurements shall be used, but aside from this it has become very plain that even the most experienced workers may take the same measurement with personal variations which strongly affect the results. If there is thus a grave question whether the figures of the best workers may be compared with one another, it is easy to realize that the literature of the last eighty years is full of dead wood. To deal with these difficulties two committees have recently been formed, one American [11] and the other international,[12] which are supervising spe-

[10] M. L. Tildesley, "Racial Anthropometry: A Plan to Obtain International Uniformity of Method," *Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst.*, LVIII (1928), 351–62; C. B. Davenport, M. Steggerda and W. Drager, "Critical Examination of Physical Anthropology on the Living," *Proc. Am. Ac. Arts and Sci.*, LXIX, No. 6 (1934).

[11] Committee on Anthropometric Interests, of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists.

[12] Comité de Standardisation de la Technique Anthropologique, of the Congrès International des Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques.

cific investigations into various techniques of measurement with a view to making some recommendations and reducing the confusion which prevails. While this work has only been started, it has at any rate been made clear that new techniques are not needed as much as some general agreement as to those already in use.

The difficulties in mathematical treatment are also partly due to a lack of agreement, though of a somewhat different sort: the discussion concerns the limits of the value of statistics, and there are several schools of opinion among whom there is little meeting of the minds. One group [13] eschews measurement almost entirely and analyzes a population into its racial elements by a process of personal estimation which is reminiscent of divination. Another school is that which distrusts from conviction the application of exact statistical methods to any matter under the mysterious control of biology, but nevertheless uses the means of measurement in the traditional manner, as descriptive of zoölogical characters. The greatest number of investigators use statistical devices freely, as suits their purposes. Beyond these, however, there are certain schools which make a general application of very precise and complicated formulae, such as that of Czekanowski [14] or the Coefficient of Racial Likeness of Pearson.[15] The latter is an attempt to express in a single figure the degree of unlikeness of any two series of men or crania, so that a whole system of relationships may be set up. While it has been widely used, particularly by Pearson's associates and students, it has been objected to by statisticians on mathematical grounds, and by some of the anthropologists, who feel that it is too refined for the material on which it is based, investing the results in an aura of precision which is probably false.[16] The statistical arm certainly has its own inherent limitations, but all of these differences in credo and usage with regard to it have had a Tower of Babel influence on general considerations of race.

In spite of such difficulties the use of careful measurement and observation, followed by mathematical reduction of the data, remains the best approach to racial studies, since it is the only system by which it seems possible to apply the methods of exact science to man. It entails certain assumptions, however. If the movements of peoples, and their relationships, are to be discovered by an analysis of their physical features, then it must be

[13] E. von Eickstedt, *Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit* (Stuttgart, 1934).

[14] J. Czekanowski, "Das Typenfrequenzgesetz," *Anthropologischer Anzeiger,* V (1928), 335–59.

[15] K. Pearson, "On the Coefficient of Racial Likeness," *Biometrika,* XVIII (1926), 105–17.

[16] R. A. Fisher, "The Coefficient of Racial Likeness and the Future of Craniometry," *Jour. Roy Anthr. Inst.,* LXVI (1936), 57–63; C. C. Seltzer, "A Critique of the Coefficient of Racial Likeness," *Am. Jour. of Phys. Anthr.,* XXIII (1937), 101–9.

taken for granted, first, that these features in a group are inherited or transported intact, responding only to slow evolutionary changes, and second, that mixed groups will reveal their nature somehow, principally by forming a type which is generally intermediate to those of its parents, but possibly by segregation. Now the behavior of racial features or any other human features in either simple or hybrid inheritance is hardly known at all.[17] Nothing appears to contradict the statement that "races are hereditary types"; but on the other hand there is no explanation of the causes of change, even in the striking case of such a clear phenomenon as the general replacement of long-headedness by round-headedness in vast areas of the world.

We must assume not only that race is inherited without change but also that it is transported without change; that migrations may be traced by uncovering similar types in separate regions. If this is to be the case, then racial features must be, as Topinard and others thought, highly resistant to changes in climate. The influence of environment was once held responsible for racial development, but it was not clearly shown and in the last few generations the notion has been banished from reputable circles. It is showing signs of returning. Some time ago Boas [18] found distinct measurable differences between Polish and Sicilian immigrants and their own children born in this country. Shapiro [19] has produced a clearer case in Japanese immigrants to Hawaii, their Hawaiian-born offspring and their relatives in their home prefectures in Japan, all of whom are unquestionably of the same stock. The immigrants differed significantly from the parent stock in a number of measurements and proportions, a phenomenon clearly due to some unconscious form of selection, since these people migrated only after attaining maturity. Their Hawaiian-born children displayed this selected inheritance in some features, but in many others showed new characteristics all their own, which were entirely unsuspected from either their parents or grandparents and which can only be set down to the influence of the new environment. What, within a stock, are the limits of this plasticity? They are probably small, but if such a relatively simple change in surroundings can produce this effect, new uncertainties are added to the problems of racial movements. How much, for

[17] The data, consisting mostly of case histories illustrating Mendelian inheritance in special, generally anomalous, features, have been summarized by R. R. Gates, in *Heredity in Man* (1929). Knowledge of racial characters has advanced very little since the classical race mixture studies of Fischer, *Die Rehebother Bastards* (1913); Rodenwaldt, *Die Mestizen auf Kisar* (1927), etc. These indicated no clear laws of inheritance, but Hooton, "Observations and Queries as to the Effect of Race Mixture on Certain Physical Characteristics," *Second International Congress of Eugenics,* Vol. II (1923), lists a few discernible tendencies: i. e., prognathism is apparently recessive, etc.

[18] F. Boas, *Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants* (1912).

[19] H. L. Shapiro, *Migration and Environment* (1939).

example, has this factor affected other known migrants, like the Polynesians or the American Indians?

The classification of races rests at present, as Hooton's definition implies, on morphological features, either external or skeletal. Study of racial variation in the soft parts and in physiology has remained in a rudimentary state, and neither department has supplied any criteria of race. Work on the soft parts suffers from the technical difficulties of making standard records and from the lack of material, for obvious reasons. If in ordinary anthropometry, dealing with external features, a hundred men of any ethnic stock are considered a minimum sample, one can judge the obstacles to obtaining data on racial differences in some internal organ. Of all parts, the brain has, naturally, had the lion's share of attention, albeit in the interests of comparative anatomy; although its racial aspects were approached over a hundred years ago, and numerous reports are available on brains of all races, the results, though promising, have not been integrated. While little of it has been done, work on other soft parts, particularly the muscles and their attachments, has revealed racial differences of great interest.[20]

Racial physiology is also a territory of great possibilities, and one which has already yielded positive results, such as differences in basal metabolism, incidence of certain diseases, etc.[21] This form of investigation is so new, however, and the field so vast, that anthropology has had little time to digest the results. It is therefore difficult to judge such suggestions as that of Keith [22] that differential functioning of the endocrine glands has had its share in race formation, or of Marett,[23] that the ulterior cause of this differential in endocrine function is to be found in the adjustment of the sodium or potassium metabolism, or similar responses, to the chemical nature of the soil in different areas.

III. The Study of Blood Groups

There is one physiological phenomenon of racial importance which has been intensively studied, and which for a time revived the hope for a single index of race. This is the blood groups. This study [24] has grown out of the discovery that the erythrocytes in human blood may contain either or both of two undetermined substances which will cause the cells of the blood to clot, or lump together, if they are introduced into blood in which

[20] E. Loth, *Anthropologie des parties molles* (Warsaw, 1931).

[21] For a general résumé see J. Schottky, *Rasse und Krankheit* (Munich, 1937). The *Zeitschrift für Rassenphysiologie* devotes itself largely to the blood groups.

[22] Keith, *op. cit.*

[23] J. R. de la H. Marett, *Race, Sex, and Environment* (London, 1936); "Environment, Endocrines and Race," *Zeitschrift für Rassenkunde,* III (1936), 190–8.

[24] See W. C. Boyd, "Blood Groups," *Tabulae Biologicae* (1939); *Handbuch der Blutgruppenkunde,* ed. P. Steffan (Munich, 1932).

the substances are not present.[25] In the study of their inheritance these structures are designated A and B; it is known that they form a series of three allelomorphs together with a gene for O, their absence, and that they are both dominant to O and thus always appear phenotypically, giving four groups, or types of blood: O, A, B, and AB.

These are all the facts about blood groups which are of any marked significance racially. The wide-spread contemporary interest in the groups from this point of view has two sources: they constitute almost the only unit character in human Mendelian inheritance yet discovered which is not anomalous or pathological, and which can be ascertained in any individual; and it was realized two decades ago that the proportions in which the groups, or the genes themselves, were found varied considerably, but to some extent consistently, among different geographic groups. It was this which fostered the hope that a character for racial diagnosis had been discovered. Data were gathered in large amounts, but they failed to conform significantly to accepted racial divisions. Some writers suggested that O was the primitive type of blood, A being a European and B a Mongoloid development. Ottenberg, and later Snyder,[26] postulated seven or more "classes," to which they gave names having racial connotations, but the bounds of these classes were soon burst by exceptions. Others professed to see connections between the frequency of one of the genes and of some sort of bodily features, such as blondness, but they failed to make allowances for racial differences. Those with most faith were led to suppose that if two groups showed similar distributions, they thereby revealed a community of origin, no matter how great their present external dissimilarity,[27] but it was examples of just this sort which finally destroyed the belief in any primary connection between race and any of the genes. Similarly, groups of the same racial constitution vary in their blood group composition within fairly wide limits, which also contradicts the above belief, although this is a situation only to be expected from the effects of isolation and the inbreeding of local groups, with the free segregation of the several genes.

On the whole, the distribution of the genes O, A and B seems to conform more to geography than to race. This distribution, as it is known today, may be described fairly simply in terms of the relationships of A to

[25] The same substances are now known to exist in almost every cell and fluid of the body, with a number of exceptions including the cerebro-spinal fluid, hair, cartilage, compact bone and a few others.

[26] R. Ottenberg, "A Classification of Human Races, Based on Geographical Distribution of the Blood Groups," *Jour. A.M.A.*, LXXXIV (1925), 1393–5; L. H. Snyder, "Human Blood Groups: Their Inheritance and Racial Significance," *Am. Jour. of Phys. Anthr.*, IX (1926), 233–63.

[27] L. H. Snyder, "The 'Laws' of Serologic Race-Classification Studies in Human Inheritance," *Human Biology*, II (1930), 128–33.

B, and of both to O. There are no peoples without O. B has a geographic center, or peak of concentration, in south central Asia, where it is the commonest type or gene, or at least definitely outweighs A. A is more diffuse, without any single geographic peak; in Europe, although the O group is large, the A gene is far more frequent than the B, and the same relations prevail in such peripheral areas as South Africa, far eastern Asia (Japan) and Melanesia. Between these outposts and the B center there is a gradual drop in the frequency of A and rise of B, so that in such areas as the Congo, the Near East and Indonesia the proportions of A and B are approximately equal. Beyond the above outposts, in the most marginal areas of all (Australia, easternmost Polynesia and the Americas), there seems, allowing for admixtures, to have been no B at all, and many groups of American Indians lack A as well, being entirely of group O.[28] Furthermore, those groups, Pacific and American, which have O and A only, tend to have a very high proportion of the latter, approximating 60 per cent. The one contradictory note in this general description, which has no other significant exceptions, is the reported presence of a considerable B element in the last reaches of the human empire, South America.

It was the revelation of this fairly simple correspondence to geography that put the quietus on the belief in the racial connections of the blood groups, and propounded at the same time the genetically inexplicable problem of their origin. The geographical distribution has led to the suggestion [29] that both A and B appeared (as single mutations), in that order, at definite times which were fairly recent in human history, and that they have attained their present distribution partly by the expansion and isolation of the various races, and to some extent by diffusion through race mixture. In this way the geographic distribution of the genes may be made partly to agree with the supposed events of race history. The American Indians, in successive groups, would have been crossing into America just as the A gene was appearing in Asia, so that the earlier migrants would be purely O while the later ones would have A. Likewise the native Australians, though generally supposed to have enjoyed the longest seclusion of all known groups, nevertheless received the A gene but not the B, the same being true of the oldest Polynesians, who lost contact with Asia between two and three thousand years ago. When B appeared, it would seem to have radiated outward from its present point of greatest frequency in central Asia.

[28] However, several workers, using absorption techniques which have not satisfied everyone as to their reliability on such material, have found both A and B in pre-Columbian mummies and skeletons from the Americas.

[29] W. W. Howells, "Anthropometry and Blood Types in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, *Anthr. Papers Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, XXXIII (1933); H. J. T. Bijlmer, "The Relation of Blood-Groups to Race and Some Particulars of the Southwest Pacific," *Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst.*, LXV (1935), 123–31.

This explanation, simple though it is, has unfortunately no conceivable basis in known genetics, and has to face a number of serious objections. In the first place, it supposes that the A and B genes are newly appeared in the human species, while the anthropoid apes are known to have them (or, at any rate, substances which cannot be distinguished from them), and similar structures are found in other animals, even outside of the vertebrates. In the second place, none of the genes appear to have any biological value whatever, so that natural selection can in no way explain the hypothetical increase of A or B in a stock in which they have appeared as single mutations or to which they have been diffused in small amounts. Finally, a mathematical handling of the question of the transmission of mutations, such as that of Fisher,[30] makes it clear that any single mutation without the aid of selective value is certain to disappear, and that repeated mutations of the same gene at the most general rate known for such repetitions would necessitate, before reaching a proportion of as much as 10 per cent of a human population, a period of 250,000 years. In the light of these facts the first hypothesis becomes impossible. B is absent from the American Indians and the Hawaiians not simply because they became isolated from it before it arose: this is impossible in terms of time. Nor, with repeated occurrences of a fairly simple gene like B, is there any reason why it should have a geographic center of strength or why it should have any recent date of appearance. The former feeling that A and B each originated once, as a lone mutation, and spread by an unknown process through the peoples of the world, thus becomes ridiculous.

Other hypotheses have accordingly been put forward. Kroeber,[31] calling attention to similar blood group proportions in dissimilar races, suggested that independent mutations of A and B might explain certain discrepancies, particularly the A and the (supposed) B in the Americas. But then why should not B have appeared as a mutation everywhere—in Australia, for example? This is, indeed, a difficulty in the whole idea of repeated mutations.

Boyd recognizes this, and also gives due weight to the apparent presence of all of the genes among the anthropoid apes: He suggests[32] that they have been the property of the human species from its beginning; that, as the meager human population spread throughout the world, loss mutations,

[30] See L. C. Wyman and W. C. Boyd, "Human Blood Groups and Anthropology," *Am. Anthr.*, XXXVII (1935), 181–200; R. R. Gates and G. E. Darby, "Blood Groups and Physiognomy of British Columbia Coastal Indians," *Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst.*, LXIV (1934), 23–44; R. R. Gates, "Rise and Spread of the A and B Blood Groups from the Mutationist Point of View," *Zeitschrift für Rassenkunde*, IX (1939), 58–63.

[31] A. L. Kroeber, "Blood-Group Classification," *Am. Jour. Phys. Anthr.*, XVIII (1934), 377–94.

[32] W. C. Boyd, *A Critique of Methods of Classifying Mankind, with Special Reference to Blood Groups*. Unpublished.

mainly of B, took place, which, because of the small numbers of some of the peripheral breeding groups, were able in a limited number of generations to eliminate B, and sometimes A, from some of these strains. A certain amount of blood group differentiation took place in this way, coincidentally with racial differentiation, but he is inclined to think that the latter was more subject to environmental adaptation than most students will admit. He considers, from their likeness in blood group pattern, that certain Europeans, Asiatics and Africans are basically related, their differences in pigment being of a more recent origin. As Boyd is quite aware, this idea sticks painfully in orthodox crops. It is acceptable from the point of view of genetics, but it does not square with all the historical facts.

Gates [33] has attempted to reconcile several of these explanations. It is quite possible, he says, that the presence of A and B in the apes is the result of convergent evolution. He also shows that the belief in a single mutational origin for either gene is not satisfactory, nor is it necessary, since rates of mutation are known to be relatively high in many features; but he suggests that there were limited centers for the genes (possibly with independent ones in the Americas and Africa) where the rate of mutation for some reason greatly expanded, and he cites the "White Indians" of San Blas, Panama, among whom there is an extraordinary frequency of albinism, as a parallel case. The difficulty with Gates' centers of mutation, as Boyd can show, is that the prevailing quantities of the genes today call for a higher rate of mutation than any yet known, even giving man a long history. Gates' view differs from Boyd's in that he puts racial differentiation first and blood group differentiation later.

None of the explanations so far put forward can be held to be entirely satisfactory. One cannot but regard the blood groups as one would an undeciphered but obviously meaningful script. The theory of a single mutation is unacceptable on genetic grounds, while the theory of multiple origins in many areas is refuted by the astonishingly orderly plan of the distribution of the genes. Gates' suggestion may be enlarged upon, however: neither the A nor the B gene is any more mysterious in its distribution than is the blondism of the Baltic countries, and an explanation of one case should fit the other. The ultimate cause remains obscure, but blondness in Europe can only have resulted from the establishment, for unknown reasons, of a high rate of mutations to depigmentation which took place principally within the peoples of the Nordic physical type, but also among the short round-heads of the so-called East Baltic race. In other words, if multiple mutations to a particular character can be endemic,

[33] R. R. Gates, "Recent Progress in Blood-Group Investigation," *Genetica,* XVIII (1936), 47–65; "Rise and Spread of the A and B Blood Groups from the Mutationist Point of View," *Zeitschrift für Rassenkunde,* IX (1939), 58–63; "Blood Groupings and Racial Classification," *Amer. Jour. Phys. Anthrop.,* XXIV (1939), 385–390.

we have a common explanation at least for north European blondness and both the A and B antinogens in human blood. (This necessitates, in the case of the blood groups, the assumption, which is generally accepted, that O is the original type.) At any rate, it is hard not to believe that the distinct geographical pattern of the distribution of the blood groups must have considerable significance for their true explanation.

There are now known to be certain other substances in human blood, similar to the A and B structures. They are more difficult to determine and little is known about them, but one set of these, designated M and N, promises to have a geographic distribution as interesting as that of the A and B groups. In the latter, moreover, there is another little-understood complication: the A gene seems in reality to have two forms which are almost identical in behavior.

IV. Other Kinds of Variation

Race is not the only plane in which the adult physical type varies, and to which anthropometric techniques are being applied. The effect of environmental influences has been demonstrated. Another system of cleavage is that of constitutional type: within any racial group there is a wide range of body build dominated by a factor which has not been clearly explained and which has been given no more explicit name than "constitution." Several classifications[34] of constitutional types have been set up, the earliest ones determined subjectively and based largely on the contrast between a narrow, lightly built, and a broad, heavy-set form. Later investigators have applied metrical methods: Viola segregated the types which were extreme, relative to the norm, and described these types with indices; Kretschmer analysed his anthropometric data for frequently recurring forms, or modal types around which his individuals tended to cluster. He and his followers use indices of the body to identify types, but some have adapted his typology to the use of the form of the face as an index. Admittedly, constitutional types are hard to treat with metrical techniques alone, especially as it is not certain whether they are merely extreme variations from the normal, as Viola thinks, or are discrete types in themselves. Nor is it known what the relations are between constitution and race.[35]

Related questions, such as the physical form of certain physiologically selected groups, have not as yet been widely prosecuted. Davenport and Love[36] found deviations in stature and weight among groups with such

[34] See F. Weidenreich, *Rasse und Körperbau* (Berlin, 1927).

[35] O. M. de Sousa, "Les Types morphologiques constitutionnels chez les Indochinois et les Malgaches," *L'Anthropologie,* XLIV (1934), 524–56.

[36] The Medical Department of U. S. Army in the World War, Vol. XV, "Statistics," Part I, "Army Anthropology" (1921).

diseases or defects as tuberculosis, exophthalmic goitre, varicose veins, etc. Pearl and Ciocco [37] found that those with recognizable heart ailments differed from the normal only in weight. Cancer groups among U.S. Army officers [38] were slightly (significantly?) less than normal in stature.

Hooton [39] conducted an extensive anthropometric survey of American criminals, and has found support, in different ways, for both Lombroso and Goring. Not only do criminals as a group differ significantly in many measurable and morphological ways from the civil population, but they have their peculiar variations according to the type of crime they commit. The evidence suggests as one possibility that criminality is related to some sort of constitutional deficiency. (Social influences, indicated by the differences in commitment ratios between foreign-born and native stock, or between different nationalities, do not concern us here.) Whatever may be the astral relation between body type and crime, Hooton found a definite factor of race. He segregated his series into racial types (such as Nordic, Mediterranean, mixed forms, etc.) without regard to nationality but purely on the basis of the anthropological characteristics of the individuals, and found these types to be associated with particular categories of crime. (It must be realized that all of these "associations" treat of groups, not individuals, and mean only that a form of crime and a physical type or feature combine to a degree in excess of what "chance," as statistically determined, might allow. Such associations are far from complete, therefore, and may be very small indeed.)

The question of racial differences in mental or psychic qualities [40] is, to understate the matter, enveloped in an aura of prejudice, and it has been generally assumed that a choice must be made between a transplantation of the democratic tradition that all men are created equal, and the doctrine of Aryanism with all its latterday spawn. The second school has fathered so much cruel nonsense that it has caused something of a stampede to the opposite extreme, and the conflict has been a deterrent and an impediment to self-respecting investigation into the field and has even caused the whole study of race to undergo a certain amount of baiting.

The practical sense of those who oppose race dogmatism is contained in this statement of Hooton's: "Anthropologists have found as yet no relation-

[37] R. Pearl and A. Ciocco, "Studies on Constitution, II. Somatological Differences Associated with Diseases of the Heart in White Males," *Human Biology,* VI (1934), 650–713.

[38] L. J. Reed and A. G. Love, "Biometric Studies on U. S. Army Officers—Somatological Norms in Disease," *Human Biology,* V (1933), 61–93.

[39] E. A. Hooton, *Crime and the Man* (1939).

[40] This is a subject which cannot be fully treated here. The reader is referred, for its history, with pros and cons, to F. H. Hankins, contribution to this volume, and *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (1926). For a résumé of the results of research in comparative mentality see T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology* (1931).

ship between any physical criterion of race and mental capacity, whether in individuals or in groups." [41] But this is not to deny that racial differences in mental attributes may exist. It is impossible to hold to the doctrine of evolution for man's body and to that of special creation for his mind. Physical anthropology can only assume that intelligence, since it varies and is demonstrably hereditary, has a physical basis, and that it is therefore subject to the same processes of evolution and racial differentiation as bodily characters. There can be small comfort for the race dogmatists in this assumption, since mental faculties will hardly be found in the category of the most distinctive racial features, the "non-adaptive."

To anthropology, the problem of race is still one of endeavoring to classify and delimit these breeds of man almost entirely through external characteristics, though the contributions of specialists in tangent fields promise to be helpful. The particular effort of the anthropologists at present is to perfect both their instrumental and statistical techniques, in the hope of being able to comprehend more exactly the actual nature (both racial and biological), of the groups with which they deal. Closer acquaintance, however, tends naturally to disclose greater complexities and more forms of human variation, so that classification is by no means becoming simpler.

The fact that few races, if any, seem to be "pure," however, is probably not as important as it seems. To give it importance it must be explained (by others than the Aryanists) what a pure race should be, and it must be shown that there ever existed purer races than those of today. To say that there are no pure races is not to say that there is no such thing as race, and the division of mankind into races remains a fact of supreme importance both for the study of man's history and for the exploration of his potentialities of development.

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[41] E. A. Hooton, *Apes, Men and Morons* (1937).

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DEMOGRAPHIC AND BIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Frank H. Hankins

I. Introductory Outline

This section falls into four separate divisions. The first of these deals with theories relating to the growth of population in three different cultural settings, primitive, Classical, and modern. Both limitations of space and assumed lack of reader interest led to the omission of the medieval European period. A restatement of the views of Malthus seemed unnecessary, in view of its frequent repetition.

In the second division the literature using the organismic concept is briefly surveyed. The brevity of the treatment is due to the consideration that, while the organismic analogy is still frequently encountered in some of its myriad forms, its use in professional writings is everywhere understood to have only illustrative value. The Classical uses of the conception of society as an organism have, therefore, interest only for the student of the history of social thought.

The third division covers various aspects of the enormous literature on racial differences and their rôle in human history. The treatment is limited mainly to the period since the publication of Gobineau's famous *Essai* (1853–5).

The fourth and last division deals with three aspects of the studies relating to human biology. These aspects are: (1) the advances in the quantitative methods of studying heredity and variation; (2) the problem of the causes of individual differences; and (3) the operation of selection. The period covered is mainly that since the publication of the *Origin of Species* (1859).

II. Theories of Population Trends

1. *Primitive Societies.* Although preliterate peoples have given us no written records of their theories of population, students of their cultures have found indubitable evidences of such theories in their practices. A complete survey of such, impossible in this brief sketch, would cover

theories of sex, sexual taboos, conception, reproduction, paternity and parenthood, the desire for children, numbers in relation to resources, fertility, mortality, means of restriction or elimination, adoption, race origins and race differences, and related questions. Moreover, in these few words, one cannot give an adequate picture of the great variation in cultural attitudes nor pay attention to what is exceptional. We limit ourselves to some aspects of reproduction and population increase.

The primitive's ideas regarding the anatomy, physiology and processes of reproduction are crude and often erroneous. While most savage peoples realize that there is a definite connection between copulation and subsequent birth, and most of them know that semen is associated with conception, not all anthropologists credit all primitives with even this limited knowledge. Spencer and Gillen and Malinowski, for example, incline to doubt whether the Australians and Melanesians understand the fact of biological paternity.[1] Conception and pregnancy, though they may often be given a partial realistic explanation, are nearly always explained also and primarily by magical and mystical concepts, especially the incarnation or reincarnation of spirits. Conception could thus be facilitated or avoided by magical processes, though even as regards birth control there is some evidence of bits of practical knowledge.[2]

The desire to have children is generally strong among nature peoples, due to a variety of practical reasons depending mainly on the organization of culture. Usually a man's status is improved some by marriage and still further by parenthood. Children "cost but little to maintain while young, and early attain self-support; may easily be abandoned, eaten, or sold in times of need, famine, war, migration, etc. Very early they can be put to service about the house, in the fields, with the flocks. The boy soon learns to fish, paddle, hunt; and the girl to tend the fire, carry wood, water, etc. She, too, will command a price when marriageable. In some cases, indeed, children form the chief wealth of the family." [3] Children are a support for old age and save the ancestral ghosts from torment. This desire for descendants is also the basis of marriage rites designed to increase the fertility of a union, to insure male offspring, or to improve the traits of offspring.[4] It also serves as a check on adultery or premarital intercourse,

[1] B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (London, 1899). B. Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages* (London, 1929), I, chap. vii.

[2] Norman Himes, *Medical History of Contraception* (London, 1936), chap. i. For ideas regarding pregnancy, child-birth, menstruation, sex differentiation and other biological matters, see J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough,* and Edward Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage.*

[3] A. J. Todd, *The Primitive Family as an Educational Agency* (1913), p. 101; cf. N. Miller, *The Child in Primitive Society* (1928), chap. iv.

[4] E. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage* (1922), I, 315; but see R. Briffault, *The Mothers* (1927), II, 25 ff.

when these are believed to be injurious to number or quality of offspring. It accounts also for the very general disrepute of sterility. In militaristic societies boys are often much preferred to girls, while in others, where the bride price is high, girls are preferred. The desire for a fruitful union not infrequently expresses itself in the preference for a bride that is already pregnant or a mother, and in numerous societies in a trial period preceding formal marriage in order to test fertility.[5]

This universal desire for offspring is, however, accompanied by the almost equally universal desire to restrict fertility. The primitive community is small, lives in a fixed habitat under relatively static cultural conditions, and being subject to fluctuations of climate experiences periods of scarcity and abundance. It usually lives close to the limit set by its resources and knows the meaning of starvation.[6] It is not remarkable, therefore, that methods of restriction of increase are nearly, if not quite, universal. These include, as negative restraints, contraception, abortion, taboo periods, prolonged lactation, and prepubertal intercourse; and as positive restraints, fighting, malignant magic, infanticide, and killing or neglect of the aged and defective. A. M. Carr-Saunders[7] advances the thesis, earlier enunciated by Spencer, that the natural fertility of primitive is less than that of civilized peoples, a view which has been seriously questioned by Wolfe.[8] It seems reasonable to suppose that the natural fertility of preliterate peoples was often reduced by hardship and diet; moreover, their actual fertility seems nowhere to have attained the high levels frequently observed among civilized peoples. While restrictive measures were often practised for a variety of reasons,[9] and enforced by curious magical and moral precepts, they were extensively rooted in the realities of the struggle for existence. The Australian aborigines justified infanticide by saying that "if their numbers increase too rapidly there would not be enough food for everybody."[10] Among the Gilbert Islanders no pair was allowed to rear more than four children; and among the Eastern Islanders "after a certain number had been born, all succeeding children were destroyed, lest the food supply should become insufficient."[11] In not a few cases the decision whether a child should live rested not with the parents but with a group of

[5] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I, 160–3.

[6] Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture* (1923), pp. 341–7; *An Introduction to Social Anthropology* (1929), pp. 33–6; A. L. Kroeber, "Handbook of the Indians of California," *Bull. Bur. Amer. Ethnol.*, No. 28 (1925).

[7] A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem* (Oxford, 1922).

[8] A. B. Wolfe, "The Fecundity and Fertility of Man," *Human Biology*, V (1933), 35–60.

[9] Herbert Aptekar, *Anjea: Infanticide, Abortion and Contraception in Savage Society* (1931).

[10] Quoted by Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 217, 220.

elders, evidence that in a small co-operative community the welfare of all is closely associated with their numbers. It was from such data that Carr-Saunders drew the conclusion that the native peoples, far from exemplifying the Malthusian pressure on their means of subsistence, tended to approach an optimum number through the above mentioned means of regulation. While it seems true that such peoples, living in small co-operative groups with static cultures, could learn from experience how many people could ordinarily be sustained in their limited territory, and while it seems probable that many of them did maintain a fair constancy of numbers, there is also evidence, in some cases, of considerable fluctuations in numbers due both to cultural changes and to wide variations in climatic conditions.

In any case, the decline during the past century is, in most areas, striking. To cite one instance only: the Hawaiian census of 1836 reported 108,579 natives; that of 1930 reported only 22,636 as full-blood Hawaiians, and Adams estimates 9780 of these to be hybrid.[12]

Repeated investigations of the causes of the decline and threatened disappearance of native peoples have resulted in wide disagreement as to the causes, though it is generally agreed that the decline has in most cases occurred since contact with Europeans. Rivers [13] held the primary cause to be the destruction of that "interest in life" which is based on a sense of tribal unity and confidence in the tribal deities, and that this destruction was due to missionary activities and the political and economic dominance of whites. Among other causes enumerated are: forced and recruited labor, attendant segregation of the sexes, venereal diseases, other new contagious diseases (especially measles, small-pox, dysentery, whooping-cough, influenza and tuberculosis), dirty and wet clothing, missionary and governmental interference with established tribal marital institutions, warfare and slaughter.[14] No doubt causes vary much from one area to another. In some cases there has been an increase in abortion and infanticide, mothers being unwilling to bear children to work for the white man; the Melanesians say: "Why should we bring children into the world only to work for the white man?" [15] In some cases there has been a decline in births due apparently to decrease of sexual desire or of fecundity; here and there it is probable that native diseases have increased in consequence of purely cultural disturbances. Disruption of the old morality has led to

[12] Romanzo Adams, *Interracial Marriage in Hawaii* (1937).

[13] W. H. R. Rivers, *Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia* (1922), chap. viii.

[14] The whole matter is summarized by G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races* (London, 1927), chaps. v, vi and viii, and by S. H. Roberts, *Population Problems of the Pacific* (London, 1927). For an intensive research on causes, see *Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Decrease of the Native Population, Suva, Fiji* (1896).

[15] Rivers, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

licentiousness, and even to demoralization and dejection. Of the natives of the New Hebrides, Dr. Felix Speiser says: "They are convinced that their days are numbered; that they have no future as a race; that they are neither wanted nor needed." [16] Race mixture and inbreeding are believed by some writers to have proven deleterious to race vigor, but this is very doubtful.[17] Although cousin marriages are widely approved and sometimes required, most preliterate peoples believe that mating within prohibited relationships is sinful and certain to be followed by dire consequences to parents and children.[18]

It seems not improbable that the native races will on the whole continue to decline, though there are instances of such readjustment to the new conditions set up by white contacts as to promise continuance and even increase in numbers. Native cultures are in general extremely inelastic; white governors and missionaries have heretofore been unaware of the significance of cultural disruption; intelligent efforts to save the natives may, however, serve in some cases to preserve them. This will rarely be done, nevertheless, without considerable race mixture, substitution or selection.

2. *Classical Civilizations.* The Greeks were Aryan in culture and hence their tradition and religion considered legitimate sons a sacred necessity and numerous offspring evidence of the favor of the gods. Being also invaders, numbers were essential for safety and dominance. As the Classical age approached we find Solon expressing some fear of over-population and giving express approval of infant exposure, which, as also abortion, seems to have been a long standing custom.[19] Increasing numbers led also to colonization, both as a free individual movement and as a public policy. In both Athens and Sparta celibacy was condemned by law and fruitless marriage by opinion. Marriage, while having religious and individual aspects, was above all designed to furnish citizens to a necessitous state.[20]

Aristotle's *Politics* reveals that some of his predecessors, notably Hippodamos of Miletus and Phidon of Corinth, set forth utopian concepts of city-states with strictly regulated populations, communistic or egalitarian principles, and the elimination of poverty. Both Plato and Aristotle seeking the ideal commonwealth, combining unity, order, proportion and high quality of citizens, set forth quite similar ideals. Both would limit numbers and use abortion, infanticide, and colonization to avoid excess, and

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[17] E. M. East, and D. F. Jones, *Inbreeding and Outbreeding* (1919); F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (1927), Part II, chap. vii. For a brief summary of evidences of effects of race mixture, see Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 352–86; also H. Shapiro, *The Heritage of the Bounty* (1937); and Adams, *op. cit.*

[18] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, II, 174–6; Briffault, *op. cit.*, I, 217–24.

[19] René Gonnard, *Histoire des doctrines de la population* (Paris, 1923), pp. 39–40.

[20] C. E. Stangeland, *Premalthusian Doctrines of Population* (1908), p. 31.

rewards for parenthood to avoid deficiency. The *Republic* limited communism to the two upper classes and laid down strict rules for the maintenance of quality of stock. The *Laws* sought equality of property and a stationary population by the proposal that the land should be divided into 5040 equally valuable parcels, one for each head of family, which could not be sold, mortgaged, divided, or increased. Aristotle also saw that inequality is a chief source of social instability and drew from observation of Sparta the conclusion that gross inequality may lead to depopulation. He also would take definite measures to preserve good quality.[21]

At a later date Polybius noted that Greece "suffers such decline of procreation and dearth of men that the cities are becoming depopulated." He attributed this to the taste for ease and luxury, and advocated a law requiring parenthood, unless popular standards of life underwent a change. Philip V of Macedon is said to have passed such a law. While the Stoics preached the duty of parenthood they failed to practise it. The Cynics and Epicureans, more honestly realistic, advised wise men to refrain from marriage as inimical to a life of contemplation.[22]

There are many parallels between Greek and Roman theories and practices. In Rome also the early Aryan religious ideals favored marriage and fertility. The *patria protestas* of the Roman father carried paternal authority to an extreme not equalled among other peoples of Aryan culture, and may well have been a factor in the notable prolificacy of the Roman population during their first centuries. With prosperity and the concurrent changes in social life the austerities of the early institutions gave place to increased ease and individualism; fertility declined. The prolific peasantry were ruined, their lands garnered into great estates and they themselves transformed into a dependent urban stratum. These changes were denounced by agronomists, publicists and moralists. In 131 B.C. the censor Q. Metellus, in view of the striking increase in celibacy and decline in fertility, suggested that all citizens be required to marry. Augustus Caesar tried various devices to restore natality. He offered land to the fathers of three children; sought to penalize celibacy and childless marriages through denial of inheritance rights; and gave citizenship privileges, remission of taxes and other advantages to the fathers of large families. Nevertheless, he found it necessary to resort to wholesale naturalization in order to recruit Roman citizens. The growth of individualism and egocentrism, the decline of religious piety and the dilution of patriotic feeling were opposed to the restoration of fertility. *Patria protestas* had been greatly attenuated; divorce had become easy; and to the patrician class, which

[21] See A. G. Roper, *Ancient Eugenics* (Oxford, 1913); Gonnard, *op. cit.*, Part I, chap. ii; Stangeland, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–6.

[22] Gonnard, *op. cit.*, Part I, chap. ii; Stangeland, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

Augustus especially wished to restore, the advantages of not having children seemed greater than the rewards offered by the state.

There is some difference of opinion as to the effectiveness of the Augustinian legislation. Though the population increased thereafter, the patrician class was not restored. That subsequent emperors looked upon the laws as desirable is shown by their continuance, with modification, until the triumph of Christianity. Here again the Greek parallel is significant, for the Christians, finding celibacy superior to marriage, secured the repeal of the laws against celibacy in 320 A. D., while the whole of the Augustinian legislation was repealed by Justinian.[23]

3. *Post-Malthusian Theories.* The famous *Essay on Population* by Malthus, whose views are too well known to require repetition, gave rise to an extensive literature in which, amid much that has since proven false, there were enunciated many views which have since been widely and variously elaborated.[24] Malthus had dealt a serious blow to social optimism, and efforts to confute him in such manner as to support the popular views as to the perfectibility of man gave rise to much ingenious rationalization regarding poverty and to several opposed "laws."

Sadler [25] (1780–1835) denounced reliance on the preventive check in most unmeasured terms. He contrasted the fecundity of the poor with the infecundity of the rich, and somewhat illogically contended that the rate of increase of a population varies inversely as its density; misery is not due to rapid multiplication, but *vice versa.* As man has ascended in the scale of material culture from the sparsely scattered and miserable hunters of savagery to the thickly crowded and comfortable populations of civilization his rate of increase has subsided, and promises to cease altogether "at that precise point where it had secured the utmost possible degree of happiness to the greatest possible number of human beings." As the statement of a universal law such as Sadler conceived it to be, this theory is clearly opposed to many obvious facts. His proposition, however, that "a state of labor and privation is that most favorable to human fecundity" has found adherents down to the present.[26]

[23] Westermarck, *op. cit.,* III, Index; Willystine Goodsell, *A History of Marriage and the Family* (Rev. ed., 1934), chaps. iv and v.

[24] For an excellent account, see Jas. A. Field, *Essays on Population and Other Papers* (1931), pp. 1–86; also Jas. Bonar, *Malthus and His Work* (1924), Bk. IV, 355–98. A brief digest is given in Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (1938), pp. 693–700.

[25] Michael T. Sadler, *The Law of Population: A Treatise in Six Books in Disproof of the Super-fecundity of Human Beings and Developing the Real Principle of Their Increase* (London, 1830).

[26] See R. Pearl, *The Biology of Population Growth* (1925), pp. 163–8.

Somewhat similar is the theory advanced by Thomas Doubleday [27] (1790–1870) to the effect that an increase of danger for any species is accompanied by an increase in fertility; that undernourishment or a deplethoric state is favorable to multiplication; and that an affluent, luxurious and well-fed population will decrease. Neither Sadler nor Doubleday distinguished between the potential power to reproduce and the actual rate of increase; neither took sufficient account of the fact that actual increase depends as much on death rates as on birth rates; neither presented a "law" remotely approaching the general validity of the Malthusian doctrine. Both of them, however, called attention to the puzzling fact, noted by Francis Place, Samuel Read, Archibald Alison, John Weyland, Simon Gray, and others before them,[28] that poor, hard-working, and ill-fed populations have high birth rates, while the rich, idle, and over-fed have low ones.

A third theory of similar tenor was advanced by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) [29] in which he contended that throughout nature fertility balances mortality; that as one ascends the evolutionary scale he finds the individual member of a species more able to fend for itself and less fertile; and that in man the development of higher mental powers and the use of energy in social activity result in decline of fertility. There is an opposition between individuation, or self-development, and genesis, or power of race perpetuation. Spencer advanced this as a biological law in harmony with general principles of evolution, and saw in it promise of a time when human powers of reproduction would just suffice to maintain a stationary population which would have achieved a nearly perfect adjustment to nature. Like Sadler he foresaw a utopia. In the light of modern biology his theory becomes confusing, for he based it primarily on evolutionary (mutational) changes in inherited fertility, and yet sought to apply it to purely physiological changes occurring in an individual in consequence of mode of life. The contention that the strenuous life of civilized peoples reduces their natural rate of increase had been previously upheld by T. Jarrold, Robert A. Ingram, Simon Gray, A. H. Moreton and others,[30] and has been revived in recent discussion.[31]

A quite different direction was given to the discussion of population trends as it became increasingly evident after about 1875 that the birth

[27] Thomas Doubleday, *The True Law of Population Shown to be Connected with the Food of the People* (London, 1841).

[28] See Field, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 ff.

[29] Herbert Spencer, "The Theory of Population Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," *Westminster Review* (1852); afterwards, Part VI of his *Biology*.

[30] Field, *op. cit.*, pp. 66–7.

[31] F. H. Hankins, "Has the Reproductive Power of Western Peoples Declined?" *Problems of Population*, ed. by G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers (London, 1932), pp. 181–8; also in *Eugenics Review*, XXIII (1931), 145–50.

rate was declining among all classes. This decline, together with a decisive check in the rate of population increase, manifested itself first and most markedly in France. Consequently French writers, noting the increasing millions of Germans in contrast to their own feeble natality, manifested much concern over the new trends. Arsène Dumont,[32] in his theory of social capillarity, argued that in a democratic society individuals strive upward in the social scale, while standards of life filter downward. In any social class, he contended, the birth rate tends to vary inversely as ambition and striving for elevation in social rank. Rejecting all theories positing a physiological explanation of declining fertility, he found the true cause to be "the will to have few or no children." "Guided by an unfailing and fatal instinct, every social molecule forces itself to mount ceaselessly toward the luminous ideal which seduces and draws it, as oil mounts in the wick of the lamp." "The increase in numbers in a nation is in inverse ratio to the effort toward individual development." [33] Dumont sought no general biological law, but found an explanation of population trends in the psychosocial conditions developing in a democratic society during periods of rapidly advancing culture. His views have since been frequently reiterated and generally regarded as well-founded.

During the nineteenth century most professional economists gave some attention to the relation of numbers of the population to poverty, wages, international trade, and other aspects of economic life. At first, under the over-powering influence of Malthus, their views were generally pessimistic, but indications of optimism appear even before the middle of the century. Various writers saw in the absence of prudential restraint among the poor a source of happiness denied the prudent; some saw in poverty a needed school in the virtues of industry and thrift; and others saw in the pressure of numbers a much needed spur to activity and a source of invention and social improvement. Moreover, a number of writers found promise in the fact that a higher standard of living—or the desire for the comforts and decencies of life—was a cause of smaller families, for they foresaw better control over population increase as the industrial arts advanced. Further, acceptance of the Darwinian principle of natural selection led to much complacency over the struggle for existence among the poor, inasmuch as the supposed survival of the fittest was regarded as a guarantee against racial deterioration. Economic pessimism declined as the century advanced, until by 1890 a growing optimism led to the cultivation of utopian plans for the extermination of poverty. Nitti, among others, summarizing a wide range of prior discussion, emphasized the significance of religious, moral, and political, as well as economic, aspects of the

[32] Arsène Dumont, *Dépopulation et Civilisation: Etude démographique* (Paris, 1890).

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 106, 112.

social system for population increase, pointed out the consequent relativity of all theories, and attacked democratic individualism as a source of poverty below and infecundity above.[34] British social legislation began to throw increasing protection around the working classes, and numerous reformers, moved by more or less socialistic ideals, sought the guarantee of a minimum standard of life to all.[35] Back of these theories were ordinarily two assumptions: (1) that poverty was largely due to an unfair distribution of the national income; and (2) that any elevation of the standard of life would, contrary to Malthus, reflect itself in subsequent generations in a decline in the size of the family.

For the most part these dreams were badly shattered by World War I. It was widely held that war itself was largely a consequence of population pressure. This view was, in fact, openly asserted by German spokesmen who, pointing to their teeming numbers, demanded "a larger place in the sun." Moreover, it was somewhat suddenly realized that the world was getting full of people. Knibbs[36] estimated the total population of the world at 1,900,000,000, with an annual rate of increase of 1.159 per 100—sufficient to double the total in 60 years. He pointed out that such rates could not possibly be long sustained. The same viewpoint was effectively presented by East,[37] who, surveying the world, found that the sparsely populated areas, such as Siberia, Australia, the Sahara and Congo areas of Africa, the Amazon valley, and northern Canada, were vastly inferior as areas of settlement and food production to the Mississippi valley and other territory brought under cultivation during the nineteenth century. Estimating that the world's annual increase in numbers was between twelve and fifteen millions and that more than two acres of cultivated land are essential for the maintenance of each person, East made it plain that the Malthusian pressure of population on food would inevitably manifest itself, unless there was a decisive decline in fertility.[38]

This postwar revival of Malthusianism contrasted sharply with the rising prewar interest in the declining birth rate, to which increasing atten-

[34] F. S. Nitti, *Population and the Social System,* trans. from the Italian (London, 1894).

[35] See C. J. H. Hayes, *British Social Politics;* S. and B. Webb, *The Prevention of Destitution* (London, 1911); S. and B. Webb, *Socialism and the National Minimum.*

[36] Sir George H. Knibbs, "The Mathematical Theory of Population," *Census of the Commonwealth of Australia,* Vol. I (1917), Appendix A; also, *The Shadow of the World's Future* (London, 1928).

[37] E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads* (1923).

[38] See also E. A. Ross, *Standing Room Only?* (1927); Harold B. Cox, *The Problem of Population* (London, 1922); L. I. Dublin, ed., *Population Problems in the United States and Canada* (1926); Harold Wright, *Population* (1923); and works referred to therein.

tion was given after 1900.[39] Elderton [40] found the decline was associated with the working and living conditions of women which facilitated the spread of contraceptive information. She hazarded the opinion that the decline was not due to any decrease in natural fertility. Worldwide publicity was given the *Report of the New South Wales Royal Commission on the Decline of the Birth Rate,*[41] a document which was somewhat alarmist in character, and which inspired vigorous propagandist works by Beale, who in turn furnished data for Roosevelt's intemperate assault on the Neo-Malthusian doctrines and tendencies of the times.[42] In 1906 appeared notable articles by Newsholme and Stevenson,[43] and Yule.[44] The former emphasized strongly that the decline in the birth rate was not due to increasing poverty; that, on the contrary, it was associated with a rising standard of comfort, that its chief motivation was a desire for an improved standard of material welfare, and that its principal agency was contraception. Other social factors, however, were indicated by these writers: compulsory education and child labor laws and the consequent increase in costs of child rearing; the decline of religious controls; and urbanism (which produces important socio-psychological changes and facilitates the spread of birth control information and the purchase of necessary appliances). They thought the decline would inevitably continue in the "absence of strong and overwhelming moral influences to the contrary." Yule, pointing out that contraceptive devices are not real causes but only instrumental means of family limitation, thought the main causes of the decline would be found in economic conditions.

Willcox showed that the decline in the United States, measured by the ratio of children under five per 1000 married women, had been contin-

[39] Early articles: Crum, F. S., "The Birth Rate in Massachusetts, 1850–1890," *Quart. Jour. Econ.,* XI (1897), 248–65; Cannan, E., "The Recent Decline in Natality in Great Britain," *Fortnightly Rev.,* n.s., LXXVII (1902), 541–6; F. A. Bushee, "The Declining Birth Rate and Its Cause," *Pop. Sci. Mon.,* LXIII (1903), 355–61; E. A. Ross, "Western Civilization and the Birth Rate," *Publ. Am. Econ. Assoc.,* VIII (1907), 76–112, and *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XII (1907), 607–32.

[40] Ethel M. Elderton, *The Declining Birth Rate: Report on the English Birth Rate,* Part I, *England North of the Humber* (London, 1904).

[41] (Sydney, 1904.)

[42] O. C. Beale, *Racial Decay* (London, 1911); T. R. Roosevelt, "Race Decadence," *The Outlook,* XCVIII (Apr. 8, 1911), 763–9.

[43] A. Newsholme, and T. H. C. Stevenson, "The Decline of Human Fertility in the United Kingdom and Other Countries as Shown by Corrected Birth Rates," *Jour. Roy. Stat. Soc.,* LXIX, Part I (March, 1906), 34–87. For a more general survey, see A. Newsholme, *The Declining Birth Rate: Its National and International Significance* (1911).

[44] G. U. Yule, "On the Changes in the Marriage and Birth Rates in England and Wales during the Past Half Century; with an Inquiry as to Their Probable Causes," *Jour. Roy. Stat. Soc.,* XXIX, No. 1 (March, 1906), 88–132.

uous since 1810; and Crum emphasized the decline of the Old American stock in New England.[45] The British National Birth Rate Commission in its reports[46] emphasized the differences in birth rates between social classes, occupational groups, urban and rural populations, and religious bodies. They found both contraception and abortion to be important factors, and indicated, as had the New South Wales Commission and O. C. Beale, the dangers of venereal infections. They also expressed the opinion that there had been no diminution in the physiological capacity of women to bear children in consequence of higher education, and they called attention to the general opposition of ecclesiastical authorities, especially of the Roman Catholic church, to conscious limitation of family.

Subsequent English and American writers and investigators have added little to the earlier findings except greater abundance of factual evidence that the decline is associated with the underlying economic and cultural trends of modern times. Broadly viewed, these studies have supported and expanded Dumont's theory of the fundamental conflict between natality and civilization. The latter expands egoistic desires, places extraordinary demands upon nervous energy, accustoms the population to relative ease and comfort, expands and intensifies the forces of urbanism, elevates the status and builds up the personality of women, destroys the force of dogmatic religion, undermines patriarchal traditions, relaxes the force of traditional rules of sexual morality, and very greatly increases the cost of child rearing. Moreover, the extensive decline in the death rate makes fewer births a necessity, while popular education intensifies competition in the higher walks of life.[47]

Continental writers meanwhile were reaching similar conclusions. In particular, French writers vigorously propagandized the nation as to the dangers of low natality in the presence of terrifying increases in the German population. Bertillon, Clement, Gonnard, March, Beaulieu, de Felice, and many others[48] usually restated Dumont's thesis but variously empha-

[45] W. F. Willcox, "The Change in the Proportion of Children in the United States and in the Birth Rate in France during the Nineteenth Century," *Publ. Am. Stat. Assoc.*, XII (1911), 490–9; F. S. Crum, "The Decadence of the Native American Stock," *Ibid.*, XIV (1914–15), 215–22. For later studies along same lines see W. S. Thompson, "Ratio of Women to Children 1920," *Census Monog.*, XI (1931); J. J. Spengler, "Has the Native Population of New England Been Dying Out?," *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, XLIV (1930), 639–62.

[46] *The Declining Birth Rate: Its Causes and Effects* (London, 1916); *Problems of Population and Parenthood* (London, 1920).

[47] See especially G. U. Yule, *The Fall of the Birth Rate* (Cambridge, 1920); S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race* (1921), pp. 118–79; W. S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (1930), pp. 80–131.

[48] J. Bertillon, "De la dépopulation de la France et des remèdes à y apporter," *Jour. Soc. Stat.*, XXXVI (1895), 410–38; *La Dépopulation de la France: ses consequences,*

sized all the above-mentioned causes and the peculiar conditions of the French property laws. Similarly, German writers showed correspondence of the decline with social conditions, especially emphasizing the association of high fertility with poverty, over-crowding, low wages, and other economic marks of social stratification, and of low fertility with urbanism, increased freedom of women, the greater incidence of venereal diseases, and the desire for security and comfort.[49]

This discussion of declining birth rates produced an extensive literature on the differential birth rates, that is to say, on the variable fertility of marriage among the different social classes.[50] It also gave rise to an extensive literature on the advantages of the small family system, often accompanied by contraceptive suggestions. This type of modern literature was given a brilliant foundation by Place in England, who was soon followed by Owen and Knowlton in the United States and Drysdale, Bradlaugh and Besant in England.[51] Numerous writers saw in the birth control movement the chief means for combating poverty, improving the welfare of the working classes, equalizing the benefits of cultural advances, and elevating the domestic, economic, and social status of woman. This movement was also hailed as opening the way to the ultimate control of population quality.

The active postwar interest in population led to a renewed search for some fundamental biological law governing the growth of population at large. Brownlee [52] had advanced the theory that there was a rise and fall in the natural fertility of man and that we were passing through a descending phase. Yule and Pearl gave expression to population growth in mathematical formulas represented graphically by the logistic curve.[53] The

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ses causes, mesures a prendre pour la combattre (Paris, 1911); G. Rageot, *La Natalité* (Paris, 1918).

[49] F. A. Theilhaber, *Das sterile Berlin* (Berlin, 1913); A. Blashko, *Geburtenrückgang und Geschlechtskrankheiten* (Leipzig, 1914); A. Grotjahn, *Der Geburtenrückgang und Geburtenregelung im Lichte der individuellen und sozialen Hygiene* (Berlin, 1914).

[50] See below, section on *Selection*.

[51] Norman Himes, *Medical History of Contraception* (London, 1936), gives complete account and exhaustive bibliography.

[52] Dr. John Brownlee, "Germinal Vitality: A Study of the Growth of Nations as an Instance of a Hitherto Undescribed Factor in Evolution," *Proc. Roy. Philos. Soc.*, XXXIX (Glasgow, 1908), 180–204; also "The History of the Birth and Death Rates in England and Wales Taken as a Whole, from 1570 to the Present Times," *Public Health*, XXIX (London), 211–28; for criticism of Brownlee, see A. K. Chalmers, "Is Any Part of the Present Decline in the Birth Rate Cyclical?" *Public Health* (London, Feb., 1915).

[53] G. U. Yule, "The Growth of Population and the Factors Which Control It," *Jour. Roy. Stat. Soc.*, LXXXVIII (1925), 1–58, and discussion, *Ibid.*, 63–90; R. Pearl, *Studies in Human Biology* (1924), pp. 584–637, and *The Growth of Population* (1925).

latter, by ingenious experiments with *Drosophila* and with domestic fowl, together with an analysis of birth rates in relation to population data for Algeria and American cities, attempted to prove that the birth rate is repressed by an increase in density.[54] Gini [55] espoused the somewhat obscure doctrine that a population passes through phases of youth, maturity, and senescence. This view also has proved generally inacceptable. Alongside this search for a general biological law there was revived an aspect of the Spencerian doctrine of the opposition of individuation and genesis. This view holds that modern life makes such extensive demands upon the central nervous system that the reproductive impulses are more or less undermined. Proof is found in the increase in involuntary sterility, as well as in the reduction of uncontrolled fertility among urban populations, college women, scientific men, and other groups most affected by the strenuous demands of modern culture.[56]

These theories tended to create a widespread feeling that population increase tends naturally to adjust itself to the economic and social situation without deliberate action on the part of society as a whole. Carr-Saunders, developing a view previously set forth by Cannan, argued on the basis of an extensive and scholarly survey of the whole history of population in relation to its environing circumstances that there was almost everywhere evidence that numbers approached an optimum.[57] Defining the optimum as that number which in relation to the situation gives the largest material returns per capita, and admitting some overpopulation in China and India, he saw in the practices of infanticide, abortion, taboo periods and similar customs among preliterates, as also among the great historical peoples, means of adjusting numbers at a point somewhere near the optimum. Wolfe, arguing that an optimum population implied a rational policy of regulation, pointed out that many obstacles prevent the adoption of a truly rational policy. "International friction and militaristic sentiment have already been mentioned. Hardly less effective are religious sentiment, ignorance and uncritical optimism." [58] Fairchild suggested that since numbers necessarily vary inversely with the standard of life, territory and the state of the arts remaining the same, it is possible in a given situation to have a large population with a low standard or a small population with a high standard.[59] Moreover, as Thompson ar-

[54] For criticism see Margaret Sanger, ed., *Proceedings of the World Population Conference* (London, 1927), pp. 22–58.

[55] C. Gini, and Others, *Population Lectures on the Harris Foundation* (1930). See Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 1024–26.

[56] F. H. Hankins, as in Ref. 31, and "Does Advancing Civilization Involve a Decline in Natural Fertility?," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXIV (1930), 115–22.

[57] A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem* (Oxford, 1922).

[58] A. B. Wolfe, *Population Problems*, ed. L. I. Dublin (1926), pp. 63–76.

[59] Sanger, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 72–85.

gued, to conceive the optimum in purely economic terms is too narrow, since there may be various other criteria—political, religious, personal, and so on through a wide range of social values.[60]

The search for a general law of growth made it clear that a nation's population, viewed as a whole, is a slowly changing mass, reflecting the gradual changes in birth and death rates. A flood of light was thrown on the current trends by the discovery by Dublin and Lotka and Kuczynski that, although the population was still increasing in numbers, it did not, on an actuarial basis, have a true birth rate equal to its true death rate in various countries.[61] It was noted that the populations of this country and most of western Europe had an unusually large proportion in the age groups between 16 and 40, when the fertility is highest and mortality is relatively low. While the official reports showed death rates of only 10 to 13, the true death rates were 17 to 18. Conversely, while the reported birth rates were 18 to 20 the true birth rates were several points less. These discoveries led to a complete recast of estimates as to the future growth of population, with very large downward reductions for this country.[62]

III. Organismic Ideas

The besetting tendency to think of human society as closely analogous to a biological organism is discoverable in the writings of social scientists and philosophers of every age and every field. For the most part this tendency is limited to the use of similes to express the unity of group life; but in the late nineteenth century, at the hands of what is called the organismic school of sociologists, the bold step of asserting that society is an organism was occasionally taken. The organismic analogy is found in Plato's likening of the social classes to three aspects of the mind, and in Aristotle,[63] various of the Roman writers, John of Salisbury, Nicholas of Cues, Thomas Hobbes, J. J. Rousseau and others.[64] During the late

[60] W. S. Thompson, *Population Problems* (1930), pp. 393–406; see also G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Conflict of Races* (London, 1927), pp. 39–45.

[61] L. I. Dublin, and A. J. Lotka, "On the True Rate of Natural Increase as Exemplified by the Population of the United States, 1920," *Jour. Am. Stat. Assn.*, XX (1925), 305–39 [revised in *Metron*, VIII (1930), 107–19]; and "The Present Outlook for Population Increase," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXIV (1930), 106–14; R. R. Kuczynski, *The Balance of Births and Deaths*, I and II (1928 and 1931); and *Fertility and Reproduction* (1932); P. K. Whelpton, "Population of the United States, 1925 to 1975," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXIV (1928), 253–73.

[62] For a splendid survey of the current population situation in this country, see *The Problems of a Changing Population*, National Resources Committee (1938).

[63] *Politics*, Bk. IV; see E. Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, pp. 127, 138–9, and 276–81.

[64] O. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages;* F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Mediaeval Thinkers;* F. W. Coker, *Organismic*

eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries the organismic theory of the state was very popular with German political and social philosophers, notably Hegel, Schelling, Rohmer and Bluntschli.[65]

The use of the analogy in distinctly sociological literature begins with the founder, Comte, who rested sociology directly on biology. He held that society is an organism, or an organismic unity of a higher order, governed by laws peculiar to it. As a collective, not an individual, organism, society is distinguished by the special trait of the *consensus universel*. Human society represents the final stage in organismic evolution, and its progress is marked by an increasing specialization and perfection of organs. Comte also drew various direct analogies, such as "the family is the social cell," between the individual and the social organism; and designated the study of social maladjustments as the field of "social pathology." [66]

The extensive interest in biological problems during the greater part of the last century led to the almost universal adoption of the organismic concept in political, economic and sociological literature, especially after the publication of the *Origin of Species* (1859). Herbert Spencer was the first among English writers to attempt an elaboration of the analogies. He pointed out, however, that while society has an alimentary, a circulatory and a sustaining system, it lacks a central sensorium, its units are discrete and the arrangement of its parts is asymmetrical rather than symmetrical. Moreover, he was led in final analysis to reject the value of the analogies he had so carefully elaborated: "There exists no analogy between the body politic and a living body, save those necessitated by the mutual dependence of parts." [67] He went to much pains to emphasize that the members of society are discrete so that all the feeling and thinking is done by individuals and not by an abstract society. Spencer conceived society to have evolved from primitive simplicity and homogeneity to great complexity and heterogeneity of parts; and, although differentiation implies a concurrent and equal integration in order to preserve unity and co-ordination of parts, his advanced social order was one in which the government as the co-ordinating agency almost ceased to exist. He was the apostle of an extreme individualism and found it impossible to reconcile his attachment to *laissez faire* with the logic of a thoroughgoing organismic view. Nevertheless, Spencer's analogies exerted a wide influence, especially in the English-speaking world.

Theories of the State. A fairly complete survey of organismic notions is to be found in Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 664–92 *et passim* (use index).

[65] Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–114.

[66] *Principles of a Positive Polity*, II, 240–2; Harriet Martineau, *Philosophy of Comte*, II, 258–62, 299–301.

[67] *Principles of Sociology*, Part III.

Most other members of the organismic school, less fearful of the socialistic implications of the view, found a basis for social solidarity as over against the discrete individualism of Spencer. Among notable contributors were Lilienfeld, Fouillée, Schaeffle, Worms, and Novicow.[68] In the works of all these men much ingenuity was shown in developing analogies between society and an organism and in efforts to explain society as an evolving organism. Much impressed by the growing conception of society as a part of nature and not a special creation, they held that there can be nothing in society not previously found in organismic nature; that society must be an organism because it is composed of organisms; and that sociology would only rest on a sound basis when it posited organicist concepts. While Spencer had pointed out that the analogies were only analogies and that, if they were omitted, the inductions they were designed to illustrate would still be true, Lilienfeld found society to be a true organism, though of a special, high type; that is, a person or animal is a complex of organs, whereas society is a complex of persons. Schaeffle and Fouillée developed the conception of society as a moral organism, not a true organism but an ethical and spiritual unity, held together by psychic bonds, which in Fouillée's view were largely contractual. In fact, ethical philosophers have been much impressed by the unity of a society and especially by the interdependence of its individual members. As Hobhouse stated it: "To speak of a society as if it were a physical organism is a piece of mysticism. . . . But the life of society and the life of an individual do resemble one another in certain respects, and the term 'organic' is as justly applicable to the one as to the other. For an organism is a whole consisting of interdependent parts." [69] Fouillée pointed out that, in the absence of a social brain, scientists, philosophers and leaders constitute an analogue; and Novicow and Worms noted that "the social élite" may be so viewed.

While the organic analogies served a useful purpose in the development of greater realization of the essential solidarity of the group life, and of the importance of differentiation or division of labor and of integration or agencies of social control, they gradually gave way before the increasing

[68] Paul Lilienfeld-Toailles, *Gedanken über die Sozialwissenschaft der Zukunft,* 5 Vols. (Mitau, 1873–81), Vol. I, and *La pathologie sociale* (Paris, 1896); Alfred Fouillée, *La science sociale contemporaine* (Paris, 1880); Albert G. Schaeffle, *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers,* 4 vols. (Tübingen, 1875–8); 2 vols. (2nd ed., 1896); René Worms, *Organisme et Société* (Paris, 1896), *Les principes biologiques de l'évolution sociale* (Paris, 1910), and *La sociologie; sa nature, son contenu, ses attaches* (Paris, 1921); Y. A. Novicow, *Conscience et volonté sociale* (Paris, 1897), *La théorie organique des sociétés, défense de l'organicisme* (Paris, 1899). Lundberg is a recent adherent of organismic ideas. See his *Foundations of Sociology* (1939), *passim.*

[69] L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory,* p. 87. For a useful distinction between "organismic" and "organic," see Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 688–92.

realization that the keys to social life are to be found in social psychology. It should be noted also that these analogies, sometimes in their bio-organicist, sometimes in their psycho-organicist forms, served the purposes of political polemics. They were used to combat the atomistic tendencies of the late eighteenth century and diversely to support the philosophical anarchism and administrative nihilism of Spencer. They abound in socialist and syndicalist literature and have been revived by Communist, Fascist and Nazi apologists for the totalitarian state.[70]

IV. Racial Differences

1. *Racial Determinists.* The theory that there is an identity between race and what we now call the nation is probably as old as ethnocentric groups. Equally ancient also is the theory that culture, social organization, successful social institutions, and other worshipful aspects of social life are the peculiar products of unique racial endowment. In modern times we note the sharp contrast drawn in the popular mind between Anglo-Saxon and Jew, Nordic and Mediterranean, or either of these and the Slavic Alpines. Traditionally, western Europe has been divided between the Teuton and the Latin.[71] Traditionally, also, France has sometimes thought of herself as Teutonic, sometimes as Gallic or Celtic, sometimes as Gallo-Roman or Celto-Latin.[72] The English, who are obviously a mixture of tall blond and short brunet racial stocks, think of themselves and are referred to as exemplars of the Anglo-Saxon race, excelled in purity and selectivity, in the minds of some race propagandists, only by native Americans. There is in all such doctrines a marked tendency for fact and idealization to become confused.[73] Even today Adolph Hitler, an obvious round-head of Alpine extraction, leads a movement inspired largely by the dream of restoring in numbers and power the blond long-heads of Nordic type.

[70] For example, E. B. Ashton, *The Fascist: His State and His Mind* (1937), chap. iii; L. F. Ward, "Contemporary Sociology, I," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* VII (1902), 479–93; F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State* (Columbia Univ. Studies, 1910); H. E. Barnes, "Representative Biological Theories of Society," *Sociol. Rev.,* XVII (1925), 120–30, 182–94, 294–300; P. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928), chaps. iv and viii; W. M. Wheeler, *Emergent Evolution and the Development of Societies* (1928); Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (1932), chap. iv; and Barnes and Becker, *op. cit., passim,* especially pp. 902–906.

[71] Illustrations are N. Colajanni, *Latins et Anglo-Saxons* (Paris, 1905); O. Gehring, *Racial Contrasts, Graeco-Latins and Teutons* (1908).

[72] J. Barzun, *The French Race* (1932).

[73] On race and nationality, see W. D. Babington, *Fallacies of Race Theories as Applied to National Characteristics* (London, 1895); John Oakesmith, *Race and Nationality* (1919); Henri Häuser, *Principe et origine des nationalitiés* (Paris, 1916). For a specialist's view of the problems of race determination, see the chapter by W. W. Howells in the present volume.

These interesting phenomena no doubt rest to some extent on both historical and anthropological facts. While no historical nation has approached racial purity, they have differed one from another in the proportions and nature of their racial ingredients. There is no English, German, or French race, but these peoples, nevertheless, differ more or less as biological compounds. The gross distortion of actuality in popular thought is due to some extent to our need of brief designations for anthropological differentiation. It is due primarily, however, to the feeling of unity and solidarity inspired by the patriotic emotion, which is at once an expression of group pride and an assertion of the group will to live. The concept of race has such powerful political and social consequences that race myths grow, both consciously and unconsciously, out of group awareness of common destiny. Races are therefore invented and their powers idealized to meet the demands of historical circumstances. Just as the child of an American immigrant may speak with deep emotion and manifest pride of his Revolutionary ancestors, so everywhere the average citizen, regardless of his own physical traits, readily identifies himself with that racial stock to which tradition attributes the nation's foundation and obvious greatness. By some such subtle mental metamorphosis an entire nation is able to identify itself with a particular racial type which tradition pictures as the racial forebears. Once such identification has taken place a process of idealization endows this type with supreme excellencies of every sort—even with those that are mutually contradictory. In modern times the racial doctrines which have played the most important rôle in historical movements may be conveniently sketched under the terms "Aryanism," "Teutonism," and "Anglo-Saxonism." [74]

2. *Aryanism.* The similarities among the various Indo-European languages, to which Sir William Jones called attention in 1788, led to a rapid growth of comparative grammar and philology. Twenty years later Friedrich Schlegel expressed the view that Sanskrit was the mother of languages. By 1820, Rhode [75] had made central Asia, the home of an Indo-European race, the originator of the Indo-European languages. In 1840 the home had been precisely placed by Pott [76] on the slopes of the Hindu Kush mountains in the valleys of the Oxus and Jaxartes rivers, while the

[74] Recent historical and critical treatises in this field include J. Finot, *Race Prejudice* (London, 1906); J. Oakesmith, *Race and Nationality* (1919); F. Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (1911), and *Anthropology and Modern Life* (1928 and 1932); F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization* (1926); Théophile Simar, *Étude critique sur la formation de la doctrine des races* (Brussels, 1922); Friedrich Hertz, *Race and Civilization,* trans. from the German (1928); Eugène Pittard, *Race and History* (1926), Parts I and II; J. S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, *We Europeans* (1936); Jacques Barzun, *Race: A Study in Modern Superstition* (1937).

[75] J. C. Rhode, *Die heilige Sage des Zenda Volkes* (Frankfurt am M., 1820).

[76] F. A. Pott, *Indogermanischer Sprachstamm* (1840).

tendency to idealize the original Aryans as a race with superlative gifts and to find in them the founders of all the great civilizations had already become manifest. In lectures at the Royal Institution on *The Science of Language* (1861 and 1863) Friedrich Max Müller set forth most graphically the already widely held view that the Indo-European speaking peoples were all derived from a common ancestral race. "There was a time when the first ancestors of the Indians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans and Slavs, the Celts and the Germans were living together within the same enclosure, nay, under the same roof." Although he repudiated this view twenty-five years later, after comparative philology had shown the impossibility of identifying historical races and languages, the doctrine had meanwhile become firmly entrenched in history, literature, and popular tradition.[77]

The theory that the Indo-Europeans originated in Europe made its appearance about 1850, largely on the basis of fresh anthropological evidence.[78] This view found increasing acceptance, especially among German and Scandinavian scholars, who were generally inclined to place the ancestral home of the Aryans in central Europe or around the Baltic sea.[79] Search for the original homeland has continued ever since; Asia has been abandoned, but most parts of central, northern, and eastern Europe have had their advocates.

Hartman had declared in 1876 that the Aryan race was an invention of the professor's study.[80] Max Müller had said in 1888 that "the evidence is so pliant that it is possible to make out a more or less plausible case for the location of the home in any part of the world"; [81] and Ripley had said, "It is only the lesser lights who still deal with roots as if they were mathematical symbols." [82] Nevertheless Bender,[83] resorting in 1922 to the outworn linguistic arguments, located the homeland north of the Black Sea. Giles [84] in the same year located the original seed-bed of the Aryan hordes on the plains of Hungary. Childe,[85] giving the proto-Aryans the name of "Wiros" and identifying them with Nordic ancestors, located the homeland in south Russia.

[77] See Isaac Taylor, *The Origin of the Aryans* (London, 1890); Salomon Reinach, *L'Origine des Aryens, Histoire d'une controverse* (Paris, 1892); Emile Houzé, *L'Aryen et l'anthroposociologie* (Brussels, 1906).

[78] Hankins, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff.

[79] As in works of Louis Geiger, J. G. Cuno, Theodore Poesche, Carl Penka, and Gustav Kossinna.

[80] R. Hartman, *Die Nigritier,* p. 185.

[81] *Biographies of Words and the Home of the Aryas* (London, 1888).

[82] W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe* (New York, 1899).

[83] H. H. Bender, *The Home of the Indo-Europeans* (1922).

[84] Peter Giles, "The Aryans," *Cambridge History of India,* chap. iii; see also H. Peake, *The Bronze Age and the Celtic World* (London, 1922), chap. xii.

[85] *The Aryans, A Study of Indo-European Origins* (1926).

Thus the Aryan problem still fascinates many who seek a somewhat romantic interpretation of cultural evolution, but it appears as far from solution as ever. The verifiable bits of evidence are merely scattered pieces of an enormous jig-saw puzzle. It appears clear, however, that "the notion of an original, simon-pure Aryan race of highly distinctive physical traits and of marvelous intellectual capacity, speaking a language of simple, undifferentiated purity but of unexampled excellence, passes into the limbo of outworn myths." [86] Its revival in Germany is noted below. One may, however, refer to the conclusion of Hubert, after many years of study of the Celtic question, similar in many respects to the Aryan question: "In short, anthropology has nothing to tell us of the Celts, and, in spite of many efforts, has never told us anything." [87]

3. *Teutonism.* In the recent history of Aryanism, one of the most important figures is Count Arthur de Gobineau. His famous work [88] did more than any other to inspire the subsequent romantic idealizations of Nordic, Teutonic, and Anglo-Saxon races in the literature and traditions of Germany, Scandinavia, and the English-speaking world. It is so full of discrepancies that the author flatly contradicts himself on nearly every major proposition. The one clear and unvarying assertion is that there is a hierarchy of races ranging from black through yellow to white, and that in the white branch of mankind the premier position belongs to the tall, blond Teuton, in physical, intellectual and moral qualities. His philosophy of history was based on four propositions: (1) All known civilizations have been Aryan; (2) conquest is followed by cultural improvements proportional to the hereditary quality of the racial stocks; (3) continued improvement is dependent on the preservation of the racial purity of the conquerors; and (4) but since all conquerors mix with the conquered, racial decay results, followed by cultural decline. He is usually considered to be the apostle of race purity, but in the very heart of his work is the contention that civilization arises only at the hands of a race which conquers and mingles its blood widely with others. He repeatedly implies that the crossing of races produces a ferment essential to the development of a high culture. The supremacy of the Greeks in art, for example, he attributed to the infusion of the right proportion of Negro blood. At the same time, with equal frequency, he asserts that the decay of all the great cultures has resulted from the degeneration of the originating racial stocks, in consequence of hybridization through mixture with the underlying populations.

His work is thus marked with nebulosity and contradiction. Neither

[86] Hankins, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[87] Henri Hubert, *The Rise of the Celts* (1934), p. 32.

[88] *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines,* 4 vols. (Paris, 1853–5), German trans. by Schemann (1897), English trans. by Collins (1914), Vol. I.

this nor the fact that he was a Frenchman prevented him from being acclaimed as the prophet of Germanic race glorification, although he expressly stated that in praising the ancient Teuton he did not mean to flatter the modern Germans: "Les Allemandes ne sont pas d'essence Germanique." He placed the German people below the French in racial value on the ground that they were more mixed; and held that England, the land of the Anglo-Saxons had, because of its geographical isolation, preserved in richest and purest form that blood which had created the great civilizations.[89]

In order to understand why the Gobineau doctrine of the special culture-producing capacity of the Teuton became the basis of a vigorous race cult in Germany, one must recall that Fichte and Hegel had cultivated a mystical and idealistic conception of the state as the absolute person; and that Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) had advanced the thesis that Christian civilization had been resurrected from the decadent Romans by the pure and vigorous Germanic stocks, specially gifted with creative genius and deep religiosity. These views have been frequently reiterated and expanded down to the present. The beginnings of the active cult appear to be found in the *Bayreuther Blaetter* launched in 1878 by the Wagnerian circle; and its growth was actively promoted by the formation of the Gobineau Vereinigung by Ludwig Schemann in 1894.

Another source of propagation was the thriving school of anthroposociologists of the 80's and 90's, which sought to prove by comparisons of cephalic indices that the tall, blond man was more gifted with intelligence, initiative and creative capacity than the brachycephalic type. Their basic contentions were upset by the work of R. Livi in Italy, F. Olóriz y Aguilera in Spain, J. Beddoe in England and W. Z. Ripley in this country.[90] Between these dates appeared the works of Poesche and Penka, upholding

[89] For critical estimates of Gobineau, see E. Sellière, *Le Comte de Gobineau et l'Aryanisme historique* (Paris, 1903); L. Schemann, *Gobineaus Rassenwerk* (Stuttgart, 1910), and *Gobineau und die deutsche Kultur* (Leipzig, 1910). See also M. Lange, *Le Comte Arthur de Gobineau: Étude biographique et critique* (Strasbourg, 1924); J. Barzun, *Race,* chap. iv. There has been a truly remarkable Gobineau revival in France since the war, his works and correspondence having been extensively reprinted and edited. See the monthly *Europe* (October 1, 1923), the *Nouvelle Revue Française* (February, 1934); and Maurice Lange, *op. cit.*

[90] Leading anthroposociological works include Otto Ammon, *Die natürliche Auslese beim Menschen* (Jena, 1893), and *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen* (Jena, 1895); G. Vacher de Lapouge, *Les sélections sociales* (Paris, 1896), *L'Aryan* (Paris, 1899), and *Race et milieu social* (Paris, 1909); see also his essay in *Scientific Papers of the Second International Congress of Eugenics,* Vol. II (1922). See W. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe* (1899), chaps. xix and xx; F. H. Hankins, *op. cit.,* chap. v. The work of this school was sympathetically summarized by C. C. Closson in *Quar. Jour. Econ.,* Vols. X and XI (1896), *Jour. of Pol. Econ.,* Vol. IV (1896), and Vol. VIII (1898); and *Amer. Jour. Soc.,* Vol. III (1897).

not only the superiority of the Nordic type but also the theory of his racial differentiation in the Baltic basin.[91]

The German work which ranks above all others in propaganda importance, however, was Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*.[92] This book (by Wagner's son-in-law) is marked by ardor, imagination, and intellectual vigor. It has remained to this day an inspiring source of Teuton-Aryanism, though it is full of contradictions, romantic historical generalizations, and fantastic anthropology. Although he here and there paid his respects to the degenerating character of the modern German people, Chamberlain made *die Germanen* the leaders and creators in every field of human activity. It was they who preserved Christianity and renewed civilization in the Renaissance. It is they alone who can preserve it from the inevitable decay that will overwhelm it, if the Teutonic racial element dwindles or is degenerated by mixture.

When one inquires who, in Chamberlain's view, these Teutons are, he finds them to include most of those north European stocks that have figured in history: the Celts, "genuine" (i.e., "Germanic") Slavs, Goths, Gauls, Lombards, and Tacitean Germans. The original Teutons he views as pure in race, and while he finds race crossing a factor in cultural advance through the increase of men of genius, such crossing must be strictly limited in time and extent. General mixture produces a mongrel horde incapable of leadership, organization, or creative activity. Chamberlain, however, rejects Virchow's contention that the European aristocracy is everywhere of the tall blond type and notes, especially in England, that many aristocrats have been brunet. This leads to the invention of his own racial anthropology, whereby he is enabled to include among "the genuine sons of the Teutonic race" the round-headed and brunet Luther and the long-headed, brunet Dante as well as pure blonds and the intermediate mixtures. That is, he rejects the findings of physical anthropology whereby the race of an individual is established by hereditary physical traits and substitutes a theory of spiritual divination. The genuine Teutons are thus discovered by the intuitive insight of the evangelist, and anyone, regardless of physical type, may be included if he is great enough.

While Chamberlain in some passages praises the genius of the Jews, especially the Sephardim, in extravagant terms, he more frequently views them as aliens in a Christian civilization and its chief enemies. Often, he says, adults cannot tell a Jew from a non-Jew, but "it frequently happens that children who have no conception of what 'Jew' means begin to cry as soon as a genuine Jew or Jewess comes near them." Paul was not a

[91] T. H. Poesche, *Die Arier* (Jena, 1878); Carl Penka, *Origines Ariacae* (Vienna, 1883), and *Die Herkunft der Arier* (Vienna, 1886).

[92] (Berlin, 1899). English trans. by Lees: *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols. (London and New York, 1910).

Jew, for his mother was a Hellene and Paul inherited his intellect from her. Nor was Jesus a Jew, for his message is Aryan; nevertheless, Christianity was badly Judaized and later threatened with degenerating Romanism. It was saved in the Reformation by the spiritual clairvoyance of the deeply religious folk-soul of the Teutons; it is even now threatened by an overdose of "Romanized Judaism" from which it can only be permanently redeemed through replacement by a genuine Teutonic religion! In spite of its often nonsensical twaddle and glaring inconsistencies, this work, a modernized and Germanized version of Gobinism, has exerted great influence in Germany.[93] One of the contributing factors in propagating Chamberlain's influence was Ludwig Woltmann's *Politische Anthropologische Revue,* 1902–1907, which published scientific and popular articles in the racialist field.[94]

These views, widely and assiduously cultivated, undoubtedly contributed to the exaggerated megalomania of a substantial part of the population of Germany preceding the war. Since the war the propagation of the Aryan mythology, frequently in its Nordic or Teutonic form, has continued, partly through the work of scientists enjoying social prestige and partly through societies formed for that specific purpose. The return from Teutonism to Aryanism appears to be motivated by the need indicated by Chamberlain for a term of sufficient ambiguity to include not only the traditional Nordic-Teuton, but those round-heads and brunets who were already implanted in popular tradition as national heroes. Moreover, it was especially necessary to include in the master race such brunet leaders of the Third Reich as Hitler and Goebbels. Also, Aryanism has historically often been set over against Semitism, a term which has usually implied the influence of the Jews. In the orthodox Aryan literature the Jew is uniformly pictured as crafty, unscrupulous, unassimilable, parasitic, and destructive of the finer cultural elements. Aryanism as expounded by both political and academic exponents of the Third Reich has been made largely synonymous with anti-Semitism. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Rosenberg's *Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts* are the new books of revelation.[95] Hundreds of thousands of copies of

[93] Cf. Hankins, *op. cit.,* pp. 64–90; Ernest Sellière, *Houston-Stewart Chamberlain, Le plus récent philosophe du pangermanisme mystique* (Paris, 1917), and "Une école d'impérialisme mystique," *Revue des deux mondes* (Mar. 1, 1909).

[94] Woltman wrote also *Die Germanen und die Renaissance in Italien* (Leipzig, 1905), and *Die Germanen in Frankreich* (Jena, 1907), in uncritical praise of Teuton blood in the revival of learning. For example: "The most distinguished men in modern spiritual history were, for the most part, Teutons of full blood." "The Teutons are the aristocracy of humanity; the Latins, on the contrary, belong to the degenerate mob."

[95] Here should be included also R. W. Darré's *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der nordischen Rasse,* and *Neuadel aus Blut und Boden.*

Günther's works alone have been sold. In addition importance attaches to the popular monthlies *Rasse* and *Volk und Rasse,* Rosenberg's *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte,* and the bimonthly *Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie.*[96] Special mention should be made of Baur, Fischer and Lenz's *Menschliche Erblehre und Rassenhygiene,*[97] which ranks first among German academic treatises in the field of human heredity and race psychology. The fifth section is devoted to race differences and, though objective in tone, evidences belief in the general superiority of the Nordic type. For example, this work finds Teutons and Jews much alike; lists many Jewish men of genius and points out Jewish successes in schools and professions; and notes that both Jew and Teuton are gifted with strength of will, the spirit of enterprise and the will to mastery, "only with this difference, that the Teuton is inclined to accomplish his purposes more by force, the Jew more by cunning." [98]

This postwar literature develops no new principles. Racialist doctrines are merely carried to a fanatical extreme. The Nazi *Weltanschauung* centers in the theory that political organization, leadership, law, morals and religion are, in some mystical way, expressions of the blood of the race. Race purification and preservation thus become primary purposes of state policy. Jews, Gypsies and Negroes become anathema. Nordic idealization, while overlaid with Aryan phrases, is often in the background. Günther, for example, declares that "denordization" and hence degeneration now threaten the German people and that their only hope of restoration lies in a steady increase of the valuable and healthy hereditary endowments carried by the Nordic remnant. A statement of the Young Nordic Association says: "We wish to keep the thought always before us that, if our race is not to perish, it is a question not only of choosing a Nordic mate, but over and above this, of helping our race through our marriage to a victorious birth rate." [99] There are thus in Nazi race literature two practical but somewhat conflicting objectives. One is the intensification of eugenic race consciousness; the other, the elevation of the birth rate.

4. *Anglo-Saxonism.* The academic and literary manifestations of Anglo-

[96] Hans F. K. Günther, *Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes, Rassenkunde Europas* (English trans., *The Racial Elements of European History* [1928]), *Herkunft und Rassengeschichte der Germanen,* and *Rassenkunde des jüdischen Volkes;* L. G. Tirala, *Rasse, Geist und Seele;* L. F. Claus, *Die nordische Seele;* and *Rasse und Seele;* Otto Hauser, *Der blonde Mensch, Genie und Rasse: I. Altertum, II. Italien,* and *Geschichte des Judentums.*

[97] (4th ed., Munich, 1936); trans. (3d ed.) by E. and C. Paul, *Human Heredity* (London, 1931).

[98] *Op. cit.,* p. 756.

[99] *The Racial Elements of European History,* trans. from German (2nd ed.) by Y. C. Wheeler (1927), p. 262.

Saxonism and Nordicism in England and America have paralleled those of Teutonism in Germany and Gallicism in France. These nations are commonly referred to by themselves and by continental writers as Anglo-Saxon in blood as well as culture. Numerous reflections of the Gobineau-Chamberlain interpretation of the rôle of race in history have appeared in English, and the average Englishman or native American thinks of the Anglo-Saxons as particularly gifted with capacities for personal liberty, constitutional government, and business organization and leadership—a view finding support in the view of Gobineau and Lapouge that the special gifts of the English-speaking Anglo-Saxons constitute the only hope for the future of civilization.

The Anglo-Saxon tradition roots in Tacitus and the early English sagas of the conquest. Its modern revival can be traced from such works as Kemble's *The Saxons in England* (1849), Stubbs's *The Constitutional History of England* (1874–8), Freeman's *The Roman and the Teuton* (1864), and the works of John Richard Green (1874, 1882, and 1883). These books pictured the English people as deriving from a pure and noble Anglo-Saxon stock, specially gifted with capacity for the organization of liberty under law. Seeley's works, especially his *Expansion of England* (1883), written on the theory that history should serve practical purposes, foreshadowed the encomiums of Homer Lea's *The Day of the Saxon* (1912), and the avowed militant imperialism of Kipling and of Cramb, *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* (1900 and 1915). These and many other writers developed the theory of the "manifest destiny" of the Anglo-Saxon to carry the blessings of his political traditions and institutions to nations throughout the world—nations less imbued with love of liberty, justice and order. Race mysticism and idealization thus became a vast rationalization for the advantages of imperialism.

In the United States similar ideas have been widely held. Lieber expressed the viewpoint thus: "We belong to the Anglican race which carried Anglican principles and liberty over the globe. . . . We belong to that race whose obvious task it is . . . to rear and spread civil liberty over vast regions in every part of the earth. We belong to that tribe alone which has the word Self-Government." [100] Burgess, in the most famous treatise on political science of its day,[101] likewise found the Teutonic nations specially gifted with political genius and "that, in the economy of history, the duty has fallen to them of organizing the world politically." He found that it is "the manifest mission of the Teutonic nations" to clear any territory of uncivilized peoples who resist *à l'outrance* the blessings of Teutonic liberty and order and to take charge of barbaric

[100] *On Civil Liberty and Self-Government* (Philadelphia, 1859), p. 21.

[101] *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, 2 vols. (Boston, 1890), pp. 44–8.

nations. This they may "righteously" do in the interest of civilization; it is "their great world-duty" to do so.

Burgess and Lieber in America, like the above-mentioned English writers, are representative of a host of others. Their views suffered from the romance and idealization due to the patriotic currents of the day. This is not to say that they were wholly lacking a basis in historical facts, but rather that they tended to distort the facts through oversimplification and neglect of perspective and comparison. They lacked also the benefit of much subsequent factual rectification and cultural development. Anthropological research has shown that the English, Scottish, and Irish peoples are very heterogeneous,[102] while time has revealed in the Japanese both capacity for government, the ambitions of imperialism, and a "manifest destiny." Russia and Italy have for some time been experimenting with new models of political machinery, and Germany, extolled by Burgess, Lieber, and others as the fountainhead of things "Teutonic" and therefore of Anglo-Saxon ideals of political liberty, has recently followed a course that bids fair to outdo all other anti-libertarian regimes.

Meanwhile, a belated effort to promulgate the Gobineau-Chamberlain views in this country was undertaken in Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race or The Racial Basis of European History,*[103] a work of slight scientific value and dogmatic tone. Associated works by Gould, Sadler, Burr, and Stoddard [104] were marked by too much bias and scientific inadequacy to give them a wide reading. Brigham,[105] who afterward repudiated his method,[106] sought to show the superiority of the Nordic type by an analysis of the results of mental testing of American army recruits during the war. McDougall [107] revived a number of the contentions, made in the works of social selectionists and long since rejected,[108] to the effect that the Nordic type was especially given to migration, Protestantism, divorce, and suicide. On the basis of both historical and mental test data he advanced "the law of the adaptation of the culture-species," or the theory that each race has special cultural aptitudes and that great cultural differences follow small hereditary racial differences.

[102] R. B. Dixon, *The Racial History of Man* (1923); Ripley, *op. cit.;* Pittard, *op. cit.;* H. J. Fleure, *The Races of England and Wales* (London, 1923).

[103] (New York, 1916.)

[104] C. W. Gould, *America, A Family Matter* (1922); W. S. Sadler, *Long Heads and Round Heads, or What's the Matter with Germany* (1918); C. S. Burr, *America's Race Heritage* (1922); G. L. Stoddard, *Racial Realities in Europe* (1924). For critique of these works and others, see Hankins, *op. cit.*

[105] C. C. Brigham, *A Study of American Intelligence* (1923).

[106] "Intelligence Tests of Immigrant Groups," *Psych. Rev.,* XXXVII (1930), 158–65.

[107] Wm. McDougall, *Is America Safe for Democracy?* (1920).

[108] See Ripley, *op. cit.,* chaps. xix and xx.

This "law" of McDougall's pays tribute to the recognition by the racialists of the growing conviction among anthropologists that the differences between races were less than had formerly been believed. If race differences were to explain cultural differences then small biological variations would have to account for large cultural deviations. This theory is not illogical in view of (1) the mutational basis of some differences and (2) the fact that small average differences in racial ability would statistically be associated with very considerable differences in the numbers of superior individuals who constitute inventors, organizers, and leaders generally.[109] However, the primary question remains as to the extent to which hereditary psychic differences among races actually exist.

The difficulties here parallel those relating to class differences. That is, the races with the superior intelligences (according to every test available) have the higher cultures, and there is always the question whether the former is due to the latter or *vice versa*. The numerous researches on American immigrants [110] rather uniformly found those from northwest and central Europe superior to those from southern Europe; Portuguese, Italians, and Spanish-Mexicans ranked distinctly low. Some held these differences to be due to selection plus cultural backgrounds. Nearly all agreed that conclusions drawn from the immigrants could not be transferred to the national groups from which they came. Nevertheless, there were those who thought the tests revealed genuine native differences; in refutation of the contention that the mental tests were wholly inadequate, they pointed out that the Japanese and Chinese, who differ greatly from Europeans in cultural background, appeared equal to them in the tests. Similar differences persist as to the mental levels of whites and Negroes.[111]

Meanwhile considerable effort has been made to determine whether temperamental differences exist between the different races. Such are almost uniformly alleged, and much evidence supports the allegation.[112] At the same time, cultural factors, such as economic situation, religious controls, and social status greatly affect emotional states and manifestations of temperamental qualities.

Final solution of the questions of inherent racial differences and the rôle of race in the historical record awaits answers to various preliminary questions in the heredity-environment problem. Meanwhile, the presump-

[109] Hankins, *op. cit.*, Part II, chaps, vi, viii, and x.

[110] For summary see C. Kirkpatrick, *Intelligence and Immigration* (1926); R. Pintner, *Intelligence Testing: Methods and Results* (1923 and 1931); T. R. Garth, *Race Psychology* (1931). See also E. V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man* (1937).

[111] See Pintner, *op. cit.;* O. Klineberg, *Race Differences* (1935); S. D. Porteus, *Primitive Intelligence and Environment* (1937).

[112] S. D. Porteus, and M. E. Babcock, *Temperament and Race* (Boston, 1926), annotated Bibliography.

tion on the basis of both historical and mental test data is that differences exist both in mental level and temperament. Moreover, this presumption is supported by certain *a priori* considerations. The races obviously differ in physical traits, otherwise there would be no races.[113] Innate mental differences rest on physical differences. In the cases of the major racial divisions of mankind, both mutational and selectional causes of difference have been operative for enormous periods of time. It is very improbable that these would have left the mental traits unaffected while modifying every feature of the physical and physiological structure and capacity. Moreover, it is probable that even large populations, such as those of the great modern nations, can undergo substantial alteration in their inherent traits within a few generations. Finally, cultural acquisition and development rest upon and are expressions of innate capacities. As Lowie says: "In order that certain [cultural] traits be acquired, a certain type of organic basis is an absolute prerequisite; a chimpanzee or a bat is not able to acquire human culture through social environment." [114]

Over against all this there have been in recent years many impressive statements of the importance of the cultural medium for the development and manifestation of inherent capacities.[115] One's culture so completely determines the content of one's mind that it determines his thoughts and emotions. Invention and creative work in literature and the arts depend for rate and amount very greatly upon their cultural setting; the man of genius may be a biological variate but he is obviously a product of his day and generation. At present, therefore, the contentions of neither "race dogmatists" nor "race-slumpers," [116] seem valid. A suspended judgment in favor of a position somewhere between seems indicated.

V. Aspects of Human Biology

1. *Darwinism in Relation to Man.* The publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) definitely inspired widespread interest in the application of his theories to man and society. While Darwin himself never ventured to set forth any social philosophy, his scientific views made so deep an impression on the thinking of the next half century that many brands of social theorizing sought support by claiming harmony with his principles. Darwinism was thus pressed into the service "of anticlericalism,

[113] For an effort to obliterate the idea of race, see J. Barzun, *Race, A Study in Modern Superstition* (1937).

[114] *Culture and Ethnology* (1917) p. 27.

[115] A. L. Kroeber, "The Superorganic," *Am. Anthrop.*, XIX (1917), 163–213; W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922); and recent works in social psychology.

[116] McDougall, *op. cit.*

imperialism, socialism and militarism."[117] We need not here touch upon those aspects of this application represented in the controversies centering around the names of Huxley and Tyndall, though both made deep impressions on social thinking. Rather, we limit ourselves to the literature relating to the significance of the Darwinian principles of variation, heredity, fertility, and selection for human traits, social organization and the evolution of culture. This field of investigation has gradually broadened until now it has acquired several distinctive aspects. There is (a) the development of quantitative methods; (b) the respective rôles of heredity and environment as causes of individual differences; and (c) selective processes in modern society.

(a) *Methods of research.* In the development of quantitative methods, the foundation was laid by Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874), the Belgian statistician, who, beginning with his *Sur l'homme* in 1835, had repeatedly applied the principles of the law of large numbers and theory of chances to studies of human variability.[118] It was Quetelet's conception of the average man as a mean about which other members of a group are dispersed in a manner corresponding to the law of accidental causes that is at the basis of all modern studies of variation, whether biological, psychological, or sociological. Quetelet calculated the relative frequencies of measures above and below an average and the probable error of an average.[119]

The work of Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, rested squarely on that of Quetelet. His first important work[120] represented the first application of quantitative methods to the study of heredity. In his work he made some slight advances in statistical method which he consolidated and developed in his *Natural Inheritance*.[121] The notable steps forward included the use of correlation tables, application of a graphic method for determining regression lines and angles, and the enunciation of his "law

[117] E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day* (1906), p. 133.

[118] Notably in *Du Système social et des lois qui le régissent* (Paris, 1848); *Letters on the Theory of Probabilities,* trans. by Downes (London, 1849); *Anthropométrie, ou mésure des differentes facultés de l'homme* (Brussels, 1870). An account of the antecedents of Quetelet would trace developments in vital statistics from John Graunt's work of 1662 through Halley, Durham, Süssmilch and others, and in mathematics from De Moivre through Deparcieux to Laplace and Gauss. See F. H. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician* (1908), and Lundberg's chapter in this volume.

[119] *In his Letters on the Theory of Probabilities,* and "Sur l'appréciation des documents statistiques, etc.," *Bull. de la commission centrale de statistique,* II (1845), 205–86.

[120] *Hereditary Genius: an Enquiry into Its Laws and Consequences* (London, 1869; 2d ed., 1892).

[121] (London, 1889.)

of filial regression" (that, on the average, offspring deviate less from the mean than do parents) and his "law of ancestral inheritance" (that ancestors contribute to individual make-up according to the series, ½, ¼, ⅛, etc., in which denominators equal their number in parental, grandparental and preceding generations).

Karl Pearson's contributions to this field have been those of a first-rate mathematical genius. His development of the correlation and sampling techniques may be said to dominate statistical methods in the biological, social, and other sciences throughout the English-speaking world and even elsewhere. In his *Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution* 2 vols. (1897), *The Grammar of Science* (1892, 1900 and 1911), *Biometrika* (founded by him, Galton and others in 1901), the *Proceedings* and the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society of London, Pearson developed not only the mathematical basis of the correlation technique but contributed to many aspects of modern mathematical statistics. To this development contributions have since been made by Yule, Weldon, Edgeworth, Greenwood, Brownlee, Fisher, and others in England,[122] and by Davenport, Pearl, and others in the United States.[123]

With the discovery in 1900 of Mendel's contributions to the theory of heredity, a merry war broke out between the Galton-Pearson group of biometricians, who studied heredity, variation and selection through mass data, and the rapidly growing adherents of Mendelism, who preferred to follow the transmission of traits through specific lines of descent. The biometricians assumed variations to be due to "an infinite number of infinitesimal causes" operating equally in favor of variations above or below the type, while the Mendelian concepts, "unit character," dominance and recession, presence or absence, turned them from quantitative to genealogical methods. The breach has been healed to a considerable extent by the "multiple factor hypothesis" which provides a gene basis for the Darwinian type of variation with respect to many traits, such as height and mental ability. Moreover, there has latterly been considerable progress in the algebraic expression of Mendelian ratios.[124]

Meanwhile, following the early measurements of mental traits by Galton, Binet, Cattell and others, there has been a vast development of mental tests and of efforts to measure by biometric techniques the rela-

[122] See *Biometrika, Annals of Eugenics,* and *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.*

[123] See C. J. West, *Introduction to Mathematical Statistics* (1918), Appendix II; Helen M. Walker, *Studies in the History of Statistical Method* (1929), chap. v; R. Pearl, *Medical Biometry and Statistics* (1923); and the *Journal of the American Statistical Association.*

[124] See R. A. Fisher, *The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection* (Oxford, 1930); L. Hogben, *Genetic Principles in Medicine and Social Science* (1932).

tive rôles of heredity and environment in mental development. Notable contributions to the development of method have been made by Terman, Spearman, Kelley, Thorndike, Burks and many others.[125]

(b) *Individual differences.* The second aspect of our survey deals with the rôle of heredity and environment as causes of variations among individuals, or what is generally referred to as the problem of individual differences. The first important contribution in this field was Galton's *Hereditary Genius* (1869). In the preface to the second edition he tells us that by "genius" he meant "natural ability." This work is of epochal importance but its significance rests primarily on its demonstration that superiority runs in families. In addition, it develops the thesis that natural ability is distributed in a population in a form represented by the probability curve, and compares, quite unconvincingly, the mental levels of the Athenian and the English populations. This work was followed by that of de Candolle,[126] who attributed little weight to heredity in the production of learned men, except mathematicians. Galton analyzed this study so as to support his own view by showing that de Candolle meant merely that specialized talents do not seem to be strongly hereditary, while admitting that general ability and general moral character are; in fact, de Candolle himself had raised the question whether the human breed could not be improved by artificial selection.

Galton followed with *English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture* (1874), in which again, as also in a later work,[127] he showed that distinguished men tend to have distinguished relatives much more frequently than the average man. This conclusion has found abundant support in many subsequent studies.[128]

He thus established the presumption not only that mental ability tends to be much more abundant in certain family strains than in the population at large, but that its quantitative distribution in the population is similar to that of a physical trait such as stature. These presumptions have been supported by most subsequent investigation. Studies were soon forthcoming showing that low grades of mental ability likewise tend to

[125] E. L. Thorndike, *An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurement* (1913); T. L. Kelley, *Statistical Method* (1923); Barbara Burks, *The Twenty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (1928), pp. 9–33.

[126] A. de Candolle, *Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux siècles* (Geneva, 1873).

[127] With E. Schuster, *Noteworthy Families* (London, 1906).

[128] F. A. Woods, *Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty* (1906); J. McK. Cattell, "A Statistical Study of American Men of Science: The Selection of a Group of One Thousand Scientific Men," *Science,* n.s., XXIV (1906), 658–65, 699–707; and "A Further Study of American Men of Science," *ibid.,* n.s., XXXII (1910), 633–48, 672–88; D. R. Brimhall, "Family Resemblances Among American Men of Science," *Amer. Natur.,* LVI (1922), 504–47, and LVII (1923), 74–88, 137–52, 326–44; and many others.

run in families.[129] While these early investigations necessarily lacked a precise measure of mental level, the subsequent development of mental testing has not undermined the validity of the earlier conclusion, that both superiority and inferiority run in families. The question, to which we recur below, is whether distinction, or the lack of it, is due to heredity or to social opportunity.

It was implicit in all the work of Galton that heredity is immensely more important than environment in determining the physical, mental and personality traits of an individual, and that these in turn were primary determinants of his social status. In his famous "History of Twins" in the *Inquiries Into Human Faculty,* he said, "Those teachings that conform to the natural aptitudes of the child leave much more enduring marks than others"; and he called attention to the cuckoo which, though always reared by foster parents, never adopts their chirp or twitter. He was not, however, unaware of the importance of environmental circumstances. He pointed out that "a small accident will often determine the scientific man who shall first make and publish a new discovery."[130] He realized the importance of family status and family tradition. "The fairly gifted son of a great painter or musician is far more likely to become a professional celebrity than another man who has equal natural ability, but is not especially educated for professional life."[131] He pointed out advantages often attaching to elder sons and the importance of early training. Moreover, Galton attached much more importance to high general ability than to the inheritance of those specific creative powers usually attributed to genius, and emphasized in addition such qualities as energy, health, perseverance, love of truth, independence of character, and good memory. Obviously all of these characteristics are affected more or less by training, experience, and the social milieu.

Consequently, numerous efforts have been made to controvert the Galtonian thesis that distinction rests upon a hereditary basis. Lester F. Ward reviewed the literature,[132] and, utilizing Odin's notable collection of data relating to superior men, sought to show that the frequency of men of genius is a consequence of the social opportunities provided by urbanism

[129] Among the early, frequently quoted works are: R. L. Dugdale, *The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Disease, Pauperism and Heredity* (New York, 1877 and 1910); A. H. Estabrook, *The Jukes in 1915* (1916); A. E. Winship, *The Jukes-Edwards: A Study in Education and Heredity* (1900); H. H. Goddard, *The Kallikak Family* (1912). Recent studies include: E. J. Lidbetter, *Heredity and the Social Problem Group* (London, 1933); C. P. Blacker, *A Social Problem Group?* (London, 1937).

[130] *Hereditary Genius,* 192. For severe critique see G. Spiller, "Francis Galton on Hereditary Genius," *Soc. Rev.,* XXIV (Jan., Apr., July, 1932), and his *The Origin and Nature of Man* (1931).

[131] *Ibid.,* 320–1.

[132] *Applied Sociology* (1906).

and the culture of the upper classes.[133] His argument was inconclusive. In showing, for example, that Paris was two hundred times as fecund in distinguished men as the French provinces, he demonstrated only that men of science and letters require the stimulus of a scientific and literary world. He had no data by which to refute or verify the argument that, since Paris has served as a magnet for ambitious and gifted individuals of both sexes throughout centuries of French history, and since assortative mating occurs among those of taste and talent, a high fecundity in able men and women should be shown by the Parisian population. The numerous researches of this type could not advance much beyond the very general thesis that genius must both be born and have opportunity.[134] Galton thought ability of the highest order almost certainly triumphs over all obstacles; but while this may be largely true, as shown by a multitude of cases, one has no way of learning how many able and specially gifted persons have failed to leave any record either because ill-luck overwhelmed them or because the necessary cultural medium for the stimulation or the appreciation of their gifts was lacking.

The first steps in the determination of the intensity of inheritance were made on the assumption that it could be measured by the extent of the resemblance between parents and offspring, an assumption later proved tenable only for multiple factor traits, being obviously inapplicable to traits subject to extensive influence by one or a few genes. Galton did this by the angle of regression, Pearson by the correlation coefficient. Hundreds of researches have followed, dealing with the resemblance of parents and children, siblings, twins, orphans, foster parents and foster children and other relationships. In similar manner the influence of various environmental conditions on growth, physical traits, mental level and personality characteristics were studied by the same techniques. Pearson first established the correlation between parents and offspring, between siblings, and between relatives of varying degrees, for physical traits. He found a correlation value of about $r = +.50$ for parents and offspring and for siblings, whether the trait was believed to be much or little influenced by environment. He likewise measured the intensity of inheritance for mental and temperamental characteristics.[135] In a popular statement in

[133] This view was often developed before Ward, as in C. H. Cooley's "Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races," *The Annals, Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, IX (1897), 317–58; F. L. Constable, *Poverty and Hereditary Genius* (London, 1905); A. Niceforo, *Les classes pauvres* (Paris, 1905).

[134] See Ref. 128 above; also Havelock Ellis, *A Study of British Genius* (1926); L. S. Terman, *Genetic Studies of Genius* (Stanford Univ. Pr., 1925, 1926, 1930, Vols. I, II, III).

[135] "On the Inheritance of the Mental Characters in Man," *Proc. Roy. Soc.*, LIX (London, 1901), 153–5; and similar titles in *Biometrika*, Vols. III, V and XIII.

1909 he declared that "All human qualities are inherited in a marked and probably equal degree." [136]

The subsequent development of more exact measures for both mental level and temperamental qualities has produced an extraordinary diversity of results.[137] Many investigators still support the Pearsonian values for the intensity of resemblance in these psychic characteristics, while others find lower correlations and conclude that these traits are more subject to environmental influences than are the physical. Such variability is due to differences in the reliability of tests, the complex character of traits studied, and the general variability of the samples. Tests of mental level cannot be entirely freed from all cultural influences; tests of temperament and personality are far from perfection. Traits are themselves often ill-defined and compounded of elements reflecting different degrees of hereditary or environmental influences. Moreover, they may not be homogeneous throughout the whole range of their variation, so that high correlations at one end become low at the other and different researches produce contradictory results. Among other things, these inquiries have established a considerable constancy for mental level or the intelligence quotient, which in turn has brought about a very extensive investigation into the nature and components of intelligence and of the correlations between mental level, as measured by mental tests, school performance and other scales, and such physical traits as height, weight, rate of growth, physical defects of all sorts, and health.[138]

Research has made it increasingly probable that the more successful classes are superior to the less successful, both physically and mentally. This would seem to be especially true in a democratic, competitive society, where at least some selection on the basis of merit prevails. Moreover, mental testers and educational psychologists have found it generally true that the I.Q.'s of children correlate with the occupations of their fathers and with other measures of social status.[139] In general many

[136] "The Groundwork of Eugenics," *Eugenics Laboratory Lecture Series* (1912), p. 20.

[137] For summary and bibliography see R. Pintner, *Intelligence Testing: Methods and Results* (1923 and 1931); Barbara S. Burks, "A Summary of Literature on the Determiners of the I.Q. and the Educational Quotient," *The Twenty-Seventh Yearbook Nat'l. Soc. for Study of Educ.*, II (1928), 248–353; and Gladys C. Schwesinger, *Heredity and Environment* (1933).

[138] See D. G. Paterson, *Physique and Intellect* (1930); J. A. Harris, R. E. Scammon, C. M. Jackson, and D. G. Paterson, *The Measurement of Man* (1930); R. S. Ellis, *The Psychology of Individual Differences* (1928); Schwesinger, *op. cit.*; F. S. Freeman, *Individual Differences: The Nature and Causes of Variation in Intelligence and Special Abilities* (1934); A. Scheinfeld, *You and Heredity* (1939).

[139] For example, J. F. Collins, "Intelligence of School Children and Paternal Occupation," *Jour. Educ. Res.*, XVII (1928), 157–70; J. F. Duff, and G. H. Thomson, "Social and Geographical Distribution of Intelligence in Northumberland," *Brit.*

researches in this country and in England have shown that the I.Q.'s of children, according to occupation of parents, average about as follows: professional, 116; business, 108; skilled, 98; semi-skilled, 95; unskilled, 89. In other words, in all sorts of investigations, it is discovered that superior individuals, whether parents or children, tend to be associated with the better environmental conditions, and the inferior individuals with the less favorable environmental conditions.

This discovery does not, however, prove the universal predominance of hereditary factors in the determination of these results. It is always possible for environmentalists to say that unfavorable environment has registered itself in mental or physical inferiority and that upper class environments are responsible for upper class excellencies. Hereditarians, on the other hand, contend that superior endowments produce or gravitate toward superior social environments, while mental and physical deficiencies gravitate to the lower occupations and the harder social conditions. It has, therefore, been necessary to develop refinements of statistical method, such as multiple and partial correlation, in the effort to isolate more specifically the influences of particular hereditary or environmental factors. This has proven an extremely difficult field of research and final determination has not yet been realized.

Important contributions, however, have recently been made in the newer studies of twins, both identical and fraternal. Thorndike, though erroneously rejecting Galton's distinction between fraternal and identical twins, found that the resemblance between twins is decisively greater than that between non-twin siblings; that this resemblance is much the same for traits presumably subject to training and experience and those not; and that continued subjection to similar environments did not render twins more alike.[140] Latterly a number of researches have attempted to measure the force of experience and environment by the study of identical twins reared apart. Results have been somewhat diverse. In some cases identical twins separated in infancy and not reunited for many years have been found to be physically, mentally, and temperamentally extremely alike. In other cases they have revealed differences which have been sufficiently great to suggest significant environmental influences.[141] Here again, however, finality is unattained, partly because of the difficulties of always determining monozygosity and partly through the dis-

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Jour. Psych., XXIV, 192–8; F. L. Goodenough, "The Relation of Intelligence in Pre-School Children to the Occupations of Their Fathers," *Am. Jour. Psych.*, XL (1928), 284–94; and many similar studies. See Schwesinger, *op. cit.*, and Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*, for summaries.

[140] "Measurement of Twins," *Archives Phil., Psych. and Scient. Meth.*, II (1905), 547–53.

[141] H. H. Newman, *Twins, A Study of Heredity and Environment* (1937).

covery that identical twins are rendered initially more or less unlike by some subtle "asymmetrical mechanism," similar to that which makes one side of the human face or body different from the other. Nevertheless, one is warranted in saying that twin studies have shown the very great importance of heredity for mental level and social achievement. The average differences of dizygotic twins are for both physical and mental traits definitely greater than those of monozygotic twins. It seems reasonable to conclude as a rough approximation from a survey of a number of studies that, as regards I.Q., identical twins reared together differ on an average by about 5 to 6 points and when reared apart from early childhood by about 7.5 to 8.0 points. Fraternal twins reared together differ by 8 to 10 points. Ordinary siblings reared together show average differences of 14 to 15 points, and if reared apart only one or two points more. It is striking that, on the average, the I.Q.'s of identical twins reared apart are more alike than those of non-identicals reared together. In all cases the range of differences is much greater. However, the differences in environment are only such as commonly occur in American communities.[142]

After ten years of patient inquiry Newman, Freeman and Holzinger,[143] criticizing previous studies and utilizing accumulated evidence, tentatively conclude that genetic factors appear to account for about seventy-five per cent of twin differences. They are careful to point out, however, that: (1) the weight of the two sets of factors, genetic and environmental, vary with the trait studied, environmental influences being greater for weight, I.Q. and Stanford Achievement than for height and Otis I.Q.; (2) their weight varies also with environment; and (3) their weights are functions each of the other.[144] This last conclusion is in harmony with the popular observation that good opportunity is of little value to one of moron intelligence, while superior intelligence will often utilize meager opportunity for personal development. These authors also note the necessity of distinguishing the effects of the post-natal from the pre-natal environmental influences.

Studies of orphans have likewise revealed possibilities for measuring the respective weights of innate and social factors. When reared together

[142] N. D. M. Hirsch, *Twins' Heredity and Environment* (1930); C. Merriman, "The Intellectual Resemblance of Twins," *Psych. Monogs.*, XXXIII (1924); K. J. Holzinger, "The Relative Effect of Nature and Nurture Influences on Twin Differences," *Jour. Educ. Psych.*, XX (1929), 241–8; R. A. Fisher, "The Resemblance Between Twins: A Statistical Examination of Lauterbach's Data," *Genetics*, X (1925), 569–79; Gladys G. Tallman, "A Comparative Study of Identical Twins and Non-Identical Twins with Respect to Intelligence Resemblance," *The Twenty-Seventh Yearbook*, I (1928), 83–86.

[143] H. H. Newman, F. N. Freeman, and K. J. Holzinger, *Twins: A Study of Heredity and Environment* (1937).

[144] *Op. cit.*, 345 *et seq.*

in an orphanage, orphans present the possibility of measuring the increasing degree of similarity among individuals genetically different but living under uniform conditions. When sibling orphans are placed in different foster homes they offer opportunity for the study of the influence of different environments upon genetic elements more or less similar. Davis, Lawrence, Wingfield, and others found no significant tendency for life in an orphanage to make unrelated individuals more alike; in some cases no elevation of mental level occurred with improvement in environment; but the class differences of the fathers were shown by their orphanage-reared children.[145] Freeman and others, on the other hand, found that foster children tend to resemble their foster parents and that the transfer of young orphans to good foster homes tended on the average to raise the I.Q.[146] The results of these studies are thus far quite variable and even contradictory to some extent.

In a general summary of the nature-nurture problem as revealed by studies of school children, Burks concludes "that about 17 percent of the variability of intelligence is due to differences in home environment; . . . that not far from 70 percent of ordinary white school children have intelligence that deviates less than 6 I.Q. points up or down from what they would have if all children were raised in a standard (average) home environment; that while home environment in rare, extreme cases may account for as much as 20 points of increment above the expected, or congenital, level, heredity (in conjunction with environment) may account in some instances for increments above the level of the generality which are five times as large (100 points)."

Certainly one of the most important observations in this field is that there is a marked tendency for different individuals to respond in different ways to the same stimulus. This is shown not only in different rates of physical growth but more strikingly in different rates of learning. There is much ground for believing that the democratic effort to establish social equality by the system of universal free education defeats itself. Thorndike, particularly, has emphasized the fact that bright children not only learn faster but continue to learn longer. The widely cultivated doctrine that the individual is like a piece of plastic clay subject to the molding forces of his home and community must give way to the truer view that individuals respond selectively and differentially to the stimuli about them. Any individual will, no doubt, develop differently in dif-

[145] R. A. Davis, Jr., "The Influence of Heredity on the Mentality of Orphan Children," *Brit. Jour. Psych.*, XIX (1928), 44–59; A. H. Wingfield, *Twins and Orphans: The Inheritance of Intelligence* (London, 1928); and "The Intelligence of Twins and of the Inmates of Orphanages," *Eugenics Rev.*, XXII (1930), 183–6.

[146] *The Twenty-Seventh Yearbook*, I (1928), 103–217; Holzinger as in Ref. 142; Schwesinger, *op. cit.*, 250 *et seq.*

ferent environments, but from the same environment arise quite different individuals, and in any environment the individual's genetic constitution not only sets limits to his capacity to respond to his opportunities but gives the main outlines of his body build, his mental level, and his personality type.[147]

As above noted, the development of Mendelism in biology has deeply affected the study of physical and mental inheritance.[148] In the first place, it completely transformed the genealogical or family pedigree method. The earlier work merely sought to show a general similarity between succeeding generations. The Mendelian theory that each trait is due to a specific gene or genes led to efforts to show that specific physical, mental, temperamental, or personality traits are inherited. There has thus accumulated during the past thirty years a vast quantity of pedigree material relating to the transmission of specific traits. An early summary was made by Davenport,[149] and more recent summaries have been made by Gates, Baur, Fischer and Lenz, and Hogben, in whose works extensive bibliographies will be found.[150] Suffice it to say here that traits range from simple Mendelian dominants, such as polydactilism, and from those due to rare recessive genes, such as amaurotic idiocy, to those due to a considerable number of factors and hence variable in amount or degree, such as stature, skin color, and intelligence level. A number of traits are sex-linked, including color-blindness, haemophilia, and certain rarer diseases. Blood grouping is explained by the theory of "multiple allelomorphs."[151] The hereditary basis of every variety of physical trait, from finger print and palm and sole patterns to gross bodily shape and from health and longevity to susceptibility to most varied ailments is gradually being clarified.[152] Family pedigree studies have shown that a great variety

[147] F. H. Hankins, "Organic Plasticity vs. Organic Response," *Publ. A.S.S.*, XXII (1928), 43–51; also *Soc. Forces,* VI (1928), 331–44.

[148] Recent works include H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature* (1930); L. C. Dunn, *Heredity and Variation* (1934); N. Fasten, *Principles of Genetics and Eugenics* (1935); H. H. Newman, *Evolution, Genetics and Eugenics* (3d ed., 1932); C. R. Stockard, *Physical Basis of Personality* (1931); S. J. Holmes, *The Eugenic Predicament* (1933), and *Human Genetics and Its Social Import* (1936); A. Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*

[149] C. B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics* (1911).

[150] R. R. Gates, *Heredity in Man* (1930); E. Baur, E. Fischer, and F. Lenz, *Menschliche Erblehre* (4th ed., Munich, 1936); 2d ed. trans. as *Human Heredity* (London and New York, 1931); L. Hogben, *Genetic Principles in Medicine and Social Science* (1932), and *Nature and Nurture* (1933). Basic researches in this field are published in the *Treasury of Human Inheritance.*

[151] See Hogben, *op. cit.*, chap. iii; L. H. Snyder, *Blood Groupings in Relation to Clinical and Legal Medicine* (1927); A. S. Wiener, "Determining Parentage," *Sci. Mon.* (Apr., 1935).

[152] See References 138, 150, and 151; *Drapers' Company Research Memoirs* (Lon-

of both usual and very unusual traits manifest themselves, regardless of the social environment.[153] There are other traits, however, which manifest themselves only under environmental stimulation, such as various allergies and mental and personality characteristics.

Parallel researches sought to discover the mode of transmission of the more obvious forms of mental abnormality, such as epilepsy and various types of insanity. While they have succeeded in showing that these traits tend also to some extent to run in families, they have discovered much variability of form and completeness of manifestation. It has long been known that Huntington's chorea is inherited as a simple dominant. Evidence has rapidly accumulated that two or more genes are involved in the inheritance of schizophrenia and manic-depressive insanity.[154]

The difficulties in the determination of the exact rôle of heredity in producing various forms of mental defect and abnormality are due to the following: (1) the abnormality may not manifest itself until middle age or later, so that many persons who would have shown it had they lived die before onset; (2) the gene basis appears to be complex, in some cases; (3) there are involved in the etiology not merely the special genes but the associated genes, so that the general constitution or genotypic milieu is also involved; and (4) mental abnormalities, though potentially present, may manifest themselves only under special nervous strain.

These researches connected at various points with those begun by Morel on degeneracy and by Lombroso and others of the anthropological or positive school of criminology. This school sought to demonstrate that there exists a hereditary type, the "born criminal," representing atavistic reversion to primitive traits. The theory that there is some specific genetic factor which inevitably results in criminality died a slow death, but without destroying entirely the presumption that there is a more complex and less deterministic hereditary basis for crime and delinquency. More precise measurement of criminals and delinquents indicates that, with reference to all physical and mental characteristics, they range through the whole human gamut of variations; their averages differ little, when they differ at all, from general averages for the population

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don); Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics, *Memoirs, Lecture Series, Treasury of Human Inheritance,* and *Annals of Eugenics* (London); Eugenics Record Office, Cold Spring Harbor, L.I., N.Y., *Eugenical News* and *Memoirs; Jour. of Heredity, Eugenics Rev., Human Biology,* and *Am. Jour. Phys. Anthr.*

[153] For a recent compilation, see Scheinfeld, *op. cit.,* pp. 91–6, 187–204.

[154] W. E. Merriam, "Psychoses in Identical Twins," *Psychiat. Quart.,* VII (1933), 37–49; A. J. Rosanoff, et. al., "Insanity in Twins," *Am. Jour. Psychiat.,* XCI (1934–5), 247, 724; E. Slater, "Inheritance of Mental Disorder," *Eugenics Rev.,* XXVIII (1937), 277–84; Franz J. Kallman, *The Genetics of Schizophrenia* (1938).

from which they spring.[155] Criminality, being a violation of law, is obviously largely a consequence of the law and social situations. All persons violate the law in some respects sometime, but the fact that delinquents, professional prostitutes and habitual criminals come from all classes and environments but more frequently from some than from others, leads to the presumption that mental level, emotional type, and psychophysical drives may serve to a considerable degree to select the wayward from the law-abiding.[156]

(c) *Selection.* The first important contribution to post-Darwinian studies of the operation of selection in the human species seems to have been an essay by Greg.[157] This was followed shortly by Galton's *Hereditary Genius,* in 1869. Both of these men noted that the effect of the prudential restraint so much emphasized by Malthus was to induce the more intelligent, prudent, and otherwise worthy members of society unduly to restrain their natural fertility. Greg asserted that he could conceive in the distant future a republic "in which paupers should be forbidden to propagate; in which all candidates for the proud and solemn privilege of continuing an untainted and perfecting race should be subjected to a pass or a competitive examination." Galton asserted that any nation which continued, as did modern England, to reproduce freely from its less worthy and restrictedly from its more worthy elements and to provide social measures for the protection of the former more or less at the expense of the latter would inevitably destroy the racial basis of national life. He pointed to the celibacy of the medieval church as having effectively sterilized most of the able men of gentle natures, and to the Inquisition as largely responsible for the stagnation of Spain through having eliminated annually for three centuries an average of one thousand of the freest, ablest and boldest men. He also called attention to the

[155] Chas. Goring, *The English Convict* (London, 1913); M. R. Fernald, M. H. Hayes, and A. Dawley, *A Study of Women Delinquents in New York State* (1920); C. Murchison, *Criminal Intelligence* (1926); E. A. Hooton, *The American Criminal* (1939).

[156] Jean Weidensall, *The Mentality of the Criminal Woman* (1916); J. B. Miner, *Deficiency and Delinquency* (1918); J. H. Williams, "The Intelligence of the Delinquent Boy," *Jour. of Delinq., Monog. No. 1* (1919); M. A. Merrill, "Mental Differences Among Juvenile Delinquents," *Jour. of Delinq.,* X (1926), 312–23; C. Burt, *The Young Delinquent* (1925); W. Healy, and A. F. Bronner, *Delinquents and Criminals* (1926); F. E. Haynes, *Criminology* (1935); J. Lange, *Crime and Destiny* (1930); A. J. Rosanoff, "Criminality and Delinquency in Twins," *Jour. Crim. Law and Criminol.,* XXIV (1934), 923; and N. D. M. Hirsch, *Dynamic Causes of Juvenile Delinquency* (1937).

[157] "On the Failure of 'Natural Selection' in the Case of Man," *Fraser's Mag.,* LXXVIII (1868), 353–62.

selective effect of early marriages in that they shorten the length of the generation and leave more progeny in each.

These views were repeated two years later by Darwin,[158] who, with his usual balance, pointed out that society preserves some degree of natural selection, since death-rates are unusually high among the less able, weaknesses of character result in more rapid elimination, while ability, physical health and vigor, and moral stability favor marriage and family perpetuation.

Galton touched on the subject of racial selection in an essay on "Hereditary Improvement" in 1873,[159] and ten years later in his *Human Faculty* coined the word "eugenics" as a substitute for "viriculture." In this work he also pointed out that a race of men highly selected and bred for special traits is an impossibility; that emigrants and exiles "are on the whole men of exceptional and energetic natures" and from them new racial strains may be derived; and that society ought to encourage the multiplication of its better strains by marks of family merit and financial endowments for promising youth of both sexes.

Galton appears not to have recurred to the subject of eugenics again until his lecture in 1901 on "The Possible Improvement of the Human Breed, under the Existing Conditions of Law and Sentiment." [160] Meanwhile, two important developments in the study of selection in modern life had occurred. One of these centered around the problem raised by Huxley in a famous lecture on the conflict of natural and ethical evolution.[161] He pointed out that the former requires the rigorous elimination of the weak and defective while the latter demands their preservation, because it requires an increase of altruism. Huxley here appears to identify ethical progress with increased cultivation of the softer side of human nature, whereas survival, the first essential of life, requires the virtues of both peace and war. All admit that a strong, vigorous race is essential to survival in the long run, a view vigorously sustained by Pearson,[162] who contended that even the rivalries of nations in times of peace exemplifies the operation of natural selection on a grand scale. There is obviously an inherent conflict of virtues. Galton [163] had shown that the gregariousness of the mass of men, with its attendant attributes of slavishness and dependence on the crowd, contrasts sharply with the much admired qualities of personal strength, independence, initiative, originality, and individuality. Also, the struggle between groups cultivates the virtues

[158] *Descent of Man.*
[159] *Fraser's Magazine.*
[160] *Nature,* LXIV (1901), 659–65; *Pop. Sci. Mo.,* LX (1902), 218–33.
[161] Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 1893.
[162] *National Life From the Standpoint of Science* (London, 1901 and 1905).
[163] *Inquiries,* etc.

of loyalty, courage, and heroism, which may be antithetical to those of gentleness, submissiveness, and love of peace.

Modern humanitarianism, as a manifestation of pity and sympathy, has undoubtedly tended to keep alive the weaker elements in the population and has enabled them to add their quota to succeeding generations. That way lies race degeneration. The solution, however, is not to be found in the restriction of humanitarian activities but rather in the promotion of policies of birth-control, segregation, and sterilization whereby those strains obviously unfit for the complex and exacting life of modern civilized communities may be prevented from burdening posterity with their inadequacy and maladjustment. This would preserve and even enhance racial strength, but it would not solve Huxley's problem. It appears that no form of ethical idealism is attainable, except the ideal of a well-balanced golden mean, for most virtues carried to an excess become vices. Obedience turns to slavishness, liberty to license, and personal independence into truculent egocentricity.

A second late nineteenth-century development is found in the growth of the above mentioned school of social selectionism in France and Germany under the leadership of Ammon and Lapouge.[164] It was shown not only that a gradual brachycephalization of western Europe had occurred during preceding centuries, but that there were differences in the proportions of brachycephalic and dolichocephalic types between city and country and between upper and lower classes. Finding the city populations of northwestern Europe more dolichocephalic than those of the surrounding countryside, they contended that the dolichocephals, whom they tended to identify with the tall, blond, Nordic or Teutonic type, migrate more freely and succeed more often in the competition of city life than the darker Alpines. They thus saw in the midst of modern industrial urbanism a new form of the ancient struggle of races.[165] While subsequent scientific work has sought to free itself from this early emotional attachment to specific race idealization, these authors gave impetus to an immense literature in two somewhat diverse directions. As is shown above, they lent support to the Aryan Nordic doctrine which has subsequently proven immensely important in the ideologies of western nations, and particularly of the Germans; they also stimulated a large body of research dealing with the physical, mental, and moral differences between the different social classes and between urban and rural populations, some of which has stimulated a more realistic type of eugenic study.[166]

[164] Otto Ammon, *Anthropologische Untersuchungen der Wehrpflichtigen in Baden* (Hamburg, 1890); other references as on p. 300.

[165] To this group belongs also Georg Hansen, *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen* (Munich, 1889).

[166] P. Sorokin, and C. Zimmerman, *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* (1929),

2. *Eugenic Studies.* Meanwhile, Pearson and others began a more exact analysis of the forms of selection and made contributions to their quantitative measurement. He showed that selection takes three forms: genetic or reproductive, lethal, and sexual. Pearson and others of the biometrician group showed the quantitative operation of selection, often in subtle ways, on physique and intelligence as between the social classes and occupational groups, through varying resistance to disease, infant mortality, differential fertility, the inheritance of fertility, order of birth, age of marriage and of parenthood, and otherwise.[167] Among the more important contributions of this group was the demonstration that the majority of deaths are more or less selective; that assortative mating occurs to an important extent; that of all valued human traits apparently the only one correlating positively with actual fertility is longevity; that, based on family size and death-rates of three decades ago, one-eighth of those born in one generation produced one-half of those born in the succeeding generation; that consequently racial quality very probably fluctuates from generation to generation; and that if the more fertile parents are less well-endowed than the less fertile, a significant change in the natural abilities of a population may occur in one generation. His devotion to selection led him to say: "Selection of parenthood is the sole effective process known to science by which a race can continually progress." [168]

In many respects little progress has been made beyond the contributions of the Pearson school, though a multitude of studies have appeared, especially in the United States, England and Germany.[169] Recently have appeared studies of the significance of preferential and assortative (homogamic) mating, the order of birth, the presumed handicapping of the first born, the age of parents, and similar problems.[170] The world-wide controversy as to whether modern warfare is dysgenic has produced more affirmations than denials, but has shown that the matter is far less simple

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Parts II and IV; Sorokin, Zimmerman and Galpin, *Systematic Source Book of Rural Sociology* (1930).

[167] K. Pearson, *The Chances of Death, and Other Studies in Evolution* (London, 1897); *The Grammar of Science* (London, 1900 and 1911); *Eugenics Lab. Lecture Series,* Nos. 1, 2, 5 to 9; "The Intensity of Natural Selection in Man," *Proc. Roy. Soc.,* B, LXXXV (1912), 469–76; E. M. Elderton, and K. Pearson, "Further Evidences of Natural Selection," *Biometrika,* X (1915), 488–506.

[168] "The Groundwork of Eugenics," *Eug. Lab. Lecture Series,* No. 2 (1909).

[169] See brief summary in S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race* (1921), *Studies in Evolution and Eugenics* (1923), and *The Eugenic Predicament* (1933); and Baur, Fischer and Lenz, *op. cit.* (Engl. or Germ.), Part III.

[170] L. L. Thurstone, *Order of Birth, Parent-Age and Intelligence* (1931); H. H. Hsiao, "The Status of the First-Born with Special Reference to Intelligence," *Genet. Psych. Monogs.,* No. 9 (1931); N. A. Dayton, "Order of Birth of Mental Defectives," *Jour. Hered.,* XX (1929), 219–24, and "Intelligence and Size of Family," *ibid.,* XX, 365–74.

than the peace propagandists suppose.[171] That alcohol exerts a selective influence has been demonstrated on various animal breeds but its effect on racial quality is still far from full clarification.[172] That feeble-mindedness is a handicap to survival, marriage, and the rearing of offspring has been frequently demonstrated.[173] That there is a large hereditary element in susceptibility to various diseases has been clearly demonstrated; thus the continuance of some natural selection even under the most healthful conditions is demonstrated.[174] There is also clear evidence that length of life tends strongly to be inherited,[175] and fertility to some extent.[176] That infant mortality becomes more clearly selective as it is reduced in amount has been shown by Holmes,[177] though the greater mortality of the male at all ages may be due to recessive lethal factors.[178] There are, finally, many indications that various asocial and antisocial types, such as prostitutes, criminals, beggars, tramps and other human misfits leave few surviving offspring.

The question, however, that has attracted widest attention is whether the differential fertility and mortality rates of the social classes are really dysgenic in their operation. The reduction of mortality in the lower classes by modern medicine, sanitation, and social service activities, and the more rapid decline of the birth-rate of the upper classes, tends to accentuate the difference in their net fertilities. The working classes marry earlier, leave more offspring in each generation, and have more genera-

[171] G. Bodart, and V. L. Kellogg, *Losses of Life in Modern Wars* (Oxford, 1916); F. L. Hoffman, *Army Anthropology and Medical Rejection Statistics* (1918); Geo. Nasmyth, *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory* (1916); G. F. Nicolai, *The Biology of War,* trans. from the German (1918); J. A. Novicow, *La critique du Darwinisme social* (Paris, 1910); W. Schallmayer, *Vererbung und Auslese in ihrer soziologischen Bedeutung* (2d ed., Jena, 1910).

[172] Amy Barrington, and K. Pearson, "A Preliminary Study of Extreme Alcoholism in Adults," *Eug. Lab. Memoirs,* XIV (London, 1910); D. Heron, "A Second Study etc.," *ibid.,* XVII (1912); E. M. Elderton, and K. Pearson, "A First Study of the Influence of Parental Alcoholism on the Physique and Ability of Offspring," *ibid.,* X (1910); "A Second Study, etc.," *ibid.,* XIII (1910); E. H. Starling, *The Action of Alcohol on Man* (London, 1923); R. Pearl, *Alcohol and Longevity* (1926); C. C. Weeks, *Alcohol and Human Life* (London, 1929); Haven Emerson, *Alcohol and Man: The Effects of Alcohol on Man in Health and Disease* (1932).

[173] N. A. Dayton, "Mortality in Mental Deficiency over a Fourteen-Year Period," *Amer. Assn. for Study of the Feebleminded, Proceedings,* LV (1931), 127–212.

[174] O. Mohr, *Heredity and Disease* (1934); L. S. Penrose, *The Influence of Heredity on Disease* (London, 1934); Herdmann Muckermann, *Vererbung und Entwicklung* (Berlin, 1937); C. P. Blacker, *Chances of Morbid Inheritance* (London, 1934).

[175] R. J. and R. Pearl, *The Ancestry of the Long Lived* (1934).

[176] W. Wagner-Manslau, "The Inheritance of Fertility," *Annals of Eugenics,* VI (1935), 225.

[177] *Studies in Evolution and Eugenics* (1923), chap. vii.

[178] E. Baur, E. Fischer, and F. Lenz, *op. cit.* (1931), pp. 342–4.

tions in a century. This has given rise to extensive fear lest reversed selection may be undermining the racial quality of western nations. An enormous literature has grown up on the relative survival rates of occupational, educational, and other population groups.[179] It now appears that differential birth rates among modern social classes have existed for many decades, though doubtless accentuated after 1875. There are still those who seem to believe that this contains no threat to racial quality.[180] When, however, one surveys the multitude of investigations, from the earliest studies of Galton to the latest output of mental testers and educational psychologists, he finds nowhere any research which does not indicate that the upper classes are superior to the lower classes in physical and mental quality. This problem, therefore, resolves itself into the question discussed in a previous section of this chapter as to whether upper class superiorities are due to heredity or to environment. It seems fair to say that the mass of scientific opinion is that the nations of northwestern Europe and the United States are at present suffering considerably from reversed selection. Democratic measures, especially popular education, have stimulated the rise in the social scale of individuals of superior physical and mental capacities.[181] It is possible also that the attractions of urban life likewise have drawn the more able, energetic and ambitious youth from the country, though the evidence is conflicting. But upper classes, and especially the successful elements of urban communities, have been notable for their small families. There may thus be going on a process of race consumption which even the vast populations of modern nations cannot permanently endure.

Some indication, however, that a change is imminent is found in the

[179] D. Heron, "On the Relation of Fertility in Man to Social Status, and on the Changes in This Relation That Have Taken Place During the Last Fifty Years," *Drapers' Co. Research Memoirs* (1906); W. C. D. Whetham, *The Family and the Nation* (London, 1909); L. March, "Fertility of Marriage According to Profession and Social Position," *Problems in Eugenics* (London, 1912), 208–21; T. H. C. Stevenson, "Fertility of Various Classes in England and Wales from the Middle of the 19th Century to 1911," *Jour. Roy. Stat. Soc.*, LXXXIII (1920), 401–44; R. E. Baber and E. A. Ross, *Changes in the Size of American Families in One Generation* (1924); H. E. G. Sutherland, and G. H. Thomson, "The Correlation Between Intelligence and Size of Family," *Brit. Jour. Psych.* XVII (1926), 81–92; E. Huntington, and L. F. Whitney, *The Builders of America* (1927); Margaret Sanger, ed., *Proceedings of the World Population Conference* (London, 1927), 130–207; D. C. Jones, "Differential Class Fertility," *Eugenics Rev.*, XXIV (1932), 175–90; E. Sydenstricker, and F. W. Notestein, "Differential Fertility According to Social Class," *Jour. Amer. Stat. Assn.*, XXV (1930), 9–32; C. V. Kiser, "Fertility of Social Classes in Various Types of Communities in the East North Central States in 1900," *ibid.*, XXVII (1932), 371–82; National Resources Committee, *Problems of a Changing Population* (1938), Parts V, VI, VIII and IX.

[180] See especially J. B. S. Haldane, *Heredity and Politics* (1938).

[181] P. Sorokin, *Social Mobility* (1927); S. J. Lennes, *Whither Democracy?* (1927).

discovery of Edin that the sharp reduction of the birth rate among the working classes of Stockholm has reduced their net fertility (births minus deaths) below that of the upper classes. There is abundant evidence both that all classes have become birth-control conscious and that women of the working classes are anxious to avoid the consequences of unrestrained fertility.[182] The progress of contraceptive knowledge and its universal adoption thus holds promise of establishing a higher correlation between the size of family and measures of social success.

In addition, there is an increasing interest in eugenical sterilization. Such laws are now in operation in twenty-eight American states, and in Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Esthonia, the Canadian provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, the state of Vera Cruz, Mexico, the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland, and Porto Rico. Recent genetic research has shown that much less can be accomplished by sterilization in stamping out hereditary defects than was thought feasible a short while ago. Where recessive genes are involved sterilization could be effective only if applied to an entire sibship—none of whom manifested the defect and only a fraction of whom could transmit it. Moreover, a number of defects, especially mental, ordinarily manifest themselves only after full maturity has been reached, or only after most progeny have already been procreated.[183] It is, nevertheless, a useful social device.

(For selected references, see footnotes of the chapter and Bibliographical Appendix.)

[182] N. E. Himes, "British Birth Control Clinics," *Eugenics Rev.,* XX (1928), 157–65; N. E. and C. Vera Himes, "Birth Control for the British Working Classes," *Hospital Social Service,* XIX (1929), 578–617; R. Pearl, "Statistical Report on the First Year's Operations of the Bureau of Contraceptive Advice," *First Rept. of the Bureau* (1929), pp. 2–6.

[183] See H. H. Laughlin, *Eugenical Sterilization in the United States* (1922); J. H. Landman, *Human Sterilization* (1932); C. P. Blacker, *Voluntary Sterilization* (London, 1934); *Report of the Departmental Committee on Sterilization* (Brock Report) (London, 1934); A. Myerson, and Others, *Eugenical Sterilization* (1936); E. S. Gosney, and P. Popenoe, *Twenty-Eight Years of Sterilization in California* (1938).

Part V

THE STUDY OF MENTAL CURRENTS AND PSYCHIC PROCESSES

[12]

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

Kimball Young
and
Douglas W. Oberdorfer

I. Historical Background

This survey will trace the more recent developments and present status of what is currently known as social psychology. Various extended discussions of the historical background of modern social-psychological thought are available elsewhere, so no attempt will be made to duplicate them here.[1] Likewise the writers will not essay to formulate a precise and systematic statement of what social psychology should include in, or exclude from, its sphere of study and research. Our treatment, however, will not be lacking in its positive aspects, for the concluding section of this discussion will present the viewpoint of the writers concerning what they consider to be the more important problems of current social-psychological theory and research. Nevertheless, for the most part the present treatment will have served its purpose if it succeeds in delimiting current trends in social psychology.

Modern social psychology has tended to oscillate between the limits of individual psychology on the one hand and of systematic sociology on

[1] The most extensive account is given in F. B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology* (1932). Some shorter surveys of this nature include Kimball Young, "Social Psychology," *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences,* ed. H. E. Barnes (1925), pp. 156–209; J. W. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted* (1927); Kimball Young, "The Field of Social Psychology," *Psych. Bull.,* XXIV (1927), 661–91; Ellsworth Faris, "Current Trends in Social Psychology," *Essays in Philosophy,* ed. T. V. Smith and W. K. Wright (1929), pp. 119–33 (also reprinted in *The Nature of Human Nature,* 1937); J. F. Markey, "Trends in Social Psychology," *Trends in American Sociology,* ed. G. A. Lundberg, Read Bain, and Nels Anderson (1929), pp. 115–71; L. L. Bernard, "Social Psychology in The United States," *Sociologus,* VIII (1932), 257–80; L. L. Bernard, "Social Psychology," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.,* XIV (1934), pp. 151–7; E. S. Bogardus, "The Fields and Methods of Social Psychology," *The Fields and Methods of Sociology,* ed. L. L. Bernard (1934); Jessie Bernard, "The Sources and Methods of Social Psychology," *The Fields and Methods of Sociology,* ed. L. L. Bernard (1934), pp. 366–86; Herbert Blumer, "Social Psychology," *Man and Society,* ed. E. P. Schmidt (1937), pp. 144–98.

the other. This is a reflection of its diversity of subject matter, which ranges from a study of the individual in his social relations with other individuals and groups, to group behavior itself. We have focused upon this arbitrary twofold subdivision of social psychology for our presentation: the study of personality and the study of collective behavior. After a brief note on the theoretical setting of modern social-psychological thought, we shall review developments in the psychological approach to personality dealing successively with the problem of motivation, the contributions of child and adolescent psychology, and the rapidly growing field of the relation between culture and personality. This will be followed by a summary examination of the field of collective psychology. A final section will be devoted to current trends in methodology and their implications for social-psychological theory and research. Since in recent years social psychology has received the most attention in the United States, the greater part of our discussion of social-psychological theories will be concerned with the American scene.

The main influences on the early development of social psychology in the United States, according to L. L. Bernard,[2] are from three primary sources: neo-Hegelianism, the Scottish school of moral philosophy (represented chiefly by Adam Smith), and the French students of collective behavior. The Scottish influence was felt very early in the now comparatively little known writings of Thomas C. Upham and Jacob Abbott. William James made available the fruits of psychological research in Germany and France.

An even more biological approach to the subject matter of social psychology was put forward by Ward in his *Psychic Factors in Civilization* (1893), "in which he applied the Utilitarian psychology, bolstered up by an analysis of the emotions or social forces based largely on a Darwinian analysis, to the explanation of the growth of institutions, and especially of modern civilization." [3] A similar biological tone characterized the work of Small and Vincent, who paraphrased Schaeffle in the social-psychological section of their *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (1894).

The influence of German social psychology and folk psychology was felt at Harvard and Michigan during the nineties. A definite point of view, influenced in part by Hegelian ideology, was evolved by Dewey and Mead, first at Michigan and subsequently at Chicago. The heirs to this tradition have been Thomas, Park, and Faris, and their many students, but especially Bernard, Blumer, and K. Young. Closely akin to the standpoint of the Chicago school is the outlook of J. M. Baldwin and

[2] L. L. Bernard, "Social Psychology in the United States," *Sociologus,* VIII (1932), 257–80.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 260.

C. H. Cooley, two other famous exponents of social interaction. (See below.)

Thoroughgoing interest in collective behavior and the systematic study of "psychological sociology" was manifest by two early outstanding contributors to American social psychology, Ross and Ellwood. Ross was guided mainly by the French school of collective behavior rather than by neo-Hegelianism. The description of his *Social Psychology* (1908), made by Bernard [4] would apply to most of his writings in the field: "Ross is but little concerned in this work with the processes of personality building; he takes personality for granted, and is interested primarily in describing collective behavior." Similarly Ellwood devoted himself primarily to group or collective action. His writings have sought to make the older group mind theories more palatable to modern sociologists by placing that approach on a more dynamic basis. Because of this emphasis, however, his contribution must be considered more sociological than psychological.[5]

The publication of William McDougall's *An Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1908, the same year in which Ross's text appeared, shifted the attention of American social psychology to the analysis of personality. An extended controversy concerning its foundations, the problem of human motivation, ensued for several decades. It is to this problem that we now turn.

II. Instinct or Emotion

The doctrine of social instincts has as its immediate background the writings of Walter Bagehot and Gabriel Tarde, who stressed the rôle of imitation in social life; and the development of functional psychology under William James. Bagehot and Tarde fostered the breakdown of rationalism by their insistence upon the importance of man's original nature in an understanding of his social behavior. In James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) instincts became a necessary foundation upon which social habits and the social self grow. James's definition of instinct was relatively lacking in precision. For him an instinct is "a faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance." Among the many instinctive acts which might be either relatively simple or highly complex, were some which definitely foreshadowed the formation of social habits

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

[5] Implications of the "social mind" theory are discussed in Kimball Young, "Social Psychology," *History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, ed. H. E. Barnes (1925), pp. 158–64; and at length in M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society* (1909).

and the social self: imitation, rivalry, pugnacity, anger, sympathy, the hunting instinct, fear, acquisitiveness, constructiveness, play, curiosity, and love, including jealousy and parental affections. James pictured the self which emerged from this instinctive foundation as a many-sided phenomenon of which the "social self" was but one aspect, the others being the natural self, the spiritual self, and the pure ego. The "social self" developed from the recognition which one received from one's fellows, for "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind." This emphasis upon social status and the place of social interaction in the formation of the self was much more highly developed by Cooley, Mead and the Chicago school. The importance of habit in social behavior, stated by James, was greatly elaborated by Dewey.

But it is William McDougall who gave the chief emphasis to the place of the instincts and the emotions as basic determinants of social behavior. His book, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908), became so popular and widespread in its application that his name became closely identified with the extreme emphasis on instinctive and emotional motivation to behavior.

The central feature of McDougall's system, as it was originally expounded, is a systematic and definite linkage of instincts and emotions. He defines an instinct in the following manner:

"We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psychophysical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action." [6]

On this basis, McDougall presents "The Principal Instincts and the Primary Emotions of Man," [7] which include: the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear, the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust, the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder, the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger, the instincts of self-abasement (or subjection) and of self-assertion (or self-display), and the emotions of subjection and elation (or negative and positive self-feeling), the parental instinct and the tender emotion, and some other instincts of less well-defined emotional tendency.

Upon this innate substratum, habits are developed in the service of the original instinctive strivings. The emotions may combine into various complex forms, which, when organized around some relatively stable ob-

[6] William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (22nd ed., 1931), p. 25.
[7] *Ibid.*, chap. iii.

ject constitute sentiment.[8] The whole activity of the developing self is directed, however, by the inherited drives which are basic to all human behavior. This teleological, purposive, or "hormic" (to use McDougall's term) psychology was advanced in protest against the hedonistic trend dominant in the thought of the nineteenth century. As such it reflected and exploited the extraordinary popularity and prestige of the evolutionary school of social Darwinism, and gained widespread acceptance from social scientists and educators. Bernard[9] explains its rapid rise to prominence in this way:

> McDougall's viewpoint won out temporarily over that of Cooley, partly because of its greater precision of statement and partly, because of the greater prestige at that time of biological theory and explanation in general over environmental theory and explanation. During the last half of the nineteenth century, and continuing well into the twentieth century, biology was the leading science among all of the learned disciplines. It was, therefore, almost inevitable that an instinctivist theory of personality integration should take hold strongly of the imaginations of educators, sociologists, and social psychologists generally, at a time when environmental analysis was as yet in a rudimentary stage of development.[10]

The fundamentals of his system having been presented in his *Introduction,* McDougall proceeded to draw upon them for his later presentation, *The Group Mind* (1921). There is little added to the basic theoretical structure in this later work, which is largely a descriptive account of racial and national psychology, written largely in the atmosphere of the World War. Although based upon certain aspects of comparative psychology, McDougall's standpoint, frankly vitalistic and speculative, brought protest from the experimentalists who approached the same field with counter-explanations. Under the leadership of J. B. Watson the school of behaviorism arose to challenge the monopoly of the instinctivist "explanation."

As a reaction against the introspective methods which had characterized earlier experimental psychology, a series of investigations using objective methods was begun during the first decade of the twentieth century. Many of these probed into the problem of man's original nature and examined more critically older concepts of imitation, social instincts, and

[8] McDougall evidently drew heavily on Alexander Shand for his concept of sentiment. See Shand, *The Foundations of Character* (1914).

[9] L. L. Bernard, *op. cit.,* p. 269.

[10] Among the many adaptations of the instinct hypothesis in the social sciences may be mentioned: W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (1916); Thorstein Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship* (1914); and Ordway Tead, *Instincts in Industry* (1918).

human learning. E. L. Thorndike, noted for his application of the experimental method to human and animal learning, was a pioneer in this field. His treatment, however, lengthened the list of original response patterns.[11] It remained for Watson and his fellow behaviorists to reduce the innate mechanisms to a minimum.

On the basis of his experimentation in the field of early learning in human infants Watson reduced the number of unlearned responses to a few elementary reflexes concerned with fear, love and affection, and anger or rage. The so-called instincts were considered as a series of concatenated or chained reflexes observed in response to certain specific stimuli. Watson's investigations demonstrated that these native reflexes together with a considerable number of random and exploratory movements are rapidly integrated into learned reactions. For an explanatory concept, Watson drew upon the work of two Russian physiologists, Pavlov and Bechterev, and introduced the conditioned reflex to American psychologists and social psychologists. This afforded an objective explanation for imitation, sympathy, and numerous acts previously regarded as instinctive.

As a result of the spread of behaviorism there arose a wholesale attack on the instinct theory of McDougall and his followers. One of the first opponents was Knight Dunlap[12] who criticized McDougall on the grounds of experimental validity and concluded that there are no instincts. The following year Kantor[13] raised objections to the metaphysical assumptions of the McDougallian position and also to the interrelation of instincts and emotions. At the same time Hunter[14] emphasized the rôle of early learning in modifying innate reactions. Several other telling criticisms of the instinct doctrine followed, notably those of Bernard,[15] Kuo,[16] and Faris.[17] The main point of criticism seemed to be that the instinct hypothesis is a naïve and particularistic explanation for the complexities of human behavior. The whole argument is well summarized in Bernard's *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (1924).[18]

[11] Cf. E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology,* I (1913), chaps. vi and vii.

[12] Knight Dunlap, "Are There Any Instincts?," *Jour. of Abn. Psych.,* XIV (1919), 307–11.

[13] J. R. Kantor, "A Functional View of Human Instincts," *Psych. Rev.,* XXVII (1920), 50–72.

[14] W. S. Hunter, "The Modification of Instincts from the Standpoint of Social Psychology," *Psych. Rev.* XXVII (1920), 247–69.

[15] L. L. Bernard, "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psych. Rev.,* XXVIII (1921), 96–119.

[16] Z. Y. Kuo, "Giving up Instincts in Psychology," *Jour. of Phil.,* XVIII (1921), 645–64.

[17] Ellsworth Faris, "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXVII (1921), 184–96. Also reprinted in his *The Nature of Human Nature* (1937).

[18] A still more radical attack on instinct theory is C. C. Josey, *The Social Philosophy of Instinct* (1922).

A systematic approach to the subject matter of social psychology based upon the reflex hypothesis of the behaviorists was advanced by F. H. Allport in his *Social Psychology* (1924). This work has gained wide acceptance from academic psychologists. Its basic assumption is that "The human being has inherited a number of prepotent reflexes which are fundamental not only in their original potency, but in the control which they exert over habit formation throughout life. Ultimately, as well as genetically, they are prepotent." [19] Allport recognizes six important classes of human prepotent reflexes: starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive zone reactions, and sex reactions. Upon these foundations all social behavior is built.[20] This position has been extensively criticized both by the followers of McDougall and by many sociologists as tending to an extremely mechanistic treatment of social and cultural influences.

The thrusts against instinct theory did not go unanswered by McDougall.[21] He steadfastly reiterated his belief in the existence of inherited hormic drives, urges, or appetites which serve as the dynamics of human motivation. He disparaged all attempts to reduce the behavior of man to the mechanistic reflexes of the "muscle-twitch" psychology of the Watsonians. In the latest formal presentation of his views, contained in *The Energies of Men* (1932), he replaced the concept *instinct* with the less known term *propensity,* but he continued to defend his hormic psychology [22] which

asserts that each animal species is so constituted that it seeks or strives for certain natural goals, the attainment of which satisfies corresponding needs of the animal. Since those needs and the tendencies to satisfy them, to strive towards the corresponding goals (such as food, shelter, and mate), are inborn and transmitted from generation to generation in all members of the species, they

[19] F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924), p. 50.

[20] An example of an extremely behavioristic point of view applied to social psychology may be found in A. P. Weiss, "A Set of Postulates for Social Psychology," *Jour. of Abn. and Soc. Psych.,* XXI (1926), 203–11. In this article the author advances a set of postulates based upon the assumption that the behavior of the individual and his fellows is to be regarded as only a special case of the physical universe. This approach tends toward an extreme environmentalism. A recent reflection is found in G. A. Lundberg's *Foundations of Sociology* (1939).

[21] Cf. William McDougall, "The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology," *Jour. of Abn. Psych.,* XVI (1922), 285–333; "Can Sociology and Social Psychology Dispense with Instincts?" *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXIX (1924), 657–73; and *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (22nd ed., 1931), supplementary chap. vi.

[22] William McDougall, *The Energies of Men* (1932), p. 26. In this work McDougall tentatively lists the following innate propensities: food-seeking, disgust, sex, fear, curiosity, protective or parental, gregarious, self-assertive, submissive, anger, appeal, constructive, acquisitive, laughter, comfort, rest or sleep, migratory, and a group of very simple propensities subserving bodily needs. (Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 97–8.)

are properly called instinctive. Such inborn tendencies are often spoken of as instincts; but since this word cannot be used without provoking controversy and needless difficulties, it is perhaps better to avoid it; and perhaps the best word to use here is the good old word *"propensity."*

The vigorous challenging of instinct as the basic motivating principle in human behavior led many writers toward environmentalism. Extreme proponents of this view have failed to recognize adequately the place of constitutional factors in human motivation and the resulting dynamic relationship between the organism and its environment. In recent years the term "drive" has been introduced into psychological literature to replace the older terms "instinct," "instinctive tendency" or "impulse." Many interpretations of instinct had placed the organism in a passive rôle dependent upon stimuli reaching it from the outside. The newer approach recognizes the important fact that adaptation is qualified not only by the external environment but also by the bio-chemical and neural changes within the organism. The "drive" may be defined as a certain state of disequilibrium or distress of the organism, set up from within or from without, which profoundly influences or directs the course of response leading normally to a state of equilibrium or adaptation. This equilibrium is dependent both upon the internal interplay or forces, and upon the relation of the organism itself to the outside environment. The orientation to this point of view was facilitated by R. S. Woodworth, who in his *Dynamic Psychology* (1918) tried to keep distinct the problem of the mechanism, which may be both innate and acquired, and the "drive," which induces the organism to act in a particular way.[23]

Great service toward an understanding of the constitutional substratum of social behavior has been rendered by the expanding field of endocrinology. The effects of so-called glandular imbalance upon personality development are doubtless significant. One must approach the literature in this field with caution, however, for, like so many other scientific discoveries, the findings with regard to the endocrine system have given rise to a host of popular and pseudo-scientific accounts of glandular influence on personality. One of the best non-technical treatments of the pertinent facts about modern endocrinology is to be found in R. G. Hoskins, *The Tides of Life* (1933).

The contribution of Sigmund Freud and his followers to the theory and analysis of personality has been profound, to say nothing of the practical applications of psychoanalysis as a therapy, but the importance of Freud's work will be discussed elsewhere in this volume.[24]

[23] Two recent books, L. S. Shaffer, *Psychology of Adjustment* (1936), and Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Personality* (1937), exemplify the present drive theory in social psychology.

[24] The psychoanalytic contribution is discussed further in the article by Golden-

Although McDougall's theories of original nature and of instinctive propulsions have been much criticized, there is little doubt that his continued reiteration of the rôle of internal drive or push and of the importance of emotions in behavior has been considerably vindicated by empirical investigation, especially in the field of genetic psychology and in the surveys of collective behavior, especially with respect to propaganda. McDougall's standpoint has been supplemented by the work of the psychoanalysts and of the *Gestalt* psychologists. Both the child psychologists and the followers of Freud and Jung have stressed the importance of the early years in the formulation of adult traits, attitudes, and habits. And in these investigations there has been a growing recognition of the significance of societal and cultural stimulation.

III. The Genesis of Personality

From the point of view of empirical research, the child has been utilized as a subject because of the comparatively simple character of the situations which confront him.[25] "It seems that in all probability, more and more use will be made of child subjects for the study of basic problems in personality. Adults are too difficult to study; they are too self-conscious; they have too many inaccessible defenses; their responses are too confused by the presence of layer upon layer of habit which prevents a clear discernment of the process of response; their motives are too mixed." [26]

Researches in the development of the social behavior of children can be roughly divided into two approaches: the longitudinal and the cross-sectional. The former is concerned with tracing the behavior of individuals or groups through successive stages of development, while the latter

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weiser appearing elsewhere in this book. The interested reader may consult: Sigmund Freud's own works, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* (1920); *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933); and William Healy, Augusta Bronner, and Anna Mae Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis* (1930). Many of the terms which have been used in discussions of mental hygiene and of the psychology of the personality come from Freudian literature. Examples are terms for mechanisms such as identification, projection, rationalization, sublimation, and ambivalence. The effect of psychoanalysis, as we shall see, have also been felt in the aspects of social psychology dealing with collective behavior.

[25] Gardner Murphy and Friedrich Jensen, *Approaches to Personality* (1932), p. 367.

[26] A comprehensive critical review of the methodology of this field is contained in J. E. Anderson, "The Methods of Child Psychology," *Handbook of Child Psychology*, ed. Carl Murchison (1933), pp. 3–28. The following methods are described and discussed: 1. Incidental observation; 2. Biography; 3. Systematic observation; 4. Questionnaire; 5. Psychoanalysis; 6. Case history; 7. Direct measurement and simple test; 8. Tests of complex functions; 9. Ratings; 10. Experiment; 11. Experiment involving random control groups; 12. Experiment involving paired control groups; 13. Control by statistical devices; 14. Factor analysis.

studies different individuals or groups at varying stages of development. "The great body of investigations in the child field at the present time are behavioristic in their approach." [27] The beginnings of this emphasis may be traced to the studies of J. B. Watson at the Phipps Clinic in Baltimore, where, during the period 1917–20, he made investigations of emotional conditioning in children. But it must be noted that long prior to the advent of Watsonian behaviorism, G. Stanley Hall surveyed the child development field through the study of children's biographies. His subsequent study of adolescence as a critical stage in development and his whole evolutionary approach to child behavior exerted tremendous influence upon educators and led to the widespread adoption of the genetic approach to child development.[28]

The major theoretical contributions of genetic study, however, have come from the dynamic viewpoint which is basic to social psychologists and sociologists of the so-called "Chicago School," conveniently labeled by Blumer [29] as the "symbolic interactionists." The chief concern of this group has been to describe the manner in which the self, the core of the personality, arises as a result of social interaction. The background of this theory of personality and society may be found in the writings of James, Baldwin, and Cooley. It reaches its most penetrating form in the work of G. H. Mead.

William James, as we have seen, considered the "social self" as an outgrowth of the interplay of instincts and habits and a predominantly social environment. James M. Baldwin first elaborated upon this thesis in his *Mental Development* (1895), and in his *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (1897). In his *The Individual and Society* (1911) he plainly takes the position that the alleged dichotomy between the person and society is not found in reality, but the individual and the group are part of a greater whole.

Upon a theory of imitation, suggestion, and habit (accommodation) Baldwin traces the development of the individual. The matrix of this development is the "give and take between the individual and his fellows," the "dialectic of personal growth" as he called it. Growing out of a preliminary basis, which is largely one of reflexes and on a purely pain-pleasure level, there are four stages in the development of the self: (1) The *objective* stage, wherein, through the processes of perception, memory, imitation, defensive action and instinct, other persons, as well as ma-

[27] Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

[28] Of more lasting import to American psychology, however, was Hall's bringing over of Freud and Jung in 1909 to address audiences at Clark University. This served to introduce psychoanalysis into the American academic world.

[29] Herbert Blumer, "Social Psychology," *Man and Society*, ed. E. P. Schmidt (1937), pp. 144–98.

terial objects, are reacted to as impersonal things. (2) The *projective* stage wherein the child gradually begins to note relationships between persons, projected from himself. He comes to distinguish between inanimate objects and persons. The latter are arbitrary, active, capable of giving or denying, which makes for a growing "sense of uncertainty" in dealing with them. In short, their behavior is unpredictable. (3) The *subjective* phase, wherein under suggestion and the more complicated forms of imitation, circular response or self-imitation begins. It is based upon imagery of the child's own actions in reference to others, and imagery of their actions in regard to himself. The child thus becomes aware of himself, and this awareness is in great measure determined by the images he has caught from the conduct of others toward himself. In brief, his own personality is a reflection of those about him quite as much as it is any distinctive growth from within. (4) The final or *ejective* stage is that in which the individual, through more extensive imagery and thinking, comes to recognize that other persons have experiences similar to his own, "that is, other people's bodies," says the child to himself, "have experiences in them such as mine has." [30] It is here that the moral, ethical self is born. Through the enlargement of this last stage, human sympathy, cooperation and rational social conduct are made possible.

Baldwin's early work was fundamental to the development of social psychology, although his system implies a too logical and rational unfolding of the self under social stimulation and his use of imitation is far too broad for the facts. Moreover, his acceptance of the doctrine of mental recapitulation did not clarify his thought. His influence on Cooley and Mead, however, is particularly to be noted.[31]

Charles Horton Cooley's major contributions to the theory of personality and its relation to society appear in his three books: *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902); *Social Organization, a Study of the Larger Mind* (1909); and *Social Process* (1918). His chief thesis is the inseparable connection between the individual and society. The person and society are parts of a total on-going process. The two are complementary in the most intimate sense. The child's idea of himself is the reflection of others about him. Even intelligence is largely socially conditioned. The mistake of traditional psychology is to segregate the individual from his social and material environment and to study him as an isolated atom. The mistake of the social sciences, on the contrary, is to give complete attention to institutions and social mechanisms, without taking into account the complexities of personalities involved in social life. Cooley's treatment avoids most of this unnatural separation. He begins

[30] Cf. *Social and Ethical Interpretations* (4th ed., 1906), p. 4.

[31] See also M. F. Washburn, "Ejective Consciousness as a Fundamental Factor in Social Psychology," *Psych. Rev.*, XXXIX (1932), 395–402.

his presentation with a genetic description of the rise of human nature, which is to him decidedly "social" in aspect. The psychological roots of personality are for him, first of all, in a sort of instinctive self-feeling or ego-tendency, then in the suggestibility and sympathy. Especially important are the tendencies to play, to emulate others, and to communicate. Above all else the child in his early learning is under the domination of the family, the playground group, and the neighborhood elders. These primary face-to-face groups are the matrix of all of one's attitudes and social habits, the breeding ground of ideas of honor, honesty, virtue—of the whole gamut of moral reactions. Likewise the primary group forms the background on which one's skills and later vocational or professional choices depend.

The second volume of Cooley's series is largely concerned with tracing the influence of social organization upon personality. He incisively points out the tremendous changes which impend for human nature on account of the modern industrial age with its specialization of labor, its urbanization of population, its rapid communication and class conflicts; that is, the great alteration in the lives of peoples due to the breakdown of the primary face-to-face groups, those natural sources of personality. The third volume is mainly a defense of the theory of the individual and society as an organic whole.

Following the basic premises of Baldwin and Cooley, and strongly influenced by functional and behavioristic tendencies in psychology, George Herbert Mead has presented a naturalistic and more or less objective description and analysis of the processes involved in the rise of the self. Mead published only an occasional paper, but his lecture notes and other unpublished writings have been recently edited posthumously by some of his students. His theory of the self is elaborated in *Mind, Self and Society* (1934). According to Mead, "The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself or tends to so respond. . . . The child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts towards others." [32]

This assumption of a rôle, this reacting to himself as an object similar to another, has its roots in the overt interaction of mother and child, or of children's playing together, or in other rudimentary forms of social intercourse. The matter is well illustrated in play. At the outset children play more or less individually and interactions, if they arise, are likely to be with adults or with other children who may take their toys, invade their

[32] G. H. Mead, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Jour of Phil.*, XIX (1922), 160.

play space, or otherwise interfere with their responses. At this level the interactions are of an elementary sort. But children later begin to take on the rôles of others around them; it is but a step from this type of interaction to that in which the child duplicates the rôles of others in playing with imaginary companions. In this development the place of language is crucial. The child comes to talk to himself as others have talked to him. He becomes an *object* of his own vocal and other reactions. Thus he develops multiple worlds of persons within his own activity. These various groups of stimuli and responses get organized into a wide range of separate rôles: some imaginary, many related to his place in the family, in the schoolroom, on the playground, and elsewhere. Originally this interaction has its basis in overt and sub-overt conduct with others, but it becomes internalized through the mechanism of introjection, the process of taking the responses of others into ourselves and linking them with our own. In this manner an inner forum of activity—largely sub-vocal in character—develops imaginatively and it may find expression both in overt and symbolic rôle-taking of others. This process provides the basis for the child's learning to act as others anticipate he will act. It is the process of socialization, the taking over of another person's habits, attitudes, and ideas into one's own system.

In time the introjection of the various individual rôles around the child begin to get organized into larger patterns of response. Mead has referred to this larger organization of rôles into a unity under the term "the generalized other." That is, out of a wide range of specific rôles or "others" which he has played, there emerges in time a generalized and more or less integrated pattern of the self rôle. This might be called the integrated self which grows up in everyday interaction with hundreds of specific persons whose attitudes and habits get woven into his own. The development of the generalized rôle is well indicated by Mead in drawing a contrast between the early play life of the child and the activity of the youth as a member of a team in a game with rules, differentiated rôles, and standard practices.[33]

Mead's concept of the generalized other is basic to an understanding of the integration of the self. It rests upon the ability of the individual to develop general attitudes and ideas out of a wide variety of specific and concrete experiences. Here the recurrent problems in psychology of general versus specific attitudes and of transfer of training are raised.[34] Obviously an individual may have a range from specific attitudes and specific habits to general attitudes and habits. Likewise the individual may play more or

[33] *Mind, Self and Society,* pp. 150–4.

[34] The generality-specificity dilemma will be encountered again in our later discussion of attitudes and types. See Kimball Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (1940).

less specific rôles in some instances and in others may employ the generalized rôle or integrated self. The child is characterized by specific rôles, the mature, integrated, adult, by a generalized self and corresponding concepts of group, society, nationality, community, humanity, or mankind, depending on the degree to which the generalized other has become the basis for a self which includes these broad concepts of other persons thought of as units that enter into his own life as the counterparts to his own self.[35]

In recognition of the dynamic quality in activity which we characterize as the sense of individuality, Mead, following William James, introduced the concept of the "I" which is set off against the "me" or "other," the integration of various rôles either diverse or general in character. In fact, for him, the self must be considered as made up of both the "I" and the "me."[36]

The simplest manner in which to describe the operation of the "I" is to recognize that we know it only in memory. It is always active in the present, but we are never quick enough to catch it except in retrospect. Yet when we look back upon the "I" in memory it has already taken on certain aspects of a "me" which has acted in reference to some other "me" or social object. In other words the "I" always appears as a historical item in behavior. It is the response of the individual to the attitudes of others, while the "me" is the more or less integrated set of attitudes and ideas of others which one has assumed.

In the gestural or linguistic (sub-overt) interaction there is no sharp distinction between the "I" and the "me" although logically the latter serves as a phase of the object toward which the "I" responds at the moment. That is, in responding to another we react to him as an external object and also as an internal image of him or as a "me." But as Mead points out one cannot entirely predict what this response of the "I" will be. There is a degree of uncertainty in every overt act except purely reflex ones. Likewise in reflective thought, which usually takes the form of internal conversation, the same mechanism operates. Thus in activity, overt or covert, the attitudes of other persons which one assumes as influencing his own behavior will constitute the immediate "me," but what an individual is going to do about the situation defined in terms of this "me" he does not know completely in advance. True, he can take this situation into his

[35] It is also apparent that F. H. Allport's problem with what he calls the "illusion of universality" (see his *Social Psychology* [1924], pp. 305–8, and other publications of his) would disappear were he to recognize this whole process of social interaction in which the individual, by accepting the generalized other of the crowd, the mob, the nation, comes to react to these as units in reference to his own self.

[36] See Mead, *op. cit.*, chap. iii, especially pp. 173–8, 192–200, 209–22.

own experience because he can and does assume the ideas and attitudes of other persons involved in it. But the "I" comes into play in his response. Yet when he has reacted to it, it appears in the field of experience chiefly as a memory image, that is, in retrospect. As Mead says, the " 'I' is the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them." [37] Yet while the attitude a person is taking toward others is known in terms of his previous responses, the response at the moment is not entirely predictable. It contains a novel feature; it is something which even the individual cannot anticipate completely. He may be aware of himself and of the situation, but as to precisely how he will react, he never knows, as Mead points out, "until after the action takes place." Thus the "I" represents, the unique, the novel, the unanticipated, unpredictable feature of all activity, overt or covert. This "I" in Mead's terminology is constantly related to the "me" or "other," and the self is actually to be considered in terms of the conversation or interrelation of the "I" and the "me."

The unique and somewhat unpredictable quality of the "I" is a most important aspect of the personality organization. Its roots probably lie in various aspects of the individual; in the organic or constitutional foundations of activity itself—the wants or impulses in connection with which feelings, emotions, fatigue, energy-organization, glandular and other bodily functions play a part; in the so-called unconscious associations which have been so well described by psychoanalysis; and in the conscious but uncontrolled mental associations depending upon exposure to a wide variety of social experiences. It represents the growing aspect of the personality. Not only in inner thought but in every overt act, except the most reflexive and automatic, there is always this "leap in the dark."

It is evident that the "me's" or rôles of an individual represent the organization of interactional patterns and culture which call for more or less stable and predictable reactions. But the "I," the internal or overt action itself of the individual, in reference to these patterns, is never entirely calculable. Thus although the "I" and the "me" appear together in both overt and covert or symbolic conduct, they are logically separable. Mead thus summarizes the matter:

> The "me" does call for a certain sort of an "I" in so far as we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but the "I" is always something different from what the situation itself calls for. So there is always that distinction, if you like, between the "I" and the "me." The "I" both calls out the "me" and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience.[38]

From both an empirical and theoretical standpoint much light has been shed upon the development of social behavior in the past few decades from the work of the mental testers, the child guidance clinics, and the child behavior research centers. The testing field has made great strides since the turn of the century both in studies of physical capacity and of mental capacity and growth. Coloring all of this type of research, however, has been the difficulty of separating the effects of innate predispositions and environmental influences as determinants of behavior. Efforts to measure intelligence have been hampered by the lack of a precise definition of that term, and there has been a widespread tendency to define it in terms of the tests devised. It must be remarked, however, that in many cases these mental tests have measured indirectly psychological qualities which are themselves ill-defined, and the mere numerical expression of results has not been able to supply the precision or definiteness that the original data lack. The results of these tests have been shown to be greatly influenced by environment, as witnessed by the application of intelligence testing to the personnel of the United States Army during the World War.[39] In recent years attempts have been made to attack this whole complex problem by the statistical device of factor analysis under the leadership of Spearman, Thurstone, and others. This technique, possibly because of its theoretical mathematical presuppositions, has been received rather cautiously and is being applied only occasionally to more clearly defined social-psychological problems.[40]

The establishment of child guidance clinics for the study and therapeutic treatment of juvenile behavior problems began in connection with the juvenile court movement. It was first promoted on a large scale by the Commonwealth Fund Program for the Prevention of Delinquency. Other organizations have contributed valuable research of this nature to the growing science of child development, as for example the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research, and the Judge Baker Guidance Center of

[38] Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 178. G. W. Allport, in his *Personality: a Psychological Interpretation* (1937), has also treated the unique features in personality in a very original way. Although he uses a different set of concepts and a different approach, his contribution to this problem is important.

[39] See C. C. Brigham, "Intelligence Tests of Immigrant Groups," *Psych. Rev.*, XXXVII (1930), 158–65, in which he retracts his interpretation of innate abilities made in his book, *A Study of American Intelligence* (1923). See also *Otto Klineberg, Race Differences* (1935), for evidence concerning the effects of environment on mental performance.

[40] It should be noted that the problem of intelligence raises again the generality-specificity argument in terms of general intelligence versus specific abilities. As in other phases of this controversy, both points of view have their staunch proponents.

Boston. Much theoretical material which is marginal to social psychology has resulted. Similarly the development in general medicine of the special fields of pediatrics and endocrinology together with the growth of psychiatric social work have tended to place the findings of the child guidance approach on a firmer scientific basis.[41] This more systematic treatment of behavior maladjustments is quite in contrast to the somewhat dogmatic earlier literature of child development. While recent child psychology has offered much help in practical matters of home and school training of children, from the standpoint of systematic social psychology it is only in recent years that some workers in this field have come to realize the need to integrate the findings of endocrinology, cultural anthropology, and research in child development. We shall return to comment on this matter later.

Of considerable importance to the study of personality has been the work of the several institutes for child study. The background which led to their foundation has been described as follows by Thomas and Thomas: [42]

> The growth of interest in behavior, the appreciation of the volume of maladjustment, delinquency and crime, the realization that behavior troubles originate at an early age level, that the schools have been inadequate in the control of the development of character and personality, that behavior is largely determined by the process of social interaction, the example of the work of Pavlov and Watson, and the experience of the child clinics, has led to the formation of a number of institutes for the more systematic and controlled study of the behavior of the child. . . .
>
> All of these institutes have nursery schools under their control, where young children are available both for controlled experiment and for observation of their spontaneous individual and group activities, and there is opportunity to study individual differences and changes in social behavior as related to the situations in which the behavior occurs, and the further possibility of behavioristic experimentation on the sociological plane through the process of varying the situations.[43]

[41] A detailed exposition of the child guidance approach to a particular case of a "problem boy" with outlines for history-taking typical of this field may be found in the discussion by John Levy appearing in Gardner Murphy and Friedrich Jensen, *Approaches to Personality* (1932), especially pp. 262–349. An interesting attempt to link the clinical approach to the wider social and cultural *milieu* has been presented in the recent work, J. S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern* (1937).

[42] W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928), pp. 518–9.

[43] Outstanding centers of this type include: the Institute of Child Welfare of the University of Minnesota, the Child Development Institute (formerly the Institute of Child Welfare Research) of Teachers' College at Columbia University, the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University, St. George's School for Child Study of the University of Toronto, the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station of the State University of Iowa, the Institute of Child Welfare of the University of California, and the

(We shall deal with several aspects of this situational approach below.)

Extensive applications of the genetic approach have been made in the study of the development of language. Pioneer work in this field was fostered at the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute in Geneva under the direction of Jean Piaget.[44] It should be recognized that there has been a distinct transition in the basic assumptions underlying the psychology of language. The older view, exemplified by Wundt and his modern followers in this respect, was dominated by a metaphysical dualism, a psychophysical parallelism, which focused upon language as a means for the expression of ideas. This structuralism has been largely overshadowed by a functional viewpoint epitomized by John Dewey who holds that "the heart of language is not 'expression' of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of co-operation in an activity in which there are partners and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership."[45] This newer view thus emphasizes the functional relationships of language to other modes of social as well as implicit behavior; it is thoroughly in accord with the general standpoint of the "symbolic interactionists" and represents an attempt to comprehend linguistic development in the light of social interaction.[46]

Institute for Juvenile Research at Chicago. Published reports of research from the various institutes will be found in various periodicals and monograph series and constitute a representative sample of the best modern scientific approach to the study of child development. The reader will find *Child Development Abstracts and Bibliography* and other publications of The Society for the Study of Child Development invaluable.

[44] The findings of the studies of Piaget and his associates on linguistic development and related problems have been of considerable influence in child psychology. This work is summarized in the following writings by Piaget: *The Language and Thought of the Child* (1926); *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child* (1928); *The Child's Conception of the World* (1929); *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality* (1930); *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932).

[45] See John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (1926), pp. 166–207.

[46] The best brief summary of the psychology of language is to be found in E. A. Esper, "Language," *A Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (1935), pp. 417–60. For a survey of empirical research in linguistic development the reader should consult Dorothea McCarthy, "Language Development," *A Handbook of Child Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (2nd. ed. rev., 1933), pp. 329–73. Other valuable contributions to an understanding of language and linguistic development, especially from the social psychological viewpoint include: G. A. DeLaguna, *Speech: Its Function and Development* (1927); Otto Jespersen, *Language* (1922); Israil Latif, "The Physiological Basis of Linguistic Development and of the Ontogeny of Meaning," *Psych. Rev.,* XLI (1934), 55–85, 153–76, 246–64; C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning,* including an appendix by Malinowski, "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" (1927), pp. 451–510; Frank Lorimer, *The Growth of Reason* (1929); J. F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process and Its Integration in Children* (1928); Leonard Bloomfield, *Language* (1933). See also, for the remoter implica-

In interpreting the vast accumulation of data on linguistic development, psychologists have customarily considered the emergence of speech as falling into a series of stages. Four stages have frequently been noted: (1) the *pre-linguistic,* characterized by random and unorganized, non-social sounds of the infant's first weeks after birth; (2) the *babbling* or circular response stage, wherein there is a vast amount of self-stimulation of recurrent vocal combinations; (3) the *"imitation"* stage in which the recurrent babbling gets linked to the sounds made to the child by others, leading the child to a sort of parrot-like repetition of these sounds; and (4) the stage of *true speech* in which words as symbols of objects, acts, and relations, are learned and employed in a manner similar to older persons in the particular society or group in which the child belongs.

Certain criticisms may be offered of the traditional treatment of these data: (1) There is a failure to realize that social interaction begins in the field of overt conduct, is linked fundamentally to cycles of activity, and only gradually leads over into the field of symbolic interaction. (2) While discussion of this development as marked by certain stages may be convenient, there is some danger that its gradual and continuous character may be ignored. Evidently there are no sudden or sharp changes but rather a continuous expansion of the use of vocal stimuli and responses. (3) Especially serious is the common failure to study language development against the background of, or in connection with, the social act itself. The usual description and analysis of the learning of words and sentences, their number and length, and the rise of the use of various parts of speech as classified by the grammarian, frequently neglect the relation of these symbolic factors to the expansion of the child's social contacts and the emergence of his sense of self. The relation of speech to thought and these in turn to the self will assume more significance if we make this linkage. Since the self is the inner core of the personality, its relation to thought and to language is fundamental.[47]

IV. The Situational Approach

In contrast to the genetic, historical, or longitudinal type of investigation of the genesis of social behavior patterns among children, increasing use is being made of the situational, ahistorical, or cross-sectional approach. The possibilities offered by this sort of research were first presented in a systematic way by W. I. and D. S. Thomas. It reflects the influence of the behaviorist movement in psychology, which concentrates

tions of these studies, the article by C. Wright Mills, "Language, Logic, and Culture," *Am. Soc. Rev.,* IV, 5 (Oct., 1939).

[47] The major author of this chapter elaborates on this thesis in his book, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (1940).

attention upon the overt social act as the primary source of data for research. Its proponents feel that only in this way will the more rigid prediction and control of behavior demanded by a strict scientific outlook be approached. The Thomases have characterized this standpoint thus:

> The behavioristic, or situational approach, . . . ignores or minimizes instincts and original nature and studies behavior reactions and habit formation in a great variety of situations comparatively. It assumes that whatever can be learned about original nature will be revealed in its reactions to these various situations. We regard this approach as the only one capable of giving a rational basis for the control of behavior. . . .[48]

As one step in the application of this approach Dorothy S. Thomas and her associates, first at the Child Development Institute of Teachers' College, Columbia University, and later at the Yale Institute of Human Relations, devoted their efforts to devising adequate means of defining, observing, and recording simple social behavioral situations among nursery school children and available adolescent and adult groups. A few quotations from the preliminary reports of this work, named by its authors "experimental sociology," will serve to indicate its general tendency:

> Sociological experimentation is closely allied to psychological experimentation with regard to this problem of method. A good deal may be said for controlled experiment in the study of individual behavior, but the main problem of control of the observer will still remain unsolved. . . . The problem seems to be to evolve techniques for the accurate recording of the selective responses made by individuals to the multifarious stimuli which comprise their social *milieu*. In other words, we want to find means of recording the particular stimuli in the uncontrolled environment to which a given individual, at a given moment, reacts overtly—what consistency is observable in his selective responses over a period of time and what variability is shown among different individuals.[49]
>
> Our general hypothesis has been that simple overt acts, capable of precise definition, can be selected in such a way as to be significant indicators of more complex relationships. Specifically, we have assumed that the inter-relationship between the mere number, range, and duration of contacts individuals make with other persons, the duration and extent of their manipulations of the material environment and the duration and extent of their periods of withdrawal from active contact with persons or from manipulation of materials are significant personality differentia. We have further assumed that group patterns and individual deviates can be determined in such a way that differences between groups in various situations, as well as changes in a given group and in the individuals comprising it, may be studied, provided only that the pre-

[48] W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928), p. 561.

[49] D. S. Thomas and Associates, *Some New Techniques for Studying Social Behavior* (1929), pp. 4–5.

cision of the technique we have devised be of a known and adequate degree.[50]

We have shown quite definitely for our small group of observers, with a rather extensive series of observational samples, that systematic errors of observation are an important factor in variability; that the observational error varies with the situation observed; that the observer-inconsistency probably plays a definite rôle; that, with our technique, timing and interpretation errors are at present almost inextricably interrelated; and the distortion of "reality" quite clearly occurs in observational records. If we have done nothing more than demonstrate that precision cannot be determined by a simple measure of agreement between two equally trained observers, we have made progress. That we have raised more problems than we have been able to solve is no reason for discouragement as to the future of observational techniques in sociological studies. It is impossible to make real progress in the use of an instrument until its nature is thoroughly understood.[51]

A concise and valuable comparative summary has been made of recent observational studies of pre-school children by Helen M. Bott of St. George's School for Child Study at the University of Toronto.[52] She wisely suggests that the problem of the reliability of the observers may be over-stressed at the expense of the question of validity:

. . . attention should be focussed on discovering what units of behavior have representative and predictive significance in relation to the whole of the child's behavior. When this has been done, it will next be in order to proceed with detailed studies of the consistency of these behaviour items. The training of the observer can then be persisted in till a sufficient degree of reliability has been reached. If interest is focussed first on training of observers, there is danger that the elements of observation are so reduced in the interest of reliability that they are largely emptied of significance. On the other hand, if significance can be demonstrated with observations which have only a modicum of reliability, it is safe to conclude that a more rigorous control of procedure will only heighten the significance of what has already been demonstrated to have meaning in relation to the whole of the child's behaviour.[53]

[50] Thomas, Loomis, and Arrington, *Observational Studies of Social Behavior, Vol. I, Social Behavior Patterns* (1933), p. 243.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[52] H. M. Bott, *Method in Social Studies of Young Children* (1933). In addition to the research of the Columbia-Yale group, Bott examined critically similar investigations carried on at the University of Minnesota and elsewhere. Included in the account are experiments based on these reports: F. L. Goodenough, "Interrelationships in the Behavior of Young Children," *Child Development,* I (1930), 29–47; W. C. Olson, *The Measurement of Nervous Habits in Normal Children* (1929); M. A. Parten, "Social Participation Among Preschool Children," *Jour. of Abn. and Soc. Psych.,* XXVII (1932), 243–69; M. A. Smith, *A Study of the Unsupervised Play of a Group of Institutional Children* (1931); Dorothy Van Alstyne, *Play Behavior and Choice of Play Materials of Preschool Children* (1932).

[53] Bott, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

V. Empirical Research in Personality Development

A vast amount of empirical research, behavioristic and otherwise, is being produced in the field of personality development.[54] Some of this work represents the effort to test definite hypotheses formulated on the basis of distinct systems of human behavior. This wholesale trend toward empirical experimentation must be viewed as a mixed blessing, for "the *scientific* importance of a change in knowledge of fact consists precisely in its having consequences for a system of theory. A scientifically unimportant discovery is one which, however true and however interesting for other reasons, has no consequences for a system of theory with which scientists in that field are concerned." [55] Fortunately, however, there may be discerned some evidence of a critical eclecticism emerging in the approach to an understanding of personality. Such an eclecticism

> must prove that it is actually able, in practice, to grasp and to use the contributions of schools, and that it need not rob these contributions of their vitality in so doing. Second, it must prove that it need not stifle the tendency to formulate wide and bold hypotheses; that it can, in fact, construct its own original hypotheses. If it meets both tests, it will pay a debt to all schools and still remain solvent. . . . The only sort of eclecticism which a serious scientist can respect is the integration of disparate methods into *one* method, a method which uses not merely many conceptions but many *systems of conceptions* at once. . . . The next great step in the study of personality will probably be made by some one who can not only conceive systems to symbolize the complexities of personality, but can clearly see the polydimensional totality to which his new system, as well as the old, must point.[56]

An excellent example of sound empirical research on the origins and development of the personality is found in Lois B. Murphy's *Social Behavior and Child Personality* (1937). Working with a group of nursery school children, Mrs. Murphy was able to trace the inception of both sympathetic and co-operative, and of aggressive and antagonistic patterns, in

[54] Excellent summaries of research are given in Gardner Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (Rev. ed., 1937); L. B. Murphy and Gardner Murphy, "The Influence of Social Situations Upon the Behavior of Children," *A Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (1935), pp. 1034–96; J. F. Dashiell, "Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Individual Human Adults," *A Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (1935), pp. 1097–158; Charlotte Bühler, "The Social Behavior of Children," *A Handbook of Child Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (2nd. ed. rev., 1933), pp. 374–416; and L. S. Hollingworth, "The Adolescent Child," *A Handbook of Child Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (2nd. ed. rev., 1933), pp. 882–908.

[55] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), p. 7.

[56] Gardner Murphy and Friedrich Jensen, *Approaches to Personality* (1932), pp. 366, 402, 404.

young children. She indicates the rapidity with which native responses are overlaid with social and cultural influences.

Perhaps the most significant advance in recent social psychology has been the recognition of the importance of the interrelation of culture and personality. True, those who approached social psychology from the traditions of sociology and of cultural anthropology have long stressed this matter, but those who came into social psychology from the experimental laboratory, from the field of mental measurement, or from psychiatry have only recently begun to appreciate this standpoint.[57]

Thomas and Znaniecki in their pioneer treatise on *The Polish Peasant* (1918) pointed out how crises resulting from the clash of cultural patterns may have a tremendous effect upon the attitudes, values, and personalities of the participant individuals.[58] Margaret Mead has made some interesting studies of the development of personality among primitive children.[59] She has maintained that the primitive child offers excellent possibilities for social-psychological experimentation:

> Assuming that the primitive child starts life with the same innate capacities as the child of civilized parents, the startling differences in habit, emotional development, and mental outlook between primitive and civilized man must be laid at the door of a difference in social environment. Investigations will therefore be fruitful in direct proportion as they seek to study those aspects of human nature which are most subject to social influences. An investigation of attitudes toward parents will yield more than an investigation of the primitive infant's ability to follow a light, or willingness to play with a red hoop; a study of the child's grasp of the linguistic categories of the language will be more rewarding than a survey of the number of words in the vocabulary of a group of two-year-olds. Primitive children should be regarded primarily as subjects in an already constructed control culture. The investigator is spared the almost impossible task of creating control conditions, but is presented with such conditions ready made. Every primitive society thus presents a laboratory to the social psychologist, in which he may test out whether certain aspects of human behavior are or are not socially determined. Observations upon children within any given culture cannot yield final results; they must be subject to control

[57] The reader should compare, for example, the space devoted to cultural influences in the first and in the second, revised, editions of Gardner Murphy and L. B. Murphy's *Experimental Social Psychology*. See also A. H. Maslow's chapter on culture and personality in Ross Stagner's *Psychology of Personality* (1937); A. Kardiner, "Cultural Restraints, Intrasocial Dependencies, and Hostilities," *Proc. of the Nat'l. Conf. of Social Work* (1937), pp. 97–111, and A. Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (1939).

[58] The methodological note to this monograph (I, pp. 1–86, 1927 ed.) contains a discussion bristling with implications for social psychological theory.

[59] See her *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928), and *Growing Up in New Guinea* (1930). A fruitful discussion of the anthropologists' view is also given in Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (1936), chap. xxvi, and in Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (1934), and A. A. Goldenweiser, *Anthropology* (1937).

experiments of a type, which, when primitive societies shall no longer exist, will be exceedingly difficult to conduct. As the comparative psychologist never makes an experiment without controls, so the social psychologist should formulate his conclusion with direct reference to the kind of tests which investigations of primitive societies will provide. The social psychologist of the twentieth century stands in a peculiarly favored position, for the control conditions provided by these small, isolated communities which present a social picture so radically different from civilized society are still available to him. . . .[60]

Somewhat formal recognition of the problem of "personality and culture" was given by the Social Science Research Council when it established a committee to survey the field with a view to determining its research possibilities. After a preliminary report by W. I. Thomas, several subcommittees were appointed, "each instructed to select and focus its attention at some specific point in a field of research around which there is an already existing nucleus of knowledge, to summarize this knowledge, and to suggest feasible research problems calculated to give coherent and continuous development of knowledge from the existing base."[61] These subcommittees were to embrace the fields of co-operation and competition, criminal causation, and acculturation. Thus far the most tangible results have been produced by the subcommittee on co-operation and competition, the report of which—prepared by Mark A. May and Leonard W. Doob—we shall review briefly as an example of an attack on one phase of this broad problem.[62]

The fundamental aim of the Bulletin on Co-operation and Competition is to examine the relationship of the interaction of individuals in terms of competition or co-operation to the wider societal and cultural world in which this occurs. Unfortunately the terms competition and co-operation do not have precise meanings. Among other matters, the authors believe that one must clearly distinguish between the objective or overt phase and the subjective or meaningful phase of each process. As a tentative statement they relate the two in this manner:

"Competition or co-operation is behavior directed toward the same social end by at least two individuals. In competition, moreover, the end

[60] Margaret Mead, "The Primitive Child," *A Handbook of Child Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (2nd ed. rev., 1933), pp. 909–10, 911. This position is the same as that taken in the Historical Sociology chapter, pp. 491–536. No skepticism about the value of ethnography for *historical* sociology should cause us to overlook the tremendous assets represented by ethnographic data such as those noted above (editor's note—H. B.).

[61] Social Science Research Council Bulletin No. 25, *Competition and Co-operation,* Foreword, p. 3.

[62] Emerging from the work of this subcommittee are two separate publications: John Dollard, *Criteria for the Life History,* and Margaret Mead, *Co-operation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples.* We shall examine the former in another section of this chapter.

sought can be achieved in equal amounts by some, but not by all, of the individuals thus behaving; whereas in co-operation it can be achieved by all, or almost all, of the individuals concerned." [63]

Stated in this way four problems arise concerning: (1) the motivation to compete or to co-operate; (2) the objects or goals which are sought; (3) the social situations or personnel of groups in which one or the other of these types of behavior takes place; and (4) the manner or form of performance, that is, the rules and skills developed around competition or co-operation.

The discussion of these four questions constitutes the basic chapter, "A Theory of Competition and Co-operation." The four concepts—goals, persons, rules, and performance—are considered as social or "objective" in character. On the psychological level, however, there are four corresponding concepts of importance: discrepancy, knowledge, attitude, and skill.

Regarding motivation May and Doob take their cue from a paper by F. Hoppe, the German psychologist, who suggested that the individual's behavior may be viewed in relation to two levels: (1) that of attainment or achievement, and (2) that of aspiration.[64] According to the authors it follows, then, that motivation is a function of the discrepancy between aspiration and achievement. The goals of an individual are closely linked to motivations, that is, to the discrepancies between aspiration and achievement, and unless he can close the gap between the two the individual will neither compete nor co-operate nor attempt any combination of these two forms of activity. In general the goals are either material objects or personal prestige. Moreover, goals are a function of the individual's knowledge concerning material objects or prestige since the attainment of one or both will enhance his levels of achievement in reference to corresponding levels of aspiration.

The attitudes of the individuals participating in the social situation of competition or co-operation are also important, and these attitudes vary in regard to other persons and in regard to oneself. In fact it is essential to take into account both the attitudes toward competitors or co-operators and the attitudes toward one's own level of aspiration. Much depends on *who* is competing for a given goal or with *whom* one is co-operating as well as upon such factors as one's own goal and knowledge. Finally as to the form or manner of co-operation or competition, there arise standardized habits and certain skills which vary tremendously in their effects on the behavior of the individuals concerned.

These correlative groups of concepts: goals, persons, rules, and per-

[63] *Op. cit.*, p. 6. Note how widely this differs from the ecological definition of competition (present volume, p. 225), and how closely it accords with the definition presented in Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (1932), pp. 248–59.

[64] Cf. F. Hoppe, "Erfolg und Misserfolg," *Psychol. Forsch.*, XIV (1930), pp. 1–62.

formances; and discrepancy, knowledge, attitude, and skill, furnish the dual foundation for the eight basic postulates upon which May and Doob project their entire interpretation. They are too lengthy to be quoted in full, but their essential features may be briefly stated as follows: (1) The form of any social behavior "is a function of and is defined by the goals, persons, rules, and performance that are inferred to be operating." (2) In contrast, the psychological form of behavior is a function of and is defined by the discrepancy, knowledge, attitude, and skill assumed to be operating in the given situation. (3) Also the social form of behavior is actually a function of the psychological form. (4) Yet "the goals, rules, persons, and performance in a given situation are functions of the history of the culture," and at the psychological level the corresponding variables are functions of the life history of the individual. (5) On the social level, individuals compete (a) when the goal is scarce, (b) when the rules prevent securing the end in "equal amounts," (c) whenever their performance is better, provided, of course, that the goal can be attained in "unequal amounts," and (d) when they have few "affiliative contacts with one another." (6) Again on the social level, individuals co-operate: (a) when they strive to obtain goals that can be shared, (b) when the rules require the achievement of the goal with approximately equivalent results for the participants, (c) when performance is better provided the goal can be secured "in equal amounts," and (d) when there are relatively many "affiliative contacts with one another." (7) On the psychological side, individuals compete: (a) when there are discrepancies between levels of achievement and of aspiration, (b) when they know that the goals sought cannot be shared equally with others, (c) when the internal attitudes toward competing outweigh possible conflicting ones toward co-operating, and (d) when the skills are such that under the rules of the situation they have reasonable chances of success through competition. Finally, (8) on the psychological level, individuals co-operate: (a) when discrepancies exist between levels of attainment and aspiration, (b) when they know that the goals sought can be reached by striving *with* others, (c) when the attitudes favorable to co-operation overbalance possible ones stimulating competition, and (d) when the skills are such that under the rules of the situation they have reasonable likelihood of success through co-operation.

From the standpoint and theory of these eight postulates May and Doob devote four chapters to discussing various investigations of competitive or co-operative behavior undertaken through the methods of psychology, social psychology, sociology, education, and anthropology. It would not be profitable to summarize the matter which is so compactly stated in the Bulletin. But in the course of their interpretation of the work done in these various areas of research, the authors present twenty-four propositions which seem to them to arise from these data. And in the final chap-

ter, "Prediction and Future Research," they present, largely on the basis of these propositions, sixty-eight specific research projects aimed at answering at least some of the questions implied or stated in the propositions themselves.

There are a number of matters in this treatment of these materials which demand comment: First, the writers exhibit the traditional psychologist's standpoint when they contend that for "true" scientific analysis sociological and anthropological data must be reduced to the level of psychological concepts and analysis (see postulate 3). Any adequate answer to this implication obviously depends upon one's whole point of view in regard to method and the philosophical premises behind science, but there is ample reason to question this assumption in the light of contemporary emphasis on operational concepts. Second, the tendency to consider sociology and cultural anthropology as fundamentally different in method and content is unwarranted. Third, at times there obtrudes on the part of the authors a bias unduly favorable to the doctrine of the specificity of habits and attitudes, although there is little reason for introducing this problem here. Fourth, especially evident in the review of child psychology is the almost complete neglect of constitutional and maturational factors which might well be taken into account in arriving at the inception of competitive and co-operative activities. Fifth, culture is made identical with society, at least by inference, which leads to a glossing over of possible social, that is, interactional, effects on the person which lie outside the boundaries of what is ordinarily defined as culture. Sixth, there is an obvious failure to distinguish between competition and conflict—as political scientists and sociologists have done—with the result that the highly probable social-psychological differences between these two forms of oppositional behavior are ignored.

Nevertheless, this Bulletin marks an important step forward in laying the foundation for more adequate research. All too frequently in the past, little or no consideration has been given to the postulates and propositions upon which specific research in social psychology is predicated. This report should serve to help offset this lack and to stimulate research workers to consider their fundamental premises and hypotheses before proceeding to concrete investigations.

Another interesting analysis of how social-cultural norms arise and how they come to influence human judgments is described by M. Sherif in *The Psychology of Social Norms* (1936). Experimenting with auto-kinetic effects and with unidentified passages of literary prose, he demonstrated that in the absence of any objective or culturally determined frame of reference, his subjects, either alone or in groups, developed criteria of their own. From this laboratory confirmation of well-known sociological fact, he goes on to remark: "Stereotypes, fads and fashions, emotions, tradi-

tions and attitudes are, psychologically, cases of the establishment of socially determined norms and values serving as frames of reference." [65]

Of more theoretical character, but indicating in part a linkage between psychological interaction and cultural forms, is a recent book, *Frustration and Aggression* (1939) by John Dollard and associates. Though one may well question as too all-inclusive their fundamental assumption "that aggression is always a consequence of frustration," nevertheless the authors indicate the interplay of individual drive, social participation, and culturally approved or disapproved outlets of aggressive behavior.[66]

VI. The Doctrine of Social Attitudes and Habits

The transition from the "personality" to the "collective behavior" phase of social psychology may perhaps be best accomplished through a consideration of the concept "social attitudes," which has come to occupy a central position in both fields. Closely related is the conception of "social habits," which has likewise received considerable attention in recent social-psychological thought. The chief theoretical contributions in this respect have come from the group of functional psychologists and social psychologists represented by James, Dewey, Angell, Mead, Thomas, and their followers. We have seen that early habits play an important rôle in the system of the behaviorists.

The most direct contribution to the social psychology which bases its approach on attitude and habit was the paper of W. I. Thomas at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences in 1904 on "The Province of Social Psychology." [67] Thomas was certain that a social psychology could not be written which ignored the relation of the group and the individual. For him social psychology was considered to be a study of "the individual mental processes in so far as they are conditioned by society, and the social processes in so far as they are conditioned by states of consciousness. . . . The province of social psychology is the examination of the interaction of individual consciousness and society, and the effect of the inter-

[65] Muzafer Sherif, "A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception," *Arch. of Psych.* (1935), No. 187, p. 53. This monograph served as the foundation for the interpretative volume noted above.

[66] There is a growing literature indicating the *rapprochement* of social psychology, psychiatry, and cultural anthropology. *Inter alia* see John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (1937); Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (1937); R. Linton, "Culture, Society, and the Individual," *Jr. Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, XXXIII (1938), 425–36; C. S. Ford, "Society, Culture, and the Human Organism," *Jour. of Gen. Psych.* XX (1939), 135–79; A. I. Hallowell, "Fear and Anxiety as Cultural and Individual Variables in a Primitive Society," *Jour. of Soc. Psych.*, IX (1938), 25–47; and Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom* (1939).

[67] Reprinted in the *Am. Jour. Soc.*, X (1904), 445–55.

action on individual consciousness on the one hand and on society on the other." It may be seen that this is in accord with the organic view held by Cooley and the general standpoint of the social interactionists.

For Thomas, at that time, the most important concepts of functional psychology of use for social psychology were: attention, habits, sympathy, suggestion, attitudes, and emotion. He makes a valuable addition in his conception of "crisis," regarded as those alterations in the environment and in the individual which demand adjustment. Many of these crises concern the very existence of large groups. Such are pestilence, famine, flood, defeat in battle. Still other crises like puberty, births, marriages, etc., involve chiefly smaller groups. Similarly any behavior on the part of oneself or others which destroys confidence and property (that is, any antisocial act) calls for attention and consequent rules of action. Therefore out of crises develop methods of handling problems of conduct: habits and modes of attention and attitude (social custom and taboo) often accompanied by emotional sets. Likewise certain vocations come into prominence through crises; specialization begins, and castes and classes grow up. Crisis situations also bring leadership to the fore. The study of crises in reference to the individual and the social order is quite as legitimate for social psychology as it is for sociology or history. (See the discussion of "crisis" in conjunction with Toynbee's "challenge-and-response," chapter on Historical Sociology, present volume, pp. 510–13.)

Thomas adopted the Freudian notion of the wish and expanded it to cover the motives of social behavior as he observed it among immigrant groups, Negroes, and in the social life of urban and rural centers. Coupled with this theory of wishes was his doctrine of social attitudes. The wishes form the conscious or habitual motives to conduct. The attitudes are concrete reaction tendencies, mental sets, sentiments organized around specific situations in the environment. Through the attitudes and behavior, the wishes come to light in concrete manner. The first published note on his scheme of attitudes and wishes was in the paper, "The Persistence of Primary Group Norms in Present Day Society," which appeared in 1917.[68] In this and some subsequent publications the following four fundamental wishes are conceived as convenient categories of motives: (1) The wish for security and safety, which is basic to property rights, conservatism, stable government and maintenance of the *status quo*. (2) The wish or desire for new experience, for novelty, which is basic to adventure, exploration, scientific and artistic creation. (3) The desire or wish for power or recognition of oneself by others, which is basic in prestige-seeking and in the attempt to secure superior status. (4) The wish for response, that is, the desire for companionship, for intimate face-to-face response from

[68] See H. S. Jennings, J. B. Watson, Adolph Meyer, and W. I. Thomas, *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education* (1917).

others, which is basic to the love life and to the solidarity of small congenial groups.

The attitudes which express these wishes concretely are related to the objects and situations in the environment which possess value for the individual. That is to say, emotional, sentimental imagery and attitude are projected into the situations or persons and the attitude cannot be understood without taking into account the factor of value. Thus at this period of his work Thomas maintained that social psychology must take into consideration both the social attitude and the valuational feature of the situation or object toward which the attitude is directed.[69]

Thomas has linked the wishes to the whole subject of social control through his discussion of the "definition of the situation":

> Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the *definition of the situation.* And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions.
>
> But the child is always born into a group of people among whom all the general types of situation which may arise have already been defined and corresponding rules of conduct developed, and where he has not the slightest chance of making his definitions and following his wishes without interference. . . . There is therefore always a rivalry between the spontaneous definitions of the situation made by the member of an organized society and the definitions which his society has provided for him. The individual tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first; and society to a utilitarian selection, safety first. Society wishes its members to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, orderly, self-sacrificing; while the individual wishes less of this and more of new experience. An organized society seeks also to regulate the conflict and competition inevitable between its members in the pursuit of their wishes. . . .
>
> It is in this connection that a moral code arises, which is a set of rules or behavior norms, regulating the expression of the wishes, and which is built up by successive definitions of the situation. In practice the abuse arises first and the rule is made to prevent its recurrence. Morality is thus the generally accepted

[69] Cf. Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant,* "Methodological Note," also Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923), chaps. i and ii. It is interesting to observe that in his later writings, as for example *The Child in America,* Thomas seemingly ignores this earlier phase of his work and concentrates his attention on the behavioristic approach to a study of social situations (see our discussion above). Nevertheless his doctrine of wishes and attitudes has had considerable influence on social psychologists in this country. His views together with those of Mead are the foundations of the system of social psychology cultivated at the University of Chicago. Cf. Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (1937); Krueger and Reckless, *Social Psychology* (1932); Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (1921). (One of the editors, Howard Becker, wishes to register strong objection to the ignoring of Znaniecki in the above discussion. See Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 1075–77.)

definition of the situation, whether expressed in public opinion and the unwritten law, in a formal legal code, or in religious commandments and prohibitions.

The family is the smallest social unit and the primary defining agency. . . . In addition to the family we have the community as a defining agency. At present the community is so weak and vague that it gives us no idea of the former power of the local group in regulating behavior. . . .

A less formal but not less powerful means of defining the situation employed by the community is gossip. . . . It is a mode of defining the situation in a given case and of attaching praise or blame. It is one of the means by which the status of the individual and of his family is fixed.

The community also, particularly in connection with gossip, knows how to attach opprobrium to persons and actions by using epithets which are at the same time brief and emotional definitions of the situation. . . . Winks, shrugs, nudges, laughter, sneers, haughtiness, coldness, "giving the once over" are also language defining the situation, and painfully felt as unfavorable recognition. And eventually the violation of the code even in an act of no intrinsic importance, as in carrying the food to the mouth with a knife, provokes condemnation and disgust. . . .[70]

John Dewey's presidential address, "The Need for Social Psychology," given before the American Psychological Association in 1916 was a frank effort to indicate to the psychological guild in this country their continued avoidance of one of their most fundamental and most fruitful fields.[71] He indicates the failure of the older social psychologists to attain working principles because of the unnatural separation between individual psychology and its social phases.

According to Dewey the two most important developments in the social psychology of that period were the application of statistical method to group phenomena and the rise of behavioristic psychology. The former provides a means of testing social trends and making correlations of data which are not amenable to the experimental methods of the stricter sciences. The latter, by its emphasis upon objectivity, upon the study of stimulus and response, especially its reference to instincts, emotions, habit formations, and integrations is far more pertinent for social psychology than the older emphasis upon the study of elements of consciousness as such. The learning process, which is conditioned first by the innate structure of the organism and secondly by the environmental stimuli, is the key to the building up of social habits, attitudes and modes of action. This process is basic to our institutional life and to our complex civilization. The newer approach, in short, does away with the concepts, also, of any super-individual group mind. While Dewey rests his schema upon original impulses, his greatest stress is put upon the learning capacity. For social behavior the modifications which go on under the mediation of other per-

[70] W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923), pp. 42–4, 49–50.

[71] Reprinted in the *Psych. Rev.*, XXIV (1917), 266–77.

sons is obviously the most significant. His whole thesis is that environment is the great conditioner of mind, that this conditioning occurs only under social stimulation, and that the basic problem is the development of methods of investigating human behavior in groups with an eye to control through predetermining the environment. Thus social psychology lies at the heart of every social problem and leads thence directly to a social ethics.

The implications of Dewey's paper of 1916 were expanded in his West Memorial Lectures, *Human Nature and Conduct,* delivered at Stanford University in 1918 (published in 1922). This book is an elaboration of the social psychology of habit and attitude into social ethics. The three aspects of mind which come into social conduct are impulses, habits, and intelligence. The first are original and untamed. For man, while the impulse is primary in fact, in conduct it is secondary to habit, which is more stable, since it is organized out of rather chaotic impulses into specific forms revolving around specific situations. Since habit is modified under crisis, it is just here that intelligence or deliberation may come into play. Thus, for Dewey, to social habit and social attitude there must be added man's capacity for remaking his social conduct by intellectual choice. This seems to come about more by the changes wrought in the environment, thus directing the formation and reformation of habits and attitudes, than by suppressing and crushing out by the sheer weight of will the original and habitual impulses. Social psychology must lend itself to the study of how this sort of change has been brought about and how it may in the future be accomplished. The intellect comes quite as much into the field of social psychology as do habits and attitudes.

An extensive treatment of the place of attitudes in social psychology has been made by Gordon W. Allport.[72] He points out how that concept has come to occupy a central position in recent American social-psychological writings:

> The concept of social attitudes is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology. . . . It has come into favor, first of all, because it is not the property of any one psychological school of thought, and therefore serves admirably the purposes of eclectic writers. Furthermore, it is a concept which escapes the ancient controversy concerning the relative influence of heredity and environment. Since an attitude may combine both instinct and habit in any proportion, it avoids the extreme commitments of both the instinct-theory and environmentalism. The term likewise is elastic enough to apply either to the dispositions of single isolated individuals or to broad patterns of culture. Psychologists and sociologists therefore find in it a meeting point for discussion and research. This use-

[72] G. W. Allport, "Attitudes," *A Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (1935), chap. xvii, 798–844.

ful, one might almost say peaceful, concept has been so widely adopted that it has virtually established itself as the keystone in the edifice of American social psychology. In fact several writers . . . define social psychology as the scientific study of attitudes.[73]

Allport traces the history of the concept and finds its roots in experimental psychology, psychoanalysis, and sociology. After surveying various definitions which have been offered for the term, and attempting to differentiate it from other concepts included under "forms of readiness" in human behavior, he emerges with a definitive statement: "An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related." [74] Four common conditions for the formation of attitudes are presented: integration; individuation, differentiation, or segregation; dramatic experience (trauma); and imitation. An effort is made to clarify the conception of attitudes by considering it in a series of dichotomous aspects: directive and dynamic; positive and negative; specific and general; public and private; and common and individual. In general, the conclusion is reached that all types may occur; in many cases these distinctions serve to provide polar concepts for the analysis of behavior which may reflect them in varying degrees. In his treatment of the relation between attitudes and personality Allport makes a plea for separating the analysis of personality from that of attitudes because of the unique characteristics of the former. His argument as to whether personality should be the subject-matter of psychology or sociology reflects the psychologists' tendency to perpetuate artificial academic barriers at the possible expense of the advancement of knowledge.

With the growing use of quantitative methods in social psychology have come various attempts to measure attitudes. The most systematic and popular of these has been devised by L. L. Thurstone, based upon the methods of psychophysics, in particular the measurement of equal-appearing intervals in perception. The procedure involves the construction of a rational attitude scale in the following manner: A wide variety of statements of opinion—usually about one hundred—relating to a specified attitude variable is collected. These statements are sorted by two or three hundred judges into an imaginary scale representing varying degrees of affect toward (opinions for or against) the attitude variable. The scale value of each statement (its median rating by the judges) is calculated. Through further statistical techniques ambiguous and irrelevant statements are supposedly eliminated. Finally a shorter list of about twenty statements evenly graduated along the scale is selected and presented in random order to the subject for endorsement or rejection. The score of

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 798.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 810.

the subject, which indicates his position on the attitude continuum, is either the mean or median scale value of all the statements which he endorses.[75]

This technique of measuring attitudes has been subject to much criticism[76] Thurstone himself places severe limitations on the use of the attitude scales.[77] He says,

> The very fact that one offers a solution to a problem so complex as that of measuring differences of opinion or attitude on disputed social issues makes it evident from the start that the solution is more or less restricted in nature and that it applies only under certain assumptions. . . . It will be conceded at the outset that an attitude is a complex affair which cannot be wholly described by any single numerical index.

It is further assumed by Thurstone that there is a definite correspondence of some sort between the expressed opinion and the hidden attitude. The attitude is to be inferred from the opinions which are endorsed or rejected by the subject. To be sure, he continues,

> It must be recognized that there is a discrepancy—some error of measurement, as it were—between the opinion or overt action that we use as an index and the attitude that we infer from such an index. But the discrepancy between index and "truth" is universal. We must postulate an attitude variable . . . in the nature of an abstract continuum and we must find one or more indices which will satisfy us to the extent that they are internally consistent.

But serious restriction is placed on the use of the scale in that it is admitted to be of little value in predicting any subsequent actions of the subject. Furthermore it is assumed that the scale will be used only in those situations in which one may reasonably expect people to tell the truth about their convictions or opinions.

In short, on the basis of the evident limitations of the attitude scale

[75] Cf. L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can be Measured," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXIII (1928), 529–54; L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (1929).

[76] Cf. S. A. Rice, "Statistical Studies of Social Attitudes and Public Opinion," *Statistics in Social Studies,* ed. S. A. Rice (1930), pp. 171–96 (including a commentary by L. L. Thurstone); Read Bain, "An Attitude on Attitude Research," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXIII (1928), 940–57; Bain, "Theory and Measurement of Attitudes," *Psych. Bull.,* XXVII (1930), 357–79; Ellsworth Faris, "Attitudes and Behavior," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXIV (1928), 271–81 (also reprinted in *The Nature of Human Nature,* 1937); G. W. Allport, *op. cit.,* p. 832. Likert has maintained that an *a priori* method of scoring in arbitrary units on a 1 to 5 rating scale may produce results as reliable as those given by the Thurstone scales. Cf. Rensis Likert, "Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes," *Arch. of Psych.,* XXII, No. 140 (1932), for a criticism of Thurstone. See also Gardner Murphy and Rensis Likert, *Public Opinion and the Individual* (1938), for a re-test study of the persistence of social attitudes.

[77] Thurstone, *op. cit.*

its scientific or practical usefulness is limited. The subject must be perfectly willing to be tested. The results obtained are merely rough approximations of opinion existing in a given person, at a certain place, at a certain time. The derived index tells nothing of what the subject's attitude was in the past, what factors led to the formation of the attitude; and it has no value in forecasting his future actions. Only the "more-or-less" aspect of the opinion is indicated by the attitude scale. Given a subject's position on the scale, we have no way of ascertaining how intensely he will adhere to that position. In addition the subject may harbor contradictory tendencies which are not revealed by the tests. They measure the mental set, if at all, only at the moment. This is also true of the majority of attitude questionnaires.

Added to these objections, we are not sure that the basis upon which the tests are constructed is a sound one. The psychophysical laws upon which the measurement of attitudes is based were formulated on the basis of experimentation with relatively simple stimuli. To what degree they may be used in connection with such a highly complex phenomenon as attitude remains to be demonstrated.

Finally we must not lose sight of the fact that a subject's response to a questionnaire is a response to the total situation involved. The opinion expressed may be that toward the questioner as well as toward the subject-matter of the questionnaire. Few reports of attitude research give sufficient attention to the manner in which the investigation is received. Needless to say this is a vital element in the drawing of conclusions. As G. W. Allport remarks: "Lack of insight, ignorance, suspicion, fear, a neurotic sense of guilt, undue enthusiasm, or even a knowledge of the investigator's purpose may invalidate an inquiry." [78]

Several devices have been employed to investigate the important question of attitude change. Perhaps the most direct approach is that which involves the administration of the test battery or other instrument used as an attitude indicator, both before and after the presentation of the alleged influencing stimuli under examination. This program is usually followed with two or more contrasting groups, one of which (the experimental group) is subjected to the desired influence between the two administrations, while the other (the control group) is tested at the same intervals without being exposed to the given influence. It is assumed that the difference in result between the experimental and control groups will be due primarily to the influence which was present in the one case and absent in the other. The range of factors which may be examined by this technique is relatively small. Obviously, rigid controls do not exist in everyday life,

[78] Allport, *op. cit.*, p. 832. See also R. W. Roskelley, *Attitudes and Overt Behavior: Their Relationship to Each Other and to Selected Factors* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin Library, 1938).

and the majority of experiments which attempt to impose them artificially, run the risk of examining behavior which is somewhat distorted from reality.[79]

In order to provide some controls in situations which are not amenable to the method outlined above, the experimenter may apply his attitude indicator to two contrasting groups, one of which has been subjected to a given influence and one of which has not. It is highly important, however, that the two groups be as nearly similar as possible in all other relevant characteristics. With such a condition of matched groups, differences in results obtained may be attributed largely to the presence or absence of the given factor. Indirectly this, then, leads to the conclusion that if the influence of the absent factor be brought to bear upon a given group, a change would ensue which is roughly comparable to the difference in attitude between the two groups tested. An admirable example of this type of research is found in the work of Hall on the effects of unemployment.[80]

Frequently the factors involved in attitude change are disclosed by the use of life history materials or by the employment of personal interviews. Unfortunately such methods seem to be in disrepute among many workers, principally because their results are not easily quantified.[81]

We have seen how Thomas has made the important process of social control a matter of concern to social psychology through his theory of attitudes, wishes, and definition of the situation. An appreciation of the manner in which society defines situations for the individual is basic to an understanding of collective behavior. The subjective patterns which are transmitted to the individual through social interaction are as important in their consequences for his behavior as are the material objects in his environment. The importance of the content of images and ideas has been stressed by most social psychologists.

What Durkheim and his follower, Lévy-Bruhl, termed "collective representations" are essentially these formalized contents and their meanings. Similarly Lippman applied the term "stereotype" to the shorthand verbal labels which come to be attached by the group to certain classes of individuals and social objects. Since communication is basic to social life, it is easy to see how social definitions of situations rapidly become stereotypes. For the individual, situations are usually delimited by word-formulas

[79] The reader may however consult the suggestive discussion of change in attitudes found in R. C. Peterson, and L. L. Thurstone, *Motion Pictures and the Social Attitudes of Children* (1933).

[80] Cf. O. M. Hall, "Attitudes and Unemployment: a Comparison of the Opinions and Attitudes of Employed and Unemployed Men," *Arch. of Psych.* (1934), No. 165

[81] An excellent summary of the recent literature on empirical research in social attitudes is contained in Gardner Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, "Social Attitudes and Their Measurement," *Experimental Social Psychology* (1937), chap. xiii.

he has received. These verbal stereotypes serve as a means by which the group keeps its members in restraint.

Not only do brief stereotypes of all sorts come into our mental content or sets of values, but the stories of heroes and of past and current events furnish us with an organized, more or less complete picture of our culture which colors practically everything in life. These stories become subject-matter for social psychology in the form of social myths and legends. Myths may be defined as the more illusory, imaginative, material which is poured into us from our social contacts. By legend we mean those stories which have some factual basis, but which in the retelling and recasting have lost their objective accuracy and have accumulated all sorts of imaginative details. Both legends and myths are highly important for the continuity of social life and culture patterns. Without them the past and present, as well as the future, would seem chaotic. With them the world takes on meaning and form, and does not need to be constantly recast by us or for us. They make our social reality stable, predictable, and capable of being endured. The social psychologist must realize that man does not live alone in a colorless world of passive objectivity, but in a subjective, emotionally toned world of attitudes and images, and that this world of images and attitudes determines his conduct quite as often as does the purely physical universe; in fact the two cannot be separated, for the interpretation of the material world is constantly determined by the subjective. And as we shall see, the propagandist is essentially concerned with constructing new myths and legends for the recipients of his promotional schemes.[82]

As a more or less special case of the study of attitudes, stereotypes, and myths and legends, social psychologists have given considerable attention to prejudice. In the simplest sense, prejudice signifies just what it says, "to pre-judge," to make a decision beforehand. A prejudice is an opinion or attitude, favorable or hostile, based on prepossession and therefore biased and irrational. Extensive research has been made on race prejudice. Bruno Lasker has examined the genesis of race prejudice in his *Race Attitudes in Children* (1929). Bogardus, using a concept developed by R. E. Park, has attempted to perfect a "social distance" scale which reveals the extent to which different races would be admitted to successive degrees of intimacy in social relations by a given individual.[83] Thurstone and his followers

[82] For a further discussion of the psychology and social functions of myths and legends, see Kimball Young, *Social Psychology* (1930), pp. 434–52. See also Bronislaw Malinowski, *The Myth in Primitive Psychology* (1926); and William Albig, *Public Opinion* (1939).

[83] Cf. E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (1928); also "A Social Distance Scale," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XVII (1933), 265–71.

have also constructed scales which measure degrees of prejudice, both according to the method of equal-appearing intervals (discussed above) and the method of paired-comparisons. In general these attempts at quantification are subject to many of the criticisms we have enumerated in our discussion of the measurement of attitudes.

VII. Leadership

The study of leadership has come to occupy a prominent place in modern social psychology. Manifested in every group, even the intimate congeniality and comradeship associations, are dominance in some persons, and a certain submissiveness and followership in others. In groups which have developed institutional features and have long-established culture patterns we usually find certain individuals with authority or power over others. The individual in authority is not, however, necessarily a leader. Leadership is a form of dominance and pace-setting which rests upon the interest and acceptance by the followers as well as upon the leader's ability to cope with problems. Leadership depends on submissive attitudes and habits of control on the part of followers. Power by virtue of inherited position or by reason of some system of promotion on the scale of authority may be called headship.

Most of our interpretation of leadership and headship comes from case-study or historical sources. But few experimental or statistical studies of leadership have appeared. E. B. Gowin's *The Executive and His Control of Men* (1915) provided some rudimentary data showing that for his sample executives tended to be taller and heavier than non-executives. Galton and his followers have made much of the intellectual superiority of certain classes of leaders in our Western society, but unfortunately much of the interpretation of these data is unsatisfactory because of obvious bias regarding innate ability.[84] Of importance in this connection, especially in indicating the early evidences of superior ability, is the study by L. M. Terman and his associates of 1000 school children who were shown by intelligence tests to possess high intellectual capacities.[85]

Individual variation in the whole range of physical strength, intelligence, and temperament obviously plays a part in leadership. Leadership

[84] There is a considerable literature in this field, but see *inter alia* Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius* (1869); Havelock Ellis, *A Study of British Genius* (1904); E. L. Clarke, *American Men of Letters* (1916); F. A. Woods, *Mental and Moral Heredity in Royalty* (1906); K. M. Cox, *Genetic Studies in Genius, Vol. II, The Early Mental Traits of Three Hundred Geniuses* (1926). Compare standpoint in above with L. F. Ward, *Applied Sociology* (1916); and G. R. Davies, *Social Environment* (1917).

[85] See L. M. Terman's *Genetic Studies of Genius, Vol. I, Mental and Physical Traits of a Thousand Gifted Children* (1925). Terman is now engaged in an extensive follow-up of this sample. The results should prove enlightening.

grows not only out of exceptional talent or high intelligence, but at all times depends on the social situation and the culture. Where class organization is strong, leadership tends to go with status as a member of a particular caste or class, and submission and docility to go with membership in the lower ranks. In a democratic society where class lines are faint, leaders may arise from any group provided they follow the accepted patterns of the culture. Again there are but few adequate analyses of the traits and attitudes of leaders. F. H. Allport's A-S reaction test, an attempted measure of ascendance and submission, provides little but a cross-section of particular situations in which dominance or subordination occur. Using a modified psychoanalytic method, H. D. Lasswell in his *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930) has thrown considerable light upon the rôle and function of infantile and childhood experiences in providing the motivations for certain kinds of dominance. But his sample was small and there is need for further controlled investigation along similar lines. Taking his cue from his studies of dominance among apes and monkeys, A. H. Maslow has undertaken extensive surveys, by tests and interviews, in order to expose the social and cultural as well as psychological features of dominance. He properly distinguishes between feelings of ascendancy and overt dominant behavior, and demonstrates that matters such as social situation, cultural definitions, and compensatory devices all operate to qualify the tendencies toward overt manifestations of dominance.[86]

Undoubtedly crises play a part in the development of leadership. Confronted with a novel situation, for which old devices (material or non-material) do not serve, there is set up an emotional and intellectual tension among members of the group. The leader, whether a mechanical inventor or a statesman, largely focuses these feelings and desires of his group upon a solution.

Leadership rests, for the person, fundamentally on the expansion of the self-assertive or ego trends, although it is difficult to determine the factors which lie at the basis of ego-expansion or self-assertion. The direction which ego organization takes is determined both by internal constitutional factors and by personal-social and cultural conditioning.

The types of groups and their culture will determine the objects around which leadership may grow. An intellectual "society" does not foster military leadership, nor does a religious organization ordinarily stimulate scientific genius. Moreover, groups which face a crisis afford opportunities for the rise of leadership that will not occur when the going is smooth and uninterrupted.

An important feature of social interaction and leadership concerns the

[86] See A. H. Maslow, "Dominance-feeling, Behavior, and Status," *Psych. Rev.*, LXIV (1937), 404–29, and his "Dominance, Personality, and Social Behavior in Women," *Jour. of Soc. Psych.*, X (1939), 3–39.

relations of the leader to the masses who follow him. In large part the leader crystallizes the vague feelings and attitudes of the masses, who are confronted with a situation which they cannot handle. The leader offers his followers an object with which they can identify themselves. The phenomenal rise of Napoleon after the French Revolution, of Lenin in Russia, of Mussolini in Italy, or of Hitler in Germany, well illustrate how the formation of definite programs accompanied by attractive symbols of strength and security attract the masses, long weary of disaster, hardship, and especially, uncertainty. They find in the leader and his platform an image they can follow. Likewise in setting his rôle and in giving him status, they project upon him many qualities which they imagine a leader should have. Then by identification they again get these very qualities back into themselves with added dividends to their own personalities. This projection reacts on the leader, who to be successful must assume these rôles and accept this status. Finally the leader as symbol affords a focus for feeling and acting together. Around him and his ideas they build up a pattern of response directed to an end, usually satisfying because it appears, at least, to bear fruits in action. In this way leaders become important factors in the process of social control.

In short, the leader, who stands out from his fellows, is not separated from them except in degree. He has much in common with them in biological background, in his participation in social life, and in his culture. Nevertheless he represents uniqueness and variability of thought and action, even within a particular society. In Mead's terms, his personality may be said to be greatly endowed with "I-reactions." While the culture and the group sets the outlines of most of our thought and action, there remains the periphery of individual deviation. And this variation rests originally on biological differences from heredity evident at birth and in the early years; it depends on maturation or physical growth, itself affected by endocrine balance; it is affected by personal-social conditioning, especially in the early years and perhaps chiefly by cultural factors; and finally, it depends on the particular interpretation which the individual himself gives to the mass of culture that pours in upon him.

There have been a number of attempts to study types of leaders in various fields. A. B. Wolfe, for example, in his *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method* (1923) discusses three sorts of leaders in the field of economic and political behavior especially: the conservative, the radical, and the objective-minded scientist. There are also the older classifications such as "the man of action," and the thinker, discussed by O. L. Schwartz in his *General Types of Superior Men* (1918); and the classification into extravert and introvert, following Jung's personality types. Harold D. Lasswell in discussing political leadership [87] has distinguished between the

[87] H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (1930).

bureaucrat or administrator, the agitator, and the theorist. Paul Pigors [88] has attempted to classify types of followers as the constructive, routine, impulsive, and subversive. Since any classification of leaders bears upon the broader matter of typification of personality, we shall return to this problem in our general section on methodology.

VIII. Collective Behavior

In the study of collective behavior it is useful to make a distinction between two types of groups: the crowd, and the public. The crowd is to be regarded as a temporary, quasi-primary group of persons in direct contact, where the communication is vocal or directly overt. Unlike the more organized primary group, the crowd seldom develops specific features of social organization such as institutions, forms of regular control, and patterns of interaction. Such a quasi-primary group may possess the rudiments of societal organization; but on the whole it tends to be temporary and rather easily aroused to emotional states. Yet it must be realized that the more organized primary groups such as the family, the play group, neighborhood, and primary community, especially under severe stress, are not always free from some of the same features often seen in the crowd. It is, however, with the development of complex culture and the rise of secondary groups that the crowd comes to play a larger part in our own society. Today the crowd is closely linked with mobility of population, with the development of innumerable audience situations, and with the development of what Park calls the "touch-and-go" relations of people, or with that impersonality so ably discussed by Simmel. Yet in spite of its relatively temporary nature, the crowd is affected by culture. There is always some common ground of experience of language or gesture, if not of other common culture patterns. And in some instances the crowd becomes a form of managing certain crises, as may be seen in the long acceptance of the lynching mob or the race riot as a means of settling racial or other conflicts.

A crowd, then, may be defined as a contiguous and spatially distributed group which has a circularity of responses in common language and gesture toward each other, with shoulder-to-shoulder massing and polarization toward some object of attention. The crowd has sufficient numbers to prevent intimate, face-to-face contact, especially in the presence of some stimulus which affords a common focus of attention. Psychologically the crowd often releases the inhibitions of attitudes that have been censored by group-sanctioned patterns of behavior. This release of repressed images and action patterns is facilitated by the dissociation of consciousness and behavior from that normally found in social intercourse. Repressed images

[88] Paul Pigors, "Types of Followers," *Jour. Soc. Psych.*, V (1934), 378–83.

and action patterns are released with greatest violence in crises involving the fundamental values of the group—the retention of status, and survival itself. Crowds are relatively temporary, but their effects and the threats of their recurrence are highly important in social control.

Much early writing on crowd behavior dealt with it in terms of group consciousness, mob mind, and other psychological concepts applied to mass phenomena. If we mean by such terms as "crowd mind" merely a universality of attitudes, ideas, and actions in a group of individuals, there is perhaps no serious objection to be made. But the difficulty arises as soon as we pass from this analogous treatment to the belief that mobs or audiences possess a super-individual consciousness. So long as crowd behavior can be dealt with as a phase of interaction, psychological concepts are pertinent. When we deal with the more permanent aspects of group behavior to be seen in certain institutional formulations, we must introduce sociological concepts as well.[89]

Everett Dean Martin, taking his cue mainly from the psychoanalysts, has described crowd behavior from the point of view of the unconscious formulations behind crowd thinking and acting. He contends that the crowd is essentially filled with that egotism, hatred, and the sense of absolute rightness that also marks the paranoiac. While this treatment of the crowd is enlightening, it suffers from being based almost entirely upon an individual psychology. It does not recognize the relation of cultural factors to these attitudes and moreover it neglects the place of interaction of individuals. It fails to point out that paranoiac attitudes are part and parcel of the whole unconscious foundation of the in-groups to which we belong.[90]

As we have already noted, F. H. Allport's social psychology is distinctly built around the individual, but he indicates to some extent the effect of social stimulation upon the individual's behavior. In dealing with crowd behavior he attributes the so-called crowd phenomena to the "sense of universality" and projection of one's feelings upon others. The moral consciousness of the man in the crowd is brought round by a process of projection and rationalization, so that the essential egotism of it may be covered up in a palaver of high-sounding words.[91]

Fashion is a phase of collective action which has much in common with crowd behavior. It rests in large part on physical contiguity, but

[89] The student may compare the social-psychological interpretations of crowds and publics presented here with those contained in a systematic sociology. Cf. Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (1932), Part III, "Systematics of Plurality Patterns," esp. pp. 445–87.

[90] Cf. E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds* (1920). On Freud's interpretation of certain aspects of crowd conduct, see his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921).

[91] Cf. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology* (1924), pp. 292–319.

today is dependent for its spread and persistence upon rapid communication and transportation. It is, therefore, related to the behavior of the public as well as to that of the crowd. Fashions are not in the mores; they are a phase of the non-moral folkways.[92] Fashion is a type of common thought and action which depends upon a certain spread of ideas and actions through a group. Such diffusion is relatively impermanent and superficial; and in contrast with mores which alter slowly, fashions are highly temporary and characterized by a state of flux. Yet in their time fashions seem important and significant. In modern Western society with its swift changes and heightened animation of life, its mobility and rapid communication, fashions change rapidly; and the changes themselves are really a part of the social ritual. Today the control of fashion over our lives is everywhere evident. It has become a distinctive phase of our daily life. Moreover, fashions run in cycles, and certain fashions run to extremes. They follow certain rhythms; we can measure trends in fashion statistically, but we can predict only the general direction of such trends, not their absolute direction or quantity.[93]

The public is also a relatively temporary, amorphous, and quasi-secondary group in the sense that it rests upon special interests, upon certain voluntary choices and relations. It depends, however, upon indirect media of communication—the printed page, radio, etc. The modern public is particularly the outgrowth of secondary group organization. In distinction to most crowds the public is usually supported by some more permanent, highly organized group such as a political party, a group of employers, a labor union, or other body. Moreover the public, even more than the crowd, is influenced by culture patterns of the larger society in which it finds itself. In the modern period it has been linked with political democracy, capitalism, and religious and ideological freedom.

The opinions, beliefs, sentiments, ideas, and notions of a particular public, which find expression in discussion and in various forms of dissemination through the printed word, speech, or gesture, we designate as public opinion. The oldest and still most popularly accepted conception of public opinion rests upon the thesis that man is a rational being whose opinions are formed from cool and deliberate reason applied to

[92] The interested reader should compare Ralph Linton's discussion in terms of cultural "alternatives." Cf. his *The Study of Man* (1936), pp. 273–4.

[93] Cf. A. L. Kroeber, "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," *Am. Anthr.*, XXI (1919), 235–63. For other analysis of changes in fashion see also: Kimball Young, *Social Psychology* (1930), chap. xxiii; E. DeY. Barr, "A Psychological Analysis of Fashion Motivation," *Arch. of Psych.*, XXVI (1934); D. C. Calthrop, *English Dress from Victoria to George V* (1934); J. C. Flügel, *The Psychology of Clothes* (1930); E. B. Hurlock, *The Psychology of Dress* (1929); E. E. Kellett, *Fashion in Literature, A Study of Changing Taste* (1931); R. T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior* (1938), chap. ix.

any problem in hand. Ellwood among others holds this view. He says that public opinion is a "more or less rational group judgment" and is to be sharply distinguished from public emotion and sentiment. To be thus rational, Ellwood says further that public opinion must be "formed under conditions of disinterestedness." This view goes back fundamentally to the eighteenth and early nineteenth century doctrine of the rational man. Upon this theory we may predicate a deliberate, sane, social control. This dogma has become a stereotype in certain political circles in democratic countries.

A second thesis is that public opinion is really minority opinion foisted upon the masses by the wiles of minority leaders. This theory implies that the masses are controlled by the sentiments and emotions of the élite, who use popular stereotypes to gain their own concealed ends. Associated with this view is a third notion that public opinion, while not uninfluenced by minorities, develops in crises, but always in terms of attitudes and sentiments largely emotional rather than intellectual. If leaders do anything, they simply crystallize these attitudes and sentiments and restate them in intellectually acceptable formulas. The masses accept these formulas as their own. They seem sound reasons for their beliefs, attitudes, and actions.

There are, then, really two divergent views on the nature of public opinion. The one view rests upon the thesis of the individualism and rationalism of man, the other upon a more collectivistic theory of behavior and the doctrine that man's basic values are controlled by his emotional attitudes and sentiments rather than by his cold intellectual considerations. This view—toward which the writers are inclined—definitely challenges the idea that public opinion could ever arise out of "conditions of disinterestedness." Opinion can become widespread only when groups of people are vitally concerned with issues.

Public opinion, we believe, is formed by verbalized attitudes, beliefs, and convictions, which are essentially emotional, and their associated images and ideas. It is formulated in a crisis when people differ in their definitions of new situations. The amount of rational and scientific discussion in public opinion is likely to be at a minimum, although in special groups, of course, opinion is occasionally based on fact and logic. But even the public opinion based on cold fact is usually, in the end, incorporated into the larger schema provided by emotional attitudes and values.

Public opinion is circulated first by conversation and gossip, second by various modern organs of communication, especially the newspaper and radio. Undoubtedly in opinions about subjects not geographically near, the secondary organs of news and opinion are most essential in furnishing the material for face-to-face discussion and comment. But the newspaper and radio do not entirely create public opinion. Though they arouse

our prejudices, myths, and legends, they themselves equally reflect the beliefs and convictions which are the results of direct social intercommunication. Social interaction in public affairs obviously depends upon both facts and their interpretations. Truly the newspapers and other organs of opinion bring both to us. They influence the direction which public opinion takes, but they themselves have already been influenced by our common attitudes. In short, public opinion arises when as groups we are faced with issues, when our old frames of behavior are breaking down, when there is a demand for new definitions of situations. Because these ancient patterns are deeply ingrained, it is impossible for our opinions not to be influenced by our emotional attitudes. Finally, when a consensus of opinion is attained, we may proceed to action as a group.

F. H. Allport, long an adversary of the sociological interpretation of collective behavior which draws heavily upon cultural influences, has recently restated his position based on the standpoint of individual psychology. He defines the "public opinion situation" as follows: "The term public opinion is given its meaning with reference to a multi-individual situation in which individuals are expressing themselves, or can be called upon to express themselves, as favoring or supporting (or else disfavoring or opposing) some definite condition, intensity, and constancy, as to give rise to the probability of affecting action, directly or indirectly, toward the object concerned." [94] Some research in public opinion has been based upon the Allportian position, notably that of R. L. Schanck.[95] This entire school of social psychologists views all forms of collective behavior merely as reactions of aggregates of individuals. For them social situations are constituted of stimuli emanating from other concrete individuals. Fundamentally, then, this reduces the social situation to the status of a stimulus-field, similar psychologically to the world of physical objects.

In recent years the straw vote [96] has been extensively used as a device for surveying changes in public opinion in this country and elsewhere. Originally intended to forecast the results of presidential and other elections, these surveys have been extended to embrace opinion on various current political and social issues. The best-known of these are the polls conducted by Fortune magazine, by the Crossley Corporation, and by the American Institute of Public Opinion. As an illustration of method we may refer to the operation of the last-named organization.

In conducting its straw balloting the Institute uses about 600 field re-

[94] F. H. Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* I (1937), 7–23. See also his *Social Psychology* (1924), and his *Institutional Behavior* (1933), for an extension of these ideas.

[95] Cf. R. L. Schanck, "A Study of a Community and Its Groups and Institutions Conceived of as Behavior of Individuals," *Psych. Monographs,* Vol. XLIII (1932).

[96] The reader should consult Claude Robinson, *Straw Votes* (1932), for a comprehensive survey of early straw votes in this country.

porters from all parts of the United States. These field investigators, operating under careful directions, interview a sample ranging from 3,000 to 50,000 persons. The attempt is made to see that this sample truly represents the whole citizenry of the country. The directors of the organization say: "Every Institute sample is tested for its proportional accuracy with respect to six factors: (1) representation by states, (2) men and women, (3) urban-rural distribution, (4) age, (5) size of income, (6) political partisanship." [97] The questions are carefully tested in advance of the poll, and it usually takes about a fortnight to complete the count, although under pressure a straw vote can be obtained more quickly. It is evident that opinions may thus be studied with reference to such items as age, sex, occupation, church affiliation, union membership, and political alignment, "thus narrowing the search for causes in social movements."

Not only is this novel device useful in sampling public opinion periodically, but it may in time come to be employed as a distinctive factor in influencing opinion and public action.[98]

The student of public opinion must naturally also be concerned with certain efforts to control opinion. These take two general forms in contemporary society: censorship and propaganda. Censorship is fundamentally a phase of social taboo against the expression of opinion. If it once had a narrow range in primary groups, today it reaches as far as political power and public opinion extend, and includes suppression of both free speech and free printing. Censorship is psychologically a form of restraint and negativism. It is a type of repression caused by a fear of the consequences of novel stimuli. In censorship we assume that if there is no stimulation there will be no response. Censorship, like other forms of social pressure, is exerted wherever the groups in control feel themselves endangered by the divergent minorities who question their authority by word or deed.

Censorship in the modern sense is often linked with propaganda. The deletions made by the censor may be filled up with manufactured

[97] Quoted from George Gallup and Claude Robinson, "American Institute of Public Opinion-Surveys, 1935–38," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* II (1938), 373–98. This statement of method, which is abstracted from the Institute's booklet, "The New Science of Public Opinion Measurement," also contains a compilation of the results obtained by the surveys of the Institute since its inception.

[98] In 1937 a special journal, *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* was established by the School of Public Affairs at Princeton University, "to contribute to the study of the nature and working of public opinion in the contemporary world." It should be consulted by all students of this phase of collective behavior. Excellent guides to the literature in the field are provided in H. L. Childs, *A Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion* (1934), and in H. D. Lasswell, R. D. Casey, and B. L. Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography* (1935); the latter is continued currently in each issue of *The Public Opinion Quarterly.*

news and opinions in the form of propaganda. All propaganda, however, does not merely replace censored news. Neither are censorship and propaganda active solely in wars and international disputes. They both occur in all the crises of our lives. The threat of social change in politics, economics, or religion leads to a social tension which easily produces both forms of control. Censorship is negative and repressive, and takes on the nature of taboo. Propaganda is positive and creative, and takes on the nature of legend- and myth-making which is so effective in creating the social realities.

It was the World War which introduced us on a broad scale to the functions of propaganda. Each of the belligerent nations established bureaus for propagating their own particular points of view. Such books as Creel's *How We Advertised America* (1920) and Brownrigg's *Indiscretions of a Naval Censor* (1920) indicate something of the control of information during the war. Lasswell's work, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (1927), is a most valuable source of information, revealing, as it does, the scope and method of propaganda throughout the world during the years 1914–1918.

Propaganda in the sense of proselyting has been in vogue in the spread of religious dogmas for ages, especially in Christian countries. But modern means of controlling ideas and information has made possible its extension into political, economic, and social fields hitherto undreamed of. Sometimes this propaganda is disguised under the more polite title of "publicity." The modern propagandist or "public relations counsel" has become an extremely lucrative profession. Yet it should not be imagined that the results of propaganda and publicity are necessarily nefarious. Health campaigns and many educational and other reform movements use methods essentially propagandist in nature.[99]

Again but little research has been done on the psychological factors involved in propaganda. Mention, however, should be made of Biddle's demonstration [100] that where prejudiced opinions exist the introduction of rational material has slight if any effect in modifying an individual's views, of Chen's study [101] showing how oral propaganda may rather sharply influence students' attitudes, of Annis and Meier's induction of favorable or unfavorable opinions of a public man by the judicious though surreptitious introduction of "planted content" into a daily news-

[99] Leonard W. Doob has attempted to formulate psychological principles of propaganda (Cf. his *Propaganda; Its Psychology and Technique* [1935], esp. Appendix, pp. 413–7).

[100] W. M. Biddle, "The Relationship between Knowledge and a Measure of Autistic Thinking on Certain International Problems," *Jour. Soc. Psych.*, II (1931), 493–6.

[101] W. K-C. Chen, "The Influence of Oral Propaganda Material upon Students' Attitudes," *Arch. of Psych.*, No. 150 (1933).

paper,[102] of Rosenthal's study of how radical motion pictures may alter students' socio-economic views,[103] of Wilke's interesting comparison of the relative effects of propaganda by means of speeches, radio addresses, or the printed page.[104] Other contributions of importance are Hadley Cantril and G. W. Allport's *The Psychology of Radio* (1935) and the symposium, "Radio Research and Applied Psychology," edited by P. F. Lazarsfeld.[105]

IX. Methods in Social Psychology

Before closing our survey of the trends and subject-matter of modern social psychology we shall comment briefly on the methodologies employed in the contemporary study of personality and social-psychological phenomena. Our discussion will be concerned mainly with the case or life history method, statistical methods, and typology, but we shall also make brief mention of topology and sociometry as they have recently been introduced into the field.

The case- or life-history approach has had very little attention from the psychologist, but has been developed at first out of the literature of biography and autobiography and more particularly by modern psychiatry, social work, and social psychology. The case history standpoint assumes that the present functions of the person can only be understood in terms of their genesis. The method of psychoanalysis is largely that of uncovering, by the method of free association, the infantile and childhood formulations which lie at the roots of present attitudes, ideas, and habits. Likewise through the use of autobiographical and biographical materials, through letters, diaries, journals, memoirs, and all sorts of intimate documents, attempts are being made to secure a fairly complete picture of the history of the individual. The concern is to secure a description of a causal sequence of events through the life course of the individual. On the basis of this material the observer or research worker attempts to state the interrelations of events within the individual in a systematic logical form.

John Dollard in his monograph, *Criteria for the Life History* (1935) has given us a suggestive set of categories for handling life history data.

[102] A. D. Annis and N. C. Meier, "The Induction of Opinion Through Suggestion by Means of 'Planted Content,'" *Jour. Soc. Psych.*, V (1934), 65–81.

[103] S. P. Rosenthal, "Change of Socio-economic Attitudes under Radical Motion Picture Propaganda," *Arch. of Psych.*, No. 166 (1934).

[104] W. H. Wilke, "An Experimental Comparison of the Speech, the Radio, and the Printed Page as Propaganda Devices," *Arch. of Psych.*, No. 169 (1934).

[105] In *Jour. Appl. Psych.*, XXIII (1939), 1–206. The student should also consult William Albig, *Public Opinion* (1939), for an extensive review of material in the whole field of public opinion, propaganda, censorship, and related topics.

He presents seven criteria or standards which must be considered in studying the personality in the genetic or historical frame of reference. These are:

1. "The subject (of the life history) must be viewed as a specimen in a cultural series," that is, the group is antecedent to any given individual and we must look upon the person to be studied as one in a series of individuals who are living in a cultural milieu.

2. "The organic motors of action ascribed must be socially relevant." That is to say, "the organic properties which we assume as the basis of the life of the individual in the group must be of such a kind that they will submit to social elaboration." In other words, the student of personality need deal only with those constitutional factors which can be defined in a social-cultural matrix.

3. "The peculiar rôle of the family group in transmitting the culture must be recognized."

4. "The specific method of elaboration of organic materials into social behavior must be shown."

5. "The continuous related character of experience from childhood through adulthood must be stressed." This criterion emphasizes the basic standpoint of the whole genetic approach. That is, there is a genesis and continuity in development from earliest months and years on through life. Even crises, such as those of adolescence, can only be properly interpreted in terms of this continuity. "In the scientifically valuable life history any act performed in adulthood will have a network of references to character sets, external situations, and drive impulses along the whole length of the life sequence." In other words, the time sequence of events is fundamental.

6. "The 'social situation' must be carefully and continuously specified as a factor." The culture which the individual receives from those around him always appears in concrete social configurations. Moreover, the situation will be defined both by the subject and by others around him. And in this interpretation the continuity factors (criterion 5) must also be reckoned with.

7. "The life-history material itself must be organized and conceptualized." In other words, it must be put into a systematic and theoretic framework. Without this, the material will remain discursive, purely descriptive, and lack the logical form necessary for building a science and a theory of personality.[106]

In formulating his criteria, Dollard, in common also with most cultural anthropologists, makes culture and learning practically identical. This position assumes that all human learning is culturally determined, a view which is not warranted by the evidence thus far mobilized. It has long been the contention of the senior author of this survey that recognition must be given to the probability that interaction between persons may

[106] This presentation is adapted from chapter 2 of Dollard's book. The interested reader should consult this entire monograph. Dollard not only states his criteria in some detail but also presents analyses of six life history documents from Freud, Adler, Thomas, Clifford Shaw, Jessie Taft, and H. G. Wells.

result in conditioning (learning) which is not, strictly speaking, to be called "cultural." Important as cultural conditioning is in the molding of the developing personality, to attempt to subsume all human learning under this category is to rob it of its significance as a concept. In every human grouping with common culture patterns, it is still possible for a more or less wide range of interactional patterns, ideas, habits, and attitudes to develop which are not, and perhaps cannot, be predetermined by the culture itself. The term "personal-social conditioning" has been coined to characterize this sort of learning, which arises in person-to-person relationship uninfluenced by habits and ideas culturally accepted by one's group. Many of these stimuli emerge from age and sex differences, from temperamental qualities of the persons involved, or from other factors which may be regarded as non-cultural. The phrase "personal-social" is intended to emphasize the social (interactional) character of such influences and their dependence upon direct person-to-person interaction. A somewhat similar distinction has been made by the Wiese-Becker approach to systematic sociology, which segregates "circumscribed" and "common-human" patterns of behavior. Comprehension of the dynamic part which social interaction plays in personality development, including the learning process, reflects the important contributions which Cooley, Dewey, Mead, Thomas and their followers have been making to social-psychological thought.

In addition to sharpening the term "culture," the use of the concept of interaction and the recognition of the non-cultural aspects of social conditioning would make more meaningful Dollard's concepts of the "private," internal, or subjective phases of behavior. The designation "private," with reference to behavior, is likely to leave one with the notion that after all there is something distinctly individualistic, even innate, in action patterns and attitudes. Nor should we deny the recognition of the possible influences of physiological imbalances, such as might result from endocrine or other malfunctionings, or the possible effects of organic changes which may predispose the aging individual toward some particular forms of behavior. As important as interaction and culture are for the understanding of personality, as cautious as we should be regarding innate ideas, and such notions of recapitulation as lurk in the Freudian concepts, we must not ignore the possibility of more direct influences of physiological conditions upon social behavior.

Dollard's concept of the "group plus one" to indicate the linkage of the growing individual to the group is altogether too static. Here again the recognition of interaction would provide a more satisfactory approach, for the individual is not merely added to the group as one more member. As the child is inducted into the family he influences the interactional

configuration in innumerable ways. A complete description and analysis should take this fact into account.[107]

The application of statistical methods to social-psychological data assumes, obviously, that the data to be studied occur in relatively large numbers and that the material may be broken down into convenient units or elements which may be treated quantitatively. If we wish to consider inner states or subjective factors as well as overt behavior, the question at once arises as to how the former may be handled statistically. In dealing with the inner aspects, at best we must depend upon verbal report—itself one kind of overt action. There is no way of getting at them directly unless we have recourse to experimental techniques. Hence we are dependent upon paper and pencil questionnaires, schedules, or tests, upon oral reports about inner states, or upon similar devices, provided always that these are arranged in some kind of units or elements. Frequent terms have been traits, attitudes, beliefs, opinions, ideas, habits (as verbally reported). The approach of a "trait" psychology has an advantage here because its data lend themselves to the quantitative method.

Statistical investigations of personality may be classified (a) in terms of the kinds of measuring devices used, (b) in reference to unit traits or attitudes, (c) in terms of broader clusters or of traits and ideas conceived of as faculties, or (d) in terms of the social situations in which the activity is assumed to occur. P. M. Symonds [108] gives ample details on types of measuring devices, and various books and articles have treated the study of personality from the angle of faculties, traits, and attitudes or of social situations in which the activities take place.[109]

The customary features of the statistical treatment itself need not be discussed here. We may mention in passing some considerations, however. In planning any study a number of factors must be recognized: (a) the careful definition of the units to be measured; (b) the determination of interchangeable units of measurement in the continuum; (c) the

[107] The life-history method has been used in various forms, of course, by child psychologists, social workers, and others for years, but very little if any attempt has been made to systematize the methods and findings. However, the student may examine with profit the two following investigations in which life stories were used and from which some tentative classifications were attempted: M. Lazarsfeld and H. Zeisl, "Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal," *Psychol. Monographien,* V (1933), 123; and Bohan Zawadzki and Paul Lazarsfeld, "The Psychological Consequences of Unemployment," *Jour. Soc. Psych.,* VI (1935), 224–51.

[108] Cf. P. M. Symonds, *Diagnosing Personality and Conduct* (1931).

[109] See also Kimball Young, "Personality Studies," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXII (1927), 953–8. Since this date a number of excellent reviews of the literature on tests, questionnaires, etc., dealing with personality have appeared, see especially the files of the *Psych. Bull.*

securing of an adequate, unbiased sample; (d) the determination by the best available methods of the validity and reliability of the test, or questionnaire, or schedule.

With these matters well provided for, one may secure measures of the central tendency of his distributions, measures of variability and, more important, various measures of correlation or association of one set of data with another. The correlation methods have thrown important light upon the coincident occurrence of events and have laid the foundation for inferences regarding causal relations of the data.

The advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches have been discussed many times.[110]

We need only note certain problems involved in the use of these methods. Among the advantages of this case-study or historical-genetic method we may mention the following: (1) It gives a more or less continuous picture through time of the individual's interpretation of his own experience and often of that of others. As Thomas puts it, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." In other words, the nature of social reality is revealed only when we know the *meaning* which people put upon their experience. The researches of Thomas and Znaniecki on the Polish peasant, of Healy, Shaw, and Burgess on the delinquent and criminal, of Park and his students on urban personalities, of Grace Marcus on the relations of social worker to client, of Lasswell on political leaders, and of Lowry, Levy, and Kenworthy on child conduct cases, suffice to indicate the wide range of material used. (2) It furnishes a picture of past situations which gave rise to new meanings and new responses. This is particularly valuable in giving information as to crises which are significant in the development of new attitudes, meanings, and habits. (3) Repetitions of situations, meanings, and responses may be noted and used for comparative purposes in forming generalizations. Certainly such logical methods as those of agreement and difference, and even what Bernard, first, and later, Kirkpatrick called an "informal statistical method," may be employed in working up generalizations. (4) Inferences and generalizations in this field rest upon an intimate knowledge of the situation and of the habits and attitudes of the persons interacting. As yet there is hardly any attempt to get at or to formulate standard units of classification or measurement, although R. C. Angell's categories

[110] See among others Symonds, *op. cit.;* G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research* (1929); Clifford Kirkpatrick, "Statistical Studies of Personality and Personality Maladjustment," *Statistics in Social Studies,* ed. S. A. Rice (1930), chap. xii; Kimball Young, "Method, Generalization, and Prediction in Social Psychology," *Publ. A.S.S.,* XXVII (1933), 20–34; *The Field and Methods of Sociology,* ed. L. L. Bernard (1934), Part I, chaps. ix and x, Part II, chaps. ix and x; C. L. Fry, *The Technique of Social Investigation* (1934); and Kimball Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (1940), chap. xi.

of family reaction to the depression are suggestive.[111] Rather the thinking relates to the totality or configuration of situation and persons. Inferences are drawn from a kind of intuitive judgment, insight, or feeling for the whole social *Gestalt*. This is exemplified in the work of Cooley and of J. M. Williams, whose generalizations rest in a verbalization of their impressions and comparisons, which are certainly not expressed in quantitative form.[112]

The limitations of the case study method are numerous and often seem to far outweigh the advantages. We may note the more important ones. (1) The records are open to errors of perception, memory, judgment, and unconscious bias with a special tendency to over-emphasize unusual events. Nevertheless the discovery of internal consistency in the record is believed to offset this difficulty in part. Sometimes, too, a check may be made by comparing the records from social agencies, the school, or correctional institutions, or from the case records of other individuals in the same groups. (2) No interchangeable units of behavior or of the stimuli, to say nothing of units of subjective events are used in these reports; hence it is difficult to make any quantitative check upon them without additional data, such as Stouffer used in his comparison of autobiographical statements on prohibition and responses to a standard test. (3) Attention to careful sampling is usually neglected and generalizations may thus be false, but this may be due to lack of numerous records rather than to the nature of the data itself. So much data now used represent atypical cases that an adequate check-up with typical, normal cases in sufficient number is greatly needed. The recent work of Healy and Bronner is indicative of a growing recognition of this need.[113] Yet the sheer difficulty of managing a large number of case records puts a further limit on the hope of very adequate sampling.

In spite of the difficulties inherent in the case-study approach, its importance in studying the subjective factors behind behavior cannot be gainsaid. Any fundamental generalizations about social behavior must take into account as well as the meaning which the individual gives the external situation and his own overt responses. To ignore the matter of meaning would be to reduce social psychology to the mere mechanics of the interaction of one bodily mass upon another. If the statistician has no means of handling meaning quantitatively, especially in the time sequence, then we shall have to take refuge in some other approach. This

[111] R. C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression* (1936).

[112] See C. H. Cooley, "The Roots of Social Knowledge," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXII (July 1926), 59–79; and J. M. Williams, *An American Town* (1906), and *Our Rural Heritage* (1925), and *The Expansion of Rural Life* (1926).

[113] See William Healy and Augusta Bronner, *New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment* (1936).

the case study attempts to do. The problem is frankly one of the interrelation of subjective and objective factors in the total behavior situation. We wish, in other words, to correlate subjective meaning with overt response and with the stimulating situation.[114]

The advantages of the statistical method may be summarized as follows: (1) The units of measurement or counting must be carefully defined and fixed, and, hence, interchangeable. A review of recent research in our field shows that these seem best confined to the study of overt responses and to measurable aspects of the stimuli. (2) Some approximation to an experimental program may be set up to examine various aspects of change in verbal and overt response. Some of the studies using the time-sampling techniques have carried on such work in child psychology. (3) With proper sampling, which is so essential, a more adequate picture of the distribution of units is obtainable. (4) The statistical reliability of these measures may be fairly easily determined by well-known statistical devices and in more careful work validity may be fairly well established. (5) Generalizations may be determined in terms of probabilities and correlations, and from this we may hope for certain predictive uses within the limited range of social organization and culture.

Certain limitations may be noted: (1) In the determination of units of measurement or counting there is a tendency to select only the simpler features of behavior, which behavior may not be as significant as other behavior which does not lend itself to being broken down into smaller units. There is a common assumption that all science proceeds by breaking down more complex wholes into simpler parts, but this process applied to complex social psychological data may neglect the very configurations of behavior and of situations which we wish to investigate. This is especially true in regard to so-called subjective or inner events. This criticism has been made of the time-sampling techniques by Woodard and Wilson.[115] (2) Sometimes statistical studies have masked their real difficulties by combining many variables into single units or categories. This misleads the unwary reader and tends to false conclusions. (3) Certain data are not obtainable in sufficiently homogeneous samples, and moreover, the reliability and standardization of test are difficult to establish. (4) Often statisticians pooh-pooh the case-study method for being subjective, and yet the validation of many social-psychological measures is quite dependent on subjective judgments which are not improved by

[114] See H. A. Murray, *et al., Explorations of Personality* (1938), for an extended study of the subjective factors. A quite different approach to the problem is exemplified in Florian Znaniecki's *Social Actions* (1936).

[115] See "A Symposium on the Observability of Social Phenomena with Respect to Statistical Analysis," by D. S. Thomas, F. S. Chapin, J. W. Woodard, S. A. Rice, E. B. Wilson, and M. J. Adler, *Sociologus,* VIII (1932), 436–56, and IX (1933), 1–27.

masquerading in numerical form. The overused method of validating one set of measures by another set is open to errors hidden in the original validation of the first set. In the better studies, notably Thurstone's, many of these difficulties have been removed.[116]

In short, the statistical approach provides an extremely usable method for certain types of data. But at best it deals with overt action and the stimulating situation, leaving inferences to be stated in qualitative terms or developed from the use of non-quantitative data.

As a result of scientific work, our theories of personality development should become increasingly more valid, and the scientific findings themselves should become available for application to particular groups and individuals. Thus we enter the field of prediction and control. But when we attempt application we are confronted with the fact that at present our theory and science are not sufficiently advanced to give us the necessary tools of re-education and therapy. While we have made strides in the statistical field, especially in the use of intelligence and pedagogical tests in predicting with some assurance the school success of pupils, this remains only a section of the larger problem of personality adaptation. As tests of emotionality and of personality types become standardized and improved as to content and treatment of results, we may hope for their use not only in schools, but in business, in industry and elsewhere. Yet the prediction of the individual's conduct from statistical treatment of mass data must long remain highly limited. We certainly lack the assurance of prediction which we see around us in the natural sciences of chemistry and physics. Moreover, we must be even more wary of generalizing and predicting from life-history data until we know much more about them in terms of processes and mechanisms and in terms of adequate samples. Still the matter is not entirely without some promise. Using the criteria noted above in the discussion of the case-history method, we may hope to be able to make some good guesses or state some probabilities about constancies of future behavior. Thus we may say, that if the criteria of the introvert are valid, we know a good deal about how he will react to certain broad situations. So, too, in describing and analyzing the personality of Stanley the Jack-Roller, Shaw and Burgess imply that, no matter what his social rôle, he will remain essentially an egocentric person, as they have defined this type. But the unpredictability of future situations, to say nothing of inadequacies of our data about personality organization, limit us greatly in most cases. Some aspects of this matter have thus been stated by the major writer elsewhere:

[116] Such a check as E. D. Hinckley made of judgments on Negro-White prejudices is an illustration. See L. L. Thurstone, "Commentary," *Statistics in Social Studies*, ed. S. A. Rice (1930), pp. 192–6.

It is here that the anthropologist and historian enter again with their recurrent caution about the interplay of the culture and the individual. While the impress of culture upon the personality type has not been clearly worked out, there seems good evidence that for the most part the personality type is determined by what I have called the personal-social rather than the cultural factors. If this proves a correct assumption, then we may say that underneath the variations of cultural conditioning there do lie basic social-psychological patterns, the core of which seems to be established early in life and to fluctuate but slightly. On the other hand, the social rôle is so distinctly determined by the play of culture that we shall be forced to proceed with caution regarding constancies here. Even so, given a relatively stable and unchanging culture, the play of these forces upon the individual seems to be also somewhat predictable. We know that the boy and girl reared in the Chinese home of fifty years ago were to take on certain attitudes toward marriage and their places in the family. In contrast, when at present external cultures have intruded themselves into China, such a prediction would be difficult to make. True, no problem in social psychology and sociology is more challenging than that of social change, still our ignorance of the interplay of divergent cultures upon the individual is so great that prediction in a period of transition is indeed a risk few would dare to take. . . .

Stated tentatively, however, I hope that prediction is possible under the following conditions: (1) within small segments of behavior where the variables are determinable; (2) within the limits of early psychological conditioning; (3) within restricted cultural constancies. Larger social events determined by the interaction of cultures and races, for example, seem to me impossible to predict and control, and, since the anthropologist and the historian deal with these larger events, there is no wonder they issue us a caution at all times to beware our predictive inferences lest they lead us into a *cul-de-sac* of nonsense.[117]

An old and recurring controversy in psychology has to do with the discussion of specific *versus* general traits, with the question as to whether our habits and attitudes are related only to particular situations or whether habits and attitudes of a general, universal sort may not develop, which habits and attitudes will tend to remain as constants in a large number of varied situations. Edward L. Thorndike, working in educational psychology, is largely responsible for the hold which the doctrine of specific habits and attitudes has upon American psychologists. He contended, on the basis of his educational and psychological observations and measurements, that the child built up specific responses to specific stimuli and that if there was any carry over from one situation to another, it de-

[117] Kimball Young, *Publ. A.S.S.* (1933), *op. cit.*, pp. 32–3. Editorial comment: Note that Young here uses "prediction" in the sense of "prophecy." See the chapter on Constructive Typology, present volume, pp. 21–5, 39–40.

pended upon certain likenesses, "identical elements," present in the first, which were found in the second situation. To him, apparently, the mind was made up of a host of specific stimulus-response patterns in various states of readiness in relation to specific situations. The elaborate investigations of Mark A. May and Hugh Hartshorne on honesty, truthfulness, and other moral traits of boys and girls follow pretty much Thorndike's thesis. May and Hartshorne hold for the specificity of habits and attitudes, and throw considerable doubt on the possibility of building up in children and adults general moral habits and attitudes.[118] In contrast to Thorndike there were various psychologists who contended for general habits and attitudes. A few decades ago, this problem appeared under the concept of transfer of training. It was held, for example, that logical training in dealing with mathematics would carry over into logical approach to other school subjects. It was assumed that there was some general factor built up in the first learning process which would influence learning in the second. For years the psychological literature was full of discussions *pro* and *con* on this topic.

Later the problem of generality appeared with the development, through Binet and Simon in France and later through the work of Goddard and Terman in this country, of tests of so-called "general intelligence." It was assumed by these workers that there was some general capacity termed intelligence, fundamental to learning, which could be measured by devices which we call intelligence tests. The approach of these early workers was largely qualitative. Then came Spearman, who, using devices of statistical correlation, announced what was called the "two-factor theory" of intelligence. According to this view, intelligence was dependent for its functioning upon a general factor, *g*, and upon a specific factor, or possible factors, which was related to the particular materials to be managed. Following Spearman's lead, Webb and others have developed, by using statistical devices, other common factors. In fact there are now so many general factors, along with a host of specific factors, that some are wont to believe that the contenders for general factors have actually given their case away to those who hold for specificity entirely.

Most of this early work concerned itself with measurements of intelligence. When we come into the more recently developed field of measurement of emotions and social traits or attitudes, the whole problem seems much more complicated. Dealing with materials on social attitudes (as defined by the psychologists) G. W. Allport and Hadley Cantril have contended on the basis of recent work that there are general attitudes over

[118] M. A. May and H. H. Hartshorne's work is published under the general title of *Studies in Deceit* (1928–30).

and above the specific ones shown in the face of particular situations.[119] From results of a test called *Study of Values*—devised on the basis of Spranger's six types of personality—it is maintained that there are certain constant, consistent attitudes. Thus the person who took evaluative attitudes of the esthetic type carried these into other test situations having to do with religious attitudes, economic attitudes, and the like.

The controversy between the school of specificity and of generality in traits or attitudes naturally carries over into the larger problem of *personality types*. Are there general types of life organization, certain unities of the personality which characterize the population? Or from the angle of traits and attitudes, may we say that some of these exist in correlation with each other in such a way that we can conceive of them as making up a totality that may be designated by the term *type?*

Examples of the development of schemes of typology include Kretschmer's morphological types; the psychological types of Warren, Downey, Kraepelin, Jung, Bleuler, Wertheimer and Hesketh, Jaensch, and Spranger; and the social types of Burgess, Shaw, and Thomas and Znaniecki.[120]

On the basis of various theories and studies of alleged types of men, what may one say as to the soundness of the thesis of types? Is the concept a valid one? Does it provide a logical tool for theoretical and systematic considerations, and also a logical basis for an empirical, experimental approach to the study of personality?

We may accept the general proposition that science through controlled description and experimentation aims at logical and consistent hypotheses and generalizations or laws of behavior. On the basis of these generalizations, in turn, we should be able to predict and hence to control behavior. Does the concept of type aid us to reach this goal?

While recognition of the unique and specific features of human behavior is important, while individual differences must be taken into account, we must recall that some general and universal criteria of habits, attitudes, traits, or other patterns of human activity must be arrived at, if we are to develop any sound generalizations. There are a number of considerations we may note. (1) In spite of individual variation, the constitution of the human being reveals certain features common to all members of the species. Thus the major organic systems are the same. Similarly the fundamental wants or needs appear to be the same, and the cycles of activity arising from their satisfaction are also in basic

[119] See for example, Hadley Cantril, "General versus Specific Attitudes," *Psych. Monographs,* XLII, No. 192 (1932). Also G. W. Allport, "Attitudes," *Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Carl Murchison (1933), chap. xvii.

[120] See W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928), for a review of some of these types. Also Symonds, *op. cit.,* and K. Young, *op. cit.,* have reviews of pertinent literature. The chapter on Constructive Typology, present volume, pp. 17–46, offers a fresh approach to the problem.

pattern universal to all members. Of course there are variations within the organic make-up. (2) Also there are variations in the modifications which experience or adaptation to the environment makes in the individual. Yet in spite of these deviations, there remain certain constancies of stimuli, both internal and external, that make for uniformity and commonality of behavior. That is, the repetition of the situations to which the organism responds fosters further uniformity of patterns.

Nevertheless in spite of these factors making for common activity and uniformity, the individual differences (1) in constitution, which would influence what Mead called the "I" reactions, and (2) in the nature of the environment, tend to make for divergences in patterns of activity which we must take into account. If, of course, we take the position that these divergences, these individual differences, are widespread, that each individual is *so* unique as to lack anything in common with another, then we must avoid not only the problem of typification but of prediction and control.

We are, however, probably not faced with quite such a sharp dichotomy between complete uniformity or commonality, and extreme deviation of one from another. Actually individuals do seem to fall into certain clusters of behavior patterns and, as obviously inadequate as common-sense stereotypes are about this fact, everyday experience gives some foundation for developing general concepts about behavior and for classifying individuals under these terms. The problem is really one of selecting those criteria of traits or attitudes or habits which will serve as central tendencies of a cluster or class of persons and which will set them off from another cluster or class. The heart of our present difficulty may lie here. We have not yet hit upon the differentiating criteria of personality make-up. The specific details which Jung gives to distinguish introversion from extraversion fall down in many instances when we attempt to apply this to particular persons. Or on the morphological side, Kretschmer has not given us any adequate physical indexes with which to classify our physical and mental make-up. In the same manner the endocrinologists like Berman assume various types: thyroid, thymus, etc., but they fail to differentiate, by specific items, these features from one another. And what is true of psychological and anatomical or physiological features applies equally well when we come to the problem of criteria of social and cultural conditioning. We have much descriptive material, we have certain broad categories of social-cultural differences, but specific criteria are yet to be developed.

Once we have arrived at some satisfactory criteria, the next step is to study their distribution in large samples of the population. If we find that clusters exist, if we find, for example, bi-modal or other multi-modal distributions, we should be in a position from a statistical standpoint to indicate the limits or classes or, if you please, types. Unfortunately present

efforts to delimit types lack the precision which would warrant any other than a descriptive use to be made of them.

The two remaining methods to be mentioned, topology and sociometry, have but recently been introduced into the social-psychological literature. The former has been systematized by Kurt Lewin, who has combined the outlook of *Gestalt* psychology with that of topology (a non-metrical branch of mathematics). This approach stresses the "wholeness" and configurative nature of social experience both with regard to the personalities involved and their relation to the environment. The sort of research fostered by the topologists is of the situational, cross-sectional type. Experience is described in terms of "psychological regions" and the "psychological life space." The behavior of the individual in social situations is presented as taking place in a field of forces with positive and negative valences. An extensive set of postulates and an elaborate terminology are derived. Thus far no conclusive evidence has been presented that the system transcends being an ingenious method of graphically and analogically representing well-known aspects of social behavior.[121]

Sociometry, as it has been applied to the study of personality and social groups, may be designated as the study of inter-personal relations, with special reference to measurement of attractions and repulsions (tele) within the group structure. Its chief sponsor, J. L. Moreno, has written a natural history of group formation using both statistical and geometric modes of presentation to indicate the dynamics of inter-individual relations, under the title, *Who Shall Survive?* (1934). Like the topological approach, this method may prove to be merely another clever means of describing social behavior, but the foundation recently of a journal entitled *Sociometry* devoted to its efforts indicates that it will probably enjoy a considerable vogue in the near future.

Throughout this survey of modern social-psychological thought we have seen that there has been a distinct movement away from the older static conceptions of traditional individual psychologies: associationism, structuralism, "faculty," and "trait" psychology. These views had the common shortcoming of viewing personality as a mere summation of discrete parts or elements, and almost completely ignored the dynamic factor of person-to-person interrelationship. The growing influence of the interactionists—Mead, Cooley, Dewey, and their followers—is likely to have a lasting effect upon developments in this field. Many of the confusions current in the social-psychological literature are thrown into bold relief by the work of these men. The neglect of social interaction by the traditional

[121] The reader should consult Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (1935), and *Principles of Topological Psychology* (1936). The former contains a digest of experimental investigations using this approach. Its application to broader problems of social psychology has been undertaken by J. F. Brown in his *Psychology and the Social Order* (1937).

psychologist's approach to social psychology led him not only to make distinctions which do not appear to be warranted, but also to confound certain factors which should be separated, at least analytically.

A notable illustration of a false distinction commonly made is that between "social" and "self." This view fails to recognize that the "self" is in large part social, that is, it always implies an "other." Indeed it is doubtful whether the behavior of the individual, apart from his purely physiological functions, can be understood outside its social context. Even the physiological factor can be shown to be greatly modified by the social definitions it receives. These contentions raise the intriguing question as to whether the "problems" of individual psychology may not be resolved into those of physiology, on the one hand, or of social psychology, on the other.

In our discussion we have also had occasion to call attention to the frequent confusion of "society" and "culture." This stems directly from a failure to appreciate the rôle of social interaction in the development of the individual. There has been a too frequent identification between culture and all social learning. This view neglects the distinction which we have made between cultural and personal-social conditioning in the learning process. The latter results from the person-to-person relationships (the social-interactional process) apart from the influence of commonly accepted patterns which we term *culture*.

The laboratory-trained psychologists are gradually recognizing the importance of society and culture in human behavior. But so far many of them merely make only passing reference to the matter, or employ currently popular jargon about social configurations and culture traits. They attempt no genuine integration of the materials of psychology and the social sciences. Others go beyond this elementary gesture of acquaintance and attempt some sort of co-ordination of these fields. Moreover, among the latter, as witnessed by the recently published works of J. F. Brown, Ellis Freeman, Ross Stagner, Daniel Katz and Richard Schanck, there has arisen a definite tendentious trend; namely, one toward a declared avowal of a certain normative view of society and personality which stands in rather sharp contrast to the older, perhaps unconscious, acceptance of the traditional social values found among earlier writers in social psychology. This tendency, together with the persistence of some sociologists in clinging to an ethical reformist position, has kept alive a confusion between socialization and moralization. The former is the interactional process by which the individual is taught his place or rôle in the social order; the latter refers to the building up of moral ideas, attitudes, and habits. It should be the province of a scientific social psychology to concern itself with both socialization and moralization, but with normative conceptions treated only as data and not as an integral part of the process of socialization itself.

In building up his field of knowledge the social psychologist is faced once again with the old problem of "psychic unity." Underlying social behavior in various cultures, societies, groups, and situations, are there any basic, universal forms of social interaction? If such there be, the hope of establishing universal laws of a scientific social psychology will be realized. It remains for the future to determine whether this question will be answered in the affirmative.

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[122] Editorial *addendum.*

[13]

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL FACTS

Alexander Goldenweiser

I. Introduction

It would clearly be impossible within the scope of an essay such as this to do justice to the whole range of psychoanalytic doctrine or its contribution to social theory and practice. My treatment of the subject, therefore, will of necessity be highly selective. The work and contribution of psychoanalysis may be said to lie in three fields. On the one hand and primarily, psychoanalysis was from the beginning, and will continue to be, a therapeutic technique, a method of curing certain types of psychic disorders designated broadly as neuroses. Then, again, psychoanalysis has been extended so as to constitute a system of concepts and mechanisms of more general application in psychology. It is this aspect of psychoanalytic thought that is at times referred to, not very accurately, as the "new psychology." Psychoanalysis, finally, broadening out still further, has attempted a reconstruction and reinterpretation of several important fields of social theory.

The worth of psychoanalysis as a psychic therapeutic must obviously stand or fall with the success of its technique for relieving the suffering of neurotics who constitute the majority of the patients thus treated. It would only be possible to pass on this aspect of psychoanalytic work by examining extended clinical records. For reasons both general and special these are, in the main, available only to the "profession"; and if they were more widely accessible, it would still have been impossible to deal with them here. The psychological philosophy comprised in psychoanalysis comes closer to the purpose of this essay. I shall, therefore, expound briefly the principal concepts and mechanisms comprised in the systems of Freud, Jung, Adler, Rank, and some others. The psychological findings and theories of the psychoanalysts, though no longer ignored or merely scoffed at as they were in the beginning, are not by any means accepted by more than a fraction of psychiatrists, psychologists, or social students. Again among others, both professional and lay, even the most hazardous

doctrines of the analysts have found an uncritical and enthusiastic reception. It will therefore be necessary to deal at least briefly with some of the principal criticisms leveled against psychoanalytic psychology. Amongst these priority will be given to the attacks on the concept of the unconscious which not only is basic to psychoanalysis but has also aroused the greatest volume of dissenting opinion. I shall then expound the theories of psychoanalysts bearing on social and historical facts and subject these to a critical analysis.

II. Sigmund Freud

The basic concepts of Freud's psychological system are, in brief, the following. The concept of sex, as generally used, is too narrow to cover all the relevant phenomena. Rather than emphasize the facts of coitus and propagation one should extend the term so as to cover all the psychic manifestations of the sex urge. Thus the concept of sex, *libido,* comes to embrace, in addition to the "normal" phenomena of sexuality, also the so-called perversions such as homosexuality, sadism, masochism, fetishism, and the different forms of masturbation, as well as the erotic behavior of the infant beginning with its earliest contacts with the outside world.[1] In the process of nursing the physical contact with the nipple of the nursing breast (or of the "bottle") arouses pleasurable sensations in the infant's lips, called in this connection an *erotogenous area.* Erotogenic activity is, however, not restricted to the lips but extends also to the anal region and the skin generally, of which the former absorbs much of the infant's interest and attention during the earliest period. After the weaning period the libido withdraws into itself, as it were, so that during the *narcissistic* period the infant becomes a self-contained world, satisfying its erotic urges by self-manipulation in the form of masturbation which, at this stage, is normal to all humans. It is during this period, if not before, that the growing child begins to encounter the negative or censoring attitude of elders with reference to its own urges, as expressed in its behavior. In consequence it learns to repress them. The concept of *repression* gives Freud the occasion to introduce perhaps the most comprehensive and typical concept of the entire psychoanalytic system, namely that of the *unconscious.* The repressed urges, mostly if not exclusively of an erotic nature, make up the content of the unconscious. They must be recognized as psychic although unconscious, that is, removed from the awareness of the person. They are, however, by no means passive; on the contrary, dynamism or activity is their outstanding characteristic. These urges, eager to resume their place in the mind of awareness, continue to affect the mind and, therefore, the life of the individual ever after. From the unconscious proper one

[1] *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex,* pp. 1–35.

must distinguish the *preconscious* or *fore-conscious,* which comprises all elements of experience which are temporarily forgotten or lie outside of awareness. The preconscious, then, is also unconscious but is distinguished from the unconscious proper, in so far as its elements can be readily recalled to consciousness, whereas the elements of the unconscious which are due to repression can only be brought into consciousness under very special conditions. It is true that these unconscious elements are only too eager to re-enter consciousness, as already stated, but they are prevented from doing so by the *censor,* a somewhat metaphorical concept in which are synthesized the very aspects of experience of the individual, such as educational factors and culture generally, which are responsible for the repression. During the narcissistic period and that preceding it, the child is not only sexed but perverse, *polymorphous perverse,* in so far as its eroticism comprises a variety of aspects recognized in the adult as abnormal, such as narcissism, sadism, masochism, and the like. The next period which under certain conditions may be abbreviated or fall out altogether, is a sort of *amnesia* during which the sexual scene is removed from the child's horizon, owing to repression.[2] It is this period rather than that of the earliest years which might serve as a model of that angel-like innocence which one was wont to associate with infancy. While these things are going on, the *Ego* or self is being gradually built up from the experiences of the mind,[3] including its conscious segment as well as part of the fore-conscious, that part, namely, which is more readily convertible into consciousness. The remaining part of the fore-conscious as well as the whole of the unconscious constitute the *Id.* The differentiation of the self or *Ego* is accompanied by the gradual emergence of the *Super-Ego,* made up mostly of psychic elements provided by culture with its forms and

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 36–67.

[3] A more precise statement of this crucial phase in the development of personality will be found in Otto Fenichel's "Frühe Entwicklungsstadien des Ichs" (*Imago,* Vol. XXIII [1937]): "The separation of the *Ego* from the outer world is not a sudden process, but one of gradual unfoldment. A nostalgia for the original object-free state probably always remains [Freud calls this "the oceanic feeling"]. Through *introjection* [another of Freud's concepts, *A. G.*] components of the objective world continue to be spirited away. *Projections* [another one of the concepts] by means of which unwelcome fragments of the *Ego* are assigned to the outside world, are also rooted in the still reversible character of the preliminary separation of *Ego* and *non-Ego.* Should the child be forced through personal experience to relinquish the faith in its own omnipotence, it now experiences this faculty as wielded by the adults [who have meanwhile acquired the status of independent objects] and seeks by the introjection of these [that is, adults], or of parts of them, to regain some of the omnipotence. A large part of certain 'narcistic pleasure-feelings' of later periods are characterized by such re-unification with one of the omnipotent beings of the outer world" (pp. 253–4).

values, which ever after functions as a severe critic of, as well as a sort of an ideal for, the *Ego*.[4] As the *Super-Ego* is also unconscious, it really constitutes a third subdivision of the unconscious, the first being the *Id*, and the second, the fore-conscious.[5]

When the child has emerged from the period of amnesia, its libido is ready to become integrated and to find an outside object for its satisfaction. At this point it re-enters into the stage of the *Oedipus complex* which had already begun to take shape before amnesia set in, and is characterized by a positive attitude towards the parent of the opposite sex and an emphatic positive and negative attitude (*ambivalence*) towards that of the same sex. The boy develops a positive orientation towards the mother and an ambivalent one towards the father, the girl (*Electra complex*) a positive orientation towards the father, and an ambivalent one towards the mother. The negative components of these attitudes, which are not permitted to enter consciousness or only dimly so, are responsible for the *conflict* aspect of the phenomenon, the sort of conflict of which one component remains in the unconscious, thus constituting a *complex*.

From this phase the child, under favorable or "normal" conditions, pushes on to the heterosexual life of the adult, the boy finding a substitute for the mother in a sister and then passing on to an outside feminine object, whereas the girl replaces the father by a brother, to find an ultimate erotic object in an outside male. Under certain conditions and in individuals of certain potentialities, the flow of the libido may become concentrated on one or another form of creative activity, for example, mathematics, artistic or religious creativeness. This shift of the libido from a lower level, as it were, to a higher one, is designated as *sublimation*. Under less favorable conditions the conflict between the unconscious urges and conscious directives is not so easily resolved. What occurs then is *regression* to an ontogenetically earlier form of libido manifestation. The repressed urges of the unconscious break in masterfully upon the life of awareness in the form of pathological *symptoms*. The individual has become neurotic.

[4] "Under the strong impression of this clinical picture," writes Freud, "I formed the idea that the separating off of an observing function from the rest of the ego might be a normal feature of the ego's structure; this idea has never left me, and I was driven to investigate the further characteristics and relations of the function which has been separated off in this way" (*New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 85). Thus the concept of the *Super-Ego* came into being. "The rôle, which the super-ego undertakes later in life," we read on, "is at first played by an external power, by parental authority" (*ibid.*, p. 89). The objective anxiety about the attitude of the parents is later replaced by moral anxiety, the fear of the *Super-Ego* in its capacity of a conscience. "The super-ego has the ego at its mercy and applies the most severe moral standards to it; indeed it represents the whole demands of morality, and we see all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego" (*ibid.*, pp. 87–8).

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

He develops morbid fears, compulsive actions. In the setting of the disease the various, often strangely absurd, "symptoms" function as symbols of the repressed urges.[6] It is here that the psychoanalyst must step in in order to save the patient from submergence in the experiences of the *pleasure principle* which dominates the unconscious, and to reintroduce him or her, so far as possible, to the world dominated by the *reality principle*.

In the handling of the patient the psychoanalyst adopts in the main two methods, that of *free association* and that of *dream analysis*. When applying the method of free association the psychoanalyst induces the patient to assume a relaxed reclining position and to permit the mind to function freely without subjecting it to the usual selective or critical process. He assists the patient by providing him with key words or ideas suggested by the history of the case and urging him to name the images, memories, words, which arise in his mind. In this way certain heretofore submerged memories may come to the surface. At certain points in this process the patient is wont to develop a hostile attitude, to balk and protest. The psychoanalyst has learned to identify this behavior with the proximity of a deeply repressed factor which resists being dragged into consciousness, or more accurately, is being kept from entering consciousness by an especially vigorous activity of the repressing censor which is also the agency of the resistance.[7] It is thus only in the less serious cases that the method of free association suffices to lift the repressions, thus paving the way for a cure. In the overwhelming majority of instances it must be supplemented by the method of dream analysis. The dream, teaches Freud, occurs on two levels, unconscious and conscious. The unconscious dream, called the *latent* content of the dream, or *dream thought* or *dream work*, remains unknown to the dreamer. What he actually dreams, as far as he knows, is the *manifest* dream. The two dream levels are, however, definitely related. If this relationship is understood, the manifest dream can be interpreted. What occurs here is roughly the following. The unconscious urges of the latent dream find the condition of sleep favorable for an irruption into consciousness owing to the relative relaxation of the vigilance of the censor under these conditions. But the censor, though relaxed, is still there. Therefore the latent urges cannot escape from the unconscious without undergoing a masquerade. If and when they find their way to the manifest dream, it is in the guise of symbols which must be understood and interpreted if

[6] "We may define the chief difference between psychoses and psychoneuroses," writes Alexander in his *Medical Value of Psychoanalysis*, "by stating that whereas the psychoneurosis is chiefly a conflict between the different structural parts of the mental apparatus, in psychoses the relation of the mental apparatus to the external world is profoundly disturbed" (p. 138).

[7] This method has been tested and developed on an elaborate scale by Jung and his students at Zürich (*Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien*, 2 vols., available in English).

the latent urges are to be revealed.[8] The relevance of dream analysis for psychoanalytic therapy is enhanced by two further factors. Some at least of the latent urges may be conceived as wishes, not satisfied because unrealized, which seek expression and find it, symbolically, in the manifest dream. The dream, then, represents the fulfilment of a repressed *wish*. Again, the content of every dream contains elements going back to the immediately preceding hours of wakefulness. When undergoing an analysis, the patient is filled to overflowing with latent wishes. The waking experiences of his life, while crystallizing about the symptoms of neuroses, are punctuated by frequent visits to the analyst. The wish-fulfilments of his dreams as well as his waking experiences are then likely to contain essential cues to the source of trouble. Thus it happens that a proper reading of the manifest dream frequently leads to the revelation of hidden contents which free association alone, working against powerful repressions, may have failed to bring to the surface.[9]

It must be distinctly understood that the process of analysis is not to

[8] The interpretation of symbols is a much debated subject among psychoanalysts. Some believe in "fixed" symbols, meaning by this that certain symbols invariably have the same meaning; others favor a certain latitude in the interpretation of symbols (see, in this connection, Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* and Silberer's *Problems of Mysticism and Its Symbolism*). Another point to be noted is this: the concept "symbolism," as used by psychoanalysis, does not strictly correspond to the more usual connotation of the term when used by other psychologists or by laymen. A symbol, as commonly understood, is an experienced thing, event, idea, image, which conveys to the experiencer a meaning other than itself. The symbol as well as the thing symbolized, then, are present in consciousness. Not so in analysis. Here the experiencer knows only the symbol. He takes it at its face value, being unaware of its symbolic function. It remains for an outsider, the analyst, to determine the unconscious correlate of the symbol, namely the thing symbolized.

[9] See *The Interpretation of Dreams,* pp. 103 ff.; *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis,* pp. 180 ff.; and *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre,* IV, 378–86; and Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis,* pp. 212–93.

One of the most striking confirmations of psychoanalytic doctrine, including dream analysis, came by way of literature. A Scandinavian writer, Wilhelm Jensen, had written a story *Gradiva,* in which an intelligent girl cures her lover of a neurosis by applying common sense. The story contains several dreams. When Freud came upon this story he was amazed to discover in it a quasi-clinical analysis conceived and minutely carried out by a layman, the author. Aroused by this surprising confirmation of his theories on the part of a creative artist, Freud wrote an elaborate commentary upon the story. The author, in his turn, indignantly rejected Freud's interpretation, disclaiming the insights and intents Freud had credited him with. In the author's wrath Freud saw, *more psychoanalytico,* a further confirmation of his thesis.

The incident is indeed notable. As a mere coincidence the case would have been miraculous. As between miracle and psychoanalysis, one is inclined to choose the latter (see Freud's *Delusion and Dream,* which contains Jensen's story and Freud's comments upon it).

be identified with a mere intellectual illumination of the patient. If an analyst, thoroughly familiar with the life history of the patient, were to venture a shrewd guess at the source of the trouble and reveal it to the patient, the latter, thus illumined, would not be cured. The process of being analyzed or of living through an analysis goes much deeper than that. It is nothing less than a re-living of one's own past with emphasis on precisely those elements which once proved objectionable in the living and now resist the re-living. The whole process may thus be compared to a sort of burning out of the mind. In the overt situation this process is invariably accompanied by violent conflicts, tensions, and suffering generally. This re-living of one's past, thus made possible, is moreover distinguished by the absence of time perspective: the past is re-lived as if it were the present. Into this picture the person of the analyst is drawn (*transference*). Some of the latent urges of the patient are now concentrated on him. In symbolic guise he begins to figure in the patient's dreams. Having thus become a symptom of the neurosis, after a fashion, he must now be treated in the manner of the other symptoms. In the opinion of most analysts, of whatever school, the transference is to be anticipated and is in fact essential for the therapeutic success, but once it has occurred, it must also be resolved (*abreagiert*) before success can be achieved.[10]

A careful reading of the preceding pages will have made it clear that Freud, though rooted in the clinic, has no compunction about leaving it. His analysis of the *Ego,* the theory of the libido, the Oedipus complex, the theory of dreams, belong to general psychology, not to its clinical branch. And further: one does not have to consult clinical cases or esoteric psychoanalytic tomes to find ample illustrations of repression, resistance, ambivalence, sublimation, intro- and projection, and the like. All these concepts are substantiated by the observations of everyday life. They belong to the common-human, though brought into theoretical prominence by the experiences of the psycho-pathologist.

To this phase of the subject Freud has devoted his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* in which he attempts to show that mechanisms comparable to those operative in the neurotic can be called upon to interpret such everyday occurrences as certain kinds of forgetting, linguistic lapses, errors in writing, and the like. Thus psychoanalysis, which owes its inspiration to the data and insight of the clinician, becomes transformed into a branch of general psychology.[11]

[10] *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften,* etc., IV, "Zur Technik der Psychoanalyse," 378–599; Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (3rd ed.); "Papers on Treatment," pp. 293–417.

[11] In his preface to Theodor Reik's *Ritual: Psycho-Analytic Studies* (1931) Freud writes: "It requires but little consideration to realise that such a view of the life of the human mind cannot possibly be limited to the sphere of dreams and nervous

III. C. G. Jung and Beatrice M. Hinkle

After an initial struggle, the young science of psychoanalysis developed and spread rapidly. Followers of Freud, his disciples and independent students, led by their clinical experiences, learned to depart from their teacher and soon came to conclusions of their own, often at variance with those of Freud. Among these, second only to Freud in power and originality, was C. G. Jung.[12]

Among Jung's numerous departures from the Freudian creed the most important is his different conception of the libido. Whereas to Freud it was a highly generalized sexual energy subject to repression, transformation and sublimation, Jung broadened the concept so as to include dynamic or psychic energy in general. He also projected it into the remotest human and pre-human past, thus making it figure as a current of energy-supply by which animals and men were fed through succeeding generations and species. In Jung's hands, then, the libido becomes comparable to Schopenhauer's "will" or Bergson's *élan vital,* with a decided phylogenetic projection. Jung teaches that in its early phases the libido had no sexual components. He states in fact that this particular content was "the last sphere of its application," but when it appeared it soon surpassed the others in functional significance.[13]

The concept of the libido as a "collective unconscious" is clarified by Beatrice M. Hinkle, an American representative of the Jungian school. After rejecting Freud's too narrow conception she refers to Eduard von Hartmann's *The Philosophy of the Unconscious* as the true precursor of

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diseases. If it be a justifiable view, it must apply also to normal mental phenomena, and even the highest achievements of the human mind must have some relation to the factors recognised in pathology—to repression, to the strivings for mastery of the unconscious and to the possibilities of gratification which are open to the primitive impulses. And now it becomes an irresistibly tempting task, indeed, a scientific duty, to extend the psycho-analytical methods of investigation from their original field to more distant and diverse spheres of mental interest" (pp. 7–8).

[12] We learn that in 1907, Dr. Eitington of the Zürich clinic, visited Freud at Vienna. Psychoanalytic work, it seems, had been going on at Burghölzli for some time under the leadership of Jung and Bleuler. In the spring of 1908 the first Psychoanalytic Congress took place at Salzburg, where friends of psychoanalysis from Vienna, Zürich and other spots met for a discussion of their common problems. As a result, a periodical began to appear in 1909, *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische Forschungen,* published by Bleuler and Freud and edited by Jung. (Freud, *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement,* pp. 181–9.)

[13] *Psychology of the Unconscious,* pp. 144–9. It should be added here that Jung removes the "father" from the dominant position he occupies in Freud's system. In Jung's own thought the privileged place belongs to the "mother." Thus with Freud father dominance and fear of the father became the *Leitmotive* of his psychology; with Jung, these are replaced by mother love and the longing to return to the mother's womb.

Jung's and her own philosophy of the libido. For Freud's "the unconscious can only wish" she would substitute von Hartmann's "the unconscious can only will." To Freud the content of the unconscious proper is the result of repression in the individual. Here the unconscious figures not merely as a trait of the individual, but its origin and content hinge on the fate of the individual mind. Not so with Jung and Hinkle. We read:

The unconscious from this standpoint, therefore, includes not only all the individual psychic perceptions and impressions occurring without awareness, but also the instinctive activities and reactions to environmental experiences which have disappeared from consciousness. It also includes those which the race has experienced through its long history. It is the original matrix in which lie all the potentialities and possibilities of man's future, as well as the primary impulses with the great modifications they have undergone during the long ages of human existence.

And again: "The unconscious proper is not formed or created by the individual in response to culture but it exists *a priori* behind all culture." [14] Hinkle gives interesting examples from the art of children and that of neurotics which seem to her to reveal the operation of this archaic layer in man's mind, the collective unconscious.

Jung's second major contribution is embodied in his extraordinary work, *Psychological Types, or the Psychology of Individuation* (1923). Jung's types are the *extravert* and the *introvert*. This is how the two types are briefly characterized in my *Robots or Gods:*

The introvert feels at home in the laboratory of his own psyche, his experiences, visions and values. In these terms he reaches understanding and feels at home with the world only when he is outside of it. When he approaches a task that involves the handling of things, people or events he makes lengthy preparations in which he classifies and plans and elaborates whatever is to happen, in terms of his own preconceptions. But when the day comes and he is confronted with the situation, he is nonplussed in the face of objective things, people, relationships. They cut into his very flesh, hurt him and make him bleed.

The extravert is oriented towards the objective world, whether it be things or people or social conditions. He thinks in terms of these external entities which shape and guide his mental processes. Unless a mental context corresponds to an external determinant, he is not quite sure what it means. He does not feel at rest, he is not quite himself, until he has an opportunity to step out of himself and move about within the scope and limits of a concrete objective situation. When a task is impending, he does not spend much time in *ante facto* systematization of plans. He does not know, in fact, what he is going to do, but he does know that he is going to do it and that he will do it well. When the situation arises, whether it be of things or people or cultural facts,

[14] Hinkle, *The Re-creating of the Individual; a Study of Psychological Types and their Relation to Psychoanalysis* (1923), pp. 97–129.

he finds himself in it at once, throws his entire energy into the task and meets the requirements of the situation perfectly.

And again:

In brief this means that the introvert lives his world in terms of self whereas the extravert lives it in terms of itself (pp. 81–3).

In trying to understand Jung's deep and somewhat involved conception it must be remembered that the classification refers to types of personality, not of mentality. The question involved is not intelligence but personality orientation. This becomes clear when we find Jung analysing the psychic processes of the extravert as well as those of the introvert in relation to thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition, a subject which lack of space forbids me to follow up here.[15]

This conception of Jung's and Hinkle's is extraordinarily suggestive and pregnant with possibilities of application. It is therefore surprising that so little use has been made of it outside the offices of psychoanalysts. The principal reason of this neglect no doubt lies in the fact that the layman is usually unacquainted with the concept or is unable to grasp it, whereas the social scientist is too absorbed in questions of behavior and "social problems" in general to pay proper heed to an estimate of individual personalities.[16]

It has often been remarked, not without justification, that the Freudian system has remained surprisingly sterile in the matter of masculine and feminine psychology. In the words of Hinkle: "Psychoanalysis has been developed upon the basis of masculine psychology, and the reverse of this model is considered as sufficient for an interpretation of woman's psychology" (*ibid.*, p. 285).[17] The probable reason for this singular omission

[15] See Jung, *Psychological Types,* chap. x: "General Description of the Types," pp. 412–517. (Compare also Hinkle, *The Re-creating,* etc., pp. 169–283. In this as in other parts of her study Hinkle's text is clarified by citations of concrete instances.)

[16] Another reason may lie in the difficulty of the concepts. Although, in my judgment, eminently realistic and applicable, the concepts "introvert" and "extravert" represent limits never as such realized in experience. There are no pure extraverts or introverts. It is a matter of more or less. Both personality components are present in every person but their balance is different. In extreme instances, moreover the need of adjustment to life calls forth compensatory mechanisms. The introvert develops extraversial compensations, the extrovert, introversial ones. In both instances the compensatory traits often assume exaggerated forms. (It is interesting, as a sign of the times, that the statement in the text, made five years ago, of the indifference of social scientists towards problems of individual personality, is no longer true today. In fact many social students, including some anthropologists, seem to have developed a personality obsession.)

[17] Those familiar with the history of psychoanalysis will remember how long the Oedipus complex alone occupied the field, as if it could apply equally to male and female. Only later psychoanalysts bethought themselves to introduce the Electra

is that Freud traces the libido to the earliest impulses of the infant which are as yet undifferentiated as to sex. At this level, the male and the female psyche never come into view; hence they remain unexplained. In a very meaty chapter, "Masculine and Feminine Psychology" (*ibid.*, pp. 284–335) Hinkle attempts to fill this gap. She stresses the universal importance of the "archaic mother" who was to man what she was to woman—the source of all life. From this "revered mother" type social developments engendered the "just a woman," who was merely a wife, a slave, an economic dependent and burden, an intellectual inferior. Thus man was placed in a position of raising himself from a consciousness of inferiority to one of a privileged creature.

Hinkle also comments with some indignation on Freud's identification of the son-mother relationship, a positive factor even in archaic times, with the daughter-father relationship, which in that period often assumed purely animalistic or humanly cruel forms (*ibid.*, pp. 303 ff.), a thought well deserving further elaboration.[18] There are other fruitful ideas in Hinkle's chapter into which I cannot go here.

IV. Alfred Adler, Otto Rank, Trigant Burrow

The starting point of Adler's psychoanalysis is what he calls organ inferiority. His point, in simple terms, amounts to this: physical or psychic defect, such as a missing limb, poor memory, or ugliness of countenance, places the individual in a situation where he must either succumb or fight for his place in life. The latter goal can only be achieved if the inferiority feeling accompanying the physical or psychic defect is compensated for in other directions. Such compensation frequently takes the form of over-compensation. For example, a habitual masturbator may develop a sense of inferiority on account of the social ill-repute of the practice, and as a consequence he becomes abnormally shy and sensitive. To overcome this shyness he compensates in the direction of aggressiveness, and may be led to over-compensate to such an extent as to make himself obnoxious by exaggerated self-assertion. This principle has obvious possibilities of application especially in the field of educational technique; and Adler has, in fact, contributed by his lectures and personally conducted clinics to the improvement of educational practice with reference to individuals of the

complex for the benefit of the female, without, however, adequately developing the latter conception.

[18] In his *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1933) Freud devotes a chapter to the psychology of women. He defines with utmost clarity the limits of the psychoanalytic contribution to this topic. "It is in harmony with the nature of psychoanalysis," he says, "that it does not try to describe what women are—that would be a task which it could hardly perform—but it investigates the way in which women develop out of children with their bi-sexual disposition."

above type. Adler rejects Freud's theory of the sexual urge, or *libido,* as the prime root of the neuroses and of most other things, and moves into its place the concept of the *Ego* with its lust for power and the "masculine protest." [19]

The psychoanalytic system of Otto Rank, who in his early years was especially interested in the interpretative possibilities of the concept of the racial unconscious, ultimately took the form of an intense concentration on the problems of art and artistic creativeness. In this field he rose considerably above the ideology of Freud, in so far as he applied analytic insight to the interpretation of special features of art rather than of artistic creativeness as such, as did Freud. In this way he succeeded in constructing a fairly coherent system of concepts which may yet lead the way to a fuller utilization of psychoanalysis as a tool in the interpretation of art.[20]

Another important departure from psychoanalysis in the accepted sense is represented by the work of Trigant Burrow who, after some years of analytic experience, evolved a system of group-analysis which has nothing but its roots in common with the clinical procedure of the psychoanalytic office. These researches in "phylopathology" are characterized by Galt in the following words:

> The sole purpose and object of these researches is to discover the causative factors responsible for distortions which, in their individual expression, take the form of neurosis and crime and which are repressed in such manifestations as war and other social catastrophes. In the phylogenetic approach there is no attempt to treat these conditions, individual or social, but merely to isolate and to establish the inciting causes of them (*ibid.,* p. 39).[21]

In Burrow's hands psychoanalysis throws off its therapeutic aim almost completely. Instead, it becomes a method of social analysis rooted in the

[19] Among Adler's works the following may be mentioned: *Studien über Minderwertigkeit von Organen, The Neurotic Constitution, The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology, The Education of Children,* and *Understanding Human Nature.*

[20] In his *Art and Artist: Creative Urge and Personality Development* (1932), Rank returns to the themes already broached in his *Der Künstler* (1905). The new work is, however, greatly superior to its predecessor, both in conception and execution. All I can do here is to draw attention to chapter xii, "The Artist's Fight with Art," the very title of which is a challenge.

Among Rank's early efforts his joint articles with Hans Sachs deserve mention: "The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences," *The Psychoanalytic Review,* Vol. IV (1915). See also his *Myth of the Birth of the Hero* (1914); *Psychoanalytische Beiträge zur Mythenforschung* (2nd. ed., 1922); *The Trauma of Birth, Seelenglaube und Psychologie,* and especially his extraordinary *Technik der Psychoanalyse* (in 3 volumes).

[21] Galt, *Phyloanalysis: A Study in the Group or Phyletic Method of Behaviour-Analysis* (1933), pp. 18–9.

conception that the artificialities of the cultural set-up are the prime factors of our tensions, difficulties, and misfortunes.[22]

Burrow's efforts have not gone far enough to permit an estimate of their value. All we can say is that they deserve watching.[23]

V. Criticisms of Psychoanalytic Concepts

Next to the problems of sex,[24] the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious has aroused most discussion and the greatest conflict of opinion. The Freudian unconscious involves two problems. On the one hand, there is the question of the feasibility of the very concept of an unconscious psyche; on the other, there is the Freudian unconscious, in the narrow sense, as distinguished from the fore-conscious.

Speaking broadly, the idea of an unconscious psyche is not a new one. In one form or another it was present in the philosophies of Leibniz and Schopenhauer and especially in that of Eduard von Hartmann whose *Philosophy of the Unconscious* aroused much attention and whose views of the matter became firmly identified with the idea of an unconscious, up

[22] In a sense, claims Burrow, the "normal" individual is sicker than the neurotic, in so far as the latter by his neurosis testifies, at least unconsciously, to his recognition of a maladjustment and a problem. Our term "normalcy" carries something of the derogatory meaning Burrow would give it (See *The Social Basis of Consciousness*, p. 12).

[23] See Trigant Burrow, "Psychiatry as an Objective Science," *Brit. Jour. Med. Psych.*, V (1925), 298–309; "Social Images Versus Reality," *Jour. Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, XIX (1924), 230–5; and especially *The Social Basis of Consciousness* (1927).

[24] It is interesting to note here that whereas the conventional layman as well as many physicians have rejected Freud on account of his alleged over-emphasis on sexuality, modern writers, such as René Guyon, in his *The Ethics of Sexual Acts* (1934), accuse Freud of not having drawn the obvious ethical inferences from his own theories. Freud, as we know, extends the concept of sex so as to cover the so-called perversions as well as the sexual manifestations of the infant, but he preserves the conventional standards in so far as he continues to refer to perversions as perversions and even calls the infant polymorphous perverse. It is here that Guyon's criticism comes in. He feels that Freud has not gone far enough. He has identified the conflict but failed to characterize correctly the two factors involved in it. The urges of the individual are natural and therefore normal, whereas the taboos of society are artificial and arbitrary. Therefore, when the neurotic develops a neurosis in his difficulty to adjust his urges to the social taboos he is, to be sure, sick, but the source of his disease does not lie in the abnormality of his urges. These are, on the contrary, perfectly normal; it is the social taboos that are artificial and dogmatic. Guyon's comments along this line are suggestive (see chapter ix, "The Mechanistic Theory of Sexuality in its Relation to Morals"). Where he falls short is in not recognizing that all standards are "artificial," and that no standard, therefore, may be condemned merely by designating it as "artificial," unless one is prepared to abandon standards altogether.

to the emergence of the Freudian psychology. Among more recent writers, Windelband, Lipps, and Bergson have included the unconscious in their ideological systems. "We understand by unconscious," writes Windelband, "something which, were it conscious, would appear in the familiar form of images, feelings or will, something, therefore, which must be characterised in accordance with this potential situation. In particular, individual unconscious psychic states with which they have a common psychic content." [25] Windelband further holds "that the spatial relations which represent the most common links between psychic processes require some other form of reality which would obtain between the periods when they become conscious, and this reality can be no other than that of an unconcious psychic existence" (p. 11). Turning then to the problems of logic, Windelband observes that "psychologically considered, that which holds *a priori* is in all instances an unconscious component of the empirical experience which can only be worked out by means of conscious reflection" (p. 16).

Lipps, the psychologist of aesthetics, holds that "the real 'I' is not only psychic but it is *the* psyche"; also that "there can be no concept of the psychic or no possible definition of psychology which would exclude the unconscious psyche." [26] While representing in the main a passive psyche (*ruhendes psychisches Sein*), the unconscious also contains images. "What is meant," continues Lipps, "is the fact that every present psychic happening is usually more or less conditioned by past psychic experiences and that this can occur without these past psychic experiences being overtly present in consciousness at the given moment" (p. 155), that is, that it can exercise an influence on the conscious psyche. The unconscious, therefore, is to Lipps not something that is organically superadded to the conscious but it constitutes the general base of psychic life (p. 158). "The psychological concept of the unconscious," he adds, "is neither hypothetical nor mystical but expresses factual conditions."

In contrast to Lipps, Bergson identifies the unconscious with the inactive (*impuissant*). "If consciousness is nothing but the characteristic mark of the present, that is, of the actually lived, that is in the last analysis of the active (*l'agissant*), then that which is not active may cease to belong to consciousness without necessarily ceasing to exist in some form." [27] Quibbling somewhat, Bergson adds: "If one grants to consciousness its veritable rôle, then there is no more reason to say that the past, once experienced, passes away, than there is to suppose that material objects cease to exist when I do not perceive them" (p. 153). In reality, believes Bergson, the adhesion of unconscious memories to our present state is strictly com-

[25] W. Windelband, *Die Hypothese des Unbewussten,* p. 9.

[26] Th. Lipps, "Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der Psychologie," *Dritter internationaler Congress für Psychologie in München,* p. 155.

[27] H. Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire* (6th ed.), p. 152.

parable to that of unperceived objects to those which are being perceived, and the unconscious plays in the two instances a strictly comparable part. In psychology, in brief, inactivity (*impuissance,* literally incapacity) signifies unconsciousness (p. 194).

Materialistic psychologists like Münsterberg, while granting reality to the psychic, are of course unwilling to ascribe to it any causal potency. "Psychological phenomena are in consciousness," we read, "as physical phenomena are in nature." [28] And again: "Psychological phenomena are as unreal as the atoms which mathematical physics constructs for its logical purposes" (p. 31). This means, of course, that the psychic phenomena, being constructs, cannot as such be causal, which need not prevent them from doing heuristic service in science. In this view the unconscious is removed from the realm of the psychic and becomes physiological. The French psychologist Ribot distinguishes a static and a dynamic subconscious, but to him also, it is "physiological."

Morton Prince, taking a somewhat more critical position, argues his case on the basis of the phenomena of so-called automatic writing. It was observed that the subject may be aware of the dissociated ideas which are actually manifesting themselves in the writing; or, more frequently, he is utterly unaware of them. In cases such as this where *under the same conditions* there may be consciousness or unconsciousness of the dissociated content, it would be highly artificial, claims Prince, to speak of mere physiological or neural traces when the subject is unaware of the content of the automatic writing. It is here that the unconscious psyche comes in (p. 96). As a pan-psychist, however, Prince is led to formulate his position in a way that would not prove acceptable to those of a different philosophical faith:

> As a pan-psychist I find no difficulty in accepting both a physiological and a psychological interpretation. For those who accept pan-psychism there is no distinction to be made between conscious processes and brain processes of a certain order, except as a point-of-view. They become identified the one with the other. The psychical is the *reality* of the physical. I cannot conceive of consciousness except as the reality or "inner life" of brain changes (p. 92).

Here it is difficult to see why Prince "cannot conceive of brain processes except as objective phenomena of conscious processes." [29]

Bernard Hart, finally, who finds no difficulty in endorsing Freud's ideology, states in explanation of his attitude that "unconscious ideas and

[28] Hugo Münsterberg, Theodore Ribot, Pierre Janet, Joseph Jastrow, Bernard Hart, and Morton Prince, *Subconscious Phenomena,* p. 29.

[29] For a more elaborate treatment see Prince, *The Unconscious; The Fundamentals of Human Personality, Normal and Abnormal* (especially Lectures VIII and IX). Here also Prince's pan-psychist position prevents him from answering the question whether the unconscious, that "storehouse of neurographic dispositions or residua," is psychic or physical. He cannot answer the question because he does not ask it.

complexes are not phenomenal facts, they are concepts, constructions devised to explain certain phenomena—they have not been found, they have been made" (p. 131). Now this, I think, is the only angle from which the concept of the unconscious can be utilized without incurring the danger of a mystical standpoint. But it must also be remembered that while the Freudian unconscious might be vindicated as a concept, that is, a heuristic construct, such is not Freud's own view of what he means by unconscious. Categorically he regards it as psychic, not conceptual, as a psychic reality *"in"* the subject, not as a category of thought of the interpreting student or investigator.

It is clear [writes Freud] that the question whether the undeniable latent conditions of psychic life are to be regarded as unconscious psychic, or as physical, threatens to become a quarrel about words; for this reason it is advisable to push to the foreground what we definitely know about the nature of these problematic conditions. In their physical characteristics they are wholly removed from us: no physiological picture or chemical process can give us an inkling of their being. It is certain, on the other hand, that they have most extended contacts with conscious psychic processes. By means of certain devices the unconscious can be transformed into the conscious or be replaced by it, and it can be described in terms of the same categories employed in dealing with the conscious psyche, such as images, urges, decisions, and the like. With reference to many of these latent states, in fact, we must say that they differ from the corresponding conscious ones only in so far as they are not conscious. We shall, therefore, not hesitate to treat them as objects of psychological investigation and as standing in a most intimate relationship with the conscious psychic acts.[30]

Clearly then Freud would have rejected Hart's favorable but erroneous interpretation of his theory.

It was shown in the preceding exposition of systems other than Freud's that his unconscious, in the narrow sense, became the butt of the attacks

[30] *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre,* IV (1918), ch. xviii: "Das Unbewusste," 297. Compare in this connection the following in my "Is Freud a Psychologist?": "We are reminded frequently enough by Freud and others that the unconscious is psychic. . . . But on analysis the unconscious—Freud's submerged psyche—does not operate like a psyche at all. It is most orderly, coherent and deterministic, whereas the mind of awareness is casual, chaotic and somewhat disjointed. The unconscious knows no conflicts, no contradictions, the very traits which characterise the conscious mind. The psychoanalyst has baptised the unconscious as psychic. But should we try to classify the unconscious in accordance with its traits, gleaned from Freud's works, the result would be very different . . . We should find it behaving like blind organic substance, if not like that other substance—equally blind and not even organic—which, at bottom, is the substance of the cosmos." And again: "The concept of the unconscious, though born of the intent to save psychic autonomy, bears the earmarks not of psychology but of physics, not of mind but of mechanism" (*History, Psychology and Culture,* pp. 434–5). This interpretation, like Hart's, would no doubt have been repudiated by Freud.

of his critical followers.[31] Adler demoted the sex urge in favor of the *Ego* instincts, whereas Jung broadened the concept of the libido both in content and in genetic depth. His libido may be likened to psychic energy in general; further, it is not wholly derived from the inner conflicts of the individual in so far as it contains a deep layer of unconscious "racial" deposits.[32] The disagreement in this matter between Freud, on the one hand, and Jung and Adler, on the other, can only be decided on the basis of

[31] For a comprehensive exposition and critical estimate of Freud's preconscious and unconscious see J. H. van der Hoop's *Character and the Unconscious, A Critical Exposition of the Psychology of Freud and of Jung* (1923).

[32] As we saw before Dr. Hinkle fully accepts Jung's position and elaborates it in her own way. Reik also insists that just as "regressive investigation" has proved indispensable in the case of the individual, so the "racial unconscious" must serve as a heuristic tool in social and historical interpretation. He writes: "We may answer this question simply by pointing to the fact that regressive investigation has been found to be necessary in the analysis of the individual. The conflicts of the individual, as well as many very significant characterological traits, cannot be fully understood unless we carry back the analysis into the earliest years of his childhood, the occurrences and impressions of which require just as much attention as the later experiences of puberty and manhood. We even believe that it is in the events of his 'pre-historic' childhood that the basis is laid for his later experiences, and that the mental processes of these years (processes which have later become unconscious) possess a peculiar significance and a tendency to produce after-effects in the later years of his life.

"If we accept the fact of the continuity of psychological processes beyond the limits of a single generation, we are obliged to consider the effects of such events in prehistory, since they persist and are renewed by the unconscious mental life. The experience of our ancestors is as potent in its influence on us as our experience will be on the mental life of our descendants. Much of what we believe long since dead and buried in us still lives on in the depths of the mind and determines our course in life. As the French say, *'Ce sont les morts qu'il faut qu'on tue'* ('It is the dead whom we must kill')." (*Ritual,* etc., p. 25.)

Freud apparently never felt quite at home with the racial unconscious, *but he also commits himself to it.* After expounding his theory of totemism Freud remarks: ". . . it can hardly have escaped any one that we base everything upon the assumption of a psyche of the mass in which psychological processes occur as in the psychic life of the individual. Moreover, we let the sense of guilt for a deed survive for thousands of years, remaining effective in generations which could not have known anything of this deed. . . .

"But further consideration shows that we ourselves do not have to carry the whole responsibility for such daring. Without the assumption of a mass psyche, or a continuity in the emotional life of mankind which permits us to disregard the interruptions of psychological acts through the transgression of individuals, social psychology could not exist at all. If psychic processes of one generation did not continue in the next, if each had to acquire its attitude towards life afresh, there would be no progress in this field and almost no development. . . . *I do not claim* that these problems have been sufficiently explained or *that direct communication and tradition,* of which one immediately thinks, *are adequate for the task.*" (*Totem and Taboo,* pp. 259–60; italics mine, *A.G.*). Note also that Freud championed the racial unconscious in his last published work, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939) [editor's note—H.B.].

clinical material; but it may, perhaps, be anticipated that Freud's concept will ultimately be shown to be too narrow and subject to revision, perhaps, along the lines adopted by his critics.[33]

So much for the unconscious. But there were other and more comprehensive criticisms.

It was, of course, to be expected that a system so radically new and conforming so little to the accepted standards of psychological technique as that of Freud would arouse much dissenting comment. Freud himself relates an early experience of his on the occasion when he presented a paper in Krafft-Ebing's seminar in Vienna. He says that a "negative vacuum" formed about him, an attitude which was to follow all his efforts, until he steeled himself to the opposition and learned to expect and disregard it.[34]

VI. Other Critics

Naturally enough, the technical psychologists, the "profession," were among those who resented most poignantly the impact of Freud's system. Some of these, like Knight Dunlap, took recourse to facile satire.[35] Others, like Hollingworth and Woodworth, were satisfied with mild irony.[36] It will be admitted that not much is gained by nicknaming psychoanalysis "psychoanalogy" and the like. We need not take these authors any more seriously than they took Freud.

But there were others.

One of the most destructive critiques of Freud's system, which appeared as late as 1923, is that of A. Wohlgemuth: *A Critical Examination of*

By way of comment let me say this. The believer in a racial unconscious is confronted by the following dilemma (or would be if he were aware of it): either he remains on the purely psychic level, in which case a racial unconscious becomes a mystical concept (for what is its *locus,* by what mechanism is it being carried when the individual is, say, in the germinal stage?); or he accepts a biological (organic) base for the racial unconscious, in which case what he is dealing with is a special case of the inheritance of acquired (cultural) characteristics, a principle rejected by the bulk of modern biological theory. (See the Becker and Bruner, and Kolb items in the bibliography on p. 430 [editor's note—H.B.]).

[33] Interesting details on Freud's relations with Jung and Adler will be found in Fritz Wittels' *Sigmund Freud, His Personality, His Teaching, and His School* (1924), pp. 145–60, 176–97. Wittels also furnishes otherwise unavailable material on Freud's "Early Years" (*ibid.,* pp. 15–27) where, among other items, Freud's indebtedness to Goethe is laid bare.

[34] *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement,* p. 14.

[35] *Mysticism, Freudianism, and Scientific Psychology* (1920).

[36] H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology and Functional Neuroses* (1920); R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology, A Study of Mental Life* (1921). See also R. Allers, *The Successful Error* (1940). For a discerning and deservedly sharp rebuttal to Hollingworth see John T. MacCurdy's review, *Mental Hygiene,* V (1921), 181–9.

Psychoanalysis. Wohlgemuth subjects each one of Freud's major concepts to a searching critique. As an experimental psychologist he has no use for a psychic unconscious. "To separate the content of consciousness from the conscious processes," we read, "is fallacious. And so this is nonsensical, being a contradiction in terms" (p. 14). And then further on: "The unconscious is not a scientific conception, it is mysticism and mythology" (p. 21). We are already familiar with this type of criticism of the unconscious. Anyone, of course, is at liberty to choose his heuristic concepts. It is, however, regrettable that trained men should find it so difficult to enter into the spirit of the game, as it were. The Freudian unconscious may be a concept or even a mere concept, but so are the theoretical constructs of the physicists. At any rate it did excellent service for the analyst who refused to shift gears from the level of the psyche to that of the neural processes. Freud himself is by no means sure that the concept of the unconscious, as formulated and used to date, will prove more than temporary. He even allows that a chemical formula may be the last form that the concept or its successor will assume. For the present, however, he is forced and content to use it for the purpose indicated.[37]

Wohlgemuth's method of dealing with the question of forgetting, the forgetting of the disagreeable, is even less satisfactory. In refutation of Freud's position he here refers to his own paper, "The Influence of Feeling on Memory."[38] The paper deals with an experiment with school children, boys and girls, who were asked to record their pleasant and unpleasant experiences during a certain holiday. The test was repeated some days later, and the analysis of the returns indicated that the pleasant or unpleasant feeling-tone connected with the memories had no influence on remembering or forgetting. The author, however, forgets that Freud's unconscious is the abode of repressed rather than merely forgotten experiences. Now the repressed differs from the merely forgotten precisely in the fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, of recall, and it is here that the influence of humiliating or otherwise unpleasant factors enters into the picture. This distinction would presumably be rejected by Wohlgemuth on account of his refusal to accept the concept of repression. Well and good! But then his attitude in the matter of forgetting will to this extent be prejudged and can no longer be taken on its merits. The author's comments on Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* are especially acrimonious. Needless to say, he rejects all of Freud's devices and methods of analysis as artificial and fantastic. That such is the natural and usual reaction to this tantalizing and extraordinary book will be granted. Nevertheless, if Freud's method is examined against the background of his own clinical experiences and that of others, a facile rejection of the entire matter will

[37] See *Three Contributions to Sexual Theory,* pp. 73–6.

[38] *British Journal of Psychology,* General Section, XIII (1923), 405 ff.

seem worse than unjustifiable. It is true that Freud and other psychoanalysts, in their handling of dreams, do not face a truly experimental situation—nor does any physician in dealing with patients—but it is also true and significant that a high degree of comparability has been observed in the character and behavior of dream mechanisms and that the therapeutic function of dream analysis figures in this connection as *prima facie* evidence of at least the general validity of analytic interpretations.[39]

Wohlgemuth's inability to understand Freud's approach becomes apparent in connection with the *Gradiva* case referred to before. The author treats this instance as a sort of a test case. Freud, as we know, regards the manifest dream content as a transfigured reflection of the latent dream or dream thought. Now, in Jensen's story a number of dreams occur, patently invented by the author, the manifest content alone being given. In analyzing the story, Freud, by manipulating the manifest content, constructs a latent one *ad hoc*. Wohlgemuth's irate comment runs as follows:

> This means that the latent dream-content stands to the manifest dream content in a causal relation, not as antecedent to consequent but as consequent to antecedent. The manifest dream content is there and it is not the consequence of the latent dream content but rather its antecedent. The latent dream content is the production of Freud's own imagination and own brain web. In short, it shows that Freud's method can be applied to anything, and that one can always get a result satisfactory to the uncritical (p. 56).

To adopt the author's own terminology, this stricture is a sample of fine-spun asininity. All concerned are, of course, aware that a story is a story, that the characters, incidents, dreams, are products of the author's mind, and that Freud's interpretation of them in this case is merely an analytical exercise to show the insight, albeit unconscious, of the author in constructing a manifest dream which, if the story had been real and the hero a live neurotic, would have reflected a latent dream content in the best psychoanalytic manner. What more, may we ask, could be expected from an analysis of a fictitious incident? All in all, we may say that whenever the

[39] I have already referred to the habit of the analyst of leaning too heavily upon therapeutic results as a vindication of the truth of his theories. It must, however, be admitted, in fairness to the analyst, that his therapeutic successes—which, roughly speaking, are neither better nor worse than those of all internal medicine—speak in favor rather than against the validity of the implied theories, at least as a general scheme. Compare, in this connection, what Eliseo Vivas has to say on this point: ". . . before clinical success can be accepted as evidence for the theory of psychoanalysis a necessary logical connection will have to be shown to exist between clinical practice and theory. That that connection is not as obvious as it is sometimes thought to be is shown by the fact that the clinical procedure has been interpreted in mutually incompatible ways by various schools of psychoanalysis, and so far no crucial experiment has been devised to decide between them." ("Freud and Philosophy," *The Kenyon Review,* Spring 1940, p. 174. The entire essay is well worth reading.)

intuitive insights of a Dostoyevsky, Balzac or Jensen fit into the methodologically more deliberate constructs of scientific psychology, they tend to support its conclusions and are in turn supported by them. This is all one can say in such matters.

Space forbids a further discussion of Wohlgemuth's strictures, most of which suffer from his inability to shift even partially to the point-of-view of the analysts. I shall, however, note before closing that Wohlgemuth's daring and, of course, negative critique of symbolism is well taken. In the case of symbolism the analyst, in positing "fixed symbols," does not deal with a heuristic concept but with a concrete substitute. Here we are justified in demanding proof. A snake either stands for a phallus or it does not, and should anyone assert that it does, the burden of proof is on him. In his chapter on symbolism Wohlgemuth succeeds in showing that in the case of "fixed symbols" such proof is not forthcoming.

In his interesting and suggestive book, *Instinct and the Unconscious,* the late W. H. R. Rivers brings telling criticism as well as confirmation of Freud's theories. Rivers's competence here is beyond dispute. During the World War he was associated as psychiatrist with the Maghull Military Hospital and the Craigloskhart War Hospital. As Rivers himself points out, the war situation offered unrivalled opportunities to watch the operation of the repression of unpleasant or horrifying experiences, as well as to probe into the relation of shell-shock and other like afflictions to the preceding life history of the patient. One such instance is so revealing as to deserve inclusion here, even if in abbreviated form.

The case is one of claustrophobia, morbid fear of enclosed spaces. The patient was a medical man, aged thirty-one, who had suffered from childhood from a dread of enclosed spaces and "especially of being under conditions which would interfere with his speedy escape into the open." The patient remembered that at the age of six he was wont to sleep with his elder brother in what is known in Scotland as a box-bed. He vividly recalled his anxiety and the urge to get out of bed, which remained unsatisfied on account of the fear of awakening his brother who slept with him. A similar state would take possession of him when ascending the shaft of a coal pit or when travelling through a tunnel. In a theater or other crowded building he felt distressed unless placed near the door. As a child, he had been nervous, excitable and subject to night terrors, and about the age of twelve he began to suffer from an attack of stammering. Sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and inability to work were frequent afflictions. Some time before the war, while himself engaged in medical studies, he consulted a German physician and placed himself in his care for a period of two weeks. The physician, who had just then become acquainted with Freud's system of analysis, directed the mind of the patient towards the forgotten sexual experiences of his early infancy. The latter tortured him-

self in vain to recall relevant incidents and finally cut off the analysis, his condition meanwhile having become aggravated.

After the outbreak of the World War, the patient went to France where he faced the necessity of living in dugouts, which filled him with terror, especially at the thought that he might not be able to escape should anything untoward happen. When they told him that spade and shovel should be used in case he were buried in the dugout by an explosion, his dread became extreme. When he became aware of the fact that his comrades were taking their instructions in the most matter-of-fact way, he realized for the first time the abnormality of his own attitude. This insight, however, failed to relieve his condition. To induce sleep he began to take recourse to narcotics and often spent a large part of the night walking about the trench rather than remain in the dugout. Ultimately he landed in a French hospital, and later was transferred to England. An examination of the case history enabled Rivers to diagnose the trouble as claustrophobia and to direct the patient's interest towards relevant dreams. Presently a series of such dreams materialized, bringing to the surface heretofore forgotten childhood experiences. And then came the crucial dream followed by conscious reflection which brought back to his memory a further incident. Almost immediately there came the conviction that the long-sought clue had been found.

> The incident which he remembered [relates Rivers] was a visit to an old rag-and-bone merchant who lived near the house then occupied by the patient's parents. This old man was in the habit of giving boys a half-penny when they brought him anything of value. The child had found something and had taken it alone to the house of the old man. He was admitted through a dark narrow passage with a turn on the way. Lying at the end of the passage he could see a brown spaniel. Having received his reward, the child came out alone to find the door shut. He was too small to open the door, and the dog at the other end of the passage began to growl. The child was terrified. His state of terror came back to him vividly as the incident returned to his mind after all the years of oblivion. The imprint this incident had made upon his mind was attested by his recollection that ever afterwards he was afraid to pass the house of the old man, and if forced to do so, always kept to the opposite side of the street (p. 176).[39a]

The subsequent dream brought to the surface the name "McCann" which proved to be the name of the old rag-and-bone merchant. Inquiries instituted by Rivers brought confirmation by the patient's parents, who were still alive, of the actuality of the rag-and-bone merchant and the correctness of the name. From this time on the treatment made rapid progress and, although the patient continued to suffer from a number of other afflictions, his life-long claustrophobia vanished.

[39a] Quoted from *Instinct and the Unconscious* by W. H. R. Rivers, by permission of the Macmillan Company, Publishers.

This unusually interesting experience prompted Rivers to assume a critical attitude towards Freud's dogmatic dictum that all neuroses rested in infantile sexuality. On the other hand, it convinced him that the mechanism of repression resulting in an unconscious drive could, as in this instance, become responsible for a neurosis. Reflection over the case brought the further insight that an analysis of the case history, revealing the precise nature of the affliction, was a necessary preliminary to a successful cure. The German physician, failing to discern the claustrophobia, had mistakenly directed the search of the patient towards sexual memories. Hence the failure.[40]

Probably the most competent among the technical analyses largely favorable to Freud is John T. MacCurdy's book, *Problems in Dynamic Psychology, A Critique of Psychoanalysis and Suggested Formulations* (1922). On account of the detailed and largely clinical character of MacCurdy's discussion, it cannot be analyzed here. This much, however, must be said. The future critical reconstruction of psychoanalysis will rest on studies such as MacCurdy's in which one finds the happy and rare combination of an intellectual insight rooted in abundant clinical experience, with a general attitude which, while appreciative of psychoanalytic findings, is also independent and keenly critical.[41]

Another discerning and critical survey of the systems of Freud, Adler

[40] This case is related in considerable detail in *Instinct and the Unconscious,* Appendix II, "A Case of Claustrophobia," pp. 170–84.

The larger part of Rivers' book comprises a systematic attempt to develop a biological theory of the unconscious by bringing it into relationship with instinctive behavior. This aspect of Rivers study can not be gone into here. I might say, however, that his analysis, though perhaps not always convincing, contains elements of sufficient originality and suggestiveness to commend it to the attention of interested readers.

In another book, *Conflict and Dream* (published posthumously, after Rivers's death in 1922, under the editorship of G. Elliot Smith), Rivers continues his attack on Freud's excessive leaning towards sexual interpretations. He also subjects the Freudian theory of dreams to a critical examination at the hand of his own clinical experience. While Rivers' command of dream material may be regarded as slight in comparison with Freud's enormous experience, his critical acumen and the unusually favorable circumstances entitle this book to serious consideration.

[41] MacCurdy expresses his appreciation as well as his censure in the following words: "It is my belief that the greatest service which can be done to psychoanalysis to-day and the most practical form for tribute of gratitude to Freud to take is the dispassionate criticism of his work. His theories cannot endure as they stand and the sooner they assume scientific and logical form the more certain is their immortality." (Preface, p. xiv.)

MacCurdy is right, I think. To his comment I might add that honest and dispassionate criticisms of analysis will bring the richer results the sooner its representatives will learn to raise their dogmatic shutters. If new evidence were properly evaluated by psychoanalysts, the result would be a broadening of their doctrine with a consequent extension of its value for the interpretation of social facts (cf. Malinowski, *Sex and Repression in Savage Society,* 1927).

and Jung, with special reference to the psychological rather than the clinical aspect, is the book by Dr. W. M. Kranefeldt, *Secret Ways of the Mind* (1932, translated from the German). Among his numerous censures on the Freudian system the author reacts negatively to Freud's tendency to interpret later conditions in the ontogenetic development of the individual in the light of regression to or transformation of earlier states. He cannot, for example, accept Freud's position that parental love is "nothing other than" the reborn narcissism of the parents (p. 53). Kranefeldt also protests against the notion already analyzed by us that "the character of a human being is constituted by the—sublimated—material of sexual excitation" (p. 65). In analyzing Freud's theory of dreams the author brings out the interesting point that Freud's own psychological system must from one angle be regarded as a fantasy and that it is unreasonable to except that one type of fantasy formation, namely that of dreams, should without residue be interpretable in terms of another fantasy construct, namely Freud's own system:

> We see to what absurdities we are led [writes Kranefeldt] when we believe that a single pattern of fantasy has general validity. Nor does the distinction between the "manifest" and "latent" content of the dream help us for there is really no such difference. This corresponds merely to the distinction between the sensual (*sinnliches*) and significance (*Sinn*), as it must be made, and is made everywhere, except in the Freudian psychoanalysis and in materialism. Moreover, Freud uses his backdoor of the latent content only when the meaning is obscure. But in the first place it is generally known that many dreams are hard to understand; and in the second place, this is a difficulty that is not peculiar to dreams alone, or to the unconscious in general (p. 85).[42]

VII. Applications of Psychoanalytic Theory to Sociological and Historical Facts

Quite early in the development of psychoanalysis wider perspectives began to open up for the applicability of its theories to fields other than

[42] Very properly also the author objects to the narrow range of Freudian symbolism. "The symbolism for the genitals," we read, "suffers from the disproportion between the small group of things to be indicated—genital organs, sexual intercourse—and the immensely large number of possible symbols for these things" (p. 89). The following symbols for example stand for the male genital organs: the sacred number three, lengthy objects, also trees, church spires, knives, daggers, revolvers, water-faucets, watering pots, fountains, and so on. And again: "When one has realised that the psyche shapes its natural expressions in the form of phantasy, he will ask why Freud equates the life of phantasy in the soul with sexual phantasies. The reason is that Freud generalizes the case of sexual repression. He thus gives us no theory of the soul, but describes an attitude—a very frequent one, to be sure—of the conscious to the unconscious. Since the relativity of this standpoint is not realized in the slightest degree, a sort of Ptolemaic system of the psyche results" (p. 91).

those comprised in the realm of individual psychology. Here belongs the essay by Otto Rank and Hans Sachs, "The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences." [43] After reviewing the various possible applications of the concept of the unconscious, with which we are already familiar, the authors turn to its bearing on the investigation of myths and legends. They take their cue from the parallel drawn by Freud between the Oedipus complex and the ancient Oedipan myth:

This leads [the authors continue] far beyond the previous purely external parallelization to the common unconscious sources by which, not only the dream productions, in the same manner as the myth formations, were nourished, but all phantasy products in general as well. Psychoanalysis has thus, not only a definite interpretation to propose, but at the same time establishes a necessity of myth interpretation in general, by means of the share which the unconscious has in myth formation. Further, it offers in place of the superficial comparison, a genetic method of consideration which allows myths to be conceived of as the distorted remnants of wish phantasies of whole nations, as you might say, the secular dreams of young humanity. As the dream in an individualistic sense, so the myth in a phylogenetic sense, represents a piece of the past mental life of childhood; it is the most brilliant confirmation of the psychoanalytic method of consideration that it finds the experience of unconscious mental life gained from individual psychology again in the mythical traditions of past ages identical in content. In particular, the portentous conflict of the child's mental life, the ambivalent attitude toward the parent and toward the family with its many-sided relations, has been shown to be the chief motive of myth formation and the essential content of mythical traditions. Indeed, it may be shown that the development of mythical ideas, in their widest extent, reflects just the cultural relations of the individual in the family and the latter in the tribal relationships (p. 29).

Passing then to the theory of religion and the bearing of psychoanalysis on ethnology and linguistics, the authors make the following pregnant statement:

We have, at the beginning, called the repression the result of the culture of the community acting upon the individual. Now, we see that its counterpart, the unconscious, also stretches out beyond the bounds of the individual and represents the return of the first beginnings of our species, in which everyone must begin afresh as a child; these early conditions are withdrawn from consciousness with the progressive adaptation of civilization but never destroyed or rendered of no effect. Hidden by the superstructure of the higher mental life, the unconscious nevertheless remains alive and represents, since it comprises within itself simultaneously the past of the individual and that of the species, the universal human of the personality, the connection which binds the most highly developed, as well as those who have lagged behind, to the whole (p. 81).

[43] *The Psychoanalytic Review,* Vol. II (1915). Page references are to the reprint of these articles in *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series,* No. 23.

The significant step made by the authors in all these considerations comprises the concept of the unconscious as a racial deposit (see above, pp. 407–8), as well as the theory that the mental life of the individual repeats the mode of development of the species. Both of these theories are brought into relation to the psychology of neurotics, on the one hand, and to that of the primitives, on the other. I shall have more to say on both of these points presently. Meanwhile it should be noted that the racial connotation of the unconscious, as already indicated, cannot be accepted without proof, which has never been furnished, and that the parallelism between psychic ontogenesis and phylogenesis can be regarded as applicable only in so broad a form as to deprive the concept of all serviceability as an interpretative theory.[44]

Attempts have also been made to apply psychoanalytic principles to the interpretation of historical characters and the fictitious personages of literature. Among these may be mentioned Ernest Jones's analysis of Hamlet, Pierce Clark's *Napoleon Self-Destroyed,* Freud's own *Leonardo da Vinci,* —the latter a quixotic attempt at biography writing based largely on the interpretation of a fragment of a dream—and many others. It is, of course, tempting to apply the insights of psychoanalysis to a speculative interpretation of historical characters and literary figures. But the procedure is hazardous in the extreme and, more important still, it stands in contradiction to the avowed professions of the psychoanalysts themselves. If psychoanalysis is to maintain its status as a system of individual psychology, using a minutely controlled biographical method, then historical characters and literary figures represent but poor material for its application. After all, what psychoanalysis, at its best, is attempting to do is to reveal new facts and processes of psychic life and to illumine them by the light of its theoretical constructs, not to project speculative possibilities

[44] It is interesting to note here that psychoanalysis in this matter has travelled along the path of the classical evolutionists in anthropology, who, in their day, utilized the enormous but poorly explored ethnographic material for the purposes of a sweeping generalization.

Among other works of a programmatic character bearing on the social uses of psychoanalysis, I might mention Oskar Pfister's *Some Applications of Psychoanalysis* (1923), in which he examines the relations of the doctrine to art, philosophy, child life, and missionary work. Closer discussion of this work may be dispensed with here. In still other works the Freudian position, uncritically accepted, has been applied to ethnological material with results imposing in form but questionable in substance. Among these may be mentioned Karl Abraham's *Dreams and Myths,* Ricklin's *Wish Fulfillment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales,* and Géza Róheim's *Social Anthropology* (1926). The latter work in particular may be taken as a good example of intellectual frustration, in so far as an enormous amount of energy and great scholarship has been expended on an investigation so dogmatic and uncritical in its approach as to deprive it of all serious value.

such as interpretations of historic characters must needs remain, or imaginative feasibilities such as characters in fiction inevitably are.

VIII. Freud's Sociological and Cultural Contributions

Having first conceived a system of psychic mechanisms primarily oriented so as to explain certain psychic disorders (neuroses), Freud proceeded to expand his system. Thus it came to include, as we saw, a much wider range of psychic phenomena not usually classed as abnormal,[45] and ultimately, a still wider range of social and historical facts in general. Freud's most ambitious effort in this direction is represented by his *Totem and Taboo*. In the first part of this book he draws attention to a series of parallelisms between the mentality of primitives and that of neurotics. Following the model of taboo-like prohibitions in neuroses he constructs the following hypothetical scheme for primitive taboos:

> Taboos are very ancient prohibitions which were at one time forced upon a generation of primitive people from without, that is, they probably were forcibly impressed upon them by an earlier generation. These prohibitions concerned actions for which there existed a strong desire. The prohibitions maintained themselves from generation to generation, perhaps only as the result of a traditional set-up by paternal and social authority. But in later generations they perhaps have already become "organized" as a piece of inherited psychic property. Whether there are such "innate ideas" or whether these have brought about the fixation of the taboo by themselves or by co-operating with education no one could decide in the particular case in question. The persistence of taboo teaches, however, one thing, namely, that the original pleasure in doing the forbidden still continues among taboo races. They therefore assume an *ambivalent attitude* toward their taboo prohibitions; in the unconscious they would like nothing better than to transgress them but they are also afraid to do it; they are afraid just because they would like to transgress, and the fear is stronger than the pleasure. But in every individual of the race the desire for it is unconscious just as in the neurotic (pp. 52–3).

In the chapter on magic and animism Freud establishes the important concept of the "omnipotence of thought." In this case Freud's idea represents nothing new. It was anticipated by Wundt and was used by John Dewey[46] and the anthropologists. But the term somehow carries conviction and provides a convenient bridge between the subjectivity of the

[45] Freud's vindication of this procedure will be found in his *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* and *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. No real grasp of Freud's ideological system can, however, be acquired without a perusal of his *Sammlung Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre* of which five volumes have appeared to date.

[46] See, for example, Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, pp. 204–20 ("Soul Beliefs of the Totemic Age"), and elsewhere; Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 10 ff.; *cf.* also my *Robots or Gods*, chaps. i and ii.

primitive who makes his thoughts live as realities in the outside world, and similar tendencies in the neurotic. The theory in this volume, however, which has aroused most attention is Freud's analysis of totemism. It runs, in briefest possible compass, as follows. In the Cyclopean family [47] of hoary antiquity a group of brothers revolted against their common father who held a monopoly of sexual rights in the small community. In a vehement moment the brothers killed the father. Thereupon they were seized by remorse and regret, thus revealing their ambivalent attitude (Freud refers to this incident as *"nachträglicher Gehorsam,"* obedience *ex post facto*). By a voluntary pact they now decided to continue to abstain from the women of their group and to look for wives outside. Also, they projected their sense of group unity into the body or image of an animal, symbol of the father. They worshipped it. Thus totemism emerges as the origin of the clan—the first social unit, of exogamy—the first moral rule, of ancestor worship—the first form of religion. Art also sprang from the same source. When the hero of a Greek tragedy finds in the chorus a sympathetic response to his thoughts and agonies, we must recognize in this, teaches Freud, a re-enacting (shall we say, beyond space and time?) of the drama of the father and the parricidal brothers. The responsive attitude of the "brothers," incidentally, is a disarming disguise for their really bloodthirsty sentiments.

I might say, without further delay, that this totemic theory represents psychoanalysis at its worst. Apart from numerous misconceptions of fact, here relatively unimportant, Freud assumes a racial unconscious by means of which this original parricidal act is carried over into the life of following generations in the form of morbid recollections and ambivalent attitudes.[48] I need not repeat here what was said before about such a phylogenetic extension of the unconscious. He also falls into the common error of ambitious theorists (*vide* the evolutionists!) of attempting to explain as much as possible by one factor. Religion, morality, society, and art thus all appear as historical echoes of a primeval crime perpetrated in the ambivalent setting of the Oedipus complex. Though picturesque and in spots even brilliant, Freud's book is really no more than an interesting intellectual monstrosity.[49]

[47] Freud borrowed this semi-mythical social grouping from J. J. Atkinson's *Primal Law* (published in one volume with Andrew Lang's *Social Origins*).

[48] Freud refers to the racial unconscious incidentally, as it were: it does not form an integral part of his system; Jung, Hinkle and others, as we saw, use the concept systematically (cf. pp. 407–8).

[49] Cf. my *Early Civilization,* pp. 395 ff.; Kroeber's and G. Elliot Smith's reactions to Freud's daring effort are equally negative. See also Howard Becker and D. K. Bruner, "Some Aspects of Taboo and Totemism," *Jour. Soc. Psych.,* III, 3 (Aug., 1932), 337–52.

Freud's contribution to social psychology is contained in his book *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* Apart from its other features Freud's approach to this time-worn topic has the charm of novelty. The pattern of a crowd, for authors like Le Bon, was a group of people, in physical contact or proximity, subjected to a common stimulus. Freud does not begin with this. For him the typical crowd is an organized group with a leader, such as the Christian Church with its Christ, or an army with its commander-in-chief. Freud conceives of the attitude of each member of a crowd towards its leader as of one kind with a patient's relation to the hypnotist or a lover's to his beloved. Thus he contrives to bring the situation within the scope of psychoanalytic doctrine. In the identity or marked similarity of the bonds between each member of the group and their common leader we must see the factor which transforms an aggregate of humans into a crowd. The principal difference between Freud's approach and those of his predecessors lies in their regarding the relation of the members of a group to each other as the primary crowd-forming factor, and their common relation to the leader, though also important, as the secondary factor. In Freud's theory the rôle of the two factors is reversed.

While Freud here certainly seized upon an important and perhaps relatively neglected element of the crowd-psychological situation, his theory must be regarded as erroneous, inasmuch as the similarity between the patient-hypnotist or lover-beloved relation and that of a crowd member to the leader is decidedly strained. The entire conception impresses one as dragged in *ad hoc,* in order to make Freud's favorite pattern applicable to the crowd situation. Concrete experience, moreover, attests the fact that many kinds of crowds may be leaderless without thereby losing any of their distinguishing features in structure or behavior. This comes out forcibly in Freud's final example where he accounts for the panicky performance of an army regiment by the fact that the leader, as a psychological rallying point, no longer exists for them: without the leader the crowd vanishes, leaving each individual to perform for himself. Now, while this latter factor cannot be dismissed as pure invention, concrete experience shows that a fleeing regiment, though leaderless, may nevertheless qualify as a crowd with the typical multiplication and enhancement of emotions and accompanying derangement of behaviors through crowd-psychological channels.[50]

In his *The Future of an Illusion* and *Civilization and Its Discontents*

[50] Cf. here Everett Dean Martin's *The Behavior of Crowds,* which in some respects is more Freudian than Freud's own book. In this context, however, Martin skilfully employs Freudian mechanisms in the interpretation of crowd behavior without taking recourse to Freud's unfortunate theory referred to above.

Freud appears as an analyst of culture. In *The Future of an Illusion* Freud's concern is with the complex of religious attitudes and institutions in their relation, on the one hand, to the mind of man, and on the other, to the rest of culture. In agreement with many other thinkers before him, Freud sees the ultimate source of religion in man's predicament in the face of a menacing, little understood, and only partially controlled nature. The idea of the primitive god as the father, already broached in his essay on totemism, is re-introduced here. What we find then, says Freud, is both an infantile and a phylogenetic prototype for religion. The task of the gods is three-fold: "They must exorcise the terrors of nature, they must reconcile one to the cruelty of fate, particularly shown in death, and they must make amends for the sufferings and privations that the communal life of culture has imposed on man" (p. 30).

As has already been shown, Freud regards religion or supernaturalism, envisaged psychologically, as an instance of the "omnipotence of thought." Religion, then, is an illusion in so far as it is a wish-fulfilment achieved by the projection of a psychic state into the external world to function there as an existential reality. The question which confronts him at this point is whether this illusion should be retained on account of the solace it brings or whether, as an illusion, it should be rejected. Freud's carefully reasoned conclusion is that it should be rejected. Religion is a mass delusion, comparable to the personal delusions of the neurotic, and even as the latter seeks liberation by turning to the psychoanalyst, so the religious devotee might be freed and is, in fact, being so freed by the incursions of scientific insight into the domain long entrenched behind religious dogma. Freud is, of course, aware that this liberation can only be secured at a price. The menace of nature, the imperfections and impositions of culture, will then have to be met directly, in a pitched battle as it were. "After all," queries Freud, "is it not the destiny of childishness to be overcome? Man cannot remain a child forever; he must venture at last into the hostile world" (p. 86).

If one attempts to evaluate this contribution, it will appear that its positive aspects are not new, whereas Freud's personal interpretation can hardly be accepted. The application of the concept of omnipotence of thought, already used in the sections on magic and animism in *Totem and Taboo,* is here more sweeping and equally adequate. Freud does not stand alone in his conclusion that religion, as an illusion, should be eliminated from man's world-view and the consequences faced. Here he is in agreement with those scientists and laymen who, partly for the same and partly for different reasons, have come to see things as he does. The communists of the U.S.S.R. might well adopt Freud's essay as their anti-religious bible. What remains, then, as Freud's peculiar contribution is the identification of "god" with "the father" achieved through individual

and phylogenetic channels. I have already indicated that this conclusion cannot be accepted as realistic.[51]

In his *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud wrestles with the deepest problems of culture. The real theme of his essay is the struggles of man's "original nature" against the impositions of his "second nature" or culture. "The meaning of the evolution of culture," he says, "is no longer a riddle to us. It must present to us the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species" (p. 103). To particularize, Nature is not alone in confronting man as power, menace, and mystery. Society does the same, and so does culture. Throughout he must pay a price for adjustment. He must recognize his limitations, submit to a partial substitution of social aims—those of the group—for individual ones, bow to the restrictions imposed by culture upon his sex urge, his love of power, his aggressiveness.[52] Two factors, in the main, contribute to his submission and enslavement: the overt acts of social pressure, and his own *Super-Ego*.[53] The *Super-Ego* functions here as a censor, as conscience, which should be distinguished from remorse. Remorse takes the form of regrets after a "bad" act has been committed, conscience is the general psychic situation which makes remorse possible. Then there is a *consciousness of guilt* which, according to Freud, "comes into being before the super-ego, therefore before conscience" (p. 127). At first it is merely the "direct expression of the dread of external authority." Later, genetically speaking, the consciousness of guilt becomes identical with conscience.[54] The *Super-Ego* brushes aside the *Ego's* claim to happiness, and so does culture. "It almost seems," remarks Freud half-ironically, "as if humanity could be most successfully united into one great whole if there were no need to trouble about the happiness of individuals" [55] (p. 135). It is for this reason that Freud avers

[51] Freud's essay is of interest from another standpoint. Having shown religion to be an illusion, he recommends its elimination. The method may be described as carelessly drastic. Religion may be an illusion—no doubt it is—what of it? Man's psychic equipment is agog with illusions some of which we may, with Cabell, designate as dynamic: they help one to live. What Rank has to say about the child, has a wider application: "The child, like primitive man, tends more to the unreal, he does not want logical, causal explanations, but emotional consolation and he denies reality in favour of consoling illusions which therefore seem to him to be 'truer.' These are apparently necessary in order to live, and the child has the right instinct for it, just as did man of the primitive and religious ages" (Otto Rank, *Modern Education*, p. 47).

[52] *Op. cit.*, pp. 60–1.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[55] One thinks here of the situation in the U.S.S.R. where the most ambitious attempt to date at unification of a portion of humanity is proceeding, distinguished by a most flagrant disregard for the individual happiness of the component human units.

his intention "to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the evolution of culture, and to convey that the price of progress in civilization is paid in forfeiting happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt" (p. 123). And yet, Freud is not over-pessimistic. He allows that the day might come when Death will bow to Eros, when the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction will meet the demands of civilized society, at not too high a price.

All in all, it seems that Freud's contribution to social theory is slight in comparison with the extraordinary enhancement brought by his system to individual psychology. There are several reasons for this. The transfer of the "Freudian" mechanisms from the neurotic to the normal individual was in itself wrought with serious dangers. It would probably be safe to say that the operation of these mechanisms is the more conspicuous and significant the more nearly neurotic the individual is. If, therefore, we commit ourselves to a sweeping utilization of Freudian psychology in the interpretation of human affairs, grave errors are sure to follow. Of this ample evidence was adduced in the foregoing. Further, Freud does not hesitate to use the concept of a racial unconscious to link up the experience of the species with that of the individual. As no mechanism is known or even readily conceivable, as we said, by means of which this linkage could be brought about, the racial unconscious figures as a sort of *deus ex machina* which sets things up neatly enough for Freud but cannot be expected to be accepted on faith by his critics—this apart from the inherent improbability of Freud's more particular allegations, such as the gruesome affair of the Cyclopean family. Without doubt *Civilization and Its Discontents* represents the high point of Freud's social thinking. The very sincerity and boldness of the attempt command respect. There can be no question that what he has to say about human aggression, the *Super-Ego* with its conscience, and the heavy toll exacted from the individual by civilization, deserves the most serious attention. As to the sense of guilt, I find no reasons even in Freud's own essay why so much should be made of it. The "instinct of Death" seems altogether unnecessary. Freud himself admits that its presence cannot be demonstrated. I think the spirit of aggression so vividly portrayed by Freud would have done just as well, or better, without this quasi-divine companion. Can we doubt that what prompted Freud to make this particular formulation was the temptation to introduce here his two favorite concepts, complex and ambivalence? A fighting companion had to be provided for Eros, and a worthy one was found in Death. Thus was forged the fatal complex of civilization!

Freud's partial failure to contribute constructively to an understanding of the crowd, totemism, religion, civilization, is due, in the last analysis, to the fact that psychoanalysis, as a general theory of the mind, is, basically and emphatically, a system of *individual* psychology. To make it function

as a tool of social study, it must be supplemented by specifically social factors. This Freud refused to do. Instead he bridged the gap between the individual and the social or cultural by introducing, together with several of his colleagues in analysis, the concept of a racial unconscious.

But there are other social facts which, both in theory and practice, are directly rooted in individual psychology. Here psychoanalysis should prove of service.

IX. Other Attempts at Social Interpretation

A notable attempt towards a practical application of the new psychological insights has been made by Harold D. Lasswell in his *Psychopathology and Politics*. It may be said in anticipation that the net contribution of this scholarly and thoughtful work proves somewhat disappointing. The author sets out with the intent to apply the lesson taught by psychoanalysis, namely, the influence of infantile and other early experiences of the individual upon his subsequent career, to the interpretation of political performance. For this purpose he divides politicians into agitators, administrators, theorists, and just men of political convictions. "We want to discover what developmental experiences are significant for the political traits and interests of the mature," writes Lasswell. "This means that we want to see what lies behind agitators, administrators, theorists and other types who play on the public stage." For this purpose he surveys a series of case histories. By way of introduction there are some interesting reflections on "A New Technique of Thinking." Logic, it seems, is not a short-cut to salvation. "Our faith in logic is misplaced. Exclusive emphasis upon logic (even where logic is adroitly used) incapacitates rather than fits the mind to function as a fit instrument of reality adjustment." Instead the "emotional aberrations" which deflect logical thought from the straight and narrow path are to be remedied by a skilful use of "free-fantasy" (more commonly called free association). Here is Mr. A, the agitator. We are informed by the case history of his brother-hatred, a fixation on his father, partial impotence, concentration on self, and early acquisition of the arts of the hypocrite in order to pose as a "good boy" before his father. The incidents of his career are then interpreted in the light of this background. The early animosity towards the brother was compensated for by an assumed love of humanity, "buttressed by the usual rationalizations." Democracy, pacifism, humanity and other derivatives of "brotherhood" became favorite objectives. A feeling of uncertainty about himself led to exaggerated vehemence of principles and to convictions frequently expressed in violent language. Held down so long by domestic authority (that of the father), he came to hate all authority, the state, the Bible, and the like. Conscious of his own sinfulness, he fulminated against social evils such as "irregular" sexuality, gambling and drinking. For a deficient

control of self a substitute was found in the control of others, at committees, conferences, meetings. As long as his feverish activities lasted he was submerged in a constant current of a busy life, but in privacy and solitude a sense of futility would creep over him. Sustained study was also impossible, as a constant reassertion of his importance in the world was essential to the preservation of a psychic balance.

Thus the analysis continues through several examples of political agitators and political administrators. Now all this is very interesting but the total outcome, as I said, is decidedly disappointing. The fatal lack seems to be the absence of control cases. The basic thesis, that we should become aware of our emotional drives and acquainted with the sources of their origin, may be granted at once. Also that the history of the whole man, a biography of personality, is needed for this purpose. It may further be granted that such procedure might point a way towards the correction of the person in question as well as towards a more understanding attitude on the part of others. But what is the proof, in a particular instance, that the revealed childhood experiences were the real factors responsible for the performances, short-comings, dislocations in later life? Clearly some sort of control is essential here. If the study of personalities as historic individuals is to maintain itself as against the disindividualizing approach of the statistician, it must provide safeguards against psychological interpretations, however ingenious, which are *merely* plausible. Granted that they may be true, the question is, are they? If a considerable collection of case histories were presented in which similar performances in later life were found to be associated with similar situations in infancy or childhood, the analyst of personality would have some firm ground to stand on. In the absence of such controls any interpretation of a career in the light of an individual personality history, no matter how suggestively carried out, will inevitably fail to carry conviction. Only in this way can the gulf be spanned which separates the possible or probable from the actual.

Another work belonging to this category is *The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public* by Franz Alexander, psychoanalyst, and Hugo Staub, attorney. Alexander, an orthodox Freudian, makes systematic use of psychoanalytic concepts in an attempt at a thorough rehauling of criminological procedure. He points out that in these troubled days when the individual finds himself neglected or even abused by society, any protest against cultural imposition is likely to prove inordinately vehement. Social justice, always felt as a restraining pressure on the part of the individual, is endured the more readily the smoother and more adequate its working. When it breaks down, as so often happens in the modern world, the individual protest is likely to take anti-social and criminal forms. Alexander utilizes the Freudian concepts of the *Id, Ego* and *Super-Ego* as working

tools for a reinterpretation of criminal acts and motives. Responsibility for crime is commonly associated with the theory of free will. But the "freedom" implied attaches only to the conscious motives of the *Ego*. The greater the rôle played by the unconscious *Id* in the determination of an individual's behavior, the less responsible does he become for his actions; unless, indeed, from psychoanalysis he gains an insight into the unconscious with the resulting possibility of harnessing and controlling it. Alexander recognizes *neurotic criminals,* whose anti-social activities are the result of an intra-psychic conflict between the social and the anti-social components of the personality, and *normal criminals,* whose psychic organization may be regarded as fundamentally similar to that of the normal non-criminal but who are led into crime by identifying their personalities with a social group subversive of the purposes or ideals of the major society. There are, finally, criminals whose acts are conditioned by some pathological organic process, as in the case of epileptics and the like. From all of these must be distinguished the *acute criminals*. Criminal acts of an acute type, holds Alexander, may under certain conditions be committed by anyone. In instances of the latter type no profound psychological or biological technique is necessary, the interpretation of the act being wholly resolvable into specific sociological factors. If the judges were made cognizant of psychoanalytic technique, the perspectives opened up by this new insight would make them understand how unfair it is to expect the criminal to furnish a true psychic motivation of his act. The real prompting may come from the unconscious which is thoroughly unknown to the culprit, hence any attempt on his part to interpret his act in terms of the conscious psyche is as likely to mislead his judges as it is, in fact, misleading to himself. The consciousness of guilt which, according to Freud, normally develops in most individuals as a reaction of the *Super-Ego* to the criminal urges of the *Ego* or the *Id,* often takes the form of a desire for punishment. In the neurotic these urges are corrected. Thus there may not be anything in the overt behavior of the patient which would reveal or actualize these urges except the neurotic symptoms. Nevertheless the patient will punish himself for his "guilty thoughts" by a sense of guilt and a demand for punishment which, in fact, he might himself impose. In the case of a criminal, when the unconscious urge has led to a criminal act, the self-censor and a demand for punishment may also be operative. Thus the actual punishment imposed by society in the form of imprisonment may temporarily exercise a salutary effect on the mind of the criminal. This effect, however, is quite superficial, for it merely consists in punishment fitting, as it were, into the niche prepared for it by the criminal's desire for punishment. The deeper causes of the criminal act and the inner conflict out of which it sprang will remain undetected and unremedied.

In the second part of their book the authors analyze a considerable number of criminal cases in the light of the psychoanalytic approach. While it is in place here, as in the case of Lasswell's study, to sound a note of warning, in view of the need for a methodic control of individual instances, the application of psychoanalytic technique in this field holds out the promise of new insight, likely to result in a fairer, more discriminating, and more constructive approach to the problem of crime. And let me repeat, the fact that psychoanalysis here functions as an individual technique, its proper domain, is responsible for the favorable results.

Freud's clinical experience with neurotics, as we know, revealed to him a heretofore barely suspected world of infantile psychology. Presently Freud discovered sexuality here, as well as the fateful beginnings of the struggle between original nature with its precultural urges and the demands of education, harbinger of culture. It was to be expected, therefore, that the teachings of psychoanalysis would re-echo in the realm of educational theory and practice. As already indicated, stress was now laid on the earliest years, from birth to six or seven. The dangers of repression were emphasized. The educational content, the teaching of "subjects," receded before the claims of personality building. Many experimental schools, in different countries, adopted psychoanalysis, or at least aspects of its technique, in the training of pupils—and teachers.

A striking contribution in this field is Otto Rank's *Modern Education* (1932). Rank, with whose ideas on art and artists we are already familiar, rejects the formulations of Freud and Adler as too limited. In both of these "simplifying theories" the emotions, "the basis of the child's psychic life," are inadequately accounted for. For Freud, all emotions originate in the sexual sphere. This assumption, though possibly correct ontogenetically speaking, leaves the essential characteristic of emotional life, namely, its differentiations, unexplained. Adler knows of no feelings of essential importance beside the so-called "feeling of inferiority," since all other emotions can apparently be derived from that feeling of inferiority as readily as they can, with Freud, from the sexual impulse. Granting that our whole emotional life might conceivably be explained by one or the other of these two theories, Rank insists that we still need a theory of the emotional life, as such, if we are to understand the manifold gradations of the emotions so characteristic of the human mind (pp. 65–6).

This stricture sounds the key-note of Rank's study. Realizing that education, at any given time and place, inevitably reflects the "ideology of the community" (that is, an aspect of culture), Rank weaves the cultural situation into the fabric of his educational philosophy. Modern education (which includes parents), must heed the call for individualism in education. Whether this can be done successfully is another question. Rank is frank enough to admit that the problem is far from solved. "The forma-

tion of individualities," he is forced to conclude, "can never be the program of education, the very nature and system of which is to form types" (p. 28).[56]

The fundamental tool of modern individualistic education, such as it is, Rank finds in the "old principle of love," as contrasted with constraint and punishment, and the new content of psychological education he finds in "sexuality," that is, the sexual illumination of children as a substitute for religion and obfuscating fables. With his usual candor Rank discerns a difficulty here also, which is as puzzling as it may prove significant. For clinical educational experience shows that "the child refuses (to accept) the correct scientific explanation including the release of sex implicitly implied in it" (p. 43).[57]

Returning to the question of emotions, Rank remarks wisely: "This cardinal question of pedagogy seems to me answerable only in an unpedagogic way . . . Let the adult's emotional life be what it will, his task as educator would be to accept the child's emotional life as it develops from the individual and as a reaction to the parental emotional life" (p. 73). Emotions are nurtured in human contacts. If the child's emotions are to unfold freely and adequately, it must be encouraged by a similar freedom and spontaneity in emotional expression on the part of the adults. This implies, of course, "an occasional unpedagogic manifestation of affect," which should not be feared, "since with it one serves the higher educational aim—the formation of the human being" (p. 74).

Rank confronts the educational situation not merely in its ample scope but also in its limitations, especially with reference to the modern scene. We talk of "understanding" the child. In and by itself this is, of course,

[56] "For every individual education according to its nature would be anti-pedagogic," he says, "just as the educator himself must be fundamentally conservative if he wants to attain the pedagogic aim of the collective type. A more revolutionary individualistic educator is a contradiction in terms, for because of his educational principles he would be able to train only like-minded [that is, equally "revolutionary individualistic," *A.G.*] pupils, and this continually advanced process would precipitate in a few generations the collapse of the whole system of education" (pp. 28–9).

[57] *"How is sexuality to be discussed and explained, and at the same time its activity restricted, seems to me not yet solved,"* writes Rank. And he continues a little further on: "Fortunately the child himself vigorously upsets all our psychological calculations by carrying on his sexual activity independently of our attitude towards it. But that means that the child not only gives in to his sexual impulse in spite of our prohibition, but also that he experiences it as something forbidden, bad, and something to conceal even when we permit and release it. This is the first momentous discovery we have made with our sexual propaganda for children. This experience points to the fact, that it is not the external prohibition or the influence of education that connects sexuality with the idea of sin and guilt, but something inherent in it which is experienced by the individual as dangerous and, perhaps, rightly so" (pp. 41–2). If this can be substantiated (Rank, unfortunately, does not quote or indicate his source), the discovery would indeed be momentous!

to be desired and aimed at. But it must also be remembered that "a better understanding of the child . . . often makes the task of the educator more difficult if not impossible. . . . For all understanding leads rather to tolerance than to action and without action we cannot proceed in the education of the child or in dealing with anti-social individuals" (p. 88). In other words, the problem of the modern parent or pedagogue is complicated by the fact that he must be guided by two at times almost irreconcilable standpoints: on the one hand, the child is to be guided and corrected, on the other, it must be understood, appreciated, and hence accepted.

Rank's book, the content of which is merely suggested here, represents a striking example of what may be expected from matured analytic insight when applied against a broad cultural background. Performances such as his have been rare, so far. But they may multiply.

X. Conclusion

In utmost brevity, let me now summarize. Psychoanalysis as a branch of medicine we may leave to its fate, for must not a therapeutic accept its verdict from a statistical estimate of success? As a branch of psychology, psychoanalysis has brought with it a marked extension of horizons and a deepening of insight. But also, it has sinned much. The concept of an unconscious, in my judgment, stands vindicated provided its psychological nature is not taken too literally. It differs from the conscious psyche as much as it resembles it. Also, the reduction of its content (with Freud) to repressed urges or—still worse—repressed sex urges, seems uncalled for. Here Adler, Jung, and Rank have gone beyond Freud, and in the right direction. The "racial unconscious" is quite another matter. While a general disposition of the higher organisms to function in a quasi-psychic manner, though below the level of consciousness, may be granted, the *content* of the unconscious must be traceable to individual experience, unless we care to assume the responsibility of introducing (with Jung, Hinkle, and others) a spurious biological concept for which no justification can be found in accredited biological theory.

Much illumination has resulted from the introduction of the concepts of repression, resistance, conflict, complex, ambivalence, symbolism, as well as of the broadened concept of sex (libido), but here also there is room for a *caveat*. Freud's habit of accounting for things by regression (a return to an ontogenetically earlier form), while useful for certain purposes, is a dangerous procedure, in so far as it not only explains but explains away. This procedure suffers from a common fault with all historical reduction when the latter is meant as an explanation—that which is to be explained vanishes in the process. Again, the simplification thus brought to that aspect of nature which manifests itself in living humans is unwarranted

and probably illusory. Where is it written that nature is simple, granting, of course, that it would be convenient if it were? Thus when religious, artistic, or mathematical creativeness is represented as a sublimation of repressed sexuality, this accounts, at best, for the ample flow of the libido, but not for the specific form of activity fed by the flow. Here, once more, Jung, and especially Rank, are preferable to Freud. All this is but a partial way of stating that psychoanalytic psychology represents, at most, a certain corner of the psychological realm or, still better, a certain angle of vision with reference to it. Enormous stretches of the mental landscape remain untouched by psychoanalysis. It takes memory for granted, while concerned about its lapses; it says nothing about concepts or the technique of reaching valid conclusions, while taking pains to account for erroneous conclusions or valid ones irrationally arrived at; it accounts at most for the stature of genius, by tracing the energy supply to its presumed source, but has nothing to offer that might shed light on the particular kind of genius in question. All this is not, in itself, a fault but a limitation which psychoanalysis should recognize when tempted to pose as a "new psychology," that is, as a substitute for the "old."

Psychoanalysis, then, is essentially a psychology of certain aspects of personality, more particularly of morbid personality. As such, its method is biographical, in part, autobiographical. The advantage of this approach is that it brings the student to grips with people as they are, rather than lead him on to broader but more abstract studies of mind in general. The limitation of the approach is the obverse of this advantage; in so far as one is concerned with the individual and employs an individual technique, one should not expect nor attempt too sweeping generalizations. Experiment being impossible, comparative data become essential, *and* relentless critical vigilance. For this reason, the extension of psychoanalytic interpretations to historical characters and literary personages is to be rejected as constituting little more than a frivolous byplay of analytic work.

The proper relation of psychoanalysis to social and historical facts is implied in the preceding. Emphatically an individual psychology, it can bear on social things only indirectly. It is, however, true and important to realize that the concentration on personality brings psychoanalysis nearer to the social than is the case with general psychology. The further fact that the psychic knots psychoanalysis has learned to untie are mostly due to the impact of society upon the individual, points to an important rôle psychoanalysis might come to play here, provided it learns to check ambition by self-discipline. Whenever psychoanalysis has attempted to explain the social or historical through the individual, it has failed, as in its interpretations of myths, in *Totem and Taboo,* and in crowd psychology. It has succeeded, at least partially, in dealing with material where the individual aspect is pronounced, as in the studies of political personages

or criminals. And its successes promise to become dramatic and pregnant with consequences, when analytic insight is combined with a broad cultural perspective, as in Rank's book on art, and even more so, in his work on education.

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Part VI

THE CULTURAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

[14]

LEADING CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO SOCIAL THEORY

Alexander Goldenweiser

I. Evolutionism in the Nineteenth Century: Its Rise and Fall

Every so often in the history of human thought an idea makes its appearance which changes the world. Whenever this occurs, the temptation is to identify the idea with the period fructified by it. Yet it might, after all, have been an old idea which was only waiting for a rich soil to bring its full harvest. Evolution belongs to this class of ideas. If taken broadly, it is a very old idea, almost as old as recorded human thinking, perhaps quite as old. Primitive man, while accepting much of his experience without asking questions or puzzling about answers, was not wholly indifferent to the nature or origin of things about him. And so, in off moments, he pondered about the beginnings of things in nature, and in culture as well.

The possibilities of explaining how things came to be what they are are limited. Persistence, creation, or development, are the three alternatives. We find primitive man at one time or another hitting upon each one of these explanations. The Eskimo, for example, are wont to think of the past as a replica of the present. Things always were what they are and they are what they are because they were what they were. Other primitive tribes, such as the Australians or some of the American Indians, account for some things in nature—fire, the stars, the seasons—by creation; and they account in a similar way for the more conspicuous attributes of human culture, such as the arts and ceremonies or the rules of social behavior. Once upon a time, in the more or less remote past, there lived a creature, animal, human or divine, who, for one reason or another, came to make or institute these things or to teach man how to make or practise them. Creation, in the last analysis, is the objectivation of an idea: a thought, heretofore merely in the mind of the creator, becomes a fact or an event in the world of human experience. The primitive notions of creation belong to this category. Still other primitives, pre-eminently the peoples of Oceania, explain the present through the past by a sort of development,

with or without an accompanying idea of creation. These genealogically minded natives of the South Seas who trace the pedigrees of their chiefs to fantastic lengths through history, tradition and, when these fail, myth, use a similar approach when thinking about the world. The dominant concept here is that of change and, here and there, that of transformation, a change inherent in a pre-existing potentiality. The last conception will be recognized as a vague precursor of the idea of evolution. It will be seen, then, that this idea, as that of creation or that of persistence, is old indeed. But in crude civilizations, when man did not ponder persistently or think systematically, such ideas did not leave much of a dent in the prevailing world view. They were more or less passing fancies, sufficient to settle, after a fashion, a somewhat disturbing problem and clear it out of the way.

Among the Greeks, where human thought took a tremendous leap in the direction of persistent inquiry and rational demonstration, the ideas of change and development began to play a prominent rôle. Building upon the early Ionian philosophers, Heraclitus with his "all is in flux" perhaps deserves the credit of being the first modern precursor of evolution, in application to nature. His dominant concept, however, was that of change, movement, flux, not transformation or development. In application to human society, both Plato and Aristotle thought in dynamic terms. To them the world of social things was neither pre-established nor persisting. Society, moreover, while exhibiting spontaneous changes, was also amenable to deliberate transformation under human control. As such transformation is inevitably guided by certain standards or ideas, we have here an early sample of the concept of progress, a desirable and desired change towards the realization of certain ideals. Lacking the experience of the implied difficulties, Aristotle and Plato treated the problems of social reform rather cavalierly, thus qualifying as early utopians, even though their approaches differed from those of their followers in social dreaming.

In his great fantasy, *De Rerum Natura,* Lucretius, writing in the first century A. D., once more applied the concept of development to things material and spiritual or social. Soon after this the concept of human progress was permitted to go to seed for many centuries. In the Middle Ages, the world at large and human society in particular became immersed in a dogmatic slumber of persistence. In the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries this world view received its culminating expression in Dante's *Divine Comedy.*

Meanwhile, forces were at work which were soon to bring forth other methods of thinking and a radically different approach to the problems presented by nature and social living. As far back as the twelfth century, the vistas opened up by the Crusades began to undermine the foundations of a self-sufficient and self-satisfied world view. The tremendous enlargement of the human horizon brought about by the geographical explora-

tions and discoveries of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was working in the same direction. The mighty impetus received by the natural sciences during the Renaissance and the varied experiences of political life during the same period set the minds of men working in two directions, which for the time being remained separate. On the one hand, the speculations of Copernicus and Kepler and the mechanical researches of Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo served to re-open an almost forgotten treasure-trove of scientific inquiry. Measurement, experiment and the idea of law began to make their way into the sciences of nature. On the other hand, writers like Machiavelli, the first exponent of *Realpolitik,* began to look at society with sober eyes. A deliberate eschewing of ideals in the service of realism leads, of course, to a cynical outlook. And so Machiavelli acquired for posterity a reputation which he only in part deserved. For, ruthless though he was (no more so, however, than Mussolini, Hitler, or Stalin), he deserves credit for a determined effort to see things social as they really are. In the eighteenth century Voltaire in his historical works proved a worthy follower both in realism and cynicism. Jean Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand, though revolutionary in his total import, adopted a sort of inverted utopianism consisting in projecting an ideal into a fictitious past, a method of procedure which corrupted social vision for some time to come. In the preceding century the thought of Locke and Hobbes had suffered from the same tendency towards retrospective speculation, although Hobbes, in his notion of a social Leviathan, also added a striking idea to social theory, an idea fated to become the nucleus of the so-called "organismic" view of society.

In the meantime the real advance in social thinking had come through the influence of the natural and mathematical sciences. Here the central figure was Réné Descartes (1596–1650), inventor of analytical geometry. The geometrical precision of Cartesian thought was promptly reflected in the approach to the problems of morals and politics in the philosophy of Spinoza (1632–77), and, in so far as the concepts of mechanism and law were implied in the broader aspects of Cartesian ideology, it also became the foundation of the more strictly sociological constructs of such men as Bossuet, Turgot, and Condorcet. In his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* (1681) Bossuet visualized the development of mankind in the form of twelve epochs, from Adam or Creation ("The first age of the world") to Charlemagne ("The New Empire"). Turgot in his *Plan de deux discours sur l'histoire universelle* comes nearer to modern ideas in dividing the history of culture into a hunting stage, followed by pastoral life, then by agriculture, and finally the introduction of government. Rousseau (1712–78), whose *Social Contract* represents in these matters a step backward rather than forward (as already noted), also assumed in his *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755) a series

of cultural stages preceding the introduction of civil government. The thinking of these early sociologists was carried further by Condorcet in his *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1793) in which he anticipated Comte by assuming a unilinear series of stages in cultural development, which, moreover, could all be observed in human societies, as then known, in which all phases of "barbarism and civilization" stood exhibited. Far in advance of all these writers was the sociological thought of August Comte (1798–1857). We find in his system a more deliberate and complete formulation of evolutionist principles than are to be found in the works of the classical evolutionists themselves.

First of all, Comte introduced the comparative method into sociological inquiry. He observed that the different societies still to be found on the surface of the globe were not on the same level of development. On the contrary, all phases of human progress could be discerned among them. Thus the observation of the cruder societies still living, supplemented by information on historically known societies, would provide a complete picture of human development. The modifications implied in that development ("the forward march of humanity"), held Comte, were always slow, gradual and continuous; further, they followed a fixed order; the differences, finally, in the levels reached by the different societies were due to the varying speed with which they passed through the consecutive stages.

As all human developments were uniform, taught Comte, the developments of the different aspects of culture were also uniform and concurrent. Profiting by this consoling thought, Comte felt justified in restricting his specific inquiry to one particular culture, namely that of western Europe, and within that culture, to a single aspect, namely intellectual development. This investigation of the history of thought in western Europe led Comte to formulate his grand law of three successive stages, the theological, metaphysical and positive.[1]

[1] For details of Comte's system see his *Cour de philosophie positive* (1830–42). The following interesting negative estimate of Comte was expressed by Maurice Defourny: "The merit of Comte consisted in having arranged into a system a host of notions dispersed in the intellectual atmosphere of his epoch: he succeeded in casting them into a perfectly coherent system. He is an arranger, not a creator. According to him logical coherence is the distinctive characteristic of a science. This work, however, though coherent, is not scientific, for his so-called laws seldom represent a faithful expression of the facts. . . . He symbolizes a period of transition between the age of deduction and that of observation" (*La sociologie positiviste: Auguste Comte,* pp. 353–4, as quoted in *Theory of History,* p. 97, by Teggart, who gives a very clear and intelligent picture of Comte's thought). See also Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (1938), pp. 562–93. Cf. this part of the present chapter with the corresponding sections of the chapter on Historical Sociology in the present volume, pp. 491, 493–98, esp. 497.

As noted before, Comte derived his notion of social determinism from the then prevailing mode of thought ultimately traceable to the influence of Descartes. As such, it was, of course, first applied to the physical cosmos; but toward the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, attempts began to be made to squeeze the heretofore loose and amorphous social thinking into the same frame. It cannot be said that the deterministic approach, as represented by Comte or his predecessors in the physical sciences, had a direct effect on the classical evolutionists of the second half of the century. Rather did they absorb it from the "intellectual climate" of the time. Spencer, in particular, did not borrow directly from Comte nor did he even read him to any extent, except when driven by controversy to defend himself against the allegation of such borrowing.[2]

Another system of thought, belonging primarily to philosophy but immensely potent also in social ideology, was the philosophy of Hegel (1770–1831). As is well known, Kant's half-hearted hesitancy to penetrate through the armor of the "thing in itself" aroused something like contempt in Hegel. Striking out the unknown or unknowable "beyond," he boldly drew the "thing in itself" into his general history of the cosmos which to him became a biography of the world mind. The cosmos with its history, the history of man, and the thoughts of individual men were the concrete manifestations of this absolute and universal intelligence. Hegel undertook the task of thoroughly revising the old Aristotelian logic and set up a new system of logical categories which became his guides in the exploration of thinking but also of the very structure of the outside world, "outside," that is, by mental decree, for at bottom there was no outside in Hegel's system. It is thus that the famous dialectic trilogy, thesis—antithesis—synthesis, became not merely the law of mind but also of history and the rest. According to this law, which certainly depicts a form of change if not of evolution, all things change from a thesis which is their state of being at a given time, to an antithesis which is the opposite of the thesis, in a sense, a contradiction of it, to an ultimate synthesis which reproduces the thesis, to a degree, but also embodies certain elements superadded during the advance through the antithesis. This rigorous and daring ideological approach dominated much of European thought in the first half of the nineteenth century. Its influence was particularly marked in

[2] See his *The Classification of the Sciences; to which Are Added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte* (1864), and "The Genesis of Science," *Essays,* Vol. II. The group of thinkers and writers in England on whom Comte exerted a profound influence stood somewhat apart from the evolutionists. Among them were James and John Stuart Mill, G. H. Lewes, and George Eliot. Thomas H. Huxley also valued Comte very highly, but his critical empiricism saved him from accepting the extremes both of Comtism and evolutionism, although he was, of course, a most ardent and effective exponent of certain aspects of the latter.

law and the theory of politics.[3] But its most conspicuous offspring, fated to outlive the others, proved to be the historical philosophy of Karl Marx (1818–1883). An orthodox Hegelian in his youth, Marx later broke away from the shackles of idealism and, turning Hegel upside down, to use a familiar phrase, translated a world of mind into one of matter. But while the substance of Hegel was thus inverted, the form survived. The essence of the dialectic was saved and became the foundation stone of Marx's own historical philosophy which inspired a fairly narrow stream of thought in the second half of the nineteenth century, then went into temporary eclipse, only to return in recent days with unimpaired if not enhanced vigor and vitality.

It is interesting to note here that Marx was not much influenced by the pre-Hegelian trends in the direction of determinism, which led back to Descartes and had such a marked effect on Comte. Marx was also relatively indifferent towards those advances in geological and biological thinking which laid the foundations for classical evolutionism. The evolutionists themselves were little read by Marx, and appreciated even less, with the exception of Lewis H. Morgan, the progress of whose gigantic labors, ultimately to be embodied in his *Ancient Society,* was eagerly followed by Marx and his friend and collaborator, Engels.

II. The "Classical" Evolutionists

In approaching the classical evolutionists it should be noted that scientific thinking in the form given it by Descartes did not directly or significantly affect them, while the thought of Hegel remained wholly foreign to them. The inspiration for the new dispensation in social thinking came from another source, namely the work in biology and geology of the early nineteenth century. Of the writers who directly affected both Darwin and Spencer and also influenced the latter indirectly by way of Darwin, three deserve mention: Thomas Robert Malthus, Charles Lyell and Karl Ernst von Baer. Von Baer, discoverer of the human ovum, established the pregnant biological principle of the recapitulation of phylogeny in ontogeny: the embryonic individual passes in somewhat abbreviated form through the stages represented by the antecedent species of animals.[4]

[3] In his *Memoirs,* Alexander Herzen speaks eloquently of Hegel's influence upon the "men of the forties" to whom the author belonged. Stankevitch, the philosopher, Byelinsky, the critic, Bakunin, the anarchist, all had their period of well-nigh fanatical Hegelianism. It is interesting in this connection that Hegel's dictum "everything that is, is rational" (*alles Seiende ist vernünftig*), misunderstood, should have served to dampen radical enthusiasms and foster conservatism. Half a century later Hegel's trilogy, in Marxian version, became the stock-in-trade of radical ideologists.

[4] See his *History of the Development of Animals* (1828–1837). Von Baer's own work was largely concerned with ontogeny. To the end he remained very cautious

In his *Principles of Geology* (1830), Lyell sounded a dynamic note by introducing the concept of stratification: now a spatial series of superimposed strata could be translated in terms of temporal depth. A generation before von Baer and Lyell, Malthus in his *Essay on Population* (1798; second greatly altered edition, 1803) had formulated the following principle: while the food supply increases in an arithmetical ratio, population increases in a geometrical one, thus leading to a pressure on the population. The consequent tension may give rise to a competitive struggle for food. Spencer (1820–1904) and Darwin (1809–1882) were greatly impressed by this principle. The latter derived from it the concept of the "struggle for existence," which became one of the corner stones of his theory of natural selection; whereas Spencer was thus led to formulate the concept of "survival of the fittest." Darwin incorporated this last concept in his *Origin of Species* (1859),[5] whereas Spencer took over the idea of natural selection from Darwin, fitting it into his argument in the second edition of the *Principles of Biology*. Spencer's direct dependence on Darwin in the broader field of evolution should, however, not be exaggerated. The relative independence of Spencer's position can be established by an examination of his *Prospectus, the First Principles* and the first edition of the *Principles of Biology*. In this first edition (1855), which appeared before Darwin's book, his own ideas had already assumed definitive form. As an interpreter of biological evolution Spencer leaned heavily upon Lamarck's principle of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.[6]

The so-called classical evolutionists derived the scheme of their thinking from Spencer. In one sense, however, Spencer himself was not only the first but also the only modern evolutionist, for he alone took evolution as such as his subject and developed it systematically in the *Synthetic Philosophy* in application to all the principal fields encompassed in human

as to the phylogenetic applications of his principle, especially with reference to the genetic relations of one species to another. For details of this as well as the relation of von Baer to Wolff's *Theoria generationis* (1759) and the involved interdependence of his work with that of Cuvier and Lamarck, see Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, II, 299 ff. A more precise and definitive formulation of the "basic biogenetic law" (*Biogenetisches Grundgesetz*) was made some thirty years later (1866) by Ernst Haeckel, the German protagonist of the genetic theory. It is also Haeckel who made the first full application of the biological, embryological, and paleontological facts to the descent of man (*Anthropogenie* [1st ed., 1874]), adding detail and precision to Darwin's argument (*The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex*, 1871). Cf. as to all this Haeckel's *Der Kampf um den Entwicklungs-Gedanken* (1905).

[5] The full title was: *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life.*

[6] Nor did he abandon the principle in the later editions, where natural selection also plays an important part. Spencer was highly appreciative of Darwin's theory but a little vexed at not having thought of it himself.

knowledge. Omitting cosmology and geology (which were treated briefly in the *First Principles* [7]), he surveyed the domains of biology, psychology, and sociology (including politics and ethics).

Each one of these works exerted a powerful influence in its special field. The more philosophically minded among physicians were greatly impressed by the generalizations of the *Biology,* which continued to stimulate the thinking of biologists proper until quite recent days. The *Psychology,* in addition to the influence it exerted as probably the most detailed and consistent example of psychological associationism and atomism, continued for long to make itself felt vicariously through the work of Taine, *On Intelligence,* which represents an almost slavish re-statement of the Spencerian position. The generalizations of the *Sociology* were powerfully reflected in the writings of Guyau and Durkheim as well as in the sociological syntheses of Ward and Giddings. Spencer's ideas on government, largely through his insistence on individualism and his negativistic attitude towards the state ("administrative nihilism" Huxley had called it), became the philosophical bulwark of much political theorizing directed against socialistic ideologies, with the consequence that Spencer who referred to socialism as "the coming slavery" is anathema to the Marxians to this day. The *Ethics,* finally—probably the least successful link of Spencer's system,[8] although regarded by him as its culmination,—did not fail to exert a steady influence in the direction of ethical naturalism, as opposed to the theologically, philosophically, and legalistically inspired ethics of the preceding period.

In dealing with sociological and ethical data, Spencer found it necessary to supplement his own researches with an enormous collection of material gathered under his guidance by a number of assistants. These data, comprising mostly primitive cultures but also some of the classical civilizations, were used by Spencer as the factual base for his *Sociology* and *Ethics.*[9] Just where Spencer found the inspiration for such utilization of

[7] It is curious that just these two sections should have been omitted, considering that it is here that Spencer could have written with almost the knowledge and authority of a specialist. The reason for the omission, as given by Spencer himself, is equally interesting: he was eager to reach the final volumes of the *Philosophy* devoted to human affairs. Always disturbed about his health he preferred not to take any chances.

[8] This negative estimate does not apply to the section entitled "The Data of Ethics" which contains a very able argument.

[9] This amazing collection, entitled *Descriptive Sociology,* continued to appear after Spencer's death and has only recently been brought to a conclusion. In no other scientific enterprise, probably, has such enormous labor gone to waste. Partly on account of the unreliability of large parts of the miscellaneous material, but mainly on account of the uncritical handling of it, the awesome volumes of the *Descriptive Sociology* are practically worthless. Even the late Giddings, next to John Fiske the most ardent American Spencerian, could say no more for it than that he had traced

comparative material, it is not easy to determine, for no adequate motivation for his procedure seems extant in either biographical or auto-biographical sources. It will be recalled, however, that in this approach Spencer was neither the first, nor of course, the last. As shown before, Comte had already adopted a similar procedure, supported in his case by methodological reflections more relevant and exhaustive than those given by Spencer himself. Comte, again, had found precedents in this matter in the works of Condorcet, Turgot, and Bossuet, and even Voltaire. Towards the middle of the century, but preceding the emergence of evolutionism, the utilization of vast collections of sociological and cultural data referring mostly to primitive tribes had already been adopted by Theodor Waitz (1821–1884) in his comprehensive *Anthropologie der Naturvölker* and by Adolf Bastian (1826–1905) in a large series of philosophico-anthropological works.[10] Without deliberately or knowingly leaning upon any of these scientists, Spencer seems to have combined their points-of-view. He shares with Waitz and Bastian the idea of the unity of the human mind, and with Comte and his predecessors, the conception of stages in the development of civilization.

As a fructifier of anthropological thought, in the narrower sense, Spencer divides honors with E. B. Tylor (1832–1917) whose critically chastened reasoning and vast learning in primitive custom and lore earned him the title of "the father of anthropology." While his epochal *Primitive Culture* (1871) a book devoted mainly though not wholly to the doctrine of animism, has achieved the greatest renown, the *Anthropology* and *Researches into the Ancient History of Mankind* are equally notable.

As an evolutionist, Tylor differed in many ways from Spencer with whom he is in this capacity so often identified. While he shared the latter's conviction that the human mind was everywhere essentially the same, his *Primitive Culture* is not, in any significant sense, a contribution to evolutionary sociology. Rather does it project on a world-wide canvas the life-history of a system of belief, namely animism. It is true, however, that Tylor considered that many, if not most, of the particular religious complexes rooted in animism had developed independently and in strikingly similar forms in many different parts of the world and at different times in history.

The two outstanding methodological features of Tylor's *Primitive Culture* and of Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* and *Principles of Ethics* are the utilization on a large scale of the comparative method and of the prin-

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to their literary sources some two thousands of the references and had found them correct! (From my personal recollections, *A. G.*).

[10] Cf. his *Ethnische Elementargedanken, Der Völkergedanke,* and especially *Der Mensch in der Geschichte,* 3 vols. (1859).

ciple of survivals. When in later years, the evolutionists were taken to task for their use of this procedure, the resulting discussion created a good deal of confusion. On the one hand, it was generally admitted that the comparative method was fruitful, in fact indispensable, in such subjects as linguistics or the systematic branches of the natural sciences. On the other, the evolutionists were criticized in severest terms for their use of what seemed to be the same method. The simple point of the matter, of course, is that the evolutionists were at fault not in using the comparative method but in the use they made of it. They drew their comparative material from countless sources dealing largely with the cultures of primitive peoples in different parts of the world. At the time when the early evolutionists composed their synthetic studies, anthropology as a science was as yet unborn. Therefore, the materials then available for such studies were drawn from relatively faulty sources such as descriptions of travellers, missionaries and the like. The theorist, moreover, intent on his thesis, seldom had the time, patience or even competence to sift critically each particular source. Also, he but seldom acquainted himself with a particular culture in its totality, preferring instead to cite instances from material culture, religion, social organization, or whatever other aspect happened to be needed in a particular generalization. The result was much factual inaccuracy, as well as an even more serious dislocation of the material which resulted from the fact that particular items of a culture were presented, not in their natural setting, but in isolation from other cultural facts with which they were frequently or even inevitably associated. These were serious faults but not the most serious. The principle error of the evolutionists consisted in the fact that their alleged series of historical stages were made up of links drawn from most varied times and places. These links were not in themselves bits of development, but static cross-cuts of a culture at the point of a particular rite, belief or custom. These static links were then put together end to end, making up what was claimed to be a historical series of stages. It could readily be shown by critics that this substitution of a link exemplified in one series for a corresponding one missing in another, was only permissible on the assumption of a uniform development of culture or of phases of culture at different times and places. Now this latter assumption was actually made by the evolutionists, but clearly they could not use the comparative data in its substantiation, for the kind of use they made of the method already pre-supposed the assumption. Thus the reasoning of the comparative evolutionist was shown to be circular.[11]

[11] Cf. my *Anthropology, an Introduction to Primitive Culture,* pp. 507–99, where this argument is presented more fully and illustrated by a diagram. See also the chapter on Historical Sociology, present volume, pp. 505–9, for a discussion of the "illustrative" method *versus* a *genuinely* comparative method.

A similar point could be made with reference to the concept of survivals. A survival was defined as a cultural feature which does not fit in with its cultural medium. It persists rather than functions, or its functioning somehow does not harmonize with the surrounding culture. The use made by the evolutionists of such survivals was to regard them as leftovers from an antecedent state of culture in which what now were survivals functioned as full-fledged cultural features, well and meaningfully co-ordinated with other features.

Now it will be admitted that once the history of culture is ordered into stages and certain features are regarded as belonging to certain definite stages, then one such feature encountered in a later stage, where it becomes a survival, might be regarded as an indication of a pre-existing stage in which this feature was not a survival but an integral part of the culture. As in the case of the comparative method, again, it will be seen that the ordering of the history of culture into stages with their proper cultural features here becomes a prerequisite in the absence of which survivals lose their significance as indicators of particular past conditions.

We know, of course, that survivals exist. They do, in fact, represent a constant and omnipresent aspect of all cultures. Any cultural feature, whether originating as an invention or as a borrowed trait, undergoes a more or less prolonged process of incorporation into the culture. At last it fits, perhaps perfectly. But then, for any one of many possible reasons, the feature begins to change its function or meaning or loses them altogether. It is improved upon, superseded, left behind. It ceases to fit into the rest of the culture, and should it persist at all, becomes a survival. No student of culture history would for a moment doubt the reality of this process. What required rectification was the erroneous use made of it by the evolutionists.

The uniformity of cultural development posited by the evolutionists was supplemented by two additional principles, that of gradual change and that of progess. Culture was supposed to change by slow gradations, barely perceptible at the time of their occurrence and conspicuous only after constant accumulation of slight changes had taken place. It is easy to see that this aspect of the theory of social evolution represented the reflection in the social sphere of the concept of change by "imperceptible gradations," introduced into biology by Darwin.[12]

[12] It is worth noting that in this matter of gradual change Spencer was the first, perhaps the only, consistent and conscientious evolutionist. He actually made an attempt to trace separate aspects of culture through series of but slightly differing stages, substantiating his demonstrations by copious comparative data, interspersed with ingenious hypotheses to fill the gaps left by the facts. No other evolutionist took such pains. It may be said, therefore, that the concept of gradual change was with most evolutionists rather a tacit assumption than an active principle, concretely exemplified.

The third tenet of social evolution as held by Spencer was that of progress, that is, change in the direction of improvement. Spencer worked out a logically coherent system of social values which he had developed, particularly in his *Ethics,* and what he attempted to demonstrate was the gradual progress in the history of society towards the realization of such values; for example, progress from a state of militarism to one of industrialism, or progess from a state of society with a lesser differentiation of parts and integration of the whole to one in which society represented a highly co-ordinated system of functionally differentiated parts. The concept of progress, while tacitly accepted by evolutionists, was but seldom applied by them in the concrete. Here again Spencer stands somewhat apart. He attempted systematically to work the concept of progress into his evolutionary series, thus giving his sociological philosophy a decidedly optimistic slant.[13]

It appears, therefore, that the fundamental concept of evolutionism was that of uniformity. The origins of cultures, or of certain aspects of cultures, thus assume significance. Driven by a quasi-organismic law of development, culture, in its history, passes through certain fixed stages. In the histories of particular cultures, therefore, identical or at least similar stages can be detected. In an origin, as in a seed, all future developments lie predetermined. It need occasion no surprise then if we find evolutionists to be eager origin hunters. By origin, moreover, they meant not a casual origin such as would obtain from a cross-cut of any developmental series, but the origin of origins—the First Origin. Obviously enough, such first origins were not to be discovered in the available collections of concrete historical or ethnographical data. Hence they had to be invented. Many evolutionary theories were primarily concerned with such hypothetical origins.

[13] Ludwig Stein, journalist and historian of philosophy, writing on Spencer in the Viennese newspaper *Neue Freie Presse* (1895), refers to him as *"Der optimistische Philosoph."* It will be remembered that one of Stein's own books was entitled *Der soziale Optimismus.*

Spencer's conception of progress in evolution cannot be understood without remembering that he was an ardent upholder of the principle of inheritance of acquired characteristics. To him, therefore, cultural progress was correlated with an underlying biological and psychological progress of man which was, at least in part, the result of the advance of culture absorbed into the human organism as an inherited disposition. Spencer, for example, held that Aristotle, with all his intellectual acumen, could not have functioned as a successful modern railroad president, not because in ancient Greece there were no railroads to preside over, but because the Greek brain, even that of an Aristotle, had not developed sufficiently to make such a cultural achievement possible. As he himself put it: either there was inheritance of acquired characteristics or there was no evolution. In defense of the principle he fought a long and bitter battle with August Weismann, the biologist, whose protracted experiments followed by those of countless others have failed to date to produce any acceptable evidence in support of the principle.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the evolutionary standpoint inspired numerous works dealing with one or another aspect of culture. In the domain of social organization, J. J. Bachofen,[14] Swiss Classicist, John Ferguson McLennan,[15] Scottish jurist, and L. H. Morgan,[16] pioneer American anthropologist, arrived, in part independently of each other, at a new conception of the history of social development which, in its completed form, consisted of the following phases: first, the clan, an organization of actual or assumed kindred, hereditary, with maternal descent; then, the gens, a form of organization structurally analogous to the clan but with paternal descent; then, the family, characterized in its early phases by the predominance of the paternal principle. The stage of clan organization was identified by these writers, especially by Bachofen and Morgan, with a matriarchal condition in which women played a dominant part in social, political, and possibly economic matters. According to Morgan, the evolution of marriage proceeded from an original stage of promiscuity in which there was no regulation of sex intercourse whatsoever, through two stages of group marriage, to a final stage of individual marriage.[17]

In the sphere of economic development, Letourneau and others set up the following sequence: hunting—pastoral life—agriculture. From the standpoint of the materials utilized in economy, claims were made for another sequence: stone age—bronze age—iron age. To this series of three stages Wundt later added a fourth and earliest stage, the age of wood. It was also taught that the institution of individual property arose relatively late, having been preceded by communal property ownership.[18]

In the domain of art, A. C. Haddon saw the origin of all artistic en-

[14] *Das Mutterrecht* (1861).

[15] *Studies in Ancient History*, 2 vols. (1886, 1896).

[16] *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (1870), and *Ancient Society; or, Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilization* (1877).

[17] Cf. A. Giraud-Teulon, *Les origines de la famille* (1874); M. M. Kovalevsky, *Tableau des origines et de l'évolution de la famille et de la propriété* (1890); J. Köhler, *Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe* (1897); E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity* (1909–10), and "Matrilineal Kinship and the Question of Its Priority," *Memoirs, Am. Anthr. Assoc.*, Vol. IV (1917); A. Post, *Die Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit;* E. B. Tylor, "The Matriarchal Family System," *Nineteenth Century*, XI, 81–96; H. Cunow, "Les bases économiques du matriarchat," *Le Devenir Social*, Vol. IV.

The most systematic critique of Morgan, in English, will be found in Lowie's *Primitive Society*. See also the same author's *History of Ethnological Theory*, section on Morgan.

[18] Ch. Letourneau, *L'évolution de la propriété* (1889); similarly oriented are his *L'évolution de la morale* (1887), *L'évolution politique* (1890), *L'évolution juridique* (1891); K. Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, and *Arbeit und Rhythmus* (1902); W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk-Psychology*, pp. 11–115 ("Primitive Man").

deavor in the attempt to reproduce natural forms which later underwent a process of conventionalization, thus becoming more and more geometrical, but to the end preserving traces of their naturalistic origin in the symbolic meanings attached to the geometric patterns.[19]

In religion, Spencer saw the origin of religious consciousness in a primary emotion of fear which was gradually supplemented and ultimately superseded by more positive and constructive emotions, such as those of love and adoration. On the side of worship, he traced religious rituals back to an original ancestor worship. The generalization was clinched in his famous aphorism: all society arose from the fear of the living, all religion from the fear of the dead.[20] While Spencer and Tylor went to great lengths in their attempts to substantiate the assumption of a primitive animism as the conceptual aspect of earliest religion, J. G. (later Sir James) Frazer in his ambitious *Golden Bough* argued that a stage of magic preceded that of animism and religion.[21] F. B. Jevons in his *Introduction to the History of Religions* conceived of totemism as a phase in religious development following primitive animism and preceding the development of higher deities which grew out of totemism. Various animalistic features associated with such higher deities were interpreted as totemistic survivals. The same author also ascribed an economic function to totemism in picturing it as a stage preceding the cultivation of plants and the domestication of animals, first worshipped, then cultivated or domesticated.

Even the most ardent evolutionists were, of course, aware of the fact that actual historic sequences somehow did not "run true to form." Always there were some discrepancies between the assumed and the actual stages—whenever, that is, history could be called upon to substantiate or refute the evolutionary assumption. To dispose of these discrepancies the evolutionists employed the method of terminological abuse. They spoke of "irregularities," "accidents," "intrusive or disturbing factors," and the like. Thus theory was saved, in defiance of history, by a system of terms which assigned positive values to items fitting the theory and negative ones to those contradicting it.

Nineteenth century evolutionism proved a fructifying source for social thinking. It stimulated the minds of men towards daring hypotheses. It brought forth samples of carefully constructed and ingeniously developed arguments. It stimulated the exploration of primitive cultures and of the earlier phases of the historic civilizations. But it could not survive the

[19] *Evolution in Art* (1895); H. Balfour, *The Evolution of Decorative Art* (1893); Y. Hirn, *Origins of Art, a Psychological and Sociological Inquiry* (1900); W. H. Holmes, "On the Evolution of Ornament," *Am. Anthr.*, III, 137–46.

[20] H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*.

[21] Vols. I and II, *The Magic Art*.

rise of anthropological science, nor the increasingly more critical methodology of the social sciences generally. It is to be noted here that the evolutionists did not, as a rule, draw their material from the known and carefully explored periods of history. Rather did they deal with cultures beyond the reach of history where facts were few and far between. This invited the hypothetical approach. It was relatively easy to improvise segments of history where history was not present to belie them. Significantly enough historians as such were either hostile towards evolutionism or simply ignored it.[22] At the close of the century, when evolutionism was at its height, the leading historians of England, Germany and France continued their researches, as if it had never been born.[23] In fact, the

[22] This applied especially to the evolutionist's assumption of laws in history. "During my many years of historic research," writes Eduard Meyer, "I have never discovered a historic law, nor have I encountered one in anyone else's writing" (*Kleine Schriften*, p. 32). This statement is followed by a long footnote in which Meyer successfully ridicules Breysig's "laws" (see below, p. 448) by the simple device of citing them. "The element of necessity which is of the essence of natural laws," continues Meyer a little farther on, "is altogether lacking in all these (historic) rules; they merely state the possibility—or different possibilities—of a future . . . historic development" (*ibid.*, p. 33). Cf. with this the following passage from my *History, Psychology, and Culture:* "These determinisms (in history) are in no sense absolute, but relative in two respects: they obtain within a system of preferential relations; and the events predicated allow of alternatives, more or less limited. In most instances, again, the spring of action is not supplied in these determinisms. In other words, they do not, in themselves, constitute a guarantee that anything further will happen. The general formula applicable to all such situations would run somewhat as follows: *if* anything further happens . . . it will be one of several alternative events, inventions, ideas, or it will fall within the limits of a certain range of possibilities" (p. 21). Cf. the chapter on Constructive Typology, present volume, pp. 17–46, for a discussion of this matter, especially in relation to "if and when" recurrence.

[23] There were, of course, exceptions, such as Karl Lamprecht and Kurt Breysig. Lamprecht's historical writings, though innocent of the naive rectilinearity of evolutionary schemes, breathe a similar spirit. In certain respects he did indeed depart from the evolutionists. For their individualism he substituted a comprehensive analysis of groups. Not the reflective mind of the individual but the creative spirit or soul of the nation was to him the significant *locus* of historic life. In this Lamprecht can be compared to the socialistic ideologists of the period; but whereas the latter stressed the economic base, he emphasized art, literature and philosophy. In opposition to Ranke—or so he thought—Lamprecht wanted to know not *wie es eigentlich gewesen* but *wie es eigentlich geworden*. He divided his many-volumed *Deutsche Geschichte* into periods or phases of "rising psychic intensity" characterized by symbolism, typism, conventionalism, individualism, and subjectivism. These phases, primarily derived from a study of art, were supposed to hold also for other aspects of culture and for nations other than Germany (a truly evolutionistic turn!). His ideas were criticized sharply by such German historians as Below, Gierke, and Lenz. Lamprecht's work did, however, make an impression. He became the standard-bearer of *Kulturgeschichte* as opposed to politically oriented history, and when Steinhausen founded the *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* (1903), this was due to Lam-

concepts implied or expressed in the writings of these historians were often diametrically opposed to the cherished tenets of evolutionism.[24] The social scientists who proved most amenable to evolutionary influence were not the historians who dealt with history but the sociologists who were intent upon the construction of social forces, social laws and social regularities. Sociologists like Guyau in France, Müller-Lyer in Germany, Kovalevsky in Russia, Hobhouse in England, Ward and Giddings in America, well represented the thoroughgoing fashion in which sociology annexed and utilized the results of evolutionary thought.

Before the advent of scientific anthropology, the evolutionists built their successes on data soon to be sifted and amplified by the new science; and it is these explorations which sounded the death knell of evolutionism.

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precht's inspiration. See his *Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft* (1896), *What Is History?* (1905), and "Zur universalgeschichtlichen Methodenbildung," *Abhandlungen der Philologisch-Historischen Klasse der Königlich-Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften,* XXVII (1909), 44–7. *Cf.* also Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode,* pp. 95 ff., 124 ff.; Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie,* I, 530 ff.; and Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century,* pp. 588 ff. See the chapter on The New History, etc., pp. 553–6.

More daring as well as closer to orthodox evolutionism is the position of Kurt Breysig. In his *Der Stufenbau und die Gesetze der Weltgeschichte* (1905) he undertook to formulate laws of historic development of universal validity. We read there: "The content of world-history comprises a succession of stages demonstrable among all peoples, even though the separate branches of mankind have covered uneven stretches of the journey" (pp. 8–9). Breysig enumerates no less than twenty-four "laws" of history (pp. 107–11)! Space forbids analysis of this ambitious system. It may be noted, however, that in so far as Breysig's "laws" are derived from a study of political units (states), these laws, even were they valid within this domain, would inevitably prove too narrow to encompass the other aspects of culture (cf. Barth, *op. cit.,* pp. 619 ff.). In 1900 he conceived the plan of a *Geschichte der Menschheit,* in numerous volumes, of which the first appeared in 1907. No other volume has seen the light, so far. Instead he published twenty years later, a work on the historic process *in general, Vom Geschichtlichen Werden* (3 vols.), with the interesting sub-title: *Umrisse einer zukünftigen Geschichtslehre.* In the preface to the second volume of this work (*Die Macht des Gedankens in der Geschichte*) he writes as follows: "Even my ambitious plans of 1908 have in the course of continuous labor . . . been deepened and expanded. Even so, I am still unable to carry out either the old or the new plans.

"I might have attempted, starting with my present premises, to combine into a doctrine the various factual interconnections which I have explored separately, if not for the conviction that all such generalizations should be postponed until I come to dispose of a much greater stock of ordered observations" (p. x, translation mine, *A.G.*). Evidently it is easier to write about a *zukünftige Geschichtslehre* than to illumine the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen!* Cf. pp. 19–25, present volume.

[24] For an analysis of the historical standpoint, shared by most, if not all, historians, see Rickert (pp. 98 ff.). It is curious to note how aspects of the individualizing approach of the historian have in recent years found their way into the very camp of the evolutionists, as, for example, in the historical works of Leon Trotsky.

The criticisms which came from the rapidly maturing science were leveled mainly against that tenet of the evolutionists which had been utilized by them most imaginatively and constructively, namely, the tenet of fixed stages in historical development. Edward Westermarck, in his *History of Human Marriage* (1896), although himself unable to resist the allurements of the comparative method, succeeded in showing that the family was the most ancient, as well as universal, form of social organization, that it was present in the most primitive human groups which knew no clans or gentes, and persisted among those which had these kinship groups. A number of American students demonstrated the artificiality of the concept of promiscuity, no proof of which was to be found in primitive conditions, and adduced sufficient evidence to reduce group marriage to a much more modest place in the history of matrimonial institutions, as well as to indicate the feasibility of its developing from individual marriage rather than representing a nucleus of the latter. The same group of anthropologists also attacked the presumed succession of clan and gentile organizations. It was argued that no concrete evidence had ever been produced to substantiate the clan-gens sequence, that such institutions as the prominence of the mother's brother which was regarded by evolutionists as inherent in maternal organizations and as a survival in paternal ones, could very well be explained in the latter instances without the hypothesis of a pre-existing clan stage. On the basis of American data, principally, it was also pointed out that the Indian tribes with maternal descent, such as the Iroquois, the Northwest Indians, and some of the Pueblo Indians, represented the highest cultures in North America, a strange condition if the clan organization were to be regarded as an earlier phase in social development. Finally, it was pointed out that numerous tribes, in America and elsewhere, where primitive cultures were still observable, had neither clans nor gentes but a fairly amorphous family organization with an occasional slight pre-eminence of the paternal principle, and that no evidence could be adduced to demonstrate a pre-existing clan or gentile stage in such tribes.[25]

[25] C. N. Starcke, *The Primitive Family in its Origin and Development* (1889); E. Grosse, *Formen der Familie und Formen der Wirtschaft;* F. Müller-Lyer, *Die Familie* (1912), *The Evolution of Modern Marriage* (1930); John R. Swanton, "Social Organization of American Tribes," *Am. Anthr.* (1905), pp. 663–73; R. H. Lowie, "Social Organization," *Am. Jour. of Soc.,* XX (1914), 68–97, "Family and Sib," *Am. Anthr.* (1919), pp. 28–40, *Primitive Society* (which contains an elaborate critique of Morgan), and "The Matrilineal Complex," *Univ. of Cal. Publ. in Am. Arch. and Ethn.,* XVI, 29–45; A. Goldenweiser, "Social Organization of the American Indians," *Jour. of Am. Folklore,* XXVII (1914), 411–36, *Early Civilization,* pp. 235–821, and *Anthropology, an Introduction to Primitive Culture,* pp. 504–21; W. H. R. Rivers, "Marriage," *Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. VIII, *Kinship and Social Organization,* and *Social Organization;* Kroeber's review

Similarly in art, while it was admitted that the process of conventionalization, made so much of by Haddon, was not a figment but a frequent development in the history of design, it was pointed out that neither general considerations nor concrete conditions spoke in favor of this being the only art development. Granted the general aesthetic sensibilities of man, his experience provides as many starting points for geometrical design as it does for realistic motif. In many further instances, moreover, it could be shown that the reverse process had taken place, namely, the reading of realistic meanings into originally geometric patterns. In the American Plains, for instance, we find that a system of geometric designs consisting of a limited number of simple unit patterns is found in a large number of tribes with but slight variations. The symbolic meanings of these designs, on the other hand, vary from tribe to tribe. Under such conditions, it seems highly improbable that these realistic meanings should represent survivals of an original stage of art realism. For, if such were the case, it would have to be assumed further that the dissimilar realistic patterns converged incomprehensibly into highly comparable, if not identical, geometric designs. The opposite process, on the other hand, is perfectly feasible: the geometrical designs, having established themselves in the Plains after spreading from one or more centres, were subsequently interpreted by each tribe or group of tribes in accordance with their local religious or ceremonial conditions, thus leading to diversity in symbolism.[26] (Cf. the "comparability-generalizability" contrast, pp. 505–9.)

The evolutionary scheme in the realm of property—from communism to individual ownership—was also shown to be contradicted by primitive data. What we find here is the co-existence, even among most primitive communities, of communal ownership in things of public use—such as

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of Hartland's essay mentioned before, *Am. Anthr.,* XIX, 578 ff., Hartland's reply, and Kroeber's counter-reply, *ibid.,* XX, 224–7. For an important recent review of the entire problem see Robert Briffault's *The Mothers,* 3 vols., which, though mildly evolutionistic, is highly critical and not devoid of originality.

[26] The ease and naturalness of both of these processes, when viewed psychologically, is in fact quite apparent. It is as easy to read, Hamlet-like, natural shapes into lineal or inchoate forms, as it is to visualize natural objects or creatures in the form of more or less geometric figures, an art successfully practiced by the caricaturists. See here A. C. Haddon, "Decorative Art of British New Guinea," *Cunningham Memoirs, Royal Irish Academy,* Vol. X; F. W. Putnam, "Conventionalism in Ancient American Art," *Bulletins Essex Institute* (1886); F. Boas, "Decorative Designs of Alaskan Needlecases—A Study in the History of Conventional Designs," *Proceedings U. S. National Museum,* XXXIV (1908), 321–44, and *Primitive Art;* C. Wissler, "Decorative Art of the Sioux Indians," *Bulletins American Museum of Natural History,* XVIII (1904), 231–78. B. Laufer's "The Decorative Art of the Amur Tribes," *Memoirs American Museum of Natural History,* VII (1902), 1–79, will be found illuminating in this connection.

hunting areas, cultivable fields, or ceremonial houses—with individual ownership of things made and used by individuals. Each person, though perhaps not owning anything else, owns his or her own tools, weapons, garments, decorations and the like. It remains true, however—and here the hasty generalization of the evolutionist paved the way to the truth—that communal ownership of public utilities is more characteristic of primitive than of later periods in history, also that an emphatic development of individual ownership in such utilities as forests or lands is characteristic of much later periods in economic development.[27]

The famous three stages in economic evolution—hunting, pastoral life and agriculture—were thoroughly transformed by critics of evolution. Following the epoch-making work of Eduard Hahn, it was made clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that the earliest stage in economy was inadequately described by the epithet "hunting," for invariably this male pursuit is accompanied by the gathering (by women) of the wild products of nature, such as roots, berries, barks, yams and the like. It is the combination of these two unisexual activities which constituted the earliest stage in economy. These pursuits, moreover, do not cease with the appearance of other economic forms but persist almost invariably up to and into historic civilizations. It was further shown that agriculture may develop among primitive hunters and food gatherers without an intermediary stage of pastoral life. In America, for example, where the domestication of animals, with one or two exceptions, is almost unknown, agriculture is common among a large number of tribes. And, finally, as was first pointed out by Hahn, agriculture itself must be conceived in the form of two historically disparate institutions, namely, primitive agriculture, generally practised by women, in which the plow is unknown, the only tools are the digging stick or the crude hoe, and domesticated animals are not employed in field work, and historic agriculture, ushered in by the plow, in which man takes the leading part and with him the domesticated animal.[28]

The effect of this critique of stages proved devastating. What had for a time appeared as a relatively simple, uniform and unilinear process, presently began to reveal itself as a somewhat bewildering maze of intercrossing, diverging and converging chains of development. The anthro-

[27] Cf. R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* ("Property"). See also Raymond Firth, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori,* and B. Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific.*

[28] E. Hahn, *Die Hausthiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft des Menschen* (1896), "Die primitive Landwirtschaft," *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft,* Vol. IX, and "Zur Theorie der Entstehung des Ackerbaues," *Globus,* LXXV, 281–7; R. Thurnwald, *Economics in Primitive Communities* (1932). Cf. also F. Boas, ed., *General Anthropology* (1938), Chapters VII, VIII, and IX.

pologist now looked upon himself as a historian of pre-history in which, so it seemed, conditions were as capricious and complicated as history had long ago revealed them to be in later periods.

An attack was also directed against the tendency of many evolutionists to rationalize primitive culture. Religion and even social organization were pictured as outgrowths of a deliberate mental effort, as in the solving of an intellectual problem. As against this position it was pointed out that unconscious, emotional factors, socially rather than individually controlled, were dominant in the shaping of culture and society. Man feels and reacts first, then, if ever, ponders and interprets. To assume the reverse process is a frequent foible of the retrospective analyst, contradicted by all we know of the spontaneous tendencies of the human mind.[29]

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, this destructive work was done. As a consequence, thinkers, turning, with a characteristic recoil, their backs upon evolutionism, tended to discard it altogether. In the perspective of a generation, a fairer view may now be taken of the work and service of the evolutionists. Clearly enough, many of them were men of imagination and intellectual daring who ventured into heretofore unexplored fields and permitted their hypotheses to penetrate into what had seemed sheer darkness. Their very exaggerations stimulated inquiry,—their errors, corrective efforts. But evolutionism stands for more than that. When it was purged of its extravagances certain residual truths remained. With the evolutionists, the vast majority of modern anthropologists, as well as social scientists generally, accept the fundamental psychic unity of mankind. This truth, already recognized by pre-evolutionary students such as Herder, Waitz and Bastian, has become the basic postulate of anthropological science. Even though the modern anthropologist may reject parallelisms in development, or at least parallelisms of any chronological length, he cannot shut his eyes to the presence of numerous parallelisms in particular customs, beliefs and material objects. While similarities in chains of development can thus be shown to be imaginary, similarities in particular things or ideas are conspicuous and important historical realities. (See the chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 525–7.)

So also with the stages. While the uniformity and unilinearity of developments is denied, it remains true that certain things come, and must come, before other things. More or less readily, this can be demonstrated upon all aspects of culture. In social organization, for example, numerically small groups must have preceded large aggregates. There were peoples with no chieftainship, or with an undeveloped form of it, before prominent or exalted chiefs made their appearance. Chieftainship or

[29] É. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life;* L. Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think, Primitive Mentality,* and *The Soul of the Primitive;* W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology,* and the volumes of his *Völkerpsychologie.*

leadership generally took the form of an individual privilege based on capacity before it became crystallized into a hereditary prerogative. The family, based on universally present biological and sexual factors, preceded the clan or gens. Relative uniformity in social status prevailed in human groups before social classes developed. And so on. Similarly in technology, finished products in tools or weapons cannot be conceived as a starting point: they must have been preceded by relatively crude and crudely practical tools. Thus it is justifiable to regard the material equipment of the Australian as representing a more primitive stage than is found in the highly accomplished technology of Melanesia and Polynesia. Transportation on foot preceded all other forms of transportation and persisted after other forms had developed. Huts and tents were fashioned before people learned to build of stone, and the uses of wood and stone were known before the smelting of metals was invented. Agriculture and animal husbandry presuppose the invention of cultivation and domestication—obviously not primitive accomplishments—and so were everywhere preceded by hunting and the gathering of the wild products of nature. In religion, a general animism and magic were already present and probably ancient when anthropomorphic deities began to be conceived of. Similarly, animals and other things in nature had aroused religious attitudes long before the emergence of totemism, which presupposes an underlying system of hereditary social units. A general participation of the community in religious beliefs and rites, with medicine men as mere experts in a common art, preceded the development of a class of priests who learned to ponder things religious as well as to exercise control over others.

Over and above all this, the evolutionary scheme, though failing in its attempts to squeeze history into a rigid frame, left behind it a firm conviction of the operation of causes in history. And if causes there were, then searching for them, if in a narrower compass, remained a task. We may feel with some anthropologists and historians that almost anything may come from almost anything, but we must admit that nothing comes from nothing. The latter insight leads right back to the evolutionists.

III. Diffusionism and the *Kulturkreis* Theory

The evolutionists never learned to appreciate the significance of diffusion, that is, the spread of culture or elements of a culture from tribe to tribe in the course of historic contact. The phenomena of diffusion were, of course, well known to the evolutionists and, in fact, to those who preceded them. Both Ratzel and Bastian had thought deeply on the problems thus created. Bastian, to be sure, was convinced of the possibility and actuality of cultural similarities springing from the background of a

psyche everywhere essentially the same, and functioning in similar surroundings, but he never doubted that similarities so striking as to preclude the feasibility of independent origin should be interpreted by diffusion.[30]

More definitely and more clearly than Bastian, the geographer Ratzel sensed the significance of diffusion and devoted part of his restless activity to the following up of the geographical distribution of particular objects, such as the African bow or certain types of armor. While insisting that similarities in material culture were more apparent than in spiritual culture, Ratzel was also well aware of the fact that material culture was, after all, culture, that it was the product of man's mind, its expression and vehicle.[31]

It was soon realized by anthropologists that among the so-called "disturbing" causes of the evolutionists diffusion played a prominent rôle. It is indeed apparent that an object or idea borrowed from without is in its origin independent of whatever forces or trends may have been operative in the borrowing tribe. It follows that to the extent to which the cultural equipment of a group consists of borrowed traits, it is no longer interpretable in terms of the past culture of that group. In so far also as such borrowed traits become part and parcel of the group culture, all future developments must be regarded as co-determined by these traits. Diffusion, therefore, whenever it occurs, cuts into the chain of evolutionary development, thus rendering it less autonomous or self-determined and more dependent upon a broader complex of historical factors in which other tribes are involved.

In so far as the theory of diffusion encouraged the patient pursuit of

[30] For example, he writes in substance: It lies far from me to emphasize historical relations or even to suspect them. On the contrary, my efforts are primarily directed towards the discovery of the laws of change in things and thoughts and everywhere to relate them to the common-human as resting in fundamental psychological causes. I have further striven to support these conclusions by far-flung comparisons resulting in large accumulations of facts negating the feasibility of such historical relations. These should never be posited on the basis of merely vague similarities, but if the analysis of carefully explored cultural districts makes such suppositions of historical links inevitable, then I feel justified in accepting them. (*Beiträge zur vergleichenden Psychologie,* Preface, p. 6.) Some modern diffusionists might profit from reading the last sentence—once a day.

[31] Writes Ratzel: "A tool, a weapon is an integral, tangible thing which does not change of its own accord, which can be gathered, described and put away as one would a plant or an animal. Some tools or weapons may remain identical in their distribution over the entire globe. The people themselves change more readily than do these products" (*Anthropogeographie,* II, 597). At the same time, he warns against the tendency to despiritualize the material: "On account of the fact that they (things) consist of dead, dumb materials, one often forgets that the manipulating hand of man is guided by his mind. *These objects are forms in which ideas dwell*" (*ibid.,* p. 598 [italics mine, *A.G.*]).

individual or grouped culture traits and of their wanderings from tribe to tribe, it proved a definite contribution to anthropological insight and method. In so far as the theory was used as a corrective of evolutionary one-sidedness, it also played a useful and constructive rôle. But matters did not end there. As in many other instances in the history of thought, the theory of diffusion, having contributed its share to the demolition of evolutionary dogma, presently itself developed dogmatic tendencies: it became diffusionism. This trend in anthropological thought received its logical formulation at the hands of Fritz Graebner, whose early training was in history. After a fairly prolonged period of intensive study devoted largely to objects of material culture, Graebner brought his theoretical position to a focus in his *Methode der Ethnologie* (1911), the principal conclusions of which may in brief be stated as follows. The evolutionists vastly exaggerated man's ability for original thought. Inventions are hard, and radical ones occur seldom. The fewer independent inventions we posit in our reconstruction of the past, therefore, the safer our conclusions. As a purely theoretical admission, Graebner was willing to allow for the possibility of convergence, even of developmental parallelism, but in fact, he scarcely ever considered such processes as actually occurring; he taught instead that only after all attempts to interpret similarities through diffusion had failed was one justified in ascribing these to parallel developments or to convergence. The analysis of cultural similarities thus emerges as the crux of all these problems. In formulating his approach to similarities in culture, Graebner established two criteria, a qualitative and quantitative one. The qualitative criterion referred to the formal similarities between objects or ideas in two or more tribes, the quantitative criterion, to the number of instances of such similarities. The conclusions to be derived from such comparisons of similarities were to Graebner perfectly definite. They had to him a well-nigh logical rigor and finality. The geographical separation of the traits compared had, therefore, no bearing on the conclusion reached. What was true of two similar objects or ideas among neighboring tribes was equally true when the tribes were continents or oceans apart. Graebner had little patience with the hesitancy of ethnologists to assume diffusion as an explanation of cultural similarities when geographical and historical conditions seemed unfavorable to such an interpretation. Such hesitancy, thought Graebner, was but a species of fear of space and time. With a naive conclusiveness he argued that distance was relative, and that a thousand miles is at worst but one thousand one-mile stretches. This concept of "interpretation at a distance" (*Ferninterpretation*) became the bridge over which Graebner passed from emphasis on diffusion to a hard and fast diffusionism.

From this point on Graebner's argument took the following form. Cultural features can only be interpreted in terms of other features belonging

to the same cultural complex. This sounds plausible enough until one discovers the nature of such a Graebnerian complex. It was derived from the tracing of similarities between objects and ideas spread over wide districts which were then regarded as constituting a cultural zone or *Kulturkreis*.[32] In the different local links of a *Kulturkreis,* similar cultural features were found not singly but in numbers. This, Graebner taught, was to be expected: as soon as contact is established, cultural features will spread, inevitably. The idea that a single cultural feature or a small number of features might spread from one tribe to another, unaccompanied by more general diffusion, Graebner designated as a "culture-historical absurdity."

Having established these principles, Graebner attempted to prove them concretely in the area which he had studied most thoroughly, namely, Oceania (including Australia). Then, with the assistance of Bernhard Ankermann and Father Wilhelm Schmidt, the *Kulturkreise* were extended to Africa, South America and, at least tentatively, North America. Thus a large part of the globe was encompassed.

It will be seen that in this picture no allowance whatsoever is made for the independent origin of cultural similarities. Rather must we see in it a determined effort to interpret the cultures of primitive tribes, wherever found, in terms of a limited number of *Kulturkreise,* hypothetical constructs built up on the basis of similarities between cultural features spread over wide districts. As an early associate of Graebner's, W. Foy, put it, *the* problem of ethnology thus becomes the reconstruction of historical contacts of peoples and of the wanderings of cultural features from tribe to tribe.[33]

[32] Graebner's *Kulturkreis* must be carefully distinguished from a "culture area" of American ethnology (cf. below, p. 463). Whereas the latter is a descriptive and classificatory term for a historico-geographical unit characterized by certain cultural features, a *Kulturkreis* is *constructed* on the basis of similarities between cultural features spread (not always continuously!) over a wide district. That such cultural features had at one time and at some place constituted a historical-geographical unit, is not a fact but a hypothesis. A *Kulturkreis,* then, is not a descriptive concept but a hypothetical construct.

[33] The details of the diffusionist position will be found in the following works: Leo Frobenius, "Die naturwissenschaftliche Kulturlehre," *Allgemeinverständliche naturwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen,* Vol. XX (1899), *Der Ursprung der Afrikanischen Kulturen* (1898), "Die Kulturformen Ozeaniens," *Petermann's Mitteilungen,* XLVI (1900), 204 ff., 234 ff.; F. Graebner, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Ozeanien," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* XXXVII (1905), 25–84, "Die Melanesische Bogenkultur und ihre Verwandten," *Anthropos,* IV (1909), 726–80, 998–1032, also numerous articles in *Ethnologica* and the *Baessler-Archiv;* F. Graebner and W. Foy, "Begriff, Aufgaben und Geschichte der Völkerkunde," *Führer durch das Rautenstrauch-Joest-Museum der Stadt Köln* (1908); B. Ankermann, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Afrika," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* XXXVII (1905), 54–91; various authors in *Korrespondenzblatt der deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthro-*

Graebner's position was vigorously attacked by Boas, Lowie and the writer. It was pointed out that Graebner unduly underestimated man's capacity to originate new things. Inventions, it is true, come hard, and some of the primitive ones, the worth of which we may be tempted to underestimate, were, no doubt, as "difficult" as the modern ones. Evidence abounds, on the other hand, of the origination of new ideas, technical and other, by children as well as adults. Further, Graebner clearly overestimated our capacity to evaluate similarities. Our judgments of similarities in material things may be fairly adequate and amenable to objective verification, but in the realm of social, religious, moral or artistic things, the recognition and evaluation of similarities is highly subjective. Here more or less striking disagreements between individual observers are to be expected. The history of the theory of diffusion bristles with instances of such disagreements. This being the case, it is no longer safe to disregard the geographical perspective. If the distance is not excessive and historical contact is known or probable, then a series of similarities, in themselves perhaps insufficient to carry conviction, would argue in favor of diffusion. But if the same similarities were observed among widely separated tribes, off the highways of known or probable contact, they would fail to clinch the argument for diffusion.[34]

Graebner's assurance that cultural features tend to keep company in diffusion is contradicted by the known facts in primitive as well as modern cultures. An object of material culture, a custom, ceremony, myth, game, book, play, or what not, will travel alone or in limited company without carrying with it any of the other traits of the cultures in question. In two cultures exposed to one another for a great length of time, the steady or spasmodic percolation of traits might perhaps result, *sooner or later,* in all but cultural identification; but this is an entirely different problem. It remains true that in their travels cultural features become separated from their local associates and develop ways and habits of their own. If this much is granted, Graebner's cultural districts acquire a strange air of abstractionism; they seem to float in empty space.[35]

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pologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte, Vol. XLII (1911); W. Schmidt, "Kulturkreise und Kulturschichten in Südamerika," *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* XLV (1913), 1014–24; W. Schmidt and W. Koppers, *Völker und Kulturen,* Part I, *Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft der Völker.*

[34] Compare here my *Anthropology* etc., "The Problem of Cultural Similarities in Relation to Diffusion," pp. 470–4.

[35] Partly in justification of Graebner's position, it may be noted that his method of procedure is more nearly adequate when objects of material culture are involved. As already observed, similarities here are more readily perceived and more easily verified. Material objects, moreover, persist without change or with relatively little change, whereas things of spiritual or social culture will fluctuate and transmute almost unceasingly. For criticisms of Graebner see F. Boas, "Review of Graebner's *Methode," Science,* XXXIV (1911), 804–10; R. H. Lowie, "On the Principle of

On a purely logical ground, an important censure on Graebner's position was made by Haberlandt, who pointed out that in every science the burden of proof rests with him who would assert connections, not with him who abstains from positing any such linkages between the observed facts.[36] Putting this abstractly, every object or idea should be assumed as belonging where it is found and to be interpretable in terms of its local surroundings and the local past, unless good grounds can be adduced for a contrary interpretation.

Unabashed by the unfriendly reception of his ideas in many quarters, Graebner persisted in his diffusionistic researches and succeeded in annexing a number of ardent supporters in the persons of W. Foy, his one-time associate in the Cologne museum, Father W. Schmidt, who, though hostile at first, later outdid Graebner himself in his enthusiasm for the so-called culture-historical method, B. Ankermann, who contributed a number of studies of African culture permeated by the same standpoint, and others. Diffusionism also penetrated into England where it found a prominent representative in W. H. R. Rivers, a physiological psychologist by training. Rivers became interested in anthropological problems under the influence of A. C. Haddon who induced him to join in the labors of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits.[37] Rivers was largely responsible for Volume II of the *Reports* dealing with psychological tests but he also prepared the sections on social organization and relationship terms (see Volumes V and VI). Presently he devised the so-called genealogical method which proved of great use in dealing with problems of kinship, social and ceremonial organization.[38] Later, Rivers undertook an independent study of the Todas of Southern India, contributing an elaborate work on the ceremonial organization of these people. During this period, Rivers's broader outlook on human culture history was mildly evolutionistic. The second phase of his career was ushered in with his presidential address to the British Association in 1911 in which he expounded the principles of the culture-historical school. Without ever wholly accepting Graebner's position,[39] Rivers from then on

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Convergence in Ethnology," *Jour. of American Folk-Lore,* XXV (1913), 259–90; and my "Anthropology and Psychology," *Social Sciences and Their Interrelations,* ed. Ogburn and Goldenweiser, pp. 69–88, reprinted in revised form in *History, Psychology, and Culture,* pp. 71–86.

[36] "Zur Kritik der Kulturkreislehre," *Korrespondenzblatt der deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und Urgeschichte,* XLII (1911), 1162.

[37] See Volumes V and VI.

[38] "The Genealogical Method of Ethnological Inquiry," *Soc. Rev.,* Vol. III (1910). See also my *Anthropology* etc., chap. iv, "How Anthropologists Work," pp. 49–50.

[39] In contrasting his position with Graebner's, Rivers writes: "To him, the introduction of the dual organization of society or of an Austronesian tongue seems

began to use diffusion in a somewhat uncritical as well as highly speculative fashion. His articles on the contact of peoples,[40] the sociological significance of myths,[41] and his elaborate study, *The History of Melanesian Society* (in 2 volumes) are permeated by this point of view.[42]

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to present no greater difficulty than the introduction of a new weapon or implement. To me, on the other hand, social organization, language and religion seem to be bound up with the life of a people so far more intimately than material objects that it is not enough to say they have been introduced. It is the duty of one who attempts to analyze a culture to formulate a mechanism whereby an introduced element of culture has become part of the complex in which it is now found" (*History of Melanesian Society,* II, 4). It is certainly true that Rivers's approach to culture is far more discerning and sensitive than that of Graebner, but there is also this common element: both writers use the theory of diffusion, not as a tool of inquiry, but as a speculative principle of interpretation. Curiously enough, Graebner's view of Rivers was no more complimentary than was Rivers's of himself. When reading *The History of Melanesian Society* on shipboard during his last trip to Australia (in World War days) he is known to have remarked that it was all very well but that the book was patently poetry, not science.

[40] *In Essays and Studies Presented to William Ridgeway* (1913), pp. 293–305.

[41] *Folk-Lore,* XXIII (1912), 307–32.

[42] The extent to which Rivers's critical acumen was dulled by diffusionistic enthusiasm may be gathered from his interpretation of Australian burial rites (in *The Contact,* etc.). Rivers had previously established the two following principles: (1) an art, even a useful one, may be neglected and forgotten, as illustrated by the history of the bow in Polynesia, or by boat building in the Torres Straits ("The Loss of Useful Arts," *Westermarck Anniversary Volume,* 1912), and (2) a relatively small number of immigrants may bring about important cultural changes in the invaded territory, provided the immigrant culture is sufficiently superior to the indigenous one to impress the natives as great and wonderful (*The Contact,* etc., pp. 477 ff.). Armed with these two principles, Rivers approached his Australian problem. He found here that on a background of a relatively uniform and crude culture there existed a great variety of methods of burial, such as inhumation in the extended and contracted positions, preservation on platforms, on trees, and in caverns, a simple kind of embalming, as well as cremation. It is inconceivable, argued Rivers, that so great a variety of methods of disposal of the dead should have originated among the Australians without external influence. Without any support whatsoever from any known historical source, Rivers then visualized this external influence in the following form. There must have been a series of migrations, presumably from Melanesia, each bringing a small number of immigrants. The culture of these northern immigrants was vastly superior to that of the natives and was at first absorbed by them, including the immigrant method of burial. Presently, however, the crude native culture proved its inadequacy by losing most of the traits thus acquired, with the sole exception of the new method of burial which was preserved, perhaps on account of the greater conservativism which always clings to these particular rites. Followed another migration. By this time, the native culture had returned to its pristine stage of crudeness and was once more ready to be impressed by the immigrant culture and absorb it, including the new method of burial. After a while, this culture also proved unassimilable by the natives: it decayed and vanished, leaving behind a second method of burial. Thus the process continued. Each new migration would bring an additional method of burial, while the native culture fluctuated

IV. The Heuristic Concepts of American Ethnology

We already had occasion to refer to the early American evolutionists. Contributions to evolutionary theory do not, however, exhaust the work of these scholars. There were also intensive studies of particular aspects of culture and here and there bits of revealing analysis. Otis T. Mason thus greatly enhanced the field of technology, especially in his comprehensive and in part analytical work on American basketry.[43] F. H. Cushing, dis-

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between a condition of pristine simplicity and one of relative advancement. By this somewhat circuitous method, the Australians were supposed to have accumulated their collection of burial rites. It is unnecessary to examine this scheme in detail to discern the extreme lack of self-criticism it reveals as well as the length to which Rivers was willing to travel with a purely hypothetical diffusionism. And in his *History* he went even farther! Rivers's gravest error in his diffusionistic theories lies in the multiplication of hypotheses; for, all else being equal, the probability that a hypothetical structure will tally with historical reality decreases in proportion to the complexity of the structure.

The acme of uncritical diffusionism was reached by the writings of G. Elliot Smith and W. J. Perry. The numerous volumes of these authors, which moreover belong rather to the field of romance than of ethnology, cannot be analyzed here. For the most systematic and trenchant criticism to date of Smith's position see Roland B. Dixon, *The Building of Cultures* (1928); cf. also the very interesting study by Clyde Kluckhohn, "Some Reflections on the Method and Theory of the Kulturkreislehre," *Am. Anthr.*, XXXVIII (1936), 157–96, where a number of sources not available to me have been utilized. Lowie's recent work, *The History of Ethnological Theory* (1937), contains much matter relevant to our problem. In this book, intended as a selected survey of anthropological thought in relation to field work and ethnographic method, the author criticizes and appraises the contributions of the culture-historical school, in its English and German variants, from a standpoint different from the one here adopted. Apart from minor points the difference lies in the fact that Lowie subjects the ideological contributions of the various diffusionists to a process of weighting in the light of the *performances* of the several authors, such as their field methods and the like. From this experiment some diffusionists (notably the German ones) emerge less foolish than they sound. From one angle no exception can be taken to Lowie's procedure, and it is to be expected that ethnologists (or some of them) may, like the primitives, prove wiser in act than in thought. On the other hand, a theoretical system, as such, belongs to the ideological level and is entitled to examination and appraisement as a logical structure. This is the point of view adopted in this essay. (For a full presentation of W. Schmidt's position, see his *The Culture Historical Method of Ethnology* (Fortuny's, New York, 1939 [The German original appeared in 1937.]).

[43] "Aboriginal American Zoötechny," *Am. Anthr.*, XII, 45–81; "Primitive Travel and Transportation," *Annual Reports, U. S. National Museum* (1894), pp. 239–83; "Influence of Environment upon Human Industries or Arts," *Annual Reports, Smithsonian Institution* (1896), pp. 639–65; "Similarities in Culture," *Am. Anthr.*, VIII, 101–19; "Mind and Matter in Culture," *Am. Anthr.*, n.s., X, 187–96 (the last two bearing on evolution); "The Human Beast of Burden," *Annual Reports, U. S. National Museum* (1887), pp. 237–95 (there are similar summary articles on canoes, weaving, skin-dressing, harpoons, traps, in other volumes of the Smithsonian

tinguished by apt intuitions and a powerful imagination, fitted himself for writing on the origins of invention by learning the arts which he intended to trace to their beginnings.[44] Major J. W. Powell, Horatio Hale and A. S. Gatschet laid the foundations of American linguistics, Powell preparing the first draft of a map of American Indian languages which remained the basis for all further studies and revisions.[45] W. H. Holmes applied his comprehensive knowledge and marked penetration to studies of primitive art, thus illuminating the relationship between art form and the material used, as well as the relation of technique to form.[46] A. F. Bandelier, a great student of Spanish sources, subjected to a scathing critique the version given by Spanish writers of the social and political organization of ancient Mexico. As a result, this phase of Mexican culture was pulled down considerably to something like the level with which the studies of North American Indians had made us familiar.[47] Like Bastian in Germany, F. W. Putnam devoted much of his energy to the collection of museum specimens and the problems of their classification and arrangement. But withal, American anthropology until the nineties of the last century had no personality of its own nor any very definite assortment of scientific methods.

The new orientation in American anthropology came with Franz Boas.[48] Brought up on the methodological rigors of natural science, Boas

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Institution and National Museum Reports); "Aboriginal American Basketry," *Annual Reports, U. S. National Museum* (1902), pp. 171–584, *The Origins of Invention* (1895), and *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture* (1894). The last three are of considerable interest even today.

[44] See especially "Manual-Concepts: A Study of the Influence of Hand Usage on Culture-Growth," *Am. Anthr.*, V, 289–318.

[45] "Indian Linguistic Families of America, North of Mexico," *Reports, Bur. of Am. Ethn.*, VII, 1–142.

[46] "Prehistoric Textile Fabrics of the United States Derived from Impressions on Pottery," *Reports, Bur. of Am. Ethn.*, III, 393–425; "The Use of Textiles in Pottery Making and Embellishment," *Am. Anthr.* n.s., III, 397–403; "A Study of the Textile Art in its Relation to the Development of Form and Ornament," *Reports, Bur. of Am. Ethn.*, VI, 189–252.

[47] "On the Art of War and Mode of Warfare of the Ancient Mexicans," "On the Distribution and Tenure of Land of the Ancient Mexicans," "Social Organization and Mode of Government of the Ancient Mexicans," *Reports, Peabody Museum of Am. Arch. and Ethn.*, X, 95–161, XI, 385–448, XII, 557–699. See also T. T. Waterman, "Bandelier's Contribution to the Study of Ancient Mexican Social Organization," *Univ. of Cal. Publ. in Am. Arch. and Ethn.*, XII, 249–82.

[48] A student of the natural and exact sciences in his youth in Germany—his doctoral dissertation dealt with the analysis of the color of sea water—Boas specialized for a brief time in meteorology, then undertook an expedition to Baffin Land where he proposed to study the relation of the Eskimo tribes to their environment. It is this experience that turned his mind from the study of nature to that of man. Presently, we find him exploring the tribes of the Northwest Coast under the auspices of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Here he had opportunity

had little patience with pure hypotheses or abstract theory. His special gift, sharpened by early training, was the discovery of problems; as to theories and methods, they were of concern to him as tools rather than ideologies. As an Americanist he insisted on the necessity of subjecting local cultures to detailed study and meticulous description. While accuracy of information was one aim of such studies, another and equally important purpose was to cultivate a sense of cultural reality, of historical processes in the making. The theoretical point involved here was that the only safe guide to an understanding of the remote and veiled past of primitive cultures was the intensive study and cautious interpretation of other primitive cultures still available for investigation. Whereas the concrete cultural content changes, taught Boas, the general phenomena of cultural life remain everywhere and always substantially the same.[49]

An important concept developed in America in the course of such concrete investigations was that of *culture areas,* first conceived by Boas in the course of an examination of material objects from different districts for purposes of museum exhibition.[50] The tendency of such objects to fall into geographically circumscribed groups was then tested out with reference to other aspects of culture, and presently it became apparent that the cultures of the North American Indians could be grouped into a number of culture areas characterized by relatively distinct sets of cul-

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to sharpen his natural gifts for field work and to develop that particular interest in the Indians of the northern coast to which he has remained true to the present day. His first appointment in the United States was at Clark University, then in its prime, where he taught physical anthropology, utilizing this opportunity to apply the methods of mathematical statistics to the dynamic problems of somatology. But it is not until his appointment to a professorship at Columbia and a curatorship of anthropology at the Museum of Natural History in New York that his influence on anthropological studies in this country began to be felt. An immensely valuable collection of Boas's theoretical writings is now available in his *Race, Language and Culture* (The Macmillan Company, 1940).

[49] It would carry us too far into the family squabbles of American anthropologists if I undertook to comment here on the question whether Boas's orientation is historical, a-historical, or anti-historical. To critics such as Radin (see his *Method and Theory of Ethnology*) and Kroeber (see his "History and Science in Anthropology," *American Anthropologist,* XXXVII [1935], pp. 539–69), I can only reply here that to the best of my knowledge and understanding, based on eighteen years of personal association and many more of literary contacts, Boas's orientation is "historical" in the sense in which I understand this term and in which it is understood by many historians with whose works I am familiar. If Boas is at times overcautious in his estimate of historical reconstructions, this is due to his dislike of speculative constructs, but does not argue against his historical point of view.

[50] There is an obvious relationship here to Bastian's "geographical provinces" with the difference that, whereas his "provinces" remained, in the main, a philosophical concept without further use for the interpretation of cultural facts, the culture areas of American anthropologists function heuristically as a classificatory device with historical and geographical references.

tural features. Not that any particular form of art or social organization or material culture was limited to one culture area. Here and there this was so, as, for example, in the case of the Eskimo; but what was true, as a rule, was that a whole complex of traits and their inter-relations were recognized as characteristic of an area, whereas the separate traits frequently overstepped area boundaries in their distribution.

The concept of culture area, as developed in anthropology, must be recognized as an important sociological concept with an objective and a psychological reference. In so far as an area is characterized by a mere enumeration of culture traits, the concept remains objective. But as soon as the functional aspect, consisting in the inter-relations of such traits, is included, the emphasis is shifted to the psychological side. It should also be noted here that the culture area concept, although rooted in realistic features, is not wholly free from certain elements of subjectivity. The evaluation of the traits selected and to a degree even the very selection of certain traits as characteristic of an area, are based on judgments which are, within limits, subject to the caprice of a personal equation. Also, as was pointed out by Sapir, a culture area, while relatively stable, does not by any means represent a cultural complex permanently fixed in time. On the contrary, shifts and transmutations will inevitably take place. It thus comes about that the different culture areas distinguished in North America need not and probably do not represent cultural conditions belonging to strictly comparable chronological levels. All of these points had to be kept in mind if a useful heuristic concept were not to become a hindrance to anthropological research in America.[51]

[51] As soon as the culture areas had become acclimated in American ethnology, it became clear that the concept, if valid, should also be applicable to other continental areas. In pursuance of this idea, Melville J. Herskovits carried out a preliminary survey of African cultures resulting in a tentative grouping into culture areas. Similar attempts, more ambitiously oriented, had already been made by Graebner and his followers in Oceania, Australia and South America, but as was shown before, the "culture areas" (*Kulturkreise*) of these students do not represent historico-geographical realities but highly hypothetical constructions. It cannot, therefore, be said that the mapping of the primitive world into culture areas, as conceived and partially carried out by Frobenius, Graebner, Ankermann, Schmidt and others, has contributed fruitfully to the interpretation or even a significant classification of these cultures. On the culture area concept consult Clark Wissler, "Man and Culture," *The American Indian*, chap. xiv, pp. 57–63, and "The Relation of Nature to Man in Aboriginal America," pp. 110–57 (in the sections here noted of the last two works, Wissler deals especially with the problem of time sequence as related to distribution); Edward Sapir: "Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture, A Study in Method," *Geological Survey, Canada, Memoir 90, Anthr. Series*, No. 13; W. H. Holmes, "Areas of American Culture Characterization Tentatively Outlined as an Aid in the Study of the Antiquities," *Am. Anthr.*, n.s., XVI (1914), 413–6; Wilson D. Wallis, "Diffusion as a Criterion of Age," *ibid.*, XXVII (1925), 91–9; Melville J. Herskovits, "A Preliminary Consideration of the Culture Areas of Africa," *ibid.*, XXVI (1924), 50–63, *The Cattle*

Another concept associated with that of culture areas was that of *marginal areas.* Concrete studies of the distribution of cultural features had shown that the districts marginal to two or more areas were characterized by certain cultural features which belonged to the areas to which these districts were marginal. The study of such marginal areas proved a useful adjunct to the study of culture areas, especially from the standpoint of diffusion and cultural assimilation. In this connection, it became clear that a marginal area is marginal only from an objective standpoint, in so far, namely as its cultural content was common to two or more areas. Psychologically, on the other hand, a marginal area is a culture area like any other.[52]

In the realm of cultural dynamics, American students elaborated the concept of *pattern,* meaning by this that certain elements of form in objects or of functions in social and intellectual affairs are developed and subsequently standardized in a locality or tribe. Henceforth such standardized forms serve as a pattern or model for other objects or functions that may develop in the same domain of culture, and also exercise a sort of a cultural alliterative effect on traits or functions, of local or foreign provenience, which though originally different from the pattern, become in due time subject to its influence. Lowie applied this concept concretely to his studies of ceremonialism, Wissler to his detailed investigations of material culture; [53] I made quite extensive use of it in a theory of totemic

Complex in East Africa, reprinted from the *Am. Anthr.,* 1926. A stimulating critical discussion of the culture area concept, specifically as used by Wissler, will be found in Carter A. Wood's article, "A Criticism of Wissler's North American Culture Areas," *Am. Anthr.,* XXXVI (1934), 517–23, which is based on his doctoral dissertation (Yale), "A Critical Analysis of the Culture-Area Concept." Cf. also my *Anthropology* etc., chap. xxix, "Culture Areas in North America," pp. 475–80; and A. L. Kroeber, "The Culture-Area and Age-Area Concepts of Clark Wissler," *Methods in Social Science,* ed. S. A. Rice (1931), pp. 249–50.

[52] An obvious modern example, among others, is that of Alsace-Lorraine. To the inhabitants of the region their culture is just *their* culture, but to the residents of the neighboring French or German districts Alsace-Lorraine appears as a hybrid region in which French and German cultural elements are mixed.

[53] "Ceremonialism in North America," *Am. Anthr.,* Vol. XVI (1914), especially "Diffusion of Ceremonials" and "Ceremonial Patterns"; Goldenweiser, "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America," *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore,* XXVII, (1914), 411–36, especially "Diffusion and Pattern"; Wissler, "Material Culture of the North American Indians," *Am. Anthr.,* XVI (1914), 447–505, especially "Trait Association" and "Diffusion of Material Traits." In contrasting material traits with other traits of culture, Wissler has the following observations to make: "Material culture is heterogeneous and without a unifying technological concept; hence, patterns can exist only for traits based upon the same concept and even then are subordinated in detail to the nature of the materials . . . In short, 'the pattern theory' as applied to ceremonial traits has no similar significance in material culture; but, there are technological conceptions that prevail over considerable geographical areas and which constitute patterns of a kind, though in no case does any one of these unify the ma-

origins.[54] In his studies of Plains garments, Wissler showed how a certain pattern of garment cut prevailed over a large area of contiguous tribes and also to indicate variations from the pattern in minor details which became tribal characteristics.[55] Another striking instance of pattern dominance adduced by Wissler was that of medicine bags and associated rites among the Blackfoot Indians, where the acquisition of a medicine bag was controlled by a pattern of great rigidity.[56]

In the course of a critical examination of evolutionism which absorbed much of their time and was frequently enlivened by brisk controversy, American students came to use the concept of *convergence*. This concept, originally derived from biology, was first applied to cultural problems by von Luschan and Ehrenreich, then by Boas, Lowie and myself. By convergence is meant that two or more cultural features belonging to different cultures tend to develop certain similarities originally absent or less marked: there is convergence from greater difference to less difference. This concept has an obvious bearing on the evolutionary theory of parallelism, in so far as it makes it possible to interpret present similarities by convergence instead of by parallel series of developments.[57] In this connection, I had occasion to point out that the principle of limited possibilities increased the likelihood of convergence. If we designate a cultural task as a problem, then, if there is only one way in which the problem can be solved, convergence to that solution becomes inevitable. If the number of solutions is limited whereas the initial steps are more varied, then convergences are the more probable the smaller the number of possible solutions. This principle operates most strikingly and clearly in the domain of technology where the conditions and necessities of use provide a more or less definite limitation to the range of possible variation in the

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terial culture of a tribe" (*op. cit.*, p. 493); also: "It appears that in material culture the tendency is not so much to profit by borrowed, disparate technological ideas as to take over whole complexes with all their concepts. This is in contrast to the observed condition in ceremonial traits as noted in the 'pattern theory' (Goldenweiser), or the tendency of a tribe to have a more or less fixed conception of its own according to which important ceremonies are worked over (Lowie). The difference also serves to make clear that material culture is decidedly heterogeneous, or composed of disparate traits, whereas ceremonial culture is likely to be unified, or built around a fundamental idea" (*op. cit.*, p. 491).

[54] "The Origin of Totemism," *Am. Anthr.* (1911), reprinted in *History, Psychology, and Culture*, pp. 335–40.

[55] "Costumes of the Plains Indians," *Anthr. Papers, Am. Museum of Nat. Hist.*, XVII (1915), 39–91.

[56] "The Ceremonial Bundles of the Blackfoot Indians," *Anthr. Papers Am. Museum of Nat. Hist.*, VII (1911), 65–289, particularly "Origins of Rituals," pp. 100–6.

[57] Boas, "Review of Graebner's *Methode der Ethnologie*," *Science*, XXXIV (1911), 804–10; Lowie, "On the Principle of Convergence in Ethnology," *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore*, XXV (1912), 24–43.

solution of a technical problem. A knife, a pot, a canoe, must be such and such if they are to be a canoe, a pot, or a knife, therefore no matter where or how you begin, you must sooner or later solve the problem in one of the limited possible ways.[58]

In the field studies undertaken in North America, a number of methods were tried and developed, such as the regional survey method,[59] the method of individual variation (of which the biographical method is the most promising variant), the genealogical method, and the house-to-house canvass method. The method of individual variation was used most fruitfully by Paul Radin, who succeeded in establishing an uncommon degree

[58] "The Principle of Limited Possibilities in the Development of Culture," *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore,* XXV (1913), 259–90, reprinted with important modifications in *History, Psychology, and Culture,* pp. 35–55 (see especially footnote 1 on pp. 48–9).

[59] A notable instance of a regional survey is the work of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition. The tribes of the Northwest Coast were already well known before the studies of the Expedition began. Travellers' reports dating from the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries were available, by Dixon, Portlock, Vancouver, Mackenzie, von Langsdorff, and Lisiansky. Later W. H. Dall had published his *Alaska and its Resources* (1870), and Ivan Petroff his *Report on the Population, Industries, and Resources of Alaska* (1884). There was also the *Report on the Queen Charlotte Islands* by G. M. Dawson (1880), and the various publications by J. G. Swan. Soon after the completion of his work among the Eskimo of Baffin Land (1883–4), Boas turned his attention to the North Pacific tribes, publishing his findings in various German and American journals. He was thus no longer a novice in this district when he began his survey for the British Association for the Advancement of Science the results of which appeared in a series of *Reports on the North-Western Tribes of Canada* (1888–98). Before the publication of the last *Report,* the Jesup Expedition had already begun its work (1897). The basic problem which Boas and his associates had set themselves was to work out as fully as possible the cultural similarities (and, perhaps, relationships) of the tribes of the Northwest Coast of America (the Kwakiutl, Bella Coola, Haida, Tsimshian, and Tlingit) to the tribes of Northeast Siberia (the Chukchee, Koryak, Gilyak and Yukaghyr) which were separated from the American tribes not only by Bering Strait but by a wedge of Eskimo tribes in Alaska. The "field work" was undertaken, on the American side by Boas, Livingston Farrand, Harlan I. Smith, and John R. Swanton, on the Asiatic side, by the Russians, W. Bogoras, W. Jochelson, and I. Sternberg. The collection of data extended over five years (1897–1902), and the results have been appearing ever since in handsomely printed and lavishly illustrated volumes, under the editorship of Boas. Needless to say, a flood of light was thus shed on the cultural individualities of the tribes included in the survey, on the intertribal contacts in Northwest America and Northeast Siberia, on the cultural relations between America and Siberia. Even so, more work remains to be done, and other investigators are now engaged in it in the same areas. Regional co-operative surveys such as this (the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits is another instance) are among the most fruitful devices of modern ethnography. But they are hard to organize and to "swing." It may be worth noting also that the outstanding monographs on primitive tribes—Martin's on the Malay, Schultze's on the Bushmen and Hottentot, Malinowski's on the Trobriand Islanders, Spieth's on the Ehwe, and others—were the work of single men working in restricted areas. Cf. on this point p. 504.

of intimacy with the tribe investigated.[60] Upon constructing a tentative picture of the tribal culture on the basis of the accounts of his informants, Radin checked up his results by inviting other informants to describe or relate the episodes or tales already covered in the preliminary study. The variations and discrepancies thus disclosed contributed much to the deepening of the resulting picture. This method, as used by Radin and others, has done much to offset the exaggerated impression of cultural uniformity in primitive communities with which anthropologists were once obsessed.

The genealogical method which, as already stated, was introduced into ethnology by Rivers, has the obvious merit of objectivity and lends itself to the purpose of verifying the accounts of informants. It was used on a large scale and with gratifying results by C. M. Barbeau among the Tshimshan,[61] by Mrs. Elsie Clews Parsons among the Zuni and other tribes,[62] and by Miss Gladys Reichard among the Navajo.[63] Where the number of natives to be investigated is relatively small, the method of a house-to-house canvass has the merit of making the study exhaustive. This method was also used by Barbeau among the Tshimshan, and more recently by R. F. Fortune in his studies of the Melanesians of Dobu,[64] and Miss Hortense Powdermaker in her Lesu study.[65]

One of the outstanding contributions made by Boas to American ethnology and to anthropology in general lies in the domain of primitive linguistics. While a beginning, as we saw, had been made, the high development of the subject in America and the impressive collection of concrete linguistic studies now available, are almost wholly due to the infectious enthusiasm of Franz Boas and the methodological rigor on which he insisted. As a result, we now possess a considerable number of American Indian grammars which, by the way, lack none of the complexity

[60] *Crashing Thunder, the Autobiography of a Winnebago Indian; Primitive Man as a Philosopher;* "Religion of the North American Indians," *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore* (1914), pp. 335–73; *Social Anthropology* (1932), especially chaps. xxxiii, xxxiv and xxxv; and in 1937: *Primitive Religion, Its Nature and Origin.* Similar attempts were made with varying success by Boas and Benedict (mythology), Ruth Bunzel (art), Margaret Mead (general cultural orientation), Malinowski (personality), and others.

[61] Personal information.

[62] "Notes on Zuni," *Memoirs Am. Anthr. Assoc.,* Vol. IV (1917); "Laguna Genealogies," *Anthr. Papers, Am. Museum of Nat. Hist.,* Vol. XIX (1923).

[63] "Social Life of the Navajo Indians," *Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology,* Vol. VII.

[64] *Sorcerers of Dobu* (1932).

[65] *Life in Lesu* (1933). I might add to these remarks on the genealogical method that—like all methods—it may be abused. To be fruitful the genealogical tree must be fed—with data. Else it turns into so much timber. This stricture applies emphatically to Thurnwald's Salomon study and, to a degree, also to Miss Reichard's Navajo monograph.

and "cussedness" of grammars in general.[66] Primitive linguistics, valuable as such, also provides an irreplaceable technique for the study of certain aspects of culture. The more personal or esoteric features of a culture simply cannot be understood or even revealed unless the linguistic approach is adopted. The possibility of permitting the informant to speak his own language, speak freely and in a natural tempo, is an important condition for successful and detailed information. Sapir's meticulous study of Nootka medicines,[67] Radin's delicately discriminating psychological confessions of Indians,[68] Boas's reconstructions of Tshimshan social organization, based on native texts covering a wide range of topics [69]—all these and numerous other studies would have been impossible without the use of the linguistic method.[70]

As in the case of evolution, so in that of diffusion, American students supplemented their critical discussions of other authors by the local application of the concept. In his study of the maize culture complex, Wissler showed how the white farmer adopted virtually in its entirety the preexisting complex of maize cultivation as practised by the Indians.[71] By a minute comparative analysis of Plains tribes he was enabled to substantiate his conclusion that the Blackfoot must have borrowed from others practically their entire cultural baggage.[72] In his particularly illuminating study of the horse in relation to Plains culture, he further emphasized the fact that the inter-relation of traits was a more significant aspect of a culture or of a culture area than the mere co-existence of such traits, and that it was from this angle that the emergence of the horse in Plains culture became significant. No new cultural traits were added except those directly related to horse culture, but Plains culture became transformed, in a sense almost created, as a result of the enhanced possibilities of communication provided by the horse and of the changes thus induced in the buffalo hunt and in warfare, the two cherished pursuits of the Plains.[73] Similarly Lowie, by way of a detailed comparison of

[66] *Handbook of American Indian Languages,* 2 vols., ed. F. Boas (see Boas's "Introduction," pp. 1–84).

[67] Personal information (cf. Sapir's *Language*).

[68] *Crashing Thunder.*

[69] "Comparative Study of Tshimshan Mythology," *Reports Bur. of Am. Eth.,* Vol. XXXI.

[70] Malinowski in his Trobriand work—the source of several exciting monographs—used the linguistic approach systematically, and in his *Coral Gardens and their Magic* he has capped these studies with an "ethnographic theory of language."

[71] "Aboriginal Maize Culture as a Typical Culture Complex," *Amer. Jour. of Soc.,* Vol. XXI (1916).

[72] "Material Culture of the Blackfoot Indians," *Anthr. Papers, Am. Mus. of Nat. Hist.,* V (1910), 1–177.

[73] "The Influence of the Horse on the Development of Plains Culture," *Am. Anthr.,*

Plains age societies, was able to trace the extent and direction of diffusion, borrowing and assimilation of special features in these societies.[74] Radin, in his study of the Peyote, showed how Christian doctrine and the pre-existing Indian attitudes became mixed and amalgamated, at times beyond recognition, in the rites of the Peyote.[75] One of Boas's contributions to the subject of diffusion took a statistical form, in this case in application to myths. In his elaborate study of Tshimshan mythology, in a setting of a vast comparative material, American and Siberian, he succeeded in a number of instances in indicating the extent and direction of diffusion of tales and separate incidents.[76]

Attempts at an analytical disentanglement of highly involved culture complexes were made by Radin in application to the Midewiwin ritual,[77] by Ruth Benedict in her study of the guardian cults of the American Indians,[78] and by myself in a study of totemism.[79]

XVI (1914), 1–25. Cf. also Francis Haines, "Where did the Plains Indians get their Horses?" *Am. Anthr.*, XL (1938), 112–8.

[74] "Plains Indian Age Societies," *Anthr. Papers, Am. Mus. of Nat. Hist.*, XI (1916), 877–1031. This study, though no longer recent, remains a model of a methodologically impeccable analysis of diffusion in a restricted district.

[75] "A Sketch of the Peyote Cult of the Winnebago," *Jour. of Rel. Psych.*, XII (1914), 1–22.

[76] These applications of the statistical method to ethnology by Boas were preceded by similar attempts made by others, such as those of Tylor as far back as 1889 ("On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions, Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent," *Jour. of the Anthr. Inst. of Great Britain and Ireland,* XVIII, 245–69), and Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg in their *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* (1915). Without going into the subjects investigated in these two studies (models of patient endeavor in both instances!), there is this to be said: Tylor as well as Hobhouse and his collaborators used a "tribe" as the unit in their computations. That is, if a custom, such as avoidance between husband and wife, occurred in a tribe, this was counted as one instance. In this way the number of tribes examined seemed sufficient to justify a statistical approach. It was, however, overlooked that numerous tribes were included in this collection which were contiguous to each other. Now, if two neighboring tribes have a similar or identical custom, diffusion is the common, at times inevitable, explanation. This being so, the two tribes would represent *one* instance (not two instances!) of the occurrence of the custom. If then allowance were made for this factor (including many doubtful instances), the total number of cases would be reduced so considerably as to preclude the use of statistical method. It is for this reason that the laborious efforts of Tylor and Hobhouse cannot be regarded as successful. It need occasion no surprise, then, if no other similar attempts seem to have been made. Cf. the discussion in Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 751–53.

[77] "The Ritual and Significance of the Winnebago Medicine Dance," *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore* (1911), pp. 149–209.

[78] "The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America," *Mem. of the Am. Anthr. Ass.*, XXIX (1923).

[79] "Totemism, an Analytical Study," *Jour. of Am. Folk-Lore,* Vol. XXIII (1910), reprinted in revised form in *History, Psychology, and Culture,* pp. 213–332.

In summarizing briefly some of the basic tenets of what for short may be designated as the American School, the following features may be mentioned. With the evolutionists, the psychic unity of mankind is admitted, as well as the ever present origination of cultural traits by invention. But the tenet of uniformity in cultural developments is rejected as contrary to historic reality. With the diffusionists it is admitted that cultural traits and trait complexes will travel, also that the impact of culture upon culture is of the greatest significance as a dynamic factor in cultural growth. But the tendency of some diffusionists to regard the concept of diffusion as a principle of interpretation rather than merely as a heuristic tool is categorically rejected. The verdict of diffusion, it is held, is based on the evaluation of similarities, such evaluation being as a rule inconclusive and almost always subjective, at least to a degree. Hence, we may not dispense with the correctives of geographical location and of the probability or demonstrability of historical contact. It is believed that culture everywhere is in the main the same in its basic processes; therefore the gaps in our knowledge due to the paucity and fragmentariness of the primitive past can be filled in by concrete studies of primitive cultures still available for investigation. Only when thus equipped, may we venture upon guarded reconstructions. While admitting, with the older ethnologists, that primitive culture is characterized by a remarkable uniformity brought about by the dominance of tradition and pattern, the critical ethnologist makes his reservations. He is now able to point out that a more minute study has revealed a considerable range of individual variation and fluctuation within every primitive culture. Primitive life, moreover, has its creative individuals, even though their achievements may be narrowly circumscribed by social norms. The linguistic method, finally, is recognized as an always important and sometimes indispensable tool not merely in the study of language as such but of the rest of culture. Only in this way can the less obvious aspects of primitive beliefs and attitudes be revealed and understood.

V. Recent Trends

1. *Functionalism.* Now that this term has become technical it takes some effort to realise that the underlying principle has been applied for a long time in American ethnology and elsewhere. On the face of it, the term means that objects, customs, institutions, are significant to the student, whether anthropologist or social scientist, not merely by what they are but by what they do, by their functions. "A social unit is what it does." In functioning, cultural traits become linked up. From the objective standpoint, they become part of complexes of associated traits. And psychologically they acquire new meanings and interpenetrate.

Through symbolism artistic designs and carvings come to partake of religion, mythology, social status. A social unit, such as a clan, by its functions, becomes part of the economic, legal, religious, ritualistic, political life of a tribe. Any object of material culture, though relatively impervious to psychological factors, fluctuates in meaning with its use. As a tool, it is part of the tribal technology or, perhaps, economy; as a weapon, it forms part of the war complex; as a decorative feature, it enters into the aesthetic life.

One of the favorite themes of Professor Boas, in his lectures, was this inter-relationship of cultural traits. His famous thrust against the evolutionists, that they tore cultural features from their historical or psychological settings, a dictum presently to become an anthropological commonplace, carries the same connotation.[80]

Speaking as an American anthropologist I might say: we all partook of functionalism once—before it acquired a capital F. With capitalization came new vistas and new difficulties.[81]

The prophets of the new Functionalism are A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinowski. Both are experienced field anthropologists and original theoreticians. Radcliffe-Brown once wrote an acceptable monograph on the Andaman Islanders, and more recently contributed a re-

[80] Lowie's section on functionalism, in his discussion of Boas (*History of Ethnological Theory,* pp. 142–4), gives a brief but adequate picture of this phase of the subject. The entire section on Boas (pp. 128–55) is well worth reading.

[81] Let me quote here from my "Totemism, an Analytic Study," *Jour. Am. Folklore,* Vol. XXIII (1910). I am quoting the non-revised version, to place it chronologically with reference to modern functionalism: "We see how deeply the belief in guardian spirits has entered into the life and thought of the people of British Columbia; and the particular forms and applications of that belief are as varied as they are numerous. Reared on the fertile ground of a general animism, guardian spirits among the Thompson River Indians, embrace the greater part of animate and inanimate nature. Through the medium of art the realm of magical potentialities becomes still wider; for when the representation of a spirit protector is carved on an implement or weapon, the object becomes a carrier of supernatural powers. Among the Kwakiutl, the guardian-spirit idea stands in the center of a complex system of secret societies and initiation ceremonies. With the approach of winter, the guardian like a ghost of the past, emerges from its summer retirement, and, through the medium of names, transforms the social organization of the people. Among the Haida and Tlingit the belief in the magical powers of supernatural helpers has engendered a prolific growth of shamanistic practices. The type of clan and family legend prevalent on the entire coast, particularly among the Tsimshian, Haida and Tlingit, consists of an account of how the ancestor of the clan or family met his guardian spirit and obtained from it its supernatural powers; and in the dances of the secret societies that mythological motif finds its dramatic embodiment. The guardian-spirit idea also becomes one of the standards of rank found among these people. The greater the powers of an individual's supernatural guardian, the more respect he commands; while secret societies rank according to the powers of their members" (pp. 218–9). This, I submit, is functionalism (without capital).

markable treatise, both systematic and synthetic, on the social organization of Australian tribes (*Oceania,* Vol. I), based in part on his own researches *in loco*. Malinowski's native experience, though limited in range (the Trobriand Islanders of Northwestern Melanesia), is extraordinary both in the mass of published material and in the remarkable discernment and penetration exhibited by the author.[82] Both authors have been prolific in their contributions to theory.

In his masterly article "Culture" in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Malinowski expounds a functional position which, in its basic features, would, I presume, be acceptable to most anthropologists; but the same article contains items of lop-sidedness and exaggeration of the sort responsible for the equivocal status of the new Functionalism. "The simplest as well as the most elaborate artifact is defined by its function, the part which it plays within a system of human activities; it is defined by the ideas which are connected with it and by the values which surround it." Excellent! This would prove acceptable to any functionalist, however old-fashioned. What holds for artifacts applies *a fortiori* to social forms and to the imponderables of religion, morality and art. The way these features are absorbed in a culture and held tight in a network of interconnections is described by Malinowski with great skill. But he goes further. In a series of pregnant paragraphs he depicts the passage of man from the organic to the psycho-social level. Culture is thus made to appear as a formalized and traditional super-structure arising, dynamically and pragmatically, out of the original urges of man. In a final passage, not original but formulated with precision and succinctness, he then defines culture in the following words:

> Culture is then essentially an instrumental reality which had come into existence to satisfy the needs of man in a manner far surpassing any direct adaptation to the environment. . . . Culture, the cumulative creation of man, extends the range of individual efficiency and of power of action; and it gives a depth of thought and breadth of vision undreamed of in any animal species. The source of all this consists in the cumulative character of individual achievements and in the power to share in common work. Culture thus transforms individuals into organized groups and gives these an almost indefinite continuity. . . . Organization and all concerted behavior, the results of traditional continuity, assume a different form for every culture. Culture deeply modifies

[82] Among his descriptive works the following should be noted: *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922), an elaborate account of the highly ritualised trading expeditions of the Trobrianders; *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia* (1929), which, in addition to sex, covers kinship, magic, ritual; and *Coral Gardens and Their Magic,* 2 vols. (1935), probably his most solid work, in which the gardening activities of the natives and associated customs and ideas are subjected to minutest scrutiny. The book also contains an "ethnological theory of language." It is hard to read, but worth the effort (cf. also his "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages," in *The Meaning of Meaning* by Ogden and Richards, pp. 451–510).

human innate endowment, and in doing this it not only bestows blessings but also imposes obligations and demands the surrender of a great many personal liberties to the common welfare. . . . Although culture is primarily born out of the satisfaction of biological needs, its very nature makes man into something essentially different from a mere animal organism. Man satisfies none of his needs as mere animal. Man has his wants as an implement-making and implement-using creature, as a communing and discoursing member of a group, as the guardian of a traditional continuity, as a toiling unit within a co-operative body of men, as one who is haunted by the past or in love with it, as one whom the events to come fill with hopes and with anxieties, and finally as one to whom the division of labor and the provisions for the future have given leisure and opportunities to enjoy color, form and music (p. 645).

An admirable statement that every social scientist may well take to heart.[83]

Against this background, however, Malinowski comes to see the different aspects of any culture, in the concrete, as constituting meaningful and significantly interrelated wholes. Here the cogency of the argument breaks off. One way of misreading culture is to read meaning and univocal determination into every bit of it. Here organism is made to defeat history by forcing upon it an illusory unity and preordained specific significance which, in fact, it does not possess—except in spots. In his attack upon the diffusionists Malinowski is certainly right when he states (p. 624) that they build their argument upon "irrelevant form and fortuitous concatenation." But he surrenders uncritically to his "theory" (see definition of functionalism, above) when he refuses to admit the diffusion of single traits, the existence of "necrotic" survivals or the reality of fortuitous trait complexes. Here his argument becomes purely literary: "If culture in its material aspect [but any other aspect would do as well, *A.G.*] is primarily a body of instrumental artifacts, *it seems at first sight improbable* [italics in these quotations mine, *A.G.*] that any culture should harbor a *great many irrelevant traits,* survivals or fortuitous complexes either dumped down by some itinerant alien culture or handed over as survivals, useless fragments of a vanished stage. Still less is it likely that customs, institutions or moral values should present this necrotic or irrelevant char-

[83] Quoted from Malinowski's "Culture," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* by permission of the Macmillan Company, Publishers. In his article, "The Group and the Individual in Functional Analysis," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLIV (May, 1939), 938–64, Malinowski develops this concept of culture still further. On p. 942 he submits a chart, as a "Synoptic Survey of Biological and Derived Needs and their Satisfaction in Culture" (q.v.) which is used as a point of reference in the subsequent analysis. But is this functionalism? The author tells us that it is: "Indeed, functionalism is, in its essence, the theory of transformation of organic—that is, individual—needs into derived cultural necessities and imperatives" (p. 962). Surely a dictum such as this is not calculated to help us grasp the meaning of functionalism even (read "particularly") as used by Malinowski himself.

acter in which the evolutionary and diffusionist schools are primarily interested" (*Ibid.,* p. 625 by permission). As against this, one must say that single traits or coupled traits do, in fact, diffuse, as well as larger complexes of traits; that survivals far from being a fiction of the evolutionists (though of course, abused by them) are real, leading to cultural misfits or to those loosely floating (Malinowski's necrotic) traits so common in all cultures, as well as to culturally readjusted or transfigured traits; that, finally, fortuitousness or conditionality is profoundly characteristic of culture as a historic product, which, though organically determined in some respects, is, in others, "that thing of shreds and patches" [84] of which Lowie speaks.

We must therefore also reject Malinowski's *ex cathedra* statement "that [functional anthropology] holds that the cultural process is subject to laws and that the laws are to be found in the function of the real elements of culture. The atomizing or isolating treatment of cultural traits is regarded as sterile, because the significance of culture consists in the relation between its elements, and the existence of accidental or fortuitous culture complexes is not admitted" (*ibid.,* p. 625 by permission). What "laws" does Malinowski have reference to? Even were we to admit that such laws were possible, surely we should insist on their problematic character. What can he mean by "not admitting" the existence of fortuitous complexes except that he refuses to accept it? In making this stricture it must, of course, be remembered that "fortuitous" here does not mean "uncaused," therefore miraculous, but merely unforeseeable, hence not subject to formulation as laws or principles.[85]

As to the atomizing or isolating treatment of culture traits, there is this to be said. No one could object to the statement that "the diversity of function, not the identity of form, is relevant to the student of culture" (*ibid.,* p. 625 by permission), *provided* that what we are concerned with is the dynamic or operational aspect of a trait. But every trait also has a static, purely descriptive, or formal aspect. When this claims our attention the pure "is"ness of the thing, custom, belief, institution, becomes of prime concern. It is all very well to say with Ratzel that objects of material culture are "things in which ideas dwell"; ideas apart, these objects are just things having certain physical characteristics, measurable perhaps (if the objects are material) or at any rate describable. Now it is here that formal similarity, or, as a logical limit, identity, becomes important. In connection with diffusion and whenever conditions are such as to render it problematic,

[84] *Primitive Society,* p. 441. (In point here is the brief critique of extreme functionalism in the chapter on Historical Sociology, present volume pp. 500–1.)

[85] On the concept of accident, in this context, see my "History, Psychology and Culture," *Jour. Phil. Psych. and Sci. Meth.,* XV (Oct., 1918), pp. 26–9, and "The Concept of Causality in the Physical and Social Sciences," *Am. Soc. Rev.,* III (Oct., 1938), pp. 635–6.

similarity, as between two objects in two cultures, is rightly deemed significant, especially so when the objects or traits are complex. If the similarity is very great (approaching identity) any anthropologist, including Malinowski, would regard this as *prima facie* evidence of diffusion. There are then situations where it is not function that counts but the sheer photographic selfhood of the thing.[86]

For the purpose of this essay, enough has been said, I trust, to make clear the distinction between the functional approach, as one of the indispensable tools of the ethnologist, and Functionalism with its sometimes exaggerated pretensions and dogmatic dicta. It is not possible here to supplement this with a similar analysis of Radcliffe-Brown's even more ambitious system.[87]

2. *The Individual.* The problem of the primitive individual has been occupying anthropologists for a long time. In the idyllic vision of a Rousseau, primal man was pictured as a virtuous animal, uncultural but unrestrained, and happy. A Durkheim, on the other hand, or a Lévy-Bruhl, impressed by the overweening power of society with its double-riveted hold (an outer and an inner) upon single man, left little room for individual variability or choice. Professional anthropologists, nurtured upon the ideology of folk-culture, on the whole minimized the rôle of the individual in primitive society. This attitude, however, could not long hold out against the evidence of field workers who were amassing incontrovertible proof of individuality, variability, personal determination. The latter view could, moreover, be buttressed by cogent theoretical reasoning.

> The question naturally arises [I wrote in *Anthropology*] what then is left of the individual? Is there such a thing among primitives as individual freedom, or the sense of it? Paradoxically enough, there is. Society can prescribe a form, set a pattern, preside over a process, but the actual dynamics of it all,

[86] A fuller insight into Malinowski's position in the concrete can be secured by consulting his *Crime and Custom in Savage Society* and *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*. Compare also his lengthy "Introduction" to Hogbin's *Law and Order in Polynesia.*

[87] The serious student will find the relevant sources for such an analysis in Radcliffe-Brown's article "Primitive Law," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.,* in his "The Methods of Ethnology and Social Anthropology," *S. Afr. Jour. Sci.,* XX (1923), 124–47, and "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies," *Br. Ass. Adv. Sci.* (1931). Lesser's critique, "Functionalism in Social Anthropology," *Am. Anthr.,* n.s., XXXVII (1935), 386–93, will also be useful, as well as Radcliffe-Brown's reply, "On the Concept of Function in Social Science," *Ibid.,* pp. 394–402. A rather comprehensive review of both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski will be found in Lowie's *History of Ethnological Theory,* pp. 221–49. The relation of Radcliffe-Brown to Durkheim can be gleaned from the final theoretical section of the former's article in *Oceania* (Vol. I) referred to before and from W. Lloyd Warner's interesting Australian book, *A Black Civilization* (see especially pp. 229–33 and chap. XI: "An Interpretation of Murngin Totemism and its Ritual Logic" [the entire Part III is entitled "Absolute Logic"]).

eludes society. When all is said, the day's work and play are in the hands of individuals, particular persons. Baskets, pots and canoes, traps, dances, songs and rituals must be such and such, and as a means, society offers or prescribes traditional techniques. Thus the limits are set, and they are narrow indeed. But within these limits the processes remain plastic. Anyone familiar with techniques knows that there can be no absolute standardization. It is like the rules and skills of a game; these are given but then there is the game itself, consisting of a series of events or acts which can neither be foreseen nor determined in advance. So also with industry, hunting, or fighting. The individual starts out with his patterns, but within these limits he must meet the emergencies of time, place, and event. It is the difference between learning how to shoot and shooting to wound or kill, the difference between knowing how a pot is made and how to make a pot, the difference between shadow-boxing and a prize fight (p. 413).

Then, passing to the psychological aspect of things:

Here we must first of all dispose of the notion that primitive man, as an individual, views his culture, his patterns, as a whole which he can contemplate, analyse or juxtapose to himself. It is certain that nothing of the sort occurs, at least not in the case of an average person, which means the vast majority. To him his culture is a much more particular and intimate thing. It comes as experience, or rather as numerous experiences, in education, training, work, ritual, chase, war, social contacts. In each and all of these situations, patterns knock at the door of the individual. But now note this: the pattern has two aspects—a negative and a positive. In its negative capacity a pattern excludes the unacceptable and therefore proscribed; in its positive capacity it prescribes and delineates the acceptable—the pattern is its model. A pattern in a given sphere is then a taboo on anything outside the pattern, as well as an invitation or command to reproduce the pattern itself. From the latter standpoint the pattern sets a task; it indicates what one is expected to do. . . . In the absence of criticism and choice, the pattern here is scarcely ever thought of or felt as a limit; rather is it a model. There is no frustration of impulse, merely guidance and direction. The pattern defines a task, concrete and complete. It points the road one is to travel. When we say, therefore, that primitive life is weighed down by patterns, the metaphor is unfortunate; rather should we say that it is carried by them.[88]

It is true that primitive culture also knows its nonconformists, offenders, heretics. These persons may have the courage—or weakness—to deviate from the norm, but they do not, except most rarely, entertain any thought of changing the existing order. And certainly all the rest, the great conforming majority, accept their society as an unchanging element, as something given, and without quite knowing what it is they are accepting. A weight one is not aware of is only half a weight. Even as the animal bends its instinctive nature to an

[88] Cf. my "Loose Ends of Theory on the Individual, Pattern, and Involution in Primitive Society," *Essays in Anthropology,* presented to A. L. Kroeber (1936), pp. 99–102.

existence full of excitement and gusto, so does the primitive, while bowing to the pattern, lead a life rich in content and animated in tempo (pp. 413–6).

Another aspect of the problem received illumination at the hands of meticulous and highly trained field workers. It has been said that in the dark all cats look black. In the darkness of vague and confused apperception, all primitive individuals seem alike. Not so to the experienced field technician. More or less prolonged residence in a primitive tribe coupled with the recording of information in native text and, in some instances, actual command by the investigator of the native language, have resulted in much fresh insight. We know now that the primitive artists, though following a more or less stringent pattern, differ in many details (as in the Plains or especially in the Pueblo region), that story tellers vary both the content and form of their tales, that the religious experiences of individuals, however conforming to a set routine, reflect the specific cultural background, temperament and personality of the devotees. Here the pioneering work of Paul Radin proved little short of epoch-making. There is probably no other anthropologist with his equipment who has spent so many years in systematic labor with one tribe, the Winnebago. Boas's work with the Kwakiutl was as systematic and comprehensive and even more prolonged, but even Boas, with his wonderful gifts, lacks those special talents of a field worker which Radin possesses to an eminent degree.[89]

[89] See in this connection chapters i, ii, iii, and iv of his *Method and Theory of Ethnology* (1933) in which he deals with great insight, though not without personal animus, with "the presuppositions of the ethnological method" in the United States, England and the Continent, and the factors involved in field work. There is much here that space does not permit elaborating, but let me note the very interesting reflections on the overemphasis on material culture so long prevalent among ethnologists. That this, in the first place, was due to the simple fact, noted by Radin, that "specimens," fragments of material culture, could be easily collected and described (p. 93), is obvious enough. It is equally true, though less obvious, that this led to the lack of appreciation and understanding of the rôle of the individual in aboriginal civilization and the naïve application of an antiquated form of the theory of economic determinism . . . "traceable directly to its influence, not to mention the various quantitative interpretations so popular today" (p. 95). (Quoted by permission of the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., Publishers.)

Radin's comments on the importance of native texts are so important as to deserve a passing reference even in this essay which, of course, is not primarily meant for ethnologists. After giving due credit to Boas for his insistence on the value of text material Radin continues: "Owing to circumstances over which the investigator often has no control, this primary requirement (texts) is, however, frequently not fulfilled . . . it must be clearly recognized that every type of information suffers to some extent, if it is obtained in translation, and that some of it is rendered almost useless for certain types of intensive work. Even when investigators are fortunate enough to enlist the active services of natives in securing their facts, if they are obtained in translation, much of what would normally be gained by such a procedure is lost. Information on material culture, for obvious reasons, suffers least. That on

Radin's first extended contribution to the study of primitive personality assumed its final book form in 1926 under the title *Crashing Thunder, The Autobiography of an American Indian* (edited by Radin). As this is almost an unique instance of a primitive "case study" of any length, I shall let the author tell us how he secured it:

In the year 1909 I commenced field investigations among the Winnebago Indians living on the Nebraska side of the Missouri River. . . . Among these Indians there lived a family named Blow Snake, consisting of a father and a fair number of children all grown up. Two of these were men quite well known in the tribe for a variety of reasons. These two became my principal informants. They had lived the most exciting of lives, for to the usual round of adventures that fall to the lot of most Indians of that region now, they had added a murder and a conversion. . . . The older of the two seemed to be by far the more gifted. His memory was simply prodigious. He recounted to me a ceremony which took him two months, working practically six hours a day, to tell me . . . he wove my presence among the Winnebago just then, into the whole fabric of his life. I was the preordained one who had sensed what was the proper time to come to the Winnebago. . . . It was from him that I obtained a sketch of reminiscences which short as they were, threw more light on the real Indian than any of the more elaborate things I had collected in the usual external fashion which is the pride of scientific procedure among ethnologists.

It was from the perusal of these "reminiscences" that the idea developed within me of getting a real autobiography, and having heard vaguely of the adventures and tribulations of Crashing Thunder, the younger brother of the family, which seemed to bear all the earmarks of a true rake's progress, I approached him about the matter, to receive a meaningless affirmative reply. . . . Well, ultimately the autobiography was written out by the Indian in syllabary. . . . It is the manuscript translated literally that is here presented [continues the author]. No changes of any kind have been introduced. Certain things,

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religion and literature, on the other hand, loses almost all of its significant character in translation. And if a wide-spread impression exists today that little attention has been paid, in aboriginal civilizations, to religious speculation or to distinctions customary in our own religious thought or that primitive literature is only folklore in our sense of the term, that, I cannot help feeling, is due to the unauthentic manner in which the data have been gathered" (p. 105).

Statements such as Radin's (together with the evidence he adduces) should be taken to heart by every social scientist. Students of modern society, sociologists in particular, have during the last quarter century or so, shown increasing interest in anthropological material but they remain naïvely indifferent to ethnographic procedures. If the rich cultural data furnished by primitive societies is to bring its full harvest for the use of the sciences of man, ethnographic monographs should be subjected to the same critical scrutiny, as to methods of procedure, which we bestow, as a matter of course, upon works of history. For the nature of the stuff is of the same order, in the two instances: it is human, complex, fringed by shades of meaning, and saturated with values. Cf. the discussion of idiography in the chapter on Constructive Typology, present volume, pp. 19–26, and of ethnology and sociology, chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 502–5.

however that Crashing Thunder had told me on previous occasions, which, for that reason, he merely mentions in the autobiography proper, I have inserted in their proper places. Everything in this manuscript comes directly from him and was told in the original and in the first person. It is needless for me to insist that I in no way influenced him either directly or indirectly in any way (p. xi).

Follows the autobiography which must be read—it can not, of course, be discussed here.

In his second contribution bearing on this topic, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (1927), Radin goes much further. He is now prepared to advance a working hypothesis to the effect that "thinkers" in our sense are not foreign to primitive cultures. In his foreword to Radin's book, John Dewey wrote as follows:

From the standpoint of the specialists in this intellectual territory, Dr. Radin's work is pioneering in quality; it introduces new perspectives in its assertion of the existence of a definite intellectual class proportionate in numbers and influence to the "intellectuals" in any civilized group, and one which is possessed of ideas upon most of the things which have formed the staples of philosophical discussion. It is easy to imagine his contribution becoming the center, almost a storm-center, of animated debate and heated controversy among the special students of primitive life (p. xv).

If the "storm" referred to by Dewey proved to be no more than a gentle breeze, the fault, I believe, was not Radin's. Anthropologists, like others, are as a group quite dyed-in-the-wool. Rather than examine the new perspective critically or otherwise, most of them preferred to raise an eyebrow and pass on. Yet there is much food for thought in Radin's book. Among the topics, which, he contends, primitive philosophers have pondered, we find "reality and the external world," "the nature of the ego and of human personality," "the nature of God," and the like. The evidence is in the form of prose and poetry and conversation. The attribution of the authorship, especially of its coming from one head, as a deliberate rational process, is, of course, in most instances conjectural. Considering the nature of primitive literary material—told, not written, and passed on by tradition—this is inevitable. Radin has the courage to regard as true what seems overwhelmingly plausible and intelligible, even though proof, in the sense of demonstrability, is not forthcoming.

Chapter V of Radin's book, "Freedom of Thought," carries a message of its own. He there shows that individual variability exists, as proved, for example, by the presence of different versions of a myth which "could be explained in terms of the temperament, literary ability, and interests of the story-teller" (p. 54).[90]

[90] "Among the [Winnebago], one man was famous for the human touches which he imparted to every tale; another, for the fluency with which he spoke and the choice

The author, of course, does not deny that the conservative majority, including many of the leaders, disapprove of irregularities, and of deviations from the "Party line." But he also points out that the only price the deviate must pay is facing sarcasm, ridicule, no more.

> But it is equally true that if one felt strong enough to stand the chaff and unpopularity and that the prestige value attachèd to the deviations or peculiarities definitely outweighed the disadvantages, then one could be certain of one thing, that no prosecution or persecution would take place. If a man chose to disbelieve in the efficacy of the spirits, apart from the ridicule to which he would unquestionably be subjected, this led to nothing worse than a shrug of the shoulders for his idiocy and uncalled-for bravado. *Essentially this was considered a matter of private concern* [italics mine, *A.G.*] although it probably would mean worry and concern to friends and relatives (pp. 54–5).

"That is my way of telling the story. Others have different ways," shot back one informant when pressed by the author for explanation.[91]

In his latest book, *Primitive Religion, Its Nature and Origin* (1937), Radin continues along the line of his thesis with special reference to religion. His claim is that among primitives, as in literate societies, there are people who are indifferent to religion, others—the large majority—who accept it with passivity, still others—the small élite—who are the religious creators and systematizers. He tries to substantiate his claim by a large number of concrete illustrations from different parts of the primitive world. Of course, as in case of *Primitive Man as Philosopher,* the illustrations call for interpretation which can easily become subjective.

Among the anthropologists of the new Functionalism with their disciples and followers, and among several of the younger members of the Boas school, the search for the individual has become something of an obsession. If the evidence adduced is not always convincing this is often due to the practice, criticized by Radin, of permitting interpretations to mar the native material, as is.[92]

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of his language; a third, for his dramatic delivery; a fourth, for the radical way in which he handled time-worn themes; a fifth, for his tremendous memory; a sixth, for the accuracy with which he adhered to the 'accepted' version, etc." (Radin, *Social Anthropology,* p. 364.) "We know that the artist who has obtained complete mastery over his technique invariably plays with his art. In a similar way the *raconteur* who has obtained complete mastery over his technique plays with his material and it is this play that becomes an important factor in the origin of different versions" (*ibid.,* p. 364).

[91] Note what Radin has to say in this connection about the "influence of the written word," the predominance of the visual sense, and the effect this has on the character of thought and the attitude towards thought in literate societies (pp. 61–2; cf. also *Method and Theory of Ethnology,* pp. 261 sqq.).

[92] Cf. Malinowski's works referred to above: Margaret Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea, Coming of Age in Samoa,* and *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies;* Reo F. Fortune, *The Sorcerers of Dobu* and *Manus Religion;* Hortense

In this matter of the individual, anthropology cannot be regarded as the herald of the new orientation. Rather does it come in the wake of a more general trend permeating the social and psychological sciences. It has been said that the Renaissance re-created the individual. But this was only against the background of the Middle Ages. The present rebirth of the individual has given him temporal depth. We are coming to realise that nature and nurture, germ-plasm and culture, though they explain much (with a *petitio principii* still unresolved), they do not explain all: when all is said, the individual is a function of time, not time in general but his own time, the sequential order of his own life's experiences. This sequence has about it all the earmarks of a historic series: it is complex, strictly individual (unique), irreversible, irreplaceable. To study it and grasp it we must adopt at least some of the tools of the historian. The psychoanalyst, the progressive educator, the social worker and sociologist, whenever they deal with individuals in biographical perspective, function, in part, as historians, though more or less incognito.[93]

3. *Configurations in Culture.* Like the problem of the individual, that of cultural integration has a long, if not always honorable, history. The pre-Wundtian German linguists and philosophers, Lazarus and Steinthal, represented the doctrine of the folk-soul, descendant of Hegel and Herder, a semi-mythical entity called upon to explain whatever eluded the approaches both of the individual psychologist and of the objective culturalist. In his *Ethik* and especially in the *Völkerpsychologie,* Wundt effectively laid low the specter of this doctrine. Or so it seemed. Wundt

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Powdermaker, *Life in Lesu;* Raymond Firth, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori;* Ian Hogbin, *Law and Order in Polynesia;* Jules Henry, "The Personality of the Kaingang Indians," *Character and Personality,* V (1936), 113–23; Ruth Landes, "The Personality of the Objibwa," *ibid.,* VI (1937), 51–60.

[93] This is what once led me to refer to the individual as a "historic complex *sui generis*" ("History, Psychology and Culture," reprint from *Jour. Phil., Psych. and Sci. Meth.,* XV [1918], p. 23). The recrudescence of a sense of the individual among sociologists, flanked by psychiatrists, can be gathered from the symposium in *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XLII (May, 1937), pp. 773–894, while Robert S. Lynd's recent *Knowledge for What? The Place of Social Sciences in American Culture* (1939) represents, among other things, a brilliant effort to salvage the individual from a complete ideological submergence in culture with which he was threatened. However true it may be, in some respects, that culture belongs to a level all its own, a dynamic view of the cultural process can only be secured by studying "culture *in* personality and personality *in* culture" (p. 53). Compare with this Boas's statement that "we must understand the individual as living in his culture; and the culture as lived by individuals." (Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture,* Introduction, p. xii. Cf. also Dr. Benedict's own statement: "It is always a give and take, The problem of the individual is not clarified by stressing the antagonism between culture and the individual, but by stressing their mutual reinforcement. This rapport is so close that it is not possible to discuss patterns of culture without considering specifically their relation to individual psychology" [*ibid.,* pp. 253–4]).

himself has been accused, though unjustly, of having absorbed something of the folk-soul while demolishing it. In the sociological theory of Durkheim "collective consciousness" appears at times to transcend the connotations of a term which might designate nothing but the sum total of social interactions. So also with Lévy-Bruhl. "Prelogical mentality," factual errors apart, is an innocent enough concept, but in the pages of its inventor it often suggests a *locus,* analogous to, but distinct from, the neural base of individual minds. Without pursuing this historical retrospect any further into the relevant but disturbing distinctions between "society" and "culture," on the one hand, and "wholes" and "integrative trends," on the other, let us now turn to the latest phase of this subject, as it appears in modern anthropology.

With some surprise one discovers that the field here is held by one book, Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* (1934). Even more markedly than in the case of Paul Radin with his individual, cultural configuration is pre-empted by Dr. Benedict. No one else in anthropology has so far attempted to duplicate her contribution. The fact that the atmosphere of anthropological discussion is more than a little touched by configurationism indicates the weightiness of Dr. Benedict's contribution, as well as the timeliness of the subject. *Patterns of Culture* opens up with some pages of anthropological commonplaces, to rise in the central section towards a distinctly original point of view which, in the final pages, culminates in fresh insight bearing on the relation of the individual to culture. We are reminded, to begin with, that primitive societies offer the only available laboratory for a comparative study of cultures.

> The most illuminating material [writes the author] for a discussion of cultural forms and processes is that of societies historically as little related as possible to our own and to one another. With the vast network of historical contact which has spread the great civilizations over tremendous areas, primitive cultures are now the one source to which we can turn. They are a laboratory in which we may study the diversity of human institutions. With their comparative isolation, many primitive regions have had centuries in which to elaborate the cultural themes they have made their own. They provide ready to our hand the necessary information concerning the possible great variations in human adjustments, and a critical examination of them is essential for any understanding of cultural processes. It is the only laboratory of social forms that we have or shall have (p. 17).

With the passing of primitive cultures their treasure trove of information is rapidly becoming depleted. In the words of Ramon, a "Digger Indian" informant of Benedict's: "In the beginning God gave to every people a cup, a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life. . . . They all dipped in the water, but their cups were different. Our cup is broken now. It has passed away" (p. 22). The broken pots of archeology

are such broken "cups" which reveal, or at times, disguise, all but a few aspects of civilizations that have passed away. But also among primitives who are still with us: their cups, if not broken, are cracking, and the life blood of lusty cultures is escaping through the cracks.

Out of an infinitely varied supply of cultural forms each local culture has selected some and has emphasized some:

> Each from the point of view of the other ignores fundamentals and exploits irrelevancies. One culture hardly recognizes monetary values; another has made them fundamental in every field of behavior. In one society technology is unbelievably slighted even in those aspects of life which seem necessary to insure survival; in another, equally simple, technological achievements are complex and fitted with admirable nicety to the situation. One builds an enormous cultural superstructure upon adolescence, one upon death, one upon afterlife (p. 24).

We are now moving in the direction of configuration. "From every part of the world and from all levels of cultural complexity, it is possible to illustrate the overweening and finally asocial elaboration of a cultural trait" (p. 32; cf. pp. 24, 36, 44). War, funeral rites, puberty, kinship regulations, have been cultivated, in different cultures, into "asocial" exaggerations.[94]

This process is by no means categorical and final: one choice, one line of elaboration, once and for all time. On the contrary, there are shifts and changes of mind, culturally speaking. So, once more:

> Every culture, every era, exploits some few out of a great number of possibilities. Changes may be very disquieting, and involve great losses, but this is due to the difficulty of change itself, not to the fact that our age and country has hit upon the one possible motivation under which human life can be conducted. . . . Becoming traditional, they (these changed orientations) would be given the same richness of content, the same importance and value that the older patterns had in other generations (pp. 36–7).[95]

While cultures, then, are varied in the extreme, each culture "tends also to be integrated."

> A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action.[96] Within each culture there come into being characteristic purposes not

[94] In connection with some of these "exaggerations" there may be a factor involved which lies off Dr. Benedict's line of argument. Compare my remarks on involution in "Loose Ends of Theory etc.," *Essays in Anthropology*, pp. 102–4.

[95] Novelists in the grand manner have often shown finer insight in such matters than sociologists, historians, or laymen. Compare the illuminating pictures of changing generations in Tolstoi's *War and Peace* or Galsworthy's *Forsyte Saga*.

[96] The moderation of this statement is to be noted. In other passages the expression is less felicitous. Cf. the strictures on these "less felicitous" passages presented in the chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 500–1, *et passim*.

necessarily shared by other types of society. In obedience to these purposes, each people further and further consolidates its experience, and in proportion to the urgency of these drives, the heterogeneous items of behavior take more and more congruous shape. Taken up by a well integrated culture, the most ill-assorted acts become characteristic of its peculiar goals, often by the most unlikely metamorphoses. The form that these acts take we can understand only by understanding first the emotional and intellectual mainsprings of that society (p. 46).

Here the author begins to take her cue from the *Gestalt* psychologists, as well as from such philosophical historians as Dilthey (q.v.) and Spengler. "The whole . . . is not merely the sum of all of its parts, but the result of a unique arrangement and interrelation of the parts that has brought about a new entity" (p. 47). Moreover, "the whole determines its parts, not only their relation but their very nature" (p. 52).

From *The Decline of the West,* Dr. Benedict borrows Spengler's two concepts which introduce his two "destiny ideas": the Apollonian for the Classical world and the Faustian for the modern. The author uses, by preference, Apollonian and Dionysian. She feels that Spengler's generalization is somewhat top-heavy on account of the great complexity and correlated internal inconsistency of the cultures he has chosen for characterization. For this reason and in her capacity of an anthropologist, she prefers to subject some primitive cultures to the same kind of analysis.[97]

Her choice fell upon three: the Pueblo tribes, especially the Zuñi, the Northwest tribes of the Pacific coast, especially the Kwakiutl, and the Dobuans of northwestern Melanesia, neighbors of Malinowski's Trobrianders. Of these, the Zuñi material has been in part collected by the author; among other writers she relies chiefly upon the excellent and recent data gathered by Ruth L. Bunzel; the Kwakiutl data comes, of course, mainly from Boas, but a considerable number of other writers are also drawn upon; the Dobu material derives almost exclusively from Reo F. Fortune's *The Sorcerers of Dobu,* a fact justifiably censured by Lowie.[98]

Space forbids me to reproduce the author's interpretation of all three

[97] "It is one of the philosophical justifications for the study of primitive peoples that the facts of simpler cultures may make clear social facts that are otherwise baffling and not open to demonstration. This is nowhere more true than in the matter of the fundamental and distinctive cultural configurations that pattern existence and condition the thoughts and emotions of the individuals who participate in those cultures. The whole problem of the formation of the individual's habit-patterns under the influence of traditional custom can best be understood at the present time through the study of simpler peoples. This does not mean that the facts and processes we can discover in this way are limited in their application to primitive civilizations. Cultural configurations are as compelling and as significant in the highest and most complex societies of which we have knowledge. But the material is too intricate and too close to our eyes for us to cope with it successfully" (p. 56).

[98] *History of Ethnological Theory,* p. 278.

cultures. Instead, let us examine somewhat closely the section on the Zuñi, an Apollonian culture, whereas the Kwakiutl and the Dobuans represent the Dionysian type.

> The Zuñi [we are told] are a ceremonious people, a people who value sobriety, inoffensiveness above all other virtues. Their interest is centered upon their rich and complex ceremonial life. Their cults of the masked gods, of healing, of the sun, of the sacred fetishes, of war, of the dead, are formal and established bodies of ritual with priestly officials and calendric observances. No field of activity competes with ritual for foremost place in their attention (p. 60).

Preoccupation with detail and meticulousness in performance are conspicuous here. There are, for example, more than a hundred masked gods. "Each . . . has individual details of costuming, an individual mask, an individual place in the hierarchy of the gods, myths that recount his doings, and ceremonies during which he is expected" (p. 68).

In comparison, "domestic affairs like marriage and divorce are casually and individually arranged" (p. 73). Thus,

> when the boy decides to ask her father for the girl, he goes to her house. As in every Zuñi visit, he first tastes the food that is set before him and the father says to him, as he must say to every visitor, "Perhaps you came for something." The boy answers, "Yes, I came thinking of your daughter." The father calls his daughter, saying, "I cannot speak for her. Let her say." If she is willing, the mother goes into the next room and makes up the pallet, and they retire together. Next day she washes his hair. After four days she dresses in her best clothes and carries a large basket of fine corn flour to his mother's house as a present (p. 74).

That is all there is to it! Think in comparison of the tremendous ado accompanying such occasions among the Trobrianders, or among ourselves, say, a generation ago.

Possessions, as such, count for little. No one "is concerned with the counting of possessions, but with the ceremonial rôle which he has taken. A 'valuable' family, in native parlance, is always a family which owns permanent fetishes, and a man of importance is one who has undertaken many ceremonial rôles" (p. 77).

In comparison with most other American Indian tribes the Pueblos are Apollonian.

> The desire of the Dionysian, in personal experience or in ritual, is to press through it toward a certain psychological state, to achieve success. The closest analogy to the emotions he seeks is drunkenness, and he values the illuminations of frenzy. [Even under modern conditions drunkenness is not a problem in the Pueblos] . . . The Apollonian distrusts all this. . . . He keeps the middle of the road, stays within the known map, does not meddle with disruptive psychological states (p. 79).

The purgatory which awaited the vision seeker on the Plains, including torture on occasion, is not known here. Concentration is all that is demanded. "'Keep thinking it all the time,' the old medicine man said always" (p. 81). It is important to remember, the author reminds us, that the usual accessories of the vision quest are all present here, "the seeking of dangerous places, the friendship with a bird or animal, fasting, the belief in special blessings from supernatural encounters" (p. 87); but the interpretation is different. Measure, Apollo, prevails. On certain ceremonial occasions whipping is practised here also but the rite is merely symbolic or formal: "the adults [the whipped ones are children] repudiate with distress the idea that the whips might raise welts" (p. 91).

The author draws a suggestive contrast between the dances of a Dionysian and an Apollonian people. "The Coca of northern Mexico have a whirling dance, . . . and the climax of it comes when the dancer, having reached the greatest velocity and obliviousness of which he is capable, whirls back and back and upon the very ground altar itself. . . . In his madness the altar is destroyed, trampled into the sand again. At the end the dancer falls upon the destroyed altar" (p. 94). Among the Hopi who also dance upon the altar in their Snake Dance, "there is no frenzy. It is prescribed, like a movement of a Virginia Reel" (p. 94), and similarly consists of the alternation of two dance groups. The frequently assumed danger from the snakes (rattlers) does not exist. For the occasion the serpents have been despoiled of their poison and are harmless. Of course, to an unaccustomed eye the performance looks gruesome enough, at that; but not to these priests: they take it in their stride, like the rest of the day's work. No horror. No thrills.

Perhaps the most suggestive contrast between the Plains Indians and these Pueblo folk is in their attitudes towards personal authority. With them, self-reliance, personal initiative, fearless leadership, make the man. Here, as among the Zuñi, "the ideal man . . . is a person of dignity and affability who has never tried to lead, and who has never called forth comment from his neighbors. . . . Even in contests of skill like their footraces, if a man wins habitually he is debarred from running" (p. 99).

In line with the preceding, all emotions, anger, love, jealousy, grief, are soft-pedalled among the Zuñi. "The fundamental tabu upon their holy men during their periods of office is against any suspicion of anger. Controversies, whether they are ceremonial or economic or domestic, are carried out with an unparalleled lack of vehemence" (p. 106).

This sketch will have to suffice; but perhaps enough has been said to make clear what Dr. Benedict means by Apollonian, and at least to suggest what she means by Dionysian. Zuñi, Dobuans, Kwakiutl "are travelling along different roads in pursuit of different ends, and these ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those of an-

other society, because essentially they are incommensurable" (p. 223).[99]

In commenting upon her own contribution, Dr. Benedict tries to forestall criticisms for dogmatism, tries in vain, as subsequent discussion has shown. At any rate, she is prone to admit that cultural integration is a matter of more or less, that some cultures apparently resist integration, whereas other ones achieve it under apparently adverse conditions. Also, she explicitly uses her two terms, Apollonian and Dionysian, merely as convenient catch-words, without holding out any expectation that these terms will continue to do synthetic service when applied to a wider material. With these few reservations, granted by the author, the concept of configuration in culture is likely to have an exciting career. If Benedict's book has so far failed to stimulate others to try likewise, this obviously is due to the great difficulty of such a task. The configurationist must not only possess a comprehensive descriptive knowledge of a culture, but he also must have insight (*Einfühlung*), a rare gift. Constantly he will have to resist the temptation of seeing unity or harmony where none or little exists. Another danger, often fatal to historians and cultural anthropologists, lies in the ease with which the student may be misled into substituting his own valuations or interpretations for those of the people he is studying. The difficulties, it will be seen, are considerable. But they are not more serious than those confronting the historian. Largely, in fact, they are the same difficulties. And we know that these are not insuperable.[100]

[99] Radin has expressed a very negative judgment about the concept of configuration as formulated by Benedict. "Her error," he writes, "consists in attempting a succinctness of characterization that fails because it is too refined. It is the essence of a civilization that she attempts to distill, and, to prevent its volatilization, she dogmatically includes and excludes in an unjustifiable and arbitrary manner. A real danger lurks in such a procedure. . . . Quite apart from this, it is doubtful whether distilled syntheses of this kind are ever applicable to culture. It is conceivable that they may hold for individuals, but they certainly do not hold for a specific culture . . ." (*Method and Theory of Ethnology*, p. 179–80).

It must, of course, be remembered that this extremely severe verdict was based on the reading of Benedict's "Configuration of Culture in North America" (*Am. Anthr.*, XXXIV [1932], 1–27), not on that of *Patterns of Culture* which was still unpublished at the time of Radin's writing. Also, he had his own axe to grind, as he was commenting upon Benedict as a culture historian. I believe, at any rate, that with the more comprehensive treatise before him, he must have modified his opinion.

[100] A word is due here to Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, 3 vols. (1937). The main subject of this enormous work is cultural fluctuation, in forms of art (Vol. I), of systems of truth, ethics and law (Vol. II), of social relationships, war, and revolution (Vol. III). The fourth volume, *Basic Problems, Principles and Methods*, is to follow. Of direct interest here is Vol. I, especially chap. i, "Forms and Problems of Culture Integration and Methods of their Study"; chap. ii, "Ideational, Sensate, Idealistic, and Mixed Systems of Culture"; and chap. iii, "Concrete Illustrations of the Chief Types of Culture Mentality."

Dr. Benedict's warning that the concept of configuration cannot safely be applied

In Chapter 8, "The Individual and the Pattern of Culture," the author's interest shifts to another theme, and here also she succeeds in making an original contribution. "The vast proportion of all individuals who are born into any society," we read, "always and whatever the idiosyncrasies of its institutions, assume, as we have seen, the behavior dictated by that society. . . . They do not all, however, find it equally congenial, and those are favored and fortunate whose potentialities most nearly coincide with the type of behavior selected by their society." For example, "those who, in a situation in which they are frustrated naturally seek ways of putting the occasion out of sight as expeditiously as possible are well served in Pueblo culture," whereas "those who react to frustration as to an insult and whose first thought is to get even are amply provided on the Northwest Coast" (pp. 244–5). Thus it happens that an individual who in our society would pass for a paranoiac, finds himself exalted among the Kwakiutl, while in Dobu the disoriented person is "the man who (is) naturally friendly and (finds) activity an end in itself" (p. 258). The abnormal person, then, socially speaking, is simply a cultural misfit.

Thus we find Dr. Benedict complaining that "the issue in psychiatry has been too often confused by starting from a fixed list of symptoms instead of from the study of those whose characteristic reactions are denied validity in their society" (p. 258). Many of these go under from the strain, become chronically "abnormal," others, suppressing their natural inclinations, succeed in accepting the culturally sanctioned patterns, like the Zuñi misfit who was too turbulent and violent for a society which distrusts all authority, but turned over a new leaf and—died governor of Zuñi. The *berdache* (homosexual) who in our society lives on the edge of imputed

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to modern, meaning literate, historic cultures, on account of their internal complexity and inconsistency, is beautifully illustrated by Sorokin's performance. His preliminary summary of the state of this problem in modern anthropology is throughout misleading, and, in spots, definitely incorrect. But let us pass this by. In establishing his own "systems" of culture, Sorokin does not deal with local primitive groups but with entire civilizations, at times of continental sweep; he does not restrict himself to portraying a culture with its values and predilections "at a moment of time," as it were, but attempts to synthesize periods centuries long. As all the cultures he examines are highly complex and shot through, more or less, with those inconsistencies of which history holds so many examples, his success, on the face of it, depends on what is left out or permitted to remain, on what is slurred over and what emphasized. Moreover, in a task requiring deep discernment and interpretative skill, he falls prey to a statistical method of procedure which, in such a context, proves next to meaningless. As a result, his culture systems, ideational, sensate, mixed and all, stand out as highly artificial concoctions against the innumerable facts cited as evidence. Small wonder that the fate that ultimately befalls him is not unlike that of the Indian in the story who aspired to climb to the stars, using a ladder for the purpose; but the ladder proves too short and he ultimately finds himself suspended in the air. Cf. the comment in the chapter on Historical Sociology, present volume, pp. 535–9.

perversion and even criminality, is among many Indian tribes a privileged and honored person.

Is it not time, then, to revise our psychiatric approach, making allowance for the social determination of so-called "abnormalities" which at the present time we are wont to interpret in psycho-biological terms?

In the second place [concludes the author significantly] an increased tolerance in society toward its less normal types must keep pace with the self-education of the patient. The possibilities in this direction are endless. Tradition is as neurotic as any patient; its overgrown fear of deviation from its fortuitous standards conforms to all the usual definitions of the psychopathic. This fear does not depend upon observation of the limits within which conformity is necessary to the social good. Much more deviation is allowed to the individual in some cultures than in others, and those in which much is allowed cannot be shown to suffer from their peculiarity. It is probable that social orders of the future will carry this tolerance and encouragement of individual differences much further than any cultures of which we have experience (p. 273).[101]

The sociologically oriented revamping of psychiatry advocated by Dr. Benedict will, of course, require much caution and in spots more knowledge than we now possess. But there is no denying the desirability of the social state prophesied in her final statement. Whether we may permit ourselves to hope for the proximate advent of these "social orders of the future" is another matter.[102]

I might fittingly conclude this section with a quotation from a modern psychoanalyst who combines with her professional competence more than a little understanding of the anthropological point of view. In her *The*

[101] In her *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies* (1935), Margaret Mead arrives at a very similar conclusion. Having found that her material throws doubt on the accepted attribution of different, and even contrasting psychological traits to men and women, she concludes as follows: "Historically our own culture has relied for the creation of rich and contrasting values upon many artificial distinctions, the most striking of which is sex. It will not be by the mere abolition of these distinctions that society will develop patterns in which individual gifts are given place instead of being forced into an ill-fitting mould. If we are to achieve a richer culture, rich in contrasting values, we must recognize the whole gamut of human potentialities, and so weave a less arbitrary social fabric, one in which each diverse human gift will find a fitting place" (p. 322). From *From the South Seas* by Margaret Mead, copyright 1935 by Margaret Mead, by permission of William Morrow and Co., Inc.

[102] A careful reading of the author's book can leave no doubt that on several occasions she found inspiration in the writings of the late Edward Sapir. Compare his "Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry," *Jour. Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, XXVII, 229–42; "The Emergence of the Concept of Personality in a Study of Cultures," *Jour. Soc. Psych.*, V, 408–15; and "The Contribution of Psychiatry to an Understanding of Behavior in Society," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XLII, 862–70. His older contribution, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXIX, 563–5, will also be found interesting and relevant. Consult, in addition, A. I. Hallowell's "Psychic Stresses and Culture Patterns," *Am. Jour. of Psych.*, XCII (1936), 291–310, and Barbara Aitken's "Temperament in Native American Religion," *Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst.*, LX (1930), 363–87.

Neurotic Personality of Our Time (1937) Dr. Karen Horney writes as follows:

> Making further use of anthropological findings we must recognize that some of our conceptions about human nature are rather naïve, for example, the idea that competitiveness, sibling rivalry, kinship between affection and sexuality, are trends inherent in human nature. Our conception of normality is arrived at by the approval of certain standards of behavior and feeling within a certain group which imposes these standards upon its members. But the standards vary with culture, period, class, and sex.
>
> These considerations have more far-reaching implications for psychology than appears at first impression. . . . It is no longer valid to suppose that a new psychological finding reveals a universal trend inherent in human nature.

Going what seems to me beyond the evidence, she continues: "The effect of all this is to confirm what some sociologists have repeatedly asserted: that there is no such thing as a normal psychology, which holds for all mankind" (pp. 18–9).

We are thus led to a conclusion which agrees with results arrived at, from another angle, in my examination of psychoanalysis (*q.v.* on pp. 427–9). It does not seem premature to hope that psychiatry, particularly psychoanalysis, purged of its own aberrations by the broadening anthropological vision, may yet come to function as a real help-mate of the sciences of human culture, and might show the sociologists and cultural anthropologists the way to a deeper insight into what is suggested by their own material.

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* Editorial *addendum.*

[15]

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

Howard Becker

I. "The Shape of Things to Come"

Vor Jahrhunderten hätte ein Dichter dieses gesungen?
Wie ist das möglich? Der Stoff ist ja von gestern und heut.[1]
GOETHE.

The midday sun beats down on Pharos, that lonely islet flecking the Middle Sea but a scant sail from Alexander's great city at the mouth of the Nile. Step softly over the monsters of the deep that share the slumbers of old Proteus, the shepherd of the flocks of Neptune, and lay firm hold upon him. Shout in his ear the questions answerable only by those who glimpse the future, and tighten your grip. Dreading his task of prophecy, Proteus twists and turns, but your clutching hands mock his strength, and lo! you wrestle with a lion, grapple with a bear, or grimly clamp your grasp still tighter to hold a writhing serpent. Fear not, for you have seized only the harmless Proteus, and in the end your will decides. His "strong enchantments failing," the old man of the sea yields at last, dons his wonted peaceful guise, and reluctantly shares with you his vision of things to come. Then, humbled by human courage, Proteus pipes retreat to his seaweed-trailing herds, and plunges into the cool green refuge that laps ceaselessly at the shore. You are alone on Pharos.

Or were, in Homer's time. . . . Today we know not Proteus, nor any of the gods, but our straining gaze is still turned toward the future. *Savoir pour prévoir* [2] has survived the nineteenth century to become one of the chief maxims of the twentieth; the mood of Lynd's *Knowledge for What?* [3] is that of the Greek who sought out the shepherd of Neptune.

[1] Translation:
"Did a poet sing this centuries ago?
How is it possible? The matter is of yesterday and to-day."

[2] This maxim we owe to Comte.

[3] Although we differ with many of the implications of Robert S. Lynd's book (New York, Princeton University Press, 1939), there is no essential disagreement with the main thesis. The social sciences *should* be "relevant to futurity." *Ultimate* value-relevancy cannot be escaped. It is one thing to say this, however, and quite another

"What does the future hold in store, and how can we prepare today for the events of tomorrow?" is an ever-recurring question. The values it dimly symbolizes are the key values of much of our work in social science; our efforts are "relevant to the values of futurity"—in short, *wertbezogen*.[4] We cannot escape, even if we would, from the scales of value implanted or elicited by our rapidly changing culture.

To be sure, this orientation toward the future is in no sense peculiar to ourselves; Proteus has been badgered by inquisitors since time immemorial. Yet there may be a difference between the ancients and the moderns; the men of old oftentimes posed questions touching on personal destiny or the fate of fellow-clansmen and small communities, whereas we are steadily becoming more and more concerned about the ultimate lot of nations or even of entire civilizations. Certainly the sages of bygone days were similarly concerned,[5] but we may well doubt the existence of an uneasiness as widespread as that which grips the world of today. The very fact that the Great Society has come to seem a possibility on the surface of a globe criss-crossed by countless strands of communication knitting together Hottentot and Eskimo, Frenchman and Brazilian, Russian and American, presses home to the humblest tabloid reader the further fact that the parts of the potential whole may destroy each other before his own life has reached its allotted span.

II. The Protean Questions

Wie? Wann? und Wo?—Die Götter bleiben stumm!
Du halte dich ans WEIL, *und frage nicht* WARUM? [6]

GOETHE.

Within the scope of this chapter, however, we cannot take account of the inarticulate yearnings of the masses; our task is to see "what thoughts of old the wise have entertained," and to compare them with the ideas held by whatever sages the world of our own time may have brought forth. Hence it is possible to say that the questions thrust at Proteus

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to say that questions of immediate social utility should dictate the choice of problem, the technique of research, or the rôle of scientist *qua* scientist.

[4] See Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (Boston, D. C. Heath & Co., 1938), Vol. II, Chap. XXIII, for discussion of this matter. Rickert and Weber are the key figures. Goldenweiser's chapter on the relation of the natural sciences to the social sciences, in this volume, pp. 93–109, is also important.

[5] Here a useful conspectus has been provided by J. O. Hertzler, *The Social Thought of the Ancient Civilizations* (New York, 1936).

[6] Translation:

"How? When? and Where? Silent remain the gods.
Restrict yourself to Because, and never query Why?"

have taken and still take the following forms: (1) What was the earliest condition of the creatures we call human, and how are those conditions changing with the lapse of time? (2) Can there be discerned an all-encompassing drift toward a single goal, in spite of the baffling maze of changes? (3) Are there any sequences or stages in societal development that when discovered will enable us to estimate the varying speeds at which the differing sections of mankind have approached the goal? (4) Can it be said that "History repeats itself" in any fundamental sense?

Obviously, these questions have often been asked in the same breath, as it were; those who clutch the writhing Proteus find little opportunity for nice distinctions. Still, we may provisionally consider the first two apart from the others, more especially as their aim seems on the surface to be the probing of the past rather than the discovery of the future. As we go on to examine them more narrowly, however, we shall see that even preoccupation with "first things" carries with it, as an inseparable counterpart, the contemplation of "last things."

III. From Mumbo-Jumbo to Darwin

Um niemand zu schelten, um niemand zu preisen,
Darf ich euch nur aufs Alte verweisen.[7]

GOETHE.

The problem of first things is often "solved" by preliterates in terms of a culture hero or charismatic leader who is sometimes a sort of trickster, sometimes a wise elder, sometimes a divine or divinely inspired law-giver. Fully armed from the brain of the culture hero springs the society, together with the altogether admirable institutions and practices wherewith it is clothed. Frequently a complete creation myth, a cosmogony, spreads an aura around Osiris, Gilgamesh, Yü the Great, or Shiva. Virtually all these stories share the traits of wonder-working power, disregard of the means-ends schema [8] enforced by the necessities of everyday life, and by the same token, a very slight measure of anything that can be called rationality. Here, in other words, we are confronted by two or more differing systems of logic: one which applies to that marvelous world veiled in the awesome mists of the past or beyond control in the present; the other, the logic of familiar materials, of accustomed

[7] Translation:

"In order to blame no one, in order to praise no one,
I can direct you only to the ancient."

[8] The index of Talcott Parsons' *The Structure of Social Action* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938) will provide numerous references on the means-ends schema. See also his chapter in the present volume, pp. 601–46.

manipulation, of ordinary person-to-person intercourse, of everyday things and events.

"Beginnings" are always arbitrary, but perhaps one of the earliest groups of thinkers who more or less rationally dealt with the problem of social origins and development were the Greek "tale-makers" and their successors, not least among them the Metics and Sophists who flourished as early as the sixth century B.C. These mentally mobile "strangers" in the sacred societies [9] of their day had been forced to develop what we may call techniques—and the Greek word from which technique is derived means indifferently art, skill, craft, trick, stratagem, ruse. That is to say, there had developed at this period several bodies of methods or means by which certain desired goals or ends could be attained in step-by-step, "causal" fashion. The means-ends schemas thus elaborated in and through the necessities of trade, warfare, organized communal life, handicrafts, money economy, and so on, were projected into the past, and the charismatic culture hero [10] began to be displaced by the reasoning mind of man.

Very popular, for example, was the theory of an originally animal-like, lawless state of Nature,[11] from which men emerged "according to plan." The first society, said our Greek exponents of technique, emerged when men fashioned a governmental compact, agreeing to refrain from violence toward each other and depositing their concentrated power in the hands of a dispute-settling ruler. Vehemently opposed to these thinkers and yet in accord with them in some respects was Plato, who set forth, in Book III of his *Laws,* one of the best-rounded accounts of social genesis produced by the ancients. Interestingly enough, he asserted that "every man should understand that the human race either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, and will always be and has been, or that it began an immense while ago." [12] The aloof, detached Aristotle paid scant regard to his teacher's concern with vast reaches of time, and provided a brief "solution" of his own which was analytical rather than historical. Engaged primarily in proving his initial assumption that man is a "social animal," he traced the progressive manifestations of essential human sociality in the family, the village, and the state. If it be true that he studied more than one hundred and fifty city-state constitutions

[9] The writer has defined these terms in his article, "Processes of Secularization," *Soc. Rev.* (British), Vol. XXIV (Apr., July and Oct., 1932), pp. 138–54; 266–86.

[10] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* "Charismatic Leadership" pp. 22–6. Note that I say, above, *"began* to be displaced." Charisma is still with us, and may well remain. Are not Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin charismatic leaders?

[11] *Ibid.,* "Theories of the Natural State of Man," pp. 423–58.

[12] Plato, *Laws,* Book VI, 781E–782A.

as the basis of his *Constitution of Athens,* we may hold Aristotle to have been the earliest known exponent of the method of historical comparison. Beyond question, his *Politics* bears the impress of an extensive collection of empirical data, shrewdly marshaled into inclusive categories and made to march at the generalizer's command.[13]

Continuing in the Greek vein, we may well point out the significance of one of the most neglected discussions of political and social development; namely, Polybius's anticipation of the later conflict theorists through the doctrine, contained in the sixth book of his *History of Rome,* that the state originated in violence. As if this foreshadowing of Ibn Khaldūn and Adam Ferguson were not enough, Polybius, like Herodotus before him, antedated Sumner by more than two thousand years in his championing of the "customary basis" of morality, and achieved priority over Spinoza and Adam Smith in his discussion of reflective sympathy as an essential foundation of stable societal structure.[14] While we are engaged in this secondary task of pointing out that "there were great men before William K. Smith," [15] we may also call attention to that Spencer of the Classical world, the great Epicurean poet Lucretius, who endeavored to show that the whole cosmos, including its societal phases, developed spontaneously without aid from or interference by the gods.[16]

Lucretius, however, reached only a small élite for whom human "invulnerability" against the ills of existence constituted a supreme value in their disintegrating, decadent culture. More significant was Seneca, the eclectic Stoic philosopher who carried even further than his predecessors the notion of the idyllic life of early man.[17] It was Seneca's fortune to find his sounding-board among the Christian Fathers. They identified his Golden Age with the state of man before the Fall, and held that the later period of misery, confusion, and disorder was none other than that which followed the expulsion from the Garden of Eden. This notion of social origins and development held the field throughout those centuries vaguely termed the Dark and Middle Ages, although nearly all the writers had little to say about the Golden Age; they were chiefly occupied in stressing the miseries of existence before the coming of the new dispensation embodied in the Christian polity.[18]

Christianity, as we know, had rivals. Far beyond even the late medievalists in intellectual grasp and command of fact was the great Mo-

[13] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 180–93.
[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 200–202.
[15] James Barrie, *Courage* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 43.
[16] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 200–202.
[17] *Ibid.,* pp. 207–11.
[18] *Ibid.,* pp. 234–41.

hammedan scholar and statesman, Ibn Khaldūn. His contribution to historical sociology was the most remarkable in the entire era between the austere Roman, Lucretius, and the canny Scot, Adam Ferguson. In his analysis of the interaction of pastoral nomad and tiller, his penetrating insight into the factors of personal and social disorganization, his isolation of a cycle of political rise and decline valid for many regions other than the North Africa with which he was familiar, and his realistic study of the sources of social control, we have the most strangely modern-sounding theories that one could well imagine.[19]

Distinctly inferior to Ibn Khaldūn in many respects, and yet marking emergence of views going far beyond those current in the Europe of his time, was Jean Bodin. This Frenchman, apologist and publicist for rising secular absolutism, revived and expanded the geographical determinism of certain later Greek thinkers, echoed the Sophists in premising a lawless primitivism, followed Aristotle in his doctrine of the family origin of society, and paralleled Ibn Khaldūn in tracing the origins of the state to their source in conflict. The net effect of his work was to prepare the ground for that type of historical sociology most prevalent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; namely, the assumption that society and the state developed through a social and governmental compact.[20]

Of this revived Platonism we need say little, for its historical and psychological weaknesses were effectively attacked by three writers who were in the forefront of those restoring the historical point of view in historical sociology to the place it had held with Lucretius and Ibn Khaldūn. The most famous of the three, Vico, while not devoting himself exclusively to the demolition of social contract theories, strongly stressed the necessity of amassing historical knowledge as part and parcel of the attack on the problem of social origins and development. Hume, child of the Enlightenment, showed that the social contract theory was a philosophical monstrosity, a psychological contradiction, and a historical anomaly refuted on every hand by easily ascertainable fact.[21] Still more sweepingly "anti-contract" in viewpoint was Adam Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Here was enunciated once more the theory that the state arose in and through violence, particularly in the form of conquest. Not only this; Ferguson foreshadowed Boas and like ethnologists by discarding preconceived notions as to the nature of "primi-

[19] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 265–79. Note that we say "modern-*sounding*"; after all, Ibn Khaldūn was a child of his time.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 348–58.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 396–404. In saying "refuted," above, I do not mean to imply that Hume solved the apparently insoluble "problem" of social origins. He merely showed that the social contract theorists had not solved it.

tive man" and his institutions and studying the life of the so-called "simpler peoples" as nearly at first hand as he could.[22]

Vico was also an early exponent of the philosophy of history [23]—a label applied in the eighteenth century to a type of thought as ancient as Proteus. It provided the uniting thread on which the Italian strung, three upon three, the successive eras of his history of civilization. A sample of the more important French contributors to these fields would include Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon. The latter, with his isolation of "organic" and "critical" periods, represents a clear-cut anticipation of Comte, Tönnies, Spengler, and Sorokin—indeed, not only does he anticipate but in many cases surpasses these writers.[24]

Much French thought of the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was dominated by the rationalism, skepticism, and optimism of the Enlightenment, whereas in the works of Herder, Adam Müller, Hegel, and other German thinkers, one finds a curious mixture. Along with numerous rationalistic streaks there are evident several layers of traditional allegiance (national and/or ethnic), "oversoul" conceptions, absorption in historical continuities, and exaltation of the non-rational factors in human life and history. In this Romanticism, as it came to be labeled, there are undeniable deficiencies in clarity and even in logic of the usual sort, but it was nevertheless significant because of the historical interests it stimulated and the crushing blows it gave to hastily-carpentered reconstructions of the past.[25]

In the work of Auguste Comte, rationalism and a French variant of Romanticism were incongruously wedded; the resulting progeny furnished the historical retinue for the first system of doctrine to bear the name of sociology. Several "laws" of social and mental development were included in this system, notably the famous unilinear formula of "from the Military-Theological, through the Critical-Metaphysical, to the Industrial-Scientific." [26] There can be little doubt that modern historical sociology differs radically in method, content, and conclusions from most forms of the philosophy of history—certainly from the Comtean. Nevertheless, in the attempt to find bases in the past for the projection of the future, the philosophy of history has been indispensable as a driving force, and we shall try to assess its current significance in the later part of the chapter.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 451–2, 545–6.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 445–6, 465–70.

[24] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. V, p. 24, quoting Bazard, "Exposition de la doctrine Saint-Simonienne," *Oeuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, vol. XLI (Paris, 1877), pp. 171–4.

[25] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 487–90, 531–2.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 568–94.

In this hasty survey of prototypes, we dare not overlook the rise of critical historical scholarship as exemplified in the work of Ranke and his contemporaries and successors in many countries.[27] His insistence on the study of the past "as it actually and peculiarly was" (see the discussion in section II of the chapter on Constructive Typology), did much to establish the later differentiation between history as an idiographic specialty concerned with "facts of succession" and historical sociology as a nomothetic specialty analyzing "facts of repetition."[28] Stimulated by critical historiography, scholars worked up a vast amount of concrete material, of which only a small part has yet been utilized by historical sociologists. Tremendous storehouses of well-attested evidence still await exploitation; no one who has advanced beyond a high-school knowledge of history can subscribe to Lundberg's ridiculous statement that there is little of scientific worth in the products of modern historical research.[29]

Thus far our focus has been essentially pre-Darwinian, and before setting the lens for the post-Darwinian foreground, we should note the initial interest in historical economics and economic history evidenced in the work of Heeren, Sismondi, Hildebrand, Roscher, and Knies. The genetic point of view which characterized the group led them to ask many Protean questions, and the data they amassed are utilizable by historical sociology even today.[30]

IV. Evolutionism and the Ways Out

Prächtig habt ihr gebaut. Du lieber Himmel! Wie treibt man,
Nun er so königlich erst wohnet, den Irrtum heraus! [31]

GOETHE.

Yet, for all the pre-Darwinian interest in the early condition of mankind and the changes it has undergone in the course of time, it is nevertheless true that the most potent influence on historical sociology until the very recent past was the theory of organismic evolution. Here Darwin's "random variation, struggle for existence, natural selection, and survival of the fittest" were the rallying slogans, with Spencer's grandiose watchword of "homogeneity to heterogeneity" only second in impor-

[27] Albion W. Small, *Origins of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), pp. 93–101.

[28] The distinction between "succession" and "repetition" comes from A. D. Xenopol. See Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 1089–90.

[29] G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 512–13.

[30] Albion W. Small, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–107, 194–7, *et passim*.

[31] Translation:

"Splendidly have ye built. In Heaven's name! How can one drive out error,
Now that it dwells in such kingly state!"

tance.[32] Human society, as well as the strictly organismic realm, was held to be the product of evolutionary forces operating over an immense period of time. The historical sociology arising on the basis of this assumption flowed in two channels: one, the social Darwinism of Gumplowicz and other exponents of a revived conflict theory; the other, the "classical anthropology" of Tylor, Frazer, Morgan, Lippert, Keller, *et al.*[33]

Holding, as we do, that the phosphorescent glow of evolutionary doctrine plunged historical sociologists into a veritable Slough of Despond, there seems little point in listing those who were led astray by its will-o'-the-wisp flickering. The reader who has not explored the marshland of social evolutionism will find trustworthy guides in Lowie's *History of Ethnological Theory* and in Goldenweiser's chapter on anthropological contributions to social theory in the present volume. Here we need say only that the classical school assumed that there is an organismic law of development in social institutions and, as an inseparable corollary, a sequence of gradual and orderly changes, basically the same the world over, proceeding from confused and/or simple relations to complex and well-co-ordinated socio-cultural structures. The formulas developed were essentially prophetic, for it was believed that subsequent stages of societal development could be forecast, whatever the special conditions affecting a given society, on the basis of the "later evolutionary stages" already passed through by comparable societies—and all societies were thought to be *directly* comparable in their pre-ordained course of growth.

These evolutionary postulates led to a widespread use of the so-called comparative method—which, let it be noted, is not comparative in the sense to which we shall later restrict this term, but rather, "preferential" or illustrative. Given a hypostatized sequence of stages, the illustrative investigator rambled over the face of the earth, hand-picking preferred specimens of conduct and institutions which he then tucked into his ready-made pigeon-holes.

The first sweeping rejection of the illustrative method by a sociologist of repute appeared in the writings of Émile Durkheim. As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, he had begun to insist that valid conclusions as to social development must rest upon intensive study of one social institution in a single and well-demarcated culture area.[34] This procedure he later (1912) utilized in his study of *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* in which he selected for analysis the development of religious institutions in Australia. Although the transferability of his

[32] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 664–742. Cf. also this reference for the bearing of the distinction between "organismic" and "organic."

[33] Robert H. Lowie, *History of Ethnological Theory* (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1937), pp. 54–85; Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* pp. 748–57.

[34] In *L'Année Sociologique,* vols. I–XII (1896–97—1912), *passim.*

conclusions to certain other "cultural circles" is not so entirely impossible as was believed a decade ago, it is still true that most modern ethnologists outside of France are exceedingly critical of Durkheim.[35] The flight from classical anthropology has usually followed other paths which, speaking in broad outline, have been five in number.

First is the trail represented in the attempted buttressing of the old illustrative method by comparison of a simple statistical type—an effort most prominently identified with the names of Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, and by most critics held to be unsuccessful.[36]

Second among these byways may be listed that followed by the diffusionists, who attempt to explain similarities in culture on the hypothesis of spread from a common center, or centers, of origin. Only one center is "discovered" by the extreme English diffusionists of the Smith-Perry school; several centers, varying in number, have been isolated by Ratzel, Graebner, Rivers, Frobenius, Schmidt and Koppers, and Wissler.[37] Diffusionism has much to commend it but, when pushed to extremes, falls foul of the fact that "culture is not contagious." That is, the spread even of material culture cannot be explained by means of mere spatial contiguity; societies living cheek by jowl oftentimes fail to affect each other in any significant degree.

Third is the route offered by an essentially historical method having strong idiographic leanings. Although it has had many practitioners, Boas and his school in America have been its most prominent exponents.[38] They have assigned full credit to independent origin as the indispensable factor in many societal changes, but when historically demonstrable, have also granted a prominent place to diffusion. Particularly searching has been their analysis of alleged socio-cultural parallels; the result has been to show that many traits once thought to be directly comparable are actually of quite different functional significance. Of positive contributions to historical sociology, however, Boas and his followers have relatively little to show; their function has been critical and idiographic. In passages to follow later we shall try to show the *sociological* shortcomings inherent in this approach, which we label "extreme historicism."

Fourth is the avenue recently opened by the functionalists: Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Mead, Benedict, and many more.[39] These ethnologists attempt to account for apparent similarities in social origins and development on the basis of man's biological uniformity and the fact that this uniformity "calls for" a relatively limited number of types

[35] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 196–216; Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 750–1.
[36] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 751–3.
[37] Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–95. See also Goldenweiser, present volume, pp. 453–9.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 128–55.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 230–49.

of interaction, and that these generate their accompanying socio-cultural structures and institutions. Further, the interactions and their concomitants inevitably engender other manifestations which are functionally bound up with them. In investigating social origins and development, therefore, the assumption is that any given society is a functional unity in which each component simultaneously "calls for" and is "called for by" every other component. Diffused traits are accepted only when they can be functionally interrelated with those already present; similarly, innovations arising within the society gain headway only when they can be integrally united with the existing "whole." Functionalism has stimulated much worthwhile research, but has been drastically criticized because of its initial premise that every portion of a given socio-cultural aggregate is related to it in such a way that the "parts" constitute the "whole" and the "whole" constitutes the "parts." This premise is a wholesome purgative for those afflicted with the crude illustrative method, but it also renders genuine comparison difficult or even impossible.[40]

Fifth and most recently chosen is the highway followed by those ethnologists influenced by modern psychology, psychiatry, psychosociology, and sociology. Thurnwald,[41] Redfield,[42] Linton,[43] and Mekeel[44] are among the most conspicuous, but many others might be listed. In general, little is said about origins; Proteus is questioned about processes of development. Further, orientation toward the future is plainly apparent in the concern with acculturation and like processes whereby preliterates and denizens of "cultural islands" are drawn within range of modern secularized life. Stress on minute detail, regardless of relevance to a particular problem—a stress characteristic of the Boas school—gives ground to interest in generalization on the basis of carefully examined empirical evidence. The method is basically analytical rather than idiographic;

[40] Florian Znaniecki, "The Object-Matter of Sociology," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, Vol. XXXII, 4, pp. 541 ff. See also Goldenweiser's critique, present volume, pp. 471–5.

[41] Lowie classifies Thurnwald as a functionalist, but this seems a bit strained. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 242–9. Perhaps Lowie's term "tempered functionalism" indicates that he himself has doubts of the validity of his classification. Thurnwald's great work is his *Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethnosoziologischen Grundlagen*, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1931–34). A number of his articles, in English, are conveniently grouped in the *Am. Soc. Rev.*, Vol. I, 3 (June, 1936), 4 (Aug., 1936); Vol. II, 1 (Feb., 1937), and 2 (April, 1937).

[42] Robert Redfield, *Tepotztlan: A Mexican Village* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1931).

[43] Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936).

[44] H. Scudder Mekeel, "Clinic and Culture," *Jour. Abn. and Soc. Psych.*, XXX, 3 (1935), 274–85; "A Psychoanalytic Approach to Culture," *Jour. Soc. Phil.*, II, 3 (1937), 232–36; "A Social Science Approach to Case Work with the American Indian," *The Family*, XVIII, 6 (1937), 204–207; *Explorations in Personality*, joint author with Henry A. Murray (1938).

"facts of repetition" rather than "facts of succession" are in the foreground. At the same time, due heed is paid to functionalist warnings concerning the necessity of taking processes in their full contexts; hence, although generalization is regarded favorably, it is insisted that a genuinely comparative method, markedly similar to that later described in this chapter, is an indispensable corollary. Ethnology of this variety—comparative, contextual, and issuing in analysis of processes—will probably effect a closer *rapprochement* with the social sciences in general and with historical sociology in particular than will any other type. Moreover, it has the merit of being able to include old problems in a new frame of reference, and therefore does not have to start from scratch.

V. Ethnography, Sociology, History

Feindschaft sei zwischen euch, noch kommt das Bündnis zu frühe;
Wenn ihr im Suchen euch trennt, wird erst die Wahrheit erkannt.[45]

GOETHE.

Few sciences, however, can wholly extricate themselves from the marshes of error in one generation, and when the flight has been precipitate, the paths chosen may lead dangerously close to other quagmires. Even those most keenly aware of the mistakes of social evolutionism sometimes fail to see how harmful may be the consequences of drastic reaction. Many of the American ethnographers of the "critical school," [46] and those "cultural sociologists" who have followed in their wake, illustrate this fact. We rightly reject the grandiose and fantastic formulas of the nineteenth century, but should we abandon the attempt to find methods of analysis that may ultimately yield predictive power and that may be applicable to widely varying cultures? Can we describe a given people with the minute and scrupulous accuracy of the run-of-the-mine American ethnographer, and stop there? [47] In short, are we essentially idiographic historians, who rightly eschew all questions of comparability, and devote themselves to the depiction of some limited sector of human life in its characteristic particularity? Or does our special niche in the division of labor call for sustained effort toward generalization, modest though the possibilities of such generalization may be?

If the term "sociology" means anything at all, it should be clear that we must try to generalize. Here lies *our* task. More, we must try to generalize in such ways that we put crucial questions to Proteus if we work

[45] Translation:

"Enmity let there be between you, alliance is yet premature;
When in search you diverge, then only will truth be revealed."

[46] Boas, Lowie, and a host of others fall in this category.

[47] Paul Radin, *Method and Theory of Ethnology* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933) is a good illustration of the dogmatic idiographer.

in that part of the sociological field called "historical sociology." This we cannot do if we follow the style set by those who, in flight from the bog of nineteenth-century classical anthropology, strike trails across territory quite as spongy. No paradox is involved when, in devotion to the task of historical *sociology,* we warn against extreme historicism, whether of ethnographic or of conventionally historical extraction.

Further, we perpetrate no paradox when we assert that we can successfully grapple with Proteus only when we arm ourselves with historical data. Frightened by the gruffness of some orthodox historians, who would have us believe that any body of social phenomena manifesting datable time-sequences *via* written record is in the exclusive possession of historical specialists, we have deprived ourselves of vitally necessary equipment. The same historians, moreover, have successfully intimidated us on many occasions because of their harsh insistence that historical data can be dealt with only idiographically. With even less comprehension of the nature of constructed types than is manifested by most American sociologists under the sway of raw empiricism, if that be possible, these historians have chased us off their supposed preserves by shouting "Exception!" As we try to show in the chapter on Constructive Typology, exceptions *must* be found; they do not in and of themselves invalidate constructive-typological generalizations. But we are just beginning to wake up to this fact; most of us walk in fear and trembling of the idiographic historian's scowl.

A similar neglect of the aid of history is to be attributed to the surviving reverence for ethnographic data. Some of this reverence issues from mindsets not much more scholarly than "noble Red Man" romanticism; we are enthralled, as it were, by Pocahontas and Hiawatha. Another source is to be found in the example of ethnographers who are still in the grip of nineteenth-century notions of the "social protoplasmic character" of preliterate societies—and these notions are manifest even among those who are most avowedly in reaction against classical anthropology. Take Murdock: "The Arunta and the Tlingit and the Hindu [*sic*] are as important to sociology as the experimental rat and the fruitfly are to genetics." [48] The upshot of this nonsense is that we think we can dispense with historical data if only we can learn enough about our little brown brothers. Well, let us see; just how much aid can preliterate data supply to the *historical* sociologist? [49]

[48] George P. Murdock, book review, *American Anthropologist.* Vol. XXXIV (Oct.–Dec., 1932), p. 704. It is to be doubted whether Murdock now holds this view.

[49] The negative tone of the passages following this question is warranted *only* with reference to the study of time-sequences covering a *long* period. The writer is exceedingly friendly to ethnography when its data are usable—and that is gratifyingly often. No sweeping disparagement is intended, for the sociologist owes a great debt

To begin with, the preliterates studied by ethnographers provide no reliable information about long-term social and cultural changes. The orally transmitted lores cannot be trusted, even when they are available, for timespans covering more than two or three generations. Further, and in spite of Murdock *et al.*, we know that the contemporary preliterate does not represent the primitive in the sense of the simple or "social protoplasmic"; many features of their societies are more complex than our own. Again, the greater number of preliterate groups have no historically demonstrable continuities with the larger civilizations for which written records are available, and hence cannot be even indirectly related to the major courses of social change. Once more, the absence of written records means that "document" and "interpretation" inevitably derive from or through the same person, and hence description and analysis tend to coincide—not the happiest of scientific situations. To restate this last point: The contemporary ethnographer is dependent upon contemporary informants. The latter necessarily select and interpret the facts entering into the descriptions they provide. Obviously, selection and interpretation always take place, but it is one thing to have this done by the scientist and another to have it done by someone who has only a remote conception of the problems involved. The historian, on the other hand, frequently has access to written records which, although beyond question bearing the impress of time and place, have not undergone the peculiar "contemporary distortion" to which the ethnographer's materials are exposed. Illustration: Is knowledge of eighteenth-century Methodism best gained through study of the extant documents or through interviewing present-day Methodists? Plainly no historian in his senses would choose the latter course; many ethnographers, in dealing with problems essentially similar, are forced to use it, for no alternative exists. (This would all be very well if they did not sometimes make a virtue of necessity by contrasting "field work" with "library research" to the disparagement of the historian.) Still further, the language obstacles present among preliterates mean that very few contemporary ethnographers are likely to be able to check each other—in fact, the difficulty of mastering a given preliterate tongue may be so great that only one linguist may be said really to know it. Contrast this with the records of historical peoples in languages understood by literally thousands of present-day scholars!

Historical sociology, then, must pay due heed to history, not as a

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to the ethnographer. He has showed us, for example, that we cannot lightly toss about terms such as "human nature," "basic needs," "fundamental institutions," "masculinity," "femininity," "religion," and the like. If ethnography had done nothing more than break the crust of "civilized," "modern," and "Western" prepossessions, it would have deserved its present high standing.

source of idiographic insight, but as a mine of data to be utilized for the answering of Protean questions by the method of constructive typology. We must cease to restrict our choice of data to the history-less preliterates on the one hand and to current events in our own civilization on the other. Twenty years from now it should be impossible to admit the truth of the statement that "In most sociological treatises there is an amazing gap between the *corroboris* of Australian natives and the coronation of George the Sixth." Certainly the historical sociologist who fails to make the fullest use possible of the verified information provided by ethnography justly incurs the contempt of his colleagues, but it is also true that the historical sociologist who ignores the data of history is a brother of the animal that bore Balaam.

VI. Illustration *vs.* Genuine Comparison *via* Culture Case Study

Wenn man fürs Künftige was erbaut,
Schief wirds von vielen angeschaut,
Tust du was für den Augenblick,
Vor allen opfre du dem Glück.[50]

GOETHE.

Thus having declared allegiance to historical materials, not only for the struggle with Proteus but for all the efforts of sociology, there inevitably arises a fundamental problem in the logic of the social sciences: What is the relation of history and sociology? How can the data of history be used by sociology at all? In the chapter on Constructive Typology, the terms idiographic and nomothetic have been liberally applied, and the reader might easily infer that we have been speaking exclusively in the Windelband-Rickert tradition; namely, that history depicts the unique, the non-recurrent, the empire of *Alexander,* whereas sociology sets forth the "laws" of the general, the recurrent, the *empire* of Alexander and similar rulers. This is simple, clear, and persuasive, and so far as the idiographic pole of the antithesis is concerned, it is hereby expressly accepted. When we turn to the nomothetic, however, certain restrictions must be imposed—restrictions akin to those proclaimed by the functionalists.

Let us say, to begin with, that historical items, in common with other social data, cannot be wholly separated from their contexts. Speaking metaphorically: If we are so rash as to tear apart an intricately pat-

[50] Translation:

"When one builds for the future,
Many will regard it askance.
If you do something for the moment only,
Before all else sacrifice happiness."

terned tapestry and sew the fragments on a "timeless" background, we get nothing but a crazy quilt for our labor. While maintaining that the "whole-part" relationship extolled by some dogmatic functionalists involves numerous logical fallacies, we are nevertheless convinced that "timeless" classifications are nothing more than tools convenient for dissecting purposes. They reveal relevant problems, but if they wholly destroy the historical strata to which they are applied, they leave nothing but a scattered collection of meaningless fragments.

This fact is well exemplified in the illustrative method used by the classical anthropologists and those social scientists who followed in their train. It is possible to fill the pigeonholes in almost any *a priori* scheme of classification by judiciously choosing the illustrations to fit. Spencer, Morgan, Briffault, and many others have been guilty of this error, and the consequences we know. The sociologist should not approach his data with the fixed intention of subjecting them to classification on a Procrustean bed of "timeless" categories that are all generalizable in advance.[51] He *can* do this if he wishes, of course, but in every case he will find that the result yields no predictive power; he has gratified his need for symmetry and order, and that is all. Genuine prediction, "retrospective" or "prospective," must be couched in "if and when" terms (see the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 26–34)—*and "if and when" always refer to situations bearing some discernible similarity to historical situations that either have already occurred or that can be envisaged in terms of what has already occurred.* The "geologic strata" of history cannot be arbitrarily juggled; if the constructed types of historical sociology are to have predictive power, they must be developed without *primary* regard to their generalizability. (The honest researcher will, of course, admit that he *hopes* to get generalizations and that some of them are already present, in crude form, in his early formulations of his problem.) If they prove to be generalizable *in spite* of the fact that they are first of all designed to yield a shorthand description and analysis of the social processes and structures permeating a *particular* historical configuration, and in close relation with a clearly defined hypothesis, so much the better,

[51] Lundberg's *Foundations of Sociology* is literally full of classifications of this ahistorical character.

But we are in no sense advocates of Pure Induction. Why should we advocate the impossible? We all have our "hunches," and they enter into research in a vital way. All that we mean by our attack on "timeless" categories is contained in the examples cited: Spencerian evolutionism, etc. There is no remotest intention of denying the part played in research by deduction, "hunch," speculation, "through-the-elbows" knowledge of the field studied, or the influence of generalizations made by past thinkers. Researchers certainly do not think in a vacuum, and they vaguely know where they are going when they start. Nevertheless, the method of culture case study helps us to avoid the pitfalls of uncontrolled illustration of attractive "hunches."

but such generalizability must not be the all-controlling aim of the endeavor.

Here again we refer to the chapter on Constructive Typology. It will be recalled that we there set forth constructed types intended to be of use in the sociological comprehension of a particular series of historical occurrences; namely, the development of Western Christianity. The ecclesia, the sect, the denomination, and the cult were not planned with the purpose of explaining the genesis and interaction of all religious structures, much less of social structures in general. They are avowedly limited to specific Western European and American phenomena. Such limitation is the essence of what we call "culture case study"; dated and localized types must be accumulated before there is any thoroughgoing attempt to build types of undated and non-localized form. Some indication of what is meant by this may be gleaned from the analysis of Jew, Armenian, Parsee, Greek, and Scotsman in the chapter on Constructive Typology (pp. 31–34), but it may be well to provide another example.

VII. Culture Case Study: The Minimum-Maximum Scale

Suche nicht vergebne Heilung!
Unser Krankheit schwer Geheimnis
Schwankt zwischen Übereilung
Und zwischen Versäumnis.[52]

GOETHE.

The relation of culture contact to social change may set a vaguely defined problem. In examining the society of Sparta, let us say, with an eye to this connection, one is likely to be struck by the fact that there is little evidence, over a relatively long period, of either culture contact or social change in this socio-cultural configuration. Turning to Athens of the same era, we encounter evidence of what seems to be a maximum of both culture contact and social change in certain datable and localizable sectors. Culture case studies affording such contrasts provide an approach that seems likely to vouchsafe a valid basis for selection and comparison. A study of the culture, in the essential particularity of its time and place, where the phenomena relevant to the problem—in this case the sources of social change in the Greek world of the period—are at a *minimum,* yields a sort of control or marginal case. One point thus fixed, we set at the opposite pole a culture case study in which the same phenomena are at a *maximum.* With two points of reference thus

[52] Translation:

"Seek not vain salvation!
The heavy secret of our ill
Vacillates between undue haste
And slothful neglect."

established, we have a determining orientation; between these two extremes any number of relevant culture case studies can be placed. If a sufficient number were available, it is within the bounds of possibility that a sort of continuum could be built up, and if the number were very large, transition from one case to the other might be almost imperceptible. Yet, in either direction would lie the limiting extremes, giving significance, perhaps, to even the minutest variation. The extremes, let us remind the reader, are on the one hand a social order in which the phenomena denoted by the problem, i.e., culture contact and social change, are at the empirically discoverable minimum so far as the particular era of Greek civilization is concerned.[53] In contrast to this, we have a case in which the same phenomena are at the empirically discoverable maximum. When as the result of intensive culture case studies, both at the extremes and in the transitional zone, the processes correlated with transition toward one or the other extreme have been discovered, within the limits set by the constructed types developed on the basis of the empirical data, the problem has been solved, *but only for the cases examined*. This result achieved, it may then be possible to restate the constructed types in "if and when" terms, and then to search the historical record for other cases that will provide a checkup on the validity of the predictions made. Only when validation of this pragmatic variety has been secured can there be any talk of far-reaching generalizations, and even with such validation it is altogether too much to assume that these generalizations will hold for all cases whatsoever. Generalization, in a very real sense, is omission; the more universal the statement, the less is its predictive power in answering questions "relevant to futurity." We may, if we wish, ask Proteus an empty question like this: "Do human beings associate and dissociate at all times and places?"—but do we not already know the answer? Is the voyage to Pharos worth the trouble?

In the foregoing paragraphs reference to Sparta, Athens, and related cases has been made with definite intent, for the writer has already carried out such studies and has arrived at the conclusion that there does emerge a factor in the culture contact and social change therein evident that inevitably enters into any generalized statement about Greek society. Naturally we lack space to produce the proof in these pages;[54] let us simply assert that mental mobility appears as one analytical ele-

[53] Of course, there were many Greek societies, such as that of Arcadia, which apparently changed less than did Sparta. The sources for the study of such societies, however, are too scanty to make research worth while. Even the sources for Sparta are none too good.

[54] See the writer's unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Ionia and Athens: Studies in Secularization," University of Chicago, 1930.

ment in all the Greek configurations studied. Now it should be noted that reference to mental mobility as a *comparable* aspect of these cases does not necessarily mean that it is a *generalizable* factor when it appears in other cases that have not been so minutely analyzed. *We must always face the possibility that in the latter instances it may be only the known outcome of a series of unknowns having little or nothing in common.*[55] At the same time, the fact that mental mobility has emerged as the result of focusing on the same problem in a number of historical cases ranged in minimum-maximum sequence renders it probable, although by no means certain, that the formula which explains such mobility, relevant variables taken into account, in each of the cases studied, may also explain it, *mutatis mutandis,* in other cases. Stop! Note that we have said "probable, although by no means certain." The formula is worth a trial, and that is all that can safely be said.

Again pleading lack of space, we do not here present such an explanatory formula. Assuming that the reader will give us the benefit of the doubt, let us go on to say that the result of our labors is the construction of certain types resting firmly on particular historical subsoils, and yet transportable to other regions for the purpose of making test borings, at least. It should be clear that these constructed types are not "timeless"; the presence of some degree of "historical saturation" is indispensable. Turning to another example: The historically relative character of constructed types is thoroughly demonstrated by the work of Max Weber, in spite of the fact that he rendered lip-service to the Windelband-Rickert theory. In point are his types of domination: traditional, charismatic, and rational.[56] Only in particular types of historical configuration are these manifested in *clear-cut* fashion, and the attempt wholly to eliminate their historical reference deprives them of almost every vestige of predictive power. Furthermore, Löwith has plainly shown that all of Max Weber's constructed types have the red thread of a theory of the total process of historical change running through them; not only is their significance bound up with particular historical configurations, but their ultimate bearing becomes apparent only when what Weber regarded as the total historical process is held in view.[57] (This point will again be mentioned when we analyze theories of the total process of historical change.)

[55] This is an exceedingly important point, for it is the basis of our distinction between "comparison" and "generalization." We may *compare* socio-cultural "parallels," but, as has been shown by the critical ethnologists, these alleged parallels may arise out of radically differing contexts. See present volume, pp. 441–4.

[56] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1920), *"Die Typen der Herrschaft,"* pp. 122–176.

[57] Karl Löwith, "Max Weber und Karl Marx" *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.* Vol. LXVII, 1 and 2 (March and April, 1932), pp. 59–99, 175–214.

VIII. A Theodicy and Its Empirically Valid Portions

Müsset im Naturbetrachten
Immer eins wie alles achten:
Nichts ist drinnen, nichts ist draußen;
Denn was innen, das ist außen.[58]
GOETHE.

Let us now turn to historical sociology of a closely related type. Successful culture case study, pervaded by a theory of the total process of historical change, is strikingly exemplified in the recent work of Arnold J. Toynbee. Six massive tomes of *A Study of History* have thus far appeared,[59] and although the work will probably run to at least three volumes more, those now available are sufficiently self-contained to be dealt with by themselves.

Toynbee's enterprise has just been termed "successful," and the adjective undoubtedly is warranted where *culture case study* is concerned. Unfortunately, a number of flaws in other respects are evident, and we must first take reckoning of these. Of these defects, perhaps the most serious is Toynbee's adherence to a theodicy, to a kind of universal and transcendent philosophy of history (one of the "rejected varieties" shortly to be discussed). Goethe's conception, set forth in the prologue of *Faust,* of evil as a force that in spite of itself makes for good, is given definite approval. This is but an echo of the far older belief that "All things work together for good for them that love God." This may indeed be true "under the aspect of eternity," but it has nothing to do with science as understood, rightly or wrongly, by the present generation. Second among the blemishes is an all-pervasive mysticism that leads Toynbee to dally with terms such as *yin* and *yang* in ways that occasionally result in emotional exaltation rather than intellectual clarity. To be sure, Toynbee sometimes uses *yin* and *yang* as equivalents of changelessness and change, but the mystic tendency, like King Charles's head, perpetually intrudes. Third is a shortcoming usual among historians who manufacture their theories of social change in ignorance of the relevant sociological literature. Instance the fact that some of Huntington's most dubious doctrines have been adopted, with a few minor qualifications, as part of Toynbee's treatise. In view of the fact that the merits of his analysis are largely independent of the truth or falsity of Huntington's doctrines, this is the more regrettable. Fourth,

[58] Translation:

"In observing Nature
Ye must needs heed one thing above all:
Nothing is within, nothing is without,
For what is within is simultaneously without."

[59] London, 1934–39.

Toynbee wastes a great deal of energy and space in exploding racial dogmas that are not taken seriously by any anthropologist of repute; here again his lack of familiarity with the critical literature has led him to manufacture his arguments *ad hoc*.

Yet in spite of these and other flaws, the profound significance of Toynbee's work is incontestable. Beginning with a forthright attack on extreme historicism, he proceeds to a very thorough and circumspect discussion of method. Not sufficiently acquainted with the literature of constructive typology, he nonetheless avoids many of the pitfalls of crude empiricism and apriorism. A plan of operations centering about several societies shown to be "intelligible fields of historical study" is elaborated. Following this, he isolates twenty-one comparable entities to which what is essentially a method of culture case study can be applied: Egyptiac, Andean; Sinic, Minoan, Sumeric, Mayan; Syriac; Indic, Hittite, Hellenic; Western; Orthodox Christian (in Russia), Far Eastern (in Korea and Japan); Orthodox Christian (main body), Far Eastern (main body); Iranic; Arabic, Hindic; Mexic; Yucatec; and Babylonic. Toynbee makes good his case for the relatively unfamiliar groupings of the above classification, and sets for himself a problem that includes all four of our Protean questions; namely, "What are the causes of the geneses, growths, breakdowns, disintegrations, and rhythms in the histories of civilizations, and what are the prospects of the contemporary Western world in the light thereof?" This, to say the least, is a large order, but it must also be said that Toynbee comes nearer to being equal to his self-imposed task than any other thinker, past or present, with whom we are familiar.

He begins his analysis by considering a number of "possible positive and negative factors" which may help to account for the traits manifested by "civilized" groups [60] as contrasted with more "primitive" societies. His conclusion, apparently valid in spite of its moralistic overtones, is that the negative factors of "psychic inertia" and "inferior race" vouchsafe no satisfying explanations. Next in order, as a possible positive factor, is the natural environment, and through the skillful dissection of several culture cases he demonstrates that "favorable" natural environments do not necessarily call forth the phenomena of civilization. Indeed, Toynbee does much to render plausible the theory that strikingly *un*favorable natural environments have in many instances been the indispensable factor in the transition from "primitivism" to "civilization." The challenge of drought for Egypt; trackless marsh for Sumeria; flood for China; tropical forest for the Mayas; bleak climate and grudging soil for Andean culture; sea for Minoan; and so on for most of the twenty-

[60] Toynbee's definition of civilization is sufficiently different from those customarily used to warrant the quotation marks, although we shall drop them in succeeding paragraphs.

one culture cases. Where challenges from the natural environment have been conspicuously lacking, there have been "civilization-eliciting" challenges from the human environment, particularly from what Toynbee calls external and internal proletariats (of which instances are respectively afforded by the Germanic barbarians and the early Christians).

Every informed American sociologist will be struck by the similarity between Toynbee's "challenge-and-response" and Thomas's "crisis." This is rendered still more striking by Toynbee's masterly survey of the "range of challenge-and-response." Hard countries; new ground; blows; pressures; penalizations—all these challenges and the responses thereto are analyzed with staggering acumen and with an abundance of comparable culture cases. So inclusive is Toynbee's knowledge of history that he frequently seems able to select cases in which only the crucial factors vary; controls are thus provided for many of his generalizations. The outcome is that the rôle of challenge-and-response in the *genesis* of civilizations is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Culture case study has here won a genuine victory.

The adequacy of Toynbee's researches with regard to the *growth* of civilizations, however, stands in some doubt. He carries conviction, to be sure, in his analysis of arrested growth, although this may in part be due to the adroitly chosen cases of the Eskimos, the Mongols, the Janissaries, and the Spartiates. Yet we need not be hypercritical; even without Toynbee's evidence most sociologists would agree that ant-like or machine-like perfection of adaptation acts as a check on change. When he turns to the positive factors in civilizational growth, Toynbee is much less convincing, for the mystical motif that merely confuses the first volume of his treatise becomes so loud by the end of the third (dealing with civilizational growth) that it almost drowns out the systematic-empirical theme. He operates with two conceptions at this point: "etherialization" and "withdrawal-and-return." By the first of these he means a process whereby a dominant minority meets internal or external difficulties by developing some saving formula. Solon's response to the challenge of the Athenian internal proletariat, a response in the form of abolition of debt slavery, currency revision, and so on, is one among many instances provided by Toynbee. In other words, the culture shifts to a higher level of complexity, is rendered more "ethereal," through the intervention of some especially gifted leader, who is usually representative of an advanced minority. "Withdrawal-and-return" is a process closely linked to etherialization. The leaders or the élite which they represent go into seclusion, either by actual physical withdrawal or "ivory tower" retreat, and in this seclusion develop the etherializing plans that make growth at a more complex civilizational level possible. The possibility is rendered an actuality through the phenomenon of return; the leaders or the élite come

back to the common life from which they had temporarily absented themselves, bearing the saving formula. To the present writer it seems that Toynbee may at times grant too important a rôle to single individuals or small minorities, but it cannot be denied that he has an amazing array of evidence to prove his point. Future research alone will show whether or not this evidence is of merely "illustrative" character.

The breakdowns and disintegrations of civilizations in a certain sense run the film backwards. Challenges are so overwhelming that the response, even when forthcoming, utterly fails; mechanical imitation of an idolized pattern leads to cultural sterility; dominant minorities become disorganized, both "personally" and "socially," before etherialization can be effected; external and internal proletariats overwhelm the decadent civilization; archaism on the one hand and futurism on the other are chosen as escapes from an ever more onerous challenge—and the end is collapse.

With no extensive aid from modern psychiatry, psychology, or psychosociology, Toynbee has produced an arresting analysis of the types of mentality that appear in civilizations which are breaking down or disintegrating. His presentation of what he calls "Schism in the Soul" should be read by every social scientist; without technical verbiage and with profound insight Toynbee arrives independently at many of the conclusions set forth by our mental hygienists and clinicians. Studies of "split personality," "marginal men," "demoralization," and "civilization and its discontents" would profit immeasurably through cross-fertilization with his remarkable array of attested historical evidence. Of great interest, in the present phase of Euro-American civilization, is Toynbee's analysis of the yearning for "the savior with the time-machine" that appears among the decadent élites of disintegrating societies. Salvation is sought through a "leader" upon whom the weary and thwarted can cast their burdens. Responsibility becomes a galling load; anyone who seems able to carry it for all rises to "omnipotence." As a by-product, Toynbee also shows that dictatorship of this kind is not simply a result of more adequate means of communication (press, radio, and so on), as some myopic interpreters of current events would have us believe.

In the volumes to come later, Toynbee promises like discussions of those problems of historical sociology which can be subsumed under the headings of universal states and churches, heroic ages, contacts between civilizations in space and time, and other vitally important matters already mentioned. No matter what reservations one may have as to the Christian value-judgments that pervade the treatise, there can be no question that Toynbee has given to sociologists a magnificent example of the possibilities of culture case study in historical sociology. Those who fail to profit by his example can never hope for answers from Proteus.

IX. Rejected Philosophies of History

Es ist nicht zu schelten,
Man lass es gelten!
Ich bin aber kein Haar
Weiter, als ich war.[61]
GOETHE.

Many of Toynbee's value-judgments, issuing as they do in a kind of Christian theodicy, force upon our attention once more, and this time in relative separation from the others, the second of our Protean questions: "Can there be discerned an all-encompassing drift toward a single goal, in spite of the baffling maze of historical changes?" In other words, Max Weber's total historical configuration and Toynbee's Christian philosophy of history make it necessary for us to survey the many attempts that have been made to determine the general trend of the development of culture, or of "the historical movement" as a whole. Few of these attempts are of the scientific character we associate with historical sociology; what is currently called the philosophy of history includes a great deal that the critical sociologist must brusquely reject. Still, it is necessary to run over the list of rejected varieties before discussing the type of philosophy of history that offers some prospect of harmonious union with a sound historical sociology.

The universal and transcendent kind of philosophy of history has been and is exceedingly prominent, and is first among those marked for rejection. By "universal" is meant ultimate purpose or meaning or value toward which not only all mankind but the entire universe, as it were, strives—that "one far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves." "Divine" affords a hint of what is meant by "transcendent"; the universal purpose is to be attributed to God's Will, or to the realization of the Absolute Idea, or to a Beneficent Nature. The genealogy of this variety of the philosophy of history is long; it begins with the earliest cosmogonies and finds present exemplification in the Millennial sects (although we might also name some sociologists). Within our present limits it is useless to try to justify the exclusion we have announced; we can merely proclaim the fact that theodicies are not for us.

Similarly, we must announce the shutting of the gate before the universal and immanent philosophies of history. As "immanent" indicates, transcendent sanction in a Divine Will is not explicitly sought, but it is

[61] Translation:

"There is no use in reproaches,
Just let it stand as it is.
I, however, am not one hair's-breadth further along
Than I was."

asserted that there is a goal or purpose toward which the development of the universe, and by the same token, of human society, not only *does* tend but *ought* so to tend.[62] Now, we should be the first to grant that modern sociology is "relevant to futurity." But it does not follow from this that the sociologist should permit himself to answer his own questions before he has *earnestly* come to grips with Proteus. All too frequently the vision of the desired end blinds us to the prerequisite and entailed conditions which may make its attainment undesirable or impossible. Even though we concede that "impossible" is a restriction that has been successfully defied time after time in the long annals of mankind, it may none the less be true that the modern sociologist is now in a position to provide estimates of relative probability, at the very least. Faith has moved mountains, but only at a terrific cost of blood and sweat. The end to be achieved, whether "Aryan supremacy," a "classless society," or a "warless world," may be worth the price that must be paid—but the sociologist has the duty of determining what that price will be. If he allows his dream of the perfect society—and all men rightly have such dreams—to veil the stark realities that confront him and his fellows, he has betrayed his trust. His must be an ethics of responsibility, not an ethics of sentiment,[63] and he must therefore speak in the declarative mood, not in the imperative or optative. As sociologist, i.e., in his professional rôle, he must bar "ought" from his vocabulary. In his other rôles, should he so choose, "ought" may have an honored place—indeed, the scientific specialist who allows his specialty to degrade him to the rank of *mere* technician is to be pitied or even despised. There is no reason why the scientific rôle should dominate the other rôles in the repertory of the rounded, humanized personality. For example, the specialist is not obliged to put his skill at the service of destructive forces; he may justifiably withhold knowledge of death-dealing devices or techniques of manipulating the masses from those who may misuse them. The special value held by the scientist *qua* scientist is predictive power, but the *scientist's* ultimate desideratum may or even should be subordinated to the supreme values cherished by the same person in his rôle as one of the "men of good will." But even "men of good will" must be technicians if they are to provide trustworthy guidance into the future;

[62] Virtually all the social philosophies setting progress as a supreme end are of this type. See J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932); Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 458–506; P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* Vol. II, *passim* (New York, American Book Company, 1937); Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society: A General Sociology* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934), ¶¶ 6, 49, 77, 93, 112, 393, *et passim.*

[63] *Verantwortungsethik vs. Gesinnungsethik.* See Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Munich, 1920), essay on "Politik als Beruf," pp. 396–450, esp. pp. 441–2.

bungling amateurs, no matter how excellent their intentions, must be shouldered aside. And not only the amateurs; many earlier writers of high standing, and many modern sociologists, have mixed too many "oughts" with their counsel—Marx, Ward, Hobhouse, Oppenheimer, and scores of others! [64] Valuable leads can be taken from them, but they are beyond the pale of historical sociology as a responsible science.

Next in the array of our rejected varieties is the relative but transcendent philosophy of history of which Troeltsch provides the most arresting instance,[65] but of which examples are also to be found in Scheler, Spengler, and, in some phases, Sorokin. Limiting ourselves to the writer first mentioned: Troeltsch drifts close to the ground occupied by the extreme historicists in holding that there can never be any theories of socio-cultural process applicable, even within carefully guarded limits, to all mankind—because there is no such thing as mankind. To be sure, says Troeltsch, there are great cultural totalities, but each constitutes a whole having its own untranslatable value-system, and therefore possesses a fundamentally unique kind of interaction among the "parts" of that "whole." Here there seems to be a patent confusion between "facts of succession" and "facts of repetition," as well as a farrago of "whole-part" mysticism, but inasmuch as these have already been discussed elsewhere —namely, in this chapter and in the one on Constructive Typology—the passing reference must suffice. According to Troeltsch, not only is there no way of determining what *ought* to be the universal or even the common-human trend of development, but there is no way of determining what *is* that trend. At best we can discover the meaningful sequences of the cultures in which we have been saturated, so to speak, and into which we therefore have insight—and that is all. This seemingly complete relativity of value-systems and their "whole-part" effects Troeltsch cloaks with a sort of transcendental sanction by echoing the assertion that "Every epoch is in communion with God." [66] The values of the Turks are not our values, hence their "inwardness" cannot be comprehended nor their course of change predicted. The Turks, however, are God's children even as ourselves, and God will know and reconcile, in His transcendence, the relativities of mortality. Our task as bearers of the great Euro-American value-system is to strive to realize to the full the possibilities inherent in that system, trusting that God will ensure their ultimate incorporation in the realm of the Absolute. To the present

[64] For a fairly full list, consult Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie,* 3rd and 4th eds. (Leipzig, 1922), and Ludwig Stein, *Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie,* 3rd and 4th eds. (Stuttgart, 1923).

[65] Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (Tübingen, 1922); Eugene Lyman, "Ernst Troeltsch's Philosophy of History," *Philosophical Rev.,* XLI, 5 (Sept. 1932), pp. 443–65.

[66] An aphorism attributed to Ranke.

writer this seems an ill-digested conglomerate of extreme historicism and "the theology of crisis." [67] Science is grounded upon faith,[68] but not of this kind, and we therefore refuse to include Troeltsch and like-minded writers among the historical sociologists to be given serious consideration.

X. A Usable Theory of History

Willst du dir aber das Beste tun,
So bleib nicht auf dir selber ruhn,
Sondern folg eines Meisters Sinn;
Mit ihm zu irren ist dir Gewinn.[69]
GOETHE.

Lest we should seem too "exclusive," let us now turn to those theories of the total historical process that can with some assurance be brought under the category of historical sociology. The use of the plural "those" points to our plan of organization; the difference between the excluded and included varieties is so great that we may perhaps regard the latter as subtypes, differing only in details, of one comprehensive genus.

This kind of historical sociology is not cosmically universal, for it does not assume a meaning or purpose or value toward which the cosmos "strives." Moreover, it is not socially universal, for it presupposes no over-arching end, ideal, or norm for the attainment of which humanity as a whole should or does bend its efforts. Further, it is not transcendent, for it incorporates no revelation of nor insight into the workings of the Absolute, Beneficent Nature, or the Divine Mind. Finally, and probably most important, it is not subject to the criticism leveled against extreme historicism in this chapter and elsewhere, for its advocates demonstrate effectively that certain generalizations can be made that are not entirely circumscribed by particular historical configurations at particular times and places. In short, these generalizations are not of the rigidly dated and localized sort.[70]

Two subvarieties of this non-universal, non-transcendent, and non-relative theory of the total historical process can be distinguished. They differ only in the degree to which the postulates, methodology, and re-

[67] Now identified with the names of Karl Barth and Friedrich Gogarten.

[68] Namely, the faith that man can know and control his world and his earthly destiny. Proof? There is none—not in 1940!—nor has there ever been. But without this faith science becomes meaningless.

[69] Translation:

"If you wish to treat yourself in the best way possible,
Do not rest on yourself alone,
But follow the mind of a master;
Under his leadership even error brings you gain."

[70] Cf. chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 28–31.

moter consequences of such a theory are laid bare and structurally interrelated. The first division, comprising the less thorough formulations, includes the theories of Shotwell, Robinson, Durkheim, Woodard, and more especially Tönnies and Teggart;[71] in the second may be placed the more highly integrated presentations of Max Weber and Alfred Weber.

By and large, the historical sociologists in the first group hold that the trend of social development the world over has been and will be toward a greater measure of geographical (vicinal), social, and mental accessibility,[72] mediated by all those devices of transportation and communication that wind about the globe with ever-increasing intricacy. Along with this, of course, go more and more differentiation and secularization and, *pari passu,* a heightening of those personality traits ordinarily labeled individuation, compartmentalization, and means-ends rationality. Instance: Tönnies builds his entire theory of social development, as set forth in *Geist der Neuzeit* as well as in earlier writings, in terms of the transition from "community" to "society," joining to it, as an inseparable corollary, a shift from "essential will" to "arbitrary will"—or in the terms used earlier in this chapter,[73] from mental immobility to mental mobility. A markedly similar trend is traced by Teggart, but the latter is more interested in the precise analysis of the processes involved than is Tönnies; he finds the chief clue in the breakdown of isolation following upon migrations and communication, for these precipitate conflicts of differing idea-systems and start processes leading to release from traditional restraints.

Essential agreement with much of this can rightly be attributed to Max Weber, but his agreement is qualified by the methodological stringency of culture case study and constructive typology.[74] Initially trained in jurisprudence and history, Weber commanded a simply staggering array of empirical evidence, and was accordingly skeptical of sweeping formulas. One of his earliest writings was an agrarian history of the ancient world; one of his latest (posthumous, in fact) an analysis of Pharisaism.

[71] Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (Simpson trans., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933), esp. Bk. II, chaps. i–ii; James W. Woodard, *Intellectual Realism and Culture Change* (Minneapolis, Sociological Press, 1935); Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* 8th ed. (Berlin, 1935); ———, *Fortschritt und soziale Entwicklung* (Karlsruhe, 1926); ———, *Geist der Neuzeit* (Leipzig, 1935); F. J. Teggart, *Processes of History* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1918); ———, *Theory of History* (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1925).

[72] Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1932), pp. 222–24.

[73] See also Barnes and Becker, *op. cit., passim.*

[74] Of course Weber did not use these labels, but his *idealtypische Methode,* at least, can with some provisos be called constructive typology, and the basis of the *Idealtypus* is frequently the *historische Individuum,* bringing the latter close to culture case study.

From beginning to end he was an unflagging advocate of "coming to grips with the data," of intensive culture case study. Oftentimes dipping his pen in iron and gall, Weber opposed all efforts to find modern capitalism, for example, in the Greek world, or to equate the Middle Ages with the era marking the domination of the Athenian landed gentry, or to cull illustrations for a rigid sequence of stages of industrial evolution, as Bücher [75] and Pöhlmann [76] tried to do, from the Greek household and slave workshop. Yet Weber did not topple over backwards into the swamp of extreme historicism; he succeeded in finding comparable aspects of constructed types primarily intended to render possible the sociological patterning of particular historical configurations. Further, he was able to make some of those constructs generalizable through judicious extensions of the constructive typology with which he consistently operated. As we attempted to show in the chapter on Constructive Typology, this method utilizes various personality types, types of social processes and structures, and relatively self-contained interactive units composed of such personalities, processes, and structures. These are never found in "pure" form, but for the purposes of isolating analytic elements and of scientific systematization, are dealt with *as if* they so existed.

Exhibit: Weber was quite as keenly aware as is any "institutional economist" that economic activity is historically conditioned, and that it oftentimes evidences a very slight degree of anything that can be called means-ends rationality; he was no naïve classical economist. Nevertheless, he constructed types of "the rational man" for the purpose of being able to assert definitely, in relation to particular time, place, and circumstance, what can be regarded as rational and what cannot. He saw clearly that whenever we call economic conduct "institutional" we tacitly presuppose our own rationality as observers. Not only this: In calling conduct "irrational" we set it over against a definite conception—which, to be sure, may be tucked away in an obscure cranny of our minds—of what rational conduct is like under a wide range of circumstances. How else can we pass judgments of "institutional molding" or of irrationality? "If the salt have lost its savor, wherewith shall it be salted?" The rational, or what is believed to be rational, is always the meaningful standard by which the irrational is judged.

Weber went on to point out that what is regarded as rational differs widely from place to place and from time to time. There is ample historical evidence to show that religious devotees have often engaged in conduct that would lead to their confinement in an insane asylum if it had

[75] Karl Bücher, *Industrial Evolution,* trans. from the 3rd German ed. by S. Morley Wickett (New York, 1901).

[76] Robert von Pöhlmann, *Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus,* 2 vols. (Munich, 1893–1901).

occurred almost anywhere in Western Europe or America during the twentieth century, but in their day and generation, they were taken quite as a matter of course—in short, they were believed to be "normal" and even rational. True, says Weber, a Hindu mystic suddenly transplanted to a center of Catholicism would not be regarded as in any way rational; the value-systems of the contrasting civilizations are too far apart. Still, it is clear that within any given civilization the scope of rationality is always implicitly determined, and is taken for granted in passing social judgments of every description. We have, as it were, a sort of secret yardstick by which we measure conduct, sometimes without any clear idea of what we are doing. Indeed, some raw empiricists boast that they are able to analyze "behavior" without making use of "theories." All too often, however, these apostles of Pure Induction overlook the fact that their own civilization has imparted to them a host of preconceived notions which they never stop to examine or of which they are not even aware. Among these notions one of the most common is the prevailing standard of rationality. Weber rightly felt that "the rational man" can never be other than a fiction, but that if grievous error is to be avoided, the component traits of this fiction must be isolated, arranged in a definite pattern, and explicitly set forth in "public" terms. Having himself done this, he demonstrated, to anyone who will take the trouble to read his analyses [77] rather than depend on second-hand statements,[78] that a great deal of power in prediction (whether of "prospective" or "retrospective" variety) [79] can be gained by operating with what is after all, to repeat, a fiction. Moreover, he was at pains to point out that such constructed types are likely to have little utility if they conform to a statistical mode or mean; a deliberate modification or accentuation of the average is frequently advisable if scientific prediction of social processes is to be attained.[80]

Restating: The constructed type is a device made of the particularity of history, shaped in such a way that this particularity becomes comparable and, in some instances, widely generalizable. To take our "rational man" again: Only in particular historical epochs can even relatively well-marked conduct of the kind he represents be found. *Without knowledge of the particularities encountered in those epochs we should not be able to build a useful type of rationality.* Once such a type (or types) has been constructed, however, it may be of great aid in revealing

[77] Contained in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922) and in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen, 1921–23).

[78] Such as the book by H. M. Robertson, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism: A Criticism of Max Weber and His School* (Cambridge, The University Press, 1933).

[79] See chapter on Constructive Typology, p. 34, esp. footnote 14.

[80] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922), p. 10.

the presence and further ramifications of the conduct in other eras and cultures. Moreover, if our "economic man" has been well constructed, the fact that a particular culture does *not* reveal his presence is in itself of great importance—the "negative utility" of a constructed type may in some circumstances be quite as significant as its "positive utility."

In the present context the interesting thing about the constructive typology of Max Weber is that it serves and stands in the service of a non-universal, non-transcendent, non-relative theory of the total historical process. For Weber, at least, the most readily discernible factor in social development is the growth of the rational habit of mind (in terms of the means-ends schema). This leads to that abstraction from the concrete and personal which is so deeply engrained in the habit patterns of "the economic man" and, to choose an instance equally apt, of "the scientific man."

But let it be proclaimed to all who have ears to hear that although Weber devoted his life to the construction of types of rationality and the analysis of the resulting interactional systems, he set no supreme value on rationality as such. Indeed, he once trenchantly said:

"It is the fate of our time, characterized as it is by rationalism and intellectualization, and above all by tendencies to secularize the world, that precisely the most ultimate and sublime values have been withdrawn from the common life of every day. To those who cannot manfully bear the burden thus imposed we must say, 'Silently return, without the usual self-advertisement of the renegade, but rather with the simplicity and directness of faith, into the open arms, widely and pityingly extended, of the old churches. . . . "The sacrifice of the intellect" must be made . . . but we will not reproach . . . [you] for this if it can be made sincerely.' Such a 'sacrifice of the intellect' for the sake of unconditional religious self-abandon is morally something entirely different from the evasion of the demands of intellectual honesty which becomes manifest when the courage is lacking to make clear to one's self one's own final position, and instead substitutes a sickly relativism that slips from under the demands of duty." [81]

From the context of these and other passages, it is plain that Max Weber could never himself make the "sacrifice of the intellect," but he cast no scorn on those who did. The vials of his wrath were saved to cast upon the heads of those who fondly fancy that they can retain full sincerity and yet "blend the best features of science and religion."

The growth of the rational habit of thought and of the concomitant secularization of society, then, was for Weber the strand upon which all sociological constructs must be strung, regardless of the religious or ethical value of that strand. This is clearly a generalization, but it is not uni-

[81] Max Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf," in *Gesammelte Aüfsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 554–55. Cf. pp. 854–66, present volume.

versal in its bearings, for Weber took pains to point out varying rates in the growth of rationality, fluctuations and reversals in the trend, and peculiar distortions resulting from the conflicts within personality engendered by rapid or all-absorptive rationalization. The trend merely appeared as the most easily comparable and generalizable trait of all the manifold culture case studies upon which he had so successfully labored. Moreover, he was under no delusions as to the range of rationality, for he regarded many phases of life as quite beyond its reach and, as has been intimated, his ethical standpoint was that of unqualified individual autonomy and responsibility on a wholly *non*-rational basis: "Let us go to work and meet the demands that the day imposes upon us—as human beings as well as professionally. [The ethical task] . . . is plain and simple when each of us finds and obeys the inner urge which gives consistency to *his* life." [82] Clearly this is not the creed of an apostle of "the rational man" as humanity's Messiah; Max Weber used constructed types as tools of analysis—and that is all.

XI. "Cultural History as Cultural Sociology"

Freuet euch des wahren Scheins,
Euch des ernsten Spieles:
Kein Lebendiges ist ein Eins,
Immer ists ein Vieles.[83]

GOETHE.

His younger brother, Alfred Weber, has incorporated these and like analytical tools in his "sociology of culture." [84] Although Alfred Weber fails to reach the high level of methodological *finesse* manifested by his brother, his work is well worth examination, for it deals with some matters not explicitly discussed elsewhere.

Connections with several of our "rejected varieties" of the philosophy of history are evident in Alfred Weber's studies, but this is no sufficient ground for objection. Problems are problems, in whatever context they occur: Romantic, rationalist, or Marxian. These examples, be it noted, probably represent the chief influences in his "sociology of culture." Indeed, the latter can perhaps be fairly characterized as an attempt to apply Marxian formulas of class struggle, economic interest, and dialectic de-

[82] Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 555.

[83] Translation:

"Rejoice ye in the true illusion,
In the most serious play.
Nothing living is a unity,
Always is it a multiplicity."

[84] *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie* (Leiden, 1934).

velopment to historical happenings, and then to point out their inadequacy in the explanation of the "cultural" achievements of man.

The special sense in which Weber uses the word "culture" shows how he has attempted to solve the problems posed by Romanticism. The uniqueness and mystery of genius, as manifested in music, sculpture, poetry, and other "cultural emanations," is unqualifiedly affirmed. Yet, the manifest *conditioning* of these achievements by other phases of the total historical process does not *determine* their basic traits. These can be idiographically apprehended and in some measure communicated, but they defy prediction, whether of "retrospective" or "prospective" kind. (This seems far too sweeping.) Moreover, culture does not "progress," and it has no necessary connection with the rational, means-ends control of the situations encountered in everyday experience. MacIver, who presents a closely similar conception, says: "There is no 'march' of culture. It is subject to retrogression as well as to advance. Its past does not assure its future." [85]

Unlike Spengler, whom we shall consider later, Alfred Weber does not regard the "cultures" of different peoples as in any sense homologous; each is necessarily unique. Accordingly, there can be no "morphology of culture" of the type Spengler proposes. "Cultural emanations" can be absorbed and at least partially comprehended *once they have occurred,* but they can never be predicted, much less prophesied.

Quite otherwise are the rationalistic strands of "civilization"—a term also used in a special sense. The secularization and rationalization of life, most clearly apparent in natural science, is the aim of the "civilizing intellect." The growth of "civilization" is coherent, in spite of checks, reactions, and shifts of emphasis, and its products are transferable from people to people. This universality of "civilizational" phenomena means that the great historical entities, though differing radically in their "cultures," are nevertheless potentially or actually interdependent. Means-ends rationality is everywhere applicable and, given the right conditions, it *must* emerge.

These conditions are in part provided by the "societal" process—once more a special usage. Every "intelligible field of historical study" (to borrow Toynbee's phrase) is characterized by definite configurations of "societal" processes. Some of their structural consequences are castes, classes, and other groupings such as those based on age, sex, kinship, or

[85] R. M. MacIver, *Society: A Textbook* (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1937), p. 275. See also his more extended discussion, "Civilization *versus* Culture," in the *University of Toronto Quarterly,* Apr., 1932, and "The Historical Pattern of Social Change" in *Authority and the Individual* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937). James W. Woodard has made similar distinctions in his *Intellectual Realism and Culture Change* (Minneapolis, 1935).

territory. Here the problems confronted by Alfred Weber are essentially those set by the historical materialism of Marx. In tracing "societal" developments, he tends to agree with the Marxians in maintaining that they are chiefly of *immanent* character; the relations between "intelligible fields of historical study," brought about by trade, war, migration and other means of diffusion, are of secondary importance in "societal" change. (The present writer would take issue with this position if there were sufficient space at his disposal; as it is, all that can be done is to note disagreement and to refer to Goldenweiser's valuable discussions of evolution, independent origins, diffusion, and like topics in the chapter on Leading Contributions of Anthropology to Social Theory, especially pp. 439–70.)

Alfred Weber goes on to say that the processes and structures making up differing "societies" tend to follow in certain sequences—although, to be sure, no unilinear schema that is *empirically* valid can be constructed. In other words, he maintains that intensive culture case study entered upon for *sociological* purposes justifiably issues in the building of societal types and subtypes that are not only comparable but that may also be generalizable within the limits set by constructive typology. Such comparability and generalizability are possible, however, only for the "civilizational" and "societal" aspects of historical configurations. The "cultural" phases are in some respects functionally interdependent with the others, but they cannot be subjected to scientific analysis; namely, to the systematic statement of the probability of the potential or actual recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical.[86]

A signal service to historical sociology, in our estimation, has been performed by Alfred Weber in setting out this three-fold classification. We seriously doubt, however, whether "cultural" happenings and products are so wholly beyond the range of prediction as he maintains; Toynbee's discussion of archaism and futurism,[87] to choose no other instance, seems effectively to controvert his thesis in some respects. Further, Alfred Weber does not distinguish properly between the peculiar contents of the "cultural emanations" as such, which of course, can be apprehended only idiographically, and the constructed types within which, for predictive purposes, many of these "emanations" can be scientifically incorporated.

Nevertheless, in the analyses of the full sweep of historical change presented by Alfred Weber and Max Weber, some features of which, in less clear-cut form, are also to be found in Tönnies, Teggart, and several other writers, we have theories that are worthy of the earnest attention of the historical sociologist.

[86] Discussed at length in the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 17–46. Needless to say, Alfred Weber does not operate within the confines of this definition of scientific activity.

[87] A. J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 49–131.

XII. What Are Stages Good For?

Das geht so fröhlich
Ins Allgemeine!
Is leicht und selig,
Als wärs auch reine.[88]
GOETHE.

Closely bound up with many theories of history, and especially with the varieties just surveyed, is the conception of stages of development—essentially, our third Protean question: "Are there any sequences or stages in societal development that when discovered will enable us to estimate the varying speeds at which the differing sections of mankind have approached the goal?"

In part following Ginsberg,[89] we may distinguish four ways in which the notion of stages has been employed. Each of these has a different background in the panorama of social thought, and each possesses a very different value for a sound historical sociology.

First is the notion of unilinear stage-sequences attributable to social evolutionists such as Spencer, Morgan and the like. This has been thoroughly discredited, as we have seen, and hence may be dismissed without further ado.

Second is the idea of stages as typifying general trends of development in the socio-cultural life of mankind taken as a whole. One of the chief nineteenth-century efforts along this line is exemplified by Comte's theological-military→metaphysical-legalistic→scientific-industrial succession. Another was Durkheim's view that the mechanical and restraining solidarity of group repression of individuality slowly gives place to the voluntary solidarity of the social division of labor and the functional organization of society.[90] DeGreef held that the transformation runs from régimes based on force to those marked by voluntary contract.[91] Novicow contended that the stages of change may be most adequately formulated in terms of the substitution of "higher" for "lower" forms of social conflict: physiological→economic-political→intellectual.[92] Closely paralleling this, Ratzenhofer and Small suggested that the shift has been

[88] Translation:

"That goes so gaily
Into the general.
It is as easy and carefree
As though it were also unqualified."

[89] Morris Ginsberg, "The Conception of Stages in Social Evolution," *Man*, XXXII (April, 1932), pp. 87–91. See also Goldenweiser's remarks, pp. 441–53.

[90] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 829–34.

[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 867–73.

[92] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 730–4.

from a "conquest state" to a "culture state."[93] Hobhouse maintained that the stages of social development are best characterized as those in which kinship, authority, and citizenship have successively been the bases of cohesion.[94] Giddings divided social development as follows: zoögenic, or animal society; anthropogenic, or the society of man in transition from animal to human tribal organization; ethnogenic, or tribal society; and demogenic, or the society of the period covered by written records. This last era he further divided into the military-religious, roughly corresponding to early antiquity and the Middle Ages; the liberal-legal, covering Greco-Roman and early modern developments; and the economic-ethical, comprising the period since the Industrial Revolution.[95]

Social evolutionism doubtless had much to do with the formulation of these stages, but their authors probably owe most to those philosophies of history already listed and *excluded* from the field of historical sociology. At the same time, we may admit that such stage-sequences have a few features that are not entirely devoid of utility for the non-universal, non-transcendent, and non-relative historical sociology which we have approvingly expounded. In the later discussion of constructive typology in this chapter we shall try to show how they may be of use. The major weaknesses of these theories are the complacent optimism (characteristic of the nineteenth century, but sadly unwarranted in the twentieth) and the illustrative method usually invoked in their support. We feel that we do not incur the charge of reactionary relativism when we assert that Sorokin has effectively exploded the optimism,[96] nor that we are guilty of extreme historicism in claiming that Max Weber has shown, through his use of genuine comparison, that the illustrative method is a thing of shreds and tatters.

Third among the varieties of stage theory are the sober and subdued attempts of those who frame schemas of change for one or more parts of a total social organization, using the method of culture case study. Theorists of this variety frequently confine themselves to the description and analysis of one culture case, although many of them admit the possibility that comparable sequences may be found to apply, within broad limits, to other cases. Schmoller[97] and Myres[98] provide instances: the former developed a series of stages of economic change chiefly applicable to Germany but usable, with modifications, elsewhere; the latter worked

[93] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 717–18.

[94] L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (London, 1922).

[95] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 778.

[96] P. A. Sorokin, *op. cit., passim.*

[97] Gustav Schmoller, *Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre,* Part I (Leipzig, 1900).

[98] J. O. Myres, *The Political Ideas of the Greeks* (Cincinnati, Methodist Book Concern, 1927).

out sequences of political ideology in the Greek world in a way that affiliates him with culture case study arriving at comparabilities—although he gave little explicit attention to questions of method.

Fourth are those stage theorists who refuse to make the assumption that stages arise or "evolve" out of preceding stages, i.e., they reject the postulate of genetic continuity *as postulate*. Virtually all of the theories discussed under the three earlier heads implicitly or explicitly presuppose it. Even the otherwise cautious Alfred Weber courts danger by restricting "societal" change to a principle of immanence that bears some of the earmarks of *a priori* evolutionism. Writers representing the fourth point of view leave the question of genetic continuity entirely open. The stages distinguished are not necessarily descriptive of sequences as they actually occurred; they are merely viewed as constructed types aiding in estimates of rank or quantity, in comparison, and, when due caution is exercised, in generalization. The influence of Max Weber is once more apparent, for even the severest historical critic of ordinary stage theories, Georg von Below, himself adopted stages cast in terms of constructive typology.

Entirely warranted is the skepticism with which modern historical sociologists regard the first three kinds of stage theory. Old-fashioned unilinear evolution obviously is in outer darkness; theories outlining general trends of social development rapidly crumble into decay when built of the shoddy scraps raked together by the illustrative method; and stages based on only one culture case study provide, *in and of themselves,* no constructs that span the abyss of extreme historicism. Only the method of constructive typology based on genuine comparison enables us to arrive at stages including everything of sociological value in the other varieties.

XIII. Constructed Types Again

So schauet mit bescheidnem Blick
Der ewigen Weberin Meisterstück,
Wie ein *Tritt tausend Fäden regt, . . .*
Ein *Schlag tausend Verbindungen schlägt.*[99]

GOETHE.

Although we have said a good deal about constructed types elsewhere in this volume, a fresh statement, adapted to the present context, may not be amiss. These types are heuristic devices, not definitions or aver-

[99] Translation:

"So look then with modest glance
At the masterpiece of the eternal weaver.
How *one* tread moves a thousand threads . . .
One stroke establishes thousands of relationships."

ages.[100] In dealing with a historical configuration such as Western Christianity, for instance, there is no hope of grasping and embodying in an array of words the infinite variety and intricacy of the phenomena called to mind by the term. The idiographic attempt to unroll the "full historical reality" yields nothing which the sociologist can directly utilize. (Moreover, who can ever communicate the *"full* historical reality?") A special twist must be given to selected strands of historical happening, and they must then be knotted together with others which may not always be thus present in empirical situations or which do not frequently take place in the "same" way. Why? In order that they may be woven into a coherent whole, into a constructed type, and eventually used for predictive purposes.

In working with the late medieval stage of Christianity, to modify our example, no sociological profit results from trying to bundle together the strikingly diverse and even contradictory beliefs, emotions, and modes of conduct of a gigantic congeries of persons alive at any one medieval date. When we talk about the fourteenth-century Church, do we mean the parishioners and functionaries of St. Ursula's in Cologne, as of March 2, 1376, *plus* like bodies affiliated with Chartres Cathedral as of the same date, *plus* the adherents of St. Mark's in Venice, same day and hour, *plus, plus . . . n?* Obviously not; the only way out of formless historicism is the weaving of a type; the warp and woof is provided by culture case studies centering on promulgated beliefs, moral ideas, maxims of conduct, modes of action, and so on. These constructs are then checked by reference to other culture case studies, and the outcome may be a set of types showing that a certain measure of comparison is possible. Beyond doubt, the strands used in our weaving are all spun out of experience, and they are certainly intertwined in accordance with conceptions of adequate causation and objective possibility.[101] Nevertheless, the resulting fabric is designedly a heuristic construct, a means of possible comparison and perhaps of generalization, and is never exactly duplicated in any concrete instance.[102]

The Church or ecclesia is but one of the religious structures of Western Christianity. Others, set forth in the chapter on Constructive Typology, are the sect, the denomination, and the cult. In some culture case studies this battery of four types is well adapted to the purposes in hand, but in

[100] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1922), p. 10.

[101] Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, 1920), pp. 266–90.

[102] If it does seem to be duplicated, the fact should be borne in mind that no type can possibly include all the traits of a concrete instance. Imagine that a supposed empirical match were found for the "perfect Airedale" as envisaged by some judge. The "match" has all the desired characteristics—and also has worms! This seemingly ludicrous example is *exactly* in point.

others either a lesser or a greater number may be necessary.[103] They are constructed *as needed* for the mastery of the "empirical chaos," and are modified or discarded where the data change or the purpose of the analysis is altered.

When attempting to formulate any or all of the Protean questions, it is permissible—nay, desirable because sociologically necessary!—to construct a typological sequence and to use it as a means of estimating the rate and trend of the historical occurrences in question. These in turn provide one test for the validity of the constructed type. Instance: If culture case studies of handicraft economies are made, it is then possible to build a type of handicraft economy, and from it to make deductions or "mental experiments"[104] which can be verified or refuted by reference either to the culture case studies on which the type was based or, preferably, to others made expressly for validating purposes. For example, we may deduce that in a social order of which such a type of handicraft economy is a component, the only source of capital accumulation is to be found in ground rent. From this we may infer that a transformation of the system would be effected by a limited supply of land, population increase, influx of precious metals, and so on.[105]

The deductions thus made must then be placed in juxtaposition with the ascertained facts, and if they do not fit (as they do not in the so-called Middle Ages, for instance), we must infer that the social order in question was not primarily based on a handicraft economy, and the investigation proceeds to a deeper level of analysis. Let us recall our earlier statement that constructed types may have "negative utility" as well as "positive"! If the deductions *do* fit the facts, the former may be legitimately transferred to other cases having comparable features for further checking, and if repeated transference proves possible, a constructed type having some measure of generalizability has been produced.[106] Our "marginal trading people" construct is perhaps a type having such "positive utility" (see the chapter on Constructive Typology, pp. 31–34).

As long as a stage-sequence is not regarded as absolute, as long as room is left for changes made necessary by increasing knowledge, the conception of stages may therefore be a very useful one. With some hesitation, we advance the idea that it may sometimes be possible to make use ("negative" or "positive") of the stage theories formulated on the old illustrative basis, *if* great caution is observed and *if* they are repeatedly

[103] The writer, for example, finds that the Greek religious phenomenon known as Orphism requires a special constructed type; so also do the worships centering at Delphi and Delos.

[104] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, 1920), p. 5.

[105] Ginsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[106] *Ibid.*

checked by culture case studies. In this way, researches into "what thoughts of old the wise have entertained" may help us to grapple with our old man of the sea; knowledge of the anticipations of historical sociology in bygone days may yield more than flatulent footnotes and the narcissism of the savant. Manifestly, Ibn Khaldūn or Adam Ferguson cannot provide us with hypotheses that are "relevant to futurity" as we *now* view that futurity. Suggestions about the best ways to interrogate Proteus may be worth while, however, and at any rate, they may save us from the overweening belief that our generation is the first to set foot on Pharos.

XIV. Small-Scale Cycles

Mein Kind, Sie wissens nicht zu machen;
Doch Artischocken sind von allen Sachen
Die schlimmsten nicht, die unter zarten Fingern
Ihr widerspenstig Naturell verringern.—
Nimm nur den Stachel mit geschickter Kraft,
Das ist der Sinn von aller Wissenschaft.[107]

GOETHE.

Many members of the present scientific generation are probably inclined to say, at this point, "All very well, but suited only for Toynbees and Webers—let us look at a kind of historical sociology that the modest scientist of ordinary ability can hope to handle." In some moods, the present writer feels that such a position is eminently reasonable, and is inclined to regard small-scale cyclical theories of socio-cultural change as most clearly falling within the confines of a historical sociology conforming to modern canons of science.[108] We can perhaps ascertain "the probability of potential or actual recurrence" most readily when we limit ourselves to the fourth Protean question: "Can it be said that 'History repeats itself' in any fundamental sense?"

Questions well asked are, in a certain sense, already answered. (In fact, it has even been hinted that the hardy souls who hold Proteus fast finally hear only the echoes of their own voices, and are satisfied therewith.) Certainly Galileo did not dump a cartload of stones out of the Leaning Tower; he had so carefully pondered his problem that the demonstration

[107] Translation:

"My child, you know not what to do;
Yet artichokes are by no means the worst of those things
Which diminish their natural resistance
Under the touch of delicate fingers.
Take hold of the prickly leaf with power adroit,
That is the meaning of all science."

[108] George A. Lundberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 211–15, 238–39, 514, 517, 531.

of his solution could be yielded by the fall of only a few stones of differing weight.[109] Alas, sociologists have as yet achieved no such precise formulations, but many small-scale cycles have been isolated, and have yielded some power of "retrospective" or "prospective" prediction. Manifestly, these cycles, process-series, sequence-patterns, rhythms, and periodicities must always be cast in potential or actual terms, and thus evade laboratory experimental control; nevertheless, they conform to strict rules of scientific method *if* the line between the constructed type and "the empirical chaos" is held steadfastly in view.

This conformity is rendered easier because they do not attempt to determine the trend of the *total* process of historical change; large-scale theories, cyclical or otherwise, are manifestly very difficult to subject to scientific treatment defined as "the systematic statement of the probability of the potential or actual recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical." Small-scale cyclical theories are in better case, for they can be more easily verified or refuted. Some of those that may be held successful are Simmel's "conflict cycle," [110] Bogardus's "race relations series," [111] Park's "succession series," [112] Hiller's "strike cycle," [113] Edwards' "revolutionary cycle," [114] some of the Marxian theories of revolutionary tactics,[115] and Pareto's "circulation of the élite." [116]

This last verges on the large-scale variety, to be sure, and there may be some legitimate doubt as to whether it has been satisfactorily verified. Nevertheless, let us present it in detail as a possible example of valid and relatively small-scale cyclical theory, avoiding Pareto's recondite terminology whenever this can be done without falsifying the picture.

Both in the present and the past, says Pareto, social equilibrium is constantly being upset by the accumulation of spineless decadents in the upper classes and energetic upstarts in the lower. When the upper classes no longer possess leaders with the attitudes necessary for governing, and the lower classes have such leaders, revolution is the unavoidable outcome. No society can maintain itself by persuasion; oligarchies using

[109] We say "demonstration" rather than "verification" because Galileo himself held that the dropping of stones was necessary only to convince those who could not follow his reasoning. His "experiment" was really a persuasive gesture.

[110] George Simmel, *Soziologie* (Munich, 1908), pp. 247–336.

[111] E. S. Bogardus, "A Race Relations Cycle," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXV, pp. 612–17.

[112] Pervading many of the monographs of the Chicago "ecological" school: Wirth's, Thrasher's, etc.

[113] E. T. Hiller, *The Strike* (Chicago, 1928), pp. 5–11.

[114] L. P. Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1925), *passim*.

[115] Frances Bennett Becker, "Violence the Midwife," unpublished M.A. thesis, Smith College, 1934.

[116] Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, ¶¶ 2060–2612.

force rule *de facto* if not *de jure*. When such an oligarchy becomes soft-hearted, squeamish, humanitarian, when it has lost the capacity and/or willingness to use force, the social order becomes unstable, and can be put on an even keel again only when a new élite, rising from the underdog level, forcibly wrests power from the effete rulers and does the governing itself.

Upheavals of this kind issue from changes in the balance of prevailing attitudes. For analytical purposes these attitudes, says Pareto, can be placed in two pigeonholes. Personalities in which attitudes of "combination" predominate are innovators, experimenters, risk-takers, mentally mobile. His term for such persons is *speculators;* their income is variable and depends upon their sagacity and scheming. Personalities in which attitudes of "group persistence" predominate are traditionalists, followers of routine, advocates of "sound methods," mentally immobile. His term for such persons is *rentiers;* their income is fixed, or nearly so, and does not depend on adroitness and manipulative skill. The society that best maintains a moving equilibrium is one in which these contrasting attitudes are best distributed. The leaders are strong in "combination," thus permitting necessary innovations; the followers are strong in "group persistence," thus consolidating the advantages arising from innovation.

The leaders constitute an oligarchy that manages to retain control by the clever use of force and by playing upon stabilizing attitudes, but unless there is a "circulation of the élite," this power cannot be retained. History, says Pareto, is "a cemetery of aristocracies" for, as generations succeed each other, nepotism and formalism close the ranks of the upper classes against able upstarts. The result is that the oligarchs become prevailingly of complacent *rentier* mentality, and the underdogs are led by embittered, excluded *speculators*. The old cycle is closed by revolution, and a new cycle begins.

Little hope can be entertained for the indefinite self-maintenance of any upper class, says Pareto, but there are two ways in which its life may be prolonged. One is the unshrinking use of force whenever necessary. The other is the absorption of lower-class *speculators* who represent a threat to the existing régime; they should be permitted to become wealthy or to acquire other requisites of oligarchic membership. Eventually, however, the oligarchs become decadent. Force is frowned upon, and at the same time nimble-witted and energetic recruits from the lower levels are barred. These enterprising outsiders, encouraged by relative immunity from punishment, plot and preach against the hapless, feckless, upper crust, the masses are converted to a new myth, and in due course the longed-for overturn occurs. The masses then have a new élite to dominate them. Therefore, we have a cyclical pattern, the "actual recurrence of phenomena which, for the purposes in hand, are regarded as identical."

Pareto's cycle has not yet been adequately verified, although there have been a few studies tending in that direction. But however this may be, there can be little doubt of the scientific legitimacy of such historical sociology. The problems involved are definite, and there are sufficient empirical data to make an adequate check-up possible. The same is true of the other cycles listed at the beginning of this section. Whatever the hardened skeptic may think of the more sweeping varieties of historical sociology considered elsewhere, he can hardly fail to give his support to the study of small-scale cycles, even though he may think that *attested* results to date are meager.

XV. Large-Scale Cycles

Ihr verfahrt nach Gesetzen, auch würdet ihrs sicherlich treffen,
Wäre der Obersatz nur, wäre der Untersatz wahr! [117]

GOETHE.

The scientific warrant of large-scale cyclical theories is much less certain. Here we classify those which take in all phases—e. g., "societal," "civilizational," and "cultural"—of all the processes sustaining and changing each and every "intelligible field" of history. The supreme test is always prediction, whether "retrospective" or "prospective," and it can be most readily applied to phenomena of limited scope in time and space, such as "strike cycles" and "circulations of élites." For one thing, there is some prospect of determining [118] whether or not the phenomenon which is supposed to have recurred is really the "same"; i. e., whether or not it falls within the limits of the constructed type already established, whether or not it can be regarded as identical for the purposes in hand. When entire continents and epochs are included in massive cyclical generalizations, any framework of problem, hypothesis, and constructed type that is strong enough to bear the burden thus imposed is likely to be hewn out of timbers so cumbrous that precise leveling and squaring are not possible.

Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* [119] affords an excellent instance of a cyclical theory of the large-scale kind. It has already been mentioned among the "rejects" of the philosophies of history, but must nonetheless

[117] Translation:

"Ye proceed according to 'laws,' and certainly would ye hit the mark
If the postulate could be granted, and if the corollary were true."

[118] For the reason that historical contexts of relative completeness are more readily procurable; there are fewer gaps in the data.

[119] The first volume of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* was published in 1917; the second, in 1922. A cheap one-volume English translation is now available (New York, A. A. Knopf, 1939).

be considered here as well. Spengler makes no effective use of distinctions such as Alfred Weber's "society," "civilization," and "culture," to say nothing of carefully delineated subtypes such as those of Toynbee and Max Weber. Every intelligible field of historical study is dealt with as a "whole" that is more and other than the sum of its "parts." Here the objections raised against extreme functionalism are relevant—and indeed, Benedict[120] has been much influenced by Spengler.

Basic to the Spenglerian "morphology of culture" is a sort of Hegelian idea of an "oversoul" of historical entities, complicated by crude organismic notions. Each of the great units he isolates—Egyptian, Chinese, Classical, Magian, Mayan, Faustian, Russian, and the like—has gone or will go through a cycle of birth, vigorous maturity, and senile decline which is the same for all and is determined by immanent, unalterable organismic "laws." The analogy between "mentality-organism" and biological organism is more than an analogy; it amounts to homology or even absolute identity. Each of these functional "wholes" has its own mathematics, science, religion, and art; there is no effective interaction whatsoever with other "wholes." To be sure, there may be temporary deformation or "pseudomorphosis," but the immanent "laws" of the original whole work themselves out in spite of the external influences that have temporarily constrained them. Further, nothing can either speed up or retard the inevitable ripening, withering, and decay. Moreover, time limits can be set on these processes, for they usually run their course, says Spengler, in about a thousand years.

Lack of space must again be pleaded; the numerous specific errors and general distortion of history perpetrated by Spengler cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that, in spite of the praise bestowed on Spengler's work by Eduard Meyer, among others, few historians of repute have accepted his contentions. Still more damning is the fact that historical sociologists dealing with the same body of materials, among them Toynbee and Max and Alfred Weber, regard the *Decline of the West* as nothing more than a *tour de force* executed by a man of undeniable literary ability and considerable erudition. (When contrasted with Toynbee, however, Spengler's range of information, great as it is, dwindles to insignificance.) The importance that Spengler's work has for the sociologist does not lie in the antiquated organismic version of all-inclusive cyclical theory which it reawakens, but in the cogent analyses of peasant and industrial-urban cultures to be found in the latter part of his treatise. Spengler does not give the sources of any of his ideas, except for references to Goethe and Nietzsche, but plentiful internal evidence shows that he borrowed his basic conceptions from Danilevsky, Rückert,

[120] Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934). See Goldenweiser's comments on this work, present volume, pp. 482–9.

and, where the rural-urban analyses are concerned, from Tönnies.[121] But not to be unduly disparaging, it should be said that Spengler unquestionably adds a great deal to the already fruitful conceptions of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft.*

Somewhat resembling Spengler's is a recent cyclical theory which its originator prefers to call a theory of trendless fluctuations, clustering about an "ideational-idealistic-sensate" triad. This, it will be readily recognized, is the basic schema of Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (first three volumes, 1937).

The method is essentially illustrative, and the categories Sorokin applies are not explicitly recognized as constructed types. In fact, it is perhaps fair to say that there are passages in the *Social and Cultural Dynamics* in which they are handled as ontological entities, i.e., as "really" existing. Other aspects of the method are "logico-meaningful" and "causal-functional" interpretation. What Sorokin means by the first of these is that certain parts of a given socio-cultural unit are "congruent" with each other, even though the "independent-dependent variables" relationship cannot be established. One might say, for example, that the philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, with its system of deductively linked propositions, is "congruent" with Gothic architecture and its system of interlacing groins, pillars, and buttresses. Causal-functional interpretation, of course, fits into the "independent-dependent variables" mode of analysis.

The main fields of study are the Greco-Roman and Western European cultures during the past twenty-five hundred years, with forays into Egyptian, Arabic, Chinese, and Babylonian cultures. A great deal of careful research work has been done in these different fields, but in the writer's estimation the fields analyzed have been subjected to categories that are *a priori* generalizable, and hence open to all the objections raised in the earlier part of this chapter. Genuine comparison is not practiced, and the so-called "quantitative" presentation (for which no first-rate statistician has a kind word) chosen for many of the data tears the cultures studied into such minute bits that the resulting mosaic presents no pattern that anyone following a method of culture case study proper would recognize.

Sorokin finds that the socio-cultural units with which he deals are tangibly integrated in both the logico-meaningful and causal-functional senses, and each of the isolable "parts" is also found to be integrated as a "whole" that forms a part of a larger "whole." This comes perilously close to extreme functionalism, and is a much higher degree of integration than is discovered in similar units by Toynbee and Max and Alfred Weber.

[121] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 784, 1032–33 and notes.

It is also maintained that the prevailing mentalities discoverable in the time span of twenty-five hundred years undergo immanent changes, and that even the phases of these changes are also immanently determined. But for each fluctuation in a given direction, whether toward the ideational or the sensate poles, there is an endpoint, set by what Sorokin calls "the principle of limits," after which the trend is reversed. This "principle of limits" has a dialectic flavor (although elsewhere Sorokin scoffs at Hegelian-Marxian notions), and to the writer seems to have a definitely *a priori* character. Sorokin wastes a great deal of space in attacking unilinear evolutionism *via* "the principle of limits"; evolutionism has already been so thoroughly riddled that there seems no need for an *a priori* fusillade. The result of this immanent limitation, says Sorokin, is an ever-new recurrence of the "same" patterns: materialism—idealism; determinism—indeterminism; ethics of absolute principles—ethics of happiness; realism—nominalism; ideational art—sensate art; and so on. There is no contesting the fact of empirical diversity, but whether the phenomena that are supposed to "fluctuate" are really the "same" is at least an open question. Culture case study and constructive typology might have helped to provide some empirical check-up; as it is, many of the assertions are supported by hand-picked illustrations.

In fairness, we should note that Sorokin himself asserts that the transformations ascertained by his mode of analysis are not always quite the "same." Each current of culture ("part"), being an immanently determined system, shows a margin of independence in its movement, but at the same time all the "parts" of whatever "whole" is studied change together where long-time fluctuations are concerned. In this sense, therefore, the various socio-cultural entities studied demonstrate their high integration in "part-whole" terms, although this integration, says Sorokin, is not perfect.

There is an endeavor on Sorokin's part to escape from extreme functionalism by introducing the notion of the "leading and lagging" of cultural variables. For example, the music of a given culture may change in a certain direction somewhat earlier than painting and sculpture, and on other occasions it may lag behind them. Nonetheless, the long-term trends are of the integrated character noted above. It seems apparent to those not wholly subscribing to Sorokin's method and conclusions that we have here something much like the Marxian ideas of "accelerating" and "retarding." When confronted by evidence that no well-marked integration as between "parts" of certain intelligible fields of historical study is present, the Marxian can always claim that there is a temporary differential in the rate of movement, but that in the long run it will cancel out. Awkward facts can thus be circumvented, to the satisfaction of the

exponent of the theory at least, but the scope thus afforded loose generalization seems a bit too great for the advocates of more precise methods.

Yet, in spite of the "leading and lagging" qualifications which Sorokin introduces, his position is essentially functionalist, and even verges on the extreme. To quote: "All the essential 'swings' of the currents of culture-mentality . . . (science, philosophy, religion, art in all forms, ethics, law, economic, political, social forms) . . . appear to be but a manifestation of the passage of these cultures from one of . . . [the main types—ideational, idealistic, or sensate] to another." [122]

Those "swings" of cultures as "wholes" Sorokin finds twice clearly exemplified in the Western world. First is the Greek shift (1) from ideationalism in the sixth century B.C. and before, (2) to the idealistic type, which is essentially a mixture of the ideational and sensate, in the fifth, (3) to the predominately sensate in the late fourth and thereafter. The second major "swing" is clearly manifested in the Christian world at about the sixth century A.D., when its ideational phase definitely becomes "monopolistic"; this endures until the end of the twelfth, when sensate forms reappear and through intermixture yield an idealistic phase in the thirteenth and fourteenth; thereafter the sensate phase begins and reaches its climax in the nineteenth. In the twentieth century, says Sorokin, there are unmistakable signs of ideational traits that will ultimately bring about a fresh cycle; they mark "the beginning of the long-time decline of our overripe Sensate culture." [123]

We have already noted the fact that Sorokin makes a few excursions into cultures other than those mentioned in the paragraphs immediately preceding, but it is nonetheless true that the latter alone are thoroughly analyzed. And this analysis, it will be recalled, (1) leans heavily on categories generalized in advance, (2) is propped up by an illustrative method, (3) is backed by a type of "quantitative" technique, and (4) finally rests on only two "intelligible fields of historical study." Sorokin's conclusions sound much like those advanced by Spengler, even though he calls himself an "anti-Spenglerist." [124] The resemblance becomes still more striking when one takes account of the fact that Sorokin makes liberal use of an organismic analogy closely akin to Spengler's "flowering, ripening, withering, and decay." [125]

To many sociologists, the functionalism and organicism espoused by Sorokin will appear to be heavy liabilities,[126] but the author of *Social*

[122] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 787. Cf. Goldenweiser's note, present volume, pp. 487–8.

[123] *Ibid.*, p. 786.

[124] *Ibid.*

[125] *Ibid.*

[126] See Florian Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, pp. 541 ff.

and Cultural Dynamics rashly shoulders still another burden. He proclaims, as does Spengler, that "Even systems of truth and knowledge, including so-called science, are but manifestations dependent upon the type of culture." The fact that science operates within the means-ends schema is ignored or brushed aside; consequently no distinction is made between "society," "culture," and "civilization" (to borrow Alfred Weber's terminology). We are therefore compelled to ask Sorokin, as we might ask Spengler, "How do you know that what you say is true?[127] If science is relative to given cultural configurations, how can you analyze cultures other than your own? How can you even analyze systems of knowledge that differ from your own within your own culture? More, does not this 'cultural solipsism' bring you perilously near to personal solipsism? Are you not reduced to the position of the Scottish humorist?"

> " 'We meet and mix with other men;
> With women, too, who sweetly chatter:
> But mayn't we here be duped again,
> And take our thoughts for Mind and Matter?' "[128]

Using a homely figure, the present writer is inclined to say that Sorokin, in painting the floor of his study, has painted himself into a corner, far away from all the doors and windows. Max Weber showed that scientific systems are beyond question "relevant to value" (*wertbezogen*), but that this does *not* mean domination by value-*judgment*. It is entirely possible to make sociology "relevant to futurity," for example, without simultaneously thinking exclusively in terms of a Golden Age or a Day of Doom in either past or future. We can justifiably say, "If this is the end to be attained, these are the means by which to attain it," without in the same breath plumping for either end or means.

Social and Cultural Dynamics has fluttered the academic dovecotes, perhaps because of its polemic tone and the relative unfamiliarity, to many American sociologists, of the point of view it represents and the historical learning it incorporates. Sorokin has performed a signal if unlooked-for service, for in the effort to deal with him in his own territory we may become less mealy-mouthed and more erudite. We may learn to face issues squarely, instead of resorting to the familiar dodge of the timid reviewer: "In spite of all its shortcomings, this is a good book."

Moreover, Sorokin's use of historical materials will probably help us to escape from that stultifying preoccupation with preliterate data on the one hand and current events on the other already anathematized in this

[127] All that is implied by this question is that the means-ends schema is, in our estimation, demonstrably commensurable as between differing cultures; no absolutism is implied.

[128] Charles Neaves, "Stuart Mill on Mind and Matter," *The Edinburgh Book of Scottish Verse* (London, 1911), p. 709.

chapter. To assail theories of social and cultural dynamics that build their walls with the stones of history requires the use of historical missiles. In other words, we must meet Sorokin on his own ground. When the din of battering-rams and the clank of catapults has died away, we shall probably be thankful for the provocative cyclical theories, large-scale or small-scale, that let loose the dogs of intellectual war. In the realm of the mind, at least, "Conflict is the father of all things."

XVI. No Historical Sociology without Historical Data

Das junge Volk, es bildet sich ein,
Sein Tauftag sollte der Schöpfungstag sein.
Möchten sie doch zugleich bedenken,
Was wir ihnen als Eingebinde schenken.[129]

GOETHE.

The foregoing survey of the cyclical varieties of historical sociology has perhaps demonstrated that systematic sociology and historical sociology are *complementary*. Without the problems raised and the validating techniques provided by the former, the latter degenerates into the "rejects" of the philosophy of history or into antiquarianism, while, without the check on "timeless" abstractions afforded by culture case study and constructive typology, systematic sociology sinks to the level of verbal jugglery and mathematical incantation.

Most American sociologists would at least render lip-service to this complementary function, but when dealing with small-scale cycles, rhythms, and so forth, we all too often gather data only from the present and the immediate past. Paradox: We try to generalize in what is at least one aspect of historical sociology [130] while almost completely disregarding the data of history!

Our weakness is in part an outcome of the general ahistoricity of American thinking. Descendants, for the most part, of migrants who severed their European roots, and oftentimes contemptuous of "the old

[129] Translation:

"The younger generation fancies that its christening marked the first day of creation.
It should, however, bethink itself of the swaddling clothes which we donated."

[130] We say this advisedly. Any cycle involves time-sequences, and in addition, must be compared with the past cycles if "the next phase" is to be predicted. Further, are we not just as dependent on the "documents" if we now study the Chrysler strike of 1939–40 as we are if we study the Lawrence strike of 1912? To be sure, we are able to find eye-witnesses of the former more readily than of the latter, but must we not subject *any* eye-witness to what is essentially "the criticism of sources," so well-known to the historian? Cf. Goldenweiser's comments, pp. 448, 481, and 487.

country," we have little sense of or interest in historical continuities. This frontier frame of mind contributes to the widespread American belief that it is easier to check the present than the past, easier to view events "under the aspect of our own era." Hence, runs the inference, the good sociologist should strain every nerve to collect current events, and if historical sources are used at all, appropriate apologies should be made for dispensing something that is not really "just as good."

Shamefaced confessions are not necessary, for the substitute, so-called, is oftentimes superior to the fancied original. Stevenson quite properly said, "The obscurest epoch is today." What do we now know about the "causes" of World War II? About the plots and plans now in full swing for the Presidential campaign of 1940? Clearly, information indispensable for anything remotely approaching sociologically satisfactory knowledge of the present never becomes available until the present is the historical past. Think of the diaries, memoirs, confessions, autobiographies, secret archives, undercover diplomatic deals, and *sub rosa* trade agreements! These and countless other data, as yet inaccessible, must become available before we know what situations have really affected the present day and generation. Again, how great is the scope of "today" in spatial terms? If we hope to pass beyond home, office, and the route between the two, do we not have recourse to essentially historical sources? To traveler's tales, letters, the printed word? Does the fact that we get news "over the air" render it any less second-hand than the word-of-mouth of the Addisonian coffee houses? Do newsreels bring us all the *significant* facts? And is not *Recent Social Trends* now a *historical* document? How long will the census of 1940 remain "contemporary"? Once more, have the social processes initiated today or yesterday run their course? Is it not clear that the hypotheses we now frame, concerning cycles and the like, cannot be subjected to verification by referring to the present alone? We must either wait for the processes involved to reach their endpoint in a unique time-series (which puts us in the same position as the business forecaster who so gloriously demonstrated his competence in 1929), or we must search the past for phenomena presenting comparable and generalizable similarities. In short, no matter how advanced sociology may become, materials drawn from the present alone will never provide bases sufficient for the validation of any but the most minute of cyclical hypotheses. Finally, we readily recognize the distorting prejudices of the much-berated Victorians; what about our own? Does it not follow that generalizations based only on contemporary data and guided by contemporary theories alone are likely to suggest the frog's-eye view of the hack journalist rather than the bird's-eye view of the historical sociologist? If Proteus is ever to answer our fourth question: "Can it be said that

'History repeats itself' in any fundamental sense?" we must be prepared ourselves to supply the content of that crucial word, "history."

XVII. The Importance of Method

Und ein Gewebe, sollt es ewig sein?
Zerstörts die Magd nicht, reißt die Spinn es selber ein.[131]

GOETHE.

Yes, we must be prepared ourselves to supply the content of that crucial word, "history," and we must also be ready to lend that content scientific meaning by placing it in the right framework of theory and method.

This gives the sought-for key to the cryptic myth of Proteus! A question properly asked is, in a sense, already answered. If it is not properly asked, no amount of aimless fact-gathering or high-flown speculation will serve as a substitute. Methodology is not something separable from "real research"; it is the very heart of sound research. *Nothing is more practical than theory;* does not its etymology show that the theorist was "one who travelled to see men and things?" And methodology, as a branch of sociological theory, is, etymologically again, simply "the scientific way to go."

"The scientific way to go for those who travel to see men and things" —what could be more practical than that?

To ourselves and others, then, we can say this: "When you have carefully envisaged your problem, skilfully framed your hypothesis, intensively studied your culture cases, soberly constructed your comparable types, cautiously generalized, and thoroughly validated your conclusions, you have successfully wrestled with Proteus.

"His answer is the echo of your own voice. You are alone on Pharos."

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[131] Translation:

"And should any web be eternal?
If the maid does not destroy it, the spider itself tears it down."

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[16]

THE NEW HISTORY, ARCHEOLOGY, AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION

Harry Elmer Barnes

I. The New History and the History of Culture

1. *Lack of Cultural Interests on the Part of the Older Historians.* The critical and erudite historians, led by von Ranke, perfected the technique for the accurate determination of historical facts, so far as they can be recovered or reconstructed by the historical scholar. But they did little to broaden the conceptions of the historians as to what facts are worth recovering. They rested content, for the most part, with the older notions of the subject-matter of history.

As a rule, religious and political interests have been dominant throughout the greater part of the course of the development of historical writing. Among the Jews, most of the historical writing was occupied with proof of God's tender and unique solicitude for "the Seed of Abraham." Patristic, medieval and Reformation historical writing was shot full of supernaturalism, always endeavoring to make clear God's somewhat vacillating and changeable will towards man. This *motif* dominated the succession of works from Chronicles-Ezra-Nehemiah, through Augustine, Orosius, Otto of Freising, Baronius, Bossuet, Paley and Merle d'Aubigné, to Montague Summers and Henry Osborn Taylor. Even in our own day distinguished historians dogmatically assure us of God's existence and detail his attributes. For example, Henry Osborn Taylor, a leader in the study of European intellectual history and former president of the American Historical Association, concluded one of his latest books with the assurance that:

> God exists: we may be as sure of Him as ever; it is only the rational proofs of God that change and lose their validity. The sense of the divine, the strength and comfort of belief in God, may still be the grandest verity of human life; may still assure us that here and forever all things shall never cease to work together for good to them that love God, who rest in the sure harmony of relationship with the divine and omniscient and omnipotent love. . . . Human progress still points onward through the action of the free intelligence, the righteously resolving will, and the ever more enlightened love of God and

Man. . . . Through many conflicts and in many ways, but always in the way of freedom, the human soul has been emerging, and has been gathering, as it were, affinity to God, in whom lies its immortality.[1]

On the whole, however, the last half-century has been characterized by a notable and healthy secularization of historical writing. Not only has the interest in supernaturalism enormously declined, but there has also been a distinct abatement of the feeling of dogmatic assurance about the nature of God and his specific will with respect to the human race. The findings of modern science and Biblical criticism have not only undermined the older dogmatics and apologetics. They have also made it woefully apparent how inadequate are the orthodox conceptions of the extent, nature and control of the cosmos. In the face of this situation, the informed and thoughtful historian hesitates to deliver himself of theological opinions or to assume to possess the confidence of God, even though admitting that cosmic problems today are infinitely more impressive and interesting than they could possibly have been to Augustine or Luther.[2]

The other obsession of the conventional historian—an absorption in political events and episodes—has died harder and is still a potent force opposing the development of a more rational and inclusive type of historical writing. The political tradition has a heritage as venerable as the theological. Among the Jews the political and the religious preoccupations were blended. With Herodotus historical interest was partially secularized and relatively concentrated on political entities, though "the father of history" was less an offender in this respect than any of the other major historians of classical antiquity. He gave liberal consideration to cultural elements and contrasts. From Thucydides to Freeman, Droysen and Rhodes, however, the great majority of the distinguished historians who did not devote themselves to advancing the cause of Christianity or one of its multitudinous sects were engrossed in a study of divers events, episodes, and anecdotes relating to political, diplomatic, or military history. Droysen, Freeman, Seeley, and Schäfer frankly and aggressively proclaimed manly history to be but "past politics," though some erratic minds might busy themselves with the more effeminate history of economic life, social institutions, literature, or the fine arts.

To a very considerable degree this political obsession in modern times was due to two influences, not entirely distinct—the Hegelian theory of the state and the spirit of nationalism. The philosophy of Hegel had emphasized the state as the noblest of God's mundane achievements, and Hegel's philosophy had enormous vogue among the German savants who founded the science of history in its modern form in the first half of the

[1] H. O. Taylor, *The Freedom of the Mind in History*, pp. 293–7.

[2] Cf. J. H. Leuba, *God or Man?* (1933); and J. H. Robinson, *The Human Comedy* (1936).

last century. Added to this was the sentiment of nationalism, which flourished with particular virulence during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, and was given a more substantial technological basis by the Industrial Revolution. The French memories of the Revolutionary and Bonapartist glories, the German inspiration from the War of Liberation and the unification of the empire, the Italian ecstasy over the ultimately consummated ambition for a united Italy, which had inspired Dante and Machiavelli as well as Mazzini, the English enthusiasm over the peninsular campaign and Waterloo, as well as the new imperial expansion after 1870, and the pride of the Americans over the foundation of the Federal Republic and its preservation intact after a great civil war, all served to warm the hearts of the great historians of the nineteenth century. And along with these purely political foundations of nationalism went others of a psychological and cultural sort, such as the doctrine of racial and cultural superiority. Hegelianism and nationalism, in combination, proved amply adequate to hold most historians firmly in the service of political history.

One would find less to complain of in the devotion of these historians to political history if they had actually promoted a study of political institutions and contributed to an increase of our knowledge concerning the development of the state and its various organs. But the major part of this political history was perverted through the operation of two influences flowing mainly from the effects of Romanticism upon historical writing. One was the Romanticist theory that history should be vivid and interesting, and hence, that the finest sort of historical material is to be discovered in dramatic episodes. The other was the view, drawn largely from Carlyle and his disciples, that history is collective biography. Hence, the personal element loomed large in this variety of historiography. On account of the triumph of this combination of ideals and aspirations, most of the political history of the last century was primarily biographical and episodical, and threw little light upon the general problems of the origins and evolution of the major political institutions. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that generalized works on constitutional history like those by Waitz, Fustel, Maitland, Luchaire, Esmein, Viollet, Flach, Brunner, and G. B. Adams were more enlightening with respect to the history of the state than the achievements of scores of equally scholarly conventional political historians of the day. Amazing detail, often concerning irrelevant topics was, then, the characteristic thing about the respectable historical writing of the last century.

Moreover, an exclusive devotion to even the dynamic and vital political and legal history of the type represented by Brunner, Esmein, Flach, Maitland, and Adams can hardly be defended. The state is not the whole of human society or culture. It is but the umpire of the social process, the

arbiter of conflicting social and cultural interests, many of which are more fundamental than the state. All of them taken together supply the dynamic and creative elements in the development of man and society, significant as the state may be in rendering their impulses, interplay and conflicts more constructive and less disintegrating and disastrous. Moreover, the detailed study of the state's evolution is really the province of political science rather than of history.

In spite of the fact that most respectable historians in every modern state, and particularly in Europe, remain faithful worshippers at the political shrine, there has been revolutionary progress in the last half-century in the way of expanding the scope of the historian's interests. This has probably been due to the remarkable cultural changes of the period, to the advances made in the natural and social sciences, and to the greater independence and liberty of scholars, which have allowed able and original historians to execute their ambitions and to express their conceptions with relative freedom.

The remarkable progress in science, technology and economic institutions, with the resulting social and cultural changes, has led to a great increase of interest in the history of science and technology, and in economic and social history. The rise of psychology, anthropology, and sociology has introduced new lines of approach to the study of man and his activities in society, and has furnished added guidance in the execution of such projects. The exaggerated interest of Burckhardt and Symonds in the Renaissance was an important factor in arousing a greater concern with the history of literature and the fine arts. Along with some disastrous influences, Romanticism served to broaden the ken of the historian by interesting him in religion as a universal institution, as well as in philosophy, art, and letters.

Attention should also be called to the influence of the growing popularity of Ph.D. degrees in promoting the new history. At first, the dissertations were unusually dry, minute and conventional. But in time it became necessary to find so many new subjects that the distressed professors were forced to approve topics which lay far outside the field of the usual political and diplomatic history. Once the breach was made, further departures became easier and more marked.

Not a little credit for the rise of a broader interest in history must be assigned to the personal insight, originality, and courage of the historians who have so largely fashioned the new history. Looking at the change broadly, it may be safely maintained, without grain of national vanity or arrogance, that the movement for a more dynamic and comprehensive type of history has gained a much firmer hold in the United States than elsewhere, and has been received with the least cordiality and greatest resistance among professional historians in Great Britain.

The fundamental tenet of the exponents of the broader type of history is that it is the function and duty of the historian to describe every phase of the development of the culture and institutions of a people, though any particular historian may select that aspect of the history of civilization which interests him most. It must be conceded that one interested in the history of Anglo-Saxon literature or the Irish learning of the sixth century is as truly a historian as he who traces the evolution of the Witanagemot or the vicissitudes of the Saxon dynasty. This does not mean that it is unnecessary for the historian to discriminate at all in weighing and estimating the importance of events, but the idea of dynamic historical writing does oppose strenuously the notion that any one phase of human achievement so transcends all others in importance that we are justified in concentrating on one aspect of culture and ignoring the others. What the new historian pleads for is not the substitution of a new fetish for the political obsession, but rather for the recognition of the necessity of describing the development of every phase of the life and culture of a society. It is obvious that, with the widening of the historical field in this manner, the execution of a well-rounded history of even a single national state will require the co-operation of a large number of enthusiastic and tolerant experts. No one person could well hope to master every phase of the history of a single society during even a brief period. The great historical works of the future seem destined to become co-operative products.

Many historians, then, no longer remain content to chronicle the doings of public figures in the field of politics. They have tended to become interested in the whole realm of human achievement on our planet—intellectual, economic, social, political, scientific, and esthetic. They have been aided in this by the progress of modern astronomy with its new chastening cosmic perspective, by the development of the evolutionary point of view with respect to life and culture, by the rise of psychology and social science, by the progress of modern industrialism and urban life, and by the growing secularism of the contemporary era. There were notable anticipations of this attitude towards history in the period of rationalism and Romanticism, but contemporary developments have been far more varied and voluminous. And they have been founded upon wider and more substantial knowledge and have been disciplined by a more accurate technique of historical research.

2. *The Rise of* Kulturgeschichte: *The History of Civilization and Culture.* The most conspicuous phase of the development of a broader interest on the part of historians has been the growth of what is usually known as *Kulturgeschichte,* which is the term given by the Germans to the history of civilization and culture. Though this has been a popular and widespread tendency only in our generation, its roots go back to the age of rationalism in the eighteenth century.

By common consent, the real beginning of modern *Kulturgeschichte* dates from the publication of Voltaire's *Age of Louis XIV,* and his *Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations.* The latter was an over-ambitious project for the times, was highly arbitrary in its selection of material, and of very uneven value, but it was the first history of civilization worthy of the name ever penned by man. The many universal histories, promoted by the rise of Romanticism, also contained much material on the history of civilization. The next major contribution to cultural history came in the famous *History of Art in Antiquity* by Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68). Published in two volumes in 1764, it was the first able history of ancient art, laying special stress upon the art of the Greeks. In Greek art, Winckelmann discerned as major features its loftiness, purity and admirable sense of proportion. The book had a wide influence upon scholars, poets and artists, especially upon Romanticist students of cultural history. But it did not greatly affect the professional historians, who remained devoted to recounting the story of public affairs and the actors therein.

Early in the next century came the effort, in the works of Madame de Staël and Sismondi, to make the history of literature a branch of the history of civilization and of social history. Gervinus followed soon after with his history of German poetry. Then Heeren stressed the importance of commerce in the cultural and institutional history of antiquity. Eduard Zeller, under the inspiration of Hegel, devoted a long life to his magisterial history of Greek philosophy. One of the earliest avowed histories of civilization was the *General History of European Civilization* by the French historian and publicist, François Guizot (1787–1874), which appeared in 1828. It surveyed European development from the Roman Empire to the eighteenth century, laying special stress upon the rise of *bourgeois* ideas and the growth of representative government. It reflected well the conservative middle-class historical ideals of the first half of the nineteenth century in France.

Next came those developments which we associate with Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–62) and John William Draper, his leading disciple. Buckle's contributions to history, embodied in his famous *History of Civilization in England,* combined a eulogy of intellectual freedom, with emphasis on the influence of geographical factors and food resources upon the growth of culture. From these assumptions an American physician and chemist, John William Draper (1811–82), wrote a comprehensive *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1863), strongly skeptical in tone but disappointing as an intellectual history of Europe. Even more sharply anticlerical was his courageous *History of the Conflict between Science and Religion.* Written in a similar intellectual temper were two books by an Irish historian, which were perhaps the most remarkable examples of historical precocity in the whole history of historical literature. These were

the *History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe* (1865) and the *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne* (1869) by William Edward Hartpole Lecky (1838–1903). Lecky's work on rationalism was a landmark in the history of the intellectual emancipation of the West from such ideas as those of Augustine and Calvin. Another powerful British exponent of free thinking and agnosticism was Sir Leslie Stephen (1832–1904), famed for his *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,* and for his *The English Utilitarians.* The next important example of this literature was the work of an American scholar, publicist and educator, Andrew Dickson White (1832–1918), president of Cornell University. His monumental *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* was, in reality, a historical justification of his own life work in the cause of intellectual freedom and toleration. It was probably the most impressive of all "free-thought" historical enterprises and one of the most thrilling and absorbing historical books ever penned.

Another development appeared in some important historical works, mainly by Germans, that devoted special attention to the history of life, manners, and customs. This school really dates from Jacob Grimm and his historical work on the German language, legal customs, folk tales, fairy tales and the like. One of the earliest and most important of these writers was Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823–97), pioneer in both *Kulturgeschichte* and descriptive sociology in Germany. He gathered his material not only from documents, but even more from extensive travels in Germany. His major work was *The Natural History of the People as the Basis for German Social Politics,* which appeared in four volumes between 1851 and 1864. Riehl's historical doctrines were based upon the assumption that geographical factors, such as climate, topography, and the like, account in the main for cultural diversity. He held that social conditions and occupations also play their part in the process. The peasants are naturally provincial and the townspeople cosmopolitan and progressive. He believed that the family is the social cell and the great social stabilizer. Riehl was at his best in dramatic characterizations of German local life and culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was very weak and inadequate in historical generalization and in appreciation of the genetic evolution of culture. He was pre-eminently a descriptive social historian. Riehl was much impressed with the cultural importance of art and music and devoted a great deal of attention to them in his main work and in special works on German art and music. In addition to his own works, he edited a large co-operative series on *The Land and People of Bavaria.*

In the work of Gustav Freytag (1816–95) we find a fusion of nationalistic and cultural history. Freytag came to the study of German social and

cultural history after scholarly training in philology and the history of the drama. His major work in the field of cultural history was his *Scenes from German History* (*Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*) which appeared in five volumes between 1859 and 1862. It covered the whole history of the life of the German people from their origins to the nineteenth century. Freytag held that the life of the people was the outstanding feature which gave unity to the history of the German nation. He stressed the organic nature of national culture in a manner reminiscent of the Romanticists. He agreed with Guizot that the middle class provides the backbone of national life and culture. His work included much more political and military history than Riehl's writings, and he provided colorful pictures of the major German national heroes—Charlemagne, Barbarossa, Luther, Frederick the Great, and the like. Yet Freytag was no sentimental worshipper of the past, as Riehl was to a considerable degree. He made it clear that life becomes more harsh and provincial as we recede from the present. Freytag's work possessed great literary charm and intriguing anecdotal intimacy.

More scholarly in a conventional sense and more strictly historical were three other works on German civilization. Karl Nitzsch (1818–80) wrote a *History of the German People to the Peace of Augsburg,* which was published posthumously in three volumes from 1883 to 1885. Nitzsch gave attention to economic, social, and intellectual, as well as political, history, and he possessed unusual powers in the reconstruction of medieval German institutional life. He also wrote an important history of the Roman republic, which was not so obviously a contribution to cultural history. Perhaps the major Catholic contribution to *Kulturgeschichte* was the voluminous *History of the German People at the End of the Middle Ages* by Johannes Janssen (1829–91), which appeared in eight volumes from 1877 to 1894. It took as its theme the life of the masses, giving also much attention to the history of social life and culture. His picture of German society on the eve of the Reformation was a masterpiece, but scholars question his contention that German civilization attained its highest development at the close of the Middle Ages.

The final fruition of the school of Riehl and Freytag came in the work of their admirer, Georg Steinhausen (1866–1933), who brought out an able *History of German Culture* in 1904, and also wrote a number of more specialized works on different phases and periods of German cultural history. While he differed from Freytag in eliminating the state entirely from consideration in cultural history, he equalled Freytag in his talent for rendering significant and entrancing the most minute details of daily life. In the history of esthetics he did not match Burckhardt in originality, though he had a better knowledge of the formal facts. This type of historical interest, as represented in the progress from Riehl to Steinhausen,

was reflected in the *History of French Civilization* by Alfred Rambaud (1842–1905), in John Richard Green's popular books on English history, in the six-volume social history of England, edited by H. D. Traill and J. S. Mann (1901–1904), and in the voluminous history of the American people by John Bach McMaster.

More interested in literature and esthetics than in life and institutions, was the Swiss scholar, Jacob Christoph Burckhardt (1818–97), author of the most brilliant survey of the Renaissance and of a realistic study of Greek civilization. Burckhardt studied history under Boeckh and Ranke, and art under Kugler. He was also influenced by the Romanticist yearnings for art and literature. The work upon which his fame mainly rests, *The Civilization of the Renaissance,* appeared in 1860.

Burckhardt seized upon what he conceived to be the basic psychological trait of the period—the emergence of individualism—with great brilliance and success. It remains, after three-quarters of a century, the most original and engaging work on the Renaissance by any single author. Its main weakness lay in the failure of the author to appreciate the gradual development of the Renaissance out of the Middle Ages. He portrayed it as a more sudden and dazzling episode than the facts warranted. Yet, Burckhardt was no indiscriminate worshipper of all aspects of the Renaissance. He fully recognized its brutal and seamy side, but believed that this was the price exacted for its glamorous achievements in the realm of esthetics. Burckhardt's *History of Greek Civilization* was a much longer work and was a distinguished historical achievement. It cast off all romantic reverence for the Greeks and dealt with Hellenic civilization in a fair, but realistic, fashion. But the book never made the stir created by his treatment of the Renaissance. Burckhardt's range of interests in cultural history was amazingly wide, a fact well revealed when the collection of his essays and lectures was published by his students in 1918 on the hundredth anniversary of his birth.

Burckhardt's views of the Renaissance were expressed in more complete and unrestrained form in the work of his English admirer, John Addington Symonds (1840–93), biographer of Dante and Michael Angelo, and author of *The Renaissance in Italy,* which was published in seven volumes from 1875 to 1886. While a student of Dante and his times should have known better, Symonds stressed even more than Burckhardt the sharp break between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. To Symonds, the Renaissance was not only the springtime of humanity in the West; it was also an age devoted to promoting freedom and humanitarianism. Symonds saw a direct intellectual and moral line of descent from the Renaissance through the Reformation to the French Revolution. They were all spiritually akin. Symonds' description of Renaissance culture and personalities was forceful and written with great charm. His general

theories as to the place of the Renaissance in western history have, however, been comprehensively rejected.

The cultural history of classical antiquity was illuminated by Ludwig Friedländer (1824–1909). His early interests were in Homeric scholarship, but he fell under the influence of Mommsen, Riehl, Freytag, and Burckhardt and produced his *Roman Life and Manners Under the Early Empire* in three volumes between 1862 and 1871. It presented almost unequalled pictures of many sides of a great civilization—the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. Manners, customs, life, travel, art, antiquities, and many other aspects were described with much charm, intimacy, and vividness. Friedländer was in his approach more of a colorful and dramatic antiquarian than a dynamic historian of civilization. More comprehensive in time, but less detailed, were the three works of Sir Samuel Dill (1844–1924), *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire,* and *Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age.* Dill wrote in clear and attractive fashion and had superb powers in interpreting his materials. His last work, that on Merovingian Gaul, was the least able of the three, for Dill was a Classicist and lost his critical powers in the most difficult age which a medievalist has to treat. His work on the Merovingians is far inferior to that of the Frenchman, Ferdinand Lot, and the Austrian, Alfons Dopsch. The cultural, as well as the political, history of Rome from the fall of the empire to the Renaissance was provided in the colossal *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages* by Ferdinand Gregrovius (1821–91), published in eight volumes between 1859 and 1872. Gregrovius also wrote a less complete book on *The History of the City of Athens in the Middle Ages.* He was a prodigious worker and writer and ranged over many subjects from early Greek history to the problem of socialism in the writings of Goethe.

Economic development was brought within the field of *Kulturgeschichte* in such important works as those by Karl von Inama-Sternegg (1843–1908) and Maxim Kovalevsky (1851–1916). The former wrote a monumental economic history of Germany, laying special stress on the importance of agrarian developments. The latter, under the influence of Spencerian evolutionary concepts, produced an even more ambitious treatise, a comprehensive economic history of Europe. He also wrote at length on the rise of modern democracy and on the derivation of modern Russian institutions from their ancient laws and customs.

The most pretentious effort by any historian, prior to the Lamprecht era, to write a general history of civilization, was that embodied in the *General Cultural History from the Earliest Times to the Present,* by the scholarly Swiss writer, Otto Henne-am-Rhyn (1828–1914), which appeared in seven volumes between 1877 and 1897. Considering the scope of the

task and the period of its execution, the work was remarkably well done and remains one of the major individual accomplishments in cultural history and historical synthesis. Henne-am-Rhyn was an amazingly prolific writer on cultural history. In addition to this large general work, he wrote a cultural history of the German people, a cultural history of the Jewish people, a cultural history of the Crusades, a work on the place of women in cultural history, and an account of the cultural import of German folk tales. Produced in the Lamprecht epoch, but in part independent of Lamprecht's personal influence, was the great work edited by Paul Hinneberg, *The Culture of the Present: Its Origins and Destiny,* which appeared in thirty-seven volumes between 1905 and 1921.

The influence of the new science of anthropology upon cultural history in Germany was best exemplified in the work of Julius Lippert (1839–1909), especially in his *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit* (translated into English as *The Evolution of Culture*). He applied in discriminating fashion the evolutionary notions of writers like Morgan and Spencer, to cultural data, but he also emphasized the importance of the diffusion of culture. Further, he believed that the dynamic factors in human history were cultural rather than biological and geographical. He was, thus, one of the first "cultural determinists." Within each cultural complex he emphasized the potency of ideas. Lippert wrote other books on the evolution of religious ideas and rites, the history of the family, and the history of German manners and customs. Not only cultural history but also historical sociology owed much to his writings and influence.

The most aggressive champion of *Kulturgeschichte* and the most discussed person in connection with its development in recent times was Karl Lamprecht of Leipzig (1856–1910). Lamprecht's first important work was a long and original treatise on the economic history of medieval Germany, with special attention to the Moselle area. Here he indicated his interest in the history of economic groups and economic mass movements as affecting the social history of a people. This attitude he obtained in part from Karl Marx, though Lamprecht was not an orthodox Marxian. He was also much influenced by Comte's suggestion that history should be viewed as successive stages in the collective psychology of humanity, and he was affected as well by the doctrine of evolution.

From the time of the publication of the first volume of his *German History* until his death, Lamprecht accompanied his systematic historical work by an unending controversy with the exponents of the older historical notions. In this debate he upheld his thesis that "history is a socio-psychological science" concerned primarily with "social-psychic materials," as contrasted with the "individual-psychic" factors which had been emphasized by the previous conventional narrative and biographical history. To him history was the collective psychology of the past rather than the collective biogra-

phy, as had been the opinion of the typical historians who had generally followed Carlyle's views on historical causation, if, indeed, they believed in historical causation at all. Probably the best succinct statement of Lamprecht's principles is contained in the following summary by the eminent English historian, John B. Bury:[3]

Among the evolutional attempts to subsume the course of history under general syntheses, perhaps the most important is that of Lamprecht, whose "kulturhistorische" attempt to discover and assign the determining causes of German history exhibits the [indirect] influence of the Comtist school. It is based upon psychology, which, in his views, holds among the sciences of mind (*Geisteswissenschaften*) the same place (that of a *Grundwissenschaft*) which mechanics holds among the sciences of nature. History, by the same comparison, corresponds to biology, and, according to him, it can only become scientific if it is reduced to general concepts (*Begriffe*). Historical movements and events are of a psychical character, and Lamprecht conceives a given phase of civilization as "a collective psychical condition (*seelischer Gesamtzustand*)" controlling the period, "a diapason which penetrates all psychical phenomena and thereby all historical events of the time." He has worked out a series of such phases, "ages of changing psychical diapason" in his *Deutsche Geschichte,* with the aim of showing that all the feelings and actions of each age can be explained by the diapason; and has attempted to prove that these diapasons are exhibited in other social developments, and are consequently not singular but typical. He maintains further that these ages succeed each other in a definite order; the principle being that the collective psychical development begins with the homogeneity of all the individual members of a society and, through heightened psychical activity, advances in the form of a continually increasing differentiation of the individuals (this is akin to the Spencerian formula). This process, evolving psychical freedom from psychical constraint, exhibits a series of psychical phenomena which define successive periods of civilization. The process depends on two simple principles, that no idea can disappear without leaving behind it an effect or influence, and that all psychical life, whether in a person or in a society, means change, the acquisition of new mental contents. It follows that the new have to come to terms with the old, and this leads to a synthesis which determines the character of a new age. Hence the ages of civilization are defined as the "highest concepts for subsuming without exception all psychical phenomena of the development of human societies, that is, of all historical events." Lamprecht deduces the idea of a special historical science, which might be called "historical ethnology," dealing with the ages of civilization, and bearing the same relation to [descriptive or narrative] history as ethnology to ethnography. Such a science obviously corresponds to Comte's

[3] J. B. Bury, "Darwinism and History," in *Evolution in Modern Thought* (Boni and Liveright, *Modern Library*), pp. 260–2. Some critics, notably Bernheim, have held that Lamprecht derived his views directly from Comte, but Lamprecht denies any such dependence and maintains the complete originality of his scheme, while admitting its similarity to Comte's. See his *What is History?* (1904), p. 157, note.

social dynamics, and the comparative method, on which Comte laid so much emphasis, is the principal instrument of Lamprecht.

Working from the above premises, Lamprecht has outlined what he regards as the great stages in the socio-psychological development of western civilization. The earliest or the primitive stage he designates as the "symbolic." This was superseded in the early Middle Ages by the "typical," that period of differentiation which produced various distinct types of culture. The later medieval period was the age of the "conventional" in culture, social life, industry, art, and religion. This was followed by the period of "individualism" from the Renaissance through the *Aufklärung,* an epoch in which, in the Protestant portions of Europe, the individual might hold direct communion with God, and was everywhere distinguished by great individual works of genius in science, art, literature, commerce, and politics. Beginning with the Romanticists and extending to the Industrial Revolution came the period of "subjectivism," characterized by the deep emotional revolt against rationalism. The period since the Industrial Revolution is declared to be one of "nervous tension" in which mankind is still groping for a central ideal or a distinguishing socio-psychic principle.[4]

Though these stages or epochs have been the organizing principle of his voluminous *German History,* Lamprecht maintains that they are typical of social evolution in general among all peoples that have developed to the level of modern civilization.[5]

Lamprecht did not ignore political history, but he subordinated it to economic and cultural history. His interest in economic history led him to lay special stress on economic factors in German development, and he also gave unusual attention to the history of art and music. Not only did Lamprecht write voluminously; he was also an eager and effective controversialist and did much to promote his views on history. He had considerable influence on Lacombe and Berr in France, Ferrero and Barbagallo in Italy, Pirenne in Belgium, and W. E. Dodd and Carl Becker in the United States.

While Lamprecht did not found a formal school in Germany, he left a strong influence. In 1909 his admirers enabled him to found the *Institut für Kultur-und-Universalgeschichte* at Leipzig to carry on the training of scholars in his tradition. A number of his disciples have done important work. Kurt Breysig, in his *Cultural History of Modern Times,* applied Lamprecht's general ideas to a systematic survey of the cultural evolution of the modern world. Breysig's work is even more rigorously schematized and generalized than Lamprecht's. In late years, Breysig has devoted himself to intellectual history and the philosophy of history in his *On Historical*

[4] Lamprecht, *What is History?* Lecture II. The similarity to Spengler and Sorokin is worth noting. See the chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 519–35.

[5] *Ibid.*, Lectures IV–V.

Becoming. Eberhard Gothein has made valuable contributions to the study of the Renaissance and to the history of the Jesuits and the counter-Reformation, and was a contributor to the Hinneberg series. Walter Wilhelm Goetz has edited the *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte;* has written important monographs on the age of the Renaissance and the Reformation, accounts of the cultural history of the Assisi and Ravenna, and a cultural history of Germany; and has edited the *Propyläen Weltgeschichte,* a magnificent and profusely illustrated universal cultural history. Rudolph Kötzschke is an expert on medieval economic history, especially the agrarian history of the medieval period. Bernhard Groethuysen is one of the eminent contributors to the up-to-date interpretation of the Renaissance and Humanism, and has written an account of the rise of the *bourgeois* spirit in France. The progress of cultural history in Germany has been hastened by the work of Lamprecht and his followers. This, together with his influence abroad, has tended to transform a previously sporadic and casual interest in cultural history into a fairly well organized movement in this direction.

German cultural history was merged with historical sociology in the writings of Franz Carl Müller-Lyer (1857–1916), psychologist, physiologist, and historical sociologist. His historical system was a fusion of the terminology of Spencerian evolution, the "stage" theory of the evolutionary anthropologists, and the Marxian materialistic theory of history. He believed that one could reduce the historical development of institutions and culture to definite laws. He held that there is a general uniformity of cultural and institutional development the world over, in which the divergencies are local and of relatively trivial character. His handling of technological and economic development was especially suggestive. His general theoretical views were of the type which are now accepted only with severe reservations by critical anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, but his handling of concrete materials was often very clever and suggestive. Müller-Lyer wrote on the evolution of everything from tools to love. His most important theoretical work has been translated into English as *The History of Social Development.* Even more schematic and sweeping and more up to date in its mastery of historical materials is Alfred Weber's *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie* (1935), perhaps the ablest effort yet produced to merge cultural history with a highly generalized sociological interpretation of human institutional development. It treats of the evolution of typical civilizations as viewed through the sociological approach. (See the chapter on Historical Sociology.) The important theoretical work of Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert on intellectual history and the relation between the natural and social sciences is dealt with in another section of this volume, pp. 93–109.

In France, the traditions of cultural development, embodied in the philosophy of history and historical sociology of Auguste Comte, were kept alive by René Worms and other French disciples of Comte. The next important French contribution to the development of cultural history came in the work of several able and original students of literature and literary critics, Hippolyte Taine, Charles Sainte-Beuve and Ernest Renan. Taine, historian of English literature and of the French Revolution, believed that history must be a science and that human culture is a product of the race, social environment, and the historical occasion. Sainte-Beuve, a talented literary critic, wrote an admirable cultural history of the Jansenists, his *History of Port Royal*. Renan was an urbane rationalist, a charming essayist and a great Semitic scholar. He did much to link up "free thought" with cultural history.

An important impulse to cultural history in France appeared in the work of Jacques Philippe Tamizey de Larroque (1828–98), who showed the relation of archeology and letters to cultural history. His own most important writings were on French archeology and the social and religious history of the Middle Ages. Another stimulating approach to the subject appeared in the books of Paul Lacombe (1834–1919), whose chief work was *History Regarded as a Science* (1894). Lacombe stressed the view of history as a genetic science of the development of institutions, and contrasted sharply the conventional history of events with what he regarded as the vastly more important history of the development of human institutions. He understood the mutual interdependence of history, thus conceived, and historical sociology. In his own narrative writings he devoted attention to literary history, and to the history of political, economic and educational institutions. Lacombe had no little influence on Henri Berr, the chief contributor to the idea of historical synthesis in France and editor of one of the most ambitious of all co-operative works on *Kulturgeschichte*.

Two of the more eminent and broad-minded of the distinguished French historical scholars, Alfred Rambaud (1842–1905) and Charles Seignobos, (1854–), wrote well-known histories of civilization. Rambaud produced the best history of French civilization, and Seignobos wrote an introductory history of all Western civilization. Georges Renard, himself an authority on economic history from primitive to contemporary times, has edited much the best co-operative work on general economic history from primitive days to our own, *The Universal History of Labor*. This sort of work has tended to bring history down to earth and arouse interest in the development of material things and the destiny of the common man. It is at the furthest extreme from the historical ideals of Pufendorf, Robertson and Gibbon, who felt that history is a record of the doings of prominent public figures and high courtiers. Renard has also contributed an important monograph

on the social and institutional basis of national literature. It is a scientific and modernized treatment of the attitudes first introduced by Madame de Staël and Sismondi.

The foremost French exponent of historical synthesis and of the history of civilization in France is Henri Berr. His general theoretical position was set forth in his work, *Historical Synthesis,* published in 1911. Ten years later he expanded his views and answered his critics in his *Traditional History and Historical Synthesis.* Berr makes a fundamental distinction between erudite summaries and scientific historical synthesis. He also carefully differentiates between the latter and the old *a priori* philosophy of history. Berr undertook the heavy responsibility of editing what was the most ambitious co-operative work on the history of civilization ever attempted down to that time—*The Evolution of Humanity,* in about one hundred volumes. In the Introduction to this he presents his general theory of historical synthesis in its most compact form:

> Without claiming that the method of scientific synthesis can actually be fixed for history in any definite fashion it may be assumed—at least, as a tentative hypothesis—that the facts of which human evolution is woven, can be grouped in three quite distinct orders. The first are the contingent, the second the necessary, and the third those that relate to some inner logic. We shall try to make use of and to harmonize the very diverse explanations that have been attempted, by endeavoring to show that the whole content of human evolution falls into these general divisions of contingency, necessity, and logic. It seems to us that by this tripartite division, history receives both its natural articulation and its whole explanation. Indeed, this classification opens up a deeper view of causality. It invites us to probe into the mass of historical facts and to attempt to disentangle three kinds of causal relations: mere succession, where the facts are simply determined by others: relations that are constant, where the facts are linked to others by necessity: and internal linkage, where the facts are rationally connected with others. On this view of the nature of the causes operating in history, a synthesis may not appear easy, but it is at least conceivable. . . .
>
> Although profoundly scientific in intention this series will not, for that reason, be any the less alive. It has been supposed, quite erroneously, that the introduction of science into history is opposed to life, that the resurrection of the past is the privilege of art. It is analysis which reduces the past to a dust-heap of facts; what erudition collects is saved not from death but from oblivion. Synthesis resurrects the past, otherwise than does intuition, and better. Its task as defined by Michelet, "the resurrection of the whole of life not merely in its surface aspects but in its inner and deeper organisms," cannot be fulfilled by genius; but science can accomplish it by deepening its theory of causality and endeavoring, through its synthesis, to reconstitute the interplay of causes.

It may be said that the series lived up to the high expectations of the editor. Excepting only the English edition, which has been notably extended,

it is the most comprehensive of all contributions to the history of human civilization. Most of the contributors are French specialists in one or another phase or period of the history of civilization. Another contemporary French historian who has taken an active interest in historical synthesis is Louis Halphen, an authority on Roman and early medieval civilization, and co-editor with Philippe Sagnac of a large history of civilization, *Peoples and Civilizations,* in twenty volumes. Gustave Glotz, one of the more important contributors to the Berr series, began to edit an elaborate *General History,* with emphasis on the history of civilization. A concise French work on the history of civilization in France by a single author is the *Universal Cultural History* by the French physiologist and historian of science, Charles Richet. He regards the history of science as the most important element in the development of human culture. Hence, his two-volume work on the general history of civilization carries the story down to 1789 in the first volume. Most of the striking scientific and technical advances in human history have taken place since that date. Richet's attitude is a valuable corrective of the former disproportionate emphasis placed on ancient and medieval history. In any brief review of cultural history in France one would have to mention the erudite savant, Salomon Reinach (1858–1932), a voluminous and independent contributor to the history of art, literature, and religion in innumerable able volumes.

In England, one of the chief workers in the cause of historical synthesis since the days of Buckle has been Francis Sydney Marvin. His *Living Past* and *The Century of Hope* are able introductions to historical synthesis and interpretation. A sincere friend of peace, he has edited the many co-operative volumes in the *Unity Series* devoted to tracing the history of civilization and emphasizing the international character of Western civilization. The most ambitious venture in the use of cultural and institutional materials thus far attempted by any single scholar is *The Study of History* by Arnold J. Toynbee, of which six volumes have thus far been published (see chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 510–13). Versed in many languages, he relies upon a discriminating comparative method. It is a learned and impressive enterprise and promises to be the most extended effort by one author to link up historical sociology with actual accounts of cultural genesis. J. B. Bury, himself the author of a charming little volume on the history of the freedom of thought and of a larger treatise on the theory of progress, has rendered important services to the history of civilization in an editorial capacity. As planner of the *Cambridge Ancient History,* and the *Cambridge Medieval History,* he provided for extended treatments of economic and social history, philosophy, science, art, and religion, though of course these great sets are primarily political history. An interesting brief co-operative cultural history is contained in the so-called *"Legacy"* series—*The Legacy of Israel,* edited by Edwyn Bevan and Charles Singer; *The*

Legacy of Greece, edited by R. W. Livingstone; *The Legacy of Rome,* edited by Cyril Bailey; *The Legacy of Islam,* edited by T. W. Arnold and Alfred Guillaume; and *The Legacy of the Middle Ages,* edited by C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacob.

Sir John Hammerton has done much to promote work in cultural history. He has edited magnificent collections of pictorial reconstructions of the past—*Wonders of the Past* and the like, and he has edited the most serviceable history of civilization ever published in the English language, *A Universal World History,* in eight volumes, lavishly illustrated. C. K. Ogden, in collaboration with the present writer, has undertaken the task of editing an even more complete *History of Civilization* than that projected by Berr. It embodies both the Berr and Renard series and many additional volumes supplied by English, American, and German scholars. It is the most formidable and comprehensive of all co-operative histories of civilization.[6] The best history of English civilization is the co-operative set, *Social England,* edited by H. D. Traill and H. S. Mann. H. G. Wells, in his *Outline of History,* did more than anyone else since John Richard Green to arouse the interest of English readers in non-political history.

Historians in other parts of Europe have contributed to the growth of interest in the history of civilization. One of the ablest and most original of all national cultural histories is the *History of Spanish Civilization* by Rafael Altamira. More complete, but giving less attention to cultural history than the work of Altamira, is the *History of Spain and Its Influence in Universal History* by Antonio Ballesteros. In Italy, Pasquale Villari, who contributed important works to the cultural history of the late medieval period and the Renaissance, strongly emphasized the importance of historical synthesis. While sharply critical of the old grandiose philosophy of history, Villari held that the task of the historian is not completed until he has arranged his facts in a logical and orderly synthesis. Benedetto Croce, while on the one hand trying to dress up and render more palatable the old philosophy of history, has also made important contributions to the history of European and Italian art, literature, and esthetic theory. Guglielmo Ferrero's *Greatness and Decline of Rome* reflects the influence of Lamprecht's emphasis on the importance of collective psychological factors in historical development. Corrado Barbagallo is the editor of the chief Italian journal devoted to cultural history and has himself written one of the finest of all general histories of civilization.

Henri Pirenne, in Belgium, influenced by Lamprecht and Lacombe, executed a broadly conceived history of Belgium, as well as contributing notably to the history of medieval economic and urban life. In Rumania, Alexandru Xénopol (1847–1920) not only wrote a stirring national history, but also produced important books discussing the nature and problems of historical science, his *Fundamental Principles of History,* and his *Theory of*

[6] See H. E. Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence* (1926), pp. 55 ff.

History. Carefully differentiating between the nature and problems of the natural and the social sciences, including history, he contended that history may be regarded as a genetic social science. Laws of historical causation can be worked out for general historical patterns and trends, if not for individual historical events. The only significant historical facts are those which have important social relationships and consequences. One of Xénopol's leading disciples, Nicolae Iorga, in his *Essay on the Synthesis of the History of Humanity,* attempts a general history of civilization and human progress which gives evidence of broad vision, keen insight, and no little learning. Russian interest in cultural history has been manifested in many works —Kovalevsky's economic and institutional histories, Vinogradov's work on the social history of the Middle Ages and the history of law, Paul Miliukov's writings on Russian institutional and legal history, and Rostovtsev's magisterial work on the early cultural history of southern Russia and the social and economic history of the ancient world. From Czechoslovakia have come the scholarly writings of Thomas Masaryk on the history of Slavonic thought and literature.

3. *James Harvey Robinson and the Rise of Cultural History in the United States*. We have noted above some early anticipations of cultural history in the United States by such writers as John W. Draper and Andrew D. White, but the effective promotion of this line of historical interest and interpretation began with the work of James Harvey Robinson (1863–1936) of Columbia University, who gave his attention particularly to intellectual history, but was also an enthusiastic proponent of general cultural and institutional history, to which he gave the term "The New History." The best summary of his attitude towards the subject-matter and responsibilities of history was contained in his volume, *The New History* (1912), probably the most influential work of its kind ever written in the United States.

Robinson accepted as the foundation of his approach to the study and interpretation of history Lamprecht's dictum that the historian should concern himself chiefly with discovering how the present has developed out of the past,[7] but he rejected absolutely the attempt to force the study and interpretation of the past into any such artificial and *a priori* scheme of cultural evolution as Lamprecht has devised. He even rejected as unnatural and misleading, in view of the continuity of history, the conventional periodizing of the past as "ancient," "medieval," and so on, and admitted only a tentative division of intellectual development for pedagogical purposes into the: Primitive, Ancient, Hellenic, Patristic, Scholastic and its decline, the *Aufklärung,* and the Present Age, since the industrial and scientific revolutions of the last century.[8]

[7] James Harvey Robinson, *The New History,* pp. 62, 78, 102–3.

[8] J. H. Robinson, *Outline of the History of the Western European Mind,* p. 35, (1919).

Believing with Lamprecht in the dominion of the socio-psychic over the individual psychic, and being an extremely ardent exponent of the doctrine of the continuity of history, he held that the task of determining how the present world-order has developed can best be solved by studying the changing attitudes of the intellectual classes from primitive times to the present day. By this he meant not merely an investigation of the systematic philosophical systems of isolated thinkers, but of the prevailing intellectual orientation and outlook upon life, in the broadest sense of that term, which has existed in various successive epochs from the earliest times. Being wholly inductive and non-schematic, his method of approach makes possible an unlimited adaptation to any new developments in either psychology or history. It also recognizes much more freely and fully than Lamprecht the influence that great personalities may have had in shaping the socio-psychic trends.

As Robinson made clear, this notion is not a new one but was ably and distinctly stated by Francis Bacon, who, indeed, a century hence may be looked upon as quite as much the harbinger of the "New History" as of the new inductive scientific method. In the following citation Robinson quotes this significant passage from Bacon and offers his own comments upon its value to the modern historical student:

> Lord Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning,* says: "No man hath propounded to himself the general *state of learning* to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature and the State civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the World seemeth to me to be as a statue of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsuls, the mathematicians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, authors, and books; and so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects; their inventions, their traditions; their diverse administrations and managings; their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes; with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world; I may truly affirm to be wanting." . . . Bacon's reproach is still merited, for no one has as yet, so far as I know, ever clearly conceived of a general history of the chief opinions of the intellectual class.
>
> Yet what more vital has the past to teach us than the manner in which our convictions on large questions have arisen, developed and changed? We do not, assuredly, owe most of them to painful personal excogitation, but inherit them, along with the institutions and social habits of the land in which we live. The content of a well-stocked mind is the product of tens of thousands of years of accumulation. Many widespread notions could by no possibility have originated in modern times, but have arisen in conditions quite alien to those of the

present. We have too often, in consequence, an outworn intellectual equipment for new and unheard-of tasks. Only a study of the vicissitudes of human opinion can make us fully aware of this and enable us to readjust our views so as to adapt them to our present environment. If it be true that opinion tends, in the dynamic age in which we live, to lag far behind our changing environment, how can we better discover the anachronisms in our views and in our attitude toward the world than by studying their origin? Is not Bacon right in accusing the historian of presenting us with an image of the past without its great cyclopean eye, which alone reveals its spirit and life? [9]

More than being merely the field of historical activity which seems far better adapted than any other to interpreting the significance of the past for an understanding of the present, intellectual history has a far richer and more extensive body of data than any other type. The volume of written records describing what man has been thinking of, or has avowed that he has been thinking about from the earliest times, exceeds beyond comparison the amount of historical information which has been preserved in any other field. Of the lives of the greatest figures in the history of culture and thought it frequently happens that little or nothing is known, while many volumes of their thoughts have been preserved. Further, intellectual history not only has at its disposal a vastly greater and more varied assortment of sources than any other branch of history but also, unlike that for any other phase of the subject, almost all of this information is of a sort which can be made use of with confidence by the historian. In an attempt to reconstruct the political history of the past, for example, the general tendency of an age to exaggerate, lie, distort accounts, ignore vital events in contemporary political life, or attribute political or military success to miraculous causes would render the writings of such an era of almost no value to the political historian. Yet to the historian of the intellectual reactions of humanity it would have a high degree of value, for, as Seignobos has expressed it, "the psychological fact" exists unimpaired. The very prevalence of allegory, miracle-mongering, forgery, or general distortion of fact would constitute a situation of the utmost interest and importance for the historian of the psychological development of the race.

Though this original and suggestive point of view, with its great emphasis upon the psychic factors in historical development, has gained little general acceptance among the conventional historians, its promise for the future can be gathered from the immense interest which Robinson's lectures on the history of the intellectual class aroused at Columbia University and the enthusiastic following he developed among the younger and more progressive historians in this country.

[9] Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 101–3, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

In even the earlier editions of his syllabus for this famous Columbia course, Robinson promised a comprehensive manual to cover the field of intellectual history. This had long been awaited by his students and disciples, and *The Mind in the Making* (1920), delivered originally as the Kennedy Lectures before the New York School of Social Work can be regarded as no more than a preliminary effort at fulfilling this promise.

As an intellectual history of Europe the volume is pathetically inadequate, but as an effort to present the leading generalizations which might be drawn from a long and assiduous cultivation of the field of intellectual history the book is nothing short of a magnificent achievement. Indeed, it is the calm and deliberate judgment of the writer that no other book by an historian can be said to equal this and his later *Human Comedy* as presentations of the more significant generalizations of history for the use of thoughtful citizens. As a withering attack upon the conventional utilization of history to justify anachronisms in our own civilization these books are both unrivalled and invaluable.

But Robinson's influence on intellectual and cultural history was exerted mainly through his teaching of graduate students at Columbia and through his brilliant and original textbooks on European history which revolutionized history teaching in American schools and colleges.

The majority of the historians in the United States who have cultivated various phases of cultural history have been students and disciples of Robinson. Perhaps the earliest of these was James Thomson Shotwell (1874–). Down to the time of the World War he gave great promise of becoming one of the outstanding members of this school. Few historians have so thoroughly mastered the essential foundations of successful writing in the field of cultural history. He was trained originally in comparative literature. Then he studied intellectual history under Robinson. He examined with thoroughness the newer cultural anthropology as expounded by Boas and the prehistoric archeologists. Perhaps no other historian in his day had so competent a grasp of anthropology and the prehistoric background of human civilization. An indication of his knowledge in this field was revealed by his little book *The Religious Revolution of Today,* published in 1913. It was a masterly study not only of the current religious crisis but also of religious origins. The greatest influence Shotwell exerted upon American cultural history, came through his teaching, especially a large and popular lecture course upon European social and economic history from primitive times to the present. It was his ambition to take over Robinson's work in intellectual history when the latter retired from active lecturing. Shotwell's broad views of history were also reflected in his article on "History" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and in his unfinished fragment *An Introduction to the History of History* (1921). He launched the *Records of Civilization* series, an invaluable collection of source-material on cultural history.

The entry of the United States into the World War brought a sharp turn into Shotwell's historical importance and destiny. Like Woodrow Wilson, he believed the British Empire to be the custodian of human civilization, and he welcomed with great gusto our entry into the war to pull the British chestnuts out of the fire. He threw himself with great zeal into propaganda in favor of the Allies and hoped for a constructive peace treaty. He was as bitterly disappointed by the Treaty of Versailles as was his chief, Mr. Wilson, and following in the footsteps of the latter, he found compensation and consolation in an ardent championing of the League of Nations. He also took an important part in the movement for the outlawry of war, and helped in the movement which ultimately led to the Kellogg Pact. Of late he has been an eager searcher for peace formulas, ever a more desperate and frantic quest. Though Shotwell wrote little on cultural history, he has contributed some notable volumes on the current international scene, the League of Nations, the International Labor Office, and making of the Treaty of Versailles. A most promising cultural historian was thus diverted into the dolorous and obituarial field of diplomatic history. He also edited the vast *Economic and Social History of the World War.*

Another of Robinson's early students was Carl Lotus Becker (1873–), who came to Columbia after having been trained at the University of Wisconsin under the famous social historian, Frederick Jackson Turner. At Columbia he studied intellectual history under Robinson, paying particular attention to the age of rationalism. Becker's writings have reflected his dual training. His works on American history are the outcome of Turner's influence, while his suggestive works in intellectual history are in the Robinsonian tradition. He has contributed to our understanding of the background of the American Revolution, and also written a suggestive work on the general evolution of American democracy. But his most important contributions to intellectual history have dealt with various phases of rationalism, such as his work on the origins of the Declaration of Independence and on the historical philosophy of the Enlightenment. He has exercised a considerable influence upon a number of able graduate students, his work here centering around the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. His status and prestige in American cultural history far outrun his literary product, which has been relatively slight, but he is very commonly regarded as the ablest historical philosopher the United States has produced. Most of his historical notions are assembled in a little book entitled *Everyman His Own Historian* (1935).

One of the most productive and learned of Robinson's disciples is Lynn Thorndike (1882–), who has, along with Preserved Smith, most successfully combined the rigorous scholarship of the erudite school with the interest in intellectual history generated by Robinson. Indeed, he has never shared to any great degree Robinson's general historical philosophy, but he

has devoted his life to the study of intellectual history, thus reflecting the influence of his teacher. His doctoral thesis under Robinson was a brief study of magic in medieval history. This led him into his life work, a most thorough study of the interrelations of magic and science from the classical period to early modern times. He has already published four large volumes in this field, and several more will probably follow. His most notable contribution to historical thought is perhaps his slashing attack upon the Renaissance myth and his contention that the real Renaissance began in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He has given more attention to the history of science than any other professional American historian. He summarized his general views on cultural history in his *Short History of Civilization* (1926). In no sense an active propagandist for the new history, Thorndike has been one of the most substantial contributors to cultural history in our generation.

A much more enthusiastic exponent of Robinsonianism and the new history, and also one of the most productive of Robinson's students, is Preserved Smith (1880–). He has frequently proclaimed Robinson to be the most stimulating and original historian of whom he knows. A member of Robinson's famous seminar on the Protestant Revolution, Smith early became interested in Luther, Erasmus, and the Protestant movement. He has written standard works on Luther and Erasmus and far and away the best one-volume manual on the Protestant Revolution which has appeared in any language, his *The Age of the Reformation*. He is a discriminating defender of the Protestant movement, though recognizing its many manifestations of intellectual reaction and intolerance. During the last fifteen years he has been engaged in the preparation of a projected five-volume work on *A History of Modern Culture,* tracing the development of Western culture from the age of Humanism to the present day. Two volumes have already appeared, bringing the story down to the age of the Enlightenment. These volumes are very generally regarded as the finest products of cultural history written by an American historian, when one takes into consideration the vast erudition, the precise scholarship, and the enlightened outlook of the author.

The youngest of the Robinsonian school is a man who has been deeply influenced by the study of philosophy, and is himself a professional philosopher, John Herman Randall, Jr. (1899–). His *Making of the Modern Mind* (1926) is the best substitute we had for many years for Robinson's unfulfilled promise of a general intellectual history of Europe. He has also written other important volumes dealing with the development of modern civilization as influenced by the revolutions in thought and industrial life.

Charles Austin Beard (1874–), a lifelong friend of Robinson and his professional collaborator, has been thoroughly sympathetic with the Robinsonian point of view, but has devoted himself more to political science, po-

litical ideas, and American history. Among the students of Robinson, he has been distinguished for his emphasis upon economic factors in historical development. His *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (1913) aroused a storm of controversy. His *Rise of American Civilization* is regarded as the foremost application of the principles of cultural history to the interpretation of the history of the United States, special stress being laid upon economic influences. Of late, he has shown an interest in intellectual history, especially the philosophy of history, in which he has been more influenced by the Italian scholar, Benedetto Croce, than by Robinson's mode of approach.

An important member of the Columbia school of historians, who was not actually a student of Robinson's, but was sympathetic with the Robinsonian point of view, was William Robert Shepherd (1871–1934). He made one of the most original American contributions to cultural history through his emphasis upon the great influence exerted by the expansion of Europe on the development of Western culture since 1500. Shepherd exerted his main influence through his famous course on this subject at Columbia. His promise to write up his lectures in systematic form was never fulfilled. But students of his, such as James E. Gillespie and Jay B. Botsford, have written volumes indicating how fruitful the approach of Shepherd is in promoting a better understanding of the rise of modern culture and institutions.

Harry Elmer Barnes (1889–) has devoted himself primarily to putting into print most of the currents of thought and historical aspirations developed by the cultural historians at Columbia who, with the notable exception of Beard, promised more than they produced. The influence of Giddings and Dunning is represented by his work on social evolution and the history of social theory, especially emphasizing the influence of sociological thought upon political theory. Shotwell's influence is manifested in his writings upon the history of historiography and in his *History of Western Civilization*. He carried out the Robinsonian tradition in his *New History and the Social Studies* and his *Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World,* the latter of which may be regarded as a faithful and ambitious execution of the Robinsonian aspiration for a full-sized intellectual history of Europe. The influence of Shepherd has been manifested in all of his writing on cultural and institutional history and has particularly dominated his book on *World Politics*. He has been the most voluminous expositor of the ideas of the Columbia School of historians, in all cases fully recognizing his obligation to his former teachers.

There have been a number of notable contributions to cultural history in the United States which have developed more or less independently of Robinson and the Columbia group. A conspicuous illustration is to be found in the work of the famous Orientalist, James Henry Breasted (1865–1935). He first gained for himself recognition as one of the world's outstanding

Egyptologists, but he later extended his interest to the entire ancient Orient, and in the later years of his life did more than any other single person to promote the excavations in the western Asia. His *Ancient Times* is the best summary of his historical conceptions and contributions. Breasted accomplished more than any other historian in this country or abroad in making clear the vast influence of the ancient Orient upon classical civilization and upon Western civilization as a whole. In his later years he fell under the influence of Robinson as a collaborator, and gave special attention to the history of ideas and religion in the ancient Orient, especially stressing the Egyptian origin of Hebrew social ideals.

Two of Breasted's colleagues at Chicago have also been notable for their contributions to cultural history. Professor Ferdinand Schevill (1868–) is probably the finest American practitioner of *Kulturgeschichte* as the term is understood in European historical writing. He was trained in part in Germany. He has shown an unusual competence in the field of the history of art and esthetics, being more of a master here than any other American historian. His specialty has been the history of the Renaissance, upon which he has written an important book, *Siena,* and more recently a magnificent *History of Florence.*

James Westfall Thompson (1869–) has done more than any other American historian to synthesize the cultural and institutional history of the Middle Ages, his most notable work being a two-volume book, *The Middle Ages* (1931). William E. Dodd (1869–1940) was influential in introducing Lamprecht's historical views in the United States, and has devoted himself to the cultural history of this country, especially expounding and defending the democratic point of view.

Charles Homer Haskins (1870–1937) of Harvard University was long regarded as one of the conspicuous examples of the erudite school in the United States. He was by profession a medievalist and became the foremost American authority on Norman institutions. In the latter part of his life, however, he devoted himself primarily to the history of medieval science and intellectual life, subjects which he handled in a most thorough and scholarly fashion.

One of the foremost American authorities on intellectual history was George L. Burr (1857–1938) of Cornell University. While rigorously trained in the methodology of medievalism in Europe, Professor Burr was chiefly inspired by Andrew D. White. Though a master of all phases of medieval culture, Professor Burr gave special attention to the history of witchcraft and toleration, on the latter of which he has been regarded as the leading world authority. Reluctant to publish, Burr has exerted his wide influence chiefly through his brilliant lectures.

The outstanding American writer on the theory of history is Frederick J. Teggart (1870–) of the University of California. His three most important

books are *Prolegomena to History; The Processes of History;* and *The Theory of History*. He has devoted himself particularly to elucidating the foundations and relationships of cultural and institutional history. He introduced this subject in his earliest work, the *Prolegomena,* published in 1916. His *Processes of History* is the most comprehensive effort to describe, as Robinson used to put it, "how we got this way"—or as the Germans would put it, *wie es eigentlich geworden*. His *Theory of History* went over much the same ground as was covered in his two earlier volumes, bringing his thinking and materials up to date. Here he laid special stress upon the importance for cultural history of the writings of Comte and theory of progress, of Darwinism and evolutionary doctrine, and of the views of Hume and Turgot on cultural lag and the differential development of human culture. Teggart attempted to work out a plausible synthesis of these various views.

Of all the important writers on the newer methods and attitudes in history, no other suffered more from the discrepancy between his merits and his influence than Teggart. Unquestionably the foremost writer in this country, if not in the world, on the theoretical basis of the new history as a science of social change, he has remained practically unknown and without influence outside the circle of his few students. This has been due to his preference to play a lone hand—too often denying the significance of what most others have done and refusing to associate himself actively with those who have borne the burden of establishing the new history. (See the chapter on Historical Sociology, esp. pp. 517–18.)

II. Archeology and Cultural Evolution

1. *The Archeology of the Preliterary Period*. One of the most direct and immediate contributions to the descriptive basis of cultural determinism has been the work of the archeologists who have recovered the remains of man and his works from very remote ages. We shall here briefly summarize some of the more notable phases of the development of archeology and indicate the way in which it has illuminated our understanding of successive eras of human development. The close relationship between archeology and cultural history has been admirably expressed by Professor Alfred L. Kroeber:

> Archaeology, by etymology the study of beginnings, has historical reconstruction for its objective. It differs from history in its materials. These are artifacts, or objects actually made and used in the past, generally buried or lost subsequently and more recently recovered. Mostly they are not written documents: or if so, they have been transmitted to us not continuously but in the same manner as the artifacts. The ultimate purpose of archaeology is, however, the same as that of history, the authenticated presentation of a series of human

events. By the nature of its materials it stresses the daily life of populations, their manufactures and art, religions and customs, in brief, their general culture. It is, therefore, more nearly related to culture history than to "history" in the current or popular sense; and it may be defined as that part of culture history for which both documents and ethnographic descriptions are lacking.[10]

Not so very long ago the origins of human culture, like those of the human race, were shrouded in total darkness. As long as Adam was accepted as the first human being, there could be no notion of any history of man before his day. The science of "prehistoric" archeology had no reason for existence, since the origins of human writing go back to a period almost coeval with the "first" man of Biblical history.

The discovery of human skeletal remains in ancient geological deposits, proving the presence of early types of man at this remote period, and the finding of the artificial products of human handiwork in similar deposits soon made it clear, however, that the history of man and his culture must have extended back over a very long space of time. Now we have sufficient knowledge, though it is far from complete, to follow in broad outlines the history of human culture from its remote origins through its various stages of development to our day.

The science that has made this possible, "prehistoric" archeology, is little more than a hundred years old. Since there was no calendar in the days of preliterary man, the archeologist is forced to classify and arrange the evidence with which he deals—that is, the stone, bone and metal remains that he has uncovered—in a time sequence which is directly related to the progressive development of material culture. To his aid come the geologist and the paleontologist, who make it possible to give such objects approximate datings. This they do by bringing forward estimates of the age of the geological formations in which these objects were deposited, as well as of the fossil animals whose bones have been found in juxtaposition with bone and stone remains deposited by early human beings. The essentials of prehistoric archeological technique is well summarized by Kroeber:

> Essentially the method of prehistoric archeology consists of the recognition and correlation of two things: cultural styles and the physical association of these with one another in the ground. Sequence is inferred from the degree of association or non-association of styles with each other and with skeletal, faunal and geological data. Stratification or superimposition of remains is only a particular and most convincing form of associational proof. Even stratifications may lead to error where layers have been disturbed subsequent to deposit.[11]

The existence of stone implements, which we of today know to have been the work of primitive man, led some writers during pagan antiquity

[10] Article, "Archaeology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* II, 163, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

[11] *Loc. cit.,* p. 164, by permission.

to sense their true significance. The great Roman poet-philosopher, Lucretius, writing in the first century B. C., seems to have recognized intuitively the sequence of the Stone, Bronze and Iron ages. Usually, however, the stone implements were then believed to have been "thunderstones" hurled by the gods, and they were so regarded for many centuries. They were even treasured as possessing potent magic power. When, in the sixteenth century, the Tuscan, Michael Mercate, advanced the theory that the "thunderstones" might be implements manufactured by early man, he was years ahead of his time. In the following century, one Tollius could write for a believing world that "thunderstones" were "generated in the sky by a fulgurous exhalation conglobed in a cloud by the circumposed humor."

Not until the nineteenth century was the human origin of these ancient stone implements fully established. Perhaps the first instance in which flint implements of early man were found and were rightly interpreted as remains from a period prior to existing civilization, was when, in 1797, John Frere uncovered a considerable supply of prehistoric flints at Hoxne in Suffolk, England. Next came the exploration of the Franconian caves in Germany by Eugen Johann Esper, Johann Christian Rosenmüller, and Georg August Goldfuss at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. These were the first systematic archeological investigations in which the finds were carefully arranged and classified. The definitive demonstration of the co-existence of prehistoric mammals was the achievement of Dr. William Buckland, who explored the famous Kirkdale cave in Yorkshire, England, in 1821, uncovering numerous bones of prehistoric mammoths, rhinoceros, stag and bison. Some three years later, in company with Northmore and MacEnery, he investigated the famous Kent's Cavern in Torquay, England. Here flint implements were found in easily demonstrable juxtaposition with the remains of these extinct animals, thus proving that man had been alive at this early date.

In Denmark, important archeological investigations were also being carried on at this time. As early as 1806 a commission had been appointed to study the geology and natural history of the country. The commission soon discovered a large number of prehistoric human implements in the shell mounds or "kitchen-middens." These remains of early human handiwork were gathered together in the Royal Danish Museum of Antiquities at Copenhagen. The first important curator was C. J. Thomsen, who held this post from 1816 to 1865. It was he, who, by the methods of stratigraphical geology, first definitely established the cultural sequence of the Stone, Bronze and Iron ages, thus reducing to a scientific basis the intuitive hunch of Lucretius. This classification was embodied in his *Introduction to Nordic Archeology* (1836). Thomsen did not, however, have any deep grasp of the real cultural significance or the relative antiquity of the exhibits which he thus classified.

It was the achievement of the first great French archeologist, Jacques Boucher de Perthes, to prove that the early stone implements which he turned up in large quantities were actually used by members of the human family many thousands of years ago. Boucher began to collect stone implements as early as 1806, and about 1830 he began to explore systematically the cultural remains of the Somme Valley, where he recovered vast quantities of stone implements and weapons from the ancient river gravels. In 1846 he published his epoch-making book, *De l'industrie primitive.* In this significant work Boucher de Perthes contended that the stone implements he had found were unquestionably of human manufacture. At first he met with sharp ridicule. But he persisted in the face of strenuous opposition, and before long his hypothesis was not only accepted, but even earnestly defended by leading students of man's early history on the earth, such as Sir John Evans of England.

Once the human origin of these stone implements was thoroughly established, Thomsen's earlier classification became meaningful. Now the tools of primitive man could be arranged in the order of their historical and technical evolution. From the middle of the nineteenth century onward, rapid progress was made in archeology. More accurate and specialized classification paralleled the discoveries of much new material in stone, bone, and metal.

In 1865, Sir John Lubbock divided the Stone Age into two distinct periods, Paleolithic and Neolithic. The period when stone implements were made roughly, he called the Paleolithic or Old Stone Age. The following period, when polished stone implements were produced, he called the Neolithic or New Stone Age. Sir John's clear and forceful writings also did much for the young science of archeology. Especially noteworthy was his *Prehistoric Times,* published in 1865.

More detailed archeological investigation, particularly of remains in the French caves of Aurignac and elsewhere, enabled Edouard Lartet and others to subdivide and classify more accurately the archeological remains and cultural sequences of the Paleolithic period. As early as 1861, Lartet suggested that the Paleolithic should be divided into Upper and Lower Paleolithic cultures.

Building upon the growing mass of material collected by field workers in France, Gabriel de Mortillet, in his *Essai de classification des âges de la pierre* (1869), laid the basis for prehistoric chronology and for our present detailed subdivision of the Paleolithic, in order of age, into Mesvinian, Chellean, Acheulean, Mousterian, Aurignacian, Solutrean, Magdalenian, Azilian and Tardenoisian periods. These are really subdivisions within the larger divisions of Lower, Middle, and Upper Paleolithic. Sometimes the Azilian and Tardenoisian sub-periods are not included under the Paleolithic but are regarded as transitional between the latter and the Neolithic.

The term "Mesolithic" has recently been applied to them. De Mortillet at the outset only envisaged four Paleolithic periods, the Chellean (at first called Acheulean), Mousterian, Solutrean and Magdalenian. The more complete subdivisions have been added since his original essay, which was notably elaborated in 1872 and again in 1883.

To the beginner in the study of prehistoric archeology, names like Solutrean, Mousterian, Tardenoisian, and so on, may well seem cumbersome and disconcerting. When properly explained, they become simple and intelligible. These terms represent the sequence of cultural evolution. At the same time, they attest the growth of technical perfection in the manufacture of the early stone implements and weapons, as indicated by the changes and improvements in the number, design, shape and cutting edge of the stone artifacts (weapons and implements). This, as we have said, is the only means of establishing a chronology for the preliterary period.

Contrary to what may appear at first sight, the strange names given to the various cultural periods were not arbitrarily chosen to puzzle the student or to offer him practice in spelling and pronunciation. They have an understandable and natural derivation. Each of these periods is named from what is called the "type site" for the form of culture thus designated. By the type site is meant the locality in which the most typical or complete remains of a particular form of stone culture were first discovered. For example, the Mousterian type site is the cave of Le Moustier, while the type site of the Aurignacian culture is the cave of Aurignac. For some of the culture eras many sites have been uncovered by archeologists. In France alone there are more than five hundred of them for the Magdalenian, the type site of which is the rock shelter of La Madeleine, discovered in 1865 and excavated by Lartet, Christy and Peyrony.

Further work on the Paleolithic was carried on in the numerous archeological memoirs of Pierre Marcellin Boule and Abbé Henri Breuil, perhaps the ablest prehistoric archeologists in France since the days of De Mortillet. Boule's monographs were summarized in his notable work on *Fossil Men* (1913, 1923). In 1915, a sumptuous survey of the Paleolithic culture and its early human fabricators was published by the American naturalist, Henry Fairfield Osborn, in his *Men of the Old Stone Age*. He leaned heavily upon Boule and Breuil. The progress in our knowledge of the Paleolithic acquired during the next two decades was demonstrated by the English archeologist, M. C. Burkitt, in his important book, *The Old Stone Age,* 1933, and by the German student, Herbert Kühn, in his *Kunst und Kultur der Vorzeit Europas* (1929).

Archeologists have both pushed their record of early man back beyond the Paleolithic and also connected it up with historic times by bridging the gulf between the Old Stone Age and the Metal Ages. The first notable suggestion that there was a pre-Paleolithic era was set forth by Abbé Louis

Bourgeois who, in 1867, expressed his firm conviction that man had lived in the Tertiary Age. This view is not widely held today, though it has received support in the writings of the American naturalist, Henry Fairfield Osborn and of the English archeologist, J. Reid Moir. But Moir and the able Belgian archeologist, Aimé Rutot, did, in the early twentieth century, rather definitely establish the existence of a long Eolithic Age preceding the Paleolithic.

Eolithic is technically defined as the age in which stone implements were for the most part selected in their natural form and not artificially altered by the work of man. There is no material testimony to the existence of clothing, of human habitations, or of the use of fire in this period, although it is believed by some that fire-making did originate in the late Eolithic. During this long apprenticeship, this long prelude to human culture, the life of man, indeed, must have been not very different from that of his simian relatives.

The revelation of a fairly well defined Neolithic period came nearly a half century before Rutot demonstrated the existence of the Eolithic. Interest in the Neolithic culture began with a study of the Swiss lake dwellings in the middle of the last century. The winter of 1853–54 was an unusually dry one in Switzerland and the water receded far from the ordinary shores of the lakes. Pile dwellings, hitherto believed by fishermen to be submerged forests, were brought to light. The discoveries were called to the attention of Ferdinand Keller, President of the Antiquarian Society of Zürich, who gave many years thereafter to a careful investigation of the culture of the Lake Dwellers, on which he was long the chief world-authority, and his book, *The Lake Dwellings of Switzerland,* was the standard treatment of the subject. The term "Neolithic" was coined by Lubbock (Avebury) in 1865.

A more complete knowledge of Neolithic culture was provided by a detailed study of the Scandinavian (especially Danish) shell mounds and of the dolmens and other stone monuments in which the Neolithic culture abounded. Among the leading students of the Neolithic have been T. Eric Peet, V. Gordon Childe, and Gustav Oskar Montelius. As Osborn, a student of natural history, provided the best popular summary of the Paleolithic, so another American naturalist, John M. Tyler of Amherst College, gave us our most readable review of Neolithic achievements in his *The New Stone Age in Northern Europe,* 1921. Keller's work on the Lake Dwellers was carried forward by the English archeologist, Robert Munro, whose *Lake Dwellings of Europe,* 1890, is still a classic. In a later work on *Paleolithic Man and Terramara Settlements in Europe,* 1912, Munro carried his treatment down into the Metal Ages by his description of the interesting Terramara culture of northern Italy, where peoples in the Bronze Age of

culture carried on the habit of building pile villages, this time on land, in the Po Valley.

The Neolithic Age in Europe is split up into three subdivisions: (1) The Campignian, (2) the Robenhausian, and (3) the Carnacian or Megalithic. The first gets its name from a type site on the lower Seine, and is roughly contemporaneous with the Danish kitchen-midden culture. As usual, there are differences of opinion, and some writers place the Campignian in the Epipaleolithic. In either case, two types of flint implements are considered typical of its culture—the pick and the tranchet or chisel ax. The Robenhausian culture—the name comes from Robenhausen on Lake Pfäffikon in Switzerland—is that of the Lake-dwelling or Lacustrian Age. The last division is characterized chiefly by the erection of the enormous stone monuments and stone tombs (megaliths).

The Neolithic era was followed by the rise of the Age of Metals, usually, copper, bronze and iron in sequence, the true Bronze Age beginning about 3000 B. C. in the Orient, and the Iron Age about 1500. Among the more important writers on the Metal Ages have been V. Gordon Childe, in his *The Bronze Age* (1930), H. J. E. Peake, in his *The Bronze Age and the Celtic World* (1922), T. E. Peet, in his *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy and Sicily* (1909), Montelius, in his many works on the Metal Ages from Scandinavia to Italy, Basile Modestov, in his *Introduction à l'histoire romaine* (1907), and probably most important of all, the brilliant French archeologist, Joseph Déchelette, in his *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique* (Paris, 1908 *et seq.*).

Childe, in his above mentioned work, and also in two other books, *The Dawn of European Civilization,* and *The Most Ancient East,* has given us a broad survey of the Bronze Age background of Oriental and early European civilization as a whole. Peake and Déchelette have devoted themselves chiefly to the Bronze Age culture in western Europe, Déchelette being the undisputed authority on the archeology of ancient Gaul, a matter to which we shall refer later. With the Metal Ages we come definitely to the better known field of archeological endeavors in connection with the extension of our knowledge of Oriental and Classical civilizations.

When the discovery and classification of primitive artifacts, or crude implements, had made possible a general chronology for the preliterary period, the next step was to develop the archeological synthesis for the various European areas. Rutot has admirably described the unity of the preliterary cultures of Belgium and the Somme Valley. Émil Cartailhac, Déchelette, Breuil, and Boule prepared the archeological synthesis for France. Cartailhac's famous work, *La France préhistorique* (1903) was the first thorough summary of archeological work on France and its significance for our knowledge of early human culture in this area. Cartailhac extended his

labors from France to Spain, being one of the first to investigate thoroughly the famous cave of Altamira, about which he published a notable monograph in 1906. His later publications on Spain have made him, perhaps, our leading archeological authority on prehistoric Spain. The results of Spanish archeology were well summarized by the eminent German archeologist and physical anthropologist, Hugo Obermaier, in his *Fossil Man in Spain* (1924, 1934). The above-mentioned book by Peet provided the most useful synthesis of the archeology of early Italy.

The best surveys of the prehistoric archeology of Germany are contained in Obermaier's *Der Mensch der Vorzeit* (1912), and R. R. Schmidt's *Die diluviale Vorzeit Deutschlands* (1912). Schmidt's book is notable for linking up archeological remains with their geological setting and their early human makers. The archeological synthesis for Scandinavia has been provided by Montelius, in his *Kulturgeschichte Schwedens von den ältesten Zeiten* (Leipzig, 1906), and many monographs. The ablest surveys of the prehistoric archeology of Britain are to be found in the several works of Moir, M. C. Burkitt, O. G. S. Crawford, Sir Arthur Keith, and Harold Peake. Keith's works, *The Antiquity of Man* (1925), and *New Discoveries Relating to the Antiquity of Man* (1932), are viewed as outstanding contributions to the prehistoric anthropology not only of Britain but of the Old World, with particular emphasis being given to the physical evolution of man. The prehistoric archeology of Ireland is best reviewed by R. A. S. Macalister in his *Ireland in Pre-Celtic Times* (1921), and *The Archaeology of Ireland* (1928).

The chronology of the preliterary age is a matter of controversy and uncertainty as to the exact number of years involved, especially with respect to the earlier periods of the Stone Age. But there is no questioning the fact that great antiquity is involved. A reasonable estimate would be the following:

The Eolithic period may have begun as far back as 750,000 years ago and have lasted to about 300,000 years ago. The Lower Paleolithic extended over the years from some 300,000 to around 100,000 years ago. The Mousterian or Middle Paleolithic—the era of the widely distributed Neandertal Man—probably covered the period from 100,000 to 30,000 years ago. The Upper Paleolithic and Mesolithic ran from about 30,000 to 15,000 years ago. The duration of the Neolithic was from some 15,000 years ago to 4,000 B. C. (6,000 years ago), when the Copper-Bronze Age began in Egypt and Turkestan. The Iron Age began in Western Asia among the Hittites about 1,500 B. C.

The dates for the New World are far more recent. It is thought that the first invaders of America, coming from Asia, brought in a late Paleolithic or early Neolithic culture about 15,000–12,000 B. C. The well-developed

Neolithic began around 3,500 B. C., and the Copper-Bronze Age about 1700 B. C.

While most of the field work in archeology has been done by Europeans, the best general summaries of the results have been produced by Americans. We have already referred to the books of Osborn and Tyler on the Paleolithic and Neolithic. An admirable brief summary of the whole prehistoric period was prepared by Harris H. Wilder of Smith College in his *Man's Prehistoric Past* (1923). But the masterly synthesis of prehistoric archeology was the work of George Grant MacCurdy of Yale University, *Human Origins* (1924). MacCurdy boiled down his larger work into what is easily the most lucid introduction to the subject, *The Coming of Man* (1932). More recently, he has edited a symposium on *Early Man* (1937), which gives us the last word on prehistoric archeology and anthropology.

In the same way that prehistoric archeology started with discoveries in France and was then carried throughout Europe, so in more recent years it has spread from Europe to all of the Old World. By today sufficient work has been done to suggest that before many years a general archeological synthesis for the Eastern Hemisphere may be definitely established. Indeed, the presence of early Paleolithic culture, from the British Isles to Java, has been demonstrated.

Extensive investigations have been carried on in Africa. Archeological investigation of prehistoric Egypt was stimulated by the interest of Professor James Henry Breasted of the University of Chicago. Two of his colleagues in the Oriental Institute, K. S. Sanford and W. J. Arkell, have uncovered Paleolithic remains in Egypt from the Chellean to the Mesolithic and have made it possible to synchronize the Paleolithic stages of Egypt and western Europe. Some believe that the former may be the older of the two. Next to the work on Egypt, the most thorough study of the African Paleolithic has been executed by L. S. B. Leakey in his investigation of archeology remains in the Kenya Colony on the mid-eastern coast. Neville Jones has surveyed the early culture of Rhodesia and M. C. Burkitt that of South Africa. In North Africa, important excavation has been done by A. W. Pond and René Verneau in Algeria. The only comprehensive synthesis of prehistoric archeology in Africa is that contained in the important and timely book by Leakey, *The Stone Age in Africa* (1936).

Evidence for the wide distribution of early Paleolithic culture throughout Africa has been fully demonstrated. Remains of culture, even as early as the Chellean and Acheulean, have been uncovered in Egypt, Nubia, Lybia, Somaliland, Kenya Colony, Rhodesia, the Congo basin, Algeria and Morocco. The evidence for the Upper Paleolithic is not as clear or widely distributed, so far as we may judge from the investigations carried on thus far. Its existence along the northern or Mediterranean coast, from Egypt

to Morocco, is certain. Sanford and Arkell and Pond have demonstrated this. Leakey has shown that in Kenya Colony the culture stages are clear from the Aurignacian through the Neolithic. There is also some evidence for Upper Paleolithic culture in Rhodesia and South Africa.

The Neolithic remains, outside Egypt and Kenya, are even less clear and copious than those of the Upper Paleolithic. There have been finds in the Vaal River area in South Africa. But, on the whole, N. C. Nelson concludes that "Africa's Neolithic stage is comparatively unknown." There are, however, rich Neolithic remains in Egypt, where this age is thought to have begun at least 12,000 years ago. Indeed, Breasted estimates that it dates from 18,000–20,000 years ago. In Egypt, the metal ages—copper, bronze and iron—are all represented, but outside Egypt no evidence of a bronze age has yet been uncovered, the transition being direct from stone or copper to iron. The iron culture of Africa came relatively early and was mainly independent of that of Asia or Europe.

While the progress towards an archeological synthesis for Asia has not been as extensive as that in Africa, much significant work has been done. In ancient Mesopotamia, investigated most thoroughly by Jacques de Morgan, a French engineer turned archeologist, no evidence of Paleolithic culture has been found, though this is by no means proof that it never existed. But there is adequate evidence of Neolithic artifacts. The copper culture came there early, the Sumerians having acquired it, perhaps as early as 4000 B. C. But the most interesting phase of the metal cultures in Western Asia is the origin of the earliest known iron culture, that of the Hittites of Anatolia, which appeared about 1500 B. C.

The most striking and significant archeological discoveries of recent years in Western Asia have been those which demonstrate the existence of Paleolithic culture in Palestine. About a dozen Neandertaloid skulls have been discovered there since the Galilee cranium was unearthed in 1925. Most of these excavations were conducted by the British School of Archeology and the American School of Prehistoric Research. In addition to these skeletal remains there have been uncovered artifacts from the Chellean and Mousterian periods. This may indicate that there was even an early Paleolithic culture fairly widely distributed over Western Asia. George Grant MacCurdy, Arthur Keith and T. D. McCown have done the most to familiarize us with the recent discoveries in Palestine.

In Siberia, I. T. Savenkov discovered early human artifacts near Krasnoyarsk in 1884, but it was not until 1923 that Gero von Merhart demonstrated that they were authentic Upper Paleolithic remains. In the present century, G. P. Sosnovski, B. E. Petri, A. C. Okladnikov and others have shown that Mousterian artifacts are fairly widely distributed throughout Siberia. In this region, culture seems to have moved directly from the Neolithic to iron.

The startling and significant discoveries of early man in China have been

more important for prehistoric anthropology than for archeology. In 1926, two human teeth were found in Pleistocene deposits near Peking. On the basis of this discovery, Davidson Black, a professor of anatomy at Peking, posited the existence of a Peking Man (*Sinanthropus pekinensis*). His daring hypothesis was vindicated in 1929, when a Chinese anthropologist, W. C. Pei, uncovered a nearly perfect cranium, and still further, when another skull was found in July, 1930, and in 1936, when Professor Franz Weidenreich of Frankfurt dug up three more skulls and a number of other human bones. There is still bitter dispute as to the antiquity of these skulls, some placing them as early as *Pithecanthropus erectus,* while others, like Dr. Alěs Hrdlička, regard them as of the Neandertal type. The more general opinion is that they are the remains of an early type of man who may have been the ancestor of both the Neandertal man and of *Homo sapiens* as well.

No artifacts were found in definite association with these skeletal remains. But the Chinese explorations have turned up cultural remains of Mousterian, Aurignacian, Azilian and Neolithic types. That Lower Paleolithic culture also existed here has been demonstrated, but the remains cannot be definitely identified with the typical European artifacts associated with this early form of human life. G. von Merhart, Eugene Prostov and Henry Field have provided the best synthesis of the archeology of Siberia, and Black, Weidenreich, N. C. Nelson, A. P. Okladnikov and Roy Chapman Andrews have given the most adequate accounts of the recent archeological and anthropological discoveries in China.

Much headway has been made in establishing the prehistoric archeological synthesis for India. Here all the typical European cultural periods are reproduced, from the Lower Paleolithic to the metal ages. The only blank is relative to the copper and bronze ages, the evidence being that, as in Siberia, the sequence in India was directly from the Neolithic to the iron culture. The synthesis for India has been set down by Panchanan Mitra in his *Prehistoric India* (1928).

It is not surprising that Indonesia, until recent geological history a part of southern Asia, should reveal evidence of a very ancient culture. Some students hold that Java gives clear evidence of an Eolithic culture, while Paul and Fritz Sarasin have demonstrated the existence of Upper Paleolithic culture in the Celebes and Ceylon. The French Geological Survey of Indo-China, under the direction of Henri Alphonse Mansuy, have explored this region, but they have not been able to uncover anything earlier than Neolithic remains.

While much still remains to be done in Africa and Asia, the archeological results to date justify a working archeological synthesis for the cultural evolution of the Old World. In one of the most recent and authoritative summaries and appraisals of contemporary archeology, Dr. N. C. Nelson holds that the established chronology and sequence of cultural periods

which have been well established for Europe are also applicable to the rest of the Old World. He believes that human culture arose in the eastern Mediterranean, where Europe, Asia and Africa meet, and radiated out from this center at a relatively uniform rate. The progress made in a world-wide synthesis of preliterary culture is surveyed by Oswald Menghin, in his *Weltgeschichte der Steinzeit* (1931).

The archeological research of the present century has brought the New World convincingly into the general picture and pattern of the Old World archeological synthesis. The more daring theorists contend that both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were crossed long before Eric the Red, Lief Ericsson, Columbus and Magellan, the invaders bringing in the late Paleolithic culture of Indonesia and the pyramid art and architecture of Egypt.

We do not, however, have to accept these plausible but unproved hypotheses to show that early American culture was an importation from the Old World. We know that Upper Paleolithic culture had reached Siberia and China at a relatively early date. It is also certain that the New World was first peopled by Mongoloid invaders from northeastern Asia who had adopted this culture. American culture was thus born as a product of the late Asiatic Paleolithic and early Neolithic.

American archeology began as a phase of the controversy over the antiquity of man in the New World. It started almost as early as European archeology. In the decade following 1835, the Danish paleontologist, P. W. Lund, carried on extensive investigations of Brazilian caves and found a number of human remains in juxtaposition with extinct Pleistocene mammals. These were exploited following 1870 by the archeologist, Florentino Ameghino, in his valiant efforts to prove not only that man in the New World originated in the Western Hemisphere but that mankind as a whole had a New World origin. He believed that the whole world had been peopled from South America. To substantiate his belief, he not only used Lund's data but also carried on extensive investigations himself in the Argentine Republic.

The theory of the American origin of mankind in the New World has been rather ruthlessly exploded in the present century, largely as a result of the critical analysis of data by the eminent anthropologist, Aleš Hrdlička of the Smithsonian Institution. Others who have backed him up have been Bailey Willis and William H. Holmes. Professor Kroeber well sums up the situation when he writes that "the New World shows as yet not a single piece of generally credited evidence of the presence of Pleistocene man."

Nor is there any convincing evidence of early Paleolithic culture in the Americas. The main arguments for an American Paleolithic Age, which were once popular, were based on the argillite implements in the Trenton gravels in New Jersey; the chipped knives and spear-points of Folsom, New Mexico, associated with the bones of an extinct species of bison; and

artifacts in caves in Patagonia which were found in juxtaposition with the remains of extinct mammals. These are no longer accepted by critical archeologists. As Dr. Nelson puts it: "While in earlier years there was a strong inclination to parallel the Paleolithic development of Europe by means of typological comparisons with that of America, a critical examination of the finds has not so far yielded anything that can conclusively be proved to be of the same antiquity as the earlier Paleolithic remains of Europe. . . . The industries of the early periods are mainly, if not entirely, of typical Neolithic character." Professor Kroeber agrees when he writes that: "Certainly the great bulk of American prehistoric data seems to be of general Neolithic type and level."

The view as to the origin of New World peoples and culture which is now generally accepted runs about as follows: the Western Hemisphere was first peopled by Mongoloid immigrants, who came in near the close of the last Ice Age, around 15,000–12,000 years ago. They entered by the way of the Bering Straits and spread over the ice-free regions east of the Rocky Mountains. The earliest archeological remains of man in the New World have been found on the western plains. There were doubtless a number of successive waves of these immigrants from Asia. There is no conclusive evidence to support the theory that any other race except the American Indians had ever existed here before the coming of the Northmen and later Europeans. The Asiatic immigrants brought in a late Paleolithic and early Neolithic culture, passing from a hunting to an agricultural economy in the Western Hemisphere. Dr. Nelson thus summarizes the essential facts of early cultural evolution in the Americas:

> The immigrants must have been hunters and agriculture as an essential foundation of existence must have developed in Central America, whence it gradually spread in both directions, north and south, but without covering the entire area in which climatic conditions made agriculture possible. With it the more advanced arts, such as pottery, spread over the continent. Metal-casting was confined to narrow areas in Central and South America. It seems that all these steps in cultural development occurred in the New World later than in the Old. A connection between them cannot be established.[12]

The high civilizations of the Aztecs of Mexico and the Incas of Peru were discovered by the Spanish invaders under Cortez and Pizarro, but the spectacular Mayan civilization of Yucatan and Guatemala, though known to explorers in the nineteenth century, was not investigated by archeologists until the twentieth, and most of the excavations have been carried out since the World War. This culture can be traced back to about 100 B. C. with accuracy because of the recent decipherment of the Mayan date inscriptions, but there is no certainty as to the origins of this striking

[12] In Franz Boas, ed., *General Anthropology* (1938), p. 216.

civilization. The presence of pyramids and other phases of Mayan art which resemble that of the Nile Valley has encouraged the followers of Graebner and Elliot Smith, of the extreme culture-diffusion school, to maintain the certainty of early cultural contact between Egypt and Yucatan. More skeptical scholars do not accept this hypothesis.

The knowledge which has made possible the archeological reconstruction of early American culture has rested upon a number of careful studies of special areas and upon summaries of these investigations by those who have carried them on and by other writers on the subject.

The early Eskimo culture has been studied by members of the Jesup North Pacific expedition, the fifth Thule expedition, the Rasmussen expedition and many individual investigators. Among the more important of these students we should mention Vladimir G. Bogoras, Franz Boas, Diamond Jenness, Hrdlička, Therkel Mathiassen, Henry Bascom Collins, Frans Ferdinand Dall and Walter Hough. Mathiassen investigated the Hudson Bay area, Jenness, Hrdlička and Collins the Alaskan region, and Bogoras the Siberian Eskimo culture of the Chukchee. The most interesting result of these investigations is the demonstration that the antique Eskimo culture was much higher than that now known in any extant group of Eskimos. The essence of the matter has been well stated by Professor R. V. D. Magoffin:

> The evidence thus accumulated has convinced scientists of the strange fact that the Arctic had its golden age, like old Greece, when the people of the North were busy, prosperous, artistic, and very much interested in living. In those days Eskimo hunters spent long winter evenings close to the stone lamps, working to make their weapons beautiful. The large number of sea creatures represented in the remains of the settlements show how successful the hunters were. And then, instead of continuing to become more inventive, artistic, and wealthy, these people lost interest in self-betterment. They dropped back, perhaps through disease and hard times—who knows? They fell into the less admirable state that we associate with the Eskimo race.[13]

The culture of the Northwest Pacific Coast Indians has been investigated by many archeologists and anthropologists, notably by the participants in the Jesup expedition at the turn of the century. The leading spirit was Franz Boas. Later work has been done by John R. Swanton, Edward Sapir, Herbert Williams Krieger, and others. The Indians of the California area have been studied by Professor Kroeber and his associates. The best archeological and anthropological work on any American Indian culture has been that carried on in the southwestern United States under the leadership of Alfred V. Kidder, N. C. Nelson, F. H. H. Roberts, Jr., Samuel James Guernsey, Neil Merton Judd, H. S. and C. B. Cosgrove, Elsie Clews Par-

[13] R. V. D. Magoffin and E. C. Davis, *The Romance of Archeology* (1929), pp. 288–9.

sons, H. Scudder Mekeel and others. They have uncovered the culture of the ancient pre-Pueblo basket-makers and have revealed the remarkable cliffdwellers of the Pueblo (town) culture, notable for their remarkable pottery products. They were the leading architects and artists of native America above the Rio Grande.

The Moundbuilding Indian culture, from Ohio to Georgia, has aroused the curiosity of students since the days of DeSoto. H. C. Shetrone, Warren King Moorehead, George Langford, J. Walter Fewkes, and Collins have taken a lead in the excavations which have revealed the character of this culture, with its hunting and agricultural economy, its stone and copper artifacts, its penchant for ornamentation and personal decoration, and its excellent craftsmanship in making weapons and ornaments, including jewelry.

The argillite culture of Trenton, New Jersey and the Delaware Valley, once thought to prove the existence of Pleistocene man in America, has been studied by Charles C. Abbott, Clark Wissler, Ernest Volk, and Leslie Spier. The culture of the Indians of New York State has been investigated by a number of archeologists, of whom A. C. Parker is the leader. The oldest culture was Algonquin, which was followed in turn by moundbuilders and then by the famous Iroquois culture of the Five Nations, who were first scientifically investigated by Lewis Henry Morgan. The Indian culture of New England and the eastern United States has been most thoroughly examined by W. H. Holmes and C. C. Willoughby.

The Aztec civilization of Mexico has attracted the attention of observers since the days of Cortez. It was a rich agricultural civilization, especially notable for its lavish buildings, the profusion of gold and silver ornaments and jewelry, and the brilliant chromatic decorations which astonished the brutal and destructive Spanish invaders. Our knowledge of this culture has been enriched and systematized through the labors of Zelia Nuttall, H. J. Spinden, Thomas A. Joyce, and many others.

The unfolding of the Mayan civilization of Yucatan and Guatemala, well described by Franz Ferdinand Blom in his *The Conquest of Yucatan,* impressed archeologists in the twentieth century about as much as the discovery of the Aztecs did the Spaniards in the sixteenth. This culture is reminiscent of the Egyptian for its pyramidal architecture and its large and lavishly decorated temples. These peoples apparently independently invented hieroglyphic writing and a calendar and carried on more complicated mathematical computations than the Greeks or Romans in some respects, having invented a symbol for zero. The chronology of the Mayan culture can be carried back into the pre-Christian era, but without telling us anything conclusive about its original derivation, a subject learnedly investigated by Leo Wiener. For our knowledge of this Mayan culture we are indebted to T. A. Willard, J. L. Mitchell, R. B. Stacy-Judd, E. H. Morris, W. L. Pux-

ley, E. H. and J. E. Thompson, G. O. Totten, A. M. Tozzer, Henry Stephens, Edith Hill Ricketson, Frans Ferdinand Blom, Thomas W. F. Gann, Sylvanus Griswold Morley and Vértiz José Reygadas, and the best syntheses have been provided by Gann, Blom, Joyce and Spinden.

The other high American culture of prehistoric times was that of the Incas of Peru and Ecuador. This was first visited and partly destroyed by the Spanish explorer Francisco Pizarro. Its archeological synthesis was first worked out by Friedrich Max Uhle (1856–). Since his day it has been further explored by Erland Nordenskiöld, Johann Jakob von Tschudi, P. A. Means, C. W. Mead, Julio César Tello, Kroeber, Wendell Bennett, and Hiram Bingham. Joyce has summarized most of the results of this work.

Other South American culture areas have been investigated by Paul Robert Lehmann-Nitsche, F. A. Outes, and in the older work of Florentino Ameghino on the Argentine remains. The best synthesis of all South American culture is Uhle's *Kultur und Industrie südamerikanischer Völker* (1889). West Indian archeology has been investigated by Herbert Williams Krieger and others.

All this work has made possible general syntheses of American Indian culture, of which the most satisfactory products are Clark Wissler's *The American Indian* (1938), W. Christie MacLeod's *The American Indian Frontier* (1928), and Rafael Karsten's *The Civilization of the South American Indians* (1926).

Striking as these achievements of prehistoric archeology have been in the last century, Professor Kroeber believes that those of the next century may be even more epoch-making:

> It is evident that the promise of prehistoric archeology is almost boundless, provided that scientific purpose and rigidly critical use of evidence continue to hold their own against the natural human impulse towards overhasty and romantic speculation. In view of the solid progress of the last twenty-five years, the results due from the next twenty-five, not to say hundred, are practically inconceivable today.[14]

These works on prehistoric archeology have provided an altogether new perspective on the development of human culture. Not very long ago, books on the history of Europe began with the history of Rome. Even after the glory and genius of Greece were recognized, there still remained unappreciated the great achievements of the ancient Orient. Now, we have pushed well behind the scenes of ancient Oriental times. Throwing back the origins of human history into remotest antiquity, anthropology, archaeology, and their allied sciences have revealed a long and momentous age that we

[14] Kroeber's "Archaeology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, p. 166, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

describe as preliterary. Man is not only discovering his past; he is in truth remaking it.

When man began to record in writing his doings, his achievements, and his beliefs, the preliterary age came to a close and the literary or "historical" age began. This did not happen all at once; the one merged into the other in different regions at various times during the metal ages. By the close of the preliterary age, man had already established the material basis for all subsequent culture. True, it took a great period of time—perhaps a million years—to accomplish that task. But without the achievements and contributions of the preliterary period, none of the higher cultural attainments of the subsequent literary age would have been possible. In economic activity, in art, in language, in religion, in law, in social organization, preliterary man left an indispensable heritage to his posterity. With respect to material culture, it is not too much to say that human civilization before the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century more closely resembled preliterary culture than it does our present-day life.

Concepts of property and law, religious institutions, and fundamental economic processes were developed during the preliterary age. In the same period, men advanced from hunting and fishing food-gatherers to food producers who domesticated animals, tilled the soil, and engaged in the metal, textile, and pottery industries. The origins of language, the preliminaries of writing, and rudimentary pictograms during that period mean that the literary age was prepared for in the preliterary. The foundations of art, including the industrial skill and technique which merit the term artistic, were also laid down during this period. First steps in artistic design were taken, and chromatic and realistic art reached high levels. Here, too, we must seek the beginnings of literature and music—that is, oral literature and folk music, as distinct from literature and music recorded by writing.

By historic times, the European races were distributed to a substantial degree as they are at present. Avoiding all controversial issues, it is sufficient to note that the peoples of Europe fall into three racial groupings: the Mediterranean, the Alpine, and the Teutonic or Baltic (also called Nordic). The first and third belong to the larger Eur-African division, and the second belongs to the Eur-Asian. The longheaded and swarthy Mediterranean race is to be found chiefly around the shores of the Mediterranean. The blond Teutonic, Baltic, or Nordic race is located mainly in the north of Europe, especially in Scandinavia. The roundheaded Alpine race—Slavs and Celts —may be placed as occupying the central and eastern area of Europe, forming a wedge of peoples thrust westward into Europe between the other two races. We must keep in mind that for thousands of years these three racial types have been intermingling with one another, thus making it practically

impossible for pure racial types to exist. (See W. W. Howells' contribution, pp. 264–78, on the physical determination of race.)

2. *Archeology and the Recovery of the Culture of the Ancient Near Orient.* While the most revolutionary aspect of archeology in contemporary times was the work of the prehistoric archeologists which we have recounted above, next in order would come the achievements of those who have recovered for us our present extended knowledge of the civilization of the Near East in ancient times.

A century and a half ago little was known about the history and culture of the ancient Near East, save what could be gathered from the excerpts of Manetho and Berossos, the fragmentary accounts by Herodotus and other Greek writers, a few scattered references in the Bible, and such remains above ground as pyramids, obelisks, and temple ruins. Today we have numerous large volumes by Erman, Maspero, Eduard Meyer, and their successors, dealing with the history of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, and throwing light even upon the preliterary periods of their civilizations. What has made possible this vast enlargement of our knowledge?

The answer is that we owe our knowledge of the ancient Oriental civilizations as much to archeological work as we do our information relative to the life of man in the preliterary age. The main difference is that to purely archaeological efforts have been added the scholarly labors of the linguists and philologists. Man in the early Orient had mastered the art of writing. Therefore, fully to exploit what the archaeologists have brought forth we must be able to read the languages of the ancient Egyptians, Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Hittites, Persians, and the like. Most of these languages have been mastered, but there are some which still defy scholars, especially the Cretan and Etruscan languages.

The beginnings of our discovery of the riches of the antique Oriental cultures were associated with Napoleon's expedition into Egypt in 1798. He took with him many scientists, engineers, and scholars. They used a part of their spare time in making a survey of the monuments and inscriptions of ancient Egypt. The results of their work were published between 1809 and 1813 in a series of volumes which first systematically described the monuments in the Nile Valley awaiting the spade of the excavator. The first important excavations were the work of a German scholar, Karl Richard Lepsius (1810–84), whose work around Memphis after 1840 astonished the learned world. In 1850, the French secured control over archeological exploration in Egypt, and Auguste Mariette assumed direction of the work. He founded the famous Cairo Museum and placed there many of the remarkable finds which he and his associates unearthed in the next thirty years. In 1880 an even more famous French scholar, Sir Gaston Maspero (1846–1916), took up Mariette's work, but the French monopoly was broken and scholars from other countries participated in later exploration.

The most important of these were W. M. Flinders Petrie of England and James Henry Breasted from the United States. They penetrated pyramids, unearthed tombs and palaces, gathered papyri, and copied inscriptions, in all these ways enriching our knowledge of the Nilotic civilization of antiquity.

Popular interest was focused most dramatically on this work after 1922 when English excavators uncovered the tomb of Tutankhamen with all its vast riches. Breasted was particularly notable for his linking up archeological investigation with the methods of the machine age, including steam shovels and the like. Gaining lavish financial support from Rockefeller funds, he built up the famous Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago. When this was thoroughly established it had an annual budget of $650,000 and supported no less than twelve distinct archeological expeditions in Egypt and western Asia. Breasted also used our latest mechanical methods to popularize the results of archeological discovery. The last project on which he was engaged prior to his death was an ambitious showing of airplane moving pictures of the archeological monuments of the Ancient East and of the modern engineering methods of carrying on archeological explorations.

In order that the work of the excavators might be fully understood and interpreted, it was necessary to be able to read the ancient inscriptions and writings which they recovered. The first step here was the discovery near Alexandria of the famous Rosetta Stone by an officer of the Napoleonic expedition. This stone has on it an inscription repeated in identical form three times—in Greek, in Egyptian hieroglyphics, and in Egyptian demotic writing. Another important tablet was the Philae obelisk, which was discovered in 1822 and had inscriptions in both Greek and hieroglyphics. From these two stones and the previous work of Akerblad and Young, the French scholar J. F. Champollion (1790–1832) was able to decipher the Egyptian writings. From this time on—in other words, during most of the last century—scholars have been able to read the ancient records which they have brought to light in Egypt, thus gradually building up our present extensive knowledge of the rise of civilization in the Nile Valley.

In the archeological exploration of Mesopotamia—the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates—the English took the lead. C. J. Rich (1787–1821), an official of the East India Company who lived in Baghdad, visited and surveyed the great mounds under which were buried the cities of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. This suggested to historians the promise which awaited further efforts. In 1835–37 a British expedition under General F. R. Chesney first thoroughly mapped the Mesopotamian area for archeological investigation.

The serious work of excavation began in 1842 when the French consul general in Mosul, Paul Botta, excavated the ancient site of Khorsabad and

unearthed the palace of Sargon. On his heels followed the work of the greatest of earlier Mesopotamian excavators, Sir Austen Henry Layard (1817–94). He probed the mound of Nimrud in 1845 and uncovered palaces of the leading Assyrian monarchs. Shortly afterwards, he discovered the famous library of Asshurbanipal. He carried on a long series of productive excavations on many sites in both Assyria and Babylonia. W. K. Loftus began his work in Babylonian archeology in 1854. Twenty years later, the Englishman, Sir George Smith, and the Frenchman, G. C. E. De Sarzec, began to make many other illuminating discoveries. Particularly important were Smith's discovery of the Babylonian origin of the Biblical stories of creation and the flood, and De Sarzec's uncovering of the remains of the palace of Gudea of Lagash. This latter achievement was the beginning of our knowledge of the Sumerian civilization, thus proving that an earlier culture had preceded the Babylonian. Another Frenchman, this time an engineer with antiquarian leanings, Jacques de Morgan, began work in the last decade of the nineteenth century. On his famous expedition into Persia, beginning in 1897, he discovered the extremely important Code of Hammurabi at Susa in 1901. De Morgan's enthusiasm often outran his technical learning, but he did much to place excavation on an efficient engineering basis. British archeologists, among them Woolley, King, Thompson, and Hall, have done valuable work in the present century. More recently, Breasted, as we have noted, utilized the resources of his Oriental Institute at Chicago to revive postwar interest in Mesopotamian and Persian, as well as Egyptian, archeology. The most important achievements of the last few years in Mesopotamia have been the uncovering of cities representing an antiquity greater than any urban cultures hitherto exhumed. They lie back of the Sumerian culture, and apparently link up the latter with the preliterary cultures of the Near East.

The difficult work of deciphering the cuneiform or wedge-shaped letters of the Mesopotamian languages began back in 1765 when the German historian Barthold Niebuhr pointed out the differences in the various cuneiform scripts. In 1802 another German, G. E. Grotefend, established correctly about one-third of the Old Persian letters. But the decisive work was done by a British army officer stationed in Persia, Sir Henry C. Rawlinson (1810–95). At great personal risk, he scaled the sheer rock of Behistun and copied a key inscription located three hundred feet above the plain. This was written in three languages. By the use of this and other inscriptions, Rawlinson mastered the cuneiform of the Old Persian, the Susian, and the Babylonian writings. The correctness of the work of Rawlinson and of his contemporaries, Hincks, Oppert, and Talbot, was finally demonstrated in 1857 through a test administered by the Royal Asiatic Society of London. Babylonian cuneiform provided the key to Semitic cuneiform in general and led to the decipherment of the historical records of the whole

area. Rawlinson's philological work was carried on by Sir George Smith. The most brilliant and illuminating work on the relation of philology to archeology and cultural history is the late Edward Chiera's *They Wrote on Clay* (1938), a reconstruction of Babylonian civilization from the deciphered Babylonian tablets. The knowledge of Hebrew and Aramaic possessed by Biblical scholars also helped in the decipherment of the ancient Semitic cuneiform. For more than seventy-five years, then, we have been able to understand the significance of the clay tablets and rock inscriptions which archeological labors have brought to light in the Mesopotamian region.

Similar archeological work has been done in Palestine and Syria, especially after the creation of the Palestine Exploration Fund in England in 1865. The excavations and the results thereof are admirably described by Professor R. A. S. Macalister in his *A Century of Excavation in Palestine* (1925). Garstang and Albright have since excavated Jericho and other sites and added much to our knowledge.

Perhaps the most novel archeological work in the last half-century in western Asia has been that which uncovered the important Hittite civilization of Anatolia. Very productive work was begun by the German, Hugo Winckler, in 1906, and continued, among others, by Garstang and D. G. Hogarth. Many of the inscriptions found here come from the same period as the famous Tel-el-Amarna letters which throw so much light on the administration of the Egyptian Empire. The Hittite writings were in two languages—one derived from Egyptian and the other from Babylonian cuneiform. The Hittite cuneiform script can now be read, thanks to the labors of the Czech scholar, Friedrich Hrozný, and his successors. A good beginning has also been made in the decipherment of the Hittite hieroglyphics. An excellent Hittite grammar has been prepared by Professor E. H. Sturtevant (1933). The first good summary of the results of archeological work in ancient Hittite realms was John Garstang's *The Land of the Hittites* (1910), which still remains the best popular introduction to the subject.

No one has better summarized the significance of this archeological work in connection with the civilization of the ancient Near East than the brilliant expositor, James Baikie:

> A hundred years ago all that was known, or supposed to be known, about the great empires of the Ancient East could have been printed in the thinnest of duodecimos; and even so, the bulk of it would have been either untrue, or so distorted as to be unrecognisable for truth. Today, all that has been entirely changed. Round these ancient empires, a literature has already grown up which is almost comparable to that existing about Greece and Rome, and which is steadily growing in amount and value year by year. The actual historical outlines of the fortunes of the better known among them—Egypt, and the Mesopotamian kingdoms—are becoming more and more clearly defined; and while

there are still great gaps in our knowledge, and much of the chronology is still uncertain, the general course of history in these nations can be, and has been traced with very considerable accuracy. The buried cities themselves have risen again from their dust. We can walk along the Procession Street of Babylon, and tread the great pavement-blocks of red breccia and white limestone over which Nebuchadnezzar's triumphal chariot rolled as he went up to give thanks to Marduk in the vast temple of E-sagila, under the shadow of the actual tower of Babel, E-temenanki, "the Foundation-Stone of Heaven and Earth." We can go down into the tomb of Pharaoh, and see him lying there still, as he was laid in state three and a half millenniums ago, amid the clash of sistra, and the loud lament of the myriads of Thebes. We can read the letters which the king of Babylon wrote to the king of Egypt a hundred years before Moses was born, and can hear these mighty potentates wrangling over questions of tribute or bribe, like bagman over an order, or horse-copers over a deal. Europeans of today have walked through halls where Sennacherib "gloried and drank deep," and have ransacked the library where Sardanapalus, the much-misunderstood, stored for himself the wisdom of all the ages that had gone before in Babylon and Assyria; and the worshippers of the God of Israel can tread the Holy of Holies where the prayers of the great Oppressor of Israel were offered. The very graves have given up their dead to show us, so far as the outward form can show it, what manner of men they were who fought and ruled and legislated before Greece or Rome had been dreamed of; and the code by which men's lives were ordered in Babylonia . . . and the romances and love-songs of Egypt are the common possession of all who care to read them; and we can follow, in the very words in which they themselves gave utterance to it, the thought about God and the universe of men who died five thousand years ago. These are the accomplished facts.[15]

For a general survey of the archeology and art of the ancient Near Orient, the monumental summary is to be found in the *Histoire de l'art dans l'antiquité* by Georges Perrot and Charles Chipiez (10 vols. 1881–1914), which is now in great need of being brought up to date.

No better illustration of how modern scholars are recreating a new past can be found than in the recently discovered civilization of the Aegean world. Apart from the references and allusions scattered through ancient Greek literature and tradition, the modern world was, until the seventies of the last century, generally unaware of any culture flourishing in the eastern Mediterranean prior to that of the Phoenicians. Archeological discoveries since then have revealed that a high civilization existed in and about the Aegean world, which in some centers—Crete, for example—can be dated back to the middle of the fourth millennium, B. C.

Of all the archeologists to whom we are indebted for the recovery of this lost civilization, no one possesses greater human interest than its discoverer, Heinrich Schliemann (1822–90). Fed on romantic legends as a youth,

[15] Baikie, *The Life of the Ancient East* (1923), pp. 4–6, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

Schliemann taught himself Greek and read his Homer while he prosaically worked as a grocery clerk in a German town. The ancient world and the Trojan War became sturdy realities for him, and their fascination never diminished throughout his life. One of the happy accidents of his romantic business life enabled him to make a fortune out of Russian petroleum after the Crimean War. When, as a wealthy man, he decided to devote the rest of his life to archeology, he started on the practical realization of his boyhood dreams. In 1870 he began excavations on the site of Troy, and within four years he had uncovered nine cities built one above the other. In 1876, turning to the Greek mainland with the hope of discovering the remains of the Greeks who engaged in the Trojan Wars, he brought to light first Mycenae and later Tiryns (1884). Schliemann's first book summarizing his discoveries in Troy was his *Troy and Its Remains* (1875). He later published two memoirs, *Troy* and *Ilion*. These reflected the improvement of his archeological methods through his association with the German archeologist, Wilhelm Dörpfeld. He described his work at Mycenae in his book *Mycenae* (1877). His lesser investigations were summarized in the volume printed in 1890 by Carl Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations*.

Schliemann's own highly emotional reactions to his remarkable finds tended to produce incredulity in addition to the sensation they caused. But their high value to students of cultural history, however much Schliemann may have misunderstood the nature of many of his discoveries, is now indisputable. His work was continued by Dörpfeld, who had served as his assistant, and by Tsountas and MacKenzie, among others.

Schliemann, however, had made but a beginning in revealing the ancient civilization of the Aegean world. Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, the excavations in Crete have suggested that this island was probably the source of the Aegean civilization, and without question one of its chief centers. In this work the excavations of the brilliant English archeologist, Sir Arthur Evans, at Cnossus (begun in 1894) stand pre-eminent. F. Halbherr, Hogarth, R. M. Dawkins, R. B. Seager, and Mrs. H. B. Hawes are prominent among those who have since engaged in excavations in Crete. The outstanding works summarizing this Aegean archeology are Sir Arthur Evans' *The Palace of Minos* (1921–28), H. R. H. Hall's *Aegean Archeology* (1915), and René Dussaud's *Les civilisations préhelléniques dans le basin de la mer Egée* (1910). The most recent general survey of Aegean culture is the work of Gustave Glotz, *The Aegean Civilization* (1925).

The net result of the archeological investigation of Crete since Schliemann's day has been well summarized by Macalister:

> We now know that roughly between 2250 and 1200 B. C. the island of Crete was the centre of a maritime empire, which extended its influence, in politics

and in culture, over the Aegean islands and mainland shore, and which, though not using iron—a metal the working of which was not as yet introduced into Europe—practised a naturalistic art of the highest merit, and enjoyed a civilization in many respects more "modern" in its comforts than any other of the ancient world. The Palace of Cnossus, with its innumerable chambers and passages, and with its frescoes of bulls, is the tangible historic basis of the tales of the Labyrinth and the Minotaur. We have been admitted to the throne-room of King Minos, and we may even sit upon his royal seat. We can turn over the tablets upon which his stewards recorded the household accounts and inventories, though as yet we may not pry into their secrets. And in the beautiful painted ware that graced his halls we may at last see the long-sought origin of the art with which in its later, literally degenerate, form, Schliemann at Mycenae had startled the world of scholars of his generation.[16]

The area in which the civilization that we call Aegean—and which is also referred to by historians as Cretan, Minoan, and Mycenaean—flourished extended roughly from Crete to the west coast of Asia Minor (Troy), and to the mainland of the Greek Peninsula (Mycenae or Tiryns). It also included the islands of the Aegean Sea as well as Cyprus. What people first created this civilization we do not definitely know; we shall call them Aegeans. It seems very likely that they were members of the Mediterranean race. This appears to be so in the case of Crete, although the remains of Alpine peoples, who were presumably late immigrants, have also been found there.

The civilization of Crete was a wholly bronze culture, which is customarily divided into three periods. According to Hawes they are: Early Minoan (2800–2200 B. C.); Middle Minoan (2200–1700 B. C.); Late Minoan (1700–1200 B. C.). The name "Minoan" is derived from the legendary Cretan king Minos. The so-called Golden Age of Cretan bronze culture fell roughly in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B. C., coinciding with the recovery from the destruction of the palace cities by an earthquake or a violent revolution about 1600 B. C. The Cretan craftsmen were the masters of a truly remarkable technique in bronze, and also did excellent work in the precious metals. During the true Aegean age, Crete was unacquainted with iron. It is possible that iron was brought in by the invaders from the North who swept away the native Cretan civilization.

Pushing their investigations north of the Aegean and into the Euxine area, archeologists have made important contributions to our knowledge of the culture of early days in southern Russia. The most impressive of such works is Ellis H. Minns' *Scythians and Greeks,* 1913, a truly monumental book on the culture of the north shore of the Black Sea in early times. It provides the background for any real understanding of the origins of Russian civilization. Minns' work was carried further to explain the origins of Rus-

[16] *Cambridge Ancient History,* I, 138–9.

sian civilization and the rise of the Kievan state and culture by M. I. Rostovtsev in his *Iranians and the Greeks in South Russia,* 1922.

Prehistoric archeology has also contributed much to a better understanding of these cultures of the Near East by describing the cultural background of the emergence of Oriental civilization. Especially important was the unearthing of prehistoric remains in Egypt by Petrie and DeMorgan. Breasted showed how Egypt is a museum for the study of cultural evolution from the Paleolithic to modern times in his *Origins of Civilization* (1920).

3. *Archeology and Classical Civilization.* Archeological work bearing on the clarification of our knowledge of Greek and Roman history is so well known as to call for only brief mention in this place. It began very early, in fact, with the age of Humanism in the period of the Renaissance. Perhaps the earliest important work was the *L'Antiquité expliquée et représentée en figures* by Bernard de Montfaucon. This was an elaborate collection but was undiscriminating and failed to distinguish epochs of artistic and cultural development. The first important work devoted systematically to the portrayal of the ruins of Athens was the *Antiquities of Athens* by James Stuart and Nicholas Revett, which began to appear in 1761. This aroused much interest in Hellenic antiquities, which was still further increased by the bringing of the famous Elgin marbles to England between 1803 and 1812. From this time onward, Greek archeology was systematically cultivated by English and Continental scholars. The nature and results of their work are well described by Adolf Michaelis in his *Century of Archeological Discoveries* (1908).

The archeological investigation of Rome also dates back to the period of Humanism. Here the most distinguished student was Flavius Blondus (1388–1463), whose most famous works were *Illustrated Italy, Rome Established,* and *Rome Triumphant.* Montfaucon also gave attention to Roman materials. The great impulse to Roman archeology came, however, with the general stimulus given to Roman studies by the great German historian, Theodor Mommsen. The most interesting popular summaries of the results of all but the more recent Roman archeology are contained in the various works of Rodolfo Lanciani, especially his *Ancient Rome in the Light of Recent Discoveries* (1888). The standard manual on Roman archeology is the monumental *Manuel d'archéologie romaine* by René Cagnat and Victor Chapot.

Prehistoric archeology has supplied invaluable information clearing up the history of pre-Roman Italy and exposing many of the myths of traditional Roman history. Representative works are those by Modestov and Peet mentioned above, to which might be added the elaborate book of Montelius on Italian civilization after the introduction of the metal cultures.

Archeology has made notable contributions to the religious history of

the Roman Empire, particularly notable being the investigation of the remains left by the devotees of Mithraism, the great Persian rival of Christianity. The outstanding work here is Franz Cumont's *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux Mystères de Mithra.*

4. *Archeology and the Early History of Northern Europe.* We have already treated the archeological explorations of northern Europe in early days in connection with our discussion of prehistoric archeology. But we should point out here that the results of such work have given us an altogether new perspective on the history of both northern Europe and the Classical countries of Greece and Rome. These archeological labors have provided the only foundation for approaching in a truly historical manner the origins and development of Classical civilization, since much of early Classical history was affected by north European contacts as well as by the culture of the near Orient. They also do away with the old myth that the peoples of northern Europe during Classical times were savages or barbarians in all cases. We have, for example, an altogether different conception of the civilization of Gaul from that which might be derived from Caesar's *Commentaries.* A book like Childe's *Dawn of European Civilization* is indispensable alike for an intelligent approach to the early history of western Europe and the history of Greece and Rome. Déchelette has divided the Bronze Age in Western Europe into four main periods, based on the improved technique and increased variety of implements: Period I, 2500–1900 B. C.; Period II, 1900–1600; Period III, 1600–1300; and Period IV, 1300–900. The following Iron Age has been divided into the Hallstatt period, 900–500; and La Tène, 500–first century A. D.

Especially important has been the archeological investigation of the culture of Gaul before Roman days. This has completely revolutionized the approach of alert historians to the history of Gaul and medieval Europe. The civilization of pre-Roman Gaul was, by and large, in nonliterary matters, as high as that of Greece before the Persian Wars; fully on a par with that of Rome before the conquests that built up the Roman Empire; and as high as that of medieval Europe in the West down to the eleventh century. It is true that in literary achievements early Greece and Rome and eleventh-century Europe had advanced far beyond pre-Roman Gaul. On the other hand, the material culture of pre-Roman Gaul was in some ways decidedly superior to that of early Greece, primitive Rome, or eleventh-century Europe. To overlook the history and civilization of Gaul is, then, to pass over in silence not only a remarkably high culture but one that had a prolonged and diversified influence upon both the Roman Empire and medieval institutions. While it would be deplorable to ignore Germanic culture prior, let us say, to Otto the Great, this would be less disastrous to a proper understanding and evaluation of the history of Western civilization than it would be to pass over the history of ancient Gaul.

A number of archeologists, such as Childe, Montelius and Peake, have dealt with the Bronze culture in Gaul, but the classic archeological work on Gallic culture down to the Roman period is Déchelette's famous *Manual of Prehistoric Archeology,* which the author fortunately published before his untimely death in the World War. The early history of the Celtic peoples in Gaul has been told in comprehensive fashion by Henri Hubert in two recent volumes, while the monumental history of Gallic civilization is Camille Jullian's *History of Gaul,* covering the period from 600 B. C. to the end of Roman dominion. These works prove that Gaul maintained a high level of culture from the beginning of the Bronze Age down through the Roman period, and was the schoolmaster of the Germans in the early Middle Ages.

The important Celtic culture in pre-Roman Britain, as well as its modification by the Roman occupation, has also been revealed by archeological investigation. The results have been set forth in such works as Norman Ault's *Life in Ancient Britain* (1920); D. A. Mackenzie's *Ancient Man in Britain* (1922); T. Rice Holmes's *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar* (1907); F. J. Haverfield's *Roman Occupation of Britain* (1924); and R. G. Collingwood and J. L. Myres's *Roman Britain* (1937).

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Part VII

SOME APPLICATIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS

[17]

SOCIOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT *

Talcott Parsons

I. Introduction

A direct discussion of theories put forward under the name of economics which may be held to contain a sociological element can be of little value without a clear conception of the logical problems involved in different views of the scope and logical subject-matter of economics. Since there cannot be said to be general agreement on these matters, it will be necessary to lay down, briefly and without full justification, the writer's own opinion in order to set up a scaffolding, a scheme of analysis, in terms of which actual theories may be approached. Any such scheme is necessarily a product of a rather highly sophisticated phase in the development of a science. The earlier phases are almost always concerned directly with the understanding of certain pressing concrete, though not necessarily practical, problems. These are attacked in whatever way promises results at the time, without bothering very much about the exact logical nature of the procedures involved or the relation of various possible approaches to each other. The social sciences have now, however, reached a stage where such careful logical discrimination has become imperative and is in process of realization.

II. The "Ideal Type" of "Orthodox" Economic Theory

Thus it is only in retrospect that we can see just what sort of a science the founders of economics were building up. There can, I think, be little doubt as to what is the main trend of development of economic thought. It is that which has rightly been called "orthodox" and which, whatever its variations at different stages of development, has certain definite ele-

* The substance of this paper has already been published in two articles in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 49 (1934–35), 414–53; 646–67. Thanks are due to the editors of the *Quarterly Journal* for their kind permission to make use of the material in altered form. The author wishes also to note that had the paper been written more recently his position would, in certain aspects, have been stated somewhat differently, although minor revisions were made in 1940.

ments of continuity throughout. It may be said to be the general tradition which, starting for "modern" purposes with Adam Smith, develops through the "classical" school whose most important figures were Ricardo and Mill, down to Marshall and the marginal utility economics. The variations, especially in the later phases, between marginal utility theories, specific productivity theories, mathematical equilibrium theories, etc., are too numerous and complex to be entered into here. Fortunately they may all be regarded as family quarrels, too minor to be of real significance for the purposes of the present study.

What are the distinguishing principles of this "orthodox" economic thought? The question can, I think, best be answered with reference to its later rather than its earlier forms, since matters of principle come to be thoroughly worked out and precisely formulated only after the difficulties and ambiguities of earlier rough formulations have come to light. Since this essay is concerned with types of thought it is essential to achieve as clear-cut a formulation of the "ideal type" of orthodox economic theory as possible.

The central conception, perhaps, is that the science of economics is concerned primarily with the study of the processes by which individuals, living in society, secure the means for the satisfaction of their individual wants. In the abstract situation selected out of the complex whole of social life for special study by economics, there are three main groups of elements. In the first place there are the wants of the individuals or groups which for economic purposes may be taken as units making up the society. While it is logically quite possible to enter into a very complex investigation in order to explain the nature and existence of the wants which in the last analysis motivate acquisitive activities, leading into sociology, psychology, biology and what not, it may safely be said to be the position of orthodox economics to assume the wants as given data which the economist at most simplifies into relatively general types. Their explanation is left to other sciences. The quantitative measure of want-satisfaction on which most orthodox economists have agreed is utility. Thus it may be laid down as a fundamental proposition that economic action proceeds in such a manner as to maximize want-satisfaction or utility.

Secondly, the means required for want-satisfaction are not given in unlimited quantity, but must be acquired through a complex process; namely, production. The productive process requires the ultimate expenditure and allocation between alternative uses of the economic resources of the community. These fall into the three great categories of natural resources, labor, and savings. It is through the various combinations of these resources that satisfactions, utilities, are produced. The production always involves cost, expenditure.

Finally, economics makes a definite assumption about the type of human behavior involved in the whole process—namely, that it is, in type, rational in the limited sense that, given the "end," acquisition of the largest possible means of want-satisfaction with the least "cost," the adaptation of means to this end tends to be the best possible in the circumstances.[1] The end may thus in the given circumstances be held to determine the course of action. This rationality will hold equally of the individual's distribution of his income between his different wants, and of the processes through which he acquires his income.

While these essential elements will hold for an isolated individual, such a case has no more than an academic interest. The fact of a plurality of individuals living together in a society introduces the further complications of the division of labor and exchange. With these conditions and a general medium of exchange (money), the end of individual economic action becomes the acquisition of money, and this fact makes a quantitative treatment of economic problems enormously easier. Economics is in fact the only social science which enjoys the advantage of an automatic quantification of its subject matter. The boon is not unspoiled, however, since the translation of money-quantities into utility terms is not an easy matter.

Given the acquisition of means of want-satisfaction as the aim of economic action, there are three logical possibilities of sets of conditions under which the action can take place.[2] One, generally called competition, is where each individual works to satisfy his own wants under a given set of market and production conditions which he is unable to alter deliberately. The second, monopoly, is where there is more or less possibility of altering the conditions. The third, collectivism, is where the whole society is deliberately organized and centrally controlled for the acquisition of means. Historically, for important reasons, competition has been much the most-used assumption in developing economic theory. Only relatively recently has much attention been devoted to the theory of the other cases.

The existence of a complex system of division of labor and exchange and of a generally recognized medium of exchange creates certain possibilities of complication. The immediate "economic" motive of each individual becomes the maximization of his money income. And what is from the point of view of the community as a whole, and thus of the individuals in it, the "real" end of economic activity, the production of goods and services, becomes from the point of view of each individual, a means. Thus the economic system as a whole may be looked at from two

[1] For some of the reasons why this must be considered an ideal type and not a concrete description see F. H. Knight, in Stuart Rice, ed., *Methods in Social Science.*

[2] See Pareto, *Manuel d'économie politique,* Ch. III, Section 40 ff.

angles, one as an "earning" process, the other as a "producing" process. The co-ordination of the two becomes a major task.

Theoretically perfect co-ordination is possible under certain very rigidly defined sets of conditions—those of the theorem of maximum satisfaction. Perhaps the most important of those is that "purchasing power" should be power only over goods and services—for consumption, but not power over persons, which is by its inherent nature cumulative. The line is a very difficult one to draw in concrete reality. In general the lack of this co-ordination will be empirically as important as the extent of its existence.

Furthermore, the very fact of the division of labor introduces a further complication. In the theory of competitive individualism every case of co-operation for a common end is in so far an element of monopoly, a disturbing factor.[3] It is, except for the extent to which the family, not the individual, is the real unit, possible to eliminate this factor very largely on the "earning" side. But on the "producing" side, organization may well be a fact of dominant importance. This was not true, of course, of the earlier formulations of the theory, which thought of exchange as the only "social" process, while production was individual and solitary. But the facts of a changing society have forced a reconsideration in terms of a productive unit which itself is a complex organization of co-operating individuals. The polar antithesis of Locke's solitary Indian killing a deer is the modern giant corporation. It is quite possible that a whole series of such organization types of the unit of economic enterprise might each be taken as a basic assumption for purposes of theoretical reasoning. Marx, following up suggestions in Malthus and Ricardo, was perhaps the first to attempt to build a theoretical structure on the assumption of an organized producing unit.

The theories developed on this basis may, in certain ways, serve not merely as explanatory principles, but as norms of economic efficiency. Since the type-case which economic theory makes use of is that of perfect rationality in the adaptation of means, under given conditions, to given ends thought of in practical terms, the theory expresses the best possible utilization of the given resources to satisfy the given wants. This aspect of the theory, for the case of competition, has been formulated particularly in terms of the doctrine of maximum satisfaction, which, under the assumptions of rationality, independence of wants from the processes of their satisfaction, and mobility of resources, states that the pursuit by each individual of his own interests in competitive production will result in the maximum of want-satisfaction for all the individuals in the society.

The leading elements studied by orthodox economics, thus formulated,

[3] Though it must reach a certain magnitude before becoming a market factor of appreciable importance.

form an abstract "ideal type." On this basis a theory has partly been developed, partly awaits elaboration, which by itself says nothing as to the concrete relevance of the assumptions on which it is based. The problems of the relation of economics and the other social sciences, and the various possible concepts of the scope of economics, arise out of investigation into the concrete significance of these assumptions and the relation of the factors specifically dealt with in this theory to the others which may be held to play a part in social life, and which may or may not be dealt with by other sciences.

III. The Classification of "Unorthodoxies"

We shall make use of a double classification of the possible ways in which this "ideal type" of economic theory may be related to the concrete reality. The first distinction involves the general conception of science entertained by the writers concerned. On the one hand, they may adopt an "empiricist" view that any science, or at least economics, has the task of delivering a full and complete explanation of a given sector of concrete reality. In terms of this attitude two basic alternatives are possible: either the principles of economic theory as above outlined are directly, without essential qualification for other factors, applicable to concrete "economic activities," to "business," in which case the orthodox theory will be held to be satisfactory, or they are not so applicable. In this latter case two further alternatives are open: they must be supplemented by other elements, still operative within the framework of economic science, or, in the more radical view they are definitely wrong and economics must build anew from the start. If any departure from the "narrow orthodoxy" sketched above be held to be a "sociological element" [4] then the earlier theories introducing such elements have employed mainly the supplementary method—a root and branch criticism of the whole thing, and a tendency to throw it all out, is relatively recent. The great bulk of "unorthodox" movements have belonged in this general "empiricist" category.

On the other hand one may take a view of a science that its specific subject-matter is not concrete phenomena, as such, but a logically defined abstract element or set of elements in the concrete. If this position be adopted, criticism of the direct concrete applicability of economic principles ceases to be so disturbing. Divergences may be explained as due to other factors—and the corrective is no longer the remodeling of economic theory to take account of them, but rather the synthesis of its results with those of other sciences in the final full explanation of the concrete. This is a path explicitly and consciously taken only relatively

[4] Whether this view is justified will be discussed below, Section VIII.

recently; some outstanding examples of it will be discussed in the latter part of the chapter. Its path consists not so much in emphasizing sociological or other elements *in* economics, as in working out a sociological supplement to an avowedly abstract economics. In certain respects this has formed one of the most important trends of recent sociological thought which, to a very important degree, has been determined by this means of defining its relation to economics.

The other main line of distinction of theories will concern the character of the elements invoked to supplement or replace, as the case may be, the central element of rational economic action. This, like all "action" (as distinct from "behavior" in the technical behaviorist sense) is, and must be, analyzed in terms which involve some form of the schema of the relation of means and ends. The peculiarity of "economic" action is its situation in an intermediate position in the great chain of means and ends, where its "ends" are by definition only means to other ends of a more ultimate nature. The ultimate ends motivating the action as well as the main facts of the situation, the "conditions" of the action, are taken for granted as data. Looking at the thing, as this schema does, from the "subjective" point of view, i. e., that of the individual acting, the supplementing of the "economic" element can take place in two directions. One or the other, or both, of these sets of data can be turned into problems and their explanation made an obligation of the economic theorist.

Historically, in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon economics, by far the greater part of the unorthodox movements have concentrated their attention on the "conditions," rather than the "ends." This throws attention to such factors as the external environment, the ultimate source of natural resources, population and the laws of its growth, scientific knowledge and its resultant technology, or finally the "social environment" consisting, above all, of forms of business organization. Since the bulk of these thinkers are empiricists in the above sense this must be accompanied by some positive means of eliminating the element of ends from consideration. For this purpose various psychological assumptions like hedonism, the instinct of acquisition, etc., or other constant instincts, or finally, a "habitual" standard of living have proved most serviceable. Marshall is, to my knowledge, the first economist explicitly to make "wants" a variable category, an innovation the implications of which certainly led further than he realized.

From the formal point of view of the logical structure of scientific theory, the empirical "supplement" to abstract economics consists merely in narrowing the range of the "data" accepted without inquiry by economics, and a corresponding widening of the range of "problems" included within its scope.

Given, as any empiricism of this type must assume, the constancy (for

scientific purposes at least) of the ultimate ends of action, it is inevitable that there should be a general tendency to measure means in terms of the degree to which they realize these ultimate ends. Hence a continual bias toward a linear evolutionary view of the process of "economic" development, laying stress, as the case may be, on biological selection, accumulation of scientific knowledge and resulting technological improvement, or better adaptation of social organization, i.e., its becoming more "economic." To account for a long period of time in achieving a relatively high degree of such adaptation it is convenient to invoke retarding influences, so that the process may be conceived as one of emancipation from them. "Ignorance" and "custom" are by far the most pervasive of these, though others such as Veblen's "anthropomorphism" and "predation" may also enter.

But in the face of this logical situation, it is natural to suspect that the appearance of *qualitative* rather than quantitative differences between economic epochs and systems, indicates the presence of elements of a different sort, even if they are arrayed in a single irreversible temporal order. There is one great body of economic "empiricism" in which this insistence on qualitative differences is most conspicuous: the German historical school. It is, in fact the antithesis to the Anglo-American "positivistic" empiricism. It either assumes as constant, or tends to ignore or minimize such factors as external environment, even science and technology, as well as man's bio-psychological equipment. The emphasis, on the other hand, is on the specific totality of a "culture" and above all on the integration of its economic organization and activities with its religious and ethical values, or more vaguely, its *Geist* or spirit.

The only difference the abstract, rather than the empirical, view of economic science makes in these two cases, is that these factors are looked upon as supplementing the authentically economic. On the one hand, economics is abstract because it neglects the "conditions" of economic action, on the other, because it neglects the specific nature of its ultimate ends.

Finally, criticism may attack the economic conception of the process of economic action itself. This attack has from the positivistic side centered chiefly on the rational element. In its extreme form, positivistic anti-intellectualism has held the rational element in any action to be either non-existent or negligible. To find a substitute for the logical rôle of rational action, the positivist is driven in the first instance to some form of anti-intellectualist psychology, usually in instinct or behaviorist form, and ultimately to a biological explanation of this. This path has been taken most of all by the school of empiricists who have argued first, that all economics is dependent on psychological assumptions, second, that the older economics was an application of hedonistic psychology, and third, that modern psychology has disposed of hedonism.

The "historical" opposition, on the other hand, has attacked not so much the conception of rational action itself, in its broader sense, as rather its specific economic form as dominated by "calculation of advantage." As against this, it has urged the individual's incorporation in the larger groups, and his subordination to super-individual ends.

The theories to be taken up explicitly in the remainder of this study will be chosen with a view, not to encyclopedic completeness, but rather to illustrate each of the principal logical possibilities inherent in the situation just sketched. Omission of particular names does not indicate an adverse judgment on the thinker "slighted" but rather limitations, on the one hand, of space, on the other, of the writer's interest in and knowledge of particular theories. Obviously a complete discussion would require an extended treatise rather than a moderate-sized essay.

IV. Positivistic Empiricism—(A) Supplementary Type

The simplest position, of course, is that which takes the ideal type of "economic" relationships and maintains its direct and unqualified applicability to concrete "economic" phenomena. This position might be called "empirical orthodoxy" as opposed to the "abstract orthodoxy" of Pareto, for instance.[5] It involves one of two assumptions. The less radical is that there is a concrete "sphere" of activities, a "department" of social life in which these abstractly defined relationships are substantially true in concrete fact. The more radical is the generalization of this view to include not merely the one "department," but virtually (or in limiting type, absolutely) all of social life. This latter makes economic theory the central element in, if not the whole of, a system of sociology; in perhaps the strictest sense of the expression, it is the "economic interpretation of history."

In fact such a view, wavering as between the less and the more radical of the above assumptions, has played a very great part in the history of economic thought. In general, the tendency has been to concentrate on the analysis of a limited sector of concrete relationships—roughly those of the market—value, price and the distribution of wealth, with a certain indefiniteness as to how far it was legitimate to push the analysis out into the peripheral questions of factors impinging upon, but not so directly involved in, these relationships. This is substantially true of that element of the utilitarian tradition which, following Locke and Adam Smith, rested on some form of the postulate of the "natural identity of interest." [6] It

[5] See below, Section VII.

[6] Cf. É. Halévy, *La formation du radicalisme philosophique,* 3 vols. This is incomparably the most extensive and penetrating analysis of the interrelated currents of English social and economic "individualism" in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

is at least one main strain in the "classical" economics and the later thought of Jevons and Marshall.

Historically, the theory was arrived at mainly by considering how the harmony of a beneficent state of nature was translated into the conditions of a society characterized by the division of labor and exchange. The fundamental concept is that of the quantitative equivalence of exchange relations, so that it can still be said that in a "virtual" sense every individual consumes only the product of his own labor. The absence, on the one hand, of the concept of marginal utility, and hence the emphasis on a "real" cost of production theory of value, plus the derivation of the theory, on the other, from the conception of a non-social state of nature, where the productive functions of land, capital, and business management are not in evidence, led to the peculiarities of the classical system centering about the rôle of labor in production and value. The internal logical difficulties growing out of this situation can be said to have been substantially overcome in the later marginal utility and opportunity-cost theory, so that the theory of a competitive economic order expressed in the propositions involved in the modern doctrine of maximum satisfaction constitutes the most sophisticated and logically satisfactory formulation of economic theory in this sense. In so far as this theory has been held to be substantially true of any considerable section of concrete reality, "orthodox empiricism" has existed.

Analysis of the logical conditions necessary for this formulation of such a theoretical system, however, soon reveals the necessity for the existence of a very definite set of corresponding concrete conditions for the working of the real system. If, then, the theoretical analysis is to apply directly to the concrete reality, these conditions must be proved to exist and accounted for. This involves the factual conformity of the competitive process to rules which prevent its diversion from the assumed end. It is not difficult to show that the use of either physical violence or deception as means of attaining "economic" ends, on the one hand, of economic resources and strategic position in economic relations as instruments of power over others, on the other, will upset the conditions for the working of such a system. How then is their absence accounted for?

The simplest and least convincing solution is simply to assume that they are in some sense contrary to the nature of things, or a variant of the same view, that the enlightenment of self-interest will cause each individual to see that his own interest is so bound up with that of the system as a whole that it does not "pay" to do anything detrimental to the latter. Among other things, this would involve the assumption that the length of time entering into the calculations of one's own "long-run" interests so far transcended the span of a single human life as to become essentially meaningless. It is difficult to see how acts, the benefit of which will accrue to pos-

terity of only the fourth or fifth generation, can be construed as motivated directly by self-interest. The general social theory underlying this view is of course anarchism. Strictly speaking the theory of a system of "pure" economic individualism operating without control by any other agency is a form of anarchism.

But relatively few economists have been so "tender-minded" as to believe seriously in its possibility. On the "periphery" has almost always been found a non-economic controlling agency. The most pervasive of course has been the state whose "minimum" functions—external defense, maintenance of internal order and enforcement of contracts (now almost all economists would add provision of a monetary standard)—have very generally been held to be necessary. In general, the *laissez faire* economists' objection has not been to the state having anything to do with the economic system, but to its doing the wrong things. This view of the necessity of the state may be said to be common ground for all economists except the extreme anarchistic wing.

In addition to this, various other regulatory mechanisms have made their appearance from time to time. Besides those to be discussed specifically later, two may be mentioned here: Adam Smith's "moral sentiment" and that vague, but none the less important, factor invoked by Ricardo to fill in the gaps left open by his economic analysis, the "habits and customs of the people." [7]

By and large, though, while such factors as this have served to fill the chinks along the outside walls of economic science, they have not been made the subject of systematic analysis, as distinct from more or less casual citation. They have also not been built into the body of economic theory —Adam Smith's "moral sentiments," for instance, were dealt with in a separate work, and not as part of the *Wealth of Nations*. The first major change in this situation which deeply shook the optimistic *laissez faire* individualism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries came in with the doctrines of Malthus, which gave new turns to thought in at least three different directions.

The "pure type" of economic theory is after all pretty narrowly defined —it may be compared to the crest of a narrow knife-like ridge. Once having made a step off it on either side, it is by no means easy to stop. And it is all the more difficult to avoid making such a step to one side when one is primarily preoccupied with avoiding a step down the other. This in essence is what happened to Malthus. He fully realized the indistinctness of the boundary between the *laissez faire* doctrines of his time and anarchism. He was above all concerned to combat anarchism in the form of Godwin's "political justice." But to exorcise an evil spirit it is sometimes necessary to call in the devil himself. Malthus in fact slipped heavily

[7] Cf. *Principles of Political Economy* (Everyman edition), p. 55.

down the opposite slope into three main lines of thought, all of dubiously "economic" parentage.

The devil in this case was of course the celebrated "principle of population," in essence the view that the main lines of our social situation are determined by the (nearly) uncontrollable propensities of "human nature" on the one hand, and the unalterable niggardliness of an unkind physical nature in the form of "diminishing returns," on the other. This is the first major beginning of the linking of economics with biological theories of survival, a trend which will be entered into more at length below.

But this devil also has offspring who are not to be ignored. As Malthus says to Godwin, imagining his anarchistic idyll once realized, the growth of population would soon lead, as the only alternative to chaos and general starvation, to the spontaneous re-establishment of the institutions of property and marriage, and the division of society into classes of employers and laborers.

The first two items form perhaps the first appearance in economic thought of an independent rôle of social institutions as regulators of economic life—in this case with specific reference to the growth of population. As distinct from the more usual position these institutions are, for Malthus, not "instituted" by the state, but arise spontaneously in the processes of social life itself. The state merely sanctions them. This independence is the new note. It is true that Malthus shared the view of his contemporaries that the pursuit by each individual of his own self-interest was beneficial to the whole—in fact it was the *vis medicatrix rei publicae,* the very life principle. Ill-advised interference with it, as in Pitt's Poor Law, could only have disastrous consequences. But this was true only *within* the framework of institutional control. Without such control, it is quite safe to assume that for Malthus as for Hobbes, self-interest could only lead to social chaos, a *bellum omnium contra omnes.*

But much further development of the independent rôle of institutions as a regulator of economic activities belongs to a later date. The most important immediate influence was the third consequence of the principles of population—the division of society into classes. The original starting point of individualistic economics, the conception of a state of nature, had no place for a division into classes. All men were by nature equal. And this natural equality was carried over into the division of labor as necessary to preserve equivalence in exchange. The only differences were those due to the greater "quantity of labor" performed by one man, as compared with another. The typical division of labor thought of was where each man produced and exchanged the products of his own labor—the deer and beaver of Adam Smith's and Ricardo's examples.[8] But for Malthus, the pressure of population drove the division of labor further, to the splitting

[8] *Wealth of Nations,* p. 41; *Principles of Political Economy,* pp. 6, 15, 16.

up of processes within the same productive unit, and a division between those supervising and those carrying out the process.

Malthus was so concerned with the greater productivity of this more minute division of labor as a means of supporting population, that he did not draw the crucial theoretical consequences of the fact that the division into classes meant an inherent and cumulative inequality between the classes, both as to wealth, and more important, as to economic power. The basis of this inequality had been clearly seen by Adam Smith in his analysis of the conditions of the labor contract,[9] but not used for theoretical purposes. Ricardo went a step further in his statements about the precariousness of the standard of living, and the greater likelihood of its being lowered than raised.[10] But for Ricardo, the "capitalist" was primarily the one who supported laborers, and who took the residual share of the income. So in spite of the clear-cut conflict of the interests of the classes in his theory of distribution, the *differences* of power with their implications for the stability of the competitive system were not prominent in his thought. It was Marx who took the decisive step in this direction. Assuming the organized capitalistic enterprise as the unit of his system, he laid the principal stress on its control by the owner-manager, particularly through his ownership, and the resultant cumulative process of "exploitation" of labor leading finally to the overturn of the whole structure.[11] Thus the introduction of this power element within the economic system and its crystallization (by virtue of the advanced division of labor and the resulting structure of the organized productive unit) about the division into classes, led to a basic reconstruction of economic theory itself. A very great amount of subsequent economic discussion, particularly "unorthodox" theories of the business cycle, goes back ultimately to differences over this point.[12]

Whether the power element and the class difference are or are not "economic" factors cannot be said to be agreed upon today. What is popularly called the "economic interpretation of history," being of Marxian origin, naturally includes them. It can be said to shade off into the narrower version referred to above by imperceptible degrees. A great deal of misunderstanding in discussion would be avoided if people would make their positions on this point clear in their arguments.

The introduction of the power element through Malthus led to an internal reorganization of economic theory. We have now to note two move-

[9] *Wealth of Nations*, p. 58.

[10] *Principles of Political Economy*, p. 75.

[11] Part of the Marxian theory of "exploitation" is based on the erroneous classical view of the rôle of labor in production referred to above. But even in the more correct modern formulations the introduction of cumulative differences of power will lead to substantially similar results, though differing somewhat in detail.

[12] Outside Marxist circles, cf. Hobson.

ments, which while leaving it intact (in either of the above versions), have attempted to give it a more secure underpinning and a more certain and extensive concrete application by supplementing it with certain theories not inherently logically implied in it, nor involved in its internal structure. The first example of this is psychological hedonism. Finding its most famous and influential formulation in Bentham's "felicific calculus" it became so intimately associated with the classical economics in the system of "philosophical radicalism" that some later critics have (erroneously) held them to be logically inseparable.

Hedonism accepts the rationality of the processes of action. What it does is to put in the place of diversity of wants assumed as data by the economist,[13] one all-pervading psychological motive, the pursuit of pleasure. This gives an appearance of completeness of explanation of the totality of action, which cannot but be of great comfort to the empiricist who cannot rest content with abstractions. Since there seems to be one direction of economic activity—acquisition, and this is thought of in quantitative terms, it is logically very satisfactory to have one quantitatively variable motive explaining it all.

It is only natural that the wide currency of hedonistic psychology as an integral part of the "philosophical radicalism" of the earlier nineteenth century should have greatly aided in giving generality and philosophical sanction to the classical economics, especially in the then prevailing empiricist atmosphere. Even later, in the new impetus given by Jevons' discovery of the principle of marginal utility, the connection remained very close indeed, perhaps closer than it had ever been.

It is true that in an empiricist view economics must have a psychological foundation, and that hedonism is the one by far best adapted to the rational-individualistic economics. But the advance of an abstract factor view of the scope of economics has made it possible to separate it from hedonism. This is possible because it is no longer necessary to postulate that "economic motives" are ultimate motives in any sense, for acquisitiveness, in the sense of a tendency to maximize utilities, is a simple deduction from the general postulate of rationality of economic action. The possibility of quantitative treatment of utility arises not from the fact that it reflects a single ultimate motive, but that remaining on the level of means, its object is generalized purchasing power, that is, command over the means to the satisfaction of all wants whatever their ultimate nature. It is merely a truism that the "satisfaction" of wants is greater, the greater the means available for their satisfaction.

It is further worth while to point out that the confusion over the rela-

[13] Or perhaps somewhat better stated, in place of the generalized immediate "economic" goal of action, the acquisition of "purchasing power," the quite different psychological motive, pleasure.

tion of economics to psychology in general, and hedonism in particular, has been greatly increased by the very prevalent identification of all elements of behavior seen from the "subjective" point of view, i. e., that of the acting individual, with "psychological" elements. Since the latter category refers to one factor in concrete behavior, the former to the *whole* of behavior seen from one aspect, they can be the same only if there is only the one factor. The economic category of utility is certainly a "subjective" category; outside the "subjective" means-end relation economics in the factor sense has no meaning whatever, but it does not follow that it is a psychological concept at all.

Finally, from a strictly empiricist point of view hedonism itself scarcely constitutes a sufficient basis for economics. It remains to explain why pleasure has come to be associated with certain forms of activity and not with others. The pursuit of such questions inevitably leads far beyond the mere hedonistic postulate itself, into questions of biological survival and the like, which will form the subject of our next treatment.

We have already seen that Malthus was one of the first to invoke biological considerations in the explanation of the "economic" facts confronting him. In fact, the Malthusian theory and, more generally, the whole classical economics, forms a main element in the background of one of the greatest intellectual movements of modern times: Darwinism. In practically all thought concerned with man in the second (as distinct from the first) half of the nineteenth century, and having any kind of a positivistic leaning, Darwinism has had a major rôle.

On the one hand, Malthus' conception of the vast potential fecundity of man, generalized to include all organic species, provided the surplus on which natural selection could operate—on the other, the theory of economic competition as a means of promoting efficiency provided a model for the conception of the process itself. In fact so striking was the analogy that Keynes has remarked "The Principle of Survival of the Fittest could be regarded as one vast generalization of the Ricardian Economics." [14] To be sure, there are difficulties in the analogy with the organic structure. As Malthus so clearly recognized, to be beneficial, competition must proceed according to rules which, in the social-Darwinistic conception of "Nature red in tooth and claw," are conspicuous only by their absence. Moreover, to retain a direct connection with the older economics it was necessary to leave a place for a limited rôle of rationality of individual action.

However, while Darwinism may be considered both the mother and the goal of practically the whole of the positivistic phase of the modern anti-intellectualist movement, it is only relatively recently that it has penetrated economic thought in this radical form—on that we shall remark briefly below. Its first effect was undoubtedly to bolster up the classical

[14] *The End of Laissez-faire* (New Republic edition), p. 17.

view of the economic process by widening it out into one of cosmic significance.

The earlier phase was perhaps best represented by what was hardly explicitly an economic theory at all—the individualism of Spencer. On the one hand, his extreme negative position on the outside control of this competitive process came so close to anarchism that the necessity of controlling rules for the economic as distinct from the biological struggle scarcely even occurred to him. On the other, the Lamarckian element in his biology made it easier to maintain the postulate of economic rationality than strict Darwinism would have done.

But perhaps the most notable attempt, by an economist, to relate the conception of an individualistic competitive order to the general conditions of biological survival in Darwinian terms, has been that of T. N. Carver.[15] Starting from the economic doctrine of "maximum satisfaction" and its implication that an individualistic competitive order is the most efficient possible, he has maintained that for this reason its adoption constitutes the most powerful factor in the chances of survival of a group. It thus becomes, as for Spencer, the logical end of the great process of social evolution, which, in turn, is the continuation of biological evolution.

It is, however, interesting to note that Carver somewhat modifies the "pure" conception of "economic" society, partly to bring it successfully into this wider framework. For his purposes, it is no longer adequate to consider the "end" of social organization as merely the maximization of individual want-satisfaction. It is necessary to show that a competitive order contributes more than any other to "survival value." As a means of maximizing the economic power of such a society, and of guaranteeing against its resting on its oars in the ultimate struggle for survival, he invokes the "work-bench philosophy," the devotion to work for its own sake—a motive entirely outside the logical necessities of the older system. Also he goes rather farther than some of his predecessors in conceding that the correct rules of the game need to be laid down by an agency outside the competitive process itself. This is especially true regarding the unearned increment from land, monopoly, and the inheritance of property. In many ways Carver's theories are directly reminiscent of those of Spencer, who has the same combination of orthodox economic individualism and biological evolutionism. But being free from Spencer's naïve Lamarckian biology, and considerably more clear-headed in meeting objections to unmitigated *laissez faire,* it serves as a better example of this type of theory.

V. Positivistic Empiricism—(B) Radical Rejection

The "unorthodox" elements entering into economics in the theories so far discussed have consisted in modifications in, and supplements to, the

[15] See especially *Essays in Social Justice* and *The Religion Worth Having.*

"orthodox" theories, due to the addition of factors not considered by the latter. Still remaining on positivistic ground, there is another class of theories which go farther in that they do not merely add to the orthodox theory; they reject it as positively wrong, and substitute other positivistic elements in its place as explanations of the concrete facts of economic life.

As pointed out before, the "ideal type" of economic action concerns a relatively narrow sector in the whole long chain of relations between ultimate ends and "ultimate means." Without attacking the validity of the basic scheme of means-end relationships it is possible to object to the emphasis on the specifically "economic" element in it, and bring out others instead. This is essentially the position taken by Veblen.

The general framework of his theoretical structure is essentially very simple. In the typical fashion of positivistic empiricism, he disposes of the problem of the rôle of ultimate ends by assuming them to be given as constant factors in the form of four basic "instincts": the "parental bent"; "predatory bent"; the "bent of workmanship"; and "idle curiosity." Unlike the instincts of the main type of anti-intellectualist psychology, however, Veblen's are explicitly "teleological," they are "ends" of action rather than "tendencies." The processes of their expression or attainment, on the other hand, he thinks of as rational, resting on a knowledge of the conditions under which action takes place.[16]

In the second place, Veblen criticizes the orthodox economics as logically dependent on hedonistic psychology. Since he holds the latter to be positively unsound,[17] and he fails to make the separation just discussed,[18] he is forced to throw out the type of "economic action" altogether. One may say that in so doing "he throws out the baby with the bath." He is then left with two main types of rational action in fulfillment of the instincts, each resting on a type of knowledge and of interest. On the one hand, there is the "predatory" type, concerned with the promotion of egoistic interests and resting on pragmatic "worldly wisdom," a knowledge of men, their weaknesses, susceptibilities, etc., that is, everything about them which may be turned to the advantage of the agent dealing with them, trying to use them as means to his own ends. This, in turn, is subdivided into the explicitly "predatory" type, making use of violence and outright fraud to attain its ends, and the peaceful "pecuniary" type making strategic use of economic power (especially as given in monopoly position) and the command over large masses of property, to attain ends always at the expense of others.

On the other hand, there is the "workmanlike" type of action, resting

[16] Cf. *The Instinct of Workmanship,* chap. i.

[17] "Preconceptions of Economic Science," *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization.*

[18] Sect. IV. Discussion of hedonism.

on knowledge of "opaque fact" and "mechanical sequences," such knowledge being essentially the product of "idle curiosity." The interest in this case is in the workmanship itself, in the best possible performances of the technical task on hand, with a rather vague (and untenable) implication that such devotion to workmanship promotes the general welfare, while "pragmatic" action in terms of self-interest is always essentially predatory.

This being the case, Veblen sees the main line of continuity in the process of social development as that of workmanship, or essentially industrial technology. The pragmatic type does not figure as an "evolutionary" factor because it is on the one hand destructive—it is the Hobbesian element—on the other hand there is no such cumulative development of "worldly wisdom" as there is of "matter-of-fact knowledge."

There have been three eras relatively favorable to workmanship: the "savage" era of peaceful industry, held back, however by the "self-contamination" of workmanship (its tendency to turn to magical manipulations); the era of handicraft, when peace was established but pecuniary interests were not yet predominant; and finally the modern era of the "machine process." Veblen interprets the modern economic situation mainly in terms of the inharmonious relations of the "machine process" and the "industrial employments" that go with it, on the one hand and on the other, the essentially predatory and self-inhibiting strategic maneuvers of the business men in their "pecuniary employments." [19]

Veblen's whole treatment of the latter centers around an emphasis on the power factor which brings him in this respect close to Marx. Also in a rather vague way, he conceives of the working classes as concerned with workmanship rather than pecuniary strategy (a conception a little hard to reconcile with certain phases of trade union activity) and hence tends to identify his division with the Marxian class division. In his conception, however, the working class is a passive factor in the struggle for power in a way quite foreign to Marx. Veblen's struggle is essentially between business men. Moreover, for Marx the machine technology is mainly significant as influencing the structure of the business unit and setting the stage for the particular modern class conflict, while for Veblen it is itself the central, and the only forward-moving, as against inhibiting element in the economic process.

Veblen's principal catch-word for use against the older economics is "institutions." Nowhere to my knowledge does he clearly define the concept, usually employing such vague expressions as "habits" and "modes of activity." Where does it fit into his general theoretical scheme?

There is one almost universal connotation of the term "institutions" which certainly also applies to Veblen—a certain relativity. Institutions are not one of the elements which may be held to remain constant at all

[19] *Theory of Business Enterprise,* chap. i.

times and places. One of Veblen's main indictments against the orthodox economics was that it was a "taxonomic" science, interested mainly in classification. For our purposes, this may be taken to mean that it thinks in terms of a few fundamental and unchanging categories—value, cost, production, distribution, etc. As against this, Veblen sets the ideal of an "evolutionary" science, one which explains things genetically in terms of temporal antecedents with the implication of an irreversible process of change in time. It is mainly as this changing, "evolutionary" element in economic life that Veblen thinks of institutions.

Given his general theory, the constancy of the four instincts excludes the possibility of this element's being attributed mainly to the varying ends of action [20]—it must have to do with the processes of attaining ends themselves. The doctrine then seems to be that these processes are not settled *ad hoc* in each case by new rational considerations, but that they get crystallized into relatively well-established and settled modes of doing and thinking about things. In each case, variations take the form of relatively slight alterations of these settled modes, due to new exigencies of the situation, or the inherent process of advancing matter-of-fact knowledge—a truly Darwinian conception. While continually changing, there is in every society, at every stage, a relatively stable pattern of such institutions which form the main basis of its specific structure.

Since there are for Veblen two principal categories of action, the workmanlike and the pragmatic, there are correspondingly two main groups of institutions regulating these two respectively. But since society is one, they have to stand in some sort of relation to each other. In general, they will tend to harmonize, but, since the most important dynamic factor is the technological process, in the later stages of social evolution, especially, the institutions directly associated with it tend to change most rapidly. Those of the "pragmatic" type tend to lag behind and to represent a set of habits formed in connection with an earlier technological stage. This will be the more true the farther removed the persons and groups concerned are from direct contact with the everyday technological processes.[21]

Thus, in addition to his complete rejection of the concept of "economic action" in the strict sense, and his consequent concentration of attention on predation and technology, Veblen has invoked a further element—"institutions." Though never very explicitly stated, it is to be inferred that its importance goes back mainly to a psychological thesis—that of the very

[20] Such variability is brought in on various occasions by talking of the temporary "predominance" of one or another instinct.

[21] This is the essential theoretical argument of Veblen's celebrated *Theory of the Leisure Class*. In our society the leisure class and its institutions form one great "archaic" survival of the "predatory culture."

The most recent variant of the general theory is the "culture lag" theory of Ogburn. The resemblance is so striking that it almost certainly owes much to Veblen.

great importance of "habit" in concrete action. Thus Veblen's theory of institutions is the expression mainly of one element of psychological anti-intellectualism, though it is confined to the retarding, lag element, while social change is essentially due to rational adaptation. This psychological element, and the fact that, having assumed ultimate ends as constant, institutions concern only the processes of action, mark Veblen's "institutional" theory off sharply from others to be discussed below. As against them it may be called "positivistic institutionalism."

Thus in Veblen empiricism has resulted curiously enough in the science of economics having become a complete philosophy of history emphasizing everything in human life, ultimate ends (to be sure in terms of a very special theory of them), predation, technology, science, even institutions accounted for by habit, leaving out only the specifically economic element. It is carrying the revolt against the orthodox economics about as far as it can be done—by throwing out its own positive conceptions root and branch—and putting in its place almost every other conceivable element. Surely the sin of committing the fallacy of "misplaced concreteness" on the part of the older economists has been amply avenged.

In Veblen's theory of institutions the psychological factor of habit has made its appearance in economic thought. It is an element of psychological anti-intellectualism whose derivation from Darwinism is very evident. One further step in this general direction is possible. Veblen, after all, repudiated only the specifically economic form of rational action, retaining the predatory and the technological. One may go a step further and repudiate the rôle of rationality altogether. This step has not been made the basis of any really well worked-out "economic theory"; in fact, it has hardly gone beyond methodological discussions and scattered, unsystematized appeals to certain non-rational psychological factors to explain certain concrete phenomena such as "crowd psychology" as a factor in bank runs, etc. Nevertheless, two anti-intellectual psychological movements have had enough influence to merit mention, at least.

The one most closely related to the Veblenian point of view and most in vogue among his followers is behaviorism. The principal conception for the interpretation of behavior, the "conditioned reflex" is a more precise and physiological formulation of what Veblen more vaguely had called "habit." With the extension of the reflex mechanism to cover the areas of rationality still allowed by Veblen, the "institutional" element in his theory easily passes over into a generally behavioristic social theory. In addition Veblen's conception of science as "matter of fact" knowledge of "opaque fact," and its distinction from the "worldly wisdom" of insight into human motives, fits into the behavioristic stress on "objectivity," and their abhorrence of contact with the "subjective." Finally, the common filiation from Darwinism is very clear indeed. The conditioning of be-

havioristic reflexes is clearly the application of the idea of natural selection to the acts of the individual, while the random movements are the analogue of Darwinian variations. Given the empiricist staring point, it was out of the question that economic thought should have remained immune from the great current of positivistic "objectivism" of which radical behaviorism is the logical culmination.

In going over to behaviorism, economics approaches the final term in departure from its "classical" starting point. Not only has it, as with Veblen, thrown out the particular central category of rational action on the grounds of its alleged dependence on a particular unsound psychological theory, but on psychological grounds, it has thrown out the whole great category of rational action in general, thus shutting out radically any possibility of a return to the older ways, even in a modified form.

The other main psychological movement to come under consideration is the "instinct" psychology. In reality it was a twin of behaviorism, differing from the latter essentially in the emphasis on heredity as against environment. Perhaps the most notable case in economic literature is Mitchell's pledge of allegiance to McDougall.[22] Arguing more radically than Veblen that the assumption of rationality itself, and not merely hedonism, was the core of the difficulty of the classical theories, he proposed the adoption of McDougall's scheme of instincts in its stead. To my knowledge, he never attempted to build a scheme of economic theory on this basis. The insecurity of the whole thing is evident both from the transitoriness of the psychological theories on which Mitchell and other economists have rested their hopes, and from the inability to distinguish even a real psychological theory from others. Mitchell's inclusion in a later article [23] of Sombart along with McDougall and Thorndike as a man attempting to supply a psychological foundation to economics shows nothing less than a complete misunderstanding of Sombart's work, as the following discussion will show.[24] In general, the extension of positivistic empiricism in economics to such extremes of logical conclusion as these psychological theories seems to have involved the science in far more difficulties than it has extricated it from.

VI. Romantic Empiricism

Thus far we have been concerned with theories which in their supplements to, or substitutes for, orthodox economic theory have remained on

[22] W. C. Mitchell, "Rationality of Economic Action," *Quar. Jour. Ec.*, Vol. 18, 1910–11.

[23] "Human Behavior and Economics," *Quarterly Journal of Economics.*, Vol. 29, 1914–15.

[24] See below, Section VI.

"positivistic" ground. That is, on the whole, they have tended either to ignore the problem of ultimate ends or, like Veblen, to assume them constant. They have invoked such factors as the external "conditions" of action, technology, or biological or psychological properties of the human individual. There are other theories which, while still remaining on an empiricist basis, trying to explain the whole of concrete "economic" reality, have invoked a quite different order of considerations, centering mainly in the rôle of ultimate ends and values in human action, and concentrating their critique of orthodoxy mainly on the predominant, concrete, rôle it assigns to "economic motives." As a whole this group may be termed the theories of "romantic empiricism."

While for the most part these views have come from Germany, strange as it may seem Marshall also may be placed in this category. Of course Marshall is generally regarded as the very ideal type of orthodox economist. Examination of his theory, however, shows that besides the element of "utility" theory, there is in his work a second most important theoretical element.[25] It is noteworthy in the first place that his definitions of economics are highly imprecise—the usual one is "the study of man in the everyday business of life." [26] Upon inquiring more closely what that involves, we find it bifurcating into two main branches, the "study of wealth" and its "more important side, a part of the study of man." This latter concerns the "ways in which man's character has been formed in the conditions of his work." The "study of wealth" developed by Marshall in terms of the marginal utility principle and the "principle of substitution" is essentially "orthodox economic theory"; the "study of man" is something quite different.

It is noteworthy that Marshall, on the whole, accepts the underlying assumptions of the doctrine of maximum satisfaction, such as competition, mobility, rationality, and, with certain qualifications, the doctrine itself. He makes one basic exception from the point of view of utility theory in refusing to accept the independence of wants, of the processes of their satisfaction. Here he classifies wants into three categories: biological needs, which he sometimes refers to as "wants" without qualification; "artificial" wants; and wants "adjusted to activities." Action connected with the first two categories may be understood directly in "utility" terms, but in the last case, the wants and the activities form an inseparable unity which cannot be broken down even for analytical purposes.[27]

[25] See the writer's articles, "Wants and Activities in Marshall," and "Economics and Sociology: Marshall in Relation to the Thought of His Time," *Quar. Jour. Ec.* (Nov., 1931, and Feb., 1932).

[26] *Principles of Economics,* 8th *Ed.,* p. 1.

[27] The classification is nowhere explicitly worked out, but must be inferred from his treatment.

Thus in the "activities" in a state of mutual adjustment with wants, Marshall has introduced a factor quite outside the scope of the ordinary utility theory. This is what he means when he says that "much that is of most interest in the science of wants is borrowed from the science of efforts and activities," and "if either, more than the other, may claim to be the interpreter of the history of man, whether on the economic side or any other, it is the science of activities, and not that of wants." [28] This factor is thus conceived by him as an integral part of his economic theory.

Concretely, the activities and qualities of character he has in mind are those embodying, on the one hand, the virtues of energy, initiative, enterprise, and on the other, rationality, industry, frugality, and honorable dealing. In such activities these typical "economic virtues" are thought of as practiced not for ulterior motives on the principle "honesty is the best policy," but strictly as ends in themselves without thought of reward. They, as much as competition, and the other "utility" elements, characterize the modern system of "free enterprise."

The rôle of these "activities" may be followed straight through Marshall's thought, starting with the internal structure of his more technical theory and branching out into his general social philosophy. It is their part which primarily prompts his defence of the Ricardian labor theory of value against Jevons. Only by its introduction does he maintain the classical doctrine that the total supplies of the factors of production (other than natural agents) are direct functions of their prices. At the other end of the scale, correlative with the doctrine of maximum satisfaction, this forms the basis of Marshall's strong defence of freedom of enterprise, and finally, along with the process of developing rationality and emancipation from custom, it is the center of a linear theory of the process of social evolution as a whole, culminating in the development of "free enterprise."

This element of a definite type of activities pursued as ends in themselves not only is something different from the orthodox theory we have discussed—it supplements it in a way radically different from the "positivistic" theory treated above. It brings ends (not the immediate end of economic acquisition, but ultimate ethical values) in as a basic *variable* which must be taken into direct account in economic explanations.

It is possible, however, for it to harmonize with the "utility theory" element, and to cause relatively little disturbance of the main outline of the competitive individualistic picture—and thus largely to have escaped detection—because it fits directly into a single logical whole with the other element. To the empirically minded, the conspicuous thing in Marshall is his use of the utility analysis, and his general support of competitive

[28] *Principles,* p. 90.

individualism [29]—not the logical grounds involved in the latter. But if Marshall broadened his perspective to include a general comparative study of the relation of different systems of ultimate values to economic activities, the picture would be very different and would bring out unmistakably how radical his theoretical departure from orthodoxy really is.

Like the first group of positivistic empiricists we dealt with, Marshall supplements his pure utility theory with another factor—in his case, "activities." Here, as in the other case, there has been a group who have gone further to repudiate radically the factors formulated in orthodox theory.

The German historical school in its various ramifications is the principal representative of this view. Going back for its roots, as it does, very largely to Hegelian idealism and to historical jurisprudence, it is distinguished by two main features. On the one hand, it maintains, on the whole, a radical historical relativism. The attempt of orthodox theory to build up a general economic science universally applicable, is held from the outset to be foredoomed to failure. The classical system was held to be simply the economics of one historical epoch, and its analysis to have no validity for other times and places. Each economic organization must be considered as a reality *sui generis,* as a thing by and for itself, without essential connection with others. Economics cannot hope to set up a universal system of analytical concepts but must attack each period as an entirely new problem.

Secondly, in looking for the order of reality responsible for this radical historical relativity, the historical school has tended to find it in an ethico-spiritual factor, the *Volksgeist,* which is an irreducible entity, not a psychological factor in the positivistic sense. It is fundamentally because the spiritual constitution of societies, particularly their ultimate values, differ, that their economic organizations also differ. From their empiricist point of view, any system of theory which attempts to abstract from these differences is necessarily inadequate.

With the general empiricist tendency predominant, a propensity to become immersed in historical detail followed. On the other hand the impact of Western positivistic thought in Germany, although weaker than elsewhere, tended to blur the clear-cut features of this historical empiricism, especially in the later historical school. Particularly in the work of Schmoller there are large positivistic elements; he has a great deal to say about climate, geography, race, and other similar factors. Nevertheless, the difference of emphasis is always marked. No German historical economist ever placed in a positivistic biological or psychological theory the exclusive trust which has been fairly common in our own thought; the

[29] Both in positive definition and in their use to support individualism, Marshall's "activities" bear a striking resemblance to Professor Carver's "work-bench philosophy."

Volksgeist has always been there, even if pushed from the place of exclusive interest. It is worth while to discuss at some length Werner Sombart, perhaps the most important contemporary heir (rather than representative) of the historical school. Sombart has, on the one hand, reacted away from the positivistic tendencies of the later historicism back to a definite, if not extreme, "romanticist" position. At the same time, as against the extreme empiricism of Schmoller, he has attempted not merely to write economic history, but to develop a systematic theory.

True to the historical position his theory is not universal, except in the most formal sense, but is the theory of a particular historical economic system, that of modern capitalism. The pre-capitalistic is the only other system dealt with at all, and that is principally in order, through contrast, to throw the characteristics of capitalism into clear relief.

In his treatment of capitalism, Sombart's principal predecessor is a thinker not usually reckoned to the historical school, Karl Marx. Marx, as an economic theorist in the narrow sense, belonged mainly to the classical school, differing from his predecessors in that tradition mainly by his explicit recognition of the power factor and the resultant class struggle. But at the same time, his economic theory was worked into a dialectical philosophy of history, mainly of Hegelian origin. The most important point is that he considered capitalism a definite and specific *system* of economic organization, marked off sharply *in principle* from its predecessor and successor in the dialectical process. From the point of view of the individual participants in the system, it is thought of as one of compulsion by which the individual *entrepreneur* is forced to pursue a path of unlimited acquisition. Acquisition is indeed the dominant principle of the system, but not because of an inherited acquisitive propensity of men —rather because placed in certain competitive situations, there is no other type of conduct possible.

The class conflict, arising out of the structure of the capitalistic enterprise which crystallizes differences of power about the class line, and reinforced by the competitive pressure which keeps individuals in line, provides for Marx a dynamic element which forms the main bridge between his classical economic theory and his dialectic theory of social evolution, giving a result notably different from all positivistic theories of economic change. By introducing instability into the very heart of the capitalistic system, it facilitates the conception of it as a unique system, peculiar in its principles of organization and limited in temporal duration.

Sombart freely acknowledges his debt to Marx, stating that his own work [30] is to be regarded as a continuation and, he hopes, completion of that of Marx. But it is very largely done by drawing Marx away from

[30] *Der moderne Kapitalismus,* 6 vols. (2nd. ed.).

his affiliations with English economics and laying the main stress on the "romantic" elements in the theory of capitalism. In general, Marx's principal element of continuity from system to system, the class struggle, recedes far into the background and is replaced by a *Wirtschaftsgeist* peculiar to each system, and in each radically separated from that of the last.

In fact, aside from what Sombart would regard as quite secondary elements, such as the physical conditions of economic life (limitation of natural resources, etc.), all the elements of his theoretical analysis are peculiar to the one system under consideration. His departure from pure history-writing is apparent in that his controlling concept, that of the economic system (*Wirtschaftssystem*), is explicitly abstract, an "ideal type." Its concrete counterpart, the economic epoch, is a period of history in a given area when such a system is predominant, with no attempt to deny that elements of other systems are present. In particular, the period of concrete transition from one system to another is always one of mixture in concrete fact. Though the distinction in principle between two such systems is always sharp and clear, in concrete fact they shade off almost imperceptibly.

Such an economic system has, in Sombart's view, three main aspects, a *Geist* or "spirit," a "form of organization" and a "technique." Each aspect is characterized by certain principles which distinguish it sharply from the corresponding aspect of other systems. In form of organization, the capitalistic system has as its unit the capitalistic enterprise which is internally organized by the division into the two classes of owner-managers on the one hand, and propertyless wage workers on the other. The different elements within it are brought into relation with each other through one market, the labor market. At the same time, enterprises are related to each other and to the ultimate consumers through other markets. The whole thing is based on private initiative and competitive production for market exchange. With it is contrasted the pre-capitalistic handicraft form of industrial organization, differing primarily in the absence of a division into the owner and laborer classes.

The connection of enterprises in competitive relations, through the market, makes the system as a whole acquisitive. While the "ultimate" cause of the activity of an enterprise lies in the demand for its product, the immediate end of every enterprise *must* be the making of profit, regardless of the personal motives of individuals. Money is the quantitative common denominator of the economic order, and money profit both the immediate aim of economic activity and the measure of its success. This creates the possibility of acquisition losing its connection with the satisfaction of wants and becoming an end in itself. It is the "tendency of capital to reproduce itself," which Sombart takes over from Marx.

To this peculiar form of organization corresponds the "spirit of capitalism," [31] which indeed Sombart holds primarily responsible for its creation. This he divides into two main elements, the "spirit of enterprise" and the "bourgeois spirit." The former is a product of the Renaissance, essentially a phase of the individual will to power. Because of its essential lack of limitation and its impersonality, capitalistic acquisition offers an exceptionally favorable field for the search for power. The real creative force behind modern industrial development is this restless search for power harnessed to acquisition. It is inherently competitive, for power, of its very essence, is something we can hold only in so far as others do not hold it. At the same time there has grown up from other sources a rational, disciplined element in the capitalistic spirit—what Sombart calls the "bourgeois spirit" (*Bürgergeist*). This is characterized by the typical "economic virtues" of industry, frugality, thrift, and careful counting of the cost. Only the coalescence of the two gives the complete picture. The three principles of the spirit of capitalism are thus acquisition, competition, rationality.

With it is contrasted on each point the "precapitalistic" economic spirit. In place of acquisitiveness it has the principle of needs (*Bedarfsdeckung*) traditionally fixed for each according to his status in the social hierarchy. Once these needs are cared for acquisitive activity stops. Competition to the point of yielding power over others is severely repressed. Finally, in place of rationality is the traditionalism of the pre-capitalistic economy—acceptance of the ways of the fathers without question.

Finally, the capitalistic technology is not merely more "advanced" than the pre-capitalistic—it also is different in principle. That of the pre-capitalistic era was traditional and empirical—its procedures were accepted from the past and the knowledge on which it rested was won from the concrete experience of the particular case. Technical knowledge was that of rules learned from a master. Capitalistic technique, on the other hand, is both rational and scientific. It is based on a rational examination of each situation and thus a new solution of its problems. Nothing is taken for granted. At the same time its intellectual basis is knowledge of scientific laws *applied to* the particular case, and not rules *derived from* experience of particular cases. Perhaps nowhere does the radical nature of Sombart's thesis of the discontinuity of economic systems stand out with such startling effect as in his attempt to push it into the field of technique where continuity of development has seemed to most to be too obvious even to need discussion.

Of the three elements of the economic system it is quite clear that Sombart gives priority to the "spirit." To be sure, once the system of

[31] Cf. besides the *Kapitalismus, Der Bourgeois*. Cf. the comment in the chapter on Constructive Typology, p. 34.

capitalism is fully established it tends to be self-sustaining regardless of the mental attitudes of its participants—as it was for Marx from the beginning. Each individual finds himself in a situation where it is impossible for him to act counter to the system. His existence as a member of the society would, in that case, be impossible. Sombart speaks of the "objectification" of the principles of the spirit of capitalism in the capitalistic enterprise itself.

But these considerations do not account for the genesis of the system out of one radically different. That, Sombart holds in direct opposition to Marx, is only conceivable on the assumption that men's mental attitudes had changed, and that the changed attitudes have created the form of organization. From this point of view, it is to be noted Sombart views the capitalistic order *not* primarily as a mechanism of want-satisfaction but as the result of men's direct pursuit of *non*-economic ends, the quest of power and the exercise of the rational bourgeois virtues.

The unfortunate confusion of Mitchell, mentioned above, makes it necessary to emphasize in conclusion that Sombart's "subjective" theory of capitalism in terms of men's mental attitude toward their economic activities is *not* a "psychological" theory. It is not an explanation in terms of the *general* properties of the human mind, but of a *particular* set of value-attitudes specific to modern Western culture, and not derived from the racial heredity of its population. The term *Geist* should not be allowed to deceive. This is no more individual psychology than Hegel's philosophy of the *Weltgeist* is behaviorism. In fact, in terms of our classification, Sombart is the extreme polar antithesis of workers who, like Mitchell invoke psychological factors to help them out of the difficulties of an empiricist version of economic theory. In the explanation of concrete behavior, radical behaviorism and instinct psychology throw out everything, including the "economic" element, except physiological mechanisms, whether acquired or inherited. Sombart, on the other hand, radically minimizes *everything* at the positivistic end of the scale (including both the "economic" element and such mechanisms of behavior), in favor of the most radically "romantic" element of all, the unique "spirit" of a culture. It is an element the very existence of which Mitchell's followers do, and to be consistent must, deny.[32]

VII. Non-Economic Sociological Supplements

We have seen that in attempting to construct a science of economics on an empiricist basis, the whole gamut of possible factors in concrete social life from the physical environment and man's biological necessities

[32] For a more detailed account of Sombart's theory of capitalism, cf. the writer's article, "Recent German Literature on Capitalism," *Jour. Pol. Ec.* (Dec., 1928).

in adaptation to it, to his independent ethical attitudes, has been run. Each one of the possible factors in turn has been made the cornerstone of an "economic" theory. The most conspicuous result is the tendency to submerge altogether what we have started out to call the economic element, so that we have the curious spectacle of the science of economics being derived from the principles governing every other element of human life except the economic.

It remains to ask whether it is not possible to take a radically different course from any of these previously discussed theories, to abandon the empiricist basis altogether, admitting frankly that economics should not, and cannot, be concerned with a full explanation of concrete facts whether they be those of "economic activities" or any others, but must reconcile itself to being limited to the analytical abstraction of one of the fundamental factors in human life and its study *for the purposes of the systematic formulation of theory* [33] in "artificial" isolation from the rest.

The group of theories to be discussed in this section have, explicitly or by implication, taken this course. More specifically, they stand upon the common ground that even in concrete economic activities other than economic elements are involved, and that it is not possible for the science of economics, out of its own theoretical resources, to supply the principles in terms of which to account for these other elements.

Though Émile Durkheim never pretended to be a professional economist and never called anything he wrote "economics," his whole sociological theory is so largely oriented to the problems under consideration here, that he merits a place in the discussion.[34] His original interest was in the understanding of concrete "economic" activities, and he was a pioneer in the clear realization of the importance of the "non-economic" elements present there.

The starting-point of his thought in this field is his study *De la division du travail social* (1893),[35] a work which has received far less attention than it deserves from economists of the empiricist persuasion. Durkheim's primary concern is with the understanding of a society characterized by "economic individualism." He chooses the division of labor as his subject because of the central place occupied by that conception in individualistic economic thought. His fundamental thesis is that a highly differentiated economic order cannot be understood as resting entirely upon "contractual relations" (in Spencer's phrase), that is, the determination of the concrete relations of the individuals solely by the direct and

[33] Not of concrete division of labor of scientists.

[34] He has fathered a school of "economics" of which perhaps the most conspicuous representative is F. Simiand.

[35] Now available in English translation by George Simpson under the title "Of the Division of Labor in Society."

immediate economic interest of each. There is, on the contrary, present in all *concrete* contractual relations a qualitatively different element which may be called the *institution* of contract, a body of rules and norms, both legal and informal, determining the conditions according to which contracts are, and may be, entered into. While some of the terms of each specific contract are agreed upon *ad hoc* by the parties, and it is a matter of their voluntary choice whether or not to contract at all, there is present, *if* they so choose, a whole set of conditions which may be regarded as involuntary and obligatory, as "constraining" their actions.

In Durkheim's view, it is only by virtue of the presence of this "non-contractual" element that a *system* of contractual relations is possible at all. The very practical difficulties of settling all the implications of a renewed contract *ad hoc* would make it necessary. But more important, it is the normative rules of the institution of contract which account for the principal element of order making the stability of the system possible. Durkheim's most fundamental thesis is that individual interest alone does not provide a basis for such order, but if left to itself would result in a state of chaos, a war of each against all.[36]

The institution of contract is not for Durkheim merely a complex of habits. Already in the *Division du travail* he speaks of it mainly as a body of normative rules—no one ever claimed that habits were normative rules. Later in *Le Suicide* he specified this further by developing the view that the principal factor of stability in modern individualistic society was the common ethical valuation of individual personality as such. The main content of the normative rules of contract is the obligation to respect the rights of others, not merely the other party to the contract (so that an agreement obtained under duress or by fraud is void) but the rights of third parties. This is not merely an extension of individual self-interest, but a qualitatively different element, social in character. It means subordination of every individual to common norms. Durkheim calls it the factor of "organic solidarity."

Although the title does not indicate it obviously, *Le Suicide* is very much concerned with the problems of economic individualism. Here Durkheim goes a step further than in the *Division* to doubt the efficiency of this character of norm in securing social stability. He finds that one type of suicide, the *anomique,* which is due to inadequacy of normative control over individual activity, is peculiarly prevalent in the most "indi-

[36] It should be noted that it is not the legal possibility of *enforcing* contracts by the courts on which Durkheim lays the principal stress. It is the effective functioning of a body of normative rules involved in all contractual relations, whether they come before the courts or not. The particular *ad hoc* provisions of each separate contract are as subject to enforcement as the rules of the institution. "Sanctions" are only one element in the functioning of social institutions and for Durkheim, I think, not the most important. Durkheim here differs profoundly from the individualist economists.

vidualistic" elements of the economic system, particularly in commerce and urban industry. Moreover, a permanent stability of economic relations implies that a greater part is played by the integrated social group than is possible in a highly individualized order. It is from this motive that he proposed a revival of the occupational group,[37] based on the analogy of the medieval guild. Contrary to the syndicalist-guild socialist idea, he conceived these groups, as a curb upon the expression of interests, not as a channel for them. It was as an instrument of control that he was interested in them.

Thus Durkheim has clearly seen the presence, in concrete "economic" life (to say nothing of other parts of social life), of elements other than the economic in the narrow sense. In this he agrees with Veblen and other empiricists of the unorthodox school. He also agrees to call this factor "institutions." But he differs profoundly in his view of the essential nature of institutions. Instead of being mere habits they are normative rules ultimately dependent on common ethical values. Thus Durkheim's "institutionalism" leans to the "romantic" not the "positivistic" side of the "economic" factor.[38] Secondly, the study of this institutional factor is for him the business not of economics, but of sociology, which he goes so far as to define as the "science of institutions." [39] This view is at least consistent with the maintenance of "orthodox" economics provided it is recognized to be an abstract science. Here is where Durkheim in his study of "economic" activities breaks radically with all the empiricist schools of economics.

While the abstract "aspect" view of the rôle of economic science was implicit in Durkheim's sociological treatment of "economic" activities, Pareto was one of the first to make this view definitely explicit. He was himself a professional economist whose central interest as such was the systematic formulation of the general theory of economic equilibrium, especially in mathematical terms. Very soon, however, he became aware of the abstractness of this general theory and the necessity of its being supplemented by other theoretical principles before it could be made applicable to the understanding of concrete, even "economic," phenomena.

This realization of the concrete inadequacy of economic theory centered around the interpretation of two concrete "economic" phenomena—the protectionist movement and the socialist movement. In his earlier years, Pareto was a prolific writer in the protectionist controversy in Italy on the

[37] Most fully developed in the Preface to the second edition of the *Division du travail.*

[38] Durkheim himself was, of course, a strong and self-conscious positivist. He reached his sociological views rather in spite of, than through, his positivistic scientific methodology. Especially in the later stages of his work this led into methodological difficulties too involved to enter into here.

[39] Preface to second edition of *Les régles de la méthode sociologique.*

free trade side. But it became evident to him that he was fighting a losing battle. During that time, mainly the 80's of the last century, the movement was steadily gathering force. But from the point of view of abstract economic theory, protection must result in a destruction of wealth.[40] Hence on economic grounds alone, it is impossible to explain why governments should adopt a protectionist policy. But not only had they very generally done so in Europe, but the expected detrimental effect on wealth had not appeared. On the contrary the period was one of generally increasing prosperity.

Pareto found the explanation of these concrete phenomena primarily in the relation of the economic order to government and the structure of the governing classes in Europe. Protection was one principal phase of a relation of reciprocal usefulness of business and government. It is primarily as a means of maintaining and extending their power, not of promoting the economic welfare of the community as a whole, that governments adopt protection. At the same time the shelter of protection provides a peculiarly favorable opportunity for the rise to positions of control in economic life of a type particularly fertile in "combinations" as Pareto puts it. The increased productivity due to the change in the character of the *entrepreneur* class overbalances the direct loss due to protection itself.

Similarly in the case of socialism. From the strict economic point of view, the harmonious co-operation of the classes in the productive process is the obvious way of maximizing productive efficiency.[41] But in spite of this fact a powerful movement based on the antagonism of classes has grown up. Its primary basis is the tendency for a certain type of persons, those strong in the "persistence of aggregates," to be excluded from the governing classes and to such the road to power lies not *through* the selective process *within* a competitive order, but by the overturn of those in command of the order itself.

In neither case does Pareto see, in the failure of his economic theory to give a satisfactory complete explanation of these concrete economic phenomena, a valid reason for discarding the theory itself. It is rather that the factors formulated in the theory cannot be alone at work in the concrete situation. The correct procedure, then, is to supplement it by other theories which, in synthesis with the economic, will give a more adequate account of things.

[40] Except in certain special cases which have taken all the ingenuity of Protectionists to think up.

[41] It is clear that in excluding both business influence on government and class antagonism, from "purely economic" considerations Pareto is, with the competitive individualists, shutting out the "power" factor from economics. Thus he praises Marx as a *sociologist,* not as an economist, for emphasizing the importance of the class struggle.

But Pareto does more than merely point out the necessity of such a theory. In his sociology [42] he undertook to supply it himself. Thus at least one main motive of Pareto's becoming a sociologist late in life was the attempt to do in another way what he felt could not be done within the limitations of economic theory. While he himself was far from claiming finality for his sociological theory, and analysis shows that this modesty was justified, the general direction of his thought with relation to economics was a most promising departure.

In his general sociological system, Pareto treats the factors dealt with by economic theory as one main element of the category of "logical" action. In addition to the "economic," this includes principally the technological, and the "Machiavellian" type of political action. On the other hand, Pareto sees in the analysis of the residual category of what he calls "non-logical" action the primary analytical task of his sociology. This he divides into the two main factors, a relatively constant one (the "residues") and a highly variable one (the "derivations").

Analysis of these concepts shows, as is likely to happen with residual categories, that each has not one, but two, important meanings. The residues are, on the one hand, the manifestations of psychological instincts or drives differing from them only in a somewhat greater degree of concreteness and are hence not exclusively hereditary. On the other hand, they are the "non-scientific" ultimate common ends of group action. Action in terms of them is not non-rational in the common-sense meaning of the term; it is non-rational because the ultimate ends of the action are not derived from scientific knowledge of fact but are, as Pareto puts it, "manifestations of sentiments." Correspondingly, while the first concept of residue is linked with a view of the derivation as the whole aspect of action expressed in linguistic form, in the latter connection the residue itself is thought of from the "subjective" point of view as the major premise of the reasoning involved in action, while the derivations are the "justifications" of these major premises.[43] While in the first case, the rôle of "ideas" in action is itself brought into question, in the second, it is taken for granted, and only the "scientific" character of the ideas most important for action is doubted.

The residues are divided by Pareto into six great classes, of which only the first two, the "instinct of combinations" and the "persistence of aggregates" need be mentioned here. Essentially the two may be interpreted as the states of absence and presence of "ideal ends" respectively. The first is

[42] *Traité de sociologie générale,* 2 vols. Cf. especially Section 33 ff.

[43] The importance of his second interpretation of the residues and derivations is not generally recognized in the literature about Pareto, but is the result of the writer's own investigation of his work. A very brief statement of the thesis is in the article, "Pareto," *Encycl. Soc. Sci.* For fuller treatment see Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action,* chaps. v, vi, and vii.

characterized by a mobility and ingenuity of action in the pursuit of immediate ends, tending, however, to instability; the second, by a concern for more remote ends and the interests of the group (rather than the individual), combined with a certain rigid lack of adaptability to immediate exigencies. Thus ideal ends are thought of as exercising a discipline over individual conduct in the absence of which stability is jeopardized. It is a view strikingly akin to Durkheim's treatment of the rôle of normative rules.

Pareto further analyzes a cycle of the alternate predominance of these two great classes of residues working, above all, through the influence of the "circulation of the élite" on the residue-composition of the governing classes. The beginning of such a cycle is the advent to power, usually by force, of an élite strong in the persistence of aggregates. They are strong but inclined to rigidity. The exigencies of maintaining power on the one hand, and the conditions favorable to vertical mobility in peaceful times, on the other, lead to a dilution of these residues in the governing classes. For a time this leads to a state of greater flexibility and mobility and hence increased economic prosperity, but eventually the relaxation of discipline goes so far as to involve instability and even the danger of overthrow of the governing classes by force. In the economic field the latter part of the cycle is characterized by the predominance of a type he calls the "speculators." It is because protection favors this type that it leads to increased prosperity. (See the chapter on Historical Sociology pp. 531–3.)

Thus Pareto achieves a high degree of realism combined with a retention of orthodox economic theory, by supplementing it with a broadly conceived system of sociology. It is further significant that Pareto, like Durkheim, finds the most important qualification of the economic factor in the rôle of ideal ends as agencies of effecting discipline over individual interests. Thus as a sociologist he is primarily a "romanticist" even though, again like Durkheim, his background is mainly positivistic.

Finally, Max Weber shares with Pareto this self-conscious attitude toward the abstractness of economic theory, combined with eminent achievements in the field of the sociology of "economic" life. This coincidence on the part of two men with such diverse intellectual backgrounds, and no knowledge of each other's work, cannot but be significant.

Weber began his intellectual career in the field of historical jurisprudence as a student of Mommsen, turning then to economics where his work was chiefly in the historical field and strongly under the influence of the historical school, and also of the economic interpretation of history.

A new phase was marked by his most famous study, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. For present purposes this essay may be thought of as attempting to do something very similar to Durkheim's

Division of Labor. In the "economic" aspect of modern life, it attempts to demonstrate the existence of a non-economic, ethical element, the attitude of selfless, disinterested devotion to a "calling," i. e., any ordinary occupation, as an end in itself. This attitude toward work, conspicuous for its absence of calculation of personal advantage, Weber finds both a most prominent element in the modern economic world and indispensable to its functioning. It is this attitude toward acquisitive occupations, and not any avaricious interest in gain, which Weber calls the "spirit of capitalism." While Durkheim maintains for the "division of labor" the indispensability of a set of normative rules governing "contractual relations," i. e., essentially the relations of exchange, Weber concentrates on the other principal aspect of modern economic life, productive labor, finding it to depend on a similar factor.

In both cases, the distinguishing characteristic of this factor is its radical difference from the pursuit of individual economic interest. From the point of view of such interest, it is a controlling, disciplining factor.

Weber goes so far as to call this an "ascetic" element, and it is this which gives him the clue to connect it with a religious ethic, that of the "ascetic" branches of Protestantism, notably Calvinism. By maintaining the ascetic ideal of exclusive devotion to religious interest, yet rejecting monastic separation from the world in favor of an active rational discipline of it into a Kingdom of God on earth, the Puritan ethic combined a rational yet selfless devotion to worldly "callings" with an ascetic inhibition on the spending of wealth as a dangerous concession to the weakness of the flesh. Thus the traditionalism of the medieval economic order was broken through without relaxation of ethical control—rather control was intensified—thereby placing a dynamic force behind acquisitive callings entirely lacking when they were looked upon as necessary evils from the religious point of view.

Weber, like Marx and Sombart, thus emphasizes the compulsive disciplinary side of the modern economic order, above all maintaining that its acquisitiveness is not primarily a matter of the assertion of individual propensities brought out by the breakdown of a previous control—as is the prevailing Anglo-American view. But unlike Marx, and even more decisively than Sombart, he holds it is a matter in origin at least, not of the "material" conditions of production, but of positive ethical valuations of men, however far the objective result may be from what the original Protestants wished. Thus the principal modifying element of the narrow economic factor is found by Weber, as by Sombart, Durkheim, and Pareto, to be in the field of ethical valuations independent of utilitarian advantage.

But like Pareto and unlike Sombart, Weber recognizes the legitimacy and importance of the narrower economic factor. It is highly noteworthy that Weber, starting from essentially the same "romantic-historical" posi-

tion as Sombart, did not, like him, attempt to account for the concrete facts by developing a "historical" economic theory involving the total rejection of the narrow economic theory, but rather took the same course as Pareto in accepting this theory. He built it, however, into a wider system of sociology characterized chiefly by the important place he assigned to the factor of action in terms of ultimate values.[44]

Weber's sociology did not rest for its empirical basis merely on an analysis of the modern economic order, but he pushed his researches into an extraordinarily comprehensive comparative study of many different societies. The result of these researches is recorded primarily, though by no means exclusively, in the unfinished series on the sociology of religion.[45] The general thesis of the series may be said to be that the principal factor in the *differences* of economic life of the great civilizations of modern Western Europe, China, India, and Mediterranean antiquity, lies in the influence of the economic *ethics* of the great religions which, in the first case has directly fostered, and in all the others powerfully inhibited, the kind of economic development which so many of our writers have simply taken for granted as "natural."

Thus Weber may be placed with Pareto as a professional economist who, while recognizing the validity of the orthodox economic analysis, found it necessary to escape from its limitations in concrete interpretation by a very extensive excursion into general sociology, to which both have made outstanding contributions. It is further noteworthy that both, while approaching their subjects from the radically different points of view of a positivistic devotion to the model of the physical sciences on the one hand, and of German idealism and "historicism" on the other, have found the principal defect of the orthodox economic analysis as a *concrete* theory in its ignoring of the rôle of common ethical and religious values, and have, in turn, both made the analysis of this rôle the *pièce de résistance* of their sociological theories.[46]

[44] What Weber termed *wertrationales Handeln* and sharply distinguished from *zweckrationales Handeln,* under which category the orthodox type of "economic action" fell in his system. Cf. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* chap. i.

[45] *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie,* 3 vols. The essay on the Protestant Ethic was reprinted as the first part of Vol. I.

[46] A fuller discussion of Weber's treatment of capitalism, with a very brief sketch of his general sociological system, is to be found in the writer's "Recent German Literature on Capitalism," *Jour. Pol. Ec.,* II (Feb., 1929) and in *The Structure of Social Action.* See also the discussion of Max Weber in the chapter on Historical Sociology, pp. 509, 517–22, 527–30.

[In conjunction with the foregoing discussion (above) of the rôle of value-systems in conduct, attention should be called to Florian Znaniecki's remarkable *Social Actions* (1936). Developed without explicit reference to any of the thinkers dealt with by Parsons, the work arrives at strikingly similar conclusions. Unfortunately, absence of customary documentation and stylistic infelicities mar the treatise somewhat; it is to be hoped that American sociologists will nevertheless recognize its merits.—Ed. note: H.B.]

VIII. General Conclusions—Empiricism, Economics and Sociology

We have now completed the survey of "economic" theories from the point of view of the relation of the rigidly defined narrow "orthodox" economic element in them, to other "sociological" elements. It remains to sum up the results of the survey and to point its moral for the systematic theoretical work of economics and the other social sciences.

As was pointed out in our introductory remarks, the subtler questions of the scope and methodology of a science do not usually play a very great part in the earlier stages of its development. Hence it is not surprising that whatever methodology is implied in the work of the earlier economists should be of a rather naïve empiricist variety. They were concerned with concrete problems and naturally tended to follow them wherever they led. Since the actual economic order of their time was one in which individual competitive enterprise played a very prominent part, relatively unhampered by at least very obvious forms of control, it is not unnatural that the individualistic competitive analysis should have been applied directly and literally, especially since certain aspects of the philosophical tradition in which they lived (roughly summed up as "utilitarianism"), on the whole predisposed them pretty definitely in this direction.

But further empirical investigation, plus changes in concrete economic life itself, soon brought to light other factors. It is not surprising that the attempt should be made to modify the simpler theory to take account of these factors, especially as they could perhaps, like the power factor of the Marxian theory, be built directly into the older scheme, with, to be sure, very important differences in the concrete results. Or, like the Darwinian principle of natural selection, they could be used to fit the theory of economic competition itself into a wider theoretical framework of cosmic significance and thus confirm its essential soundness. Or finally the modifying elements like "custom" could be thought of, as it were, as part of the "environment" of economic action, but not as entering into the concrete individual actions themselves. In all these cases, the older theory could be thought of as essential part of a more complex "economic" theory, including other elements as well.

But the progress of empirical investigation was sooner or later bound to bring out the fact (which such studies as those of Durkheim and Weber, to mention no others, have established beyond doubt) that in concrete "economic" actions themselves, not merely in their "environment," other than "economic" elements were involved even in individualistic competition itself. Moreover, some of these were of such a radically different nature, impugning either the rationality of the action

itself, or its subordination to "economic" ends, that the Marxian expedient of internal modification of the theory to meet them was no longer possible.

So long as the empiricist position was maintained, the inevitable reaction to this discovery was an attack on the validity for any scientific purposes whatsoever of the older economic analysis. Hence the charges that it was abstract (that is, in empiricist terms, false), metaphysical, deductive, etc. Economic theory would then be required to undertake a radical reconstruction from the very beginning.

In tracing some of the outstanding attempts to achieve such a reconstruction, we have noted the striking fact that economic theorists have at some time emphasized, as the basis of *economic* theory, every major factor around which any of the social sciences has built its own theory. Thus biological evolution is taken to be the key, or the psychological factors of instinct or habit, or rational technology, or the "predatory" quest of power (both these last in the case of Veblen), or finally the rôle of ethical and religious values. Thus in *theoretical principles,* if not in concrete subject-matter, economics would appear to become identical with sociology [47] if that term be applied to the science which attempts to synthesize in one system the principles in terms of which the whole of concrete social life is to be understood.[48] From this point of view there is no such thing as *economic theory* as a theoretical discipline distinct from others dealing with human action. The economist is distinguished from other social scientists only by his greater knowledge of the concrete facts of what he chooses to call "economic activities." [49]

This consequence is indeed inescapable for the consistent empiricist. For there is absolutely no reason to suppose that concrete human action is divided up into water-tight compartments each dominated by radically different principles. Only the relatively high degree of differentiation of modern Western society has enabled this illusion to stand up as long as it has, and now it has definitely broken down under analysis. Human life is essentially one and no concretely possible degree of functional differentiation can destroy its unity.

Although its concrete reality is a unity, it can, like all other complex phenomena, be broken down for purposes of analysis into different fac-

[47] Just as in the opposite case, the tendency of some of the older economists to extend their principles to cover the whole of social life, in effect made sociology identical with "orthodox" economics—or rather the application of economics. Carver alone, to my knowledge, explicitly maintains this position—and quite logically.

[48] As will be noted presently, the writer does not accept this conception of sociology though it has been the predominant one in the past.

[49] The really consistent empiricists among economists, in fact, maintain this position if they do not indeed go further and deny the place in science of theoretical principles altogether, except as "empirical generalizations."

tors. However predominant any one of these factors may be in a particular set of concrete activities, it is never present to the complete exclusion of the others. The only way of maintaining a positive rôle for economic theory as a systematic *generalizing* science is to make it the science of *one* of these factors in concrete human action, to be sure, more conspicuous in those concrete activities we call "business" than elsewhere, but neither confined to them, nor excluding others there. From this point of view *no one* social science is capable of giving a theoretical explanation of concrete social facts, but only a synthesis of the principles of various of them.[50] Thus economic theory is necessarily, and by its inherent nature, abstract. But so, according to the best modern methodology, is all scientific theory. The earlier economists were guilty of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness," [51] of taking the formulations of a set of abstract principles applying to some of the factors in concrete reality, for a complete description of the whole of that reality. It is a natural and wide-spread fallacy but one that beyond a certain point wreaks havoc.

This fallacy gave the empiricist criticism its opening, and it has had little difficulty in making a decisive case. Empirically, discounting the one-sided biases of emphasis resulting from the empiricists' own non-empirical (and therefore, from their own point of view, illegitimate) theoretical preoccupations, the empiricists are undoubtedly right. But that does not make them any the less disastrously wrong theoretically. Their view has quite definitely resulted in "throwing out the baby with the bath." Indeed, my own considered opinion, which cannot be further justified here, is that a thorough-going empiricism is inconsistent with science itself. The essence of science, the *understanding* as distinct from the mere photographic reception of concrete phenomena, is theory, and the essence of theory is analytical abstraction. Whatever its dangers, there is no other way.

The only other course for economic theory, as distinct from a scientifically fatal radical empiricism, is that taken by Sombart. On the basis of German "historicism" he has maintained a greater degree of concreteness for his economics than the orthodox school, but at the heavy cost of sacrificing forever its claim to generality and restricting its applicability to a particular culture limited in time and place. There is thus no such thing as economic theory but only the economic theory of capitalism, of

[50] This does not mean that the *systematic theoretical* division of labor of the social sciences should be translated directly into a *concrete* division of labor of scientists. The theoretical subject matter of his science should define a scientist's central focus of interest, but the exigencies of concrete research are such that he inevitably ventures across the borderlines, probably in several directions. The important thing is not that he should stick to his own theoretical field, but that he should *know what he is doing* when he goes outside it.

[51] Cf. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World.*

the handicraft system, etc. The abdication of the greater claims of science which this involves would scarcely be approved by most economists.[52]

In science the first criterion is the pragmatic one of success—in explanation. Perhaps Sombart's resignation will prove the best road after all, but the other, taken self-consciously and critically by Pareto and Max Weber still seems to be open. To save the generality of economic theory, of the factors which account for the specific peculiarities of an "economic system" in Sombart's theory, its "economic spirit," or in other words, its ultimate values, most must be relegated to another science, namely, sociology. The importance of this element in the work of Sombart, Weber, Durkheim, and Pareto, in so far as it is concerned with "economic" problems in the concrete sense, invites further discussion.

This essay is entitled "Sociological Elements in Economic Theory." Thus far it has left the first term of the title purposely undefined. But in the interest of completeness and clarity, and because the writer considers himself a sociologist, the treatment cannot be complete without a brief consideration of its implications for the status of sociology in relation to economics.

The central theme has been the status of "orthodox" economic theory through the history of more than a century. In so far as its exclusive concrete adequacy has been questioned, it has been in the name of every major factor which the history of the social sciences of the period shows to have been emphasized anywhere in them as of fundamental importance for social life in any of its phases. The treatment of all these together as "sociological" elements clearly implies the so-called "encyclopedic" conception of the scope of sociology as the final synthesis of all our knowledge of man in his relations with his fellows. This has, in fact, been so predominantly the accepted conception as fully to justify the use of the term "sociological" in the title of this essay. Some sociologists, however, have themselves raised their voices against this view and the present writer shares the protest. The material just covered furnishes an excellent basis for arguing the point.

It has been shown that if we look at human action from the "subjective" point of view of the means-end relationship, economic theory occupies an intermediate position in the chain from ultimate means to ultimate ends. The deepest division between theories which have disputed its claim to concrete adequacy has been according to whether the factors lying to the one or the other side of the "economic" element of the chain were thought of as being slighted. Empiricism, as we have seen, does not alone tell which; empiricist theories have emphasized both.

[52] This does not, of course, mean Sombart's method is incapable of making *any* significant contributions.

In the traditions of Anglo-American economic thought, it has been predominantly the factors "below" the economic which have been emphasized—from the "subjective" point of view, the "conditions" of individual action. In so far as thought has tended in this direction it has ended up in biological and psychological theories, either attempting to provide a more solid, because more concrete, foundation for orthodox theory, or replacing it, as the case may be. In the "encyclopedic" sense of course this is sociology, but not in the sense that the sociological elements embody new principles not brought to light by any other science. They are rather the result of the application of biological and psychological principles to the particular concrete subject matter.

That our economic—and sociological—thought has emphasized these factors is not in my opinion due primarily to their overwhelming concrete importance. It is not a matter of sheer empirical generalization, but rather of a definite theoretical bias due primarily to our predominantly positivistic tradition of thought. The factor of ultimate ends has not been *proved* to be constant—but *assumed* so, either tacitly or, as in the case of Veblen's "instincts," explicitly. The empiricist tendency of our thought has served merely to obscure the presence of these theoretical preconceptions and delay the ultimately necessary realization of their rôle.[53]

The most striking feature of recent sociological thought has been a slow, and as yet not frequently clear, realization of the concrete importance of the principal factor lying to the other side of the economic, the "value" factor. Its emergence into prominence has been embodied in a remarkable process of the development of thought, in which the rôle of "economic action" in the strict sense has played a central part. We may note briefly what has happened in the case of the four writers treated here, who have most strongly emphasized it.

It is natural that this emphasis has been indigenous to what we have called the "romantic" tradition of thought. In its earlier stages it is a form of empiricism, but because of the theoretical "preconceptions" underlying it, its views have been so radically opposed to those of positivistic empiricism as to have been, for the most part, flatly rejected in that quarter as "mysticism." Sombart, as we have seen, emerged from the methodological empiricism of Schmoller, but by making his theory one of historical particularity rather than analytical generality. Weber, on the other hand, by taking the "value" element out of economics and placing it in his comparative sociology is enabled to avoid Sombart's repudiation of orthodox theory, and to achieve a far wider perspective.

[53] With many empiricists it has been a popular sport to lay bare the "preconceptions" of opposing theories (cf. Veblen) but as against this they have uniformly set up the claim to be entirely free from any themselves. But a theory free from "preconceptions," i. e., fundamental categories, is a contradiction in terms.

The emphasis on the value element would be under considerable suspicion had it occurred only from the "romanticist" camp whose scientific hard-headedness has been doubted in positivistic circles. But perhaps the most striking development of modern social thought is its unmistakable derivation from positivistic preconceptions—thus giving a remarkable demonstration of how types of thought, starting, as it were, from opposite poles, may nevertheless converge.

The two leading cases in this category are Pareto and Durkheim. Pareto, working with high self-consciousness on the model of physical science, obtained the double result of decisively abandoning an empiricist view of economics, and finding the main supplement to it in a theory of certain "residues" as systems of non-scientific values held in common by the members of a society. This is in Pareto definitely an emergent element, not clearly distinguished from other radically different ones such as psychological "drives," but, perhaps on that account, all the more significant.

Durkheim starts also from a positivistic position, but with a "collectivist" bias derived largely from Comte. He is clear from the start that his "social" factor is radically different from the "economic" as here defined. He plays for a while also with bio-psychological factors [54] but soon abandons them. His *conscience collective,* at the end of a process of thought too long and complex to be traced here, turns out to be precisely this same element of common values.[55] Thus the same element that the "romanticists," Sombart and Weber, have emphasized has also emerged as central to the sociological theories of the positivists, Pareto and Durkheim.

It is a striking fact that all of these men have been deeply concerned with concrete economic problems. All of them are agreed about the concrete inadequacy of orthodox economic theory, and further that the main reason for its inadequacy lies in its ignoring of the rôle of ultimate common values. Yet only one, Sombart, sees in this fact reason for its total rejection. All the others agree in leaving a place for the orthodox theory, Pareto and Weber explicitly, Durkheim implicitly. They also agree to treat the value factor in terms of a body of sociological theory.

I submit that this is the most promising view, both in doing justice to the concrete facts and in providing for a satisfactory treatment of the systematic relations of the social sciences. It avoids the necessity under which the extreme, unorthodox schools feel themselves to be of sacrificing entirely the theoretical work of generations of economists. More, economists are thereby freed of the danger of misconceiving their general rôle,

[54] Epecially in his explanation of the "causes" of the division of labor in terms of population pressure. Cf. *Division du travail,* Part II, chap. ii.

[55] Clear only in his last work, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse,* esp. Book II, chap. vii, sec. 4, or Book III, chap. iii, sec. 3. Durkheim's theory on this point has been grossly misunderstood. I have dealt with Durkheim at length in my *The Structure of Social Action,* chaps. viii–xii.

for they will not, as did Marshall, assimilate their treatment of these factors too closely to their own view of the economic.

Finally, it points the way to a specific theoretical subject-matter for sociology which enables it to escape from the (to other social scientists) irritating pretentiousness of the encyclopedic view of its scope. The concrete importance of the value factor, in relation to the economic and the biological and psychological, as well as others,[56] naturally cannot be settled *a priori;* it must be the result of empirical investigation. But there is already quite enough empirical evidence that it is sufficiently important to be the basis of a major science. In the past, in the *theoretical* sense, there has been both too much sociology (as well as biology, psychology, etc.) in economics and too much economics in sociology. There is however, a vast field for their fruitful co-operation, again with other sciences, in the solution of concrete problems beyond the scope of one or the other taken alone—as almost all really important concrete problems are.[57]

IX. Supplementary Note on Institutionalism and the Rôle of Institutions

The term most generally accepted in the United States for summing up the opposition to the orthodox economics would undoubtedly be "institutionalism." In conclusion, it is well to justify the failure of this paper to deal in terms of the simple dichotomy of orthodoxy and institutionalism. This will entail a few very brief remarks about the theory of institutions, and my opinion of its relation to both economics and sociology.

The so-called "institutionalist" movement in American economics derives what unity it has, I think, from two main circumstances; opposition to the orthodoxy of "classical" or "neo-classical" economics, and a generally strong empiricist tendency. The one common element in its criticism

[56] I should leave a place for theoretical political science centering around the "power" factor which Marx and Veblen pre-eminently among economists have emphasized, and perhaps for a science of technology. In the sense of systematic generalizing empirical sciences I am inclined to think these cover the field of human behavior. The "science of law" for instance is of a different logical order.

[57] R. W. Souter (*Prolegomena to Relativity Economics*) protests against the view that one social science is logically independent of another in the sense that it can do without assumptions drawn from the fields of the others. Of course the ultimate concrete unity of human social life, implies that the division of fields of the social sciences is only possible in terms of a coherent analysis of the whole into primary elements which must be thought of as related to each other in definite ways. If the "independence" of economics be meant to imply that economic action can be conceived as taking place in a social vacuum, Mr. Souter's protest is quite justified. For purposes of its own analysis, it assumes the other factors constant, not non-existent. Thus certain general assumptions are always found. But if this be pushed too far into the specific logical structure of economic theory it soon lands one in all the empiricist difficulties we have discussed. I think Souter goes rather too far in this direction. The exact lines, however, must be expected to shift somewhat with the development of science.

has been the insistence that the older theory has been abstract, deductive, etc. In its place is always promised attention to the "facts." But it is a basic thesis underlying this paper that "facts" alone cannot supply the basis for a structure of scientific theory. The professed empiricist generally does two things; on the one hand, he thinks of himself as dealing exclusively with the facts quite free from "preconceptions," setting forth his theories as purely inductive "generalizations." On the other hand, he always smuggles in unacknowledged (and perhaps unconsciously) theoretical principles, which really determine many of the principal features of his thought.

Some of the main features of institutionalism are direct results of this empiricist bias—its emphasis on concreteness for its own sake. But already in the direction of emphasis in choosing problems for investigation in the concrete facts, a definite *theoretical* bias is evident. It is the positivistic bias of emphasis on "scientific" method in the narrow sense of dealing only or mainly with "tangible" facts which are susceptible of quantitative treatment. Hence the emphasis on statistical material and method which combines empirical concreteness with quantification. This school has reached its highest development in the positive work of Professor Mitchell and his followers (as distinguished from his psychological leanings discussed above, which so far as I know play no great part in his positive investigations).

But mere collection and technical analysis of statistical data is not enough—the facts must be explained. Here the general positivistic bias of our thought has operated to throw the main emphasis on the factors of biological[58] and psychological determination, or of technology. In this sense institutionalism tends to merge with the positivistic branch of "encyclopedic" sociology.

But what of "institutions"? It is on the whole extraordinary how little attention institutionalists have given to the careful definition of the concept. It tends to be used as a vague catchword which may include almost anything, such as "habits," "ways of doing things," "modes of thought," etc. The widespread use of the term itself, undoubtedly comes from Veblen whose use of it has been discussed above. No more accurate or consistent definition is, I believe, to be found in institutionalist literature. Veblen had some very important and clear insights into social phenomena. Above all, he saw and emphasized the historical relativity of economic activities. He also saw that they were related to a framework of factors, a "social structure," the main outline of which was independent of the individual *ad hoc* actions. From the point of view of freedom of adaptation to environmental exigencies it was a restraining framework.

[58] Thus Professor Copeland says (*Proc. Am. Ec. Ass'n.*) that the first requirement of an economic theory is that it should be consistent with the theory of biological evolution.

But Veblen, underneath his empiricism, shared the positivistic bias of the thought of his time. When he went beyond merely pointing to the facts to fit them into a theoretical scheme, he took over the vague psychological concept of habit. Then, conscious that it is impossible to derive a particular institutional structure from a general psychological mechanism, he resorted to very complicated combinations of his four "instincts" with each other and with particular environmental conditions and stages of social evolution to give some specific content to the concept. All this is within the circle of positivistic factors with which we have dealt. Veblen may be held up as the primary example of "positivistic institutionalism." [59]

On the other hand, the emergence of the "value" factor in the hands of the more recent sociologists has opened up an entirely new approach to the study of institutions. It is noteworthy that all of the theorists dealt with in this connection maintain that the main outline of the specific peculiarities of structure of particular societies, in their economic as in other aspects, is derived from this factor, and that such elements exercise a restraining discipline over individual interests.

Of the elements in economic activities which were neglected by the older theorists, this one looms by far the largest to Durkheim and Weber, and is the one emphasized throughout by the writers of the "romantic" wing.

It is in this direction that the most promising leads for a theory of social institutions are to be sought. It is a theory still in its infancy so far as methodological self-consciousness goes. But the developments of sociological thought in the last generation have clearly marked out the main direction. It is necessary to choose between it and radically different paths.

In the two great cases of an approach to this theory from a positivistic angle two striking common elements should be noted. Both Pareto and Durkheim started their sociological work in conscious scientific reaction against the theory of economic individualism or what we have called "empirical orthodoxy" on grounds of its empirical inadequacy. Second, in searching for the missing element in the understanding of the concrete facts both first turned to the positivistic conditions of economic action, especially the biological and psychological conditions. Thus far they shared the experience of American institutionalism. But they did not, like the latter, stop there. On the contrary, they went on to lay their primary stress on this third element, common values embodied in social relationships. Durkheim goes so far as explicitly to equate this "society" factor with "institutions." For him sociology becomes the science of "institutions." [60]

In the Anglo-American scientific environment this study of institutions

[59] It is not without interest to remark that there is in Veblen's work extraordinarily little of "quantitative" method. The implications of this fact seem to have been overlooked by some of his followers.

[60] *Les régles de la méthode sociologique,* Preface to 2nd edition.

must face all the odium attached to the "unsound" and "metaphysical" theories of the "group mind" and other such ideas. Not, of course, that it must accept as final the formulations given its theory by previous thinkers, as for example Durkheim. But instead of accepting the current criticism of such ideas and falling back on the old positivistic war-horses (psychology, particularly) for explanations, it must search for the truth underlying the insights of Durkheim and the others, and bring it into a satisfactory scientific theory. The other road leads essentially to the ostrich policy of explaining institutions by denying their existence.[61] When it is more than a mere name for concrete uniformities of action, habit can be only a mechanism of the individual which is totally inadequate to the problem.

What then are "economic" institutions? From the point of view just outlined, in the abstract factor sense an economic institution is a contradiction in terms. Economic institutions can mean only the set of normative rules which control economic activities, a factor outside the specifically economic element in them, a framework within which they go on. The theoretical treatment of economic institutions is the task of sociology, not of economics. Only the empiricist view of the subject-matter of economics, which erases the theoretical distinction between economics and sociology anyway, can obscure the necessity of this conclusion.

Perhaps the most satisfactory beginning of a theory of economic institutions was that of Malthus, who so clearly saw the necessity of a regulatory framework for the functioning of an individualistic economic order. But the combined empiricism and positivism of English and American economic and social thought have prevented its being carried to fruition within this tradition. The sound concrete insights of the critics of orthodoxy, particularly the "institutionalists," have been nullified by the empiricist inability or unwillingness to enter into systematic analysis. Under the cloak of this empiricism, the positivistic bias has operated to lead thought directly away from the central theoretical problems into essentially irrelevant biological, psychological, and technological, considerations. The development since Veblen has been rather to accentuate this unsatisfactory situation than to improve upon it. So we find institutionalism represented, on the one hand, by the extreme quantitative empiricism of the "statistical time series" school, on the other, by non-social and certainly non-institutional theories derived, and sometimes injudiciously chosen, from biology and psychology.

The older institutionalism has been essentially positivistic empiricism, unfortunate in its rejection of the solid achievements of the older economic theory, and, at best, very one-sided in the factors put in its place. There is a great opportunity for a "new institutionalism" based on an enlightened and

[61] The most interesting, because most consistent, statement of this view is perhaps F. H. Allport's "The Nature of Institutions," *Soc. Forces* (1927). Allport quite logically concludes that "from the point of view of natural science, institution is not a substantive concept at all."

mutually respectful co-operation between the best and methodologically most sophisticated types of the orthodox economic theory, and the newer sociological theory of Pareto, Durkheim, and Max Weber, and their successors. In the understanding of concrete economic activities neither can get on without the other.[62]

[62] Striking evidence that concrete economic phenomena (in this case productive efficiency of the worker), are directly dependent on the non-economic (in the factor sense) elements of institutional integration of the social environment of industry is brought in the recent book of Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Society*. In many respects it may be considered a model study in the "new institutionalism."

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* Editorial *addendum.*

[18]

SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL THOUGHT

Harry Elmer Barnes

I. The Sociological Approach

In the last few decades political science has shown a marked tendency to broaden its perspective and to take more of an interest in the social and economic foundations of political life and in the social implications of governmental action. It was inevitable that sociology would play an ever larger part in furnishing writers possessing this broader orientation with materials to illustrate and fortify their position.

The reason for this is obvious. Sociology is the only social science which views and analyzes the social processes in a comprehensive fashion, attempting to discover, describe and evaluate the significance of the many geographic, biological, psychological, economic, political and cultural factors which operate to produce the institutions and activities of human society. Therefore, when political scientists have in recent years made an effort to relate political behavior to social behavior in general, they have been compelled, whether consciously or unconsciously, to adopt the viewpoint of sociology and to found their subject-matter upon information either derived from sociology or properly analyzed and classified in accordance with sociological concepts.

Of course, this attitude and tendency is not entirely new in human society. It was certainly evident in the political writings of Plato and Aristotle, and reappeared with such early modern writers as Bodin and Althusius. It was likewise dominant in the profound political writings of our earliest political scientists such as John Adams, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and John C. Calhoun. For more than a half century, however, this broad synthetic type of political insight was well-nigh obscured because of the temporary ascendency of the narrow legalists who captured political science and attempted to subordinate it to the sterile technique of classification and definition. What sociology has done has been to render significant aid to the modern school of political scientists and jurists who are attempting to restore to political science something of the breadth and profundity of the viewpoint of Madison and Calhoun, in conjunction with our modern in-

formation in the fields of biology, psychology and the social sciences, which was for the most part a closed book to men in the generations of Madison and Calhoun.

II. Sociology and Political Science

Perhaps the first special topic to be considered in this chapter is the relation of sociology to political science. There is no general agreement among sociologists as to the exact nature of sociology itself. The prevailing interpretation, represented by the late F. H. Giddings and others, is that it is the most basic and elementary social science, which provides the information and orientation indispensable to the work of the various special social sciences, filling something like the rôle of mechanics in regard to the physical and engineering sciences. Another group of writers, led by the late Albion W. Small, look upon sociology as distinctly the co-ordinated synthesis of the various special social sciences, endeavoring to organize and interpret the results of their work. Still another group lays far less stress upon the actual content of sociology, and tends rather to emphasize the comprehensive nature of the sociological method and its approach to the study of human behavior. Such writers hold that sociology is distinguished primarily by its broad synthetic mode of inquiry and formulation.

The most recent and objective sociologists are coming, however, to hold that these points of view are not mutually exclusive but rather supplementary, and they contend that sociology is fundamentally all three of these things: an elementary social science; one which derives its information and principles largely from the more specialized work of the other social sciences; and one which is characterized by the all-embracing and dynamic method which it brings into the study of social problems in whatever field it enters.

In regard to the relation of sociology to political science there is general agreement among most reputable sociologists. Sociology is that general and basic social science which is concerned with the evolution of organized society and the political community, both of which political science assumes as existent at the outset of its studies, making little or no effort to investigate the subject of how society has evolved from the loosely organized primitive tribal groups to the very recent and highly regimented condition which characterizes politically organized humanity. Sociology is devoted, further, to the study of the development and the functioning of all the diverse organizations of social control, of which the state is only one of the most prominent and powerful. Sociology is also very immediately and directly interested in the changes and modifications effected by these various agencies of social control, among them the state, in the structure and functioning of human society.

Political science, assuming at the outset the existence of the state, concen-

trates its attention primarily upon an analysis of the state and the mechanism of government, and it is only indirectly concerned with the broader problems of social origins, structure, functioning, and control, or with the reaction of the state upon social life and behavior in general.

Once we have clearly in mind the facts about the nature of these two social sciences, their relation becomes obvious. Sociology must derive from political science its intimate and ever refreshed knowledge of the concrete details of political behavior, organization and activities. Without recourse to the data of political science, sociology, when dealing with political materials, can scarcely avoid lapsing into *a priori* political philosophy. On the other hand political science can escape becoming detached from reality only by accepting as indispensable prolegomena the sociological synthesis and generalizations with respect to the underlying foundations of society, political institutions and law. Giddings has well stated this point: "To teach the theory of the state to men who have not learned the first principles of sociology, is like teaching astronomy or thermodynamics to men who have not learned the Newtonian laws of motion."

III. The Sociological Conception of the State

The sociological views as to the nature of the state have naturally varied in keeping with the development of sociological thought and the particular interests or line of analysis of the individual sociologists. In the earlier stages of the rise of sociology most of the attention given to the state was that devoted to an analysis of the resemblances between the state and a biological organism.[1] While the organismic school, represented by men like Schaeffle, Lilienfeld, Worms, and others, produced a vast amount of literature, the result of their work was primarily to demonstrate the similarity of the functional co-ordination between the organs of the organism and the various agencies in the state. They were thus led to emphasize the necessity of harmonious relations between the many agencies in political society.

Far more important has been the work of sociologists in their effort to envisage the place of the state with reference to the origin and functioning of human society at large. With a few exceptions, sociologists are universally agreed that society is the more general and basic organization of mankind which refers to and embraces all the diverse forms of associated life, whether that life be among animals or men. The state, on the other hand, is a highly

[1] See above, pp. 293–6. Inasmuch as the major sociological ideas which are related to the theory of the state are dealt with in earlier portions of this book, it has been deemed wise to save space through omitting elaborate bibliographic references. In this chapter I have merely attempted to select and organize the leading sociological theories analyzed throughout the book as they bear upon political problems. The works of authors mentioned in the text are cited in the bibliography which follows the chapter.

specialized association, perhaps the most important and powerful of a number of fundamental types of agencies utilized by society in order to make it certain that collective life shall be more safe, efficient and dynamic. Though its roots extend far back into the early history of mankind and society, the state, as it is envisaged in modern political terminology, is a comparatively recent product of social evolution. By its very origin, as well as by its specific nature and functions, it is demonstrably a creation and creature of society as a whole. This is, in reality, as Giddings has insisted, the basic point of departure for the sociological analysis of political problems and it constitutes one of the most prominent and distinctive contributions of sociology to the theory of the origin and nature of the state.

As in regard to other social institutions, so with the state: Its nature can best be understood by an analysis of its most fundamental social functions. As a rule, the sociologists have refused to be satisfied with metaphysical abstractions as to the functions and purpose of the state, and have made an endeavor to get at the real nature of the political process.[2]

In executing this program they have reverted to the attitude and line of analysis embodied in the writings of the more profound students of politics in previous centuries. Led by Ratzenhofer and Small, they have pointed out clearly that society is a complex of the most diverse types of groups which are given coherence and energy through the possession of common interests or sets of interests. If allowed to struggle for the advancement of these divergent and frequently conflicting interests without external supervision or control, society would quickly disintegrate in anarchy. In order to prevent this disastrous possibility, the state has evolved to furnish necessary supervision and restraint for this conflict of interests, so that it will result in social justice and progress rather than in exploitation and anarchy—in other words, so that social conflict may be rendered a beneficial rather than a destructive process. These conflicts of interest-groups, as Ratzenhofer and Small have insisted, are the vital and dynamic factor in the social process; the state is the indispensable umpire or regulator of these struggles and their ultimate adjustments. Government, as A. F. Bentley has made clear, is the agency through which these groups carry on the public phases of their conflicts and secure to a greater or less degree the objectives of the multifarious group interests.

By thus envisaging and describing the state as the umpire of the social process, the sociologists have established what is unquestionably the central position in the new or dynamic political science and the only rational or intelligent point of departure for a detailed study of the various institutions and processes in the political life of man.

This conception of the state as the dominant supervisory power in the

[2] The most successful effort along this line is the work of A. F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (1908).

social process of group conflict has inevitably induced various writers to consider the relation of the state to the other purposive groups of which society is constituted. This has led a number of writers, such as Otto Gierke, F. W. Maitland, J. N. Figgis, H. J. Laski and M. P. Follett, into an analysis, and in some cases into an acceptance, of what is generally known as political pluralism. These writers hold that the state is but one of a plural number of groups which make up society. The state exists primarily for the purpose of adjusting the relations of these groups to one another, and each and all of them to the state. The most extreme development of this point of view is the Fascist theory of the corporative state, clearly expounded by Fausto Pitigliani.

Most sociologists do not accord any mystical nature or power to the state, repudiating entirely the Hegelian adulation of the supreme and unique nature of the state. They would merely assign to the state the supreme co-ordinating function in society, and recognize that thus far in social evolution the state has been entrusted with a greater amount of coercive power than any other social agency. Some members of this group, such as Gierke and his disciple, Maitland, would assign to both the state and other constituent groups a real psychic personality.

A number of related theorists, such as Cooley, MacIver, Tönnies, Stein, and Baldwin have carried this analysis still further by distinguishing between the spontaneous social groupings which they designate as communities, and the various consciously organized or purposive groups of which the state is as yet the most powerful. MacIver, in particular, has emphasized what he looks upon as the unique importance of the community, holding that the spontaneous organizations of social life and activity must be given a very large share in guiding and controlling the collective life of man.

As to the relative strength and position of the state among other social groups, there is wide divergence of opinion among sociologists. Some, such as Pareto, Ward, Giddings, Hobhouse, and Stein, look upon the state as far the most powerful and indispensable of the various purposive groups in society. They hold that practically all progress must be achieved primarily through the co-ordinating and guiding function of the state. Even more thoroughgoing is the totalitarian theory of the state which has grown up with Fascism and is expounded in the writings of Giovanni Gentile and Alfredo Rocco and Sombart's *A New Social Philosophy*. These writers vie with Hegel in state worship. On the other hand, equally profound sociologists, such as Durkheim, maintain the directly opposite position, namely, that the state is fitted only for the most general type of activity because of its lack of specialized knowledge and flexibility of adjustment to special circumstances. Durkheim and others sharing his views would limit the powers of the state simply to the most general type of policies and issues, leaving the policies of the state to be applied in detail and concretely by commissions competent in

particular fields of activity. They thus favor what has been called administrative syndicalism. The guild socialists would go even further and limit the state solely to those interests and activities in society which relate to mankind as consumers, guaranteeing to producing society autonomy and self-government. Spencer, Novicow and Sumner have sought to enshrine extreme individualism. The most extreme position taken is that of the syndicalists, who would abolish the state altogether and put the coercive control of society in the hands of various economic and professional groups which they allege to be closer than the state to the fundamental realities of contemporary industrial society.

IV. Political Origins and Evolution

In dealing with the important problem of the origins of the state, sociology has been able to bring together in scientific fashion the contributions of anthropogeography, psychology, anthropology, and institutional history so as to clarify the whole problem of political origins to an unprecedented degree. It takes into consideration all the various natural factors which play a part in determining the concentration and movements of peoples. Exploiting the teachings of anthropogeography, sociology has been able to make it clear why states originated in certain definite localities on the globe, and have helped in this way to explain not only the existence, but the characteristics and destinies of the divers political entities which have thus far made their appearance.

From psychology the sociologists, such as Tarde, Durkheim, LeBon, Ross, Ellwood, Giddings, Cooley, and others, have been able to draw their information with respect to the various factors producing human sociability and collective or group life. The importance of such psychological factors as sympathy, mutual aid, gregariousness, the consciousness of kind, imitation, and group domination of the individual have been thoroughly analyzed and their significance in the genesis of human associations vigorously expounded. Sociologists have further shown the intimate similarity between the psychic factors that produce society and those which have brought about the state. Such forces as fear, group intimidation of the individual, the assertiveness of powerful and dominating personalities, pluralistic response to given situations, imitation and assimilation, have all played their part in making possible the genesis of systematic and permanent human authority in society, and in creating attitudes of obedience and respect essential to the perpetuation of any such authoritative control.

In tracing concretely the history of the state, the sociologists have relied primarily upon the progress of anthropological research. At first, they tended to accept the doctrine of Sir Henry Sumner Maine that the state originated in the patriarchal period of social organization. Bachofen and other later

and better-informed writers soon proved, however, that the theory of a universal and primordial patriarchal organization was fallacious. While we now know that the contention of this school that the earliest form of social and political organization was a matriarchate, or female rule, is not supported by the available facts, nevertheless these writers performed a valuable service in destroying the patriarchal theory.

For a generation sociologists tended to accept the anthropological theories in regard to political origins which were set forth in the famous book of Lewis Henry Morgan on *Ancient Society*. Morgan contended that human society had passed through successive periods in which female relationships in society invariably antedated the paternal organization. He worked out an orderly succession of social and political types from the most primitive promiscuous group to the quasi-civil society of the classical period.

The more critical anthropologists of the present generation, led by Franz Boas and his students, have proved, however, that this assumed invariable succession of maternal and paternal society does not square with the concrete data assembled from the study of primitive peoples. There is no evidence whatever that the female organization of society is an older one than the paternal. Neither is there any evidence that maternal organization has ever been independently transformed into a paternal form of society. Further, it has been shown that in many cases there is no gentile (kinship) society whatever among primitive peoples. There is, rather, a simple family-village organization, with bilateral descent, much like the simpler forms of contemporary social groups. Diversity, rather than unity, seems to characterize the primitive as well as the historical forms of social and political organization.

As to the actual historical development of the state, the sociologists, following Lowie and the anthropologists, have pointed out how, in the first place, there is no sharp break between pre-political and political society. Even in primitive society there are various forms of group organization for diverse public purposes which cut sharply across ordinary kinship lines. The majority of sociologists have accepted the point of view which has been expounded by various writers from the time of Polybius to that of Hume, Ferguson, and, in later days, Walter Bagehot, Spencer, and Ludwig Gumplowicz and his followers, namely, that the political state was gradually welded together as the result of warfare among primitive groups. The successive conquests of group by group brought about an ever greater amount of authoritative and coercive control by the conquerors over the conquered. In the process there were wrought out the various institutions and organizations within the state which are devoted to the exercise of this political control.

In spite of the dominating part played by war in political origins, other sociologists, such as Sutherland, Kropotkin and Novicow, have pointed out

how many pacific factors, particularly economic processes and commercial relations, have played a very significant rôle in the subsequent development of states. The thoroughly comprehensive view of political origins is well represented in the writings of such men as Giddings, E. C. Hayes, Stein, and Tarde, who have given proper attention to both conquest and the economic elements in the history of the state.

Sociologists, since the days of Comte, have also made an attempt to classify the various stages of political development, emphasizing the interrelation between the evolution of political institutions and the development of society and culture at large. Of these efforts, representative examples are Spencer's notion of tribal, military and industrial ages; Giddings' theory of the military-religious, liberal-legal, and economic-ethical periods of socio-political evolution; and Hobhouse's suggestion that the three great stages of political evolution have been those characterized by the dominating principles of kinship, authority, and citizenship.

The most important point to be made in regard to these sociological classifications of political evolution is that they all possess the common virtue of correlating political progress with some causal factor or situation in the social and cultural environment. W. Christie MacLeod's *Origin and History of Politics* is an admirable example of the sociological approach to the study of political evolution.

V. The Make-up of the State

One of the most important contributions of sociology to political science has been a more realistic and life-like elucidation of the essential elements in the composition and activity of the state. While the political scientists have long insisted that every state must include such elements as population, territory and sovereign power, they have rarely made any effort to analyze these factors in such a way as to indicate their bearing upon political processes and the nature of political institutions. Sociologists have, in the meantime, made a detailed analysis of all the essential elements in the state, indicating how their characteristics and diversities operate to produce the specific institutions and problems of political life, with the great varieties of expression which these manifest.

In regard to population, the sociologists interested in demography have made detailed studies, particularly in connection with census reports, birth and death rates, age classes, industrial groups, distribution of wealth, distribution of population, vitality classes, etc., all of which information has a direct bearing upon the specific problems of statesmanship. Along with these demographical studies may be mentioned the more dynamic studies of the racial destiny of man by the social selectionists such as Pearson, Schallmeyer, Ammon, Vacher de Lapouge, and Holmes, who have devoted them-

selves to the problem of whether the human race is improving or deteriorating physically with the progress of civilization, of the possibility of improving the race through artificial selection or eugenics, and of the bearing of differential biology and psychology upon the problems of aristocracy and democracy. Then there is the wide range of problems involved in the rate of population increase and its relation to the natural resources of any country. This type of study includes not only the increase of population through the birth rate, but also any addition through immigration. The latter aspect of the case introduces the consideration not merely of the increase in the total volume of the population, but also of the many issues involved in the mixture of various ethnic types and the resulting difficulties of assimilation. Finally, the sociologists, working with anthropologists and psychologists, have shown how necessary it is to disregard the dogma of racial superiority in political institutions and processes, because of the indeterminate factor of race and the great mixture of races in all contemporary civilizations.

In regard to territory, or the geographical factors in politics, the sociologists have been able to appropriate the remarkable work done by regional geographers and anthropogeographers in the last generation to show the various ways in which the state is compelled to reckon with such problems as topography, climate, routes of communication, cultural contacts, and strategic position.[3] At the same time, more critical sociologists have been able to derive from the cultural historians and anthropologists a sufficiently discriminating attitude, so as to avoid the absurdities of the older theory of sheer geographical determinism. While every state is, in differing degrees, affected by all the physical factors of nature, there is no strict geographical determinism. Widely different forms of political life appear in similar geographic environments, while highly similar political institutions evolve under very divergent geographic conditions. Perhaps the most important element in the newer sociological interpretation of the geographical basis of politics has been to insist that geographical influences operate primarily in an indirect rather than in a direct and immediate fashion. They condition rather than determine political evolution. Giddings, in particular, in his *A Theory of Social Causation,* made an effort to work out a synthesis of the reaction of geographic and socio-psychological factors, as they combine to produce the various forms of the state and political theory.

One of the most substantial contributions of sociology to the study of the elements of the state has been the sociological analysis of the real origins and nature of sovereignty. Philosophers and political scientists, from Austin and Bluntschli to Burgess and Willoughby, have devoted much space to a metaphysical discussion of the problem of sovereignty, but few have ever made a realistic study of just how it is possible for one group in human society to

[3] See especially Franklin Thomas, *The Environmental Basis of Society* (1925) and the same writer's chapter in the present volume.

exercise coercive authority over another group, and of the limitations which exist in the practical exercise of this supposedly absolute authority.

Sociologists, notably Giddings and Commons, have clearly indicated that there is no such thing as inherent political sovereignty. The power of any group to exercise authority over another group has been the slowly evolving product of human folkways, customs, and institutions which have created the attitudes of assertion and submission. Without these socio-psychic factors no such thing as political authority could be exercised for a moment. Further, political authority is not original or independent: it is but one phase of social control in general. The class which exercises sovereignty, as well as the general psychological basis of its power at any given time, will depend mainly upon the particular type of social organization in existence. In the earliest period, as Spencer and Frazer have indicated, political sovereignty rested to a large extent upon the alleged ability of the ruling classes to bring into play supernatural forces and powers, while today political sovereignty depends very largely upon the possession of economic ascendency.

In other words, it has been due almost entirely to the works of sociologists that the notion of sovereignty has been transformed from the metaphysical absolute of Burgess or the legalistic "determinate superior" of Austin into a secular concept with concrete social, economic, and psychological sources, uses and limitations. The sociologists have demonstrated that sovereignty is not original, absolute, or universal; that political power is derivative rather than original, arising from social, economic, and psychic forces; that sovereignty cannot be studied as an isolated entity, but only in its social setting and in the light of the evolution of the state within society; and that sovereignty in its deeper significance is a sociological rather than a political or legal problem, however important the determination of the legal superior in concrete instances may be for juristic purposes.

In addition to shedding light upon the realistic problems connected with population, territory, and sovereign power, the sociologists have stressed the necessity of considering psychological, economic, and cultural factors in the evolution and functioning of the state. It has already been pointed out how important are the various social and psychological influences which make possible the origins of political obedience and the exercise of social control through the state. In many ways these psychic considerations are of more vital importance than the questions of sovereignty or territorial limits. Charles E. Merriam's *Political Power* and Bertrand Russell's *Power: A New Social Analysis* are excellent recent illustrations of how sociology has influenced political thinking in this field.

Since the time of Aristotle the most penetrating students of political problems have laid stress upon the very great significance of economic conditions in determining the nature and extent of political problems. If the state exists primarily for the purpose of permitting the ruling class to exploit their in-

feriors or of mediating between the various conflicting interests of society, it is obvious that political theory cannot well ignore what is probably the most persistent cause of social groupings and the chief source of conflicting human interests. This is particularly true since the Industrial Revolutions of the last two centuries, which have not only increased the importance of economic factors in society, but have also enormously extended the number and complexity of economic groups. This has intensified the difficulties of statesmen in mitigating and controlling the conflicts of the various contesting interest-groups. Beard has admirably summarized the importance of the economic factor in politics:

> The grand conclusion, therefore, seems to be that advanced by our own James Madison in the Tenth Number of the Federalist. To express his thought in modern terms: a landed interest, a transport interest, a railway interest, a shipping interest, an engineering interest, a manufacturing interest, a public-official interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in all great societies and divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests, whatever may be the formula for the ownership of property, constitutes the principal task of modern statesmen and involves the spirit of party in the necessary and ordinary operations of government. In other words, there is no rest for mankind, no final solution of eternal contradictions. Such is the design of the universe. The recognition of this fact is the beginning of wisdom—and of statesmanship.[4]

Finally, such sociologists as W. F. Ogburn, M. M. Willey, and Sanford Winston, together with the cultural anthropologists and historians, insist that it is quite impossible to view these various elements in the state as isolated entities. One must look beyond these significant factors, taken separately or merely juxtaposed, namely, to human culture, which is the product of all these various elements working in different and varying combinations upon the human organism. The state, from this point of view, appears both as a creation of natural factors which are being continually changed and recombined within it, and as one of the most conspicuous of cultural institutions in itself.

VI. Types of States

In their work upon the various forms of the state the sociologists have laid great stress upon the futility of arbitrary classifications of the state which are apart from the social setting of the state and the various processes which go on within the state. Many, such as A. F. Bentley, contend that it is futile to attempt to classify the state, as the older political scientists were wont to do, under such categories as monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies. The only valid type of classification is one which refers to the different techniques

[4] C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics* (1922), p. 99.

employed in the regulation and control of the conflicting social interests which function within the state.

In analyzing the conventional forms of the state, namely, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, most sociologists writing before the advent of Fascism agreed that, whether we like it or not, democracy has come to be the prevailing norm of political institutions in the contemporary age.[5] But while admitting the ascendency and perhaps permanence of democracy, the sociologists have drawn upon modern differential biology and psychology to prove the complete impossibility of the success of the Jacksonian or egalitarian theory of democracy. It has been shown that with respect to both physical traits and mental capacities human beings are not equal or identical, but rather conform to the normal curve of distribution which is characteristic and descriptive of all forms of living matter. Hence, only the minority in any society can possess that superior physical and mental equipment which is becoming ever more essential in the direction and control of contemporary society. Giddings has well stated the implications of this fact when he insists that, whatever the form of government, the able few will always dominate. Democracy he defines as "only that state of politically organized mankind in which the rule of the few is least arbitrary and most responsible, least drastic and most considerate."

The only hope of a successful solution of contemporary political problems is to make possible on the one hand the domination of the intellectually most capable, and on the other hand to provide some method of educating the less capable majority, and inducing them to follow the leadership of the superior minority. This, of course, would necessitate the development of an ever more social point of view on the part of the ruling minority and of improved methods for the political education of the majority. Some of the most profound sociologists have repudiated the older theory that we should promote equal opportunities for all in contemporary society, and hold that the only tenable theory of democracy is that of a society in which every individual has an approximately perfect opportunity to develop to the highest possible degree his inherent potentialities. Finally, most sociologists would emphasize the fact that, whatever the defects of a democracy, the solution of modern political problems would seem to lie in some device for improving the methods and technique of democracy, since the alternatives to democracy appear distinctly less attractive than democracy itself. The most discriminating sociological analysis and defense of democracy in the light of past experience and present difficulties is George S. Counts' *The Prospects of American Democracy* (1938).

[5] See especially the writings of C. H. Cooley. In the light of the developments of the last decade such views have a strange optimism and unreality in our day. For a resolute defense of democracy in the face of the challenges and obstacles of our day, see C. E. Merriam, *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (1939).

The rise of Fascism has, of course, greatly changed the tenor of most discussions of democracy in the last few years. Democracy has suffered a great set-back in the last decade, both in fact and in theory. More than half the civilized world has abandoned democracy in about twenty years since the end of the "war to make the world safe for democracy." The chief sociologists expounding Fascism have been Rocco and Sombart.

A number of sociologists have entirely abandoned the old classifications of the types of the state and have made an effort to classify states with respect to the fundamental nature of the social and cultural system with which they are inseparably intertwined. Examples of such sociological classifications are Comte's theocracy and sociocracy; Spencer's military and industrial states; Oppenheimer's predatory state and freeman's citizenship; and the efforts of Ross, Tarde, and others to found a classification upon the fundamental psychological characteristics prevailing in any form of political society.

The chief importance of these efforts is not in any sense the new terminology introduced, but rather the insistence upon the vital fact that there is a close and inevitable relationship between the form of state and the general social and cultural conditions prevailing in any given society. This thought likewise leads to the fundamental generalization that there is no "best" form of the state in any absolute sense. The sociologists agree in general with the old view of Montesquieu that the best state is the one in which the political institutions are most in harmony with the general cultural conditions of the population in question.

VII. The Governmental Process in Sociological Perspective

In dealing with the problem of the function of the state and the process of government, the sociologists have made another contribution to realism in political theory. In the first place, the sociologists correctly insist that society is a collection of groups rather than of individuals. These groups tend to organize about certain definite interests and seek to dominate other groups in order that they may more effectively advance their group interests. Government is the mechanism through which the dominant groups exercise their control over the process of group conflict and legalize their domination and exploitation of the subordinate groups. Ultimately, in a relatively perfect state of political development, it may be hoped that government will function chiefly in the way of providing an adaptation and reconciliation of these conflicting interests—a view cherished by Novicow, M. A. Vaccaro and L. M. Bristol.

The process of government, as Bentley points out, thus becomes a method of so manipulating political bodies and institutions as to allow the more powerful groups to secure their aims and ambitions. The relative importance of any department of government depends primarily upon the success with

which it is able to advance the interests of dominant groups or to mediate between the conflicts of various interest groups. Normally, the legislature is the chief arena in which these interest groups contend, and the usual method of domination or adjustment is what has been called in this country "lobbying" and "log-rolling." While used in general as a term of opprobrium, it is in reality, as Bentley and E. P. Herring have shown, the characteristic technique of legislation.

The recognition of the fundamental process of government as one of advancing or adjusting group interests has led to new theories with respect to the reconstruction of representative government. It has been contended that with the progress of modern industrialism and professionalism the old territorial or geographic units have lost their vitality and rationale. Some of our most progressive sociologists and political scientists suggest that these territorial units should be replaced by a system of representation based upon the selection of law-makers by the various vocational or professional groups in society. It is contended that this would produce greater popular interest in government, and secure far more capable and intelligent representatives.

Others, in sympathy with the general aims of vocational representation, contend that it would be quite impossible to discover any adequate method of weighing or distributing the number of representatives to be drawn from these various groups. They would solve the problem by choosing our legislatures according to present-day methods, but at the same time limiting legislation to general policies, while the specific application of these policies would be handed over to highly competent and specialized administrative commissions. Finally, another thoughtful group of writers, led by Paul H. Douglas, suggest that instead of vocational representation the best way out of the injustices and inefficiency of the contemporary system is to be found in a system of proportional representation.

The sociological theories as to processes of government and the nature of representation lead naturally to the sociological view of the nature of the political party, best described by Bentley. The political party is viewed by most sociologists not as a metaphysical entity designed to promote the abstract good of society, but as the legalized organization through which interest-groups seek to promote their specific objects and ambitions. The party is an interest-group, or a combination of interest-groups brought together in an organization which can advance in a powerful way the aspirations of the group or combined groups. The most powerful parties are those which can unite the greatest number of interest-groups, without sacrificing at the same time the indispensable minimum of coherence and unity. In spite of the selfishness and corruption of political parties, there is little doubt, as Ward insisted, that the conflict of political parties is one of the most dynamic influences in social life. The chief danger is a situation like that which has developed in the United States, namely, the disappearance of

fundamental causes of group struggle between the major political parties, and a concentration of party conflict almost exclusively upon the spoils of office and the corruption of political power.

Sociologists have also made important contributions to the explanation of the remarkable psychic and social power exercised by political parties. Graham Wallas, Walter Lippmann, Seba Eldridge and others have shown how the chief appeal which is made by parties comes through various symbols and shibboleths which attract the emotional response of the voters. While parties are supposed to succeed primarily through the power of their intellectual appeal, it is a manifest fact that discussion and intellectual acumen have no chance whatever when pitted against powerful emotion-stirring symbols, shibboleths, and catch-words. The great statesman has no chance whatever against the political spell-binder.

All of these various contemporary sociological doctrines with respect to the political party have been brought together in remarkable fashion by Roberto Michels and by Gaetano Mosca. They show how modern democracy necessitates representative government, how representative government produces the political party, which brings in its train the political machinery and bosses who soon lose their sense of responsibility and use their power for the purpose of exploiting rather than representing the mass of the citizens. Their control of elections, the press, and political offices makes it easy for them to delude, intimidate or manipulate the populace at will. In this way, the very mechanism of democracy in the way of representative government may be self-defeating through the creation of the only technique yet seriously employed in the operation of representative government, namely, party organization. In other words, democracy requires political parties, but political parties beget oligarchy and destroy democracy.

VIII. The Province of the State

In regard to the scope of state activity there are, of course, wide divergencies of opinion among sociologists. On the one hand we have writers like Spencer, Sumner and Novicow, who favor a system approximating anarchistic *laissez-faire*, while at the opposite extreme are such writers as Lester F. Ward, Ludwig Stein, and Albert Schäffle, who favor something highly similar to state socialism. Thorough-going state activity in the form of state capitalism is urged by Fascist sociologists, with their theory of the totalitarian state.

The majority of sociologists are found aligned somewhere between these extreme positions. The most discriminating sociologists take an eclectic position and contend that no absolute statements can be valid as to what the state should or should not do. The functions of the state inevitably bear a close relationship to the nature of society at large. Certain social and cultural

conditions would demand a high degree of state intervention, while in other groups the welfare of society would be most advanced by permitting a large amount of personal liberty and independence. This view has well been expressed by Giddings, who holds that "the worst mistake that political philosophers have made has been their unqualified approval or condemnation of the rule of *laissez-faire*"; by Cooley, who contends that "we must take the relative point of view and hold that the sphere of government operations is not, and should not be, fixed, but operates with the social condition at large. Hard-and-fast theories of what the state may best be and do, whether restrictive or expansive, we may well regard with distrust"; and by Ross, who maintains that "it is idle to attempt to lay down definitely the proper functions of the state, because its scope should depend upon such variables as the trend of social relationships, the development of the social mind, the advances of technique, the talent available for government, etc." In general, this group of sociologists emphasize the fact that the scope of desirable state activity will, roughly, vary directly with the complexities of the social order and the social, economic and cultural inequalities prevailing in any group.

The attitude of sociologists toward the relation of the state to social progress is, of course, directly related to their notion concerning the proper scope of state activity. The individualists, such as Spencer, Novicow and Sumner, believe that social evolution is a natural and spontaneous affair, which cannot be accelerated, but may be obstructed and confused by human intervention. On the other hand, writers sharing the views of Ward believe firmly that man will become progressively more capable of artificially determining the future state of human society through social planning, and that the function of the state in this process must of necessity become ever more marked and indispensable. Social planning will become the technique of social progress. Ward and his disciples would, however, insist upon the necessity of basing statesmanship upon an ever more perfect body of social science if this achievement is to become an assured success. The eclectics, naturally, take the position that the achievements of the state in promoting social progress will depend largely upon whether or not social conditions at any given time and in any given group require active and extensive state intervention. But even many of this last group are inclined to believe that, with the greater complexities of the post-Industrial Revolution civilization, we are likely to need an ever greater degree of state activity.

The sociologists have offered a number of interesting suggestions with respect to the sociology of revolutions. They are pretty generally agreed that revolution is a wasteful and undesirable method of social change, because its excesses often lead to the creation of even worse abuses than the revolution was designed to eliminate. Likewise, revolution creates a state of mind generally opposed to a calm, deliberate and rational reconstruction of society.

Nevertheless, it is generally conceded that revolution is likely to be inevi-

table whenever the reactionary forces in society gain such thoroughness and permanence of control as to make impossible slow, orderly, and carefully thought-out social change. The real promoters of revolutions are, then, not so much the radicals as the ultra-conservatives. LeBon, Ellwood, and Sorokin have, in particular, dealt with this problem of revolution and social change.

The sociological views on liberty and rights are closely interrelated with the sociological theory of social control and sovereignty, as well as with the theories of the scope of state activity. In the first place, sociologists quite correctly insist that, after all, political liberty, which is usually what is meant by political scientists when using the term "liberty," is only one phase of the problem. As Hobhouse has pointed out, we must have a conception of liberty broad and comprehensive enough to cover every phase of human interests and activities.

It is obvious that, with this conception of liberty in mind, it follows naturally that the state can determine only one relatively narrow field of the whole problem of liberty—namely, legal liberty. The amount of actual liberty which will exist, and likewise the nature, methods, and types of social domination, will depend chiefly upon the social and cultural conditions prevailing in the group. Custom, convention, etiquette, and public opinion, will often, if not invariably, exert a greater influence in limiting the complete freedom of individual action than the state or other political institution.

Even with regard to political liberty, sociologists correctly emphasize the fact that liberty is not anything arbitrary, which can be enjoyed or determined independently of any specific social situation. The amount of state activity, with the resulting degree of curtailment of individual liberty, is, as we have pointed out above, dependent upon the general conditions in society. The higher the level of culture, and the more homogeneous the society, the greater the amount of liberty which may be enjoyed.

Likewise, with respect to political rights, the sociologists have completely destroyed the old metaphysical notion that man possesses any inalienable or primordial natural rights which date back to a period before the origins of human society. The sociologists insist that rights are nothing more nor less than the immunities which may be granted to the individual in any given society by the state. As Gumplowicz contended, they are simply the "rules of the game" in the social process at a given place or time. The nature, extent and number of these rights will be determined by the social situation which determines the particular degree of state intervention and political maturity in vogue at the given moment.

In dealing with the interesting question of "natural" rights, the sociologists hold that there may be some possibility of restating this concept in valid sociological terms. Natural rights may be viewed as those personal immunities which the evolutionary process has shown to be best adapted to secur-

ing relatively rapid social evolution. Giddings has suggested that this view of natural rights would necessitate our holding that there may be natural rights of the political community, as well as natural rights of the individual.

IX. War and International Relations

With regard to war and international relations, the sociologists have made some interesting suggestions. While a few, such as Gumplowicz, believe that war is a necessary and desirable factor in social progress, most sociologists at the present time agree with Novicow and G. F. Nicolai that, whereas war performed a valuable function in the creation of states, it has long since become a very dangerous anachronism and is today probably the chief menace to the human race.

Sociologists, with their grip upon the underlying causative realities of social life, are able, however, to make it clear that we cannot hope for an end of war unless we eliminate the basic causes of war in population pressure, economic rivalry, lust for empire, savage patriotic psychology, and racial and national egotism. Sociologists, led by Sumner and Hobhouse, have also called attention to the very great difficulties in reconciling democracy at home with imperialism abroad, showing how hard it is to maintain a political system which treats one body of subjects as equals and another group as inferiors. Some sociologists, such as Giddings, however, minimize this problem, maintaining that only by bringing the more backward peoples under the control of the more advanced races can we hope for the spread and maintenance of civilization.

Particularly suggestive have been the theories of Guillaume DeGreef and others with respect to the social basis of political boundaries. DeGreef has well insisted that political boundaries, even if they are of the best, namely, those which conform to natural geographic barriers, can scarcely be expected to possess permanent validity. The real boundaries between neighboring peoples are the line of equilibrium of social pressures. A powerful and dynamic group is always bound to intrude upon a weaker neighbor, whatever the nature or the location of the arbitrary political boundaries which separate them. If we are to limit the causes of war which inhere in imperfect boundaries, we must make some provision for the constant readjustment of political boundaries to the changing equilibration of social pressures. We cannot "freeze" the political set-up.

In dealing with the problems of nationalism and internationalism the majority of sociological writers tend to look upon nationality as primarily a social and cultural matter rather than a political fact. It has, however, tended to take on political significance, because during the nineteenth century the only practicable way of realizing cultural autonomy seemed to be to secure political freedom and independence. The majority of sociologists view the

present-day national state as but the contemporary stage in the evolution of political life. Inspired by Novicow and H. G. Wells, they look forward to the gradual evolution of a world state, which will ultimately be obtained through the prior acceptance of loose federations and leagues of nations. But the sociologist utters a word of caution against too great optimism with respect to the rapidity with which this desirable end can be achieved. Successful political unity cannot well precede cultural unity, or at least decent respect for other cultures, and international sympathy. Sumner, Hobhouse, Hobson, Veblen, and others have stressed in particular the obstacles imposed by modern capitalistic imperialism to the realization of any permanent world organization or world peace.

X. Social Determinism

It has already been pointed out above how the sociologists have insisted that social control is achieved only in part through the state, a large rôle being exercised by custom, tradition, and public opinion. With respect to public opinion, the more trenchant writers, such as Lippmann, point out that it cannot be more intelligent or adequate than the general social and cultural conditions at large in society. If public opinion is to be made an adequate and proper guide for social and political conduct, we must devise better means of insuring more adequately and accurately informed leaders and better machinery for spreading this information from the leaders through the mass of society.

Finally, sociologists, such as Giddings, in dealing with political theory stress the fact that, in the majority of cases, the political theory of a given age or a particular writer will reflect the prevailing psychology and outlook of the writer's era and class, either in the way of a defense of, or an attack upon, the prevailing culture and social system. To this general social and cultural determination of political theory must be added the element of the personal complexes of writers based very largely upon their personal experiences.[6] But even complexes rarely function in an arbitrary fashion; they fasten themselves upon particular problems or aspects of the contemporary social order.

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SOCIOLOGICAL TRENDS IN MODERN JURISPRUDENCE

William Seagle

I. Schools of Jurisprudence

The history of jurisprudence tends to be a succession of slogans. A theory of law differs from other sociological theories in its relation to action. The Roman jurists, it has been well said, were the first sociologists, but it was by necessity rather than by choice. Since a philosophy of law is not only conditioned by existing legal institutions, but also challenges the bases on which they rest, its appeal depends, apart from its scientific claims, upon its ability to mobilize opinion in its support. To accomplish this end, it needs an effective slogan just like any other saleable commodity. But even as every philosophy has its major and minor premise, every movement in jurisprudence has its major and minor slogan.

The dominant slogan of modern jurisprudence has been that law is one of the social sciences, and that it can be comprehended only as an integral part of a general sociology, which involves the synthesis of all the social sciences. The more immediate and programmatic phase of this conception has been to prefer investigations of the social effects of law to speculations as to its nature. In other words, the immemorial conundrum of jurisprudence: What is law? is to be sidetracked in favor of the question: How does law work? In terms of slogans, the business of the jurist is to turn his attention from the problem of the nature of law, to its end or purpose. There has thus dawned a new day of functionalism in jurisprudence, and the celebrated jibe of Bentham, that jurisprudence is the art of being systematically ignorant of what everybody knows, has less justification. In all the vigor of its youth, the sociological school, as it has come to be called, has launched a major offensive against existing schools and methods.

According to Dean Pound, who has been the most tireless of all juristic historiographers, there have been three main types of jurisprudence, philosophical, analytical, and historical. In the eighteenth century juristic hegemony lay with the philosophical school which preached the law of nature, using Greek and Roman texts which, however, were made to justify the revolutionary legal reforms which established bourgeois democracy. In the

first half of the nineteenth century, philosophical schools still flourished in the guise of various metaphysical schools which sought the evaluation of existing legal systems in terms of some fundamental ideal. The critical idealism of Kant and the absolute idealism of Hegel still made their influence felt in the legal philosophy of this period, but the juristic supremacy had really passed to analytical and historical schools.

The analytical school which had arisen in England was connected chiefly with the name of John Austin, and it represented a reaction against natural law ideas, and philosophical ideals. Analytical jurisprudence, arising in the country of the common law, which was a national and well established legal system regarded by its votaries as the very perfection of human reason, was highly positive in its orientation, and confined its attention to the precepts and prescriptions of existing systems of law. To the analytical jurist, law consisted simply of those rules which had the sanction of politically organized society. In the words of Austin, it was the command of the sovereign, but more broadly stated, it is the imperative of the state. To the historical school, on the other hand, the law, like the poet, is born not made. The historical school, founded in Germany under the leadership of Savigny, and under the influence of Romanticism, which represented political reaction, acknowledged as law only that which was a true expression of the genius of a people, i. e., the *Volksgeist*. Hence, where the analytical jurist regarded legislation as that typical form of law, the historical jurist glorified custom as law par excellence. The historical school was no less positivistic than the analytical school but in casting out the devil of abstract philosophy it readmitted him in the form of a philosophy of history. The historical jurist, it has been well said, really believed in a form of natural law which, although it could not be discovered by an exercise of human reason, nevertheless stood revealed in the processes of history.

As the third quarter of the nineteenth century approached, jurisprudence had to discover a new creative method. The secret of the nature of law had been sought in individual psychology, politics, and history, but it still eluded the grasp of the jurists. No wonder there was a disposition to turn from the nature of law to its function. Metaphysical jurisprudence, carrying on the individualism of the period of revolutionary reform and natural law, became a "will jurisprudence": the abstract will of the individual became the source of all legal rights. Both analytical and historical jurisprudence eschewed ethical ideals and confined the attention of the jurists to existing systems of law. Analytical jurisprudence, concentrating on legislation as the prime source of law, had been instrumental in promoting legislative reform in its early phases, but its initial impulse spent, it had become merely a justification for the endless reworking of existing legal doctrines and categories by means of conceptual analysis. Similarly, historical jurisprudence had at first

encouraged valuable and needed researches into the origins of law but since it could achieve no adequate philosophy of history, it was ending in a barren and aimless historicism. Moreover, in the nineteenth century, legal philosophy had been separated both from general philosophy and from political science.

But meantime there had been in the making, the science of society. Enchanted at first with the methods of the physical sciences, sociology pursued analogies which it derived from these sources, but which, like all analogies, proved unfruitful and disappointing. Society was neither a machine nor an organism, and law, particularly, was too much a science of human values to permit such comparisons. Sociological jurisprudence, it appeared, could not be an analogical jurisprudence. Dean Pound has described the mechanical, biological, and psychological stages of early sociological jurisprudence. But, in truth, these were the stages of early sociology rather than of sociological jurisprudence. The contributions of sociologists themselves to the general problems of jurisprudence have at all times been interstitial. Quite recently the need for a stocktaking of the relation of law to the social sciences occurred to Huntington Cairns. But the results, which are described in his *Law and the Social Sciences,* appear surprisingly meagre. Undoubtedly, the chief reason for the disappointing character of this review is the fact that it has been confined to the contributions of sociologists to jurisprudence. General sociology has supplied a point of view, but it has been left to the workers in the several social sciences to apply it to particular problems. Except in the field of ethnology, legal science has not been enriched to any great degree by strangers to its mysteries. In the last analysis, legal scientists must seek their own salvation. The net result of the Cairns review is to suggest that synthesis in the social sciences is still far more of an ideal than a reality.

II. The Rise of Sociological Jurisprudence

Among general sociologists who have tackled legal phenomena may be mentioned Tarde, who attempted to apply his theory of imitation to the growth of law; Vaccaro, who attempted to apply the Darwinian theory to the struggle of social classes; and Gumplowicz, whose conflict theory of the origin of the state was of especially great significance for legal theory. Indeed it is possible to go much further back, and insist, as has been done by Ehrlich, who really may be regarded as the founder of the sociological school, that its true progenitor was Montesquieu. But there can be no doubt that the modern trend in jurisprudence was inaugurated by Rudolph von Jhering who was not a sociologist, but a jurist. The revolution in legal thinking which he precipitated has still not spent its force. Jhering is entitled to be regarded as one of the truly great jurists of the world.

Although he is generally classed as a social utilitarian rather than as a member of the sociological school, he is the true founder of legal sociology. Dean Pound has distinguished between a social-philosophical school and a sociological school in modern jurisprudence, but such distinctions are necessarily very fluid. The term social-philosophical jurisprudence is in itself, however, one of great felicity. While some of the social-philosophical jurists have rivalled the metaphysicians of the last century in the abstractness of their philosophies, they are easily distinguishable from their predecessors in their social point of view, in their acceptance of social, rather than individual premises. The metaphysical school of the last century, which set so much store by ideals in the legal system were, after all, interested no less than modern jurisprudence, in the ends of law. The difference between them and contemporary social-philosophical jurists lies in the fact that they pursued individual rather than social ideals.

The work of Jhering marks this transition brilliantly. He fulfills past tendencies in jurisprudence at the same time that he transcends them. In his early work he essayed a feat which no member of the historical school had actually attempted—to trace the workings of the Roman *Volksgeist* in the development of Roman law. His affiliation with the analytical school is apparent in his positivism, and his recognition of the necessity for the imprimatur of the state for the law which the state does not create. His early individualism, which clearly associates him with the earlier English utilitarians, is manifested in his celebrated *Der Kampf ums Recht* (Regensburg, 1872), translated into twenty languages, which put a highly exaggerated emphasis upon individual self-assertion in the maintenance of legal rights. Even here, however, the underlying motive was social: the law, which was born only of struggle, would otherwise fail of its ends.

But in the end, Jhering revolted against both historicism and "legal rights." Like all seminal minds, he freed himself of the influence of his immediate environment. There was no other country living under the Roman civil law which suffered quite as much both from metaphysics and legal conceptualism as Germany. It had produced all the great pandectists of the nineteenth century who had devoted themselves to the legal exegesis of the texts of the Digest, with only a dim perception of contemporary social needs. Jhering revolted against what he later described with devastating satiric effect, as the "heaven of juristic concepts." In his *Zweck im Recht* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1877–83) he heralded the modern approach in jurisprudence in insisting upon the analysis of law in terms of its social ends and purposes. The analysis of "legal rights" was only the formal aspect of jurisprudence. The real function of the jurist was the evaluation of the "interests" which they served. A jurisprudence of interests should replace a jurisprudence of conceptions.

III. The "Social-Philosophical" School

The pervasive influence of sociology is perhaps paradoxically most obvious in those schools in modern jurisprudence which have sought to reapply the classic philosophical approaches, i. e., in both neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism. The leader of the neo-Kantians was Rudolph Stammler; neo-Hegelianism has been represented chiefly by Joseph Kohler, who, although in his lifetime regarded as at least one of the world's greatest jurists, now has virtually no followers. The social point of view is manifest in both their philosophies although their methods are highly metaphysical. They are "social-philosophical" in the most exact sense of the term.

Stammler has employed the Kantian method of the *a priori* ascertainment of knowledge. He does not derive law from the state but seeks to grasp its essence as a form of social regulation. He also applies the Kantian method in evolving a distinction between the concept of law and the idea of justice. This produces the celebrated Stammlerian critique of "just law." It is in the criteria of just law that the social ideals of the philosophy become manifest, for they involve not only the principles of individual autonomy, but co-operation and community. The idea of justice involves not only the presuppositions of the categorical imperative, but a complete harmony of all endeavor and ends, which has aptly been called a "supplemental imperative." Yet there are no universals in the Stammlerian critique. It is only the critical method that is claimed to be universal. Stammler thus completes the attack upon universal natural law which Kant began. Indeed, Stammler is responsible for perhaps the most celebrated slogan of modern jurisprudence in proclaiming the search for a "natural law with a changing content." Critics of Stammler have not been slow in pointing out that his concept of "just law" is based upon too vague a criterion for judging particular rules of law. The ideal of "a complete harmony of endeavor" certainly is no very great improvement upon the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, the idea of a natural law with a changing content is not without value in an age of legal flux.

It certainly need not be considered surprising that the neo-Hegelianism of Joseph Kohler has proved even less satisfying than neo-Kantianism. Kohler, who was a person of amazing versatility, worked in almost every branch of law from the law of patents, copyrights and trademarks, to international law, although his chief interest was universal legal history. Hegelianism seemed to offer a philosophy of law which would supply some form of unity for his highly diverse activity. But while he retained the evolutionary and pantheistic aspects of Hegelianism he cast overboard the Hegelian dialectic. If Stammler did not really go much beyond Kant, Kohler did not really retain very much of Hegel. He did not recognize in the history of humanity the revelation of the idea of reason, nor did he

identify the existent with the necessarily right. He simply strove to learn from experience and history, the universal law of evolution in human "culture" in the German sense of the term. Since the law changed from age to age, and could be understood only as part of the whole culture of a people, it was necessary to study it with the aid of history and ethnology, which were two of Kohler's chief interests. The high degree of relativity which Kohler admitted, could prove no more fruitful than the more barren historicism of the historical school. Although in principle he recognized a rational purpose in the universe, he often demonstrated the irrationality of particular phenomena, and he showed as little consistency with respect to the necessity for conscious effort in the adaptation of institutions.

IV. Legal Positivism

If neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism are to be regarded as late nineteenth century attempts to revive the great philosophical systems of the past, the school of the *Allgemeine Rechtslehre* is to be comprehended only as a roughly contemporaneous effort to banish legal philosophy entirely from the realm of law. *Allgemeine Rechtslehre* may be translated (although somewhat inadequately) as "general legal doctrine," and it has been the cardinal tenet of this school that the business of the jurist is only with positive law. If he yearned, nevertheless, for the green pastures of legal philosophy, he was to sublimate the desire by studying existing legal systems empirically with a view to elucidating their general historical and theoretical problems. Thus in the place of legal philosophy, which was declared a snare and a delusion, was put general legal theory. Different legal systems might perhaps be compared in order to determine the nature of the most general legal concepts, but beyond this the jurist should not go. It is obvious that a program of this sort would harbor the most diverse elements and spirits, whose only bond of union was a devotion to positivism. It proved, indeed, to have room for various aspects of analytical and historical jurisprudence, and in the case at least of one member of the school, of metaphysical jurisprudence as well. The leading expositors of *Allgemeine Rechtslehre* were Karl Bergbohm, Adolf Merkel, Ernst Rudolph Bierling, and Ernst Immanuel Bekker. Bergbohm was the most earnest and deadly enemy of natural law in his time, but his work concerned itself less with general theories than with international law, which was his chief interest. Merkel, who claimed the title of "legal philosopher of positivism," and formulated a "compromise" theory of law, confined himself largely to tracing the evolution of criminal law, which he did with rare perception, and to deducing its general concepts from its given forms. Bekker, a highly paradoxical figure, who devoted himself chiefly to the pandects, and constituted in German jurisprudence the link between

Savigny and Jhering, yearned to be a legal philosopher but, too skeptical and suspicious of theory, gravitated naturally to a theory which, while it excommunicated philosophy, nevertheless permitted a high degree of "positivistic" speculation. Yet it is significant that all three of these exponents of the school produced far less speculation than analyses of particular branches of law. It remained for Bierling to become the theoretician of the school which was really to end all theory, and to pass beyond general legal doctrine into the realm which was at least haunted by the ghost of Kant, and in which Stammler moved at ease. Bierling in attempting to arrive at the fundamental categories of all legal orders clearly passed beyond the pale of positivism. He not only evolved legal concepts which could be demonstrated indirectly with respect to all existing legal systems but were to be assumed with respect to all conceivable legal systems. Such concepts were those of legal subject and legal object, legal relation, legality and illegality, and hence the concept of law itself. Here were actually categories of all juristic knowledge, and the affinity with neo-Kantianism is obvious.

V. The "Free Law" Movement

The most vigorous application of the sociological viewpoint to the problems of jurisprudence occurred in Germany as the nineteenth century drew to a close. This period witnessed the rise of the *Freirechtsbewegung* or "free law" movement. It constituted the *Sturm und Drang* of German jurisprudence, and the natural culmination of the impulse which the work of Jhering had supplied. The storm raged with such fury and intensity that it threatened to destroy the very foundations of the established legal order. Indeed rumblings of the tempest are still heard at this very day, for some of the numerous adherents of free law are still among the living, and, although they may themselves have subdued to some extent their wild and demoniac energies, they have had successors who yield to them, in no respect, in iconoclasm of spirit.

The slogan of "free law" was provocative and challenging. Indeed it marked the most radical departure which had yet been made from the concerns of traditional legal philosophy. As long as jurisprudence concentrated upon the problem of the nature of law, it showed little capacity for disturbing existing legal orders. To be sure it dealt with the problem of sources, of the nature and relative claims of custom, equity, and legislation, but it did so from a static and formal point of view. As soon as the emphasis shifted, however, from the problem of the nature of law to its function, the full significance of the confusion of sources became manifest. Indeed there grew an alarming awareness of a frequent total lack of sources, and this became immediately and vividly connected with the actual process of judicial administration. For the first time in the history

of jurisprudence the technique of judicial decision became the focus not only of practice but of jurisprudence. Apart from the general influence of sociology, the free law movement owed its origin to the great dissatisfaction among many German jurists with the recently drafted and proclaimed German Civil Code which, although only a few years old, was already revealing serious shortcomings.

The champions of free law rejected as a legal fiction the traditional notion that the law is a seamless web, and they revolted no less against all the other major legal fictions, particularly those inherent in the dogma of the separation of powers, which assumed the judge to be a mechanical mouthpiece of preordained dooms. Sociology, in making the center of its interest society rather than the state, had an inevitable effect upon juristic conceptions, which was particularly manifest in the free law faith. The revolt against *étatism* was implicit in free law, as in the sociological theories which have followed it. But in free law, it appeared rather in the form of the proposition that there were unavoidable gaps in any legal system, and that in such circumstances the judge must frankly engage in creative activity. The *credo* of free law had the singular distinction of soon being given practical effect in the draft of the Swiss Civil Code which expressly gave permission to the judge to legislate, when the code was silent and no custom was established.

Among the many who propagated free law Ernest Fuchs and Eugen Ehrlich may be named as the leaders, although such figures as Herman Kantorowicz, Erich Jung, and Ludwig Spiegel were also important. It is significant that Fuchs was not a professor but a practicing attorney in Karlsruhe, and he preached no less than a juridical *Kulturkampf* against contemporary abuses in the German administration of justice, which he ascribed principally to an excessive indulgence in "constructionalism." He had a brilliant gift for phrase making, and he characterized the prevailing treatment of law in Germany as "pandectology." No less famous is his coinage of "cryptosociology" which he applied to the logical disguise of intuitive judgments.

Ehrlich, who was an Austrian jurist, was not only a leader of the free law movement but, as has already been said, perhaps the most important founder of sociological jurisprudence. If the essence of a sociology of law consists of the study of the extent to which those rules which are supposed to be observed at law are actually observed in fact, then Ehrlich may really be said to have been the first sociological jurist, for he was the first to conduct this type of investigation on a large and systematic scale. His *Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts* (Munich, 1923) may be regarded not only as the expression of the program of the sociological school but in large measure as its realization, for in its pages he demonstrated the large degree of divergence between many legal and social institutions.

Even as Jhering had not been content merely to talk of the *Volksgeist,* Ehrlich was not content to talk of a legal sociology while accepting codes and precedents at their face value. Happily Ehrlich coined a powerful slogan for sociological jurisprudence. He spoke of "living law," and he actually established a seminar to discover its manifestations by the questionnaire method. His most notable accomplishment, perhaps, was to demonstrate the extent to which the familial customs of Bukovina departed from the prescriptions of the Austrian Civil Code. Like the other believers in free law, Ehrlich attacked in his *Die juristische Logik* (Tübingen, 1918) the fiction that the state created all law, paying his respects to the current fallacies of juristic logic. Ehrlich is one of the few European jurists who has had a greater influence in America than at home.

VI. French Legal Philosophy

The chief characteristic of twentieth century legal philosophy in France has been a renaissance of natural law and juridical idealism which has taken such varied forms that it sometimes comes disguised as the purest sociological positivism. Not infrequently neo-Kantianism as well as neo-scholasticism have masqueraded as sociological jurisprudence. Stammler's "natural law with a changing content" has proven a particularly potent slogan in France, for it has been the aim of most French jurists to rediscover an adaptable natural law which shall rest upon some new basis. The need for some form of ultra-positive law was even greater in France than in Germany, for the French Civil Code which was the glory of the Napoleonic era was a far greater anachronism than even the *Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch* which was a product of the end of the nineteenth century. The work of Raymond Saleilles, Joseph Charmont, Maurice Hauriou, François Geny, and Leon Duguit all reveal natural law tendencies, although in the case of Duguit they are expressly repudiated. Geny and Duguit may perhaps be taken as the most interesting examples of the tendencies of French legal philosophy.

Geny presents the paradox of a legal philosopher who has been hailed as both an arch realist and a neo-scholastic. Indeed he has not infrequently been affiliated with the German "free law" school. His emphasis, like that of the school, is upon the technique of decision, and he has himself proclaimed a much discussed method of "free scientific research," to put an end to legal fetishism. But it appears that the method of free scientific research is applicable only to gaps in the law. Normally the jurist was to be bound by the "intention" and "will" of the legislator which Geny pretended to be able to discover. When it was permissible for the jurist to resort to free scientific research he was to search his conscience as well as to appeal to reason. By intuition he was to discover the rational basis of

the natural law applicable to the circumstances. Presumably he was to take into account social and economic needs—in the words of Geny, "the nature of positive things"—but these were only factors of the intuitive process, which were to produce the rational datum.

Duguit proclaimed himself as a positivist of positivists. But his positivism was not of the variety which condemns the jurist to the narrow confines of the law of the state. Indeed, Duguit sought a theory of law which should be independent of the state, whose personality and sovereignty he rejected as fictions. The law was anterior and superior to the state, and it rested not upon its will but upon a social fact which could be objectively demonstrated. Hence Duguit's theory has been called a theory of "objective law." The social fact upon which it rested was the "principle of social solidarity" which Duguit conveniently borrowed from Durkheim. But in attempting to derive particular rules of law from the principle of social solidarity Duguit unwittingly transformed it from an objective fact into a measure of value, which is to say that he readmitted natural law. Because there was implicit in his theory a functional view of the state which reduced it to a mere instrumentality for the achievement of social solidarity, Duguit has exercised an enormous influence on the growth of modern political pluralism, and his importance is even greater for political than juristic theory.

VII. Various European Trends

The same is true of the Dutch jurist Hugo Krabbe who also rejects all ideas of state sovereignty and personality, but who derives law not from the fact of social solidarity, but from a process of evaluation of individual interests, and is thus led to assign a far higher rôle to the state as an instrument of evaluation of these interests. There have been in recent decades, however, few legal philosophers elsewhere than in Germany and France who may be said to have achieved something of international reputations. The sociological school has had representatives in Italy, but far better known is the neo-Kantian Giorgio del Vecchio. Spain is remarkable for the extent to which metaphysical and neo-scholastic tendencies have flourished in modern times. Until at least quite recently the school of Krause has had a great many disciples there, and even Francisco Giner de los Rios, perhaps the most internationally known of Spanish jurists, exhibits Krausist influence. Of Hungarian jurists, the sociological positivist, Pulszky, achieved recognition in England, and his chief work has been translated into English.

The Russian jurist, Leo Petrażycki, has achieved especially great fame with his psychological theory of law. The application of psychological science to the solution of particular legal problems has been a marked feature of the sociological method. But Petrażycki's theory is an attempt to

found a general theory of law upon a psychological basis. He reduced law to a subjective psychological experience, describing it as an "emotion" of an "imperative-attributive" character, distinguishable from the moral emotions simply by the fact that it had a "bilateral" character in contradistinction to the latter's unilateral character. It followed that any authority was a sufficient basis for the growth of an imperative-attributive emotion, and hence for law, so that Petrażycki was also able to dispense with the state as the sole source of law, and to recognize the existence of law even among outlaws. However admirable his theory may be as a description of the formal aspects of law, it is quite useless as an historical sociological tool, for it explains not a single legal phenomenon. It has value, however, as a demonstration of the futility of all disputes as to the nature of law, and it has obviously re-enforced the prevailing political pluralism. Petrażycki himself must have recognized the trend of his theory for he evolved a "politics of law" in addition to a philosophy of law to take care of the practical problems of jurisprudence.

VIII. Revival of Analytical Jurisprudence

Perhaps the most marked and curious phenomenon of post-war legal theory on the continent has been the revival of analytical jurisprudence. Austin has been accorded the honor of a belated recognition. But this neo-Austinianism goes far beyond Austin in the direction of eliminating all measure of value as well as all social facts from the realm of jurisprudence. The assumptions of Austin were at least based upon what he took to be common social and political facts, whereas those of the present continental school are derived from a purely logical initial hypothesis with respect to the legal order. They have all inscribed upon their banner the achievement of "a pure science of law." Among these votaries of pure legal science there may be named the French jurist Roguin, the Hungarian jurist Somlo (who, however, wrote his chief work in German), and above all, the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen, who has become a veritable storm center of jurisprudence and attracted great numbers of disciples.

The central conception of Kelsen's system, which he derives from Kant's distinction between *das Sollen* and *das Sein,* is that law is a normative science, i. e., it postulates what ought to be rather than describes what is, as do the natural sciences. Since all legal rules are merely conditional judgments, their nature is neither causal nor teleological. Since the law is a system of norms, their validity can depend not upon any causal fact but only upon some norm of higher validity. Some one norm must be chosen as an initial hypothesis behind which the jurist cannot go, and this ultimate norm Kelsen discovers in the constitution, which plays, in his theory, the same rôle as the sovereign, in that of Austin. Since all other

norms result from the fundamental norm the legal order must necessarily be conceived as an absolute unity. This rigorous monism characterizes the whole of Kelsen's system, and leads him to reject all the traditional problems of jurisprudence as resting upon false dualistic premises. He regards the creation and application of law as a single and indivisible process. Inasmuch as legislation, judicial and administrative decision, even private contracts, derive their validity from the fundamental norm, the legal process is only one of progressive delegation. To express the unity of the process, Kelsen speaks of "the gradual concretization of law." The result of his premises is also to abolish the conception of the law as a creation of the state. The law and the state are declared to be identical: the state is only the sum total of legal norms, and the question of which comes first, the law or the state, is declared to be on a par with the riddle which comes first, the hen or the egg. Kelsen's holocaust includes also the distinction between public and private law, between juristic and physical persons, and the conception of subjective rights.

Kelsen's system undoubtedly possesses a logical consistency and a beautiful harmony but, like that of Petrażycki, it has little or no value in solving the problems of practical jurisprudence. Its value lies rather in its demonstration that many of the problems of jurisprudence are pseudo-problems. On the positive side it has, perhaps, as Kelsen claims, by means of its conception of "the gradual concretization of law," reinforced the insistence of the disciples of "free law" that judicial as well as legislative activity represents a creative process. But it is precisely in this process of crystallization that the Achilles' heel of Kelsen's system is to be discovered. The initial hypothesis, after all, rests, as always, upon a metajuristic social fact, and in the creation of the subordinate norms, the formal logical process can be only a mask for the familiar face of value.

The "pure science of law" is highly symptomatic of a revulsion among contemporary jurists against rising subjectivism in the administration of justice. Modern law reflects the confusion and instability of twentieth century civilization, and it is no wonder that the jurist turns with a sense of relief to any dogma that seems to offer an avenue of escape to some point high above the battle. This attitude, moreover, is often shared not only by the reactionary, but by those who believe that the law needs to be radically refashioned, for they recognize that ideals are not necessarily ideals of progress, and that to allow appeals from the positive law to some unformulated law, is to encourage the mouthpieces of the law to both have their cake and eat it as occasion may offer.

IX. American Theories of Jurisprudence

American jurists of the present generation, who on the whole are hard-boiled, share this conviction, too, but curiously their positivism has taken the form of almost completely rejecting the normative aspects of legal science in favor of a purely descriptive legal sociology, in which ideal elements are admitted, but only in so far as they are accorded recognition in actual judicial practice. Sociological jurisprudence has been carried to its logical extreme in the so-called American realist movement, which is highly typical of the development of legal philosophy in this country. Until the present generation American lawyers shared the almost complete indifference of the English lawyer towards problems of legal philosophy. Now there is a manifest growth of interest in theory, but this often consists of a revolt against all theory. Grounded in sociological jurisprudence, it has cast jurisprudence to the dogs, in the belief that it is thus achieving true sociology.

The fount and origin of sociological jurisprudence in the United States has been Dean Pound of the Harvard Law School, who has championed its tenets for over two decades, and who has been regarded as practically the only American jurist in other countries. Dean Pound, who has great literary gifts, has coined many happy phrases which have had considerable influence upon the course of the administration of justice. He has spoken of "the law in action rather than the law in books," of law as a form of "social engineering," of "the effective limits of legal action," of the constant struggle in the law between the need for stability and the need for change. Yet his actual position is difficult to fix with any certainty, for he has at the same time glorified the elements of tradition and technique in legal systems, in preference to economic and social influences, the bearing of which he has sometimes grossly minimized if not caricatured. As a historian of the common law, he has sought to capture its "spirit," and to interpret it in terms of such omnibus explanations as "Puritanism" and the "pioneer spirit." The truth is that Pound's philosophy of law is highly relativist. With that singular amiability which is not infrequently characteristic of the historiographer, he has been able to appreciate the good points of almost any doctrine or institution.

The "realists" are broadly to be classified within the sociological school, and as such are to an extent the heirs of Pound but they themselves are more likely to acknowledge themselves as the spiritual descendants of such men as Gray, and Bingham, and that great American judge, Justice Holmes. The rôle of the American judge as juristic philosopher is very natural, in view of the high importance of judicial activity in the United

States, and Justice Cardozo, as well as Justice Ulman of Baltimore, have produced highly revealing accounts of the judicial process. Gray and Bingham, who were both law teachers, contributed to the antinormative position of at least the ultra-realists in different ways: Gray by practically excluding legislation as a source of law, and regarding judicial decision only as law, and Bingham by denying the reality of all general concepts, and hence of the possibility of rules of law. But the notion that the law is not what courts ought to do but what courts do in fact received its greatest impetus from a casual remark of Justice Holmes, to the effect that the law was simply "a prophecy of what the courts will do in fact," which, it has been plausibly suggested, is a remark that has been lifted out of its context by his admirers. Thus Jerome Frank, perhaps the most extreme of the realists, who mixes a little Freud with Gray, Bingham and Holmes in his *Law and the Modern Mind,* and thus arrives at the conclusion that the quest for legal certainty is only a manifestation of the father complex, regards as law only the actual decision in each particular case, so that the law never is, but is only becoming, and may be likened to the flux of Heraclitus. Some of the realists, like Karl Llewellyn, argue that any definition of law can only be provisional, but their provisional definitions are nevertheless of an antinormative character. Thurman Arnold regards it as obvious that the law cannot be defined, and in his recent book *The Symbols of Government,* which combines William James with Pareto, has launched an attack upon jurisprudence as a twentieth century form of theology. A suspicion of general conceptions, and of logic as an instrument of legal thinking, characterizes most of the realists who, in their belief that the law must defy any attempt at rational formulation, are strongly reminiscent of the "free law" school. There is also implicit rather than stated in their doctrine, a desire for "individualization" in the administration of civil justice which recalls the demand for the individualization of punishment which was voiced by the positivist criminologists. In their emphasis upon some of the individual social sciences such as linguistics, psychology, or economics, the realists also share an earlier trend in sociology. In the realist camp may be counted, in addition to those already mentioned, Powell, Cook, Oliphant, Moore, Radin, Yntema, Hale, Hutcheson, Patterson, Robinson. Counsels of moderation have been preached by Pound, Dickinson, Fuller, Adler, Morris Raphael Cohen, and Kantorowicz, the jurist who played such a great rôle in the free law movement. The scholar last mentioned has recently come to American shores, and has satirized the realists in the belief that they have drifted, albeit unawares, in the direction of German "free law" (which has been distorted to Nazi ends). Not one of the realists, however, would grant this contention.

X. Marxism and Its Influence

While the growth of Marxism, and its influence in the social sciences, has been marked during the past half century, there have been relatively few attempts to test its premises in the field of law. Such work as has been done has often consisted of economic interpretation of history rather than the application of orthodox Marxism, and even efforts of this character have not been very numerous considering the range of opportunities. The contributions of Max Weber, Karl Renner, Anton Menger, A. Leist, Achille Loria, Benedetto Croce, Brooks Adams, J. Allen Smith, Charles Beard, John R. Commons, Richard T. Ely, Berle and Means and some of the American realists furnish almost the only examples. But even these studies are historical and descriptive rather than theoretical, and until recent years no jurist has attempted to build a general theory of law upon the Marxist conception that the law embodies an ideological superstructure representing the will of the ruling class in the bourgeois state, and that it is destined to disappear with the establishment of communism. Most Soviet jurists have been content with mere repetition of the orthodox view in its original simplicity, but a few have undertaken either to attack bourgeois jurisprudence in its light, or to elaborate this orthodox view further into a general theory of law. Thus while Krylenko has attempted to reinterpret Jhering's jurisprudence of interests in terms of class interests, M. Reissner and E. Paschukanis have attempted to create Marxian *allgemeine Rechtslehre*. Both of these Soviet jurists have been troubled by the persistence of legal institutions so long after the revolution, and have been driven to re-examination of Marxist premises with rather surprising results, not the least of which is that they have admitted neo-Kantian elements into their doctrine. Reissner protests against the juridicalization of Soviet society, while at the same time he combats the Marxian variants of the interest theory of Jhering and even rejects the latter's emphasis upon the idea of purpose on the ground that the law is discoverable *a priori*, and depends upon intuitive feelings of justice. Reissner virtually adopts the psychological theory of Petrażycki because it detaches law from state force, which he regards as the essence of bourgeois justice. Paschukanis' point of departure is the inadequacy of exploring the material basis of particular legal institutions without supplying a materialistic interpretation of law as a distinct historical form. But the essence of law is not revealed by characterizing it as ideological superstructure for so, too, are art, religion, and morals. While Paschukanis also refuses to perceive the significant form of law in the existence of organized state sanctions, his subjectivism is historical and economic, rather than psychological. The basis of his theory is a brilliant exposition of the importance of the evolution of the idea of "legal subject," a concept of equality in which the dif-

fering peculiarities of real individuals were made to disappear. The concept of legal subject is structurally similar to that of a commodity in which, as expounded by Marx, the qualities of things in the sense of their commensurability disappears. Indeed, the concept of legal subject is conditioned by the concept of commodity. The juristic subject is nothing more than the possessor of commodities, and the form of law itself is nothing but the ideological expression of the social relation of equivalence in the economy of exchange. Law is thus only civil law, for only in the civil law are there relationships between the owners of commodities who assert individual rights against each other. Law is for this reason necessarily subjective law. Public law is not true law because it does not deal with individuals and its norms are technological.

The revolt against *étatism,* which is so marked a feature of modern jurisprudence, thus manifests itself even in Marxist jurisprudence. It reflects a democratic political tendency of the past half century, which is at least a declared goal of the Soviet State. It has been felt that the state can be made subject to law only if the law is conceived as emanating from sources superior or anterior to the state. The *Rechtstaat* was also a slogan of German jurisprudence before the Nazi revolution. While the constitutional state now, of course, finds none so poor as to do it reverence, formulas of ideal justice are being offered with spendthrift generosity by those numberless German jurists trained in *Rechtsphilosophie* who have managed to accommodate themselves to the Nazi regime. Positivism is denounced on every hand, as letter-worship killing the spirit that liveth, and a creative jurisprudence, which shall realize the demands of the *Volksgeist* and racial purity in every individual case, has been proclaimed as the goal of the new Germany. In effect "free law" has strangely enough become virtually the watchword of a people in chains. But it is obvious that the new Nazi juridical idealism is only a thinly disguised rationalization of the disinclination of a cruel dictatorship to accept any bonds of law.

XI. Jurisprudence and Social Change

Jurisprudence seems to have its endless paradoxes and perplexities. Basically, however, they are all referable to one cause: dissatisfaction with existing legal orders. The current of jurisprudence constantly flows between the two poles of Is and Ought, and fundamentally, when all subtleties of juristic doctrine are disregarded, there have been only two schools of jurisprudence: the adherents of one school have accepted the presuppositions of the legal order at their face value, while those of the other have demanded some discount. This becomes all the more evident in any brief review of juristic theories which must necessarily present them without all their amplitude of detail. In the jurisprudence of previous cen-

turies, the conflict was between a simple positivism and an even more simple idealism. In modern jurisprudence, the same conflict is better expressed as one between normativism and realism, and the great question raised is whether even the normative is not subject to sociological laws. The classic jurists who formulated the legal theory of the unity of the modern state tended to believe that the whole of social life is cast in a legal mold. On the other hand, sociologists concentrating their attention on the larger problems of society have come to emphasize the fact that the law is not the only form of social control. From this premise the possibility of a legal sociology naturally flows.

Sociology is, of course, justified in refusing to rest content with the assumptions of formal jurisprudence. A law which has not been obeyed for half a century may be a perfect norm but there can be hardly any doubt that it is not a social reality. Nevertheless it must be confessed that the methods of legal sociology are still rudimentary, and that its results have thus far been disappointing. The evaluation of interests is still a method as well as a slogan, but the suspicion has been growing that until a method is evolved for recognizing and measuring interests, only another word has been substituted for the "rights" of traditional jurisprudence. It would be well, too, if legal sociologists were less vehement in their attacks upon "legal logic" for the mischief has lain rather in the choice of premises, with which logic, which is only a formal instrument of thought, has nothing to do. It is even more important, perhaps, for the sociologist to take formal legal norms a little more seriously than he tends to do. If Bentham's jibe may be taken as the perfect critique of formal jurisprudence, then Leonhard Nelson's complaint that modern jurisprudence is a case of *Rechtswissenshaft ohne Recht* deserves perhaps to be similarly regarded. But worse than the confusion of methods has been the paucity of social opportunity. If legal sociology has proven less fruitful than it should, it is because the results of its insights frequently cannot be applied in contemporary society. Its attacks upon the basic postulates of the legal order have been brilliant. But these postulates are essential to the maintenance of individual security in the existing social order. Legal realism, like positivist criminology, is too far ahead of the possibilities of social realization.

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(See also Bibliographical Appendix.)

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MODERN THEORIES OF CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY

Harry Elmer Barnes and J. P. Shalloo

I. Origins

The causes of criminal conduct and the characteristics of the criminal constitute the data of criminology. The causes and characteristics of crime and criminals have been "discovered" in practically every phase of folklore, superstition and "scientific" analysis.

From a firm belief in devil-possession to glandular imbalance, scientists, preachers and philosophers have attempted to reduce criminal conduct to one sufficient unitary "cause." Among the preachers freedom of the will, even at the present moment, holds much the same position as in medieval times. Out of a culture completely submerged in the "will of God" has gradually arisen a more or less rational approach to the problem of crime. This approach is comparatively recent, due largely to the granitic control of an authoritarian theological philosophy. The criminal was also a sinner. He chose to be a sinner. He also chose to suffer the consequences. It was his own fault. God had given him the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. The church had indicated the right. If he chose the evil, the determinant of choice lay within his voluntary moral perversity. This view is still prevalent even among many so-called scholars.

Until a wider intellectual horizon appeared through discoveries in the natural sciences, a greater knowledge of the customs and *mores* of other lands and peoples, the development of a secular view of social relationships, and the honest and skeptical inquiries of fearless minds, study of criminal conduct was largely furtive (and secret).

Not until the appearance of Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) is anything worthy of the name "scientific" study of abnormal behavior to be found. Even in the case of Gall, a German physician, theologians saw evidence of atheism and materialism, with the result that he was driven from Vienna and finally settled in Paris. Gall's ideas were of ancient origin and may be found as far back as the days of Aristotle. Grataroli and Della Porta preceded this noted cranioscopist, while Lavater (1741–1801) worked on the same thesis during Gall's life time. From Gall through Morel and

Lombroso there is a direct line of descent. Thus the basic doctrine of causation which laid the groundwork for modern criminological research may be found in the lectures and researches into "faculty" psychology, sometimes called craniology, cranioscopy, phrenology, or organology.

Others who did considerable spadework, even though not exclusively interested in crime causation, were J. G. Spurzheim, a colleague of Gall; George Combe, who popularized phrenology; and, in the United States Charles Caldwell. Thus, by the physiologists, biologists, and physical anthropologists the doctrine of free moral agency was scientifically undermined and the basis of biological determinism of conduct established.

Not only was the work of Morel and Lombroso profoundly influenced by the work of the early scholars, but it is more than likely that the later theories of both French and English psychopathologists had their origins in the general theoretical conclusions reached by Gall, Blumenbach, and others. There can be no doubt that modern psychiatry owes much to the work done by the early physiological psychologists. (Greater elaboration of the rôle of physical anthropology in the study of crime causation will be found in the chapter on physical anthropology.)

In addition to physical anthropology, at least three other branches of investigation contributed much to the establishment of the science of criminology. These were criminal jurisprudence, psychiatry, and statistics.

1. *Criminal Jurisprudence.* By calling attention to the essentially anachronistic character of punishments imposed for crimes, such as to be found in Montesquieu's *Persian Letters,* Voltaire's bitter denunciation of the penal code, and Beccaria's small volume, *Essay on Crimes and Punishments* (1764)—the last named probably the most important of all—the criminal law reformers practically necessitated a critical re-examination of the whole field of penal philosophy and thus indirectly focused attention upon the problem of crime, if not upon the causation of crime.

Because of the importance of Beccaria's essentially enlightened outlook (for his day) his general position follows: (1) the criterion for all reform must be the greatest happiness for the greatest number; (2) the seriousness of a crime must be measured by its injury to society; (3) prevention of crime is more important than the punishment of crime; (4) punishment is to be justified through its power to deter from crime, and not as social revenge; (5) torture must be abolished and a fair trial insured; and (6) more use should be made of imprisonment in the place of corporal punishment as the mode of handling criminals.

Beccaria's little work had a tremendous influence on its times. To it, in part at least, may be traced the reform of the criminal law of Austria, the penal code of the French Revolution, the reforms of Romilly and Bentham in England, and the transformation of the criminal law in the United States following the Revolutionary War.

The leader in the reform of the criminal law in England was the great Utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Bentham applied the principles of his felicific calculus to the reform of the criminal law. He proposed that penalties be moderated and that the penalty for each crime should be so fixed that the pain it imposed would be definitely in excess of the pleasure derived from its commission. This, he believed, would deter men from committing crime. He recommended far greater use of imprisonment and outlined an ideal prison structure—the famous "Panopticon"—and a rational system of prison discipline.

The person who led in the practical steps to reform the brutal criminal code of England was Sir Samuel Romilly (1757–1818). He was aided by Sir James Mackintosh, Sir Thomas Foxwell Buxton, and Sir Robert Peel. Through a series of laws the British criminal code was gradually civilized. In 1800 there had been two hundred and seventy-two capital crimes. By 1861 there were but three: murder, treason, and piracy. While touching on England, one cannot overlook the contributions made to an interest in the personality and treatment of the criminal by those early prison reformers, John Howard and Elizabeth Fry.

The humanizing of the criminal code in America was due to the Pennsylvania Quakers and to the distinguished jurist, William Bradford of Pennsylvania. The Quakers, true to the humanitarian principles of their religion, were shocked at the bloody scenes surrounding the cruel corporal punishments of the period. They worked for legislation which would substitute imprisonment for capital punishment. They were aided in the period following 1790 by William Bradford, who attacked the savage criminal codes of colonial days and drafted the revised codes of Pennsylvania. The latter, by 1794, had substituted imprisonment for corporal punishment and had reduced the list of capital crimes to murder in the first degree.

Until recently, criminal jurisprudence had made little progress since the stage which resulted from the influence of Beccaria and his age. Such legislation as the Baumes Law and other habitual criminal acts completely reflect the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century opinion. Gradually, however, criminal law has shown some responsiveness to the progress in criminal science. This has been manifested in approval of probation, juvenile court acts, acceptance in a few states of the scientific view of insanity and crime, some concessions to psychiatry, parole laws, and some approach to the indeterminate sentence. But our criminal codes and court procedure still reflect overwhelmingly the punitive philosophy of a century ago. Revenge remains the underlying principle of the criminal code today, as eloquently witnessed by Judge Joseph Ulman and Judge Justin Miller within the last few years.

2. *Anthropology.* Anthropology, which may be defined as "the science

of man," or, as Professor Marett puts it, "the whole history of man as fired and pervaded by the idea of evolution," may be divided into two rather distinct branches: physical and cultural. The former, which has hitherto been of the greatest importance to criminology, deals with the anatomical and physiological aspects of human evolution; while the cultural division treats of the development of human culture in its broadest aspects. Anthropology in both aspects, though particularly in the former, has hitherto been largely confined to a consideration of primitive and abnormal peoples because of the general repugnance which has been felt at considering man on the same basis as the rest of the animal kingdom for the purpose of scientific study. But this aversion is gradually passing away and the general intellectual world is coming to recognize the validity of the anthropologist's contention that "there shall not be one kind of history for savages and another kind for ourselves, but the same kind of history, with the same evolutionary principle running right through it, for all men, civilized and savage, present and past."

Physical anthropology may be said to have had its beginning with the famous physician, Vesalius (1513–1564). Owing to the tremendous prejudice of the times against both the methods and theories of research along this line there was but little development until the time of Blumenbach (1752–1840), the brilliant Göttingen professor. His work contributed notably to the elevation of anthropology to the rank of a science and established that branch of physical anthropology which was of value to criminology, namely, craniology. In the period between Vesalius and Blumenbach, several names are worthy of mention. Among these are Spigel, whose proposed formula for anthropological measurements foreshadowed the modern procedure; Tyson, with his beginnings of comparative anatomy; Linnaeus (1707–1778), with his classifying genius; and Buffon (1707–1788), with his wealth of anthropological description.

Contemporary with Blumenbach was Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828), who deserves a much higher place than is usually accorded him as a pioneer in the study of criminal conduct. Persecuted and hounded out of Vienna, he attracted wide attention both in Germany and in France with his theory of localized areas of the brain to account for every type of human behavior. He set forth twenty-seven different "organs" of the brain to explain various kinds of conduct. If direct study of the criminal himself may be said to be the scientific method, then Gall certainly deserves credit for using, if not establishing, the scientific method of studying crime causation.

From Blumenbach and Gall to the present time there are many names of considerable importance. The first of these is that of Peter Camper (1722–1789) who invented the modern formula for measuring the facial angle. Retzius (1796–1860) followed with his concept of the cephalic in-

dex. Contemporary with him was Grattan (1800–1871) who systematized anthropological methodology. The next name on the list is that of the man to whom physical anthropology owes its greatest debt, Paul Broca (1824–1880), the distinguished French anthropologist. Broca did many things for the purely technical advancement of the science, such as the invention of more accurate instruments, but his greatest work was in arousing contemporary enthusiasm for the study of anthropology. Along this line his two most remarkable achievements were the establishment of the Anthropological Society in Paris in 1859 and the founding of the school of anthropology in Paris in 1876. Broca's pupil and colleague, Paul Topinard, rendered great aid to the science by the complete application of Darwinian ideas to anthropology and in publishing the greatest of all early treatises on physical anthropology—*Elements d'anthropologie générale,* in 1885. Contemporary with Broca and Topinard was the third great Frenchman, Quatrefages (1810–1892). The linking up of physical anthropology and criminal identification was done by Bertillon and others.

Valuable work has been done in this line outside of France. In Germany the most distinguished worker was Virchow (1821–1902) whose work, while covering the entire field, has been of particular interest in criminology on account of his extended work in the pathological branch. Much research in this field has been done by Baur, Fischer, Lenz, and Dr. Rudolph Martin. Martin's monumental work, *Lehrbuch der Anthropologie,* which appeared in 1914, has added to the work of Topinard the accumulated knowledge of twenty-nine years of anthropological investigation. In England, the work of Flower, Huxley, Keith, Haddon, and Duckworth is especially worthy of mention. In Italy, Sergi has contributed much, while in America the most distinguished names are those of Hrdlička, Holmes, Dorsey, MacCurdy, Boas, Hooton, Starr, and Dixon. (See the chapters by Barnes and by Howells, present volume, pp. 247–78.)

3. *Psychiatry.* The third of the foundations of criminology, namely, psychiatry (i. e., mental pathology) does not have such a distinguished history as physical anthropology, being primarily a product of the nineteenth century. Its late origin is explainable from the fact that it is necessarily based upon a scientific comprehension of psychology which was not arrived at until the last century.

Psychiatry, both as a method for investigation of causes of mental illness and for the discovery of a therapy for its treatment, has its origin in the courageous work in the sixteenth century by Johann Weyer, whom Zilboorg calls the "father of psychiatry" and Bromberg designates as the founder of individualized treatment.

The first great work along the line of psychiatry was produced by the Frenchman, Pinel, in 1801. It was entitled *A Medical and Philosophical Treatise on Mental Alienation.* More than a half century after this be-

ginning the first important theory underlying modern criminology appeared in Morel's famous *Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Degeneration of the Human Species,* which was published in Paris in 1857. Here, as the title indicates, appeared the theory of degeneration which Morel accounted for on the basis of retrogressive natural selection or degradation. An interesting commentary upon the paradoxes of thought in his time is the attempt which he made to square his theory with orthodoxy and discover "the combination of the new conditions brought about by the original Fall." The first psychiatric work in America was *Diseases of the Mind,* by Benjamin Rush, in 1811.

In 1868 there appeared the work of Despine, another French pioneer, entitled *Natural Psychology, An Essay on the Intellectual and Moral Faculties in Their Normal State and Abnormal Manifestations in the Insane and the Criminals.* His particular theory was that the habitual criminal is a moral anomaly since he fails to evince any remorse for his evil deeds. The next great—perhaps the greatest—name in the early development of criminal psychiatry is that of Maudsley. His *Responsibility in Mental Disease,* which appeared in London in 1873, compares in psychiatry with the work of Topinard in physical anthropology. Maudsley's famous doctrine, derived from Prichard and Esquirol, was that of the moral insanity. It is a theory which is primarily British; it was hinted at by a Scottish physician, Abercromby, in the sixteenth century and again taken up by Prichard in his *Treatise on Insanity,* which appeared in 1835. Another name is that of the Frenchman Ribot, whose able work, *Diseases of the Will,* appeared in Paris in 1883.

The most important development in recent years in this field has been the establishment of psychiatry and the growing popularity of psychoanalysis. In its modern form psychiatry was established chiefly through the work of Charcot and Bernheim in France a half century ago. Their work has been carried on by Pierre Janet. The chief systematic work on psychiatry at the turn of the century was that of Kraepelin. It was a student of Charcot, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), who founded psychoanalysis, the most popular and stimulating branch of psychiatry today. It has been applied to criminology and the study of the criminal by Bernard Glueck, William Healy, William A. White, Ben Karpman, Bromberg, Selling, Larson, Thompson, and others.

Indeed, it is safe to say that the general impetus given to the study of the unconscious motivations of human behavior by Freud has revolutionized the study of criminal and delinquent conduct. The pioneer work of Pinel, Maudsley, and others, has been relatively unimportant for modern criminology, compared to the application of psychoanalytic technique as exemplified in the work of contemporary institutional and court psychiatrists. The Forensic Section of the American Psychiatric Association

bespeaks the interest and zeal, as well as the changing emphasis, in the study of crime causation which has made this branch of research more promising, perhaps, than all the research of the past fifty years put together. The introduction of psychiatry into courts and prisons stands out as one of the greatest innovations in causation study and treatment since the days of Lombroso. Recognition of the imperative need of understanding personality problems for scientific treatment is to be seen in such legislation as the Briggs Law in Massachusetts and the changed attitude toward criminal insanity. (See the chapter by Young and Oberdorfer, pp. 329–90.)

4. *Statistics.* The last of the four foundations of modern criminology is statistics. The use of statistics is absolutely indispensable to the development of any science where the deductions must be drawn from a wide series of observations conducted upon subjects of high variability. Therefore criminology in a scientific sense could make little progress before the development of statistics.

The chief name connected with the foundation of modern statistics is that of the Belgian scholar, Adolphe Quetelet, whose *Man and the Development of His Social Faculties, or an Essay in Social Physics* appeared in 1835. Not only did Quetelet found the science, but he also made some use of it in a study of crime. He worked out a law of the influence of climate and temperature upon crime in which he claimed crimes against persons were prevalent in the south and against property in the north. Since the time of Quetelet, the use of statistics has increased in all lines of scientific work and in no line more than in sociology in general. Professor Giddings stated that the statistical method "has become the chiefly important method of sociology; and assuredly, in the course of time, it will bring our knowledge of society up to standards of thoroughness and precision comparable to the results obtained by any natural science." In this development the names of main importance are those of Levasseur in France; Engel in Germany; Longstaff, Newsholme, Galton, Bowley, and Farr in England; and Mayo-Smith, Wright, Bailey, Wilcox, Ogburn, Mills, Sellin, Marshall, Warner, Robinson, Beattie, Gehlke, Bruce Smith, Lundberg, and Frankel in America. (See the chapter by Lundberg, pp. 110–40.)

In some of the European countries criminal statistics are carefully gathered, sifted and analyzed, and in the United States after a tardy beginning contemporary criminal statistics show signs of developing into an important branch of the science. Through the efforts of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and scholars interested in dependable statistical knowledge about crimes committed, the present day Uniform Crime Reports published by the United States Department of Justice came into existence in 1930. These reports, published originally monthly, now quarterly, contain an immense amount of information furnished

by law-enforcing agencies in this country and its possessions. The problem of a crime index was finally settled by using "crimes known to the police," regardless of whether arrests followed. Since voluntary co-operation by police departments must be depended upon, the coverage is necessarily incomplete for the entire United States, but it is likely that the majority of the serious crimes are reported by the larger city departments which submit reports.

The most complete criminal statistics are the penal or institutional statistics. Since 1926 annual reports from nearly all state and Federal penitentiaries and reformatories have been published by the Bureau of the Census. While of no importance for crime causation or criminality generally, they are extremely valuable for the characteristics of this selected group of offenders as well as for the number committed each year and the sentences imposed for offenses in different sections of the country. Constant improvement is being made to include more social data on offenders committed to and released from these major institutions. Statistics dealing with jails, workhouses, and juvenile institutions must be sought, with the exception of occasional Census reports, in the reports of agencies administering these institutions.

While penal and police statistics were developing into reasonably reliable sources of information, judicial or court statistics were found, if any, in the reports of individual courts. During the present decade, mainly through the efforts of L. C. Marshall and his associates at the Institute for the Study of Law at Johns Hopkins University, statistics of Courts of General Criminal Jurisdiction have made tremendous progress. While not all courts report the number and disposition of cases handled, a growing list of states is now included in the annual reports of judicial statistics issued by the Bureau of the Census. In 1934 the number of states furnishing judicial statistics had reached twenty-seven.

II. The Italian School of Criminology

Having surveyed the development of the basis of modern criminology, attention may now be turned to a consideration of the originators of the science who were the famous "Italian School," made up of Cesare Lombroso, Enrico Ferri, and Raffaele Garofalo.

Of the trio, the first and most famous was the eminent physician, penologist, and Turinese professor, Lombroso (1836–1909). Lombroso began his labors in criminology in the late sixties. In 1876 he published the work which was to become the point of departure for modern criminology. This was entitled *The Criminal, in Relation to Anthropology, Jurisprudence, and Psychiatry*. Though originally but a pamphlet, it grew in its last edition (1897–1900) into three volumes accompanied by an atlas. Among the more important of his other works are *Political Crime and*

Revolutions (1890); *The Female Offender,* in collaboration with Ferrero (1893); and *The Anarchists* (1894). To illustrate the comprehensiveness of Lombroso's survey of crime, it is only necessary to mention the fact that he carried his studies of crime back into the vegetable world and attempted to locate crime there in the shape of parasitical plants. Lombroso was early convinced that the criminal constituted an unmistakable abnormal type, distinguishable by characteristic stigmata, anatomic, physiological, psychological, and social.

The next question that arises is how Lombroso accounted for the criminal's existence. In treating this subject one also gets considerable light upon the mental evolution of Lombroso himself, for his theories grew in comprehensiveness and acumen as he became older and more experienced in his investigations. His first theory was that the criminal type was explainable by the principle of *atavism* or reversion to a more primitive type of the species. In the case of human atavism this means that a person is born with traits which are characteristic of the savage. Lombroso attempted to prove his theory of atavism by a comparison of the anatomical and organic characteristics of the criminal and primitive man, and by showing that the actions of the savage were normally criminal. The first of these proofs is not so difficult, if one accepts the doctrine of analogy as sufficient for scientific purposes, and admits Lombroso's description of the criminal. To demonstrate the normal delinquency of the savage is, on the other hand, an impossibility. Lombroso's arguments are based upon interpretations of the cultural life of savages which show that he was by no means as well informed in this branch of the science as in the physical side of anthropology.

Lombroso soon saw the incompleteness of the theory of atavism and introduced the theory of Maudsley that many of the criminals were to be accounted for on the basis of moral insanity. Not satisfied with this, he finally advanced the third theory that at least all born criminals can be accounted for on the basis of being epileptics. However, Lombroso never abandoned his main theory of atavism and regarded moral insanity and epilepsy as simply secondary manifestations of atavism.

Lombroso devised an elaborate classification of criminals, but such classification in the light of later knowledge and methods has today more an archeological than a scientific interest.

Lombroso's great contribution to criminology was his general viewpoint, not his specific doctrines. His doctrine of a born criminal and his dogma that the criminal can be detected by definite physical stigmata are no longer taken seriously, although Hooton, in his *Crime and the Man* (1938), has submitted evidence purporting to reëstablish such theories. The physical stigmata Lombroso enumerated are found, however, in connection with degeneracy and feeblemindedness generally. There are a large number

of criminals of high intelligence and excellent physique. Moreover, there are plenty of law-abiding citizens who possess many of his classic stigmata. But by taking the discussion of crime out of the realm of theology, and putting it on the basis of a consideration of personality, he may literally be said to have founded modern criminology.

Lombroso was followed by Enrico Ferri (1856–1928) who began his work in 1878 by publishing a work in which he denied the freedom of the will and formulated a new theory of responsibility. In spite of the fact that Ferri was one of the earliest of modern criminologists, he has been designated by one of the greatest of criminological critics as the most scientific of modern criminologists. It might also, perhaps, be added that his theories are the most comprehensive and hence the least exaggerated.

Ferri's first great work which appeared in 1884 was entitled *New Horizons of Criminal Law and Penal Procedure*. It ran through three editions, and in the fourth edition which appeared in 1900, he changed the title into the now famous *Criminal Sociology*. Among the more important of his other works are *The Homicide in Criminal Anthropology* (1895); *The Criminal in Art* (1896); and *Socialism and Criminality* (1883). De Quiros says of these works:

> Most of the theories that today are complete and crystallized take their rise from these books which represent the application of the positivistic philosophy to crime and punishment. In them we find the theory of the criminal factors, which is the key to the modern theories of criminality; also the most widely adopted classification of criminals, the penal function conceived in the social body defending itself, the penal substitutes, the transformation of criminal jurisprudence into sociologic science, forming thus a complete organism so readily adaptable to the medium that it appears to be the winner and favorite in the vital competition of modern theories.

The comprehensiveness and positive nature of Ferri's theory of the factors producing crime can perhaps best be illustrated by a passage from his *Studies on Criminality in France from 1826–1878,* in which he first stated his position:

> Crime is the result of manifold causes, which, although found always linked into an intricate net-work, can be detected, however, by means of careful study. The factors of crime can be divided into individual or anthropological, physical or natural, and social. The anthropological comprise age, sex, civil status, profession, domicile, social rank, instruction, education, and the organic and psychic constitution. The physical factors are: race, climate, the fertility and disposition of the soil, the relative length of day and night, the seasons, meteoric conditions, temperature. The social factors comprise the density of population, emigration, public opinion, customs and religion, public order, economic and industrial conditions, agriculture and industrial production, public administra-

tion of public safety, public instruction, and education, public beneficence, and, in general, civil and penal legislation.

To these factors we could add many others without exhausting them, since they include all that the Universe contains, not omitting a single word or gesture. What we must add, however, is the fact that, as a whole, they determine the law of criminal saturation: just as in a given volume of water, at a given temperature, we find the solution of a fixed quantity of any chemical substance, not an atom more or less, so in a given social environment, in certain defined physical conditions of the individual, we find the commission of a fixed number of crimes.

The second important contribution in Ferri's theory is his classification of criminals. This is perhaps the most generally accepted of any at the present time. The most elementary differentiation would include the two fundamental classes of the habitual and the occasional criminal. Further investigation and analysis revealed other well-defined classes, so that his final differentiation included five classes, as follows: born criminals, criminal lunatics, habitual criminals, occasional criminals, and emotional criminals. The born criminals make up a "class of individuals, physical and moral wretches from infancy, who live in crime from a congenital necessity of organic and psychic adaptation, and who are nearer to the lunatics than to the sane." The criminal lunatic adds to other degenerate characteristics that of clear evidences of mental alienation. The habitual criminal is one whose personality is not so abnormal as that of the born criminal but is sufficiently so as to make it, rather than the environment, the determining factor. With the occasional criminal, on the other hand, the relative importance of the two factors seems to be reversed. Environment is the more powerful. Finally, the emotional criminal shows no anatomical variations, and only commits crime under the influence of a momentary paroxysm.

Ferri sounds the key-note of modern penology when he demonstrates conclusively that the function of penal institutions and criminal jurisprudence is to defend society. This doctrine of social defense is not based upon the idea of the social contract, but rather upon the organic conception of society which maintains the necessity of combating all parasitical organisms. In addition to the positive methods of penology, Ferri proposed an elaborate series of what he called "penal substitutes." These are preventive in their nature and are designed to do away with crime, and hence to avoid the necessity of punishment. This short summary of Ferri's work demonstrates that the claim made for him in the beginning is not without foundation and that he makes a considerable advance upon Lombroso in the breadth and sanity of his views.

The last of the great trio who make up the famous "Italian School" is Raffaele Garofalo (1852–1934). Interestingly enough the works of these

men represent the viewpoint of the three classes of investigators who are primarily interested in criminology, namely, the anthropologist, the sociologist, and the jurist. Lombroso was primarily an anthropologist, Ferri a lawyer and sociologist, and Garofalo a jurist. His main work, entitled *Criminology,* appeared in 1885 (second edition in 1889). Being a member of the legal profession Garofalo was more conservative than Ferri. His main theory revolves around "natural crimes," that is, crime is not a legal creation but a natural phenomenon, and the criminal is a human anomaly. Garofalo, like Lombroso, concluded that the criminal constitutes a distinctly abnormal type.

If Garofalo was more conservative than his two great contemporaries in the matter of his discussion of the criminal, he exceeded them by his radical attitude towards the repression of crime. Society must accomplish by artificial means what nature does in the biological world. It must eliminate by an extension of the death penalty all of those criminals who would be incompatible with any physical or social environment. It must expel from the country all those in whom there is a considerable lack of pity and probity but not enough to warrant their execution. Thus Garofalo stands for a great extension in the application of the death penalty. Further, Garofalo defends the principle, which will doubtless grow in favor, namely, that reparation for damages be made by all those criminals whose abnormality is not sufficient to justify their elimination.

While the Italian school dramatized its anthropological conception of crime causation, it must share with the many others mentioned the honor of attempting to build upon a scientific basis. These research students, drawing their conclusions from many different approaches to the problem, maintained: (1) that the criminal is not a normal person who commits crime simply from perversity; (2) that the true criminal is an abnormal type; and (3) that his offense is not simply the result of perversity but of manifold influences operating upon an abnormal personality. They established the fact that the criminals are of different grades, gradually shading off into normal individuals. They held that those classes which are distinguishable by organic differences and distinct offenses must be differentiated in the process of treatment as well as for purposes of study. Finally, they introduced the new idea of social defense in the methods of penology, thus abandoning the old idea of purely retributive justice.

III. Dogmatic Criminology since Lombroso

In the treatment of the development of criminology since the initial work of the Italian School two alternatives are open, namely, to treat the developments by nations or according to definite theories of criminology. The latter seems to be advisable, since there is so great a variation

of theories within a given country that the former procedure would bring confusion where clarity is most essential.

There are, in the main, three types of theories or schools in recent criminology. The first, which stresses the anthropological influences, is naturally denominated the anthropological school. The second, which emphasizes the social forces working upon crime, is designated as the sociological school. Finally, there is a group, which can hardly be called a school, which lays particular stress upon the influence of the physical environment, such as climate, weather, barometric pressure, etc.

1. *Criminal Anthropology.* The first general type of theories of criminality are the anthropological. These anthropological theories deal especially with the alleged individual characteristics of the criminal classes and hold that the environment, especially the social environment, is less important as a factor in criminality than the personality of the criminal. While most criminal anthropologists have laid special emphasis upon the assumed anatomical characteristics of the criminal, some of the school have disregarded these and have given the most attention to the psychic traits conducive to criminality.

Of all the anthropological theories, the earliest and perhaps the most attractive was that of atavism, which, in its modern connotation, had its origin with the works of Lombroso. At about the very time that Lombroso was giving his epoch-making ideas to the world, the Frenchman, Bordier, was developing the same line of thought and had formulated a rudimentary theory of criminal atavism from a comparison of the skulls of murderers with those of prehistoric men. Contemporary with Lombroso and Bordier was the Austrian psychiatrist, Benedikt, who, proceeding along a little different line of investigation, examined the brains of beheaded criminals and reached the conclusion that their brains showed a departure from the normal which approximated the brains of the quadrumana. Therefore the criminal, according to Benedikt, exhibited an inferior cerebral equipment which made his adaptation to the social environment impossible. Colajanni, however, in his *Criminal Sociology* (1889) rejected all claims for any evidence of anatomical reversion. He claimed that the atavism which explained criminality was to be looked for in the moral realm, and contended that the criminal exhibited the rudimentary morality of the savage.

While there may have been some truth in these theories, still there is doubtless more error. Much of the latter has been revealed by the extensive researches in the field of primitive culture and of mental testing. Therefore, more recent adherents of the atavistic theory endeavor to correct the cruder statements of the earlier leaders. One of the most famous of the revisionists is the historian and criminologist, Ferrero, who claims that the main truth in the theory of atavism is the possession by

the criminal of certain psychic characteristics common to primitive man, the most important of which are laziness, impulsiveness, and physio-psychic excitability. Ferrero states this more recent and complete theory of atavism as follows:

The atavistic trait in the criminal's character is not his propensity to commit a certain crime; it is rather the psychological state that incapacitates him for work, to which through an organic connection, we must add that ready impulse so common to the criminal that I do not need to adduce new proofs. The murderer, the thief, the born swindler, are atavistic beings because they are unable to adapt themselves to the somewhat brutal uniformity and regularity of human labor in our civilizations. They cannot earn their living in any other way except through the periodic activity of hunting and fishing, which sums up the work of primitive man. The criminal, then, stands apart from civilization, to which he cannot adapt himself except through indirect and special means which constitute the crime. On the one hand, his inability to work renders him rebellious to the severe moral discipline which destroys impulse; thus making impossible in him the building up of a solid moral conscience in which ethical motives might gain a sufficient mutual strength, and he becomes the prey of his own tumultuous passions which, at certain moments, can lead him to very violent acts. On the other hand, since with all the needs created by civilization a man cannot live only by hunting and fishing, the criminal, unable to work, enters upon a systematic war, crime; so that, if on one side he offends through impulse, on the other, he does so through necessity in order to gain the means of subsistence and of enjoying life.

Closely allied with atavism is the theory of arrested development of the criminal, as advanced by the eminent English scholar, Havelock Ellis. This doctrine, which claims that the criminals manifest signs of imperfect or incomplete development, is based upon the theory that the life history of the individual offers a recapitulation of the development of the species. It is true, of course, that a valid theory of arrested development might well be founded simply upon the well known immaturity of children.

After atavism, the most famous anthropological explanation of crime is that of degeneration, or retrograde evolution. This theory, as held by the criminologists, has no theological connotations whatever, nor any relation to the so-called "fall of man." There are few, if any, adherents to the theory of degeneration who would claim the absolute identity of degenerates and criminals, but all maintain a close relationship between the two types. In establishing the foundations of this general relation between degeneracy and criminality, several scholars, mainly Frenchmen, have done valuable work. Among the earlier adherents of this theory, Magnan, with his *Morbid Criminal Obsession* (1888) and *Researches on Nerve Centers* (1893), was the most important. He was followed by Féré in *Degeneracy and Criminality* (1888); by Corre in *Criminals* (1889) and *Criminal Ethnography* (1895); and by de Montyel in *A Contribution*

to the Clinical Study of the Relations Between Criminality and Degeneracy (1892). Finally, this generical work was corrected and rounded out by Dallemagne in his *Anatomical, Biological, and Psychological Stigmata of Criminality* (1892), in which he called attention to the necessity for careful investigation, and for guarding against hasty generalizations.

In addition to this basic treatment of degeneration and criminality there have appeared many specific theories of degeneration. Of these the first that is worthy of mention is that of the Italian student, Marro, who has carried on much patient microscopic investigation in this field. In his *The Characters of Criminals* (1887) and *Puberty in Man and Woman* (1898) he presents the theory that crime may be traced to the defective nutrition of the central nervous system, which, of course, would lead to an imperfect functioning of the directing and controlling force in the human mechanism.

Another specific theory of degeneration is that which attributes crime to the defective development of the inhibitory centers of the brain. This theory is upheld by the Italian, Bonfigli, in his *Natural History of Crime* (1893); and by the Russian, Kovalewsky, in his *Criminal Psychology* (1903).

A third theory which attempts to correlate degeneration and crime is that of moral insanity. As mentioned above, this theory had its origin with Esquirol, Prichard, and Maudsley, and has many adherents among the scholars of their nation. Among the most distinguished of the English advocates of this theory was Sir Francis Galton, in his *Inquiry into the Human Faculty* (1883). In France, Ribot has defended this explanation in his *Psychology of the Emotions* (1896). In Austria it has found an advocate in Bleuler. In Italy it is supported in Virgilio's *Passanante and the Morbid Nature of Crime* (1888). Näcke and De Quiros have criticized this theory on the ground that moral insanity does not usually go with a sound intellect. Further, one cannot call all defectives morally insane, but only those who possess actively dangerous characteristics.

The last of the three general anthropological theories of criminality is that of the pathological nature of the criminal. Of these hypotheses of pathological conditions that of the epileptic nature of the criminal has been extensively developed since having been made one of the foundations of Lombroso's system. It has received its main support from the Italians, Roncoroni, Ottolenghi, and others. The main adherent of the theory outside of Italy is the Englishman, Lewis.

As epilepsy is the typical pathological clue of the Italians, so that of neurasthenia claims the most of its support from the German-speaking authorities. The most distinguished exponent of this theory of nervous exhaustion was the Austrian scholar, Benedikt, mentioned above in connection with the atavistic theories. He designates the condition as "a

nervous and native psychic debility, and consequently, a rapid exhaustion in all work whether it be physical or mental. Aversion to continual work, frivolity, thirst after low pleasures, and debility in moral struggles, are the result of this state, which is as different from madness as it is from the normal individuality." In addition to Benedikt, this theory is upheld by another Austrian, Vargha.

Some writers have seen the difficulty and danger involved in attempting to reduce the various pathological bases of crime to that of a single pathological characteristic and have rather tried to point out the many factors of such a nature that are involved in typical criminality. Of those analytical writers the most distinguished is the Argentinian, Ingenieros, who in 1907 presented an attempt at the classification and arrangement of the various psychopathic states related to criminality. On the basis of his studies he produced two very interesting tabular analyses of criminal problems. One of them related to the relative influence of individual and external factors among the different types of criminals, and the other concerned a new classification of criminals on the basis of his comprehensive theories. His classification analyzed the psychopathology of criminals under three main categories: intellectual, volitional, and moral anomalies.

Ingenieros completes the list of the students of the pathological foundations of crime, as well as of the broader group of criminal anthropologists. From the multiplicity of anthropological theories presented, two main conclusions may be drawn: (1) that it is impossible to reduce the many physio-psychic factors to a single, all-explanatory one; and (2) the typical criminal class is distinguished by a multiplicity of abnormalities, though all would rarely, if ever, be combined in a single individual. The net result, then, of criminal anthropology has been to distinguish between the typical and occasional criminals and to argue for the fact that the former is an abnormal being, marked off from the remainder of society as much by his personal defects as by the deviation of his actions from the accepted forms of conduct.

It should be emphasized that anthropological classification of criminals has little more than academic value. The importance of criminal anthropology is to be found in its emphasis upon the study of the individual rather than within which frame of criminal reference he falls. The very fact that these students of human behavior insisted upon the necessity of studying the characteristics of the particular offender insures them a high place among those attempting to lay the foundations of criminological research.

2. *Criminal Sociology.* The second great branch of modern criminology is usually known as criminal sociology from the fact that it emphasizes those external factors in the production of crime which are supplied by the social environment. These sociological theories vary all the way from

those which represent a combination of the anthropological and sociological factors to those which regard the anthropological elements as either negligible or simply the resultant of social causes.

Of the exponents of the socio-psychological theories the most eminent has been the late Gabriel Tarde, both because of his able writings on the subject and on account of his position as one of the most distinguished of European sociologists. He has upheld these theories in many writings, especially in his *The Duel, Comparative Criminality,* and *Penal Philosophy.* De Quiros quotes a section from the first mentioned work which summarizes his doctrines: "How many Italians and Spaniards have murdered one another with a frown on their brow! How many Japanese have stabbed themselves without the least enthusiasm! All of them have borne testimony to the divinity of social environment, the social Moloch, the anonymous autocrat." As the great innovators of criminal anthropology—the Italian School—were followed or supported in their general theories by specialists, so in criminal sociology Tarde's general doctrine of the paramount importance of the social environment has been applied in many special social theories.

The other leader of French psychological sociology, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), presented a sociological interpretation of crime. He held that crime is a natural and inevitable incident of social evolution. A minimum amount of individual freedom is necessary for social development. A fringe of society is bound to take advantage of this freedom and flexibility to commit crime. Any society sufficiently repressive to cut off all crime would produce such a degree of social and cultural rigidity that there could be no progress. We must pay a certain price for the evolution of our culture and institutions.

In considering special theories concerning the social factors which enter into criminality, the first to be discussed would naturally be that type which is most closely related to the anthropological, namely, the anthropo-sociologic theories. This school does not deny the influence of the anthropological factors in producing crime, but claims that they are of little importance without the proper social surroundings. According to the Frenchman, Lacassagne, one of the ablest of the group: "Social environment is the heat in which criminality breeds; the criminal is the microbe, an element of no importance until it meets the liquid that makes it ferment." This view is upheld also by two other French scholars, Dubuisson, in his *Female Thieves in Large Stores* (1903), and Aubry, in his *Murder Contagion* (1895). This school, then, which is probably the sanest of all, presents the sensible view that both favorable anthropological and social factors are essential to produce crime, and that without the presence of both, crime would not be likely to occur.

Another special social theory, presented by the Italian, Vaccaro, in his

Genesis and Function of Criminal Laws (1889), and *Critical Essays on Sociology and Criminology* (1903), is that criminality is the result of the lack of adaptation of the individual to the social environment. His whole theory is based upon the principle of the struggle for existence; he claims that those who are left behind in this struggle are likely to become criminals from exhaustion and degeneration, and from their tendency to rebel against those who have outdistanced them in the strife for supremacy. De Quiros says: "As the result of this struggle, crime appears to Vaccaro as an act which the winners who constitute the ruling power consider dangerous to their interests; the criminal appears as a rebel against the complicated system of domestication by which the winners try to develop only the aptitudes of the domesticated which they can better utilize for their ends." This theory, which represents crime as an offense against a ruling class, is rather narrow when applied to a democratic society where the laws are supposed to represent at least an approximation toward securing the general welfare of society, though it might be valid in an aristocratic or caste society. Nevertheless, the general theory of crime as maladjustment is valuable.

Another specific social theory of criminality is the theory of the psychic segregation of the criminal as advanced by the Frenchman, Aubert, in his *The Social Center* (1902). As this results from an exhausted nervous system, the victim becomes subject to the feeling of a frustrated life, a fear of poverty and ignominy. This leads to a differentiation from the human center and produces a life of organized hostility to it, known as crime.

An ingenious theory concerning the social factors in criminality is that of the social and economic parasitism of the criminal. It is held that the criminal is one who is out of adjustment to his social environment and readjusts himself to it in the abnormal manner which constitutes crime. This theory was put forward by the Spaniard, Salillas, in his *Hampa* (1898), and was developed by the distinguished Scandinavian Jew, Max Nordau, in his *A New Biological Theory of Crime* (1902). Nordau says: "Parasitism begins only when in this co-operative society there appear men who wish to take without lending anything, and who take away from others the fruit of their labor without their consent and without any compensation. In short, they are men who treat other men as raw material from which they may satisfy their needs and appetites. And the criminals are the ones who precisely fall under this parasitism." This explanation, as its exponents admit, applies with the greatest force to the professional or habitual criminal.

The last of the special theories concerning the social factors which are conducive to the production of crime is that which is based upon the economic and social philosophy of modern socialism. This doctrine is based upon the well-known socialistic premises of the economic interpre-

tation of history, which represents the economic factors as of the greatest importance of all in determining human development, and of the labor theory of value, with its logical deduction of the exploitation of the laboring class by the capitalists. Proceeding from these assumptions this group of writers argue that this exploitation of the laboring class leads to poverty and incomplete development.

These are the main direct and indirect causes of crime, and the present system of penal justice is simply one designed to protect the interests of the usurping capitalistic class. Once we bring in the great socialistic reforms, the causal conditions of crime will be removed and delinquency will naturally tend to disappear. This socialistic school has been mainly supported by a group of Italian writers. The most important of these are Turati, in his *Crime and the Social Question;* Colajanni, *Socialism and Criminal Sociology* (1884); and Loria, *Economic Bases of the Social System.* Even Ferri, who at first was an opponent of the socialistic theory in his *Socialism and Criminality* (1883), became more and more attracted by it and in 1894 declared his conversion. The main contribution of Ferri in this respect is his attempt at synthesis and the resultant claim that socialism and criminal anthropology and sociology supplement each other and harmonize thoroughly. He presents this view in his *Socialism and Positive Science.*

Criminal sociology, then, like criminal anthropology, presents a multitude of different, though related, theories—all of which present factors which are important in producing crime. Probably no one, nor perhaps all, is sufficient to account for all criminality. The main truth that can be drawn from them is that crime is the resultant of abnormal conditions of a social nature as well as of abnormal anthropological characteristics.

3. *Climatology and Meteorology in the Service of Criminology.* No discussion of the development of modern criminology would be complete without a brief review of the main contentions of that group of writers who have considered the immediate relation between criminality and varying conditions of the physical environment. The pioneer exponent of this doctrine was the sagacious French philosopher, Montesquieu, who derived many of his ideas on climate and legislation from an English writer, John Arbuthnot. In Book XIV of his *Spirit of Laws* (1748), along with a general discussion of the influence of climate upon mankind, he laid down the law that criminality increases in proportion as one approaches the equator, and drunkenness as one approaches the poles. While this is undoubtedly pure conjecture, the statement is interesting as representing the beginning of the recognition of the direct influence of physical environment upon human actions.

About a century later Quetelet put forward his famous "thermic law

of delinquency," mentioned above. Ferri, as has been shown, called attention to the influence of the physico-environmental factors influencing criminality. The conservative and scholarly American statistician, Mayo-Smith, in his *Statistics and Sociology* (1895) maintained that later investigations had tended to confirm Quetelet's law, and that it had been well demonstrated that crimes against property were most numerous in winter and those against the person in summer.

E. G. Dexter in his book on *Weather Influences* has made a very illuminating study, among other things, of the direct influence of meteorological conditions such as barometric pressure, heat, humidity, and air currents, upon the commission of crime. He reaches the general conclusion that the percentage of crime committed declines in direct proportion to an increase in heat and humidity, and a decrease of barometric pressure. He bases his conclusions upon statistics and upon the general observation that, though one may feel more like committing crime during a period of great heat, humidity, and low barometric pressure, yet all of these conditions combine to depress the individual to such an extent that he has no surplus energy to lead him to criminal action. More recent studies of industrial efficiency indicate the influence of heat, cold, humidity, etc., upon employee output. The fatigue studies of the British Industrial Board are illustrative of this type of research. Seasonal and monthly variations of certain crimes are to be found in the Uniform Crime Reports.

While all recognize that these meteorological conditions alone cannot make a criminal, still they hold that these factors exert a considerable influence upon the occasional and habitual criminal, and may determine to a certain extent the time of their outbreaks of criminality. While the doctrines of this school, if such it may be called, are probably less important than those of the criminal anthropologists and sociologists, and are less well demonstrated, it seems that they have, nevertheless, outlined a fertile field for further investigation.

4. *National Trends in Criminology.* It remains, finally, in this discussion of modern criminology to give a short summary of the status of criminal science in the various countries. Italy was the country toward which attention was drawn during the nineteenth century. While combining practically every class of writers and theories, the majority of the Italian criminologists are numbered among the anthropological school and the socialistic branch of the sociological. In a recent review of contemporary criminological research in Italy, E. D. Monachesi points out that Italian research is still dominated by Lombrosian ideas. He states that the attention of Italian criminologists, nearly all of whom are physicians and psychiatrists, has been centered upon ascertaining the relation between degeneracy and criminality, nervous disorders and criminality, habits

(such as alcoholism and narcotism) and criminality, and disease and criminality. These studies have led to the concept of the constitutional delinquent, whose personality is traceable very largely to defective heredity. This point of view has been set forth by Ottolenghi and his able student, Di Tullio, and several others. Di Tullio found four hundred murderers who possessed defective heredity. Ottolenghi, after examining several thousand criminals, concluded that the "real" criminal is the result of negative biological and social selection. He further attaches much significance to the proposition that physical characteristics indicate psychological characteristics, and seems to find the presence of tattooing a general indication of the morality, sensibility, and attitudes of the tattooed. Thus, the causes of delinquency are primarily in defective heredity.

The preoccupation of modern criminologists with the biology of crime may be explained by the fact that most of them are doctors of medicine. One defect in methodology lies in the lack of a control group, and while Italian criminologists emphasize the necessity for studying the criminal *in toto,* very little application of this methodology is to be observed. In the field of psychological atavism, the work of M. L. Patrizi has been outstanding.

France probably ranks next to Italy in the extent of the development of the older criminology. Its writers are numbered chiefly among the sociological school, and it seems that Tarde can claim the same preeminent place among French scholars that Ferri can among the Italian.

In Germany the study of criminology has been pursued with all the scientific exactness characteristic of its investigators. The doctrines of Lombroso were presented to the Germans by Kurella, who translated Lombroso's works into German and has been the persistent defender of his theories in that country. These ideas have also received more qualified support from Sommer, and from Bleuler in Austria. While formerly the general trend of thought in Germany upon this subject was anti-Lombrosian—his main opponents being Baer, Koch, Näcke, and Aschaffenburg—present-day criminological research in that country appears to be concerned to a considerable extent with the biological basis of criminality. In a recent survey Nathaniel Cantor points out the essentially biological emphasis to be found among German criminologists. Whereas in Italy crimino-biological research appears to have as its objective an understanding of criminal behavior, in Germany the objective appears to be practical rather than scientific. For example, in Bavaria, where the most extensive and critical research has been carried on, the objective is a kind of diagnostic therapeutic, that is, trying to ascertain which prisoners are reformable; while in Graz, where Dr. Adolf Lenz is in charge of the crimino-biological station, the objective is to enable the judge to estimate the criminal's responsibility and his dangerousness.

Kretschmer's work on the correlation between physique and temperament is well known in this country. One of the most significant approaches to hereditary factors has been through the study of twins, as exemplified in the work of Lange, one of Dr. Rüdin's associates at the Research Institute for Psychiatry in Munich. Much research has been carried on in Munich under the direction of Rüdin on the degree of psychic anomalies of all kinds. Genealogical charts of psychologically abnormal persons, the highly gifted, the insane, the feebleminded, and the criminal, have been prepared in an attempt to ascertain "what percentage of normal people reveal the traits found among the abnormal groups studied." The procedure of Dr. Theodor Viernstein, director of the Bavarian Criminobiological Central Office, which is associated with Rüdin's Research Institute for Psychiatry, has been influenced by Rüdin's genealogical approach as well as by Vervaeck and Kretschmer. Cantor states that "Viernstein assumes that Rüdin's methods of studying insanity are applicable to the study of criminals," but indicates that "the possible influence of socio-economic factors on the development of the offender's personality traits has been neglected."

While criminological research in Germany has been largely biological, social and environmental studies of crime and criminals have also been undertaken. "But the tendency among the German students is to study *particular* offenses or *particular* classes of criminals." Under the editorship of Professor Franz Exner, of the University of Munich, about twenty-five special monographs have been published by lawyers emphasizing psychological factors and making use of statistical techniques. Other studies have been made by Wulffen on sexual crimes, by von Hentig and Viernstein on incest, and by Albrecht on prostitution. Studies of the relation of crimes against property and the person and economic factors, alcohol, and seasons, have been published by Roesner; von Hentig has analyzed urban and rural crime rates; others have made studies of recidivism; while Luz has attempted to study the psychology of the criminal through the inmate's own opinion of the causes and prevention of crime. Juvenile delinquency, its causes and treatment, has also been studied in Germany. Important research in criminal psychology is being done by von Gruhle. In 1933 von Rohden's *Methoden de Kriminalbiologie* appeared. Höpler should be mentioned for his work in criminal statistics in Austria.

It would seem that the emphasis upon criminal biology may not be unrelated to the totalitarian racial political theory of the present day. On this possibility, Cantor comments: "It will be most unfortunate for scientific progress if research, and theory too, must be tailored according to political patterns in order to produce an Aryan criminology."

Louis Vervaeck, director of the Belgian *Service Anthropologique,* in-

fluenced by Manouvrier and Lombroso, believes, from an examination of approximately thirty thousand cases from the ten principal prisons in Belgium, that he has discovered an indirect index of criminality in what is called the "grand stretch," that is, "the relation between the height of the inmate to the distance between the tips of the fingers of the two hands extended horizontally. . . . An excessive grand stretch is an index of degeneracy; and criminals and psychopaths are degenerate." In addition to emphasis upon the Lombrosian morphological characteristics of the born criminal, psychological traits are also studied. "Instead of insisting upon a morphologically predetermined type . . . the search now proceeds for the nature and character of psychic or structural *dispositions,* temperaments, tendencies which in the socio-economic setting are apt to lead to criminal behavior."

In Spain much able work has been done, particularly along the line of criticism and exposition. Among these the most important are Montero, Aramburu, and De Quiros, the latter being probably the greatest of modern critics. Much valuable constructive work has also been done and Spain is thoroughly interested and very active in the study of criminology. Perhaps the leader of constructive Spanish criminology was Rafael Salillas, author of the notable work, *El delincuente español* (1896–1898), and head of the official School of Criminology of Spain. The causes of juvenile delinquency have been investigated by Eugenio Calon, while de Asua has studied the habitual criminal, Spanish and South American criminal law, and probation. Saldaña has been one of the most prolific of the Spanish professors, contributing *La criminologie nouvelle* (1929) and *Nueva penologia* (1931), as well as work in the field of criminal anthropology and criminal law. The work of Neves in Portugal on legal medicine and criminal police (1931) should be mentioned.

In England the great early names are those of Maudsley, Ellis, and Mercier. Maudsley's contributions have already been mentioned. Ellis in his work, *The Criminal* (1890), produced a valuable and reliable synthesis of the results of modern criminology at that time. Mercier has been particularly active in studying the relation between insanity and criminality. The relation of the social environment to delinquency has been set forth by Cyril Burt in *The Young Delinquent* (1925).

In the Soviet Union criminological research has developed very rapidly since the Bolshevik Revolution. Berman and Burgess characterize the period 1921–1928 as one of organization during which criminological institutes were established in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov, and other cities. The most productive was the Moscow Cabinet for the Study of the Personality of the Criminal and Criminality (1923). The period 1928 to 1931 was devoted to a "critical evaluation of the progress made and reorganization." In 1929, C. Y. Bulatov attacked studies of the

Moscow Cabinet showing that the Lombrosian doctrine was being revived. He insisted that social and economic factors in personality development were not being given proper weight. From 1931 to 1937 "chief attention has been given to the development of the work of research institutes particularly for practical service in the fight against crime, in the treatment of criminals, and in crime prevention." The Institute for the Study of Crime and Correction, an adjunct of the Commissariat of Justice of the Russian Republic and of the Attorney General of the Soviet Union, undertakes statistical studies of social and economic factors in criminality. Intensive studies of the individual offender are carried on by the Institute of Legal Psychiatry in Moscow. These reports are usually accepted by the court authorities, and those who are mentally ill are sent to psychiatric hospitals for treatment. G. E. Volkov has written the only theoretical work in recent years, entitled *The Class Character of Crime and the Soviet Union Criminal Law*. As might be expected, much attention is paid to fitting research concepts and philosophy within a Marxist frame of reference.

In Austria, Bleuler, Benedikt, Gross, Vargha, and Adolph Lenz have been most active. Holland has very able scholars in Bonger, Roos, and Winkler. In Denmark, Kinberg's *Basic Problems of Criminology* appeared in 1935. Prins and Vervaeck have done notable work in Belgium. Much of the research going on there may be found in the *Revue de droit penal et de criminologie*. Andreas Bjerre (1879–1925) of Sweden produced an analytical study of murderers based upon investigations in the Stockholm prison, entitled *The Psychology of Murder* (1927).

In Brazil, Berardinelli and de Mendonca in *Criminal Biotypology* (1933) reject the older Lombrosian theories and attempt to classify and discover criminal characteristics through the typological approach. This work is the first of the Institute of Identification at Rio. *Psychiatry and Criminology,* a bi-monthly journal edited by Loudet at Buenos Aires, covers the entire range of clinical studies of psychiatry, criminal biology, psychopathology, and legal medicine. This publication is the successor to a similar journal founded by Ingenieros about twenty years ago. *The Review of Identification,* edited by Almandos at La Plata, Argentina, and the *Archives of Legal Medicine and Identification,* edited by Ribeiro and Salles at Rio, are journals of value for modern criminology.

In the United States the development has been slower but is rapidly gaining ground at present. One of the first works on criminology in America was that of MacDonald, who published his *Abnormal Man* in 1893. He followed this in 1906 by a more extended treatise entitled *Criminology*. Another important work was that of the scholarly chaplain of San Quentin Prison, Drähms. In his book, *The Criminal* (1900), he makes an effective attempt to work out a thorough classification of crim-

inals. Both MacDonald and Drähms are conservative and critical followers of Lombroso. An even earlier work than Drähms was that of Frederick Wines, son of E. C. Wines, the great American prison reformer. Wines' book, while largely concerned with penology, has an interesting chapter summarizing modern criminology. Among other important publications in this country might be mentioned Frances Keller's *Experimental Sociology* (1901); Parmelee's *Anthropology and Sociology in Their Relation to Criminal Procedure* (1908), which gives a good outline of the main problems with which criminology has to contend and of the most pressing reforms needed, and his later encyclopedic *Criminology* (1918); Masten's *Crime Problem* (1909), largely a work on penology and drawn from the author's long experience at Elmira Reformatory; and McKim's *Heredity and Human Progress* (1899), a straightforward plea for the extermination of degenerate and habitually criminal types.

Among the approaches used by American research scholars, the ecological study of the distribution of delinquency has reached its most useful form in the work particularly of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay and their associates at the Institute for Juvenile Research in Chicago. Shaw's *Delinquency Areas* (1929) presents a schematic analysis of the influence of transition or interstitial zones upon delinquent behavior. An excellent presentation of this type of emphasis is also found in Volume II of the Wickersham Report on causation, written by Shaw and McKay. Briefly stated, the ecology of delinquency means that in certain natural areas there is a concentration of juvenile offenders as shown by juvenile court records. The important zone of delinquency lies immediately adjacent to the center, or business, financial, and political district of the city. The area is characterized by cheap rents, deteriorated property, undesirable institutions, absence of organized and supervised recreational facilities, gangs, and heterogeneous cultural and racial groups, both foreign and Negro. The area, largely disorganized, is reflected in disorganized personality, which results in high delinquency rates. Here we have the influence of low social, economic, and political status, combining with culture conflict to produce delinquent careers.

In addition to studies of slum areas and their effects upon the development of juvenile personality and activities, Shaw has also made excellent use of the life-history method as illustrated in his *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career* (1931) and *The Jack Roller* (1930). In both of these the psychoanalytic formula of having the individual tell his own story freely provides the interviewer with insights not easily, if ever, possible in formal case work reports. Thrasher's *The Gang* (1927) belongs in the same general pattern as the work of Shaw. A revised edition of *The Gang* appeared in 1936.

American criminological research, with the exception of studies of the

relationship of hereditary feeblemindedness, has spent little time upon the biological roots of criminal conduct. An excellent study of American biological theories of crime causation during the nineteenth century is *Causes of Crime: Biological Theories in the United States, 1800–1915* (1938) by Arthur E. Fink. Probably more than in any other country is there a distinct absence of commitment to a particular school or system of causation. Etiological research has been characterized by an eclecticism which has not hesitated to include any and all possibilities for understanding the genesis of criminal behavior. Thus we have a socio-psychiatric approach genetically formulated and pursued. If contemporary research methods were reduced to particular emphasis, it would appear that conflict is central to such an emphasis, whether labeled "mental" or "cultural," whether within the mind of the individual, or between the individual and conduct commands inherent in differential norms, as in the case of native-born children of foreign-born parents, wherein the definitions of the situation reveal opposing principles of conduct. Contributions of American criminologists are to be sought in their penetrating analyses of the rôle of conflict in the development and expression of criminal behavior.

A good statement of this conflict process has been made by E. H. Sutherland: "We have groups for all kinds of interests and with conflicting ideals. If an individual does not like the culture of the particular group in which he is located he can move into another group." In a society less complex and lacking the high mobility and communication of our present society, crime would be rare since only one pattern of conduct could exist. Similarly, "this conflict of cultures" is the principal reason "for inefficiency of the agencies whose duty it is to administer the law." In short, says Sutherland: "Thus back of the laws, back of the violation of laws, and back of the inefficient administration of the laws, we find the complexities and conflicts in modern cultures." A scholarly, critical analysis of the rôle of culture conflict in crime causation is set forth by Thorsten Sellin in his *Culture Conflict and Crime* (1938).

Good summaries of the progress in criminology to date may be found in P. A. Parsons, *Crime and the Criminal* (1926); J. L. Gillin, *Criminology and Penology* (rev. ed., 1935); F. E. Haynes, *Criminology* (1930); Nathaniel Cantor, *Crime, Criminals and Criminal Justice* (1932); R. H. Gault, *Criminology,* (1932); Albert Morris, *Criminology* (1934); E. H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (1939); and Frank Tannenbaum, *Crime and the Community* (1938). Other general treatises to appear in the near future are being written by Donald Taft, Arthur Beeley, and Wood, Waite, and Rafael. Excellent topical discussions may be found in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*. Readings in criminology are being prepared by Sheldon Glueck.

An unmerciful criticism of American criminological research, content, methods, and results has been presented by Jerome Michael and Mortimer Adler in *Crime, Law and Social Science* (1933).

A particularly pleasing manifestation of American interest in the problems of criminology was the foundation in 1909 of the "American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology." This association through its meetings and its organ, *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,* is doing much to advance the cause of the scientific study of crime in this country. Perhaps the most helpful thing that it has done has been the translation of nine of the European classics on the subject of criminology, thus placing at the disposal of the American public some of the best of modern works. The translations include the main work of each of the following: Gross, De Quiros, Ferri, Saleilles, Lombroso, Tarde, Bonger, Garofalo, and Aschaffenburg.

The survey of the development of conventional criminology has demonstrated several things. First, it has shown that the science is well established and likely to prove one of the most helpful instrumentalities in solving what has been one of the greatest social problems of all ages. Second, it indicates from the multiplicity of theories, that criminology is still in the analytical period, to use the terminology of Ward, and that the main work in the future must or should be critical and synthetic. Third, it suggests that the word "criminal" must be analyzed and that this analysis reveals the fact that it cannot be applied with a common meaning to all classes of offenders. Fourth, it shows that the science has spread to all lands and, through growing interest and understanding, it is destined more and more to influence criminal procedure and remove more and more of the archaic ideas and practices from our systems.

Down to the second decade of the present century criminology was chiefly dogmatic and theoretical. It rested more upon generalized doctrines than upon a careful study of individual criminals by scientific methods. It was still chiefly absorbed in the discussions and controversies created by the classical Italian school and their followers and critics. Europe is, in fact, still greatly influenced by Lombroso and the biological school. Indeed, Adolph Lenz's *Grundriss der Kriminalbiologie* (1927) may be almost regarded as an effort to bring Lombroso up to date and give the biological school a new vogue.

5. *The New Criminology.* Yet it may be said that in the active scientific criminology of today the doctrines of the classical school and of criminologists prior to 1910 have little more than historical import. As compared to the work of a Healy, the notions of Lombroso and his age stand much as Newton's physics does to the work of Planck and Einstein.

The death-blow to the Lombrosian dogma of a definitely hereditary type of criminal and of a complete biological interpretation of criminality

was given by Charles Goring's *The English Convict,* published in 1913 after extensive observation of numerous types of prisoners. But the epoch-making work was the product of a Chicago psychiatrist and criminologist, William Healy. His book, *The Individual Delinquent* (1915), marks as great an achievement in the second stage of the development of criminology as Lombroso's did in the first. It was Lombroso's great contribution to indicate that we must study the criminal by scientific methods. It was Healy's good fortune to be the first to do so in comprehensive and satisfactory manner, using the psychiatric method and analyzing and defending his methods. He made it clear for all time that we must cease dogmatizing about the criminal as a unified type or a collection of arbitrary classes. He must be studied and dealt with as an individual. Every criminal is an individual problem and can never be reformed until treated as such.

If Lombroso may be regarded as the first articulate biological determinist, then Healy certainly, if not the first, is the most articulate of the emotional determinists. Beginning with his notable *The Individual Delinquent* to *New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment* (1936), his consistent explanation of delinquency has been the effect of mental content upon conduct. Healy's analysis of mental content brought him to the conclusion that conflict was focal to the etiology of conduct problems. Stated more succinctly, the concept of psychic discomfort or emotional distress, derived from the life experience or apperceptive mass of the individual, determines the nature and direction of his conduct. Since frustration of the individual causes emotional discomfort, personality equilibrium demands removal of such mental pain, which is eliminated by substitute behavior, that is, delinquency. To understand the development of such personality difficulties, complete examination of the individual is necessary. Thus, physical, mental, sociological, and psychiatric analyses must be resorted to, in order to base treatment upon the needs of the whole person. This constitutes case study of the individual in its most highly developed form.

While W. I. Thomas has not been particularly interested in criminal behavior, his method has influenced the direction studies of causation have taken in this country. It is easily discernible in the work of Healy. Whether Thomas actually influenced Healy in the direction of the life history method may be debatable, but there can be no doubt that the theory of the "four wishes" (security, new experience, recognition, and response) finds its clearest expression in Healy's doctrine of frustration. Healy acknowledges the usefulness of Thomas' "four wishes" and adds a fifth, "the repetition of the familiar," in his latest work, *Personality in Formation and Action* (1938). The life-history approach as exemplified in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918) and Thomas' general

theory of behavior embodied in his psycho-social explanation in terms of attitudes and values and the definition of the situation have influenced much of the thinking of sociologists concerned with criminological research. The "four wishes" set forth in Thomas' *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923) was one of the most useful sociological theories of human conduct formulated by any American scholar.

The establishment of the case-study and psychiatric methods in criminology by Healy and his successors was revolutionary, and the scientific criminology of today may be said to rest on these foundations. Other types of work bear much the same relation to it as phrenology does to modern psychology. Healy carried on his work, this time from the Judge Baker Foundation in Boston, in his *Delinquents and Criminals: Their Making and Unmaking* (1926) and *Reconstructing Behavior in Youth* (1929). S. S. and E. T. Glueck have applied much the same method in their study of *Five Hundred Criminal Careers* (1930). The biological determinists tried to capture the psychiatric school through maintaining that though crime must be interpreted in terms of mental diseases, the latter are definitely hereditary. This effort was definitively repelled by Abraham Myerson in his *Inheritance in Mental Disease* (1925) which proved the slight degree of specific hereditary taint in any major form of mental disorder.

Thirty years ago one of the most popular and advanced theories of criminality was that the greater part of criminality could be traced directly to mental defect. This view was popularized especially by H. H. Goddard in his *Feeblemindedness; The Kallikak Family;* and *The Criminal Imbecile*. But the army mental tests proved conclusively that the intelligence of the convicts in the country matched that of the general population as tested in the army sample of 1917–1918—certainly a fair sample as to number and quality. Since that time Carl Murchison, W. T. Root, and others have carried on extensive studies of convict intelligence and have proved that feeblemindedness is no more marked among prisoners than among the free citizens of our country. And it must be remembered that the convicts are the most stupid minority of the criminals in the United States. Obviously, the criminal class as a whole is more intelligent than the mass of our citizenry.

On the basis of the studies thus far made it may be said that in our convict population which has been studied, about twenty-five per cent of our crime is due to mental defect; another twenty-five per cent to psychopathic mental states; and about fifty per cent to environmental conditions, social, economic, educational, hygienic, and the like.

An effort to revive the biological interpretation of crime has appeared in the science of "endocrinology," i. e., of the glands of internal secretion. In such works as Mariano Ruiz-Funez, *La Criminalidad y las secriones*

internas (1927), his comprehensive *Endocrinología y Criminalidad* (1929), and M. G. Schlapp and E. H. Smith's *The New Criminology* (1928), we have a tendency to reduce crime to the product of endocrine deficiencies, excesses, and disturbances. More thorough work has been done by Pende, Vidoni, Papillault, and others. Doubtless this school has a very important contribution to make, but it is not likely that we shall accept any exclusive bio-chemical theory of crime. This point of view will be fused, as it should be, in a broad psychiatric conception of delinquency. Personality depends on glands, but it is something more than glands.

The most recent attempt to correlate race with crime is to be found in the recent publications of E. A. Hooton. *Crime and the Man* appeared in 1938, but speaking before the American Philosophical Society in 1935, he explained that an examination of 17,000 individuals treated by race, nationality, and the nature of the offense, revealed that "all races and nationalities represented in this survey are physically inferior to the corresponding classes of law-abiding citizens; that criminals of any given race or nationality are as groups physically differentiated according to the type of their offense; that crime is a resultant of a complex but perfectly intelligible process of biological and sociological forces whereby mentally and physically inferior individuals of every race and nationality are selected for delinquency." His more recent statements echo this assertion.

IV. Criminalistics

The youngest of the criminal sciences is that which is called by its most brilliant exponent, Gross, "criminalistics." This is concerned with the scientific investigation of the crime with the particular end in view of ascertaining the actual identity of the criminal as well as his previous record. The methods and aims of this branch of the criminal sciences have hitherto been mainly a subject for the imagination of the writers of detective stories, but through the efforts of men like Bertillon, Gross, Heindl, Reiss, Alongi, Locard, Türkel, Osborn, Ottolenghi, and Niceforo, much has been achieved in practice which had hitherto been presented in fiction by Conan Doyle, *et al.*

Gross' contributions are summed up in his two works, *Manual of Judicial Investigations as a System of Criminality* (1894) and *Criminal Psychology* (1898). Bertillon's system is put forward in his *Descriptive Instructions for Anthropometric Identification* (1893). Alongi's work is entitled *Manual of Scientific Investigation of Crime* (1897), and that of Niceforo is *The Police and the Scientific Investigation of Crime* (1907). The most important work in this field is Locard's *Traité de criminalistique* (1933) in four volumes.

The main purpose of this school, that of ascertaining the character and identity of the criminal, is reached through the combination of a number

of steps and methods. The first of these steps is the attempt to establish a physical and biographical record of each criminal apprehended. Of the many methods of establishing an unmistakable physical record of the criminal, the most famous is the Bertillon anthropometric system. By this system all the physical characteristics are carefully measured, color of hair, skin, and beard recorded, as well as any special marks such as scars and tattooing. Finally, along with these minute characterizations is put a front and profile photograph of the offender.

More recently dactyloscopy, or identification by means of finger prints, which are believed to be strictly individual and unchangeable, has practically replaced the Bertillon system. The most scientific and generally accepted system of identification in this manner is that proposed by the Argentinian, Vucetich, in his *Comparative Dactyloscopy* (1904), and the Galton-Henry system. In late years the theory of the unique individuality of finger prints, though partly exploded by Beffel and Wehde, has been widely accepted as an infallible dogma by the police and detective systems of the Western World. Another attempted improvement upon, or addition to, Bertillon's system is that known as the "word portrait," originated by Bertillon but elaborated by Reiss in his *The Word Portrait* (1905). This scheme is based upon the plan of having a set of short abbreviations corresponding to the physical characteristics of the criminal by means of which the latter can be quickly tabulated. A system of qualified letters was first proposed, but later a decimal system of designation received the greatest favor, as it removes all linguistic difficulties and makes its international application practicable. Last of all is the more complete scheme of Bertillon called the "Biographical Ledger and Album" of criminal investigation. By this system there is filed on a card not only all essential physical and psychic characteristics of the criminal, but also his full personal history. This records perfectly, as far as the tabulated description is correct, all the necessary facts for criminal identification. Practically no police department in the United States now uses the Bertillon system of identification.

The second main function of the science of criminalistics in order of development, though first in chronological sequence, is that of the scientific ascertainment of the identity and guilt of the accused. There are three main phases of this function. The first is the scientific study of the traces of the crime. It is mainly confined to an investigation of any evidence of the commission of the crime or of traces left at the place of commission or elsewhere by the perpetrator. Bloodstains, dust analysis, moulage, finger prints, etc., are the most important of these traces. Owing to the minute investigation that is now possible through chemical and photographic agencies, crime is much harder to conceal than ever before. The second phase in this process is the detailed investigation and tabulation of the

setting of the crime. Photographs are made; minute measurements are taken; and everything which would throw any light on either the future testimony or upon the characteristics of the criminal as manifested by his crime are carefully recorded.

A type of criminalistics which has made considerable progress is that of handwriting identification and bullet identification. Handwriting and firearms experts usually figure in every sensational murder trial, and such testimony has gradually come to hold a place of first-rate importance. The science of bullet identification, generally referred to as "forensic ballistics," has been one of the major developments in scientific crime detection. Complicated devices for magnification and "finger printing" of bullets have recently been provided. State and city police at present employ experts in bullet and handwriting identification, and while much opposition and doubt as to the infallibility of such evidence have been raised, courts generally admit them as evidence on the same basis as other expert testimony, a question for the jury. Numerous laboratories of scientific crime detection have developed in this country, outstanding among which is the technical laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Identification of the United States Department of Justice. The Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory at Northwestern University is probably the most efficient and famous of the private scientific crime detection laboratories in the United States. Atcherley's *modus operandi* system, with slight modifications, has been adopted in this country.

The last phase in this process of the ascertainment of the identity of the offender and the establishment of his guilt is that of the scientific study of the value of testimony at trials and examinations. It is here that the great work of Gross holds the field, and his inductions were taken up and popularized in this country by the brilliant Harvard professor of psychology, Hugo Münsterberg. Here are classified and studied all those things which might affect the reliability of testimony, including outside influences; conditions of age, sex, training, etc.; and the limitations upon evidence in general. Much is being learned in this field outside the court room by practical experiments regarding the normal powers of observation and the retention of impressions. Closely connected with this special study of the value of testimony is investigation of the various ways in which modern psychology can draw a confession unwittingly from a guilty offender or a dishonest witness. While not as well developed as some of the other branches of criminalistics, this last seems to offer one of the most fertile fields for investigation at present.

Within the past ten years the so-called "lie detector" has developed to a degree of reliability that convicted persons submitting to its operations have gained their freedom on the basis of its recordings. The principle of the detector involves the recording of blood pressure when the accused

answers questions. Questions with a high emotional toning, indicating relation to the offense under investigation, results in a rising blood pressure if the suspect is not answering truthfully. Work in this field has been done by Keeler, Summers, Inbau, O'Neill, and others. Keeler has developed the "polygraph," while Summers' device is known as the "pathometer." The principle is essentially the same. Some use has been made of scopolamine, "truth serum," but there is some doubt both as to the reliability and constitutionality of "detectors" and sera.

The sciences of biology, physics, and chemistry have contributed much to the development of criminalistics. An excellent presentation of the rôle of science in crime detection may be found in Söderman and O'Connell, *Modern Criminal Investigation* (1935).

V. Criminology as a Social Science

The outstanding contribution of criminology has been to divorce the study of the criminal from theology and metaphysics and to attempt to discover a naturalistic explanation of crime in the personality of the criminal and the constitution of society. Hence, criminology has come to draw widely upon all the sciences relating to man.

Criminology takes over from biology the question of the hereditary traits of man in general and tries to discover how far heredity may affect criminality. It raises the question of how far sterilization may reduce the crop of criminals and the volume of crime committed. Psychology has enabled the criminologist to measure the intelligence of the criminal and to determine how far mental defect enters into criminality. Psychiatry provides the means of exploring the personality of the criminal and discovering what, if any, emotional tangles and psychopathic states may impel an individual to lawless behavior. Sociology makes it possible to inquire into the bearing of social institutions and organs of social control upon the volume of crime. Economics provides the basis for a scientific study of the relation of crime to material conditions of the criminal. Social statistics enable the investigator to gather indispensable information regarding the nature, variety, prevalence, and distribution of crime, as well as the characteristics of criminals. Criminology can never become truly scientific until adequate statistics of crime are available to form the raw material of analysis and deduction.

In short, criminology took over the theme of crime when it was popular and respectable to regard the criminal as an isolated, free-moral agent, choosing to do evil under the temptation of the devil. It has led us to look for the causes and cure of crime in the criminal himself and in the society in which he moves.

VI. The Effect of Criminology on Criminal Legislation and Court Practices

It is undoubtedly true that criminal law and criminal practice is still overwhelmingly dominated by pre-scientific views of crime and punishment. The premises and applications are those which are wholly compatible with a medieval intellectual perspective. Yet criminology has not been without some influence and it promises to revolutionize our whole mode of dealing with the criminal class.

In the first place, it is necessary to catch criminals before anything can be done either to punish or treat them. As a result of the stimulus of criminological conceptions and research, police schools have been established in many places which make possible the teaching of the fundamentals of crime detection. The police are not yet, save for a few European countries, a professionally trained class, but in many cities they are provided with some grasp of the problems which confront them and the better ways of dealing with them. In some countries, such as Italy and Austria, there are elaborate schools of criminology designed to provide competent technical training in the whole field of crime detection and the treatment of the criminal. Such progress as has been made in improving our technique and proficiency in capturing criminals is due to the impact of criminology on the police force.

Criminology has emphasized the necessity of a careful examination of criminals, so that we may classify and treat them with intelligence and effectiveness. Hence, it has insisted upon applying intelligence tests to prisoners to discover their mental level. It is becoming more and more common to insist upon a mental examination of prisoners held for trial and of convicted prisoners. Massachusetts so ordered through the famous Briggs Law of 1921, and other States have followed suit. Dr. Murchison and others have now proved pretty conclusively that even the convicts are not less intelligent than the general non-criminal population. At any rate, psychology has enabled us to be sure that feeblemindedness is not in itself a predominant cause of criminality, though among the more serious criminals it is much more frequent than in the non-criminal population.

Criminology has brought about an effort to classify criminals on the basis of their personality, the frequency of their criminal acts, and the like. The first attempt to classify criminals was that set up by the Italian school. They tried to combine the general nature of the criminal with such matters as the character and frequency of his crimes. They divided criminals into such groups as born criminals, habitual criminals, occasional criminals, criminals by passion and accident, and the like. This was a step forward, but such classifications possess no scientific precision, and gave

no insight into the causes of the criminality or the prospect of reformation.

Today the trend is towards a classification based upon mental traits, personality types, and other factors which illumine the problem of the reason for the criminal conduct. Hence we have such divisions as the defective delinquent, paretic criminals, manic criminals, criminals afflicted with dementia praecox, epileptic criminals, constitutionally inferior criminals, criminals from glandular anomalies, etc. This scientific type of classification is well set forth in such books as M. H. Smith's *The Psychology of the Criminal* (1922); Hoag and Williams' *Crime, Abnormal Minds and the Law* (1923); and M. G. Schlapp and E. H. Smith's *The New Criminology* (1928). The last is the most extreme attempt in English to correlate criminality with glandular excesses or deficiencies. This scientific classification has made little headway as yet in the actual classification, separation, and segregation of criminals in prisons and reformatories, but it must ultimately become the foundation of all scientific curative efforts. Some states, like New Jersey in particular, have taken real steps toward basing their penal policy and discipline on a thoroughgoing scientific classification of convicts. The Federal system probably leads in this field at the present time.

In our criminal courts which deal with adults there has been little success in the way of introducing any aspect of criminal science into the actual procedure. This remains still theological, metaphysical, and archaically legalistic. Even here, however, there has been some progress. In Massachusetts and some other states the court has the facts about the mental state of the accused at hand when the trial begins. Some up-to-date judges call psychiatrists to their assistance for advice. Notable examples are the psychiatric clinics of the Court of General Sessions in New York City and the Recorder's Court in Detroit. At the end of 1937 psychiatric service had been established in eleven Federal district courts.

In the juvenile courts some attempt has been made to develop a scientific procedure in the disposition of delinquency cases. As yet nothing that can properly be described as conforming to the standards set up by the Children's Bureau obtains even in these courts. A few juvenile courts have psychiatric clinics and good probation service, but for the most part such clinics are advisory or consultative and the judge is not required to follow their recommendations.

One dictum of criminal science is that not all criminals require institutional treatment; some can be dealt with much more efficiently on probation under suspended sentence. It is possible to make much better use of outside agencies for reform and the convicted person has a far greater incentive to try to go straight. Probation has made great strides, at least on paper. As early as 1878 Massachusetts passed a law permitting probation.

Rhode Island adopted the practice in 1899, and many states quickly followed suit. All states now have some kind of probation work with juveniles and most states, the Federal Government, as well as a number of the states of South America, Asia, and Africa, have adult probation. The chief defect has not been the tardiness in legislation, but the inadequacy of the probation service. As yet probation workers have rarely been scientifically trained, well paid, or sufficient in number, to carry out their work effectively. But criminology has put probation on the map in a statutory sense and we may hope for truly efficient probation work in the next generation, if differences in specific legal and procedural traditions existing in the various states can be modified or eliminated.

Another thesis of criminology is that the sentence given a delinquent should depend upon the prospect of his reformation. Therefore, there should be no flat time sentence based on the notion of social revenge, namely, making the sentence fit the crime. Sentences should be indeterminate and the institutional authorities should have the power to decide when release is safe. The indeterminate sentence conception was first introduced in practice in this country in 1869 in Michigan, where it was restricted in use, and in connection with the Elmira Reformatory in 1876. The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology began a campaign for the further adoption of a modified indeterminate sentence. Much success has been met in getting it adopted for juveniles and but little in securing its application to adult convicts. The best that has been done in connection with the latter have been maximum and minimum laws. A maximum and a minimum sentence is prescribed by law and the convict is eligible to parole as soon as his minimum sentence has been served, provided his behavior has been satisfactory.

During the past fifteen years there has been a growing agitation for some sort of "disposition tribunal" which would relieve judges of the sentencing power, or an advisory board to confer with the judge upon the best procedure to be followed in the treatment of the convicted offender. This is now done in some juvenile courts, but it is likely little advance will be made in courts of general criminal jurisdiction until legalism, traditionalism, and the vested interests of the law are eliminated. An indeterminate sentence without minimum or maximum appears unlikely for many years to come.

The parole system could be one of the most valuable adjuncts of our reformatory system of dealing with criminals, but unfortunately it is chiefly a paper system today. The parole officers are far too few and too ill-trained to handle paroled prisoners properly, and the public authorities are too timid in making thorough use of the parole privileges inhering in the laws of the state. New York, Illinois, New Jersey, and the Federal sys-

tem have parole boards and a parole system which bid fair to establish parole as a scientific actuality—perhaps the most important practical step taken since prisons were established a little over a century ago.

One of the foundations of criminal science is the doctrine that the prevention of crime is even more important than the treatment of criminals. It was formerly believed that feeblemindedness was a major cause of crime. Such a belief led to the demand that since feeblemindedness was hereditary, all feebleminded offenders be sterilized in order to prevent the transmission of this criminogenetic trait. The first law of this sort was passed in Pennsylvania in 1905, but the governor vetoed it. Indiana passed a law in 1907 which was sustained. At present twenty-nine states have sterilization laws. California has been the chief state to enforce such laws. In the case of Carrie Buck *vs* Virginia, the United States Supreme Court sustained the legality of such laws.

At the present time, the inheritance of feeblemindedness is regarded as highly debatable, but it is obvious that children of feebleminded parents will probably have few advantages socially or economically, and thus be more likely to follow delinquent careers than offspring of parents of sound mentality and higher economic and social status.

VII. Organizations Promoting Criminal Science

One of the important factors promoting the growth of criminal science, and its application in criminal and penal practice, has been the organizations designed to further the development of criminology in its various phases. The first to be organized were the various prison reform societies, the earliest of which was the Philadelphia Society for Aiding Distressed Prisoners, founded in 1777. This was the parent of the Pennsylvania Prison Society. The Boston Prison Discipline Society was organized in 1825 by Louis Dwight. The two societies were the protagonists of the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems of prison discipline, respectively. International organization began in the first International Prison Congress, held in Frankfurt-on-Main in 1845. A new series was started in the famous Congress of 1872 at London, engineered chiefly by E. C. Wines, an American prison reformer.

The greatest movement for the reform of penal methods in Europe came in 1889 when the "International Union of Criminal Law" was founded by Liszt, Prins, and Van Hamel. The by-laws which were drawn up at that time are worthy of quoting as being representative of the attitude of the modern reformers:

I. The International Union of Criminal Law holds that criminality and the means of repression must be examined both from the social and the juridi-

cal point of view. Therefore, it aims at the realization of the principle in the science of criminal law and in criminal legislation.

II. The Union adopts as a fundamental basis for its activities, the following propositions:

1. The mission of criminal law is to combat criminality regarded as a social phenomenon.
2. Penal science and penal legislation must therefore take into consideration the results of anthropological and sociological studies.
3. Punishment is one of the most efficacious means the state can use against criminality, although not the only one. Punishment can never be isolated from other social remedies, nor must preventive remedies be neglected.
4. The distinction between occasional and habitual criminals is essential in theory as well as in practice, and must serve as a basis for criminal law regulations.
5. Since repressive tribunals and penitentiary administration have the same ends in view, and since the sentence only acquires value by its mode of execution, the Union considers the distinction which the modern laws make between the court and the prison as irrational and harmful.
6. Punishment by deprivation of liberty justly occupying the first place in our systems of punishments, the Union gives its special attention to all that concerns the amelioration of prisons and allied institutions.
7. So far as short sentences are concerned, the Union considers that the substitution of more efficacious measures is not only possible but desirable.
8. So far as long sentences are concerned, the Union holds that the length of the imprisonment must depend not only upon the material and moral gravity of the offense, but on the results obtained by the treatment in prison.
9. So far as incorrigible habitual criminals are concerned, the Union holds that, independently of the gravity of the offense, and even with regard to the repetition of minor offenses the penal system ought before all to aim at putting these criminals for as long a period as possible under conditions where they cannot do injury.

The fact that such principles as these could have been set forth by the leading criminal scientists of the day fifty years ago is highly indicative of the incredible sloth of criminal law and practice in adopting scientific views and practices.

An International Congress of Criminal Anthropology was organized as a result of the impetus given to this view of crime by Lombroso and his followers. The First Congress of the International Federation of the Societies of Criminal Anthropology and Psychology, of Criminal Prophylaxis, etc., to examine problems of "etiology, diagnostics and prophylaxis of minor age criminality, criminal prophylaxis in connection with the reform of criminal laws, essential conceptions of criminal biology and bio-

typology, general criminal prophylaxis and penitentiary anthropology," was held in Rome in 1936, with constituent societies from England, Italy, Austria, France, Belgium, Brazil, and Argentina.

The American Prison Society was founded in 1870 at the famous Prison Congress of that year in Cincinnati, where many of our modern criminological doctrines were set forth some seventy years ago. The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology was founded in 1909. It is at present the only organized body representing criminal science in the United States, although the American Bar Association and numerous judicial councils have played an important rôle in this field. Law and medicine in relation to crime have been drawn together in the American Society of Medical Jurisprudence. Psychiatrists interested particularly in the social applications of mental hygiene have founded the American Orthopsychiatric Society, which is especially devoted to the crime problem and probably does more to advance modern methods in crime treatment than any other American organization. The National Society for Mental Hygiene, founded in 1909 by Clifford W. Beers, has taken a real interest in the crime problem, especially in crime prevention. The Commonwealth Fund, a foundation interested especially in mental hygiene, has contributed liberally to research in the borderland between psychiatry and criminology. During its all too brief existence the Bureau of Social Hygiene, Inc., made notable contributions in criminological research and its promotion.

Many leading psychiatrists have been instrumental in the development of scientific criminology. Among those who have done much to apply psychiatric technique to the analysis of criminal behavior are Healy, Alexander, Glueck, White, Karpman, Bromberg, Gregory, Schroeder, Adler, Freedman, Myerson, McCartney, Overholser, Selling, and a large number of institutional psychiatrists. Such organizations as the Federal Children's Bureau and the National Probation Association have done much to promote adoption of standards in juvenile courts and probation.

VIII. Penology

1. *The Sanguinary Period.* The punishment of the individual for violation of rules and regulations, whether incorporated in the traditions or mores, or embodied in statute law, probably had its origin when the first man able to inflict pain was aware of the emotional satisfaction derived from the subordination and suffering of another human being. The word "penology," however, is about one hundred years old, said to have been coined by Francis Lieber, expatriate German scholar and professor. Modern criminal codes, like all cultural accretions, exhibit, in their substantive philosophy, traces of their origin, which is clearly revenge. While at the

present time the scientific attitude precludes honest acknowledgment of the basic principle of modern penal treatment by the so-called "new" penologists, their acceptance of archaic and pre-scientific criminal codes is eloquent testimony of their essential emotional attachment to the worn-out and preliterate concepts of penal law. With very few exceptions, and most of these nineteenth-century, modern students of the purpose and effectiveness of punishment have been singularly unsuccessful in convincing either the law makers or the public of the utter absurdity of a jungle code clothed in the fine phrases of a civilized, industrial, acquisitive society.

Exactly as in the case of the development of criminology, the emergence of a theory of treatment waited upon a greater knowledge of the natural universe and a greater appreciation of human dignity and integrity of human personality. It was by no chance or coincidence that both criminology and penology appeared as partially differentiated spheres of scientific investigation at approximately the same time, historically speaking. The enormities of medieval torture, the gross barbarities of tribal codes sanctioned by theology during the Middle Ages, felt the same forces which broke the static orientation of medieval science. The reliance upon pain and suffering as the regenerative principle has long been a conspicuous component of penal codes, regardless of commentaries, interpretations, and annotations. This is still true, as any analysis of contemporary "ordering and forbidding" compilations will indicate.

Punishment for crime has taken on many peculiar and bizarre forms, from the standpoint of modern science, but it is likely that boiling in oil, sinking slowly into a quagmire, being thrown from the Tarpeian Rock, hanging in chains, being buried alive, suffering mutilation, going through life with the mark of the brand, decapitation, drowning in sacks full of poisonous reptiles, burning slowly or quickly at the stake, sitting in the stocks or standing on the pillory, and whipping were just as easily and perhaps sincerely rationalized by the law-enforcing agents of their day, as hanging, electrocution, shooting, the lethal gas chamber, and the life sentence are today justified by contemporary guardians of the public weal.

There would appear no limit to the resourcefulness of the human mind to invent ingenious and amazing forms of torture, humiliation, degradation, and suffering, to achieve those laudable objectives of expiation, retribution, deterrence, social protection, rehabilitation, and prevention. Thanks to the development of modern science, most of the forms of torture and public degradation, as well as the barbarous forms of execution, have practically disappeared from the penal codes of the Western World, if not from the minds of many citizens, legislators, and jurists.

2. *The Penitentiary Period.* It is impossible to trace the development of penal institutions as places of punishment. As early as the days of Socrates, prisons existed for the detention of those awaiting execution of sentence.

The church made some use of cells for heretics or offenders not dangerous enough for the stake and fagot. It is certain that even during the first millennium, the moral instrument of penitence led the church to isolate doubters and violators of the canon law in order to improve their attitudes toward official church doctrine.

According to Sellin, England appears to have been the first country to introduce correctional methods. The establishment of the Bridewell in London in 1557 had as its purpose both punishment and reformation by labor for minor offenders. The London Bridewell was the forerunner of later "houses of correction" in England.

Reacting to the pressure of public opinion against the repressive punishments, Holland established a workhouse for men at Amsterdam in 1595. Sellin declares that this workhouse with "its labor and its educational programs, its administrative organizations, its use of rewards and punishments, and the indeterminate sentence—through judicial review—distinguish it as one of the most important institutions of modern times." Similar institutions followed in Germany, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. Later John Howard found much in this institution that influenced the development of his philosophy of reform. The correctional idea was gradually eliminating the blood-letting of the earlier sanguinary period, which had lasted, generally speaking, until the eighteenth century.

St. Michael's in Rome in 1704, under the sponsorship of Pope Clement XI, marked a new era in the treatment of juveniles, while a similar institution at Ghent carried the idea of reclamation still further and cast its long shadow upon the development of reformatory penology still hidden in the distant future. In 1779 England made provision for the imprisonment of offenders. The coming of the Industrial Revolution, the rise of the factory system, the increasing unemployment, all combined to make imperative some method of solving the problem of criminality. The overloaded capital-offense category led juries to refuse to convict, and transportation to newly established penal colonies was introduced in 1787 to relieve the overcrowding of jails, workhouses, and prisons. But even these desperate measures failed to solve the problem. Corporal punishment continued, and the theory of "moral defect" was the guiding principle for the workhouse test.

Meanwhile prison reformers and humanitarians, such as the Wesleys, Whitfield, the many-sided Jonas Hanway (1712–1786) and, greatest of all, John Howard, were demanding more Christian treatment for prisoners. Howard, between 1773 and 1791, labored unyieldingly for the improvement of the English debtor prisons, inspected prison conditions on the Continent, and brought back ammunition sufficient to convince his contemporaries of the necessity of prison reform. During this period Mrs.

Tatnall, widow of the superintendent of Warwick Gaol, established schools for boys and girls within the gaol, separating the convicted from those awaiting trial, and the less guilty from the depraved, and provided useful work for both groups.

Elizabeth Gurney Fry began her moral cleansing of the women's part of Newgate in 1817, setting in motion personal work which greatly advanced reform. The heroic zeal of Romilly, Peel, Macintosh, and Buxton bore fruit in the repeal of the savage criminal law, and brought about a substitution of imprisonment for corporal punishment and banishment, as approved methods of penal treatment. Despite the many and salutary legal and institutional reforms secured in France, Belgium, and England, the real center of prison reform which was to influence the future of penal philosophy and treatment was Philadelphia, following 1776. The architects of the new system, the penitentiary, supplanting the sanguinary, were the Quakers of Pennsylvania.

Under the leadership of the Friends, or Quakers, the criminal code was humanized and the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of the Public Prisons came into existence. This society, known today as the Pennsylvania Prison Society, has been in continuous existence since 1787. It has had a long and distinguished history and has played a conspicuous rôle in the history of American penology.

The conditions obtaining in the Walnut Street Jail, easily one of the most notorious detention houses in history, where one long room sufficed for every type of person, young, old, debtor, insane, aged, diseased, immoral, accused, and witness, finally brought about the change in penal treatment which was to revolutionize the field of imprisonment and usher in the penitentiary system internationally known as the Pennsylvania system. In 1829 the New Prison, or Eastern State Penitentiary, was opened. Architecturally it was constructed in the shape of a wheel with cell blocks radiating from a central hub or rotunda. The essential philosophy was to be found in the "impurity complex" of the Quakers. Prisoners were lodged in separate cells, and maintained absolute silence. Religious literature and labor in the cell were later furnished as favors. The underlying principle was moral regeneration through reflection of the prisoner's fall from God's grace. Essentially, he must turn his thoughts back into and upon himself and by thinking right he would later act right, and since he was isolated from all other prisoners there could be no evil contagion.

The introduction of separate cellular confinement won the admiration of European observers like Sir William Crawford, secretary of the London Prison Discipline Society and later governor of the great prison at Pentonville, built upon the model of the Pennsylvania system, from 1841

until his death in 1847. He was sent in 1833 to observe and report upon the new penal system. His report, printed August 11, 1834, acknowledged the superiority of the Pennsylvania separate system.

De Tocqueville and Beaumont were sent by the French government to inspect the prisons of the United States and praised the new system highly in their report, which has become a classic in penological literature. Other observers, such as Dr. N. H. Julius from Prussia and F. A. Demetz from France, recommended adoption in their respective countries. Despite the admiration and enthusiasm of foreign scholars, other American states were distinctly less enthusiastic. In a very few states, like New Jersey and Rhode Island, it was adopted and soon abandoned. The reason for the apathy and later hostility toward the so-called separate, silent system is to be found in the rise of a rival system combining association at daily labor with isolation and silence at night. This was known as the Auburn system (1824), or the congregate, as opposed to the separate system.

It is no exaggeration at this date to say that without the Reverend Louis Dwight, who was secretary of the newly formed Boston Prison Discipline Society (1825), and whose zeal and piety appear to have been very close to pathological, the Pennsylvania system might have been given more consideration. Dwight, the son of devout New England parents, about whom more will be found in the section on Prison Reformers, became the fiery and unscrupulous opponent of the Pennsylvania system and did not hesitate to drag in all manner of moral and religious argument, as well as distortion of the facts, to discredit the separate system. His reports of the Boston Society—and he appears to have been entirely untrammeled in their preparation—were very largely diatribes against the Pennsylvania system and eulogies of the Auburn system. The purpose of both systems—the reclamation of the offender—appears to have been entirely overlooked in the array of his claims for the Auburn system.

The so-called Auburn system was a variant of the Pennsylvania system, with the important difference that prisoners worked together in silence rather than in solitary cells in silence. This type of discipline was adopted in the new Sing Sing Prison and in the state prisons of Massachusetts and Connecticut. Advantages claimed for the Auburn system were generally that it was cheaper to administer since prisoners could produce more, and also that the deterioration of continuous solitude could be avoided. The isolation in silence at night provided sufficient opportunity for moral reflection.

In Connecticut, with the establishment of Wethersfield Prison (1827) under the management of Moses C. Pilsbury, practical improvement in prison administration began in New England. In 1830 he was succeeded by his son, Amos, as warden of the Connecticut State Prison. Amos Pils-

bury has been called the Nestor of early practical prison reform. He was responsible for construction of the Albany County Penitentiary in New York, to which he went in 1845, "thus inaugurating the system of county and district industrial prisons for treatment of short-term, common-jail prisoners." Louis Dwight Pilsbury, son of Amos, became the first superintendent of state prisons in New York thirty years later. The Pilsburys were said to be "the best prison-keepers in the world."

Despite the heroic attempts of early penal reformers and administrators, it is evident that their efforts culminated largely in calling attention to the prison problem. Neither the Auburn nor the Pennsylvania system was designed for more than constructive punishment. Even the work of Edward Livingston, whose code of crimes and punishments was reported to the Louisiana legislature in 1824, which is credited with promoting prison reform in this country toward the true penitentiary principle, was hardly more than the back-drop for a further consideration of the prison problem. Livingston advocated the abolition of the death penalty, made reformation the fundamental aim, and found deprivation of liberty the proper form of punishment.

Each and every advocate of penal reform held punishment of the individual, regardless of offense or character of the offender, as crucial for a satisfactory prison system. An understanding of the individual and the treatment peculiar to his needs and personality in a situation approximating normal social life, which must be the rational procedure for reforming and reshaping the attitudes of the offender, remained unrealized, if, indeed, even considered. However, the exhortations of Louis Dwight bore fruit, and from 1830 to 1875 the Auburn system was the American prison system. The Pennsylvania system was finally abandoned in the Western State Penitentiary in 1869, and the system ceased formally by law in 1913 in the Eastern State Penitentiary. The separate silent system had disappeared in these Pennsylvania prisons long before its legislative demise. If the United States was unaware of the advantages of the Pennsylvania system, European countries were not, and it was extensively adopted both in England and on the Continent.

3. *The Reformatory Period.* Even in the penitentiary system the avowed objective was reformation, but this objective was subordinate to the concept of punishment. In the reformatory period, which may be said to have opened in this country with the establishment of Elmira in 1876, the orientation of institutional treatment looked toward rehabilitation first and punishment second. The emphasis was training rather than custody and atonement. Z. R. Brockway, probably the greatest prison administrator of the last half of the nineteenth century, became the first superintendent of the Elmira Reformatory. He came well prepared to assume management of the new institution, having been a clerk at Wethersfield

and later deputy to Amos Pilsbury at Albany. For eleven years he was superintendent of the Detroit House of Correction, from which position he resigned in 1872. He served as superintendent of Elmira from 1876 to 1900.

The reform background, out of which Elmira evolved, was the theoretical position taken by the French penologist, Charles Lucas (1803–1889), in his two works, *The Penitentiary Systems of Europe and America* (1828) and the *Theory of Punishment* (1836). He advocated a curative, reformatory type of prison discipline as a substitute for repressive, primitive measures. The practical demonstrations of Captain Alexander Maconochie, governor of the Norfolk Island penal colony following 1840; the writings of Archbishop Whatley, of Dublin, and the Hill brothers, Matthew and Frederick; George Combe, advocating the indeterminate sentence; the idea of parole or conditional liberation espoused by Bonneville de Marsangy as early as 1846; and the experience of Sir Walter Crofton in the Irish prisons, combined to bring into existence reformatory penology.

Gaylord Hubbell, warden of Sing Sing prison, visited Ireland in 1863 and returned with an enthusiastic endorsement of graded institutions and the "mark" system. He advocated the three-fold plan of prison discipline for New York State, saying: "Let a farm of two or three hundred acres be purchased, situated (say) on the line of the Erie railroad." Three distinct divisions should be made in the farm: (1) solitude; (2) comfortable dining room; and (3) as much freedom as possible. A commission, of which Hubbell and Theodore Dwight were members, selected 250 acres in Elmira. The commission advocated the indeterminate sentence, but suggested at least five years, if necessary, for reformation.

Brockway had already seen his advocacy of the indeterminate sentence successful in the Michigan "three-year law," which was indeterminate only to three years and which was restricted to prostitutes. The Supreme Court held it applied only to Wayne County. When he came to New York, Brockway drafted a bill providing for complete indeterminacy as advocated by Recorder Hill in England earlier, but because of opposition was forced to accept the amendment that the maximum should not be greater than that provided by law for the same offense.

To the New York State indeterminate sentence law may be traced the beginning of a change of public opinion toward such legislation. By 1933, thirty-eight states had enacted indeterminate sentence laws. A modified form of the American type, largely for special classes, has been enacted in Norway, England, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Jugoslavia, and New South Wales, and was approved by the International Prison Congress in 1910 and 1925.

The reformative principles embodied in the Elmira institution were based upon education, productive labor, the mark system, and parole. If

the reformatory for adults has signally failed to live up to its high promises, it certainly cannot be because the outstanding reformers of the nineteenth century were not zealous in their promotion of this new type of discipline. Brockway declared at the International Prison Congress in 1910 that the "reformatory of the future will be 'a moral orthopedic institute' . . . a laboratory for study of socially dangerous defectiveness—a research station for discovering the anti-social bacilli and at the same time searching for nature's counteracting serum."

By 1910 fourteen reformatories for adults had been established. In 1937, there were twenty such institutions in the United States, including the Federal Reformatory at Chillicothe, Ohio. The general collapse of the penitentiary system and the failure of the reformatory to reform must be laid to the unreality of the situation in which prisoners find themselves. Glueck's illuminating analysis of the effect of experience in the Massachusetts State Reformatory at West Concord upon after-release conduct indicates the validity of Cabot's belief, expressed in a foreword to Glueck's *500 Criminal Careers,* that the word "reformatory" is too long—"prison" is shorter and more accurate. Elmira, which originally contemplated only youthful offenders, is today simply another institution in the New York penal system.

The defects of the Elmira system were the restricted application (not being introduced in the prisons), the artificial atmosphere of the institutional routine, repressive discipline, no appreciation of the reformative value of individual participation in collective responsibility, ignorance of the fundamental principles of training for *social* behavior, and finally, a failure to treat the individual rather than view him as a member of the criminal class. This last defect still persists both legislatively and administratively, that is, the offender is not a different person in need of different treatment, but rather a member of a different group, all needing the same treatment. There have been some attempts to remove this last defect by the introduction of inmate self-government (such as the Mutual Welfare League by Thomas Mott Osborne in 1912), but which today is hardly found outside juvenile institutions; and the establishment of psychiatric clinics and classification committees in penal institutions. Inmate participation particularly with reference to athletics, entertainments, canteen, etc., is best exemplified today in the Massachusetts Prison Colony at Norfolk, the New Jersey Reformatory at Annandale, and in the United States Industrial Reformatory at Chillicothe, Ohio.

4. *Juvenile Institutions.* Institutions for youthful offenders, however, have made some progress since the days when Professor John Griscom, the American Quaker, made his extensive journeys in Europe in the early nineteenth century and observed the operations of child-saving institutions. Through his influence, the first House of Refuge for juvenile de-

linquents in this country was opened at Madison Square in New York City on January 25, 1825. It was built far north of the center of the city, in the hope that a century of municipal expansion would not disturb it. The second institution of the kind was opened in Boston in 1826, and the third in Philadelphia in 1828. But these were private institutions, though in part open to the use of the commonwealth. The first state institution for juvenile delinquents was opened at Westboro, Massachusetts, in 1847.

These early Houses of Refuge, however, were nothing more than prisons for young offenders. In neither architecture nor administration did they differ from the conventional prison, though an exception must be made in the case of the Boston House of Refuge, where, as early as 1831, Beaumont and De Tocqueville discovered the existence of a crude, but real, system of classification, promotion, and inmate self-government.

The origination of the more modern and humane method of handling juvenile delinquents in the cottage or family arrangement was due to the work of the French publicist and reformer, Frédéric Auguste Demetz. Looking upon the problem as a French judge, Demetz was shocked by the conventional method of handling juvenile delinquents. Aided by the Vicomte de Courteilles, a wealthy Touraine landholder who gave Demetz the necessary farming land, the latter opened at Mettray in 1840 his first agricultural colony for juvenile delinquents, administered according to the "family" system. His system spread rapidly, being first introduced into this country at the state reform school in Lancaster, Ohio, in 1855. But the family system of housing and administration, initiated by Demetz, was only a beginning in the right direction. Long hours and heavy work were prescribed for the inmates with the avowed aim of making them too tired to desire to play or engage in mischief. The progress has been a long and gradual one from these early "cottage institutions" to such a system as that now practiced in such a reform school as the girls' institution at Sleighton Farms in Pennsylvania, where inmate self-government and an approximation to normal family life prevail.

Examples of juvenile institutions which have incorporated modern methods of treatment and which attempt to eliminate the routine and atmosphere of penal institutions, in addition to Sleighton Farms for girls, are such institutions as Glen Mills for boys, also in Pennsylvania, and the Whittier State School in California (1893), which became a school for boys in 1916 when Ventura School for Girls was authorized. The Boys' Vocational School (1925) at Lansing, Michigan, has finally evolved from the House of Correction for Juvenile Offenders (1855) into a family unit institution which, while more formal in its routine than Whittier, is nevertheless attempting to apply mental hygiene principles in treating the individual boy. Another juvenile institution worthy of special mention is the State Home for Boys (1900) at Jamesburg, New Jersey. This institution

resembles a well-regulated boarding school and the emphasis is upon education. The organization is by cottages in family units. These examples indicate the general trend in construction, routine, and philosophy, of modern "child-saving institutions."

5. *Special Institutions.* Further differentiation has resulted in specialized institutions for the tubercular and for the narcotic addict, the latter being confined in a separate institution in the Federal system. Specialized institutions for the sexually abnormal, the epileptic, the aged and crippled, and the venereally infected have not as yet been developed. A few institutions for defective delinquents have been established. An outstanding example is the Institution for Male Defective Delinquents at Napanoch, New York, which receives offenders on an absolutely indeterminate sentence, with or without conviction by the court, and also transfers from other institutions.

Some recognition of the progress made toward reformation by inmates may be seen in the establishment of transfer prisons of the minimum-security type, such as prison farms. These, however, are not extensively developed as yet. A contradictory tendency in modern penal construction may be noted in the revival of the fortress type exemplified by Alcatraz Island, now used for incorrigibles in the Federal system.

6. *Psychiatric Clinics.* The establishment of psychiatric clinics in penal institutions definitely proved the futility of attempting to treat criminals as classes and demonstrated the need for individual treatment. Personality disorders which made successful adjustment in the community impossible have been revealed through diagnosis of the individual by trained psychiatrists. The introduction of psychiatric social work has advanced the cause of individualized treatment.

Many of the large penitentiaries in the United States now make provision for a clinical study of the offender both for administrative purposes and for the formulation of a program most likely to aid him in the process of reorientation of attitudes toward socially approved values. In the penal institutions for adults in the United States in 1936 there were 248 physicians and surgeons, 52 psychiatrists, 50 psychologists and psychometrists, 118 dentists, and 66 social workers, including full-time and part-time workers. Psychiatrists are also attached to prisons in England, Belgium, Bavaria, and the Soviet Union. While psychiatry has not yielded the results its champions hoped for, the failure lies not only in the fact that this diagnostic procedure is relatively new, but also in the classical attitudes of the public, legislators, and prison administrators, toward punishment for crime.

The clinic established at Sing Sing under the direction of Dr. Bernard Glueck and now continued and enlarged under the guidance of Dr. Amos Baker has long since passed from the experimental stage and is a recog-

nized and necessary part of the New York prison system. The Federal prison system, with the generous and valued co-operation of the United States Public Health Service, has made tremendous progress since the establishment of the Federal Prison Medical Center. The introduction of psychiatric service in the Federal system upon a sound basis was largely the work of former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Sanford Bates, and his assistant, Dr. F. Lovell Bixby.

7. *Classification.* Many of the large state penal institutions have established family case work divisions whose functions center largely around the problems of maintaining contacts and relationships between the inmate and his family and exploiting social resources which will be of use to him when released.

In order to make the work of the institution effective in reorganizing personality, classification has become the chief instrument by which this can be achieved. Classification has an ancient history and the penological literature of the last few centuries has insisted upon its use. Apart from separation of the sexes, the insane, and, to a lesser extent, the young from the old, practically nothing has been done until the present century. The theory of classification rests upon the belief that rehabilitation is the aim of modern penal treatment. In order to achieve this aim it is necessary to study the individual with a view to placing him in the institution best suited to his needs, or in the group which offers the greatest possibility for successful participation. Not only mental tests, psychiatric and physical examinations are utilized, but aptitudes and interests are discovered, always with a view to providing for the individual an opportunity to reintegrate at a socially approved level. Under intelligent and sympathetic guidance, the inmate is encouraged to work out his own problems, and progress reports are prepared by the classification committee. In the Federal system the classification committee consists of warden, deputy, director of the social service unit, chief medical officer, psychiatrist, psychologist, supervisor of education, chaplain, superintendent of industries, chief of mechanical service, and parole officer. These reports, together with interviews with the inmate, become the basis for judging his fitness for release on parole.

8. *Parole Prediction.* An attempt has been made to find a basis which will aid administrators and parole authorities in selecting inmates for parole. Prognostic tables have been constructed by Burgess, Vold, Tibbitts, Borden, Hart, Warner, the Gluecks, Witmer, and others. Such factors as offense, age, community, neighborhood, occupational record, personality type, habits, religion, nationality, education, relation to family, institutional discipline, work and school records, time served, and so forth, are correlated with success or failure during the parole period.

If judgment may be passed on the reformative effects of imprisonment

from the results of these prediction studies, then the prison system has failed to rehabilitate the great mass of offenders released on parole. As yet no scholar has been able to eliminate the methodological difficulties inherent in such analysis and no way is known to isolate prison experience as a factor in after-release behavior. The value of these prediction studies lies not in what they have contributed to an understanding of the effects of imprisonment upon behavior, but rather the attempt they represent to place release from prison upon a scientific rather than expiration-of-minimum-sentence basis.

Parole, which dates from the last quarter of the nineteenth century in this country, is today the most frequently used method of release in the prisons and reformatories of the United States. In 1936, the latest figures available, of 67,159 prisoners discharged from Federal and state prisons and reformatories, 37,794 were released on parole.

9. *Prison Industries.* Probably the most difficult problem with which prison administrators have to contend is the problem of employment. Constructive industry is the absolute essential required for the rehabilitation of the convict. The history of prison industries has been almost exclusively the exploitation of inmates for profit or the performance of useless repetitive tasks. One of the earliest types of prison labor in the United States was the lease system, which was for the exclusive purpose of making money for the institution. Public indignation at the brutal treatment of inmates under the lease system brought about its abolition in the United States. Objections, on different grounds, have also been raised against the contract, piece-price, and public account systems. Industry and free labor during the nineteenth century protested vigorously against the employment of prisoners in manufacturing for the open market.

Legislation between 1890 and 1929 was passed to prohibit such unfair competition. Attempts were made also to limit the work of prisoners on public works and ways. During this period several states passed laws requiring that prison-made products be manufactured exclusively for use in state institutions. This type of prison industry is known as the state-use system and has suffered least from attacks by organized labor and manufacturing associations. Some states required that all prison-made goods be so branded or labeled, but the courts held such laws unconstitutional.

An attempt to control interstate movement of prison-made goods resulted in the Hawes-Cooper Act in 1929, which became effective in 1934. This Federal law divested prison-made goods of their interstate character and allowed the states to pass enabling legislation forbidding the importation of prison-made goods or to regulate the sale or distribution of such products within the states. Even before the act was passed, fifteen states had passed such legislation. On July 24, 1935, the Ashurst-Sumners Act was passed, which provided Federal aid in the enforcement of any state

law "making it a Federal offense if prison-made goods are transported into a state in violation of such state laws." Section 2 covers even those states without restrictive legislation by requiring the goods to be labeled "so that the name and address of the shipper, the name and address of the consignee, the nature of the contents, and the name and location of the penal or reformatory institution where produced wholly or in part, may be readily ascertained on an inspection of the outside of such package." This law was held constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1936.

The effect of such Federal legislation has been to eliminate contract and piece-price labor and to limit the number of prisoners working under the public account system. The state-use system appears to be the only system likely to succeed under existing laws, and there is no uniformity in its application. Some states require institutions and agencies to buy prison-made goods, others do not. Some states fail to compel purchase of such goods, even though statutory requirement exists. Some states simply prohibit the sale of prison-made goods in the open market. At the present time no immediate agreement seems likely between the protagonists of a compulsory state-use system and those who advocate a permissive state-use program. Penal administrators agree, however, that idleness must increase unless prisoners are assured of some market, fairly dependable, for articles produced in prisons.

By October, 1937, twelve states had absolutely prohibited the public sale or distribution of prison-made goods; fifteen states had general prohibition laws, with certain exceptions, such as agricultural products, leisure-time products for the benefit of the prisoner, sale on premises where produced, etc.; and seven states specifically prohibited the sale or distribution of imported prison-made goods.

On September 26, 1935, the President of the United States created by Executive Order the Prison Industries Reorganization Administration for the purpose of assisting the states to reorganize their prison industries so as to relieve private industry and labor of competition and eliminate idleness in the state prisons. Surveys have been completed and reorganization plans are under way in Delaware, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Tennessee, Georgia, Indiana, Vermont, Kentucky, California, Oklahoma, Texas, and several other states.

10. *Capital Punishment.* The oldest forms of punishment are death and banishment. The latter, commonly known as transportation, has been abandoned by practically all civilized countries except for political offenders. The death penalty has also been declining during the past two hundred years, both as to the number of crimes for which it may be imposed and the number of nations retaining this ancient form of punishment.

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Roumania, and most of the cantons of Switzerland had either abolished capital punishment or abrogated it by disuse by 1930. In the United States there has been a recent reversal, such as the reappearance of the death penalty statute in Kansas and the public clamor which brought about both Federal and state laws making kidnaping a capital offense following the Lindbergh kidnap case.

Methods have changed from the old hangman's noose, or breaking on the wheel. Capital punishment by electrocution was introduced in the State of New York in the 1880's and is now in use in about half the states having capital punishment. Forty-one states and the Federal Code retain the death penalty, while seven have abolished it. The most recent trend in the execution of this penalty is the centralization of executions in the state penitentiary, especially in states where the electric chair is used, and the use of the lethal gas chamber, which is filled with hydrocyanic acid gas, causing death, it is claimed, more humanely and quickly. By January 1, 1938, eight states had adopted this method of imposing death upon offenders. In 1935, 199 prisoners were put to death in the United States, and the number in 1936 was 194.

Organizations for the abolition of the death penalty have had a mushroom growth in this country and have been singularly ineffective in bringing about any change in the attitudes of legislators. For the first time in the history of Pennsylvania, the first state to abolish capital punishment under William Penn, a bill abolishing the death penalty was passed by the House of Representatives in 1937, only to be defeated by the Senate. It does not appear at the present that there will be any very serious change either in the death penalty statutes, crimes punishable by death, or the attitudes of the public and legislators toward this highly satisfying form of barbarism.

IX. American Prison Reformers

The Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons included in its early membership some of the most famous of American penal reformers. Benjamin Rush (1746–1813), a noted physician, America's first psychiatrist, and a student of penology, was a charter member of the Society and displayed a keen interest in the welfare of the inmates of the old Walnut Street Jail. Teeters is of the opinion that the Society probably owes its inception to this public-minded medical man who also was a signer of the Declaration of Independence. His name appears on many of the committees of the Society and he was a frequent visitor to the Walnut Street Jail.

Closely allied to Rush and a charter member and first president of the

Society was Bishop William White (1747–1836), a Protestant clergyman, who for forty-nine years attended the meetings of the Society. Bishop White was particularly active in advocating reform and ministering to the needs of the unfortunate. The White-Williams Foundation, which today carries on public school counseling, was the old Magdalen Society for "fallen women," of which Bishop White was president.

According to Teeters, historian of the Society, Roberts Vaux (1786–1836), for twenty-two years corresponding secretary of the Society, contributed more than any other member of the early Society, with the exception of Benjamin Rush. The death of his sister in 1814 turned him into the philanthropic field, in which he worked with unflagging zeal to the end of his life. He died at the early age of fifty. He served as an officer of, on the committees of, or in the promotion of, more than fifty welfare, religious, and educational organizations. He carried on a prodigious correspondence with English penologists informing them of the principles of separate cellular confinement.

Roberts Vaux prepared and wrote a history of the Society from 1787 to 1826, upon which many historians of American penology have relied. He was appointed in 1821 by the Pennsylvania legislature one of a commission to devise a plan and assist in the construction of the new State Penitentiary in Philadelphia. While he did not wholly approve of the commission's report calling for "solitary confinement, absolute, without labor," he nevertheless signed it. He favored the separate system as a device to generate penance, which seemed unlikely under a congregate system. His philosophy of punishment was punishment, solitude, labor, and he later stated his ideal as certainty rather than severity of punishment. He was also instrumental in the establishment of the Philadelphia House of Refuge and served as one of the inspectors of the newly erected Eastern State Penitentiary. His son, Richard, followed in his footsteps championing penal reform, and served on the Board of Inspectors of the Eastern State Penitentiary for fifty-three years, during forty-three of which he was President. The careers of Roberts and Richard Vaux parallel the activities of Moses, Amos and Louis Pilsbury, although neither of the first two was a practical administrator. Brockway declared that "any mention of beginnings of prison reform in America that omits honorable mention of Amos Pilsbury is both inaccurate and unjust."

Contemporary with Richard Vaux was Francis Lieber (1800–1872), scholar and professor, who was born in Berlin and served in the Battle of Waterloo under Blücher. He was wounded twice and in 1819, for no apparent reason, he was imprisoned. He was again imprisoned in 1824 and after seven months was released at the request of Niebuhr, the historian, in whose family he had been a tutor. In 1826 he went to England, and in the

following year he came to the United States. He became editor of the *Encyclopedia Americana,* the first two volumes being issued in 1829.

In 1833 Lieber drew up the plan adopted for the organization of Girard College, a high-class orphanage for fatherless boys in Philadelphia. From 1835 to 1855 he was professor of political economy in the University of South Carolina. Prior to departing for the South, he had familiarized himself with the operation and principles of the Pennsylvania system. He visited Sing Sing in 1832, where he met the English Commissioner, William Crawford, on his inspection tour. In 1834 the word "penology" was coined, which he defined in a letter to De Tocqueville as "that branch of criminal science which occupies itself (or ought to do so) with the punishment and the criminal; not with the definition of crime." He believed vigorously in the death penalty and held argument to the contrary to be ridiculous. He declined an offer to become Inspector General of Prussian Prisons. Lieber believed that the punishment should accord with common sense and justice, should be adapted to the crime and criminality of the offender, and should be exactly the punishment prescribed by law. He was a voluminous writer, best known in the penological field for his translation of Beaumont and De Tocqueville's famous report to the French government, *The Penitentiary System in the United States* (1833), to which he prefixed an introduction and appended notes. The Pennsylvania Prison Society published his *Essay on Penal Law and Solitary Confinement at Labor* (1838). He appears to have taken no active interest in the Prison Society and is not even mentioned by Teeters. From 1856 until his death in 1872, he served as professor of political economy at Columbia University and also professor of political science in the Columbia Law School.

While the separate, silent system found many eloquent supporters both in the United States and Europe, it met in this country one reformer who was destined to wreck any possibility of its adoption in the United States. This crusading clergyman was Louis Dwight (1793–1854), one of the founders and Secretary of the Boston Prison Discipline Society during its existence, 1825–1854. In fact, Dwight *was* the Society. One of three sons of religious New England stock, Dwight had the misfortune to inhale "exhilarating gas" in 1813 while attending a chemical lecture. After graduating from Yale, he entered Andover Theological Seminary and developed a piety and righteousness which must have been truly amazing even in such a highly moral atmosphere as Boston. In 1824 he married the daughter of the editor and proprietor of the *Boston Recorder,* one of the early religious journals. He worked only a few months on the publication when his lung trouble began to disturb him. His sovereign remedy for all physical ailments appears to have been horse-back riding, and he left his young wife to ride his horse 150 miles to his mother's home in Stockbridge. He returned in a month and the

Board of Managers of the American Bible Society appointed him an agent to distribute Bibles through southern prisons. Writing from Baltimore, January 20, 1825, to his wife, he said: "There is but one sufficient reason for Christians in suffering such evils to exist in prisons, in this country as they do exist, and that is, they are not acquainted with the real state of things."

Six months after Dwight's horse-back tour of southern prisons he returned to Boston. Some time later he discovered skeleton keys fabricated at the Massachusetts State Prison by an inmate. He exhibited these at one Deacon Grant's house, and upon due reflection undoubtedly the assembled group concluded that the prisoner was not serving either God or himself to the best advantage, so the Boston Prison Discipline Society came into existence on June 30, 1825, to correct affairs in the prison world.

The first report of the Society appeared in 1826 and annually thereafter through 1854, and Dwight, who prepared these reports, addressed himself to the task of demolishing the claims of the Quakers and their separate, silent system. He took the Pennsylvania system apart, wrote and talked against it with such monotonous repetition that the Auburn system had to be accepted as the American system. Specifically, Dwight charged that the Pennsylvania system failed to prevent communication between inmates; failed to deter criminals; failed to use the labor of prisoners to advantage; failed to prove beneficial in its effects upon health, life, and mind; failed to be self-supporting; failed to eliminate severe punishments for violations of prison rules; failed to gain adoption in other states; failed in moral and religious instruction; in short, it was a gigantic, colossal, stupendous, and complete failure.

It availed the protagonists of the separate, silent system exactly nothing to produce documentary evidence that the Reverend Dwight was in error. His reports were printed by the hundreds and were practical guides for legislators. If ever a man had a mission, Louis Dwight had the mission of discrediting the Pennsylvania system and promoting the Auburn system, and this mission he clung to with a singleness of purpose only equaled by the zeal of a true believer.

Dwight had made the life and work of John Howard his model and text. In 1846, as Secretary of the Prison Discipline Society, he visited the European prisons. On June 13, 1853, while returning from court after attending the case of a poor inebriate, he suffered a stroke. On July 12, 1854, he died at the age of 61. His epitaph read: "A Benefactor of Man, A Friend to the Prisoner, A Reformer of Prisons, A Preacher of the Gospel."

In estimating the work of Dwight, one must admit that his determination to prevent the adoption of the Pennsylvania system and his equally unyielding promotion of the congregate system, regardless of the basis of his motivation, brought the problems of prisons and prisoners into the spotlight of attention with greater force than they had been before or possibly since. The

nineteenth century was indeed studded with penological stars whose propaganda and reform fervor were to affect later penal philosophy and practice in many ways.

If Louis Dwight was the first national figure to appear advocating the principles of religion and industry as the means of saving wretched sinners living in the vicious conditions of the prisons of the first half of the nineteenth century, his crusading spirit was equaled, if not surpassed, by the organizing ability and religious conviction of Enoch Cobb Wines (1806–1879). Wines, who was school teacher, minister, college professor, and briefly president of the ill-fated University of St. Louis, found the proper field for his remarkable talents at the age of 56, when he became secretary of the New York Prison Association in 1862, where he remained about eight years. He brought to the field of prison reform the deep religious conviction which characterized so many of the reformers of this period. Through his efforts considerable money was raised for the Association and he helped to increase its influence and effectiveness. Wines, as McKelvey so vividly puts it, dreamed of "a world-organization in which the outstanding men of all nations would join to plan an ideal prison system." Before such a grand ideal could be achieved, Wines saw the necessity for a national congress where principles of reform could have a hearing. Through his efforts, although ably assisted by that young Emersonian, Franklin Benjamin Sanborn, and Z. R. Brockway, the first National Congress of Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline assembled in the city of Cincinnati on October 12, 1870, and continued for nearly a week. He was unanimously named secretary of the Association, and held that position until his death. While the New York and Pennsylvania societies hesitated in responding to the suggestion, Wines, with the aid of a few influential leaders, managed to gather 130 delegates from twenty-four states, Canada, and South America. The absence of the Pennsylvania group precluded any contests over the relative importance and merits of the two systems or their founders.

Papers at the first National Congress were prepared by such outstanding leaders as Wines himself on "The Present Outlook of Prison Discipline in the United States." Z. R. Brockway's prophetic and remarkably able presentation, "The Ideal of a True Prison System for a State," advocated the indeterminate sentence which would allow the state to retain custody until the offenders could "be returned to society with ordinary safety and in accord with their own highest welfare," and also classification, constructive employment, moral training, and education. "The ideal of a true prison system . . . is the *Christian ideal.*" Sir Walter Crofton prepared a paper on "The Irish System of Prison Discipline." Other papers were by such noted figures as Gaylord Hubbell, Bonneville de Marsangy, Mary Carpenter, and the Reverend J. L. Milligan.

Wines had extraordinary ability to win supporters for his beliefs. San-

born, who was chairman of the committee on arrangements, of which Brockway and Wines were also members, once wrote that Wines was likely to be methodical whether upon matters well known and accepted, or open to debate, and yielded only when Sanborn insisted upon the brevity of life, "but not without a pang." An instance of this is to be found in his publishing his own original set of principles of the first National Prison Congress as well as the list revised by a subcommittee of which Sanborn was a member.

In 1871 Wines was a member of a commission to study prison labor in New York, and in its report insisted upon employment of prisoners. The opposition of free labor and industry, according to Wines, was ridiculous and the effect upon labor and industry of prison-made goods would be the same as the extraction of a bucket of water from the Hudson upon navigation in that river. He was opposed to contract labor and believed that trades "should be chosen with direct reference to the effect upon the mental and moral development of the prisoner and his economic status after his discharge." Unless labor was productive, the moral influence was non-existent. He heartily endorsed the indeterminate sentence and advocated the Irish system of prison discipline. At the National Congress of 1874 he insisted the system should be known as the Maconochie-Marsangy-Crofton system of prison discipline: Maconochie for his experiment, Marsangy for his advocacy, and Crofton for applying its principles in administration.

Wines, like Dwight, was a great admirer of John Howard. His son, Frederick Howard Wines, who was to take his place, was said to have been named for the great English reformer. Sanborn, writing a memoir of E. C. Wines, quotes F. H. Wines as saying that without the elder Wines, Elmira would not have been established, nor would Sherborn Reformatory for Women in Massachusetts, while the juvenile court, probation officers, probation and parole for first offenders might have been delayed a generation. According to Sanborn, Count di Forest, an Italian councillor, stated: "To Dr. Wines more than to any other individual is due the great reform which is the glory of the latter half of the nineteenth century."

According to his son, Dr. Wines set forth three principles basic to the reformatory system: (1) Work with nature, not against it. This condemned both the Auburn and Pennsylvania systems. (2) Gain the good will of the convict. Instil hopes of early release through the convict's own efforts. (3) A system of reliable tests to guarantee the genuineness of reformation before liberation. He believed in the reformability of criminals, but insisted that reformation of the prisons was the first task. He emphasized the value of religion and religious instruction and advocated libraries, lectures, and competitive examinations. As his son so aptly put it: "He had a passion for saving men."

Dr. Wines was the prime mover in the organization of the First International Prison Congress, under the presidency of the Earl of Carnavon, held in London in 1872, and was honorary president of the Second International Congress in Stockholm in 1878. There was no one in the field of prison reform in the United States or Europe whom Wines did not know. He won the respect and admiration of all who knew him because of his well-grounded enthusiasm and sincerity. In contrast to Louis Dwight, his enthusiasm enabled him to achieve his objectives without the evangelistic, from-the-mountain-top pronouncements of the Prison Discipline Society's secretary. Wines' place in American penal reform probably is higher than that of any other individual. He died in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at the home of John Wilson, the printer of his last volume, in December, 1879, and the following year appeared his greatest work, *State of Prisons and Child-Saving Institutions in the Civilized World.* His other work in penology was *The Prisons and Reformatories of the United States and Canada* (1867). It is interesting to note in connection with Wines that neither he nor his son appears in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* but Brinkerhoff, Brockway, and Louis Dwight are given brief biographical notices.

The examination of the rôle played by Z. R. Brockway must be brief because his contributions are to be found in several other parts of this section. Born in Lyme, Connecticut, in 1827, his first interest in prison work came from his clerkship in the Wethersfield Prison at the age of twenty-one. Later he was inspired by the work of Amos Pilsbury (for whom he had great respect and admiration) at the Albany County Penitentiary. In 1854 he became head of the Monroe County Penitentiary at Rochester, New York, and in 1861 he became superintendent of the Detroit House of Correction. He was the first superintendent of the newly established Elmira Reformatory, which position he held from its opening until 1900. He was president of the American Prison Association from 1897 to 1898. From 1905 to 1907 he was mayor of Elmira, and died in August, 1920.

Brockway's experience spanned a century of prison reform in the United States, and his contribution during this period makes him a worthy colleague of E. C. Wines. Brockway emphasized the necessity of reforming the criminal and was convinced the older prison discipline contained very little that would accomplish that end. That there must be punishment, he had no doubt, but punishment must be for protection and training must be the instrument of reform. Brockway, in common with many philosophers of the nineteenth century, believed that education was the means of securing solutions to their problems. Elmira was to be an educational institution for youthful offenders, but sufficient time must be allowed for the institution to provide the training necessary to prevent a relapse into crime after release. Educational and vocational training were central to his philosophy of penal treatment. Discipline was to be controlled by a system of marks

and grades, as in the Irish system, and parole was to be gained only after demonstrated fitness for release.

Brockway's view of the *indeterminate* sentence was in terms of the definition of the word. Prisoners should be held until they could be released without probability of returning to the institution. He recommended centralized state control over juvenile reform schools, district reformatories, or houses of correction; reception prisons for adult males where each convict would be examined; and women's reformatories. He also suggested that incorrigibles should be detained for life, while others should be transferred to industrial or intermediate reformatories.

Speaking before the Prison Congress at St. Paul in 1886, Brockway declared that the true purpose of the penitentiary is protection—"protection from fresh crimes by the same criminals; protection from their contaminating influence when released . . . and protection from any unnecessary burden of cost for their maintenance in prison. These three elements of protection cannot be divorced. . . . This principle should be at the basis of any and all plans for prison industries; namely, the use of labor for reformative results." He believed that prisoners should support themselves and if incapable be relegated to the pauper's class, "receiving only a pauper's proper fare."

The great contribution made by Brockway to prison reform lay in the fact that he was not a pulpit reformer, not a glowing idealist, no lover of the Lord and humanity exclusively, but a practical administrator bent upon integrating the principles of Christianity with the realities of institutional administration. He held the support of Wines, himself a Christian reformer, by sincerely endorsing Wines' view of religion, and he gained support for his program from other wardens because he was one of them. McKelvey graphically places Brockway in the prison reform movement: "Louis Dwight and Enoch Wines had dominated their eras by organizing propaganda for reform; Zebulon Brockway won his laurels by service in the ranks." There were other wardens of his day who were his administrative equals, but few united so many talents with practical service. "Although not as widely famed as the elder Wines, Brockway during at least twenty of his fifty years of service was the most significant laborer in the prison field." His famous *Fifty Years of Prison Service* was published in 1912.

There remain a few other nineteenth-century figures to be noticed briefly. F. H. Wines (1838–1912), the son of E. C. Wines and like him a licensed preacher, became the first secretary of the Illinois State Board of Public Charities in 1869, remaining in that capacity until 1892. In 1886 he founded the *International Record of Charities and Correction,* which merged with the *Charities Review* in 1888. From 1887 to 1890 he was secretary of the National Prison Association. He returned to Illinois in 1896 and remained

there through 1898. His influence upon charitable institutions was profound, and the inauguration of the cottage system for treatment of the insane at Kankakee was the result of his efforts to humanize their treatment. He eliminated the medieval chains and shackles and advocated psychological research and hydrotherapy. He was influential in the founding of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections in 1878 and served as president in 1883. He was special adviser in the preparation of the Tenth Census report on the Defective, Dependent and Delinquent Classes of the Population of the United States (1881). He became assistant director of the Twelfth Census, being mainly responsible for the Report on Crime, Pauperism and Benevolence in the United States (2 Vols., 1895–1896). He served as statistician to the Illinois Board of Control (1909) and started the *Institution Quarterly*. He expanded a series of lectures on crime and punishment delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston, which appeared as *Punishment and Reformation* in 1895. This volume was easily the best single volume in its field for many years. It was revised by Winthrop Lane in 1919.

Another reformer whose interests were almost as varied as E. C. Wines was Franklin Benjamin Sanborn (1831–1917) regarded even in his declining years as a radical. Sanborn was born in Hampton Falls, New Hampshire, on a farm. He graduated from Harvard in 1855 and moved to Concord. He was a disciple of Emerson and was influential in forming a kind of philosophic group in that literary center. In 1857 he became New England agent for John Brown, and when he learned of Brown's Harpers Ferry scheme, he tried to dissuade him. Finding it a futile task he worked with him. He was called to testify before a committee of the United States Senate and refused. In order to escape apprehension he fled to Quebec twice and was finally taken into custody in 1860. He was immediately released upon a writ of habeas corpus and the arresting party was driven out of Concord by a posse of townspeople. The next day he was discharged by a decision written by Chief Justice Shaw. Sanborn became one of the editors of the *Springfield Republican* and after resignation from that position remained a member of the staff until 1914.

In 1863 Governor John Albion appointed Sanborn secretary of the newly formed State Board of Charities, the first of its kind in the United States, and probably in the world. As secretary, among other duties, were the supervision and inspection of some thirty prisons. During his five-year tenure as secretary, he profoundly influenced the administration of penal and charitable institutions not only in Massachusetts but in other states as well. His system of inspection and reports became the models for other departments which followed in other states. He made himself an expert on the care of the insane and drafted many bills which were enacted into law for the administration of penal as well as charitable institutions. He

resigned as secretary in 1868 and was appointed chairman of the Board in 1874, remaining in that capacity until 1876. Three years later he became inspector of charities for Massachusetts and left that post in 1888.

Sanborn was one of the most enlightened and progressive reformers of this period. He was one of the founders of the American Social Science Association, the National Prison Association, and the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, now known as the National Conference of Social Work. He lectured at Cornell University, Smith and Wellesley colleges. Sanborn appeared as a speaker in nearly every meeting of the National Prison Association during his active career.

In 1864 Sanborn visited all the penal institutions of Massachusetts and many in other states, and made a study of what he referred to as "the Irish convict law and practice." Upon this and the defects of the Massachusetts prison system he reported to the Massachusetts legislature in 1865. His observations upon European prisons were published in the *North American Review* in January, 1866. His state report fell into the hands of E. C. Wines and Professor Theodore W. Dwight, who were then investigating the whole prison system of the United States. Sanborn wrote in his memoir on E. C. Wines in 1910: "I was able officially to promote their inquiry in Massachusetts." He also mentions that "the similarity of aims and enthusiasm brought together the elder and the younger," Sanborn being at this time 33 years old and Wines 56. They traveled together, visited prisons, and addressed audiences, and Wines spent a few days with Sanborn in Concord just before the former's death. Sanborn claims that Massachusetts anticipated New York in "laying before the people of America the then recent theories of Captain Maconochie, which reduced to practice, had demonstrated their soundness under the system of Captain Walter Crofton."

Wines and Sanborn met Brockway in Detroit in 1866 and they constituted during their association the Big Three of national prison reform. Sanborn called the first congress to order in 1870 and "the three of us, Mr. Brockway, Dr. Wines and myself, were the working force on the business committee of the sessions." Sanborn advocated education of prisoners and that they teach each other. He endorsed classification, the indeterminate sentence, useful labor, and self-support. Sanborn left no books in the field of prison reform, but he wrote many pamphlets and was responsible for the preparation of many reports. He died in Plainfield, New Jersey, February 24, 1917, and was buried in Concord, Massachusetts.

Two other influential figures were Charles Richmond Henderson (1848–1915) and Hastings Hornell Hart (1851–1932). Like most of the outstanding reform propagandists, both of these were clergymen. Henderson was born in Covington, Indiana, and received his Bachelor's degree from the old University of Chicago and his Bachelor of Divinity from the Baptist Union Theological Seminary. In 1901 he received the degree of PH.D. from

the University of Leipzig. In 1873 he became pastor of the First Baptist Church in Terre Haute, Indiana, and in 1882 transferred to the Woodward Avenue Baptist Church in Detroit where he remained for ten years. He was called to the University of Chicago as university chaplain and served as assistant professor of sociology and university recorder. In 1897 he became head of the department of practical sociology. He remained chaplain of the University.

Henderson's interest in social problems grew out of his experiences as pastor of a small church near the Chicago stockyards where he had a fine opportunity to observe conditions. He became interested in prison problems and through long study while a minister became a recognized authority in the field. In 1893 he wrote *Introduction to the Study of the Dependent, Defective and Delinquent Classes.* He also was the author of *Modern Prison Systems* (House Document 452, 52nd Congress, Second Session, 1903), and *Cause and Cure of Crime* (1914). He served as associate editor of the *American Journal of Theology,* the *American Journal of Sociology,* and the *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.* He was president of the National Conference of Charities from 1898 to 1899. His chief interest became prison reform and he was a member of national and international prison organizations to advance that cause, becoming president of the National Prison Association in 1901. He died at Charleston, South Carolina, where he had gone to recover his health, in March, 1915.

Henderson was one of those rare persons who combined the academic with the practical. He was open-minded and loyally attached to the truth. Deeply religious, he had an unwavering faith in mankind which won him the respect and affection of all religious groups. He was an able teacher, and a pioneer investigator in a new field.

While Henderson was preacher, professor, and practical investigator, Hastings Hornell Hart was preacher, investigator, and administrator. Born in Brookfield, Ohio, in 1851, he received his A.B. from Oberlin University in 1875. In 1885 he took his Master's degree there also, in the interim receiving his Bachelor of Divinity degree from Andover Theological Seminary in 1880. From 1875 to 1877 he worked as a clerk in an Indian agency in Dakota Territory. He became a pastor in Worthington, Minnesota, in 1880, and remained three years, resigning to enter social service work. He was appointed the first secretary of the Minnesota State Board of Charities and Corrections in 1883 and served in that capacity for the next fifteen years. During this period he inaugurated far-reaching reforms in the jails of that state, in the treatment of the insane, and in the handling of the problem of juvenile delinquency. His reports were influential in the form and direction which similar reforms were to take in this country and abroad. In 1893 he was president of the National Conference of Social Work.

From 1898 to 1908, Hart was superintendent of the Illinois Children's Home and Aid Society and in the latter year became head of the Child Aid Department of the Russell Sage Foundation. His title was changed in 1924 to "consultant in delinquency and penology," representing a change of interest from children's problems to prison reform. During the World War he investigated prisons in some of the southern states and in 1926 was chairman of the committee on jails of the American Prison Association. He led the investigation by the committee of the Federal prison system and in his reports pointed out the conditions of overcrowding not only of the Federal system but also of the jails in which Federal prisoners were farmed out. These reports led to a Congressional investigation which resulted in the appointment of Sanford Bates, a Massachusetts attorney, then the Commissioner of Correction in that state, as superintendent of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

In addition to innumerable pamphlets, articles, and reports, Hart formulated plans for training schools for guards and other prison officers which have been put into effect. He developed thirteen prison projects for the state of New York, to cost $40,000,000, and four projects for New York City requiring an appropriation of $15,000,000. Through his efforts the ancient structure on Welfare Island is being replaced by the modern prison plant on Riker's Island. Among his written works are *Restoration of the Criminal* (1922), *Study of the Penitentiaries of Pennsylvania* (1923), and *County Jails in the Light of the "Declaration of the Principles of 1870."* He was president of the American Prison Association, 1921–1922, and was appointed to serve two five-year terms as vice-president of the International Prison Congress in 1925 and 1930. In 1930 he was awarded the Roosevelt Medal for Distinguished Service for the promotion of social justice. He died in White Plains, New York, on May 9, 1932.

While all may not agree with the estimate here given of the reformers selected, and while J. L. Milligan, Roeliff Brinkerhoff, Amos and Louis Pilsbury, Dorothea Dix, Gaylord Hubbell, S. J. Barrows, and others perhaps deserve more than passing mention, there can be no doubt that their combined efforts are a magnificent testimonial to the faith they had in the principles of reform.

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[21]

THE SOCIAL THEORY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL WORK

Philip Klein

I. Relation of Social Work to the Social Sciences

The principal difference between theories in social work and theories in the other fields of social science is one of orientation rather than of subject matter. The facts that are observed, collected and classified by the social worker are not in themselves of a different order from those discussed by sociologist, economist, psychologist, or jurist. They tend indeed to overlap a considerable field of the social sciences and some portion of the biological and medical areas. But the principles underlying classification are not identical. The sciences, physical and social, have a distinguishable dichotomy of theory and application. With respect to theory they focus their interest on the discovery of facts and on the formulation of generalizations that may describe the relation between the observed facts. The more complete and satisfactory a generalization proves to be in describing the relation between the facts observed, the more serviceable it becomes as a theory. In this respect, the social sciences are unlike the physical sciences chiefly in the rate of their approximation to a mathematical precision of statement, and in the degree of predictability or positive correlation between sets of facts or phenomena. Social work differs from both the physical sciences and the social sciences in that it is oriented not to the observation and description of existing relations so much as to the *creation* of a *new* relation between social facts coming under its observation.

In some respects this feature of social work may not be unique. "Programs" and "systems" oriented to action have arisen within the fields of political science and economics also, in such forms as parliamentary democracy, socialism, anarchism, or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Obvious differences between social work and these programs will suggest themselves on a moment's reflection. But the principal difference lies in the only fundamental characteristic of social work—that it represents a general social custom or habit of action of impressive historical continuity, a cultural tradition of wide prevalence. This fact predetermines the conditions of theoretical speculation within its field. The tradition itself has been ra-

tionalized and modified, stimulated and repressed. It has assumed many institutional forms. It has changed apparent objectives and responded to a kaleidoscopic complexity of motivation. But it continued under all conditions to present a categorical imperative for social and individual action, demanding that those found in socially undesirable circumstances be aided toward a socially acceptable standard. The judgment or concept of "social undesirability" is not in itself part of social work theory, but only a type of datum considered in connection with the observed social facts. Thus to take a frequently occurring example: In a family of five members, the father's insanity creates economic distress, psychological tensions, and certain health problems; his legal status as a World War veteran brings to the family resources that would not otherwise be available. The facts constituting this family picture might be organized in terms of several disciplines, such as economics, psychology, public health, social legislation. The judgment that this family represents a socially undesirable status, combined with the assumed purpose of actually changing the family status, renders the situation pertinent to the area of social work. It is implied in this assumption that the status *can* be changed, or that a new relation may be established in the facts observed in the total family situation. If the socially undesirable aspects of our case are to be converted into acceptable ones, several new conditions must be created: the existing relation between the material facilities of the community and those available to the family must be changed; the tension recognized between members of the family must be relieved; potential facilities for compensation and hospitalization are to be made actual. It is the task of social work to attempt these adjustments. It is competent to do so and claims for itself a certain scientific status in the method pursued to that end, because its generalizations are derived from experience, through the scientific process of observation, classification, and comparison. *Social work theory concerns itself with principles and methods for converting the socially undesirable situation of a given individual, family or community, into a socially acceptable one,* "under conditions of the existing social order."

It will be the task of the present chapter to present social work theories, insofar as they have been formulated, to indicate some of their relations to each other and to the social sciences, and to point out briefly their historical connections and their prominent sponsors.

Three types of material usually go into the formulation of social work theories: the *a priori* judgments on the basis of which the concept "socially desirable" is differentiated from the "socially undesirable"; the description and analysis of the observed social facts, usually stated in terms of the established social sciences; and the methods adopted by social work for converting the conditions encountered into new and more desirable ones. While the first two types of material do not in themselves constitute social

work theory, they are of the stuff of which the latter is made, the data whose relations constitute the subject matter of social work.

The *a priori* judgments which guide and determine the direction of social work are judgments of social value. They arise from the *mores* of the group, vary with them, and are subject to the same influences that mold the *mores* themselves. In a community where the aged are killed off or where the provision of food is a communal task, we should certainly not be looking for social work in the form of homes for the aged, or of methods for dealing with "non-support" of wife. The very idea of charity or relief would have no meaning in a culture where the economic system is based on communal ownership and general participation. The system of social work discussed here is that based on social values established in Western civilization over a fairly long period of relatively stable basic *mores*. Some parts of this system are indeed more general and more constant than others, and some show conflicting trends of *mores*-building. Relief of the starving, shelterless, and sick, for example, has a longer and more uniform history than comfort of prisoner, or aid of unmarried mother. The latter is an interesting example of the effect on social institutions of *mores* that conflict with each other and undergo changes in their relative strength. Although social values are determined almost automatically by the *mores* and traditions of the group, they are affected also by social theories deliberately arrived at, and consciously held. In the earlier period of Western civilizaion, these theories may have had a theological or political character exclusively; but in recent centuries, independent theories of social philosophy and findings of the social sciences have had an increasing influence in shaping social judgments. More and more, the findings of the social sciences are affecting and modifying both the *a priori* judgments and the more specifically theoretical points of view in social work.

Almost every specific situation upon which the judgment of "socially undesirable" may be passed can be regarded either as a unique situation or as a type situation, and the means to be employed for effecting a change will vary accordingly. Thus, aiding a widow with small children is seen as a specific task to be met largely by the provision of those material goods which depended upon the husband's work. The *mores* decree that the particular widow be helped. Their pressure constitutes a categorical imperative both on individuals and on the community. Beyond this, however, the widowed mother represents a type situation in which the interests of several disciplines in the social sciences converge. The type as well as the specific incidence is socially undesirable, and social work theory for the elimination of both has been formulated from the generalizations supplied by the social sciences. Thus the death of the husband may be regarded as a statistically inevitable incidence devoid of any moral aspect; but the specific occurrence may have been determined in part by inadequate safety ap-

pliances in industry, by alcoholism, by speeding-up; the family may have remained destitute for lack of adequate savings and insurance, this again being due perhaps to the lack of vocational training of the husband. Such generalizations as these do not deny the categorical imperative of the *mores* that the widow be helped, but they do define her situation as a "type" with respect to which the aiding of the particular widow in question can have little significance. There is, therefore, a dual orientation for the adjustment of this socially undesirable situation: one towards the adjustment of the particular widow's condition; the other towards dealing with possible occurrences of the type situation. The one calls for material relief and probably social case work; the other involves safety-engineering, pension legislation, regulation of wages.

It is in this second field of orientation that confusion has arisen between theories of social work and movements of social reform. The relation between these is of considerable theoretical importance, and will be discussed again in connection with those special areas of social work which are on the borderline between social work and social reform.

One of the significant facts about social work is that its practice, and consequently its theories also, have been almost completely institutionalized. In this respect social work bears a striking resemblance to political theories. These, insofar as they are not mere speculation, are embodied in and expressed by a wide range of "states" and governmental patterns. The institutions of social work express, in the first place, the *mores* of the group and change with them; they respond, however, though less readily, also to changes in social philosophy and to the generalizations of the social sciences. Changes in *mores,* even in Western civilization, have always been relatively slow. Theories of social philosophy, on the other hand, have changed much faster in the last half dozen decades, during which social philosophy has been tested and revised by the growth of the social sciences. This almost precipitate bursting forth of the social sciences has already produced marked changes in the social work institutions, despite the brief space of time, and despite the resistance to change shown by all institutions. We will find, therefore, on examining the social work theories as embodied in existing institutions, a considerable departure from their predecessors and, at the same time, remarkable continuity and persistence.

II. Pre-Modern Social Work Theory

There is, of course, no strict dividing line between what we regard as the modern theories of social work and their predecessors. Nor can we find a date, or the appearance of a new institution, or that of a publication that would serve to mark the end of the old and the beginning of the new. Many apparent differences in theory are largely matters of emphasis rather

than of identity. For our purposes, we may designate the modern period of social work as beginning roughly with the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Even between that quarter and the first quarter of the twentieth century, great differences may be found in emphasis and in refinement of subject matter, but as compared with the preceding periods this last half century has a decidedly recognizable unity. For purposes of comparison, the important social work theories of the earlier period may be grouped around four interests:

The first of these is the relief of the "indigent."

The second interest we may paraphrase is the left hand of society repairing the damage wrought by its right hand.

The third centers mainly around the cure of the sick, these being conceived of as a special class of the indigent.

The fourth center of interest may be subsumed under the general title of amelioration of socially undesirable conditions.

The relief of the indigent has been the most conspicuous type of social work interest and activity. It has been rich in motivation and subject to continuous stimulation. The forms of service for the relief of the poor have constituted a large section of the cultural tradition of Western civilization. The "Biblical" motivations contributed the benefits of that authority to the relief of the poor and made charity a cultural axiom in the so-called Christian countries. Underlying this cultural tradition of relief we recognize the forces which account for the very existence of social life in man: the complex interaction of social needs and of the individual drive for self-preservation; the social work theory based on this complex cultural tradition constitutes a series of very simple propositions. To be alive is assumed as a socially desirable condition; material goods are necessary for life; the absence of material goods—i. e., indigence—is undesirable, and must be changed. This becomes the *a priori* postulate. Inasmuch as the provision of material goods re-establishes the approved status, the theory naturally arises that indigence should be relieved by alms. This is, in its essentials, the social work theory of "relief"; it represents the practice of ages. The elemental simplicity of this idea has persisted despite everything, and even at this day gives way but slowly to the newer theories of social work based on a more elaborate analysis of social life. This theory, although no longer held in its simple purity, carries with it a motivation of long established standing which supplies the momentum for many present day activities and institutions of social work. The institutional forms of this theory are too well known to need more than passing mention. The "charity" of the testaments, alms, relief societies, public relief officials and bureaus, and the hundreds of cultural variants in the history of charities are eloquent testimony of the age and universality of the theory.

In that field of social work where society seeks to repair its own "deliberately" wrought damage, the motivation displays, despite appearances, a basic similarity to that which supports the relief of the indigent. Social work which aids the prisoner, the unmarried mother, and the outcast in whatever guise he appears, recognizes on the one hand the moral and social justification of the laws and *mores* which, by imposing punishment, create the legal and social outcasts; but on the other hand, it maintains the validity of social rehabilitation (though by different instrumentalities) of these chastised members of the group.

The social work involved in the care of the sick has carried with it no distinct motivation or theory, but has become a consciously separate department of the field through what are, on the whole, accidental attributes. The sick are not only clearly distinguishable from the well, but the method of aid, even though indigence also presents itself, is fundamentally different from that of aid to the poor or outcast. The institutions in which this interest has been crystallized, such as hospitals and clinics, have, largely because of their technical relation to medicine, taken on forms widely differing from those for the relief of the poor or of the social outcast.

The fourth interest, that of ameliorating social conditions, has been steadily growing and has tended toward a focal position. The findings of the social sciences and the more critical scrutiny of social workers have led to minimizing distinctions among the first three classes with respect to both causation and treatment. This fact, together with the more intensive study of "type situations" amenable to mass methods as opposed to treatment of individual instances, has increased social work interest in general social amelioration. The most characteristic single development of the past half dozen years has been, in fact, the tendency toward coalescence of the two most widely separated types of activity in social work, namely, relief and social amelioration. These had been the opposite points of polarization during a greater part of the recent decades in social work. With the diverse and quantitatively unprecedented development of public assistance activities, however, the border lines that separate relief from basic economic reorganization of the national economy and both of these from social insurance, comprehensive national health programs, regulation of wages and hours, and trade-union organization, have tended to disappear.

III. Modern Social Work Theories

Underlying the entire field of modern social work there are two general principles that, while hardly to be classed as properly a part of social work theory, do nevertheless give it a background and setting. The first of these is a recognition of the multiplicity of phases and of causation in any social situation to which the worker may address himself. It is practically

an axiom to the social worker that no situation coming within his sphere of interest may be adequately described by one term or phrase, or as due to some one cause. To him there is no such thing as a poor family, a criminal, an unstable provider, a pauper, nor does he speak of *the* cause of high infant mortality or of excessive juvenile delinquency. Every situation presents many facets arising from numerous causes and demanding a multiplicity of approaches, whether as individual case or as type situation. Ordinarily, a widow with several small children obviously cannot earn sufficient to provide for her family, even if she were vocationally trained and capable, without endangering the physical and emotional development of the children. The social worker recognizes the necessity of providing adequate financial resources for such a family but this judgment is but small part of the significance of the datum as given. The mother may be a slovenly housekeeper, a poor disciplinarian, an emotionally unstable person; in which case the provision of funds alone will not suffice to create conditions for the healthy growth and development of the children. Possibly death of the father was caused by an accident which might have been prevented by suitable safety devices; there may be no provision on the statutes for compensation, or the administrative rulings may be inadequate to cover the case in question. Perhaps the man should never have been in the job he held because of some physical or mental unfitness; his death may have been due in part to the strain imposed by his inability to provide for his family from the meagre wages of an unsatisfactory employment into which he was forced for lack of vocational education. In other words, no instance represents to the modern social worker merely the immediately visible conditions to which a few simple remedies may be applied; every situation calling upon the services of the social worker represents the cross-section of many factors, individual and social, and may demand a variety of approaches for treatment.

The other underlying principle of social work relates less to procedure and more to motivation and to the setting of the outer limits of its operation; it may be called *the theory of social responsibility*. This is conceived of not in an ethical but in a sociological sense. It holds that society, its organization, forces, ideas, and machinery create the general situation which necessitates social work; that the means requisite for meeting the number and variety of inadequate personal adjustments to social life may exceed the resources of any individual or group of individuals; that, therefore, the organized facilities of the entire community must be utilized for dealing with the mass of existing maladjustments and for the prevention of others. The importance of this principle is far-reaching. It gives the worker an assurance in gathering to his aid whatever may be available in the community in personnel, resources, law, customs. It gives him the justification, which on other grounds he could not have, for entering the lives of other

people—whether directly in individual service, or indirectly in proposals for the administration of social laws and institutions. Moreover, it has enabled the advocates of social work to press into the realm of governmental responsibilities service after service of the kind that but a few decades ago would have seemed inappropriate for the political body to control, much less to promote. The extent to which the state has been taking over area after area of social work is regarded, however, as only one of the manifestations of the theory of social responsibility, rather than as the form which its exercise must assume. The transfer of authority for the administration of the growing body of social work from unofficial bodies to the government is merely an incident in the distribution of functions between governmental and non-governmental bodies in the organized community. Social responsibility is no less implicit in the ministration of social work by privately organized associations, than it is in the work carried on by state departments.

Present day social work theory may be classified in a variety of ways. The basis adopted in this chapter grows, in part, out of the analysis of social work theory in the preceding pages. It has the virtue, however, of corresponding roughly to the divisions in the professional training, techniques and procedure actually in vogue in the field. Social work theory will therefore be presented as falling into the following three classes:

1. Theories and methods relating to the treatment of individual persons or families.
2. The theories and methods of "group work."
3. Theories and methods of prevention, planning, and "social action."

The first two of these obviously emphasize the work performed directly with the persons whose conditions are to be improved, whether singly or in groups; while the third deals with the non-personal factors deemed responsible for the existence or for the aggravation of the socially deleterious conditions. This tripartite division might appear at first to be applicable only to peculiarly American conditions, but in essentials it holds for the entire Western practice of social work.

IV. The Theory or Method of Individual Treatment

Most of the institutions through which social work is carried on today are not new. They are continuations or direct descendants of agencies that have existed for centuries or longer. We have now, as we have had for many years, relief activities of churches and of church organizations, private relief societies, divisions of municipal bodies, orphan asylums, hospitals, dispensaries, etc. Many of the newer social agencies, such as mothers' aid departments, child-placing associations, girls' protective leagues, share

with the older type of agencies the common essential of dealing with individual persons or families, and occasionally small groups that may not strictly be called families, who are unable to meet the demands of their environment. In the older day these persons would have been called the poor, the sick, the criminal; today they are called clients. The client may be an individual or a family. He may be served by a social agency whose name and origin savor of concern for the "poor" or the "orphan," but this type of distinction is fast diminishing; the connotation of the word *client* now is the *socially unadjusted or maladjusted individual or group*. The distinction to bear in mind at this point is that between the *client* receiving social services, and the *conditions*—industrial, political, psychological, hygienic, and so on—which bring about the "situation" in which he finds himself. The condition, as distinct from the client, requires prevention, planning, social action. The most distinguishing characteristic of modern social work is the development and concept of social case work. It had its beginnings in the individualization of service to the particular person or family. It was developed, however, as a distinctive method and philosophy; so much so, indeed, that many practitioners think of it as almost covering and connoting the entire field of social work. Originating chiefly in the need for relief of the economically destitute, it developed a sociological perspective and manipulative and psychological techniques so extensive as almost to obscure its original locus in economic relief. Social case work has occupied the center of the stage in individual treatment as a part of social work for some three decades. It is only since the depression that it has shared this position with the individualized administration of public relief or assistance.

From the beginnings of its practice up to World War I, the center of social case work interest was in the economically dependent group. Any social case work theory would therefore be focussed on the rehabilitation of clients in economic distress. There have been differences of opinion, of course, as to the etiological importance in the production of dependency, of environmental and of characterological factors. With respect to treatment also, there have been variations in the views held on the efficacy of material relief as compared with educational methods. From time to time, leading interpreters of the "family agency" would see, in the case work performed by it, a means of upholding and strengthening the family as a social institution. Large preventive measures have often been given equal attention with the development of detailed case work methods in the interest of maintaining the family unit. But throughout this period, social case work as a whole concerned itself with the "poor," and the principal institutionalized agency that represented the service was the *Charity Organization Society*.

By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, agencies dealing with delinquency, illness, physical or mental, and disadvantaged childhood had gained an almost co-ordinate position with charity organization societies (or, as they came to be called, family welfare societies) in the use of social case work as their basic procedure. Behavior problems began to share, with economic distress, the center of case work interest, and relief was often supplemented or replaced by psychological measures as instruments of social treatment. Taking into account these changing tendencies, the theory of social case work, as it was generally accepted by 1920, may be summed up as follows:

Any individual or family found in a situation deemed, by the standards of his time and place, socially undesirable, may be aided to regain a condition that is socially acceptable, only, if at all, after the facts contributing to, or responsible for, the situation have been understood; and the methods by which he is aided in the recovery may have to be as varied as the factors which account for his condition. For example:

Social case work deals with human beings who have found difficulty in the conditions of social life in making their way to acceptable organization of existence. The standards of our civilization do not demand that a man be completely self-sufficient. They demand only that he be able to secure for himself or his family the combination of opportunities, services, and expert advice with whose assistance he can work out what will be for him an acceptable organization of existence. When he succeeds in doing so, he is a self-maintaining individual. Self-maintenance is the product of a reasonably adequate human equipment adjusting itself to a reasonably favorable environment.

There is no formula by which one can determine either a reasonably adequate human equipment or a reasonably favorable environment. Self-maintenance does not depend upon any such formula. Those who fail in self-maintenance present all degrees of human equipment and they are living in all varieties of social environment. Failure means nothing except that for a particular combination of circumstances representing an environment a particular human equipment is inadequate, or that for a particular human equipment a particular combination of environmental circumstances is unfavorable.

Failure in self-maintenance presents itself in many forms. One may be unequal to the task of earning a living, one may be unequal to his responsibilities as a parent, student, employer, employee, or teacher. One may be incapacitated through sickness, helpless through lack of adult supervision, unable to withstand temptation, injuriously affected by the ordinary experiences of life. Failure does not necessarily imply fault. A large part of social case work is concerned with children who are not receiving the kind of care that for them is necessary to self-maintenance, as the term is used here, and to which the present standards of society entitle them. If any one, or a combination, of these and other factors prevent one from achieving an acceptable adjustment to life and

its demands, there may be evidence of a greater or less degree of self-maintenance. The organizations through which social case work is carried on deal with human beings presenting problems such as these or others like them.[1]

At this period, the so-called sociological outlook of social case work is seen to be dominant. Environment, with its manifold causative factors, is regarded as reflected in the situation of the individual or family receiving social case work. Adjustment is oriented largely to re-establishing a suitable *modus vivendi* between individual and environment, while large social measures that would facilitate adjustment are recognized as equally necessary but independent means of creating a generally favorable environment. Whatever be the social agency to which the client appeals, his situation will be studied by the same type of detailed and painstaking analysis. This process, formerly called *investigation,* but in recent years referred to as *social study,* is the counterpart of that phase of scientific method generally designated as the observation, collection, and classification of facts. The principle of classification for the facts collected is the first point at which the special interest or orientation of social work is differentiated from other disciplines. The results of the investigation and analysis are drawn up in a statement usually referred to as the "social diagnosis." Treatment of the case, still within this sociological framework, would then consist of measures directed toward the adjustment of the individual's situation so that he may fit into his general environment. This means some combination of adjustments of the individual's life with the adjustments in his setting, since the causes presumably responsible for the individual situation are partly in his environment and partly in his own capacities. On this general platform of procedure, certain axiomatic principles have grown up, such as, for example, the following:

> Each case must be regarded as unique, calling for its own complete analysis. This theory, however, is admittedly of relative validity only. Its absolute acceptance would render a grouping of cases, generalizations, and the accumulation of experience impossible. It is a guide of emphasis, rather than a rule.
>
> The situation at hand is not only brought about by a multiplicity of factors, but is constantly subject to the influence of factors not within the control of the social agency.
>
> While this multiplicity of factors is recognized, and diversity of treatments may be planned, the "case" must always be regarded as a unit rather than as the mere collection of independent persons or situations.
>
> Social values or *a priori* judgments may be as many as the persons involved —client, worker, and neighbor—and may vary with time and place. A constant adjustment to relative values must be expected.

[1] Porter R. Lee, Editor's Introduction, *Vocational Aspects of Family Social Work* (published by the Am. Assoc. of Soc. Workers).

The limits imposed by the function and resources of the agency must be a guiding principle in adopting a plan of treatment; the limits of the client's possibilities and of the community's facilities are other modifying factors.

There are factors in the readjustment of the client that are not within the power of any individual or group of individuals; they must be brought about by mass action, educational or legislative. Some factors are beyond repair and may be thought of only as those to be prevented in the future, and therefore, outside the immediate sphere of the case worker's duties.[2]

Treatment may be of at least two large classes: the provision of service and resources, and the guidance or education of the client. There may be varying combinations and ratios of these.

In carrying out these and other rules of social case work, a body of detailed technology has been evolved and is being perfected and standardized. Thus for example, there are tried ways of obtaining evidence, of securing the help of law, medicine, psychiatry, of utilizing documentary material, and of co-ordinating the interest of relatives, employer, friends, school, and others.

The shift of social case work from preoccupation with the economically dependent, to a concern with clients presenting a much larger variety of symptoms of social maladjustment has affected developments and refinements of case work in several noticeable ways.

One of these has been the definition and elaboration of a "generic" social case work method.[3] By emphasizing the common features of all social case work, this concept serves as much to recognize the variations created by specialization, as it does to define the unity of its procedures. The greatest common area lies necessarily within the field of technique, since the particular concatenation of causative and accidental factors determine, for each case, its special character, and the agency to which it applies: medical, court, or family. Both major divisions in this technical area, that of the social study and that of treatment, reflect the effect of the shifting emphasis in social case work.

The social study was the first of these to receive attention. All phases of the client's history were expanded and refined. The volume and detail demanded in the social case history grew to unprecedented dimensions covering the individual and developmental history of the client or clients and of their parents, the client's school and industrial history, a full medical history, psychometric data or psychological study, often psychiatric and personality study, and, of course, the history of contacts with social agencies. Under the influence of the mental hygiene movement, personality study received increasing emphasis, and constitutes, in recent case records, a preponderant ratio of their contents. This development was made possible,

[2] The agency itself contributes toward the large preventive movements its knowledge of the significance of the individual occurrences.

[3] See "Social Case Work, Generic and Specific," *American Association of Social Workers.*

of course, only with the increase in intensive training of workers, a diminution of case load, and in general with the relatively high degree of prosperity which enabled agencies between 1920 and 1929 to expand and intensify their work.

Since the early twenties two entirely independent factors have entered and exerted a profound influence in the field of individual treatment in social work; they have so changed the complexion of both practice and theory as to render the foregoing description of social case work partly obsolescent. The first factor is the influence of psycho-analytic theory on social case work technique. The second is the depression which followed the economic break of 1929 and brought again into the foreground of practice the almost forgotten problem of economic destitution—this time, however, not as a sprinkling of cases concentrated in urban communities, but as a mass phenomenon covering many million families.

This is not the place, nor could justice possibly be done in brief space to the description and evaluation of psycho-analytic concepts. (See discussion in Goldenweiser's chapter, present volume, pp. 391–429.) Their importance for the development of case work as a method of individual treatment lies in the fact that the center of attention in the individual's maladjustment is shifted to his own psychological history and thus the importance of environmental causation is correspondingly minimized. Less and less attention, therefore, is paid to living conditions, economic factors, and the general environmental causes that had occupied the sociologist for decades. Search for motivations and incapacities for adjustment, even for economic destitution as experienced by the individual, is directed to the psyche, and treatment is concentrated upon efforts to enable the individual to establish a *modus vivendi* between his own drives and the obstacles to these drives represented by the environment. This environment consists of both things and persons, principally the latter, and is significant largely as it impinges on the psyche, moulds attitudes, and channels emotional forces. By comparison it is the environment that is regarded as more static and adjustment is hoped for through the psychological flexibility of the individual rather than, as earlier, through rendering the environment more amenable to adjustment. This change of focus, naturally, has influenced the attitude of case workers to general social measures of amelioration, which in this light became less important. But more than that, it has affected the technique of individual treatment itself, for this was converted into a psychological problem of the client instead of a problem of external adjustment between individual and social structure.

The psycho-analytic perspective has affected more than case work theory and method, since its concepts throw light on the human relations in all categories of association. Its principal importance here lies, however, in the fact that in the treatment of the individual, the arena of activities becomes

increasingly limited to the relationship, and the dynamic possibilities of relationship, between the case worker and the client.

Prior to the onslaught of the depression, this development in case work theory swiftly progressed to the point where the problem of economic needs as an occasion for individual treatment was receding far into the background, poverty was losing significance, and the family welfare societies were becoming organizations for providing psychological services to the problems of adjustment brought about by personality difficulties in clients. The relief problem precipitated by the break in 1929 was so sudden and so great that it had little or no influence on the theoretical developments of case work practice. It was a new thing—a thing apart. The problems of personnel introduced by the huge size of the administrative problems of relief organization tended to continue the separation between individualized treatment of persons presenting economic problems and the technique of psychological treatment of personal maladjustments as it had grown up in the field of case work through the influence of psycho-analysis. At the present time, therefore, we may recognize a rough separation between case work theory and practice on the one hand, and the treatment of needy persons on the other. We therefore have now two major but overlapping subdivisions in the area of social work concerned with individualized treatment, namely, (1) social case work as a technique of individual treatment for adjustment of the individual within himself and with his environment, and (2) the practices and theories concerned with economic assistance comprising the fields of relief and social insurance, and particularly the operations under the Federal Social Security Act. The common ground that underlies these subdivisions comprises in part the more universal significance of psycho-analytic thought in all fields of human association, in part the applicability of social case work techniques to all individual treatment, and partly the fact that problems of personality adjustment, and therefore cases treated by agencies offering this service, still come in an overwhelming measure from the lower economic ranks of the population.

V. History of Social Case Work

The term social case work has been in use in its present connotation only a relatively short time, perhaps not more than two or three decades. The term "case" itself is of older standing and was freely used at least as early as Dr. Chalmers' writings in the early part of the nineteenth century. The gradual unfolding of the concept of social case work goes back at least as far as Dr. Chalmers' time. He is probably the first of a series of men and women whose work and writings have had a direct influence on the creation of the concept and practice of social case work. Octavia Hill, Ed-

ward Denison, and Charles Loch follow in chronological order in England, and Josephine Shaw Lowell, Mary E. Richmond, and Edward T. Devine in America. There were other men and women who have had marked influence on the development of social case work by personal contact and local effort rather than through publications or by way of institutional interpretation. Even the persons named made their contributions to the theory of case work in part, and in some cases in large part, through the promotion and extension of the charity organization movement which was the earliest and most important factor in evolving the theory and practice of social case work. Other movements have contributed, especially in recent days, but their share has been rather the enrichment and further refinement of a concept already established. The Juvenile Court system in the United States, hospital social work, psychiatric social work, and child guidance are among these later contributory institutions.

Dr. Chalmers' death preceded the establishment of the first Charity Organization Society in England in 1869 by more than two decades. His great importance in the field of case work theory, therefore, comes largely from his writings and, to a lesser degree, from the experimental demonstration of his theories which he undertook in the latter period of his life. Like his successors in the history of social case work in England, his point of contact with the problem came in the field of the English Poor Law Administration. He was bitterly opposed to its principles and practice. The English Poor Law of his day provided for poor relief, financed by taxation, to all those who were deemed by the authorities to be indigent. In the course of the long and complicated history of economic conditions in England and of the administration of the Poor Law, certain notions had grown up and become commonly accepted, such as, for example:

(1) That a considerable proportion of the population was, and was bound to be, dependent.

(2) That in view of the fluctuations of economic conditions it was impossible to differentiate between those who could find work but would not, and those who either could not find work, or would be unable to labor if employed.

(3) That those incapable of self-support are entitled to relief, and that "indoor relief," that is, institutional care, is the best way of providing it.

(4) That the work test in established workhouses served to segregate the able-bodied willing, but jobless, from the able-bodied who are unwilling to work.

(5) That it was a proper burden upon the tax rates to take care of those who were unable to work and those who were able but could not find employment. Poor relief then became a simple mechanical arrangement by which those found unable to work were assigned to institutions, while among the able-bodied, the automatic functioning of the work-test segregated the sheep from the goats; the former were regarded as a proper charge on the public and the latter dismissed from further consideration.

There were many points in this system that were abhorrent to Dr. Chalmers and that he attacked with vigor and consistency. He considered the mechanics of the system inadequate for weeding out those who could work and who therefore ought not to become a burden to the commonwealth. He insisted that the investigation of each applicant, rather than an automatic testing device, would best distinguish those who needed help from those who did not, and would show what kind of help was needed, if any; that the investigation itself, and public recognition of the fact that aid depended upon the outcome of the investigation, would act as a deterrent from application upon those who really were not in need. He insisted that state outdoor relief be entirely discontinued and the burden removed from the tax payer. His analysis of the financial burden devolving upon the state was performed in a painstaking and competent manner. It was his opinion that the cost of relief, whether through taxation or through voluntary contributions by the parish authorities, would be greatly reduced by the principle of individual investigation. He did not believe that there was such a thing as poverty in an absolute sense, but that the term was relative to habits, places, and times. He even maintained that those actually in need of relief would find ample resources in the natural environment of family, relatives, and friends, without recourse to the state or parish. "Charity does not aim at the abolition of poverty but of the evils which are often associated with it (of which) one of the worst is pauperism." ". . . judgment must be brought into action as well as your sympathy." These opinions exemplify the coming of a new concept which substitutes for the simple idea of poverty as merely an economic minus sign, the more complex one of poverty as a resultant of unwise legislation, misguided generosity, unintelligent administration, bad habits, disregard of community solidarity, and slovenly thinking on the part of recipient and giver.

Perhaps Dr. Chalmers' ideas might have found less acceptance had he not taken the scientific step of testing his theories by an experiment which he conducted in St. John's parish in Glasgow in 1822. He had succeeded, as responsible head of the parish, in obtaining official consent to the practical suspension of the administration of the Poor Law within his district. He then assumed the responsibility of meeting all needs that might be found through the resources of the parish and of the population itself. In this experimental district, cases already "on the rates" were to be continued but no new cases were to be brought before the poor relief authorities. The essential parts of the experiment were centered about the following proposals. The parish was to be divided into districts with a deacon responsible for each district of some four hundred persons with whom he was expected to become thoroughly acquainted. To him was reported any case of need, and he was to be responsible for both the investigation and the subsequent treatment. Only such funds were to be

available as were raised in voluntary contributions by the church. The funds actually available to the deacons were to be kept as restricted as possible in order that the resources naturally abiding within the population itself—resources which were conceived to be of a more normal nature and of far greater potentiality than recognized resources—might be drawn upon by the persons requiring aid. It was Dr. Chalmers' theory that the deliberately planned investigation with all that it implied would be—in the sense in which a test was desirable—a much more competent one than the mechanical workhouse test. Along with these somewhat negative principles he stimulated thrift, habits of industry, mutual helpfulness by such practical devices as encouraging savings deposits, extending facilities for instructing boys and girls in reading and sewing. The experiment came to an end before it provided the necessary proof or refutation of Dr. Chalmers' theories. But apparently they had been sufficiently tested to establish a great readiness on the part of the group, which in the sixties became interested in the charity organization movement, to look back to his work as laying the basis for their theories and practical proposals.

Among the other pioneers in the history of case work theory, Octavia Hill is better known for her work in housing reform. Edward Denison of London is also associated more intimately with the humanistic movement as a whole and perhaps the settlement field owes a greater immediate debt to him than does case work. Both Miss Hill and Mr. Denison, however, were actively interested in the establishment and promotion of the Charity Organization Society in London, and were perhaps the most important early interpreters of the charity organization movement. Of the two, Miss Hill was by far the more articulate. She spoke and wrote abundantly, and continued to promote the significance of the Charity Organization Society work for a time after Denison's premature death. Miss Hill, as did Dr. Chalmers, emphasized the supreme importance of investigation in each case. The goal of investigation was no longer conceived principally as the elimination of impostors, the reduction of deliberate imposition and calculated pauperism; it was rather the ascertaining of the more deeply hidden causes of destitution and the finding of more constructive methods of treatment than the "unkind doles." Without using present-day phraseology, both Denison and Hill emphasized the importance of the complete personality of the client in any attempt to serve him. Many of the important phrases and ideas that have come to build up the concept of case work as a method of dealing with complete personalities come from Octavia Hill, and to a lesser extent, from Edward Denison.

The principal vehicle for the evolution of the concept and practice of social case work has been, as pointed out earlier, the charity organization movement, and particularly its first representative, the Charity Organization Society of London. Sir Charles S. Loch, its secretary for many years,

has been the teacher, promoter, and educator through whom for a long time the ideas of social case work, more usually thought of as Charity Organization Society ideas, were developed and extended. His writings deal mainly with the charity organization movement and convey the transition from the ideology of poor relief to that of social case work.

It was natural that important literary and social developments such as those represented by the charity organization movement should have been transplanted to America. Americans interested in philanthropy were consistent students of continental experience. Some of Octavia Hill's important essays were actually reprinted by the State Charities Aid Association of New York in 1875, through the interest of its president, Mrs. Louisa B. Schuyler.

One of the active participants in the early work of the Charity Organization Society in London, S. H. Gurteen, was himself personally associated with the first Charity Organization Society in this country in Buffalo, New York. In this country, therefore, the charity organization movement, as such, rather than any outstanding interpreter of it, was responsible for the development of social case work during its early period. It was not until the twentieth century that Edward T. Devine and Mary E. Richmond began to interpret case work in print. Edward T. Devine, a prolific author, has covered the field from various angles with the focus resting still in the realm of poor relief and charity organization. It remained for Mary E. Richmond to formulate, for the first time, and in a comprehensive way, the meaning and function of social case work as a distinct theory in itself, dissociated, except historically and incidentally, from the agencies by which it is practiced. Her *Social Diagnosis,* published in 1917, still remains (1939) the only systematic treatment of social case work as a scientific procedure. Because of the great importance of psycho-analytic literature in the development of recent concepts in social case work, reference should naturally be made to the writings of Dr. Sigmund Freud and his followers and disciples, orthodox and dissident. Interpreters of psycho-analysis for social case work have been growing in number and have reflected the divisions in thought within the psycho-analytic field itself. The literature is abundant, varied, and easily accessible. There is as yet no figure of comparable importance in it with Dr. Freud, originator of psycho-analysis.

There is still a tendency to associate case work chiefly with relief societies and Family Welfare Organizations (the new name for Charity Organization Societies), but in the development of social case work technique, some of the other fields in which it functions are at least of equal importance. The juvenile courts extending rapidly over the country, the social service departments of hospitals, and psychiatric clinics organized in connection with hospitals, schools, and other social agencies employ a large section of the case-working personnel and contribute their full share

toward the improvement of its methods. The principles, technique, and personnel of social case work are becoming an integral part of several social institutions, quite divorced in history and interest from relief of the poor. Visiting teachers are social case workers in the public school field; psychiatric social workers play the same rôle in connection with hospitals for the insane, with courts, child guidance clinics, and now even with individual practicing psychiatrists. Probation officers and parole officers are an integral part of the new judicial system. The fields of vocational guidance, employment service, and industrial welfare are introducing the function and personnel of social case work into their organizations.

VI. The Theory of Group Work

Social work has not been very fortunate in its terminology. The term "group work" is understood, and its sponsoring institutions are recognized by social workers; but it is used only because no better one has been found, and because it does, at any rate, roughly describe one of the important theories applied in the program of the group work agencies. Before presenting this theory as stated by its various sponsors it may be well to specify the particular *social conditions deemed undesirable* which the group work agencies were organized to remedy. In the first place, these were practically all urban conditions of life—in fact, conditions created by industrial urbanization: the breaking up of the family as a complete economic and social unit, the rapid change of relations between family and neighboring family, and the practical disappearance of the village community as the center and framework of social life. With these developments went a large part of the social control exercised by family, neighbors, and community, and perhaps a still larger part of the opportunities which they had provided for social life and recreation for young and old. Aggravating this change were the reduced opportunities for outdoor life, the artificial, stimulated contacts in crowded city street, city housing at its worst, and the proximity to criminal haunts, commercial amusements, and vice. The ancient class distinctions which had had a cultural connotation in the rural setting tended in the industrial city to flatten into the contrast between rich and poor—those *with* and those *without*. English philanthropists and observers of social life became aware of much of this process by the middle of the nineteenth century. And they had reason to realize that the *poor law* approach did not begin to meet the newly understood needs of the city poor. Even improvement in the technique of relief which led to the Charity Organization movement and to social case work touched only the single human being or family—it did not seem to touch the larger forces at work. Octavia Hill and Edward Denison both recognized that those of the socially fortunate who were willing and in position to help did not under-

stand the life, motives, and ways of the "poor." They both decided to study the poor in their natural habitat of industrial-urban setting, and thus set the stage for the settlement movement, still probably the most important representative of the group work theory.

At this early stage, then, we are not aware of any theory of group work, but only of the recognition of social retrogression among the city poor. The agencies created are designed to provide some means of restoring opportunities that seemed to have been lost in the social shuffle of passing from country to city, and from the old industrial order to the new, or to afford a way for the sympathetic study of the life of the city poor. It is in this light that we must regard such historical events, for example, as the establishment of the first Young Men's Christian Association in England in 1844 (followed in America in 1851), and the opening in 1883 by Canon Barnett of Toynbee Hall, the first settlement house in England. The first agency whose name, as well as apparent aim, suggests more clearly the oncoming of group work as a deliberate theory or method, was probably the Boys' Club, organized in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1860.

In contrast to the modern agencies for social case work, these and their successors have no historical continuity with institutions of long standing. They are new institutions, creations of a new age or phase of Western civilization. In the brief period that has elapsed since the establishment of the first Y.M.C.A. and the first settlement, thousands of similar agencies have come into existence; some independent, some representing new activities of institutions already established, such as churches, schools, city governments, and others still associated in national or even international bodies, such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Camp Fire Girls, Jewish Centers, Y.W.C.A.

The common characteristic of all these agencies, namely, their offering of opportunities for social gathering and recreation, provides the connecting link between the conditions which they were intended to meet and the group work theory by which their activities are largely guided. For it was the rapidly disappearing natural social life and recreation of family and community brought about by our wholesale urbanization that was intended to be restored by these new agencies. How much of this was consciously recognized in the early stages is not quite material, nor is it relevant to discover how much theory was indigenous to these institutions and how much was contributed by developments in the educational field and in socio-political discussion. It is clear that at the present day these widely spread agencies are consciously endeavoring to provide opportunities for organized group life and group activities of a kaleidoscopic variety, but with clear-cut social and educational purposes in mind. In a painstaking analysis of the principal common activities of the leading group work agencies in America prepared for the American Association of Social

Workers in 1928, Miss Margaretta Williamson uses the following phraseology:

> Its (group work) underlying philosophy maintains that normal and satisfying group activities tend to develop in the individual a richer personality, emotionally sound, and effective in its adjustment to the group relationships of life; also that group life is the means of passing on the social patterns, customs and conventions by which society is organized. . . .[4]

The existence of the group work agencies is predicated on the assumption that our forms of urban community life do not provide the "normal" and "satisfying group activities" to which Miss Williamson refers. Indeed, students of that peculiarly American form of rural life, the isolated farm or homestead, find that this type of rural life, as well as the crowded city life, also fails to provide the desired group activities. The community life of the village and small town is regarded as the provider *par excellence* of that form of social life and action. But the group work movement has not tried to turn back the clock and re-establish the "ideal community"; it has tried rather to bring the group activities of the small community into the framework of existing community life, that is, of the great and growing city, and more recently of the rural community. The group work agency seeks to bring together such members of the community or neighborhood as might have come together in the more natural setting of the village or small town because of common age level, common interest, or common pursuits. Having brought them together, the agency endeavors to intensify the natural values of such group life, to enrich them by widening interests, by cultural stimulation, by greater interplay between groups, by building up new concepts of group adhesion, by replacing such old ones as may have been established on prejudice or privation.

The passage which we have quoted from Miss Williamson was approved by leading representatives of every area in the group work field, and stands as a statement of a common purpose throughout the wide range of sponsoring bodies by which group activities are conducted. The theory that groups of people, young or old, will find in their deliberately organized activities both satisfying forms of social contact and far-reaching education advantages is the basic principle upon which the enormous expenditure of effort and material of gigantic organizations, both secular and denominational, is predicated. It may be well to follow Miss Williamson through another step in her presentation of the group work field by reproducing a few of the varying "stated purposes" of the diverse kinds of agencies examined in the course of her study.

The section of the constitution of a prominent social settlement giving its purposes is quoted in part as follows:

[4] *The Social Worker in Group Work* (1929).

. . . to make of the Hudson Guild a center of individual and co-operative activities to the end that the neighborhood, and as far as possible the larger community, may better meet the human needs and aspirations of men, women and children, that all may learn and practice better ways of living and working together.

Mr. Albert J. Kennedy, a nationally known settlement worker, is quoted describing the tasks of settlements as:

. . . the organization of life, for the most part, in tenement portions of metropolitan cities. The local communities in which they are situated are, as a rule, either in an advanced stage of physical and social disintegration, or the center of strongly homogeneous national or racial groups, or the seat of cosmopolitan aggregations of people with few interests in common.

By way of expressed purposes excerpts from the Y.W.C.A., Y.M.C.A., and Jewish Centers provide an apparently striking contrast to the above. These Miss Williamson quotes as follows:

The Young Women's Christian Association attempts to advance the physical, social, intellectual, moral, and spiritual interests of young women. The ultimate purpose of all its efforts shall be to seek to bring young women to such a knowledge of Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord as shall mean for the individual young woman fullness of life and development of character, and shall make the organization as a whole an effective agency in bringing in of the Kingdom of God among young women.

The Young Men's Christian Association purposes to lead young men to faith in God through Jesus Christ; to promote their growth into fullness of Christian character; to lead them into active membership in the church of their choice; and to make the extension of the Kingdom of God throughout the world the governing purpose of their lives.

The Jewish Center program proposes that:

1. The Center will furnish the place and facilities for educational and recreational activities for men and women in their leisure time.
2. It will furnish facilities for recreation, physical training, vocational, Jewish and other education for boys and girls.
3. It will be a Jewish town hall—a common meeting place for all elements and groups of Jews.
4. It will establish an information bureau designed to meet the needs and desires of its constituency.
5. It will be a center for the Americanization and socialization of the foreign born.

Two more brief quotations will help to show the extent to which, despite differences in form of statement, the work of the agencies constituting this large section of social work agrees at least implicitly on basic theories as to the values of group work. Quoting again from Miss Williamson:

The program of the Camp Fire Girls is planned to take care of the out-of-school time of adolescent girls and is built around three important factors; it provides activities of natural interest to girls, it makes these activities doubly interesting through an appeal to the imagination, which is a vivid trait in the character of adolescent girls, and it works quietly toward the end that through fun and happiness girls may achieve a beautiful and useful womanhood.

Says the Playground and Recreation Association of America:

If the instinct to play is a basic instinct, if through play may be transmitted the social and moral traditions of the race; if play is an important channel for citizenship building, it is the responsibility of the municipality to provide opportunities for play as it provides schools and as it safeguards the health of citizens!

The specific activities that constitute the program of group work agencies is of little importance for our present purpose, except only as they may indicate the wide variety of common interests that are utilized for bringing together the groups. Nor is there any strict principle of selection in activities sponsored by settlements or church, Y.W.C.A., or Boys' Club, national agency or municipal government. The most common activities are probably contained in the following list:

Athletics, outdoor and indoor
Educational classes (scholastic)
Music and dramatics
The arts: drawing, painting, sculpture
Literary and debating clubs
Sedentary recreation: reading, games
Lectures and speeches by prominent people
Mothers' clubs and health education classes
Meeting facilities for trade unions and local associations
Neighborhood improvement organizations
Domestic art classes: cooking, sewing
Camping and country vacations

Most of these activities are available for both sexes and all age classes, though of course generally in homogeneous groups. Some are by their nature more restricted, a few are appropriate for common participation by young and old. But taking it as a whole, the program has been built up preponderantly for the young—from pre-school to marriageable age. This fact undoubtedly accounts for the great influence which has been exerted on the whole field of group work by the developments in the field of educational theory and practice. As a result, much of the group work field overlaps that of public education and a considerable area combines the interests of social work in a stricter sense with those of experimental schools and experimental educational methods.

In group work, as in case work, there is a technology within the general method as a whole. The best values of group life are not achieved automatically by the mere throwing together of a more or less homogeneous assortment of individuals. The group life of the village community and of cultural institutions like the church and local government has had its traditional forms and procedure, often elaborate to the point of ceremony. A more direct, short-cut substitution for this transmitted technique has had to be developed for the groups sponsored by their agencies. Unfortunately, this technology has not been so carefully studied as has its counterpart in social case work; as a procedure it is practically unrecorded, and no treatise comparable to Miss Richmond's *Social Diagnosis* has been written for the group work field. Scattered here and there we find instructions, or reports, of some institution or agency, describing how clubs should be organized or troupes formed, but Miss Williamson's job analysis is probably the only systematic exposition of the more important details of the group work method that has as yet been attempted. The reasons for this are not difficult to find. Because of the diversity of the stated purposes of the principal divisions of the field and even of single institutions as compared with others of the same type, there has been little interchange of personnel in the field, and consequently a limited amount of professional consciousness. This situation, so different from that existing in the case work field, has aggravated the inherent difficulties of crystallizing a technique that would be in harmony with the varieties of stated objectives. Within the past few years there has been organized a National Association for the Study of Group Work which both expresses the need for more painstaking analysis and organization of the varied concepts and techniques, and may provide the channel for their formulation.

A review of the published contributions of leaders in the field of group work would probably fail to show either the uniformity of method found by the observer, or the similarity of objective stated by the sponsors of the several institutions in the field. Nor would such a review be even approximately complete, in view of the extended borrowings from the field of education and politico-economic speculation. Much of the new pedagogy of the last half century has found sympathetic lodgment in the group work agencies; a large part of the history of the group work agencies, and especially that of the settlement movement, is studded with philosophical discussion of democratic government and democratic social life. It is probably not inaccurate to say that the objectives of the group work agencies are but a more concrete phase of the humanitarian movement that started with the socialists of continental Europe and swept through the legislative and educational history of England and America. The few outstanding writers of importance in this field owe their prominence not nearly so much to

their literary expression as to their practical achievements in the creation of new institutions or by the stimulation of a large following.

There is one phase in the history of the settlement movement which sets it apart not only from the other group work agencies but also from the body of social work as a whole. It is the phase which deals with what Jane Addams, among others, has described as the subjective necessity of the social settlement: the search by those of the economically and socially well-conditioned section of the population who have been inspired by the humanitarian movement for moral satisfactions, for a sense of "deserving to live"; and the challenge to some among them of finding the meaning and limitations of the idea of democracy. The "giving" through the settlement of time, money, and service was both in England and in America in the earlier years of the movement only one side of the settlement idea; the other was to "take" from its beneficiaries an understanding of their life to be gained only by living in close proximity, sharing what could be shared of their troubles, finding the sources of joy and satisfaction in other classes, nationalities, occupations, economic groups. There was a delving, more or less emotional, but with the constant supervision of the intellectual critic, into the question whether there was or could ever be democracy in social life as there seemed to be to a recognizable extent in political life. This apparently nebulous phase of the settlement movement gave it much of its character and is responsible in no small part for the development of the group work method.

Roughly speaking, the settlement is the earliest and most thoroughly representative type of group work agency. The ultimate objectives of its founders are not encompassed by the program or activities of any settlement or group of settlements. Those objectives centered, on the one hand, about the social reconstruction of the life of the poor, and on the other hand, they were represented by the ideal of the "democratic" community, of new relations between rich and poor, educated and untutored, aristocrat and worker. The invincible urge to see a distant inclusive social aim prove itself or, at least, visualized in a compassable microcosm, may have accounted for the actual establishment of the settlement and of the later agencies for group work.

The small number of leaders who have defined the settlement is headed by Canon Samuel A. Barnett, who inspired and conducted the first settlement house, founded in 1884 by the University Settlement Association acting as a committee for Oxford and Cambridge. Through him, his wife, and his co-workers, the first settlement became heir of the effort, thought, and teaching of Edward Denison, Octavia Hill, Arnold Toynbee, and more indirectly but not less truly, of Ruskin, Thomas H. Green, and Dr. Chalmers. Barnett wrote very little. His name is not borne by a literary *chef d'oeuvre* but the institution founded by him became the model of a

fast growing number of institutions, especially in America. The humanitarian impulse and the ideology of the English founders of the settlement movement persisted for nearly a quarter of a century as the unmistakable inspiration and model of institutions that came in its wake. In America, Jane Addams, who founded the first settlement house this side of the Atlantic and who continued to be a national leader in socially progressive thought and action, appears to be a direct spiritual heir of Octavia Hill, Toynbee, Barnett, Denison and the others. Until her death she remained the outstanding interpreter of the movement, and its most articulate teacher. Beginning with *Twenty Years in Hull House,* her contribution of books, papers, and speeches constituted the most important literature in the field.

In recent years the points of emphasis have shifted from the motivation of the settlement founders, to a place nearer the fields of education and public social service. Two of the most important influences responsible for this shift are represented by the names of Joseph Lee and Lillian Wald: the former by bringing *play* into the foreground, the latter by introducing visiting nursing service and health education. Not only were the programs of settlements expanded in these directions, but new, or virtually new, agencies may be attributed to their influence, among them, for example, the Playground and Recreation Association of America, the Boy and Girl Scouts, Visiting Nurse Association, nurses' settlements, and municipal bodies for public recreation and for various educational health services.

Still later comes the appearance of the most extensive, and, if continuity can be assured, one of the most significant developments in this field through the programs of the Work Projects Administration. In the several fields historically associated with group work agencies, as for example, dramatics, music, athletics, pageantry, playground activities, adult education, progressive education, and club work, the W.P.A. has made an enormous contribution, and has carried on pioneering experiments in many types of activity and over a wide area in the United States.

Institutions devoted to group work often include in their programs and personnel, provisions for social case work, for influencing general environmental conditions, for many specific services, and for educational experiments and propaganda. But they all operate an important section, if not the total content, of their program through group units, and on the group work theory. This method or theory tends to be used, moreover, not only for the purposes for which it has been devised and introduced, but also—and this is mentioned merely lest it seem to have been overlooked by reason of its limited relevancy to the main exposition—for promoting the special aims of the sponsoring agency, which is sometimes religious, as in a church or Y.M.C.A., sometimes nationalistic, sometimes socio-political as with some trade union organizations, and sometimes of questionable

social justification, as in proselytizing units, or in some of the industrial plants or villages.

VII. Prevention, Planning and Social Action

Both social case work and group work are methods applied directly to an individual whose life is so lacking in the essential advantages of comfort, safety, advancement, and personal satisfactions as to become a social concern to the community. The same person may be served at the same time or at different times by social case work or by group work facilities. But social work recognizes the need for prevention as well as that for service to the disadvantaged. Prevention on a large scale is regarded as an additional and co-ordinate method in the total social work program. The history of mass prevention, if we may call it so by contrast with case work and group work, is inextricably interwoven with the institutions of social work, as for example, poor law reform with parish relief, prison reform with aid to prisoners, tuberculosis prevention with the social case work of the Charity Organization Society. Nevertheless a certain coldness, if not antagonism, has manifested itself from time to time between the votaries of social work with clients, and those active in social work through mass prevention. This may be due in part to differences in technique, and in part to the faintness of the borderline between some of the mass prevention agencies in social work and the larger movements of social, political, and industrial reform; it has made many of the former share the impatience and contempt of the latter who work in "large strokes," with the apparent hopelessness of the "merely palliative measures" of the case and group workers. Often these felt a sense of inferiority and inadequate defense to what seemed to be the truth of this contrast. That many individual social workers are themselves ardent supporters of these larger movements has failed to affect the situation. Only in those cases where the religious motive of the social worker is strong has the contrast between the plodding worker, dealing unit by unit, and the "reformer" instituting sweeping measures, failed to carry a certain sense of discouragement. In view of the closer resemblance between mass prevention as a part of social work and the so-called larger social reform movements, this may be an appropriate place to point out the particular ideas which rule the social worker's choice—his own tasks as distinct from the larger reforms in industry, government, or mores.

First, we have the historical fact of preponderant importance that the stimulus for social work has all but universally come from the impact of *observed hardships* of others upon its leaders and practitioners: the reaction to help, to do something *for* one more unfortunate. This is essentially a very different thing from *experienced hardship* by the laborer, the politically

dispossessed, or even by the theoretically outraged. To these, solution presents itself either in the form of individual escape or in that of attempting complete reorganization, industrial, political, or social, in which the reformer is also the beneficiary. The second important difference between social work on the one hand, including mass prevention, and social reform on the other, is the importance of the time element. Social work sets visible goals, presumably attainable in compassable time. For the large social reforms this limitation is but little felt: anarchism, socialism, communism, industrial democracy, when conceived as complete self-contained systems are more or less removed from the reformer's present: he is willing and expects to wait: his own, the next, or some other generation will achieve it. The social worker's objective, without necessarily contradicting this point of view, is seen in no such generous perspective. The fate and happiness of living, suffering, individuals weigh more than the contemplated bliss of a new order. The perspective is deliberately close; it is close in the case of some because of the emotional weight of observed hardships, in others, on the contrary, by reason of a more phlegmatic temperament, in others still, because the possibility of wholesale adjustment under any of the proposed new social systems is intellectually unconvincing.

A third difference between movements for social reform and the body of social work arises from divergent responses to the question whether the most complete and satisfactory rearrangement of the industrial, political, and social structure is likely to eliminate all the numberless factors, individual and environmental, that complicate the adjustment of the individual to his setting. It seems to the social worker that a large part of social work is as perennial as is the need for education, or surgery, or other professional service; that the extent and relative importance of social work may change under a better social system, but that its actual functioning will continue to be necessary. Just as the social worker no longer sees his problem as that of poverty, so also he no longer expects his task to disappear with the disappearance of poverty.

Prevention, community planning and social action are terms that may be applied to the third area in which theories of social work are being formulated and activities promoted for the general amelioration of conditions that are conducive to individual difficulties and sufferings. Several types of technical methods have become familiar in this field: legislative action (or rather promotion of legislative action); administrative improvements; propaganda; the creation of new institutions or new services. These methods, of course, have significance only as they are employed for some specific purpose and have therefore become manifest as parts of the several movements or programs. It would obviously be hopeless to list these, for in a sense they are synonymous with social work and social reform. The following would be included among the most important:

Charity organization and its variants, such as councils of social agencies, federations, social service exchanges, etc.

Labor legislation, especially with respect to women's and children's work, hazardous occupations, minimum wage, etc.

Administrative reform in institutions (municipal, county and state), and in governmental bureaus or departments dealing with these.

Social insurance, especially for accidents and industrial disease.

Social hygiene.

Mental hygiene.

Penological reform.

State or municipal provision of educational, recreational, and vocational facilities.

Creation of institutional care for defectives, mental or physical.

Housing reform and town planning.

Public health, especially prevention of tuberculosis and infant mortality, and more recently constructive personal hygiene.

The creation of the vast national system of public assistance and social security measures is the latest and most important event in this field, and in many ways overshadows in importance all other portions of the social work structure. In the light of this system it is quite likely that the perspective of social work may in the near future be fundamentally changed, and the formulation in these pages largely outdated.

The historical roots of these preventive movements take us back at least to the eighteenth century, and some to an even earlier period. First among preventive measures were probably the establishment of refuges for unprotected children who were threatened with disease and a life of crime. Such names as Canon Odescalchi and Johann Wichern are representative of this stage—both remembered, however, through the creation of institutions rather than by literary contributions. The names of John Howard and Cesare Lombroso are historically significant in the field of preventive penology; the former, active in the eighteenth century, is notable for inspiring administrative reforms; the latter, of the late nineteenth century, opened a new vista of prevention and treatment of crime by removing legalistic and moralistic emphasis and arousing a lasting interest in scientific inquiry in the field. Labor legislation is directly traceable to the leaders of factory legislation in England early in the nineteenth century. Administrative reform in institutions and the creation of a whole group of new institutions for public wards such as the insane, feeble-minded, and epileptic, is associated with a galaxy of notable names in the nineteenth century, including Dorothea Dix and Mrs. Josephine Shaw Lowell in America. The public health movement, although related to scientific discoveries in medicine (particularly chemistry and bacteriology), obtained its peculiar preventive character of today largely through the initiation of the anti-

tuberculosis movement, which was started as an auxiliary activity of a charity organization society, and is attributable in the main to the teachings and institutional pioneering of Dr. Trudeau and Dr. Herman Biggs.

Neither a complete enumeration of the special interests and fields of operation, nor the minutiae of procedure in executing a plan of legislative lobbying or of an educational campaign, will present the essence of mass prevention or social engineering. We may perhaps come nearer achieving our purpose in the space available by citing briefly a few of the better known representatives of this method in social work. As random examples we may select (a) the juvenile court, (b) the mental hygiene clinic, and (c) the consumers' league, each incidentally associated with names of outstanding leaders in social work. These three are selected mainly because they are diverse in history, personnel, and method, and not because they are necessarily the most significant examples of social prevention and engineering.

(a) The juvenile court represents an important milestone in child protection. The gradual creation of separate penal institutions or special departments in such institutions for children had been making considerable headway both in Europe and in America, before the end of the nineteenth century. But this program did not go far enough. Some of the most serious evils had hardly been touched. For example: first, the whole cumbersome method of defining crime, of elaborate procedure for prosecution and defense, of institutional consignment upon proof of technical *guilt,* were proving inappropriate to child psychology, whether in view of the act committed, or the possibility of reform by a prison or reformatory sentence; second, the effects of public trial were proving deleterious to the state of mind and to the future of the child; third, institutional confinement is pregnant with specific evils calculated to distort the mind and character of the child; fourth, the court, being a criminal court, lacked jurisdiction for those constructive measures of rehabilitation which the majority of children accused of crime seemed to need, namely, better opportunities of home and social life, economic help, and sympathetic supervision. *The juvenile court is a unique and cleverly engineered combination of legislative and administrative methods for the prevention of the evils attributed to several features of the former system of administering justice in cases of child offenders.* It changes completely by law the definition of crime as relating to children (usually under sixteen years of age), and thereby abolishes the applicability to them of the entire system of criminal procedure and penal law. It establishes a physically separate court session, or even court building, for the hearing of all juvenile cases. It gives the judge sitting in this court chancery powers and enables him to substitute chancery for criminal procedure. It establishes, under the court's jurisdiction, an administrative organization for the investigations and services necessary in

connection with the decisions of the court, and for the exercise of probationary supervision.

The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899, and practically all civilized nations have since introduced it. Judge Merritt W. Pinckney of Chicago, Judge Julian Mack, also of Chicago, Judge Harvey Baker of Boston, and Judge Ben Lindsey of Denver have been chiefly responsible for the establishment of this important social machinery, its perfection, popularization, and interpretation in print. Auxiliary developments of the court, such as the probation departments and psychiatric clinics, have afforded additional channels for its enrichment and interpretation. Thus the juvenile court in America is perhaps as well known through the publications of Dr. William Healy, for many years psychiatric attaché of the children's courts in Chicago and Boston, as through its direct publications. Healy's *Individual Delinquent* is perhaps the most notable of the literary contributions to social science that have come thus far from this field.

(b) Mental hygiene occupies a unique position in social work. An important part in this movement was played by Clifford Beers, who, after a mental collapse in 1900, was sent to a hospital for the insane, and regained his sanity long enough before his discharge to be able to observe the process of his recovery, to experience and evaluate the lack of understanding and ineptness of the medicine of the day with respect to that process, to see in that lack of understanding a counterpart of the conditions which in extramural life helped bring about mental collapse, or prevented the recovery of balance when it had once been upset. His observations and conclusions were published under the title of *A Mind That Found Itself,* and Mr. Beers supplemented his book by personal efforts in organizing the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (in America) to carry into practical effect the lessons of his experience. These related only in part to the régime of hospitals for the insane; their larger bearing was a truly preventive one: to study the conditions in various departments of life that lead to insanity, and to learn how—by mental hygiene—to counteract them; to learn how mental recovery can be expedited when once under way; to educate both the lay and the medical profession in the preventibility of insanity; to make the principles of mental hygiene available to professional practitioners outside of medicine, to social workers, teachers, employment managers; and to establish clinics where examinations could be made and preventive instructions could be given both to those in danger of mental breakdown, and to those on the road to recovery. An immense amount of study and research was one of the direct effects of the movement. Industrial plants, home life, various types of recreation, school, and other institutions have been studied to discover their dangers or virtues from the standpoint of mental hygiene. The movement was enriched by contributions to the under-

standing of mental life coming at this time from the fields of psychiatry and of experimental psychology. The area of mental hygiene which lay outside the therapeutic relation between physician and patient was being extended and the preventive possibilities thereby immeasurably increased.

The mental hygiene clinic, by whatever name it goes, is the most important institutional representative of the movement. We find it attached to school, court, family welfare society, girls' protective association, hospital, industrial plant; also it exists independently, especially in the form of child guidance clinics. It is a "locus" for serving clients and for educational work. It consists usually of psychiatric chief, psychologist, and social case work staff, the latter having the task of field investigation and field treatment, while the staff as a whole acts as a diagnostic committee. It is the visible representative in social work of an event in better living, the ultimate significance of which we may not yet be able to gauge.

(c) The consumers' leagues, associated into a National (American) Consumers' League, are social work agencies, by the test of personnel, methods of maintenance, and methods of operation. They are social work agencies from the viewpoint of motivation, *a priori* postulates, and time limitations. Their specific objectives, however, have served to confuse their place from time to time with the place of other promotional bodies in the economic and industrial fields. In some instances they have been deemed by capitalistic supporters of social work to be political, radical (and presumably dangerous), and have been excluded from participation in the benefits of some financial federations of social agencies. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that the militant leader of the National Consumers' League, the late Mrs. Florence Kelley, has been known as a socialist, as an active sympathizer with trade unions and with various political and social reforms outside the strict pale of social work.

The objective of consumers' leagues is, roughly, to improve labor conditions of women and children, with particular emphasis on women. From the standpoint of basic social and industrial reform movements, this is merely a fractional objective, part of the total goal for the rearrangement of the rewards of labor. From that point of view, a new order of society will prevent any exploitation or unreasonable hazard to labor, whether male or female; moral dangers are peculiar to women by biological accident, but are, from this view, essentially no different from other problems in a labor-exploiting system. It is, therefore, not the special goal of the promoters of the various forms of industrial democracy to guard the working and living conditions of women any more than those of men. Theoretically there is no antagonism of objectives here, so much as a difference of emphasis and judgment, even though occasionally specific programs may clash. The movement for the complete emancipation and the attainment of legal equality for women, for example, found an irreconcilable contra-

diction between its goal and the special protections thrown about women by the type of social legislation advocated by the Consumers' League.[5] Here, therefore, is not only a difference in emphasis but a difference in visible goals. The question may well be asked: Why is not an objective such as that of the Consumers' League part of the program of the trade union movement? Theoretically, perhaps, it might have been. But the trade union movement in America has been characterized during a large part of its history by a self-centered drive for power in the interests of the "ins." The "outs" must take care of themselves, except as bringing them in may strengthen the "ins." It has therefore not been part of its active platform to work for the protection of labor conditions of women *as women* and as prospective mothers. Yet the exploitation of women, as of children, has been easier, therefore relatively more frequent than that of men, and because of irreversible biological facts, more sinister in possible effects. The prevention of these effects—economic, moral, mental and physical—with only a secondary regard to ultimate questions of industrial organization, is the objective of consumers' leagues.

The methods of operation for mass prevention automatically grow out of the particular objectives chosen. First, usually comes the ascertaining of facts. This means investigations, local and national. Second, devising appropriate means for changing the conditions found. As these may be in factory, street or homes, it may mean legislation, administration, education. In any case, it means active propaganda no less than scientific inquiry, and, as experience has shown, meeting with powerful opposition of vested interests and of controlled politics. The support of consumers' leagues, as of other social work, comes largely from philanthropists, which means from beneficiaries of the capitalistic system. It is, however, a selected section of the philanthropically minded, for it is the rather rare contributor that senses the differences between the objectives of a consumers' league and the goals of a trade union and of a socialist party or who is not automatically opposed to labor or to socialism. There is bound to be exposure of exploiting capital, and danger to vested interests in the work of consumers' leagues. In the background is the critical view of the existing system and of the personal political theories of the leaders. While it is evidently possible to find the necessary support among the owners of wealth, the consumers' leagues are not dear to the hearts of philanthropists as a whole.

The planning of social work within the framework of a local community had been developing at least since the World War and has given rise to

[5] The organization owes its name to the methods adopted in its early history of bringing the power of the consumer to bear on conditions of production by refusing commodities produced under untoward conditions and favoring those that were approved. This method has been all but discarded in the technology of the league, as in the other social work fields.

two types of agencies usually called community chests and councils of social agencies. The nature of their activities in the field of planning has frequently been described as "community organization." More recently, as a result of the depression and of the creation of the vast system of public agencies for relief and social insurance, planning has had to transcend community boundaries and to include whole states and, in many important respects, the entire national government. This social welfare planning on community, state, and national scale has been intimately associated with the movement for social legislation and with social action as a comprehensive term covering legislation, administration, and pressure tactics. To quote from the *Social Work Year Book* (1939):[6]

The community today is not as independent a unit for the statesmanlike planning of social work activities as it used to be. Far-flung programs and an increasingly comprehensive network of social welfare administration under the federal and state governments cover much of the social work area that previously had been left to the localities and had been practiced to a large extent by private agencies in those localities. It is now a question not merely of recognizing that tax-supported social work is far more extensive than private activities, but rather of adjusting and accommodating local social work plans to the extensive and growing programs under state and federal leadership. These cover such major activities as general relief, old age assistance and pensions, special forms of aid to mothers and children, unemployment insurance, tuberculosis control, treatment of venereal disease as a public health problem, and so forth. Administrative and fiscal policies, supervision, and financial support have brought government into the heart of local social work activities. Meanwhile, the municipalities and counties themselves have, under these expanded governmental activities, increased their own scope of work both within the services just enumerated and in traditional areas such as local health administration, outdoor recreation, and extension of school facilities for group work.

In a discussion of social work theory at this time, therefore, prevention, planning, and social action, as a group of activities and points of view, occupy a place co-ordinate with social case work.

VIII. Certain Handicaps to Articulateness in Social Work

Even a brief presentation such as this would be incomplete without pointing out some of the peculiar facts that have helped to obscure the nature and objectives of social work as a whole. In the first place, the social worker rarely has a chance to formulate a frank statement of his procedure to his client, or group of clients, as conceived in case work or group work. One of the sad but inescapable truths constantly met with, and gen-

[6] "Social Welfare Planning," by Philip Klein. Article in *Social Work Year Book*, p. 424 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1939).

erally recognized by the case worker, is that the condition of his client is due not to external determinants alone, but is compounded in varying degrees by the character, emotional makeup, and behavior of the client himself. The case worker's task is as much to change his client's total attitude as it is to alter the unfavorable conditions beating in upon him. A direct attack upon the objective would in many, if not most, cases alienate the client before anything could be done for or with him. Even in the group work field a too pointed demonstration of the difference between the existing "before" and the desired "after" may be resented by the member of the group. The processes and special interests of the group method are emphasized rather than its ultimate and more latent values; and the improvement of community life must be presented as somewhat of a *third person interest* if the best impulses of the neighborhood personnel are to be appealed to and the ethical habit and community interest developed. Thus there has been a certain unconscious deception on the part of the social worker toward the client, comparable to that of the physician toward his patient. This type of deception is, however, on the wane. In social work, as in medicine, it is being increasingly recognized that as much, if not more, may be done with the client's co-operation and by his aid, as has been done by performing services for him.

The second perturbing fact has been the necessary evasion with respect to the giver. Here again we wish to point out a truth of general relevance rather than of absolute universality. The motives of the giver, insofar as they are not confused by interests of social advancement, publicity, love of flattery, an opiate to conscience, or some other of the human frailties generously distributed among rich and poor, may be summed up in the word charity, a desire to relieve human suffering. Compared with this motive, concepts like social justice, industrial democracy, constructive prevention, social reform, are pale and ineffective. The support of social work has come by appeal to the charitable impulse, and provided the motive was left clear, the giver has not heckled over details, so that the social workers managed to cover case work, group work, and to some extent the preventive movements, by appeal to charity. Hence there has been no inducement for analytical exposition of the objectives and schemes of social work. Moreover, the giver has on the whole been the beneficiary of the existing system, and any fundamental proposals for a new order have naturally not been welcome. The aristocratic tradition has also militated against a complete frankness by the professional social worker toward the giver. The giver's presumption of being "better" will even in a mild form run counter to the theoretical position of the social case worker that only practical limits exist to the resources that might properly be appropriated toward the services of "the least of these." The almost religious adoration of the concept of "democracy" among leaders of group work is also out

of tune with the aristocratic tradition. Frequently, however, a more pronounced deception has been practiced, especially when the social worker's interests in the aspirations of labor, or in the practical contingencies of his job, force him to proceed on principles of treatment (and expenditure) entirely out of harmony with the desires of the givers in power. An astounding amount of deception (or at least of a preference for less, rather than more, exposition on the part of the social worker) is in effect due to the differences in opinion between the social worker who can interpret, and the contributor who can give or withhold. Clarity and articulateness of social work theory pay part of the penalty.

IX. Summary

The subject matter of social work is practically the same as that of the social sciences. What differentiates it from those sciences is its specific orientation toward deliberately changing the conditions of individuals and groups from what is found socially undesirable to that which is socially acceptable, rather than toward discovery of social facts or their organization for scientific generalization. The decision as to what shall be deemed socially desirable or undesirable is a function of community mores, and is, therefore, an *a priori* postulate, not subject to scientific verification. Strictly social work theories, as distinct from those of its constituent social sciences, consist of generalizations based on observation and experience describing the manner in which the socially desirable conditions may be attained for individuals or groups found in conditions not socially desirable. These theories may therefore be legitimately termed methods of procedure. Three major methods are generally recognized in the field of present-day social work: (1) the case work method, which is largely a descendant of the traditional functions of social work to help the *poor, sick, and unfortunate,* but is entirely modern in the scientific formulation of its problems and treatment; (2) the group work method, which seeks to replace the opportunities of group training and social contact, so largely lost in the processes of urbanization peculiar to the nineteenth century; and (3) the method of large scale prevention, planning, and social action by which it is attempted to deal with general conditions recognized as conducive to social maladjustment. The particular characteristics of the present phase of social work are largely due to its extensive borrowings in recent years from psychology, from educational experiments, and from the socio-political speculations of the time. Throughout social work there is a certain amount of confusion, due to the pedagogic difficulties in applying social therapeutics to the clients affected, to the differences in points of view between many leading practitioners and the contributing public, and to the fact that a considerable area of social work interest overlaps the fields of special interest

of school, medicine, labor, and capital. These things have all militated against a clear exposition of social work theory.

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SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY TO EDUCATION

Joseph Slabey Roucek

I. Relation Between Sociology and Education

The relationship of sociology to education (pedagogy) is very close, yet it still remains one of the most neglected fields in the science of human relations. Broadly speaking, the whole history of pedagogy has hinged on the argument as to whether education ought to emphasize the individual or the social viewpoint. But, in reality, all forms of education must be conducted within the framework of social institutions and processes. Not only is the institution of the family the first educational agency of every child, but it is also impossible to imagine the span of human life, from the cradle to the grave, without the constantly modifying influences of various culture patterns. Society (strictly speaking, "societies") educates by means of many social forces and institutions, environmental and cultural factors, and particularly by organized education (the school). Education, in turn, reflects its influence back on society and its various patterns of culture.

Today, there is little disagreement with the fundamental assumption that education is a social phenomenon with definite social goals. The only question that remains is how far the school ought to be submerged in the process. Answers to these questions are sought mostly in philosophy and, more recently, in aggressive ideologies. At the same time, the issue is being narrowed down to the problem of the precise application of the social sciences to the whole field of education. Education is being integrated with sociology, the latter considered by many "educators" as a sort of supporting beam of pedagogy. Similarly, educational sociology, also termed "the sociology of education," "social education," *"pédagogie sociologique," "soziologische Pädagogik,"* has become the new marginal science uniting sociology and education. Through this union the knowledge of sociological method, problems, and generalizations, may be adequately interpreted to every educator. Surely, modern education cannot disregard the contributions of sociology; it must depend, in both its theory and practice, on the knowledge made available by the advances in sociology.

Unfortunately, however, sociology, in its relation to education a field of

knowledge known in America as "educational sociology," still remains in the twilight zone of social science, despite the fact that the past decade has witnessed distinct progress in determining its viewpoint, scope, methods, and worth. The whole field of educational sociology is, nevertheless, often considered one of the academic orphans. The editors of the scholarly and monumental *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* completed in 1935, refused it the privilege of being a member of the social science family by the simple process of failing to mention it as a subject, or to include references to studies devoted to it. Educational psychology found more favor with them and came off with three pages. And, yet, one of the main contributions of sociology has been the gradual development of educational sociology, and its contribution, in turn, to sociology as well as to education.

To trace the genetic development of this field it is necessary to follow two lines of thought, originally divergent but now fused into the comparatively new field of educational sociology: the educational emphasis of sociologists, and the sociological implications of educators.

II. The Period Before Comte

The theoretical background of educational sociology can be traced to educational, philosophical, and sociological theories in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries of France, England, Scotland, and Germany.[1] The study of human behavior from actual human affairs, rather than through the study of the Classics, was initiated. Aiming to give up any *a priori* method, this method produced a definite methodology for the investigation of human problems. Here were the roots of the later rise of scientific sociology and the scientific foundations of education. To understand human behavior scientifically it was necessary to analyze the factors of heredity and environment. Sociological thinkers were mainly interested in the latter because it enabled them to develop various ramifications of social control. These 17th, 18th and 19th centuries theories were tied together by (1) the alleged significance of environment in accounting for individual differences; (2) the vision that man can be perfected by means of a controlled environment; and (3) the utilization of universal education as the social process through which human perfectibility and social progress can be achieved. These concepts received most encouragement from the philosophy of history, the social contract, the social-psychological, and the biological schools, headed by Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, Basedow, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, Hegel, Paley, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Hume, Vico, Comte, Bagehot, Tarde, and Spencer.

[1] We have summarized here, in part, the conclusions of Florence W. Schaper, *The Rise of Educational Sociology in the United States* (Doctoral thesis, New York University School of Education, 1932).

Lying back of the genetic growth of these social and educational theories was the intellectual revolution promoted by the theories of Bacon and Newton which laid the foundations for the scientific study of social phenomena.

III. Early Sociologists

Comte was one of the earliest scholars to suggest that sociology must be built upon the biological sciences.[2] He developed the basic principles for the scientific use of the historical method in the interpretation of social phenomena, rather than the *a priori* approach of the earlier philosophers of history. The principles of Comtean philosophy are that there is (1) strong argument for the possibility and necessity of universal education; (2) definite need for the organization of education according to the logical development of the natural sciences, which order accords with the natural manifestation of all phenomena; and (3) genuine hope for the reorganization of society through the aid of sociology. Comte based these principles upon his fundamental concept that human thought is characterized by definite developmental stages, culminating in the "positive" or scientific stage.

For Comte, "the aim of education is not to create but to modify." Furthermore, he recognized the vital rôle of emotion in teaching and learning—recently so strongly stressed. Comte paid attention to the educational value of noble feelings, sentiments, or emotions. He claimed that since the close of the Middle Ages the education of the heart had been neglected in proportion as that of the mind (head) had been cultivated. Comte advised that the intellect (reason) should be subordinated to "social feelings," and that, throughout the course of education, parents and school teachers ought to seize every suitable occasion for calling social feelings into play, because exercise strengthens our tendencies. The office of the mind is to strengthen and cultivate the heart, so that the heart again may animate and direct our moral forces. This mutual influence will lead the intellect to desirable social and moral results.

Bagehot's writings are also related to this study because several of his concepts became widely known and were used by some American sociologists who influenced the rise of educational sociology. Bagehot's chief problem in *Physics and Politics* (1872) centered around the inductive study of the social

[2] A. Comte, *Positive Philosophy,* trans. H. Martineau, 2 vols. (New York, 1853), I, 27. Cf. McQuilkin DeGrange, *The Curve of Societal Movement: A Study of the Nature of Sociology in the Light of the Positive Politics of Auguste Comte* (1930); C. A. Ellwood "Auguste Comte, the Founder of Sociology," *The Story of Social Philosophy* (1938), xxiii, 358–408; DeGrange, "Comte's Sociologies," *Am. Soc. Rev.,* IV (1939), 17–25, Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (1938), 560–94.

process, or group evolution, which he believed should develop continually by means of imitation and discussion to assure ultimate social progress.[3]

Tarde is one of the founders of a school of social psychology which attempts to explain social phenomena by means of imitation, suggestion, and other related processes.[4] This school considers imitation as the mechanism which controls social evolution. Tarde and his followers contributed to the development of educational sociology several theories that stress the supreme importance of the psycho-social environment in shaping behavior.[5] Educational sociology incorporated the main concepts of Tarde through the writings of his American followers: Baldwin, Sumner, Giddings, Ross, and Ellwood.

The biological approach of Herbert Spencer need not be extensively discussed here.[6] We need only to note his contention that social progress is achieved through the operation of the laws of evolution,[7] and his notion of the "regulative system" of ethics which postulates that rules of conduct, along with other social phenomena, can be treated scientifically.[8] The educational theories of Spencer are, in fact, more intimately related to the origins of educational sociology than are his sociological theories. Especially is this true of his notable essay, "What Knowledge Is of Most Worth." [9] He conceived of education, which ought to begin in the cradle, as a process "to prepare for complete living." "The only rational mode of judging of any educational course is, to judge in what degree it discharges such function. . . . What knowledge is of most worth? . . . the uniform reply is . . . Science."

Spencer's individualism prevented him, however, from recognizing the worth of public education as the necessary means for the development of social intelligence, justice, and unity. Spencer, in fact, overemphasized as a fundamental educational principle the dogma that the sanctity of the individual human being should be kept inviolate, minimized the reform principles opposed to individualism, and made unwise use of the organismic analogy.

In summary, the latter part of the 19th century in Europe gave evidence of an increasing intellectual interest in the development of a scientific approach to the study of social phenomena. The new philosophy of history sponsored by Comte encouraged the development of inductive methodology.

[3] Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (New York, 1884), pp. 33–100, 118, 156.

[4] Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation,* trans. by E. C. Parsons (1903).

[5] L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926), pp. 75–6.

[6] Cf. Ellwood, *op. cit.,* "Herbert Spencer," xxv, 435–66; J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory* (1923), p. 330; Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.,* I, *passim,* and 664–77. E. P. Kimball, *Sociology and Education: An Analysis of the Theories of Spencer and Ward* (1932).

[7] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology,* 3 vols. (1914).

[8] Spencer, *The Data of Ethics* (New York, 1877), Preface.

[9] Spencer, *Education* (1914 ed.), chap. i.

It was followed by the socio-psychological school under the leadership of Bagehot and Tarde, who studied the mechanics of certain psycho-social processes, especially imitation, in relation to varied environments. The biological school was the last one to appear; it suggested explanations of group behavior in terms of the organismic analogy.

IV. Sociological Aspects of Early American Educational Theories

Educational thinkers in the United States in the latter part of the 19th century, influenced by significant European schools of thought and conscious of the critical social problems created by the Civil War, began to concentrate definitely on the matter of using education for social control and defining the social functions of education.[10] Some of the leaders were Wines, Mann, Harris, Dewey, Baldwin, Ward, Small, Vincent, Giddings, Ellwood, King, Ross, and Cooley. During the first decade of the 20th century the growth of all phases of academic sociology in the United States had a marked influence on the curriculum in institutions of higher learning,[11] particularly the teacher-training institutions. Sociology suggested to teachers and educators that adjustment to group life necessitates establishing relations between methods and content in the learning and teaching process. Education must be organized for social utility as well as for individual efficiency. The use of different techniques for developing a type of education consistent with the above objective was offered by Ross, Giddings, Baldwin, Dewey, and Cooley. The technique included imitation, "consciousness of kind," and communication as essential to the social process of adjusting individuals to social groups.

One of the first systematic educational treatises written in the United States appeared in 1838.[12] Enoch Cobb Wines anticipated Spencer's tenet as to the importance of the social function of education. He recognized that human nature can be modified and that the most important agency for the modification of human nature is education in both its formal and informal aspects. He was particularly cognizant of the need for popular education in a democratic form of government.

After the middle of the 19th century, Horace Mann, influenced by Pestalozzi and Herbart, and by Spencer's idea of the purpose of education, helped to popularize in the United States the conception that formal education should be free and universal and should aim to develop individual character and social efficiency. Education should be an actual training for rearing

[10] See Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, "Sociology in the United States," II, xxiv, 953–1001.

[11] Cf. F. N. House, "American Sociology before 1918," *The Development of Sociology* (1936), Part IV.

[12] E. C. Wines, *Hints on a System of Popular Education* (1838).

worthy families, for living a co-operative social life, and for being a public-spirited citizen in one's daily activities.[13]

The new educational conceptions of adjustment to life—physical, intellectual, moral, religious, political, economic—were clearly propounded by the United States Commissioner of Education, William T. Harris. As early as 1893 he stated that "no philosophy of education is sound . . . unless based upon sociology." [14] Three years later, Dr. Harris repeated this conviction before the National Education Association. The same year witnessed the appearance of a booklet comprising the educational credo of John Dewey, *My Pedagogic Creed,* and *The Demands of Sociology upon Pedagogy* by A. W. Small.[15]

V. The Influence of James, Dewey and Baldwin

The application of psychology to educational procedures became marked by the close of the 19th century. Since the time of Harris the training of American teachers has been based on both the psychological and sociological —chiefly the former—aspects of education. Hence, some of the concepts of educational psychology were fused with the early literature of educational sociology. The tremendous influence of Herbart was followed by the popularity of William James. Some of his concepts relative to educational procedures became a part of the early literature of educational sociology. James stated in 1890:

> A man's Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind. . . . Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind.[16]

This concept of the "social self" resembles that of "fellow-feeling" of Adam Smith and the concept of "consciousness of kind" of Giddings. James'

[13] H. Mann, *Lectures and Annual Reports on Education* (Cambridge, published for the Editor, 1867); B. A. Hinsdale, *Horace Mann and the Common School Revival* (New York, 1898).

[14] W. T. Harris, *Educational Review* (1893), p. 84. Cf. Harvey Lee, *The Status of Educational Sociology in Normal Schools, Teachers Colleges, Colleges, and Universities* (New York, n.d.); E. G. Payne, "The Development of Educational Sociology in America and its Present Status," *Sociologická revue,* VII, Nos. 3, 4 (1936), 367–76; and T. H. Claire, *The Sociological Theories of William Torrey Harris* (Washington University, doctoral thesis), contains excellent bibliography.

[15] A. W. Small, *Demands of Sociology upon Pedagogy* (New York, 1896). Note the title of the essay. If written today, the title would be reversed, "Demands of Pedagogy upon Sociology."

[16] W. James, *The Principles of Psychology,* 2 vols. (New York, 1890), I, 293–4.

most popular work [17] presented a non-technical discussion of consciousness, behavior, native reactions, habit, ideas, interest, attention, memory, apperception, and the will. His attitude towards instincts urged teachers to recognize in the child the multiplicity of instincts which are inherited at birth and determine most of the future behavior of the individual. This older theory of instinctive behavior has dominated, until the present time, much of the literature of educational sociology, as well as educational psychology. No other concept in the writings of James seems to have affected the development of educational sociology so definitely as his instinct concept.

Following the psychological influence of James, the psycho-sociological and socio-philosophical writings of John Dewey became popular. Dewey propounds [18] the idea that school life is an embryonic community and that the primary business of the school is to train and educate children for mutual co-operative living. "Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication. . . . Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is education." [19] In general, Dewey has continued to reinterpret his well-known message of experience, scientific method, and democracy, and the implications of them in raising the quality of living to the highest possible level.

Dewey has modified the theories of Froebel, Bagehot, and Tarde, and his ideas are related to those of Baldwin, Cooley, and Giddings. The central theme of all these scholars is that the social environment determines the conditions that stimulate social behavior. In the light of sociology, however, Dewey must be criticized on several grounds. He believes that the highest aim of education is to adjust our youth to the needs of the present society and community, but forgets that both of them may be very inadequate and out-of-date, just as happened with other social institutions which he ignores (home, church, and state). He believes too much in school education as the only agency for uplifting the child, and forgets the mighty influence of natural-living education, such as that received in the home, state, church, leisure activities, private lectures, movies, travelling, the street, etc.

James Mark Baldwin elaborated Tarde's analysis of social processes, his views not greatly differing from Tarde's.[20] The fundamental social process is imitation, although it is reflective imitation that Baldwin discusses, and

[17] James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* (New York, 1899).

[18] J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (1915); *Experience and Education* (1938); *Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1922); *The Child and the Curriculum* (1915); and *The School and Society* (1900 and 1915).

[19] Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 5–6.

[20] J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race* (New York, 1895); *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (3rd. ed., 1902); *The Individual and Society* (1911). See C. A. Ellwood, "The Social Philosophy of James Mark Baldwin," *Jour. Soc. Phil.*, II (Oct., 1936), 55–68.

therein he differs from Tarde. He explained the growth of society as an expression of self-consciousness in institutions, thought, and actions. Many educational sociologists are indebted to Dewey and Baldwin, especially to the latter's explanation of the child's mental development in relation to its social environment.

VI. American Sociological Pioneers and Education

During the first twenty-five years of the history of educational sociology in the United States, educational and sociological literature was dominated by the concept of the social function of education and by the theory that sociology should be applied to educational procedures and goals. The theories of both groups modified each other during this period and developed a philosophy of social education which produced the philosophical school of educational sociology. Educators began applying many of these sociological principles to educational situations and thereby developed the applied school of educational sociology. The background of this development is connected intimately with the American pioneers of sociology—Ward, Small, Sumner, Giddings, Ross—all of whom were interested in education, as also were many other teachers of sociology.

Lester F. Ward has had a greater influence upon educational thought in America than any other sociologist; even today a good deal of current educational theory is mainly an adaptation of Ward. He defined education "as a system for extending to all the members of society such of the extant knowledge of the world as may be deemed most important." [21] The central theory of Ward was the control of social progress by means of education, "the proximate means of progress." To insure progress, knowledge must be available for all, and schools become free and compulsory. Formal education should establish as its objective for educational procedure the criterion of social utility; it should be social education.[22]

Ward developed four leading principles of social dynamics and hence of societal progress. The first law, "difference of potential," pertains to the difference in potential possibilities of individuals. "Progress results from fusion of unlike elements." The crossing of cultures provides endless opportunities for progress. Likewise, the combining of two ideas by the human mind may

[21] L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology* (New York, 1883), II, 568. In 1906 he wrote again on "The Educational Environment and Education as Opportunity," *Applied Sociology* (1906), pp. 246–51, 511–22. See also *The Substance of the Sociology of Lester F. Ward,* summarized by Clement Wood (1930), and Samuel Chugerman, *Lester F. Ward, the American Aristotle* (1939).

[22] For an analysis of Ward's four principles of social dynamics, see E. S. Bogardus, *A History of Social Thought* (1929), chap. xvii; "The Sociology of Lester F. Ward," pp. 320–47; J. P. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* chap. xiii; J. Q. Dealey, "Lester Frank Ward," in H. W. Odum, ed., *American Masters of Social Science* (1927), pp. 61–98.

result in a new idea—in short, in progress. Ward's second dynamic principle was innovation. His third law of progress is called "conation," or social effort promoted naturally to satisfy desire, to preserve or continue life, to modify surroundings. Every constructive modification of either physical or spiritual environment benefits mankind. Ward's fourth dynamic principle is that of "social telesis": mind utilizes all the dynamic forces of society (the human desires) in constructive, orderly, ways. Telic methods may reduce social waste to a minimum. While nature works blindly, mind can perceive the best social ends and pursue them. Thought, therefore, has many opportunities to subjugate natural forces and turn them into the satisfaction of human needs. Social telesis can turn the raw passions and desires of men into socially useful channels. If individuals, as members of society, could develop prevision and work together for societary ends, they would be able to transform the world.

Ward's firm conviction in the efficacy of social planning and his faith in average, but ambitious, persons led him to advise society to educate wisely the average intelligence. He urged the distribution of useful knowledge to all humanity everywhere—the socialization of education. He supplemented a demand for sound birth with a notion of the importance of a sound environment, which would result in a society of sound people:

> The problem of education is, therefore, reduced to this: whether the members of society shall continue to pass through life surrounded only by the natural and unrecognized influences which everywhere exist, . . . or, whether they shall be required to pass a portion of their early lives under a system of artificial circumstances, so regulated that the bulk of the influences which appeal to the senses and produce ideas will be both reliable and important, and from which, under no other than the normal operations of the mind, reliable and valuable knowledge must necessarily result, solid characters be formed, and the highest ethical and dynamic actions be induced, exerting rigidly corresponding effects upon themselves and upon society.[23]

It is obvious that the influence of the concept of social progress which dominated a large portion of European sociological theories is present in Ward's theory of purposive evolution (telesis) and in his belief in nurture as against nature, as the source of human ability and achievement. His writings reflected the consensus of judgment of American leaders and educators in the latter part of the 19th century, namely, that educational procedure should be adapted to the rapidly changing industrial society of the United States. It expressed the pragmatic and optimistic philosophy of American life.

Small [24] emphasized the fact that the school is a social institution, that its

[23] Ward, *Dynamic Sociology,* II, 632–3. See E. P. Kimball, *op. cit.,* and the bibliography, pp. 315–8.

[24] A. W. Small, "Some Demands of Pedagogy on Sociology," in J. Dewey, *My*

aims are social, and its management, discipline, and methods of instruction should be dominated by a social frame of reference: "Sociology demands of educators, finally, that they shall not rate themselves as leaders of children but as makers of society." [25]

Vincent, an early collaborator of Small's at the University of Chicago, [26] another advocate of social education, stated in 1897 that "the thought of social philosophy which sees in the development of society the growth of a vast psychic organism to which individuals are intrinsically related, in which alone they find self-realization, is of the highest significance to the teacher, to whom it suggests both aim and method." [27]

Giddings combined the concept of imitation, suggested by Bagehot, Tarde and Baldwin, the "consciousness of kind," derived from Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments,* and Spencer's doctrine of cosmic evolution. These he reformulated later as the concept of "pluralistic behavior." "Consciousness of kind" is a social state of mind with its objective side dependent on communication. As Giddings put it: "The individual, therefore, is not prior to society, or society to the individual. . . . Each individual consciousness becomes adjusted to the social state. Each begins to require companionship, and each to comprehend some portion of the consciousness of others. Presently all individuals to some extent think, feel, and will, alike, and each consciousness becomes a microcosm of the social system in all its activities." [28] Giddings, although arguing vaguely for "social engineering," defended what he designated a creed of socialized individualism.

In his last work, *The Mighty Medicine,*[29] Giddings saw a conflict between natural knowledge and "occultism," traditional and sacrosanct education, "vouched for by doctors of magic, heirs and assigns of the medicine man," which crushes intellectual liberty, and "hates the scientific knowledge of nature with implacable hatred, for that knowledge exposes magic and discredits it." We must safeguard against "occultistic teaching," and learn how to fight effectively against this enemy by his own methods. "The intellec-

Pedagogic Creed (New York, 1897), pp. 19–36; and in *Am. Jour. Soc.,* II (1897), 839–51. See D. H. Kulp, "Educational Sociology," in Lundberg, Bain and Anderson, *Trends in American Sociology* (1929), vii, 297–313; Kulp, "History of Educational Sociology," *Educational Sociology* (1933), xxv, 548–68.

[25] Small, "Some Demands of Sociology upon Pedagogy," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* II (1897), 839–51.

[26] Cf. A. W. Small and G. H. Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (New York, 1894).

[27] G. H. Vincent, *The Social Mind and Education* (New York, 1897), p. 5.

[28] F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1897), p. 19, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers. See J. L. Gillin, "Masters of Social Science: Franklin Henry Giddings," *Soc. Forces,* V (1926), 197–214; and in H. W. Odum, *op. cit.,* viii, 191–230; and F. H. Hankins, "Franklin Henry Giddings, 1855–1931," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXVII (1931), 349–67.

[29] F. H. Giddings, *The Mighty Medicine* (1928), quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

tually honest and unafraid must be willing to say that they do not know when they do not, instead of inventing a knowledge that is not knowledge." [30] A stubborn conflict goes on between two irreconcilable conceptions and realities of education. One is not afraid of any knowledge and "fights in defence of mystery-dispelling knowledge and of intellectual liberty," [31] and the other is "traditional and sacrosant," which "crushes intellectual liberty when it can, . . . hates the scientific knowledge of nature with implacable hatred, for that knowledge exposes magic and discredits it." [32] Present-day education is "deplorably infected with superstition and is systematically occult." [33] Our education has failed in its highest task. "Either it has wasted itself in trying to educate the incompetent beyond their capacities and has neglected to educate the competent adequately, or it has educated mistakenly. Its methods have been wrong, or its scale of values has been wrong; or (and this is more probable) its methods and values both have been wrong." [34] The situation can be "ameliorated only by a liberal education adequate to clarify vision while extending its range, and potent to develop individual and collective self-control." [35] The knowledge of the liberally educated "must be representative. It must include knowledge of what *will* be; knowledge of what *can* be; knowledge of what *should* be, and knowledge of what, by human decision, *shall* be." [36] The organization of the mind "should correlate, co-ordinate, and focus all drives and responses." [37] "To shape a mind attentive, persistent, organized, and liberal, is to create a personality as nearly as possible adequate to the struggle for a happy existence in our present world. This is the task, not easy but not impossible, which awaits the New Liberal Education." [38] "Education is a continuing reconditioning. It can be good or bad." [39] "In recent years much energy has been devoted to improving the teaching of defective, retarded, and other low-grade minds. The interest in this endeavour has been almost pathological. Meanwhile, interest in the effective education of high-grade minds has been until very recently almost nil." [40] "It will be necessary to give unceasing attention to selection." [41] "We have to study the child as a member of society, and he becomes a full-fledged member of society on the day when first he makes or tries to make other children do as he wants them

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 146, quoted from F. H. Giddings, *The Mighty Medicine*, by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 3, by permission.
[32] *Ibid.*, by permission.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 16, by permission.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 55, by permission.
[35] *Ibid.*, by permission.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 63, by permission.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 73, by permission.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 74, by permission.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 76, by permission.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 79, by permission.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 81, by permission.

to do." [42] "Unless democracies cease to distrust intellectual aristocracies and learn to walk respectfully, albeit self-respectingly, with them, the days of democracy and of civilization are numbered." [43] The duties of "the intellectually honest and unafraid" are "to enlist for personal service and 'for the war,' . . . to safeguard children whenever it can be done against occultistic teaching, . . . to learn how to fight effectively against the kind of enemy that has to be faced," . . . and "to make sure that they have cast occultism altogether and forever out of their own hearts and minds." [44]

Ross wrote his famed *Social Control* in 1901.[45] In the preface to this he stated that it is a study of social psychology in which he seeks to determine "how far the order we see all about is due to the influence that reaches men and women from without, that is, social influence." Ross also dealt with education, approaching the subject from the point of view offered by Baldwin.[46] He held that "the ethical life itself, the boy's, the girl's, consciousness is born in the stress of the conflicts of suggestion, born right out of his imitative hesitations." "Heredity does not stop with birth; it is then only beginning." Speaking of education in the future, Ross said: "It will seek not so much to fix certain principles of authority, as to suggest directly actions and feelings and modes of viewing conduct." [47] Finally, Ross suggested that education must be the foundation for a system of social control.

Ross analyzed the behavior of the group, rather than the individual, in social organization. He was influenced by the theories and methods of Adam Smith, Bagehot and Tarde. Many of the educational sociology texts are constructed according to the socio-psychological concepts of Ross, who, as contrasted with Baldwin, Cooley and Mead, has, in American social psychology, stood for the objective or "planes and currents" approach to the subject, emphasizing the mass behavior of men rather than their personal attitudes or desires.[48] He elaborated his earlier doctrines in his large textbook on sociology. In sociology, also, Ross was interested in objective processes such as assimilation, differentiation, opposition, co-operation, and the like, rather than in personality. In all his work, the emphasis is on impersonal objectives rather than on the motivational or subjective aspects of social phenomena.

Another sociologist influencing the rise of educational sociology has been Cooley.[49] His first book explained the behavior of the individual in the group; he suggested the utter futility of attempting to understand the in-

[42] F. H. Giddings, *The Mighty Medicine,* quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

[43] *Ibid.,* p. 118, by permission.

[44] *Ibid.,* pp. 143–5, by permission.

[45] E. A. Ross, *Social Control* (1901).

[46] *Ibid.,* "Social Suggestion," Part I, xiv.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 177.

[48] Ross, *Seventy Years of It* (1936), p. 114.

[49] C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902).

dividual apart from his social life. His explanation of the "looking-glass self" [50] falls into the following elements: one's imagination of how he appears to another person; one's imagination of how the other person regards him; and a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the part of the first person. Cooley is convinced that human nature needs not to be changed, but to be enlarged upon through the utilization of sympathy, love, and other primary group impulses.

Herein lay a tremendous challenge and hope for education in the first part of the 20th century, and educators seemed to grasp the idea and to take hold of this challenge. Later, Cooley dealt with the social and individual aspects of mind that have to be developed if the higher culture is to continue.

It is, however, around the nature and functions of the primary groups, such as the family, playground, and neighborhood, that Cooley [51] built an elaborate discussion of democracy and the democratic mind. Social consciousness can be stimulated by public schools as "primary groups."

Cooley analyzes the processes of society and suggests the techniques for the development of socialized personalities. To education, Cooley assigned an important task, inasmuch as he believed that the school is the principal institution that has the facilities for developing every individual according to the nature of the unfolding personality.

An education that performs this function is distinctly a social education, for it provides for the development of a socialized personality in group life that is characterized by "loyalty, service, emulation, and discussion." The techniques for the development of socialized personality resolve themselves into social adjustment processes in the primary groups and the school. But Cooley questioned whether education, in its present form, which emphasizes formal knowledge at the expense of personality development, can perform such a function. It was not, however, to education alone that Cooley looked for the enrichment of social and individual life, but to the entire process of communication as well. Communication is "the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop." Cooley believed that social life can be directed through formal education and communication, if these processes are socially controlled and guided.

Cooley must be credited with elaborating the earlier educational and sociological theories of European and American origin through his important contributions to the study of personality growth from the subjective approach. Like Baldwin, Cooley emphasized the importance of the family and the rearing of the child for the life of society. The literature of educa-

[50] *Ibid.*, chap. vi.

[51] Cooley, *ibid.*, *Social Organization* (1909); *Social Process* (1920). See C. A. Ellwood, "Charles Horton Cooley, Sociologist," *Soc. and Soc. Res.*, XIV (1929), 3–9; G. H. Mead, "Cooley's Contribution to American Social Thought," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXV (1930), 693–706.

tional sociology is still influenced by Cooley. Particularly important is his theory of the significance of the socialization of personality, through the primary groups and the school, in preparing one to participate in democratic group life and to realize individual happiness. Our educational ideology is, in fact, under the spell of Cooley's belief, held by his professional friends, that the social environment, especially the school environment, can be controlled to such an extent that social life can be made anew.

The final influence from early American sociology which can be included in this brief summary came through the work of Sumner whose popular book, *Folkways,*[52] aroused many educators to a reconsideration of the school system. "The mores are always right" was the theme of the book. "It is only by high mental discipline that we can be trained to rise above the atmosphere (of the mores) and form rational judgments on current cases. This mental independence and ethical power are the highest products of education." Sumner defined education as "transferring to him (the child) the mores. He learns what conduct is approved and what disapproved; what kind of man is admired most; how he ought to behave in all kinds of cases; what he ought to believe and reject." Education means discipline, knowledge is power to be used for good or ill. Popular education and optimistic faith about education are in the mores of our times. We regard illiteracy as an abomination. "We ascribe to book learning power to form character, make good citizens, keep family mores pure, elevate morals, establish individual character, civilize barbarians, and cure social vice and diseases." These theories, together with the general thesis of *Folkways,* broke down some of the educational optimism and complacency that was still dominant in the first decade of the present century.

Sumner did not formally tie education in with a sociological system, but his successor, A. G. Keller, extended the approach in this direction in his *Societal Evolution.*[53] He described the evolution of the folkways and mores. He regarded the units of culture, which have been derived out of group experience, as adjustments to life situations. Education plays a vital rôle in the transmission of mores. Unlike another method of transmission; namely, imitation, education implies conscious selection among the mores, to decide upon what shall be transmitted as most important for social well-being.

> The program of education represents the greatest systematic attempt to put reasoned selection into operation that the world has seen. The root idea of education cannot be anything else than to raise up the rising generation to play its part, with the greatest satisfaction in its own self-realization, in the societal environment and within the societal code of its time—to train the young to knowledge of the game of living in society by learning its rules.[54]

[52] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (1906).
[53] A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution* (Rev. ed., 1931).
[54] *Ibid.,* p. 306.

Keller contrasted the direct form of primitive education with the indirect modern type. He emphasized the greater ease of proving to the preliterate child the expedient nature of what is taught him, because primitive mores represent a direct reaction to environment and are more readily tested.

Keller's follower, Maurice R. Davie, applied the principles of societal evolution to modern education, where he pointed out that education, like all institutions, must change as the basic conditions of life change.[55] The law of life is adjustment. New life conditions call for new methods and new types of adjustment. All social institutions are affected, although in varying degrees of directness, by the struggle for adaptation. The most recent, radical changes calling forth new types of adjustment are industrialization and urbanization. Effective education is preparation for life. The work of the schools is to fit people for social conditions that are constantly changing; hence the work of the schools must correspondingly change. Education is, however, conservative, and selective changes come only after a prolonged struggle.

In summary, during the first decade of the 20th century all phases of sociology in the United States had a marked influence on the curricula in higher institutions of learning, particularly the teacher-training institutions. Sociology indicated to teachers and educators that adjustment to group life necessitates establishing relations between method and content in the learning and teaching processes, if education is to be organized for social utility as well as for individual efficiency.

The use of different techniques for developing a type of education consistent with the above objectives was indicated by the pioneers in American sociology. The technique included imitation, consciousness of kind, and communication as essential to the social process of adjusting individuals to social groups. The new nation needed the theories relative to the development of individuality, free universal education, and the perfectibility of man through education as a vital part of American democracy. American scholars added to the European heritage by developing sociological concepts needed for the building of social behavior. It was hoped that these techniques of social control could be manipulated so that the control of social forms, social groups, social institutions, and social processes, would make possible ultimate social progress.

The fusion of the European and American sociological and educational theories was now on the way and the time was ripe for the development of a synthetic discipline, educational sociology. Its immediate predecessor was

[55] M. R. Davie, *Problems of the City* (1932), Part IV. Davie's cultural approach is also evident in *World Immigration* (1936). In line with Sumner's and Keller's influence, studies of education among primitive peoples have been made by G. P. Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries* (1934); and Nathan Miller, *The Child in Primitive Society* (1925).

a field known as "social pedagogy," which not only appears in our education under various guises, such as "civic education," "social studies," "social science," "social problems," but is quite often, although not entirely properly, identified with educational sociology.

VII. Social Pedagogy

The field of "social pedagogy" ought not to be identified with that of educational sociology. In general, there are two major concepts involved here, seemingly inconsistent. One is the point of view of those who define education as the resultant of society's efforts to achieve its own welfare, the aim of which is to educate the individual to be a useful member of society. The other aims to embrace "any and all contributions from the social sciences which may illuminate and improve educational practices." [56] In other words, sociology tries in the latter case to draw together, evaluate, interpret, and disseminate in a practical way the most vital findings and results of all fields of the social sciences. Sociology is thus given a meaning far beyond that which it intrinsically possesses, and so is education given a special vitality by virtue of its own synthetic function, simply because it is not customary to define education as including all the processes that influence all members of society. If the term is to have any precision we must limit it to those learning processes that are controlled. For our purpose we shall define education as the "consciously controlled learning process in which the situations are definitely manipulated for purposes of producing behavior changes." [57]

A similar distinction must be made in regard to the scope of sociology. It is true that sociology and the social sciences are inter-related, but their fields are different. Sociology is considered by many a synthetic science, it is true; [58] but many sociologists, on the other hand, do not grant it the glory of being the queen of the social sciences. Eubank, for instance, informs us that "sociology itself is not . . . a technique for social work; it is not a theory of social reform; it is not socialism; it is not a code of morality." [59] Another misconception is that sociology is "in some special way to be re-

[56] David Snedden, "The Field of Educational Sociology," *Rev. Ed. Res.*, VII (February, 1937), 5.

[57] E. George Payne, "The School as a Social Agency," *Readings in Educational Sociology* (1934), i, 4.

[58] See for instance, H. A. Phelps, "The Framework of Sociology," *Principles and Laws of Sociology* (1936), iii, Section, "The Special Province of Sociology," 33–5. See also P. A. Sorokin, "Sociology as a Science," *Soc. Forces*, X, 21–7, who defines sociology as a synthetic as well as a special social science, and in both instances it remains a generalizing science.

[59] E. E. Eubank, "Errors in Sociology," *Soc. Forces*, XVI (December, 1937), 178–201.

garded as a synthesis of the social sciences." [60] Even less ambitious claims of that kind can be made for the field of educational sociology.

Hence the field of "social pedagogy" is related to our discussion only indirectly. But it is a very important field which requires our attention. In general, social education is founded on the idea that the individual is essentially a social being, and that his powers can best be developed by participation in social activities. Accordingly, it demands that the school and the class be miniature societies and that co-operation be applied to all the activities of the social life. It implies a tendency to organize the school as an embryonic state, community, society, home, church, playground (the ancient Greeks called playground a school, *scholae*).

Since Comte's introduction of the idea of sociology and comparative education, the typical methods in social pedagogy have centered around the work of Paul Gerhard Natorp,[61] Paul Bergemann,[62] Paul Barth,[63] and Otto Willmann.[64]

They all agree that purely individual education is inadequate for solving the complex problems of society, and hold that a broad social attitude is essential for a complete understanding of the true function of education. They regard education as derived not only from the relation between pupil and teacher, but from the relation between the pupil and his whole social environment. But each of these writers has a different philosophy of life, and each one has made his particular system of philosophy the theoretical foundation of his notion of social education. Natorp's social education is inseparable from a neo-Kantian *Kritik* (or Criticism); "pantheism" is the spirit of Barth's philosophy of history (that is, what he thinks is "sociology"); and Willmann, a leading Roman Catholic educator, derives the basic principles of his social education from the semi-rationalistic Thomistic philosophy.

In regard to the method of investigation, the general truths of social education have been demonstrated deductively by Natorp, and inductively by Bergemann. The aim of education is the perfection of the individual, not for

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] P. G. Natorp, *Sozialpädagogik: Theorie der Willenserziehung auf der Grundlage der Gemeinschaft* (Stuttgart, 1899). See Arthur Allin, "Natorp's Socialpaedagogik," *Ed. Rev.*, XIX (1900), 290–5; M. W. Meyerhardt, "Paul Natorp's Social Pedagogy," *Pedagogical Seminary, XXIII* (1916), 51–62.

[62] P. Bergemann, *Soziale Pädagogik auf erfahrungswissenschaftlicher Grundlage und mit Hilfe der induktiven Methode* (Gera, 1900).

[63] P. Barth, *Geschichte der Erziehung in soziologischer und geistesgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung* (10th ed., Leipzig, 1925).

[64] Otto Willmann, *The Science of Education in its Sociological and Historical Aspects*, trans. from the 4th ed., by F. M. Kirsch, 2 vols. (1921–22). See P. R. Radosavljevich, "A Spirit of a Modern Educator: Dr. O. Willmann," *New Haven Teachers Jour.* (1933), pp. 11–5 and (June, 1933), pp. 20–7.

his own sake, but as a means to a social end, for all agree that education must promote the conservation and perfection of society. Social education demands essentially equal educational opportunities for all. To Natorp, father of the *Sozialpädagogik* concept, social education seems equivalent to the education of the community. Barth discovers the true social character of education in the forces that lie beyond the immediate educational field; namely, the social organization, the degree of intellectual development, and the character of a people's philosophy of life. His sociological approach is shown by demonstrating that the educational theories and practices change with modifications of social organization and social activities. The motive force behind the educational movement and the groping toward a higher cultural life is to be sought in the character of the prevailing *ideas* and philosophy of life. He seeks to make educated persons not of a small fraction of people, but of all the population. Willmann conceived society as a social body or social organism analogous to the biological organism. He thus reflected the idea of the social biologists.

In this group also belongs Saverio de Dominicis.[65] He is most closely related to Lester F. Ward, and his "sociological pedagogy" is based upon the doctrine that society's amelioration or retrogression is dependent upon and controlled by the motives, aims, ideals, and methods which dominate the educational system. The family and church cannot be relied upon to execute the educative function. The responsibility falls upon the state, which has three missions: (1) the humanitarian, seeking to eliminate war; (2) the economic, seeking to eliminate misery; and (3) the educational, seeking to eliminate ignorance.

VIII. Durkheim and Social Psychology

Since psychology has become the most influential subject in our teacher-training institutions, it was inevitable that psychology and sociology would find a common meeting-ground, both looking to the social environment as an explanation of personality, as well as a field in which individuals may exercise mutual influence.

Comte's conception of the relation between the biological and the social has been formulated not only by the sociologists but also by the psychologists, and the general problem of human personality has become the debating ground of the sociologists and psychologists. A group of social psychologists still argue the major premise as to whether they are more sociologists than psychologists and vice versa.

Émile Durkheim, although a professor of pedagogy, was really more interested in sociology. His approach to education was indicated by his

[65] S. de Dominicis, *Scienza comparata dell'Educazione: Sociologia Pedagogica* (Torino, 1926).

motto: "Education is the socialization of the younger generation." [66] He treated the science of education as an investigation of what *is* an actual social procedure; to be distinguished from "pedagogy," which is "the work of thought, seeking in the results of psychology and sociology principles for the direction or the reform of education," and to be distinguished, further, from educational activity itself. To Durkheim, pedagogy is one of the auxiliary sciences of sociology. Especially well-known is his *Pédagogie et sociologie,* published after his death. He here related education to its social function, showing that society determines the goal of education, that education is conditioned by the social environment of the child, and that changes in culture determine educational changes.

Especially valuable was Durkheim's concept of the child, conceived in its totality, as a product of society. In Durkheim's words:

> All education is a continuous effort to impose on the child, ways of seeing, feeling, and acting which he could not have arrived at spontaneously. From the very first hours of his life, we compel him to eat, drink, and sleep at regular hours; we constrain him to cleanliness, calmness, and obedience; later we exert pressure upon him in order that he may learn proper consideration for others, respect for customs and conventions, the need for work, etc. If, in time, this constraint ceases to be felt, it is because it gradually gives rise to habits and to internal tendencies that render constraint unnecessary; but nevertheless it is not abolished, for it is still the source from which these habits were derived. . . . The aim of education is, precisely, the socialization of the human being; the process of education therefore, gives us in a nutshell the historical fashion in which the social being is constituted. This unremitting pressure to which the child is subjected is the very pressure of the social *milieu* which tends to fashion him in its own image, and of which parents and teachers are merely the representatives and intermediaries.[67]

Durkheim's thesis that the child is a product of society, because it brings into the world only its individuality, later received more precise definition from Park's distinction between the "individual" and the "person." Durkheim's followers consider pedagogy one of the several applications of sociology. A most ambitious attempt to complete his sociology

[66] The most convenient collection of É. Durkheim's articles on education is É. Durkheim, *Éducation et Sociologie* (Paris, 1922). It includes the following studies: "L'éducation, son nature, son rôle," pp. 35–73; "Nature et méthode de la pédagogie," pp. 74–103; "Pédagogie et sociologie," pp. 104–33; "L'évolution de le rôle de l'enseignement secondaire en France," pp. 134–58. See P. Fauconnet, "The Durkheim School in France," *Sociological Review,* XIX (London, 1927), 15–20; Paul Fauconnet, "The Pedagogical Work of Émile Durkheim," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXVIII (1923), 529–53; Charles E. Gehlke, *Émile Durkheim's Contributions to Sociological Theory* (1915).

[67] É. Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method,* trans. and ed. by G. E. Catlin (University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 6. See his *Pédagogie sociologique* (Paris, 1914).

of "facts" by "pedagogical facts" (that is, the sociology of education) was made by Émile Candaux of Geneva.[68]

A connecting link between Comte's and Durkheim's system is represented by Eugene de Roberty, a Russian writing in French. He stressed the fact that over and above the biological and hereditary faculties of memory, association, and sensation, there is a social or cultural element. Human personality cannot develop if lacking contact with a definite culture. This is the concept of "culture conditioning," as stressed by modern educational sociologists. The mind is the result of the interaction of both elements—personal and cultural—a characteristic view of the modern educational sociologist who aims to integrate both the hereditary and environmental factors. De Roberty agreed with Comte that intellectual evolution is the primary factor in general social evolution, but emphasized the primacy of scientific thought.[69]

Durkheim's reaction, as an empirical scientist, to Comte's social philosophy, has had more influence on sociological methodology than it has had directly on education. It can be seen most clearly in the efforts of the so-called "Chicago School" of sociology and the group favoring "the sociology of education." Indirectly, to be sure, Durkheim has exerted influence through his restoring of the group and group behavior to the central place in sociological research. It has become the core of investigation in educational sociology.

The French sociological school of Durkheim also includes Lévy-Bruhl, Blondel, Halbwachs, and Piaget. They are not so much interested in the mechanism of the creation of the higher mental functions of the individual under the group influence—the main point of interest of American social psychologists—but in the content of mental processes—logic, imagination, memory, language, and so on.

Lucien Lévy-Bruhl made studies in comparative psychology which have influenced modern ethnology.[70] He held that the primitive peoples have mentalities differing from those of modern men; that various culture groups have different mental processes; and that our logic is not absolute but a creation of our social environment, as are all higher mental processes.[71] This thesis has become very important in the functional

[68] Candaux, *La fonction sociale de l'éducation, étude sociologique* (Geneva, 1930).

[69] Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, II, 826–7.

[70] L. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1910); *La mentalité primitive* (Paris, 1922); *L'âme primitive* (Paris, 1927); *La mythologie primitive* (Paris, 1935). The following have been translated: *How Natives Think* (1926); *Primitive Mentality* (London, 1923); *Primitives and the Supernatural* (1935); *The "Soul" of the Primitive* (1928).

[71] For criticism of his ideas, see A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization* (1922), pp. 325–78.

school of educational sociology with its insistence that the educational processes must be related to the cultural backgrounds of the pupils.

Lévy-Bruhl's theory that the civilized man does not understand the primitives found another expression in the writings of Charles Blondel,[72] who propounded the idea that the mentally sane individual does not understand the mentally sick person, a concept which has received recognition in the works of the latest exponents of psychopathology. Blondel accepted Maurice Halbwachs' idea of social memory.[73]

Halbwachs concluded that, when man speaks, the sense of his words appears in his thinking, since all concepts, ideas, imagination, and accompanying words, are social creations. This notion was a forerunner of the ideas underlying the "sociology of knowledge."

Partly influenced by Durkheim's school has been a Geneva professor, Jean Piaget, who has emphasized the important rôle played in the child's mental evolution by social influences, expressed by the use of the "motivated" symbols (language, numbers, etc.).[74] Piaget is one of the forerunners of the "sociology of childhood" school. On the whole, the followers of Durkheim consider the child "unsocialized," and the problem person as "de-socialized." The evolutionary ideas based on the "socialization" of the individual are vital to all educational theories today.

With the exception of William McDougall, who settled in the United States, the most influential British social psychologist has been Graham Wallas. He developed his general theory of social psychology in his *Human Nature in Politics* (1908), and his *Great Society* (1914). His most important books in relation to education were his *Art of Thought* (1926), and his *Social Judgment,* published posthumously in 1935.

Wallas' educational doctrines may be stated as follows: Men have recently increased their power over nature, without increasing the control of that power by thought. We can make war more efficiently but cannot prevent war. We need both more effective thinking on particular problems, and an improved art of thought, by means of which scientific

[72] C. A. Blondel, *La conscience morbide* (Paris, 1914); *Introduction à la psychologie collective* (Paris, 1928); *Le suicide* (Strasbourg: Librarie universitaire d'Alsace, 1933); *The Troubled Conscience and the Insane Mind,* trans. (London, 1928).

[73] M. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris, 1935); *Les causes du suicide* (Paris, 1930); *Morphologie sociale* (Paris, 1938).

[74] J. Piaget, *The Child's Conception of Physical Causality,* trans. (1930); *The Child's Conception of the World* (1929); *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child* (1928); *The Language and Thought of the Child* (1926); *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932); "Principal Factors Determining Intellectual Evolution from Childhood to Adult Life," in *Harvard Tercentenary Conference of Arts and Sciences* (Harvard University, 1936), *Factors Determining Human Behavior* (1937), pp. 32–48; *Social Evolution and the New Education* (London, New Education Fellowship, 1932).

explanation may overtake and guide empirical rules. The discipline of the art of thought should begin at an age when the choice of intellectual methods must be mainly made, not by the student, but by teachers and administrators. The present experimental schools in which students are left to acquire thought by their own "trial and error" methods have not always been successful, and the incidental hints of a clever teacher as to mental method often fail. It may, therefore, be hoped that a knowledge of the outlines of the psychology of thought may become a recognized part of the school experience.[75] The central problem of both books is "how far the knowledge accumulated by modern psychology can be made useful for the improvement of the thought-processes of a working thinker." Wallas has had considerable influence on American social psychologists.

In America, next to the work of the American sociological pioneers, the most influential exponent of the psychological aspects of sociology is Charles A. Ellwood. He has been one of the most vocal, earnest, and active sociologists, and has been untiring in his writings in asking for the application of ethical and social values in constructive social welfare programs, advocating social education as a means of effective social control for promoting social progress.[76] For Ellwood, social psychology is a science, a part of sociology, which has the task of popularizing and explaining the results of the special social sciences. In general, Ellwood can be included in the group of sociologists who follow Ward, and American education is distinctly under obligation to him for his leadership in the formulation of social programs.[77]

For Ellwood, education furnishes the most "subtle and ultimate" form of social control available to society, because it develops habits and forms character. It is the first means of socializing the individual, of developing in him a consciousness of society. Because it begins early, and because it works so effectively in implanting attitudes and values, it can work transformations which other forms of social control cannot realize.[78] In Ellwood's words:

[75] See "The Thinker at School," x, 228–55; "Public Education," xi, 256–78; "Teaching and Doing," xii, 279–308.

[76] C. A. Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science* (1923); *Cultural Evolution* (1927); *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1918); *Man's Social Destiny in the Light of Science* (1927); *Methods in Sociology* (1933); *The Psychology of Human Society* (1925); *The Reconstruction of Religion: A Sociological View* (1922); *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* (2nd ed., 1915); etc.

[77] For a clever criticism of Ellwood by an empirical sociologist, see L. L. Bernard, "The Great Controversy: or Both Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy in Sociology Unmasked," *Soc. Forces*, XIV (October, 1935), 64–72.

[78] C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society* (1931), pp. 410–13.

Educational sociology is not primarily a sociological study of educational institutions and processes. It should be primarily sociology, and not education. It is sociology applied to the whole problem of education, just as educational psychology is psychology applied to the problem of education. It is the very heart, so to speak, of general sociology, so far as the latter is the science of human society. From the development of educational sociology we may therefore expect not only great help in solving the practical problems of education, but also a revitalization and humanization of the science of sociology itself.[79]

A marked, but rather brief and exaggerated popularity was gained by William McDougall, an extreme proponent of the theory that all man's actions, feelings, thoughts, secrets, motives, ambitions, from the cradle to the grave, are but the operation of his instincts. McDougall's *Social Psychology*[80] had a tremendous vogue, became one of the most influential books of its generation, and was a best seller. Educational theory has been profoundly influenced by this instinctive theory:

> There have been too many schoolrooms in which have sat, at straight rows of identical desks, children of the same age, supposedly endowed with the same instincts, and so to be treated alike. Classroom organization has been arranged in such manner as to allow the child's unfolding instincts free play. Elaborate curricula have been devised to provide materials for the instincts of play, construction, collecting, and the like. The child has been regarded as a mosaic of instincts reflecting primitive men's experiences with his environment.[81]

McDougall is still fashionable, although the "instinctive" theory has been exploded by such critics as Dunlap, Zorbaugh, Kantor, Hunter, Bernard, Kuo, Allport, Faris, and Josey, who recognize the importance of the inborn human nature, but also assign more importance to social environment and the "conditioning processes," as developed by Pavlov and the whole group of "reflexologists."

The process of the social creation of human personality has received suggestive attention in the theory of George Herbert Mead,[82] who explains how self-attitudes develop from social attitudes. Self-consciousness arises through "taking the rôle of the other," first, in the dramatic play of early childhood and later, in the many co-operative activities of late childhood and adolescence. Finally, one comes to take the rôle of a "gen-

[79] C. A. Ellwood, "The Meaning of Educational Sociology," in E. George Payne, *Readings in Educational Sociology* (1933), p. 5.

[80] W. McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1909); *The Group Mind* (1920).

[81] H. W. Zorbaugh, "Personality and Social Adjustment," in E. G. Payne, *op. cit.*, I, 78.

[82] G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* (1934).

cralized other," which is community opinion, the attitudes of "society," the mores, and learns to see one's self in the light of the standards that are incorporated in the culture in which one is raised. Applied to education, this theory is of utmost importance; we can see readily the value of childhood in building a self-consciousness that promotes or handicaps later mental efficiency and happiness.

Mead had been preceded by an outstanding name in American sociology and social psychology, W. I. Thomas, who utilized Cooley's theory of "self-consciousness," to construct his famous "four wishes," the desire for new experience, the desire for security, the desire for response, and the desire for recognition.[83] Thomas' theory has provided the starting point of numerous sociological researches into the disorganizing social processes and culture areas, and the modification of "social attitudes" for educational processes. The contributions of Park, Young, Bernard, Bogardus, Burgess, Faris, McKenzie, Thrasher, and Sellin are indispensable for the understanding of the "educational" influences of the non-school agencies (movies, gangs, immigrant areas, the play group, occupational attitudes, slum influences, and the like) by the educational sociologist.

Sorokin, perhaps more than any other sociologist, has stressed and demonstrated in *Social Mobility* the selectional rôle of educational institutions, and in connection with this possibility of under-and-over population among the Doctors of Philosophy, has enunciated a set of ideas which recently has been repeated by one or two presidents of prominent universities.

In his *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* and *Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology,* he has indicated concretely that the character of education depends upon the immediate social *milieu,* and that occupational requirements cannot be expected to be the same for quite different social groups. Finally, in *Social Dynamics,* he has indicated, on a larger and deeper scale than most of the sociologists, that not only the character of ethical and school education but also the very nature of truth, and of the right and the beautiful, is conditioned by the character of a culture, and especially by the markedly sensate or ideational systems of culture.

IX. Various Schools of Educational Sociology

The philosophical, "value-judgment" approach has never been given up in sociology, particularly by those who are seeking to apply sociology to education. This is due to the fact, among others, that the roots of modern

[83] W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (1923); Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918), I, 72–4. A rather extensive development of the four wishes theory is provided in J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology* (1931), pp. 140–65.

"educational sociology" can be traced to a movement among certain educators emphasizing the fact that education should pay attention not only to biological and psychological, but also to social phenomena. The result was a series of works by social philosophers who helped sociology to become established as a university discipline. They conceived of educational sociology more as a philosophy than an empirical science.

Recently, however, sociologists have been more concerned with concrete analyses of social processes and empirical social research than with speculative social philosophy. This influence is also evident in educational sociology which, in general, can be divided into three branches. The largest group is composed of those who contend that sociology is a practical and auxiliary science of education which ought to be utilized in determining educational processes and goals. This school is but a continuation of the old group of social philosophers who want primarily "what ought to be." Its leaders are Snedden, Peters, Weiss, Hesse-Gleyz, Chancellor, Clow, W. R. Smith, R. C. Angell. The second school, headed by E. George Payne of New York University and adhered to by Zorbaugh, Thrasher, F. J. Brown, Roucek, Cook, and Zeleny, insists that educational sociology is more sociology than education, that any adequate educational program must be based on sociological research and focussed around the influence of cultural and group factors upon personality. Sociology determines the immediate objectives, in the sense that it specifies the conditions which must be taken into account if the general aim is to be promoted. Sociology as a science, like psychology, is fundamental in its application to the whole educational process. This socio-scientific approach merges into the third, small group, which aims to develop a special science of the "sociology of education" (Znaniecki, Waller).

X. The Roots of American Educational Sociology

The rapid growth of all types of teacher-training schools during the present century challenged those institutions to give something tangible to their students in courses on *how* to teach and *what* to teach. The first was offered by educational psychology, which had become for many educators a panacea for directing educational processes. But the problems of what to teach and the relationships between method, content, and social utility of educational processes remained unsolved. The breakdown of the traditional classical curriculum also challenged leaders of education in regard to curriculum standards and content. In 1912, Irving King stated:

> The processes of learning in the individual are conditioned to a large extent by the social environment both within and without the school, and this would seem to warrant approaching educational psychology, in part at least, from the point of view of social psychology. Furthermore, there is a growing recogni-

tion that the end of education, state it how we may, must for one thing take account of the fact that the child is, and probably will continue to be, a member of society, and that his efficiency as an individual will almost inevitably be measured by social standards of some sort. . . . The development of the modern sciences of sociology and social psychology have furnished the principles for a broader science of education than that which was possible when psychology was the only pure science upon which educational theory and practice could be built.[84]

We have already discussed the educational philosophy upholding the importance of social education in the American democracy. This has been restated frequently since 1912 and has come to be closely identified with what passes not only for educational sociology but also for the "progressive movement in education." Some of the most influential advocates have been Finney,[85] Ellwood,[86] Snedden,[87] Bobbitt,[88] Williams,[89] Hayes,[90] Faris.[91] Their dominant concept was in agreement with King; they conceived of the school as a social institution which can be used for effective social control, if only teachers and administrators will appreciate the fact that education is a social process to promote social progress. The American Sociological Society supported this stand in 1918 by devoting the papers at that meeting to the subject of "Sociology and Education."[92] The general theme of the papers considered the importance of the reciprocal relations of sociology and education in solving problems of educational procedure. Restatements of the philosophy of social education and the application of sociological principles to educational procedure have appeared subsequently in the writings of Ellwood, Groves,[93] Good,[94] Fin-

[84] King, *Social Aspects of Education* (1912), pp. 1–2.

[85] R. L. Finney, "Sociological Principles Fundamental to Pedagogical Method," *Ed. Rev.*, LV (1918), 91–110.

[86] C. A. Ellwood, "Reconstruction of Education upon a Social Basis," *Ed. Rev.*, LVII (1919), 91–110.

[87] D. Snedden, "Sociology a Basic Science to Education," *Publ. Am. Soc. Soc.*, XVII (1922), 101–14.

[88] F. Bobbitt, "Education as a Social Process," *School and Society*, XXI (1925), 453–9.

[89] J. T. Williams, "Education in Recent Sociology," *Education*, XLI (1921), 421–31, 500–9, 639–49; XLII (1921), pp. 1–11.

[90] E. C. Hayes, "Contribution of Sociology to Secondary Education," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXVIII (1923), 419–35.

[91] E. Faris, "The Sociologist and the Educator," *Am. Jour. Soc.*, XXXIII (1928), 796–811.

[92] *Publ. A.S.S.*, Vol. XIII (1918).

[93] E. R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education* (1925), discusses various American social problems "most intimately related to the work of the schools."

[94] A. Good, *Sociology and Education* (1926), was planned "primarily to select principles of social life obtained from the pure science of sociology that have any

ney,[95] Hart,[96] Kinneman,[97] Howerth,[98] and others. These books call upon education to save the world and espouse the thesis that teaching will bring quick betterment to society. It is a program for social reform through the schools setting forth the goal of a social philosophy of education.[99]

XI. Systematic Educational Sociology

During the time that a discussion of the dominant concepts of educational philosophy were claiming the interests of some educators, others were introducing courses entitled "educational sociology" and "sociology for teachers." In 1898, E. A. Ross gave a course in "Sociology for Teachers" at Leland Stanford Junior University,[100] and in 1901 David Snedden offered in the Education Department of the same institution a course entitled "Education and Society." [101] In 1902, G. Stanley Hall announced a course at Clark University, "Sociology of Education." [102] In 1906, the first course offered in the University of Virginia in sociology was entitled "Educational Sociology." [103] In 1907, Henry Suzallo listed and offered the first course in "Educational Sociology" in Teachers College, Columbia University.[104] It is believed by most students of educational sociology that John M. Gillette first used the term in the Valley City Normal School, North Dakota, prior to 1908.[105] Suzzalo stated in 1913 that "the purpose of an educational sociology is, in a specialized and scientific way, to investigate and reveal the social facts and laws upon which educational theories and practice must in large

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bearing upon education and interpret them in such a way that they may become a part of educational sociology." Various social groups are discussed, and the second half is devoted to selected social problems.

[95] R. L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (1932); the central idea is the "telic" function of education. Finney projects, against a substantial background of sociology, the possibilities and limitations of education.

[96] J. K. Hart, *A Social Interpretation of Education* (1929); *Mind in Transition* (1938), is an eloquent plea for humanitarian science as the instrument of social reconstruction.

[97] J. A. Kinneman, *Society and Education* (1932).

[98] I.W. Howerth, *The Theory of Education* (1926), is a "philosophy of education as derived from the process of organic, psychic, and social evolution."

[99] See I. L. Kandel, "Education and Social Changes," *Jour. Soc. Phil.,* I (October, 1935), pp. 23–35.

[100] H. Zorbaugh, "Educational Sociology," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XXXIII (1927), 444.

[101] F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in Institutions of Learning in the United States," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* VIII (1902), 85–121.

[102] *Ibid.,* p. 101.

[103] L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *The Southwestern Pol. and Soc. Sci. Quar.,* IX (1928), 283.

[104] Zorbaugh, *op. cit.*

[105] F. R. Clow, "The Rise of Educational Sociology," *Jour. Soc. Forces,* II (1924), 332–7.

part rest." [106] These courses rapidly multiplied, and in 1910 F. S. Chapin [107] found that eleven institutions of higher learning offered a discussion of "education" in their respective courses in sociology. By 1914, Gillette discovered that fourteen "educational sociology" courses were given in our institutions of higher learning and concluded that: [108]

A new branch of sociology is taking shape. This may be called Educational Sociology or the Sociology of Education. In its best form it attempts to make a synthesis of principles which arise from a study of the genetic and current objective conditions of social life and of the socio-psychic processes with a view to applying them to the determination of course of study and to certain phases of school management. . . . Relative to the objective aspects of education the sociology of education would hold the same relation to general sociology that, in the subjective aspects of education, educational psychology now holds to general psychology.

The academic history of educational sociology has been traced systematically by Payne,[109] Lantis,[110] Moore,[111] Lee,[112] Jeddeloh,[113] Bowden,[114] and Kulp.[115] The first survey relative to the academic status of educational sociology was initiated by Payne in 1916,[116] and reported on by him in 1919 in the City Training Schools Section of the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association.

The significant concepts in educational sociology, discussed for the most part in the textbooks which appeared beginning in 1917, relate to social forms, social groups, social institutions, social processes, social control, social progress, socialization of the curriculum, educational objectives, and personality integration.

Around 1927 a transition began to take place. The emphasis on social

[106] *Cyclopedia of Education,* V, 361.

[107] F. S. Chapin, "Report on the Questionnaire of Committee on Teaching," *Am. Jour. Soc.,* XVI, 774–93.

[108] J. M. Gillette, "Report of the Committee on Sociology in the Training of Teachers," *Publ. A.S.S.,* IX (1914), 176–83.

[109] E. G. Payne, "Educational Sociology in City Training Schools," *School and Society,* IX (1919), 212–6.

[110] L. O. Lantis, "Educational Sociology in City Training Schools," *ibid.,* XVI, 669–72.

[111] C. B. Moore, "The Aims, Contents and Methods of a General Course in Educational Sociology," *Education,* VL (1924), 158–70.

[112] H. Lee, *The Status of Educational Sociology in Normal Schools, Teachers Colleges, and Universities* (New York University Press Book Store, n.d.).

[113] Henry J. Jeddeloh, "Status of Educational Sociology in the State-Approved Teacher Training Institutions of Ohio," *Ohio Soc. Sci. Jour.,* I (May, 1929), 21–31.

[114] A. O. Bowden, "The Influence of Sociology in Education for Teachers," *Jour. Ed. Soc.* (January, 1931), pp. 272–8.

[115] D. H. Kulp, "History of Educational Sociology," xxv, 548–568, in his *Educational Sociology* (1933), which is a revised treatment of the subject published in G. Lundberg, Nels Anderson and Read Bain, *Trends in American Sociology* (1929).

[116] Payne, *op. cit.*

education which the philosophical school sponsored, and the tendency to apply sociological principles to educational procedure which the applied school practiced, gradually assumed less importance with the development of inductive techniques and research studies. This trend was concentrated mainly in the *Journal of Educational Sociology,* after 1927. The editors are inclined to believe that a synthetic approach to educational sociology is advisable. The notion of this school is described by Zorbaugh as follows:

> Educational Sociology arose out of the conviction in the minds of many school men that the objectives of education cannot be deduced from philosophical principles but must be determined with reference to the social life of which the school is a part.[117]

XII. Textbooks in Educational Sociology

The first textbooks bearing the title "Educational Sociology" were the studies of Walter R. Smith and David Snedden.[118] Smith's work is an appeal for an applied science of educational sociology. He defined the subject as "the application of the scientific spirit, methods, and principles of sociology to the study of education."[119] Under the influence of Cooley and Dewey, he dealt with the social group as the unit for analysis and conceived of the school as a social institution for the advancement of group life, as well as for individual efficiency. The social function of education should dominate all of its activities and sociological principles should be applied to educational procedures. Smith nurtured the philosophical and the applied schools.

The first book by Snedden was a treatment of the objectives of all aspects of education from the viewpoint of social education, with particular emphasis on the sociological determination of curriculum objectives. Snedden belongs to the applied school of educational sociology, by his insistence that "Educational Sociology has as its chief province the scientific determination of educational objectives."[120]

Smith and Snedden were followed by Chancellor,[121] who showed the

[117] Zorbaugh, *op. cit.*

[118] W. R. Smith, *An Introduction to Educational Sociology* (1917); *Principles of Educational Sociology* (1928); David Snedden, *Educational Sociology—a Digest and Syllabus* (1917).

[119] Smith, *op. cit.,* p. 15.

[120] *Educational Sociology,* p. 33. Snedden's subsequent works have been: *Civic Education; Sociological Foundations and Courses* (1922); *Cultural Educations and Common Sense* (1931); *Educational Sociology* (1922), republished as two volumes: *Sociology for Teachers* and *Educational Applications of Sociology; Educational Sociology for Beginners* (1928); *An Introductory Sociology for Teachers* (1935); *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education* (1921).

[121] W. E. Chancellor, *Educational Sociology* (1919).

influence of the socio-psychological thought represented by Ross, and discussed social movements, social institutions, and social measurement. His book was in large part a treatment of customs, traditions, public opinion, institutions, and surveys which restate the viewpoint of Ross. He defined educational sociology as "that branch of sociology which shows its principles in their application in education." [122] Clow's work [123] is built upon the concepts of Cooley's primary groups, Ross's system of social control, Giddings' consciousness of kind, Dewey's technique of communication, and Ellwood's social utility ideal. He is another advocate of the applied school by advocating that educational sociology should be a practical subject, applying sociology to education. Snedden evaluated these studies of educational sociology before 1922 as follows:

> In retrospect it now seems difficult to discover any considerable originality in the materials of educational sociology published during the period just reviewed. In large part the sociology and the education did not "meet," much less blend. . . . Nevertheless those books of the period show clearly the symptoms of a new movement in education. All of the writers referred to had read extensively of the currently available sociological literature. All of them seem to have been searching for means of expanding and enriching American programs of education. Perhaps most of them were a bit utopian in their outlooks and aspirations—but not more so, doubtless, than are the self-made enthusiasts in any other new social movement.[124]

Since 1922, Smith and Snedden have published revisions of their studies, and among the new contributors, belonging to this applied school of educational sociology (as well as to social education), can be included Finney,[125] Kinneman,[126] North,[127] Beard,[128] Tuttle,[129] and others.

Waller states that "the most influential volume in the field of educational sociology is *Foundations of Educational Sociology,* by C. C. Peters," [130] who outlined the methods by which the objectives of school education can be scientifically determined: "The use of these methods is only in its in-

[122] Chancellor, *op. cit.,* p. 6.

[123] F. R. Clow, *Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications* (1920).

[124] David Snedden, "The Field of Educational Sociology," *Rev. Ed. Res.,* VII (February, 1937), p. 8.

[125] R. L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education* (1928).

[126] J. A. Kinneman, *Society and Education* (1932), is another excursion into educational philosophy.

[127] C. C. North, *Social Problems and Social Planning* (1932).

[128] R. M. Beard, *The Social Functions of Education* (1937).

[129] Harold S. Tuttle, *A Social Basis of Education* (1934).

[130] W. W. Waller, "Contributions to Education of Scientific Knowledge about the Organization of Society and Social Pathology," in G. M. Whipple, ed., *The Thirty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education,* Part II, *The Scientific Movement in Education* (1938), xxxvi, 445–60.

fancy, but a thoroughgoing reconstruction of education should ultimately result from their application." [131] Peters presents a statement of the philosophy of social education in regard to the function of education, the objectives of education, and the relation of education to democracy. He also analyses the social institutions and processes, and sets up techniques for the determination of certain educational objectives. He used the sociological concepts of Cooley, Ross, and Ward, and was influenced by the philosophy of social education, basic in the writings of Dewey and Ellwood. According to him:

> Educational Sociology should not be construed as merely sociology for teachers. It should not seek to study sociology from the standpoint of education but rather to study education in its sociological aspects. . . . The educational sociologist should show the adjustment of education to the needs of society and the bearing of group phenomena upon the educational procedures by which these needs must be met. Thus Educational Sociology is a branch of Education even more than it is a branch of Sociology.[132]

XIII. The Functional School of Educational Sociology

With the foundation of *The Journal of Educational Sociology* in 1927 and the appearance of Payne's *Principles of Educational Sociology* in 1928,[133] a different conception of the scope and method of educational sociology was introduced. Payne's definition of this field is:

> Educational Sociology seeks to explain the social forms, social groups, and the social processes—that is, the special relationships in which or through which the individual gains and organizes his experiences or behavior—in their relation to the school as a co-ordinating agency.[134]

From this standpoint, education is a process by which behavior changes are made in individuals or groups. This concept of education implies that changes are made in behavior through the acquisition of habits, knowledges, and attitudes, but the emphasis in this definition is placed upon behavior because of our desire to be objective. This definition also involves not only changes in individual behavior but likewise changes in group behavior; that is, changes in the behavior patterns that characterize the group.[135]

Thus conceived, sociology is only one of the sciences called upon to

[131] C. C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology* (Rev. ed., 1930), p. v.

[132] *Ibid.*, pp. v–vi.

[133] E. George Payne, *Principles of Educational Sociology—An Outline* (1928), followed by *Readings in Educational Sociology* (1933), Vol. I; (1934), Vol. II.

[134] Payne, *Readings*, I, 22.

[135] E. George Payne, "Sociology and Education," *Jour. Ed. Soc.*, XII (February, 1939), 324.

explain behavior or provide principles basic to a program of education. It must be supplemented by biology and psychology. Sociology, however, discovers how the social environmental factors—material and non-material—condition the behavior of individuals and groups. Educational sociology involves research into the cultural and social background, both as to their effect upon the developing personality and the extent to which they must be taken into account in the construction and operation of an educational program:

> It includes a factual analysis of personality growth and development as influenced by all of the agencies of education, both informal and formal. In this objective study it recognizes the contributions of the subjective approach through philosophy and the individualistic emphasis of psychology, but is primarily concerned with a third approach: the influence of cultural and group factors upon personality and social control. This aspect of education has been almost, if not completely, neglected in the programs of education, even in our most progressive schools. . . . No understanding of the educational process is possible without an evaluation of the relative effect, more or less scientifically determined, of all the situations that impinge upon the individual in his group contacts, whether those are in school, in the family, in the neighborbood, in the community, or in other situations to which the individual is exposed. While philosophy and psychology involve the situation as here conceived, they have neither the technique nor the function to deal with them as required in the complex educational process. The problem of education in modern society requires a socio-scientific approach for its solution which only sociology is in a position to make. We regard this as the most important contribution to be made to education at the present time.[136]

It is obvious that this functional definition of educational sociology differs from the conceptions held by leaders of the philosophical and the applied school. It states that the scope of the subject includes all social relationships through which the individual gains and organizes his experiences, that the starting point of the subject is social behavior, and that the method is scientific.[137] Inasmuch as the stimulation of social behavior is initiated in the environment, the matter of control of the educational environment takes on supreme importance. So defined, educational sociology can approach its problems by using the findings of other sciences, rather than by merely utilizing philosophical concepts. The older concepts of imitation, suggestion, consciousness of kind, social control, and social processes, which furnished important historical background for the development of the early schools of educational sociology are still useful, but have been replaced by inductive principles drawn from sociological research. There is a place for the philosophical school in the interpretation of the inductive

[136] Payne, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

[137] For a summary of the recent development of this point of view, see "Contributions of Sociology to Education," *Jour. Ed. Soc.*, XII (February, 1939), 321–84.

data that the functional school aims to produce. There is, also, plenty of opportunity for the applied school to utilize the scientific findings of the functional school in the various educational situations. "The trends in the development of educational sociology seem to indicate," claims Payne, "that through the work of the functional school the time will come when 'schools' of educational sociology will be considered inadequate and obsolete, and a synthetic educational sociology will arise."

For the functional school, the more important functions of education are: (1) assimilation of traditions; (2) the development of new social patterns; and (3) the creative rôle of education. "The educational sociologist is concerned primarily with the first two functions, the third is more or less a matter of guesswork. The first two admit of research, experiment, and scientific conclusions, and therefore the procedure may be scientifically determined." [138]

Payne has gathered around him at New York University a group of sociologists, who have emphasized particularly the problems in community co-ordination (Brown, Thrasher), problems in community backgrounds (Brown, Thrasher, Roucek), problems of public health and social work (Boardman), and the sociological clinic (Zorbaugh).

As a result of the new emphasis of Payne and his group on the fact that the scope of educational sociology includes all social relationships through which the individual gains and organizes his experiences, the scope and content of present-day educational sociology is now very wide.

We can notice only very briefly the recent outstanding studies related directly to our discussion. Kulp's work [139] "constitutes an exhibit of the ways in which sociology as a special social science may apply its technics to educations of various kinds for wide varieties of types and groups of persons, youths and adults." [140] He defines and illustrates fundamental sociological concepts (such as human nature, wishes and attitudes, personality, social interaction), applies sociological analysis to educational agencies, processes, and objectives, and indicates the methodological technics of sociology, whereby educational problems may be more clearly and adequately defined and attacked: "The emphasis throughout is therefore placed not upon philosophy, nor on theory, but upon the sociological methodologies most pertinent to, and potent for, the development of a science of education." A functional, sociological approach can be also found in Finney,[141] Zeleny,[142] and Cook.[143] Cook is interested in the field of school

[138] E. G. Payne, *Readings,* II, 5.

[139] D. H. Kulp, *Educational Sociology* (1933).

[140] Kulp, p. xi.

[141] R. L. Finney and L. D. Zeleny, *An Introduction to Educational Sociology* (1934).

[142] L. D. Zeleny, *Practical Sociology* (1937).

[143] L. A. Cook, *Community Backgrounds of Education* (1938).

and community relations—types of American community life, child-shaping influences (family life, play groups and gangs, school, children who work, youth on the road, motion pictures, radio and reading, race relations and religion), and the rôle of the teacher and the school in the community.

A growing aspect of the field of educational sociology is that concerned with our minority groups. Following Donald Young [144] and M. R. Davie,[145] who had already integrated numerous studies in that field, Brown and Roucek approached this problem definitely from the standpoint of educational sociology by "conceiving education as the sum total of the experience which molds the attitudes and determines the conduct of both the child and the adult," and seek to "analyze this experience in each specific group and in the general analysis of the sociological factors which lead to social control." [146] The theory of "cultural pluralism" is the underlying thesis, on the assumption that "the school must assume responsibility for seeking, honestly and earnestly, to decrease racial and social tensions and build mutual respect and understanding." [147] The race problem, one aspect of the problem of the cultural differences of our society, has been studied in numerous works, headed, for instance, by such sociologists as Charles S. Johnson,[148] and H. M. Bond.[149] Of importance, among numerous studies of race, is Klineberg's *Race Differences,*[150] which demonstrates that the evidence of race differences from intelligence tests is not conclusive, and that racial differences must be traced to the cultural sphere.

The problem of the family, as an educational agency, the decline of its stability and its changing social functions, has interested such sociologists as Zimmerman,[151] Miriam Van Waters,[152] Burgess and Cavan,[153] Fol-

[144] D. Young, *American Minority Peoples* (1932).

[145] M. R. Davie, *World Immigration* (1936).

[146] F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities* (1937), pp. xii–xiii.

[147] See particularly xxvii, "Education and Cultural Pluralism," by E. G. Payne, xxvii, 759–69.

[148] C. S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (1934); "The Education of the Negro Child," *Am. Soc. Rev.,* Vol. I (April, 1936), 264–72; *A Preface to Racial Understanding* (1936).

[149] H. M. Bond, *The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order* (1934), is a careful examination of differences in expenditure for Negro and white education in different parts of America, the various ideologies of Negro education, the sources of control, and concrete suggestions for the improvement of Negro education.

[150] O. Klineberg, *Race Differences* (1935).

[151] C. C. Zimmerman and M. F. Frampton, *Family and Society* (1934).

[152] Miriam Van Waters, *Parents on Probation* (1923).

[153] E. W. Burgess, R. S. Cavan, *The Adolescent in the Family,* Report of the Subcommittee on the Function of Home Activities in the Education of the Child, White House Conference on Child Health and Protection (1934).

som,[154] Groves,[155] Nimkoff,[156] Reuter,[157] the Harts,[158] and W. Waller.[159] We only regret that we cannot deal with the contributions made to the other fields (as described in Payne's *Readings*) of educational sociology.

Sociology has been finding its way into high school curricula, but the problems of organizing sociological material for presentation at that level are still far from any satisfactory solution. New high school textbooks in sociology may still be viewed as forms of pedagogical pioneering. Although more frequently than not they are the usual civics text or studies of social problems, good examples of "simplified" sociology are the books of Quinn,[160] Bogardus,[161] and the Landises.[162]

The significant interplay between the personality and the environment, and particularly the influence of the environment on the abnormal personality, has received considerable attention not only by the psychiatrists and psychologists but also by the sociologists. Plant's important contribution [163] stressed the fact that the psychiatrist can cure many cases only by changing the social environment itself and not by re-educating them to accept their environment as it is. Plant points out those aspects of modern urban culture which he holds particularly responsible for the increased tensions and maladjustments of modern life.[164] He has made a most valuable step away from individualistic psychiatry toward a recognition of the social environment. The book represents, according to Folsom, "a landmark in the growing integration of sociology and psychiatry." [165]

Ryan's *Mental Health Through Education* [166] follows the spadework done already by Bassett [167] and Wallin.[168] Ryan is especially interested in the school in relation to "beauty" and "the emotions." Many schools, he claims, could make a genuine contribution to mental health "in attractiveness of environment, in friendliness of the school atmosphere, in educational programs designed to meet fundamental human needs rather than

[154] J. K. Folsom, *The Family* (1934).
[155] E. R. Groves, *The American Family* (1934).
[156] M. F. Nimkoff, *The Family* (1934).
[157] E. B. Reuter and J. R. Runner, *The Family* (1931).
[158] Hornell Hart and Ella B. Hart, *Personality and the Family* (1935).
[159] W. Waller, *The Family* (1938), "is concentrated upon the human nature of family life rather than upon its institutional characteristics."
[160] J. A. Quinn, *The Social World* (1937).
[161] E. S. Bogardus and R. H. Lewis, *Social Life and Personality* (1938).
[162] P. H. Landis and J. T. Landis, *Social Living* (1938).
[163] James S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern* (1937).
[164] See particularly "The School," xi, 273–93.
[165] J. K. Folsom, "Review," *Am. Soc. Rev.*, III (April, 1938), 258–9.
[166] W. C. Ryan, *Mental Health Through Education* (1938).
[167] Clara Bassett, *Mental Hygiene in the Community* (1934).
[168] J. E. Wallace Wallin, *Personality Maladjustments and Mental Hygiene* (1935).

mere academic traditions, in services directed to a more intelligent study of the problem of the personality in terms of family and community life, in concern for the physical, mental, emotional, and social needs of the whole child." [169]

The latest and important work in this field is that by Prescott,[170] which ought to accelerate more than ever the importance of emotional training in the schools. The emotional rôle in education, culture and civilization has been also presented ably by Denison,[171] in his study of the emotional factors by which nations and civilizations have been created, and the emotional causes that produced their fall. He concludes with a search to determine what new emotions and cultures are needed to preserve the social order of our own day.[172]

XIV. The Sociology of Education

Recently a few isolated attempts have been made to develop the "Sociology of Education" (Bystroń, Znaniecki, Chalasiński, Mystakowski, Waller) as a special and independent branch of sociology, a theoretical discipline which is not a mere auxiliary science to education, but an independent science treating the cultural sphere of education and its relations to other cultural spheres. The outstanding name in this field is Florian Znaniecki,[173] who wants, in general, to construct a formal sociology which would create a body of concepts for both utilization in research and the unification of its results. This is a problem that has been considered by such sociologists as Cooley, Park and Burgess. Znaniecki states his case as follows:

Sociological studies of facts of education should be entirely separated from discussions about the educational application of these studies and constituted into a branch of theoretic sociology. This is desirable both for the theoretic progress of such studies and for their practical utilization. Although problems selected because of their practical importance have often stimulated scientific development, no science can advance unless the problems and hypotheses which constitute its main body are organized from the point of view of their theoretic, logical connection. And no science can be truly useful practically unless it

[169] Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

[170] Daniel Alfred Prescott, *Emotion and the Educative Process* (1938). See the Bibliography, pp. 295–306.

[171] J. H. Denison, *Emotion as the Basis of Civilization* (1928).

[172] For the relation of "experimental pedagogy" to our discussion, see a survey of the whole field by Paul R. Radosavljevich, "Introduction" to W. A. Lay, *Experimental Pedagogy*, trans. (1936), pp. 1–125.

[173] Znaniecki first outlined this theory in his *Cultural Reality* (1919), and developed it more fully in his *Introduction to Sociology* (in Polish, 1922), and *The Sociology of Education*, 2 vols. (Polish, 1932), and restated it in final form in *The Method of Sociology* (1934); see particularly pp. 118–20, 146–7, 178–81.

refuses to be bound by those conceptions which have been developed in the course of practical reflection. It may be doubtful whether the whole complex of sociological problems concerning educational facts can be separated from the systematic body of general sociology. The author had such doubts when asked ten years ago to write a sociology of education (in Polish). Indeed, we ought to have a sociology of education to supplement general sociology, just as we have a sociology of rural life, of nationalities and races, of classes, and so on. Sociology of Education in this sense has only begun to grow as a self-conscious discipline. Its growth depends both on the development of sociological monographs and on the progress of systematization. The majority of objective monographs of educational phenomena now in existence are sociographic rather than sociological. They describe particular complexes of educational facts in a certain community at a certain time, but do not use this description explicitly to test sociological hypotheses or to formulate sociological problems that could be applied to all educational facts of the same kind, whenever and wherever they occur. . . . Sociography is not yet sociology.[174]

Znaniecki refers favorably to Waller's study [175] as a shining example that "many of its theoretic generalizations are applicable beyond the concrete complexes the author has investigated." In the words of Waller, it "represents a totally new emphasis." Its purpose is: (1) to describe with all possible care the social life of human beings in and about the school; (2) to analyze these descriptive materials, particularly from the standpoint of sociology and social psychology; and (3) to attempt to isolate causal mechanisms involved in those interactions which center in and about the school. Waller's ability to make his work very readable ought to popularize this novel approach of educational sociology.

XV. Recent Trends in Educational Sociology

In America, the undercurrent of critical ideas has been growing. From the educational world came the voices realizing that progressive education had gone too far, particularly as the results began to appear in the effects of the depression of 1929 and subsequent years. This tendency within the ranks of progressive education, represented by Parker, Dewey, and notably Kilpatrick, shaped its criticism around the contention that progressive education was too much concerned with projects unrelated to the actual economic and social conflicts of modern life. They held that the interest in the rich cultural and intellectual development of the individual child had led to neglecting the consideration that mere flexibility, the capacity to adjust to a changing world, eliminated from the picture social security, a problem of true individual happiness.

[174] F. Znaniecki, *Social Actions* (1936), pp. 676–7.
[175] Willard Waller, *The Sociology of Teaching* (1932).

A prophet here was found in George S. Counts, who insists that the progressives must give up their opposition to what they had called the indoctrination of social attitudes. This challenge has been most needed, because there has been too little realism in democratic educational theory. The latter has been bandying back and forth pet stereotypes such as "free intelligence," "creative mind," "the democratic way of life," "scientific method," until these terms have become clichés of a coterie. The followers of Dewey, heuristic rather than positive, formulative rather than definite, have feared any indication of "indoctrination" and "propaganda," although both are most necessary in this organized world.[176]

Counts' trenchant criticism of educational objectives and political irresponsibility in regard to the issues involved in indoctrination [177] found their most definite and capable expression in the series of studies by the American Historical Association.[178] Counts' theory is that we must be aware of our choices in framing our educational policy, and that by steadily making those choices that will influence the next generation in the desired direction—toward a vague sort of collectivism—teachers may thus participate in guiding social change.

The services of the professional sociologists have already begun to be utilized by governmental agencies interested in the social aspects of education. William F. Ogburn headed the editorial board of Hoover's survey of social trends in the United States.[179] The inquiry of the New York State Regents into the social value of the educational system was prepared from the sociological standpoint and method.[180]

All in all, the whole idea of the use of democratic ideology for educational purposes and for social control will be of great importance in American educational thought in the near future, considering the extensive internal and international problems which our social system has to face. A definite

[176] Educational Policies Commission, *The Unique Function of Education in American Democracy* (Washington, National Education Association of the United States, 1937), is a good formulation of the nature, functions and ideals of education in the United States. In this connection, it is necessary to consult, Committee on Social-Economic Goals of America, *Implications of Social-Economic Goals for Education* (Washington, National Education Association, 1937), a definite attempt to build up a socio-educational ideology for American education.

[177] G. S. Counts, *School and Society in Chicago* (1928); *The American Road to Culture* (1930); *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (1931); etc.

[178] *Report of the Commission on the Social Studies* (1934). See particularly: Counts, *The Social Foundations of Education;* C. A. Beard, *The Nature of the Social Sciences* (1932); C. E. Merriam, *Civic Education in the United States.*

[179] *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (One-volume edition, 1933).

[180] See Howard E. Wilson, *Education for Citizenship;* Samuel P. Capen and Luther Gulick, *Education for American Life;* F. W. Reeves, T. Fansler and C. O. House, *Adult Education;* Julius B. Maller, *School and Community;* Charles H. Judd, *Preparation of School Personnel;* Francis T. Spaulding, *High School and Life* (1938).

attempt to relate our educational efforts to a more aggressive democratic ideology can be found in the work edited by Andrews and Marsden,[181] which gathered a distinguished group of co-authors, while Brown, Hodges and Roucek,[182] approaching the international problems faced by America, have raised their voices on behalf of the strengthening of our international outlook by realism in international politics and by a more definite support of the democratic ideology. Both continue a growing line of sociologists who have been pointing out the problem of "cultural lag" in our social life and education.[183]

XVI. Conclusions

The school has always been and always will be a source of social control. As a social institution, charged with the task of integrating all other educational forces, it is responsible for forming certain social attitudes, habits, knowledge, ideals and ideologies. Only recently has it been realized that sociology is an indispensable subject for all forms of education. But already, under the impact of sociology, education, assigned the task of reconstructing American life through democratic processes, has begun to reform its fundamental theory and practice by admitting that the life of the school must be expanded to take in the whole community, by shifting the emphasis in educational thinking from the conventional bodies of knowledge to areas of democratic living, and by accepting the view that the so-called basic tools are best learned as they are used in meaningful situations.[184]

How far sociology has influenced the professional American educators can be seen from the remarks of the specialists on curriculum:

> The good life is social; individuals do not exist apart from society. The welfare of the group is of the greatest significance. The emphasis upon individual development must be transferred to the common life of which the individual is a part. The central problem of education, therefore, is the achievement of the good society.[185]

Our enthusiasm over the contributions of sociology to education must not, however, blind us to the fact that the future of further integration of these two fields of human knowledge is not without its danger signals. The educator, as well as the pedagogue, is now confronted by the enormous

[181] J. N. Andrews and C. A. Marsden, *Tomorrow in the Making* (1939).

[182] F. J. Brown, Charles Hodges and J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics* (1939).

[183] Ogburn, *op. cit.;* F. Stuart Chapin, "The School and Its Burden in a Dynamic Era," *Contemporary Social Institutions* (1935), xiii, 116–29; "Lag and Lead in Education," ix, 130–57; "School and Society," x, pp. 158–76.

[184] Department of Supervisors, Joint Committee on Curriculum, *The Changing Curriculum* (1937), p. 330.

[185] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

amount of knowledge. A digestion, integration and systematization of the available, accurate, and well-organized knowledge is an imperative task, which is simply baffling and, at the same time, cannot be avoided. Over fifteen hundred pages were needed merely to summarize the findings of the Committee on Social Trends, which was aware of the difficulty and suggested the possibility of establishing a permanent body for the discovery and interpretation of significant social data.[186]

All in all, educational sociology has its roots in two fields of sociological emphasis—in education and the educational implications of sociology. Today, it is neither the social philosophy of education nor the educational philosophy of sociology. It utilizes the principles and research techniques of sociology in the analysis of the social interaction of the child and the adult in the multifarious agencies of education, both informal and formal. It is a major division of the still larger field of pure sociology.

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[186] *Recent Social Trends in the United States,* I, lxxiii.

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[23]

REPRESENTATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIGION AND ETHICS

Melvin J. Williams

I. Sociological Studies of the Nature of Religion

There is an increasing opinion among both students of religion and sociology that religion is "not merely a psychological experience of the individual but it is also a phase of culture." [1] The two—religion and culture—are inseparable. Anyone who is interested in cultural achievements must, consequently, be interested in religion, for the two are so closely associated that the sociologist must necessarily study religious conditions before he can rightly formulate a sound sociology. This is why the sociologist is in a position to make notable contributions to the field of religious knowledge.

Sociological contributions to our understanding of religious phenomena have manifested themselves in two main ways. Sociologists have studied the origin of religion as a social institution rather than a divine revelation. They have made it clear that religion has evolved out of the social beliefs, necessities and processes of mankind. They have, therefore, provided us with a rational understanding of the origin of religion, have secularized our conception of it, and have done more than any other group to eliminate the element of mystery from religious beliefs and processes.

The other important sociological contribution to religion has consisted in the study and reinterpretation of the great religious systems of the world, particularly Judaism and Christianity. By so doing, the sociologists have revealed these world religions to be an evolutionary social product rather than the result of a series of divinely revealed religious dogmas. In this way, they have rendered a special service by indicating the contribution of existing religion to both cultural lag and social progress, suggesting the manner in which the former may be restricted and the latter encouraged.

It will be impossible to point out in this short chapter all the contributions of contemporary sociologists to religion and ethics. Moreover, it is difficult to list the most outstanding contributors to this field. Nevertheless a few leading sociologists, who seem, to the writer at least, to have contributed the most to religion and ethics, will herein be discussed.

[1] C. A. Ellwood, *Man's Social Destiny*, p. 181.

The modern sociological view of religion began with Saint-Simon (1760–1855), Comte's teacher and precursor in social thinking. Religion, Saint-Simon held, is merely science in disguise, satisfying the highest needs of men. In time, this veil will be cast aside, and religion will follow the method employed in the physical sciences. With this idea as a basis of his thought, Saint-Simon in his final work, *New Christianity,* bitterly attacked both the Protestant and Catholic churches for their neglect of the fundamental teachings of Jesus Christ. According to Saint-Simon, the essence of Christ's teachings is that men should regard each other as brothers. Consequently, he held that human society should be organized upon the basis of love and sympathy, for under such an organization all men will "labor for the material, moral, and intellectual development of the class, the poorest and most numerous," in other words, for the working class. Although this is a brief survey of Saint-Simon's religious and ethical ideas, it is evident that he was not only the founder of modern sociology of religion, but also a forerunner to the social-gospel movement.

Following very closely the religious and ethical views of Saint-Simon, one of his pupils, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), brought forth the idea of what he called the "New Religion of Humanity." The aim of this New Religion, which was essentially humanism, was to restore and revitalize Christian ethics upon the basis of science. In the ethical teachings of Christ, Comte found the ethical system by which human society must develop, if it is to escape the disparagement of its own conflicts. Hence, science should rally to the defense of this ethical system to show man his ultimate duty "to live for others." Although Comte remained essentially a Christian in his ethical point of view, he wholly denied the validity of theology. It should be the concern of the scientific world, he thought, to furnish scientific support for this ethical culture movement, even though neither science nor the ethical culture movement has always remained as definitely Christian as did Comte himself.

Herbert Spencer, similar to Comte in several aspects of his social philosophy, although never acknowledging any indebtedness to him, like Comte advocated a definitely humanitarian and utilitarian ethics. Ultimate reality, for Spencer, was *Unknowable;* and to this Unknowable he would consign both metaphysics and religion. Religiously, then, Spencer was an agnostic; therefore, it cannot be said that he made much of a contribution to the systematic study of religion. He did, however, appropriate the contemporary anthropological studies of religious origins, and is particularly well-known for his theory that religion began as ghost-worship.

Lester F. Ward (1841–1913), although not an agnostic, was at first negative in his attitude toward religion, seeing in it little or no social value. However, in 1897, he published his famous essay on "The Essential Nature of Religion," in which he took the position that religion, like law and moral-

ity, was essentially a "sentiment of race safety." Religion, he thought, might easily be compared in the social world to the force of gravitation in the physical world, for it perverts in human society those centrifugal tendencies which we call "waywardness." Ward thus tended to look upon religion as a sort of deification of the spirit of sociability and of the social values of group life. This theory was later accepted with variations by Durkheim and Hankins. Thus it is evident that in his later years Ward came to view religion as an essential conservative force in human society, though he never indicated that it might also be a progressive force.

In the social philosophy of Benjamin Kidd and his contemporaries, many of the gaps in the religious sociology of the earlier sociologists are filled. For, to the more modern sociologists, religion and ethics are not only conservative forces in human life, but also potential progressive forces. A brief survey of the contributions of contemporary sociologists to religion and ethics will show not only that such has been the case in past civilizations, but also that they will continue to conserve and inspire the wills and motives of men in the future.

To determine the contributions of Benjamin Kidd (1858–1916) to religion and ethics, it is necessary to grasp the central idea of social evolution and progress as represented by his major works.[2] Kidd was influenced greatly in this regard by Darwinism. He held that the primary factor in evolution has been the struggle for existence. Man has progressed more rapidly than other animals because of his superior intellect; however, the more intelligent individuals and societies have not always survived. There must, therefore, be some factor other than intellect influencing the evolution and social progress of mankind. This factor, Kidd believes, as did Vico and Hegel before him, is religious belief, along with the "ultra-rational" sanction which these beliefs provide for social conduct. "No form of belief (however rational) is capable of functioning as religion in the evolution of society which does not provide an ultra-rational sanction for social conduct in the individual." [3] Hence, "a rational religion is a scientific impossibility, representing from the nature of the cases an inherent contradiction of terms." [4] What, then, is religion according to Kidd? What is the relationship between these two factors of evolution—rational and ultra-rational?

A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of social organisms are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered sub-

[2] B. Kidd, *The Science of Power, Social Evolution, and Principles of Western Civilization.*

[3] *Social Evolution,* p. 108.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 109.

ordinate to the latter in the general interest of the evolution which the race is undergoing.[5]

Kidd holds that this element of a super-rational sanction for conduct has been the characteristic feature of all religions. No religion is without some form of supernatural belief.[6] There are various forms and qualities of these agents, but they are invariably supernatural, making their appeal to a religious instinct in man. Moved by this instinct,[7] man always desires to set up sanctions for his individual conduct, which would appear to be supernatural and ultra-rational against those which were simply natural and rational.[8]

To support this theory of the ultra-rational factor in evolution, Kidd analyzes briefly the various religions from primitive times to the present, demonstrating that the ultra-rational sanction of conduct has been the determining factor in the civilizations and cultures of all peoples.[9] Furthermore, he supports his thesis with statistical and anthropological data.[10] Kidd, therefore, virtually proposes a sociological foundation for religion, rather than a theological foundation in the narrow sense.

Due to the historical conflict between science and religion,[11] Kidd recognizes an approaching revolution in this relationship.[12] Religious beliefs must be established, he contends, "on a foundation as broad, deep, and lasting as any that theologians have dreamt of," [13] if there is to be a true science of civilization. The immense utilitarian function of these beliefs in evolution also must be adequately recognized. This according to Kidd, will necessitate a rethinking of the principles of utilitarianism.

The "greatest number" will be seen to be, not a majority, but the "social organism," as Kidd knows it. The social organism will be seen receiving the greatest good because of instinctive,[14] spontaneous sacrifice of individuals for the group. It will be instinctive and spontaneous, Kidd holds, because "the great [evolutionary] process [of which religion is the primary

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[7] In the *Science of Power*, p. 155, Kidd speaks of "the emotion of the ideal," or "the inner vision," which is probably the name given this instinct. Yet Kidd's meaning here is very vague, since no psychologist would speak of a religious instinct as Kidd uses the term.

[8] *Social Evolution*, p. 98.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 116–25.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 253, 255, 256, 276–86.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 213.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[14] See footnote 7.

factor] is proceeding as a natural and orderly development." [15] Here, "the intellect, of course, continues to be a most important factor in enabling the system, to which the individual belongs, to maintain its place in the rivalry of life; but it is no longer the primary factor." [16]

Although Kidd left many questions unanswered, and many statements unexplained in his attack on rationalism, he did much to stimulate many social thinkers. Even in the sociology of Kidd's contemporaries there is evidence of a more factual and definite theory of religious sociology than Kidd himself produced. Especially is this true of the sociology of Émile Durkheim (1858–1917).

According to Durkheim, society "is a part of nature, and indeed its highest representation." [17] Man, in his collective life, has found ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, that belong not to the individual, but to the social group. Consequently, Durkheim regards the group as the mold for the individual. Even the most primitive forms of human life are social. The social mind for Durkheim, therefore, is nothing more than the stream of collective representations considered as unity, i. e., the common group experiences or the symbols of the social life. Without this social life the individual would be nothing.

It is in such a theory of society that the ethical and religious contributions of Durkheim must be sought, for his contributions, in this regard, are merely an elaboration of his social theory.

According to Durkheim, "religious faith has its origin in society. . . . The [very] reality which religious thought expresses is society." [18] This social nature of religion is strongly emphasized in his definition of religion:

> *A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.* The second element which thus finds a place in our definition is no less essential than the first; for by showing that the idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion should be an eminently collective thing.[19]

Religion, then, is in the "image" of society; "it reflects all its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most repulsive." [20] Whatever organization society may take, religion will always be present, for man has a "religious nature" which expresses itself in "the faculty of idealizing." This faculty, "both with

[15] *Social Evolution,* p. 323.
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 307.
[17] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology,* p. 18.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 431.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 47.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 421.

the individual and in the group . . . has nothing mysterious about it. It is not a sort of luxury which a man could get along without, but a condition of his very existence." [21]

Moreover, according to Durkheim:

> A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal. . . . This creation . . . is the act by which it (society) is periodically made and remade. . . . For a society is not made up of the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things which they use and the movements which they perform, but above all, is the idea which it forms of itself.[22]

This ideal, according to Durkheim, does not represent an independent and objective reality; it is society.[23] Consequently, religion is not contained in one sole idea or cult; it, like society itself, "is rather a whole made up of distinct and relatively individualized parts." Thus a religion "consists in a system of cults, each endowed with a certain autonomy"; [24] yet organized about some central unifying element, a common bond of faith, i. e., common beliefs and rites in regard to the sacred.[25] Hence, according to Durkheim, "we have a religion as soon as the sacred is distinguished from the profane." [26]

But what is there in the collective representation of the sacred and the profane which causes them to become separated, i. e., to contradict or isolate each other? According to Durkheim, it is not something implied in the intrinsic properties of the objects of the sacred and the profane, but rather, the separation appears because of something added to their objects, namely, the reaction of sentiments upon the objects. More specifically, sacredness is imposed or superimposed upon the objects of the empirical world by "the circumstances which lead the sentiment creating religious ideas to establish itself here or there, upon this point or upon that one." [27] Consequently, for Durkheim, the feeling of sacredness, the religious force, "is only the sentiment inspired by the group in its members, but projected outside of the consciousnesses that experience them, and objectified." [28]

If religion, then, comes into existence as soon as the sacred is distinguished from the profane, how is one to justify the origin of such a distinction? Just how does the sentiment attach itself to some particular objects and not to

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 423.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 422.
[23] *Loc. cit.*
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[25] Regarding Durkheim's use of the terms "beliefs" and "rites," see *loc. cit.*
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 229.
[28] *Loc. cit.*

others? Or, assuming that this process of attachment had a beginning, what was it, and how has it developed?

For Durkheim, the present religions and the crudest with which history and ethnology make us acquainted, have already evolved into a great complexity. Hence, to answer the above questions, it is "necessary," Durkheim holds, "to descend by analysis beyond these observable religions, to resolve them into their common and fundamental elements, and then to seek among these latter some one from which the others were derived." [29]

Animism and naturism, the theories set forth principally by Tylor and Max Müller, Durkheim contends, do not represent the most elementary form of religion.[30] Neither does any other theory that makes fear, dependence, and conciliation the primitive fact and the creative element of religion. "The one form of religion from which the others were derived" is, according to Durkheim, totemism. In conducting his study of totemism, Durkheim made Australia the principal field of his research; for in that country, he assumed, is to be found the most simple society, consequently the most simple religion. Here the totemic symbol is the expression of the social solidarity of the clan mates which represents all those sentiments that bind the members together, making interaction and communication possible. As the emblem of the tribe, the totem is sacred; yet there are other objects related to the totem which are also sacred. More sacred than the totem object itself is the symbol or rather the social representation of the object. The religion of totemism is not then, for Durkheim, a worship of plants and animals, but rather a religion involving a sentiment toward an impersonal force which is found in objects but which is not identical with them. The social significance of the symbol furnishes the answer to the problem of the origin of *mana* and demonstrates the manner in which it has become diffused throughout nature and society, attaching itself to certain objects, words and acts, creating spirits, souls, gods, and the realm of the sacred in contrast to the profane.

Society—social opinion, social pressure, and social sentiment—then lends the individual or the object the quality of sacredness:

> The god of the clan, the totemic principle, can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem.[31]

The relation of the worshiper to the deity parallels the relation of the individual to society. To be in harmony with one's fellows is to be inspired and endowed with confidence and courage. Society is so powerful, accord-

[29] Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[30] Durkheim very critically rejects both theories for the lack of their universal application. For Durkheim's point of view see *ibid.*, pp. 49–70, 71–86.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

ing to Durkheim, that it is able to inflict itself upon the will and activity of the individual without any consideration of the resulting acts. All this, Durkheim would say, comes through the power of the collective representations which arise in the common social process which carries the compulsion of innumerable individuals. Thus religion is a direct manifestation of the social mind. It is simply part of the great mass of collective representations, sharing all the qualities of the latter. The same is true of ethics in Durkheim's philosophy. As the individual and his religion can mean nothing apart from society, so can his morality mean nothing apart from his religion. Morality is born, so to speak, with devotion, in the same manner in which religion is born with a consciousness of the sacred. Therefore, the moral act possesses the same quality as that attached to the sacred objects. Moral rules then become, for Durkheim, nothing more than the manifestations of the social mind.

Religion and ethics, according to Durkheim, are both eminently social; no matter by what form the religious and moral life is represented, there is one reality, society, which always lies back of them. Everywhere, then, religion responds to the same need and is everywhere derived from the same mental state. "In all its forms, its object is to raise man above himself and to make him lead a life superior to that which he would lead, if he followed his own individual whims; beliefs express this life in representations; rites organize it and regulate its working." [32] Religion is to attest to value. Its primary function "is to make us act; to aid us to live."

II. Max Weber's Analysis of Religious Phenomena

In the works of Max Weber (1860–1920), one of Germany's foremost sociologists, there is revealed not only an interest in the sociology of religion but also of all cultural phenomena. Like Durkheim and Kidd, Weber recognized a sociological foundation for religion; yet since religion, for him, is only one aspect of culture it does more than preserve the "social organism" and "aid us to live." It is both a stimulus to economic prosperity,[33] and a potential source for ethical standards of living.[34]

However, in spite of Weber's all-inclusive sociology, his contributions to religion and ethics are not easy to determine, since his theories were never developed to their logical conclusion, and therefore, many interpretations have arisen within this century which are continually giving insight into

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 414.

[33] A more elaborate discussion of this functional theory of religion is seen in the sociological contributions of T. N. Carver to religion and ethics.

[34] In the contributions of both Hobhouse and Ellwood to religion and ethics, this more practical theory is discussed at some length.

his thesis as originally developed.[35] Nevertheless, whatever may be the outcome of these speculations concerning Weber's sociology, he has made a deep and lasting impression upon many social thinkers, particularly in the fields of sociology, religion, and economics. (See the chapters on Historical Sociology and Sociological Elements in Economic Thought, present volume, pp. 517–22, 527–30, 633–36.

It may be said that Weber, in his three-volume work entitled *Gesammelte Aufsätze sur Religionssoziologie,*[36] and particularly in *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus,* included in his three volumes, has given a new turn to the discussion of social ethics. In this work Weber seeks to present the relation of religious and economic phenomena, and to discover what rôle socio-economic factors have played in such an historic development. In so doing, he emphasized in particular the astounding amount of religious influence, specifically, Puritanical, upon the development of modern capitalism. He thus rejected the Marxian materialistic or economic interpretation of history and demonstrated that the content of religious consciousness can never be wholly attributed to economic factors. In a similar manner he demonstrated that economic phenomena are never solely a function of religious factors, though particular types of economic phenomena may have their origin in, and may be attributed to, a particular religious environment or ethics.[37]

There is then, unmistakably, a dualism or even a pluralism running through his concept of society. Religious, economic, and other phenomena exist in society interdependently to constitute culture. Particular concepts of these phenomena, which are concerned with constructive measures, may be accountable, according to Weber, for the "ideal type" (*Idealtypus*). The concept of capitalism, for example, is an "ideal type"; yet it may differ greatly from the reality of capitalism as it exists in society. Hence, to determine the difference between the ideal and the reality and to weave the historical facts into a coherent whole, Weber uses the ideal-typical method. This method, as Weber conceives it, necessitates historical research, i. e., a study of the total cultural phenomena. A survey of his historical treatment of capitalism as an ideal type clearly demonstrates Weber's use of the ideal-

[35] See R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism,* pp. xi, 319–21, 325; H. M. Robertson, *Aspects of the Rise of Individualism, a Criticism of Max Weber and his School;* Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches,* II, 965 ff.

[36] A brief outline of his three volume work consists in the discussion of the following subjects: Vol. I: Prolegomena; Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism; The Economic Ethics of the World Religions—Introduction, (A) Confucianism and Taoism; Intermediate Study; Theory of the Stages and Directions of Religious Withdrawals from the World. Vol. II: The Economic Ethics of the World Religions—(B) Hinduism and Buddhism. Vol. III: The Economic Ethics of the World Religions—(C) Ancient Judaism; Supplement, the Pharisees.

[37] M. Weber, *Religionssoziologie,* I, 12, 238.

typical method. In his study, Weber finds that capitalism and all other ideal types are preceded by a religious ethics. The ethics which gave rise to the spirit of capitalism, the ideological factor,[38] Weber demonstrated, was, undoubtedly, Protestant ethics.[39] In particular, it was the idea of duty in a "calling," originated by Luther and developed somewhat by Calvin,[40] which finally developed into capitalism. There is suggested in the German word *Beruf* and more clearly in the English *calling* (vocation) a religious conception—"that of a task set by God." This was unquestionably a new idea: "the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume. This it was which inevitably gave every-day worldly activity a religious significance, and which first created the conception of a calling in this sense." [41] This conception grew to mean an "outward expression of brotherly love." Protestants, therefore, quite naturally began to identify themselves with capitalism, since, "man is dominated by making of money by acquisition as the ultimate purpose in life." [42] Catholics, on the other hand, retained the strictly ascetic tradition of the Middle Ages as represented by Thomas Aquinas, and failed to profit by their worldly activity. Hence, Weber demonstrated, that Protestants, since the Reformation, have become the economic leaders wherever they lived.[43] This is even true of the persecuted groups in Roman Catholic countries—the Huguenots in France, the Protestants in Austria, and the Quakers of England.[44] This, in brief, is Weber's theory of the origin of modern capitalism from Protestantism.

In continuing his study of the relation of religious and economic phenomena to determine what rôle socio-economic factors have played in historical development, Weber analyzes the *Wirtschaftsethik* of Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism.[45] In so doing, Weber finds that the economic and religious ethics of each of these religions have been responsible for shaping the specific economic and social organizations

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 38–9. For a more detailed treatment of Weber's conception of ideal type, see Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science,* Vols. I and II, *passim.* See also the chapter on Constructive Typology, present volume, pp. 17–46.

[39] For criticisms of this theory, see R. H. Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 319–21; L. Brentano, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus,* pp. 113–57.

[40] M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* trans. by T. Parsons, pp. 79–80. (Cited hereafter as *Parsons.*)

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[43] Sorokin points out that Weber's statistical data are scarce at this point, and are concerned almost exclusively with Baden in Germany, *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* p. 697.

[44] The explanation of this difference, according to Weber, must be sought in the intrinsic character of their religious beliefs, and not only in their temporary external historico-political situations. See *Parsons,* p. 53. See also pp. 17–30.

[45] See footnote 36.

among the peoples of each religion. Capitalism did not appear among any of these peoples because their traditions and ethics were not conducive to its principles. Capitalism did not harmonize with their cultural patterns. Of course, their traditionalism might have been broken down had there been great rational prophets who were interested in so doing, but in China these liberators or prophets did not appear. In India, the only prophets that did appear were interested solely in freedom in the spiritual realm; consequently, the economic ethics of India remained in the traditional form.[46]

Judaism and Christianity, on the other hand, have developed many rational prophets, interested both in the spiritual and every-day activities of man, in an attempt to formulate a philosophy of life for the masses. Consequently, in an effort to be more practical, Christianity, the more liberal of the two, broke from Judaism, and has become still more liberal and practical. With the Reformation came Luther and Calvin who, as has been seen, led to the development of capitalism in its present-day form. However, the spirit of Christian asceticism and the religious values which gave rise to modern capitalism have today, according to Weber, lost their influence upon the lives of men. "Victorious capitalism," with its mechanical foundations, no longer needs the support of religious asceticism. "The modern man is, in general, even with the best will (which, according to Weber, is a primary requisite for a religious life), unable to give religious ideas a significance for culture and national character which they deserve." [47]

Due to this break between capitalism and the religious ethics which gave rise to it, a new stage in the development of both religion and capitalism is at hand.[48] What the outcome will be, Weber did not have the opportunity to predict. A few statements in addresses and articles are his only contributions to this important question.

He sees the church as an institution based upon faith, giving to man personal and social security when he cannot find it elsewhere. Religion, to him, is only one of many phases of culture, residing in the realm of the spiritual qualities of man, namely, his will and feelings. Just what religion should contribute to any particular culture beside ethical standards, he never said. However, he did contend that man, in order to formulate a practical religion, must make full use of all the knowledge at hand. This at least implies the need of a positive religion, which he sometimes mentions along

[46] For a criticism of Weber's treatment of the rationality of Confucianism as compared with Judaism and Christianity, see Sorokin, *op. cit.*, pp. 694–5. Sorokin, moreover, points out that great rational prophets are not necessary for the increased "rationalization" of a country's economic, social, political, and cultural life. He uses Japan as an example, maintaining that this country has developed an unusually successful system of capitalism while retaining, largely, the traditional and magical religion of the past, *ibid.*, pp. 695, 696. [But Weber specifically limited his analysis to *early* modern capitalism.—Ed. note, H.B.]

[47] *Parsons,* pp. 181, 182, 183.

[48] M. Weber, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte,* pp. 302–15.

with other sciences. The task of such a religion, as of other social sciences, would be, according to Weber, to understand the "phenomena of life in their *cultural significance*," through the use of scientific knowledge and a specialized study of the wills and feelings of man.

Weber did not believe in attempting to make the masses happy, for this, to him, was too difficult a task for the institutions of society. He was primarily interested in the development of autonomous personality as the supreme goal of all institutions. He wished to cherish and support whatever seemed valuable in mankind—the *feeling* of responsibility, man's longing for elevation, and the intellectual and ethical good of humanity. He further wished to see the external conditions of society *shaped* or organized so as to promote social well-being, to protect and preserve man's best physical and psychical qualities.

III. Sociological Apologetics in the Field of Religion

In the religious sociology of T. N. Carver (1865–), an economist as well as a sociologist, much emphasis is placed upon the economic and social usefulness of religion. There is a struggle for existence in society, Carver contends along with Kidd, in which religion plays a primary part. In this struggle, religion should furnish man with the stimulus to strive for economic security and prosperity. Yet, due to the differences in the religions of the world some people are more prosperous than others. How, then, according to Carver, is religion to become victorious in stimulating productive activity? In answering this question, Carver in his one volume in the field of religion and ethics,[49] points out the potential economic and social usefulness of religion as seen in the sociology of Kidd and Weber respectively, emphasizing especially the growing need for a more socialized, scientific, and pragmatic religion as advocated by Ellwood and Hobhouse:

> The best religion is that religion which acts most powerfully as a spur to energy, and directs that energy most productively. That is the most productive expenditure of energy which supports the most life and supports it most abundantly, which gives the largest control over the forces of nature and the most complete domination over the world, and which enables men to control whatever environment happens to surround them and to live comfortably in it.[50]

This is the only religion that can hope to master the world, for it alone is productive in its primary purpose. Carver holds in this regard that "the world belongs, by a law of nature, to the disciplined and productive races and not to those who devote themselves to graceful consumption and eminent leisure." [51] Moreover:

[49] T. N. Carver, *The Religion Worth Having* (1912).
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

The perception of this great economic principle of valuation, and the application of it to non-commercial objects, such as men and moral qualities, is the leading characteristic of Christ's teaching respecting the Kingdom of God.[52]

This principle of valuation, Carver contends, is a law of the moral order of the universe, as it relates to the manifestations of the divine will. Yet "a knowledge of that will is to be gained only by an inductive study of manifested uniformities, that is, by a scientific study of what we call for convenience the laws of nature. . . . Whatever the order of the universe is, that is the moral order." [53] Moreover, those people who put their faith in a God of law and order and who obey his will most completely, as manifested in the laws of nature, "must succeed best, and become, by that very fact, the children of God." Furthermore, "the world belongs by law of nature, which is the only kind of divine right, to that Church which gives its people the discipline which will enable them to people the earth, to subdue it, and hold dominion over it. The church which eventually achieves this result will have proved itself to be the church of God." [54]

If a religion is worth anything it ought to be a means of conserving human energy, of avoiding waste and dissipation, of stimulating the productive virtues. It is no accident [therefore] that every Protestant country has outstripped every Catholic country, just as every Catholic country has outstripped every Pagan country. Nor is it any accident that in Protestant countries religious people, especially those of the stricter sort, have, as a rule, outstripped the irreligious people.[55]

Looking more distinctly at the future development of religion, Carver holds that the advantage will most likely lie with those churches and peoples who rely upon and teach "exact scientific knowledge of the laws of nature or the observed uniformities of God's will." [56] These people, Carver believes, will be the most efficient in the field of production, and will, therefore, be victorious.

In so far as the church becomes "militant" in its conquest of the world by calling men from the unproductive to the productive life, and in so far as it becomes scientific in its procedure, its future is assured. The task of making religion victorious, of making it work, "is not to be achieved by the destructive methods of the old crusader, but by the productive methods of modern industry and social service, and the cultivation of reverence for the laws thereof." [57]

By far the most outstanding contemporary English contributor to the

[52] T. N. Carver, *The Religion Worth Having* (1912), p. 75.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 86, 84.
[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 108.
[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 96.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 137.

sociology of religion is L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929). In his sociological works Hobhouse gives to the religionists a definitely logical and practical theory of religion and ethics. Religion and ethics, according to Hobhouse, both play an important rôle in the conservation and evolutionary development of civilization. So closely are his religious and ethical ideas related to his general social theory that, in order to estimate fully his contributions in this regard, it is necessary to survey all of his sociological writings.[58]

According to Hobhouse, "religion is an effort on the part of man to get on terms with the world," but to do this it must regard man as "a spiritual being," and a "member of a spiritual order, which gives meaning to his life-tragedy. Generally, religion is the service of the spiritual order, and its development consists in the progressive apprehension of the spiritual, an apprehension which is never merely intellectual, but is permanently based on an emotional and practical response." [59] Religion then, for Hobhouse, is man's experimental effort to adapt himself to his cosmic and social environment. The means of adaptation is not wholly rational, but also emotional. For "when we consider religious conceptions, we are dealing with the [entire] attitude of men to life and the world, an attitude which is, in fact, the expression of their [total] heredity and their [total] experience. . . ." [60] Consequently, an inter-relationship between religion and ethics is quite evident, since religious conceptions must now conform to ethical requirements, which, according to Hobhouse, were, in the past, "derived from and based on religion." The two terms, ethics and religion, although not synonymous, have very much the same meaning for Hobhouse; they are practically inseparable terms, since ethics is a part of religion, and religion is, in a sense, "emotionalized ethics." [61]

But, despite the emotional character of the religious experience, formulations of religion, according to Hobhouse, must always be logical. For "religion cannot be imposed as a rigid system on any sort or condition of men without regard to their characteristics. There must be either an actual harmony or the conditions of a possible harmony which will grow if the religion is to be a vital part of the social structure." [62] Moreover, there must be intelligent or speculative coherence in religion, for "order and coherence is of the essence of logic and reason, and religion must therefore make its account with these factors of mental life. . . . [It might be observed that] "the higher religion therefore sets up a definite and reasoned construction,

[58] The most outstanding volumes which are here analyzed are *Morals in Evolution, Social Development, The Rational Good, Development and Purpose, Elements of Social Justice,* and *Social Evolution and Political Theory.*

[59] *Morals in Evolution,* p. 398.

[60] *Development and Purpose,* p. 284, by L. T. Hobhouse, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

[61] *Ibid.,* pp. 185, 200, by permission.

[62] *Ibid.,* p. 122, by permission.

a theory of the world and of man, an ideal life, a unified system of thought and action." [63]

What then would be the sociological functions of religion? In the first place, according to Hobhouse, religion is one of the forces leading to social union, i. e., it is an important bond of social unity. Religion is not so much a distinct basis of social union, as an element involved in social consciousness, or better still, a factor which strengthens the hold of social consciousness upon the minds of men by working through kinship, authority, and citizenship. Secondly, religion functions as the socializing agency for man's natural propensity for theorizing. Side by side with man's empirical thought, there grows up another order of thought which is theoretical and spiritual, being based on the needs of man. However, since this latter order, according to Hobhouse, is the reflection of the empirical order, it must be similarly logically coherent and consistent. The chief evidence of the validity of this order of thought is the satisfaction that it yields; yet, satisfaction alone is logically insufficient proof of the similarity of the two orders. Therefore, Hobhouse chooses a synthesis between them. Such a synthesis is evident in his conception of salvation.

Hobhouse's conception of salvation is relatively simple. That from which man must be saved is his social egoism; that for which man must be saved is an altruistic human society. The "plan" of salvation for Hobhouse is one of cultural evolution; the means of that salvation is the conception of an ethical society, based on a love ethics, or, as he puts it, "moral wisdom." The "survival of civilization . . . does not depend upon political institutions alone." [64] "Fundamentally it is a question of the available amount of moral wisdom in mankind." [65]

Yet, there is a different manner of presentation for Hobhouse. The existence of empirical and theoretical orders of thought simultaneously places on man the necessity for finding some synthesis of the Greek ideal of self-assertion and of the Oriental idea of self-renunciation.[66] Such a synthesis Hobhouse finds in "bringing reason to bear on matters practical and social" to the end of refashioning the world to mankind's own will, namely, a world in which personality may be perfectly realized.[67] Salvation, then, for Hobhouse, is conceived in terms of man's ultimate socialization in the course of cultural evolution by means of the "moral wisdom" available.

[63] *Loc. cit.* This raises the problem of the development of religion according to Hobhouse. In this regard see Hobson and Ginsberg, *L. T. Hobhouse, His Life and Works*, p. 168.

[64] *Social Development*, p. 108.

[65] *Soc. Rev.* (July, 1921), p. 125.

[66] *The Rational Good*, p. xvii.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–5, for a fuller account of this presentation see *Development and Purpose*, p. 177.

In view of the importance of evolution in Hobhouse's religious thoughts, what place, if any, does a conception of God have in his religious philosophy? It would seem logical to suppose, in view of his evolutionary philosophy, that the only theism that could survive under such a system of religious thought would be pantheism. Yet this Hobhouse rejects.[68] Furthermore, he rejects all anthropomorphic ideas of God, for he feels that God, as creator or as controller, has no place in the highest form of religion. Such fulfillments of "purely intellectual needs," he believes, are stumbling blocks in the formation of social theory.[69]

Hobhouse realizes God solely in terms of the ideal of perfect goodness; consequently, he finds it difficult to name the ideal "God." More adequate symbols of the ideal of perfect goodness are to be found only in terms such as "the principle of rational harmony" and "purpose." For, "Reality is an inter-connected system which develops in time [the principle of rational harmony or] love being the permanent underlying ground of development." [70] This principle, Hobhouse submits, not "as a matter of faith, but as a sound hypothesis, [i. e.,] the evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a [purpose] slowly working itself out under limiting conditions." [71]

No discussion of Hobhouse's ethico-religious thought would be complete without mentioning his evaluation of Christianity. In this regard, there are represented in his works at least three different connotations concerning the term "Christianity." Christianity, in the first place, is regarded by Hobhouse as the explanation of a personal inner experience which is related to ethics and sociology only by implication. Secondly, it is considered as the influence of the historical Christian movement. And finally, the term is used to denote only that segment of the Christian philosophy which is known as Christian social ethics.[72]

Hobhouse eliminates the first two uses of the term "Christianity," for, in the first use of the term, Christianity has very little regard for the "collective life of humanity" and the "possibilities of true social progress"; moreover, in the second sense, Christianity has failed as an historical movement, particularly in its "central doctrine of meekness." Nevertheless, in the third use of the term, Christianity has made progress, and will continue to be an influential element in life, if it finds its expression, not in certain institutions,

[68] *The Rational Good,* p. 229.

[69] *Ibid.,* pp. 26, 27.

[70] *Ibid.,* p. 227.

[71] *Development and Purpose,* p. 24.

[72] The three connotations of the term "Christianity" are discussed by Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution,* p. 519; *Development and Purpose,* pp. 172, 173; *The Rational Good,* p. 13; *Social Development,* p. 341. See also his article "Christianity," in the *Encycl. Soc. Sci.*

but in the "general spirit of social life." [73] Christianity, in this sense, will be revolutionized, for, according to Hobhouse, emphasis will no longer be upon the "outer law" and "speculative foundations," but rather upon the individual "spirit" or "conscience" and humanitarian foundations. When Christianity fully accepts this place in society, men will be free to criticize its principles, to accept or reject whatever seems to be valuable or detrimental to social life.

Here again the necessity of a scientific spirit in matters of religion presents itself as a challenge to the generations of the future. Hobhouse says in this regard: "Dogmatic teaching, having failed with the old Adam, it remains for the next generation to see what scientific psychology may do when it takes a hand." [74] Hobhouse, consequently, advocates no definite utopia for the future religion, but rather leaves its development to the new generation of scientific religious thinkers.

Holding in the main the same general ethico-religious ideas as Hobhouse, is Charles A. Ellwood, one of America's veteran sociologists. Yet Ellwood recognizes, in view of the present demand for a more dynamic force to unify modern civilization, an immediate need of a reconstruction of religion. He would not wait, as would Hobhouse, for the next generation to take "a hand." Consequently Ellwood advocates a more optimistic view for both society and religion than does Hobhouse, basing his optimism upon the findings of sociology in particular and upon sociological and scientific knowledge in general. He makes use of such data since, for him, religion and ethics are intertwined in culture.

"Religion," Ellwood holds, "is that phase of culture which is concerned with the highest personal and social values." [75] The end of religion is not, therefore, in man's ideas and reason, as Ward and others would hold, but in his *will* and *emotions*. Religion is in the realm of faith; yet "true religion," Ellwood would say, "must [itself] be a faith thoroughly consistent with established knowledge," [76] i. e., scientific knowledge. In a scientific age, religion and ethics must be tested by the scientific spirit if they are to develop and meet the requirements of modern life. Religion cannot be destroyed by science; for it is an emotional and will attitude toward life and the universe, and there is no substitute for it. Scientific study of institutions reinforces the type of religion which Ellwood advocates, namely, ethical religion; because it "inspires men with faith in the possibility of remaking both human nature and human social life." [77] There is, therefore, a demand for a reconstruction of religion—

[73] *Encycl. of Soc. Sci.* III, p. 460.
[74] *Social Development,* Footnote, p. 341.
[75] Ellwood, *Man's Social Destiny,* p. 185.
[76] Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science,* p. 4.
[77] *Ibid.,* p. 19.

"a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life and in harmony with modern science." [78]

In his *Reconstruction of Religion,* and in his *Christianity and Social Science,* Ellwood makes his most outstanding contributions to religion and ethics. In these two volumes he very adequately shows how such a religion, as outlined above, is to be developed, and conserved, along with the bearing it will have upon all mankind. The practical utopia toward which Ellwood's social philosophy is directed is the Kingdom of God, and it has its basis, no doubt, in his own religious experience.

Only a brief summary of this theistic positivism can be undertaken here. Just how it is to be developed and applied to modern life is the important factor in such an analysis.

In making such a reconstruction of religion, the first thing necessary is "a thorough understanding of the nature of religion." [79] It must necessarily become more ethical and less theological, more social and scientific and less metaphysical. In this regard, there are certain principles which sociology has discovered in regard to human relations which are of particular significance to religion and ethics. Professor Ellwood refers to *socialization, mutual service,* and *love.* It is the primary function of religion, in the light of sociological discovery, to develop these principles so as to socialize individuals, promote social justice, and "lead men to want a better world." [80]

"The second thing to be considered in the reconstructing of religion is the social significance of Christianity, in the sense of the religion of Jesus." [81] The place and meaning of Christianity in social evolution should be adequately realized. This, he believes, would constitute a "new type of culture," "transcending predatory individual, class, tribal and national ethics, and replacing these with universalized, social, international, humanitarian ethics." [82]

For a proper reconstruction there is needed, in the third place, a recog-

[78] See Ellwood's *The Reconstruction of Religion,* Preface, p. i; *Introduction to Social Psychology,* p. 273; *The Social Problem* (Revised edition), p. 217.

[79] In Ellwood's *Reconstruction of Religion,* p. 47, the author points out four fundamental aspects of the nature of religion: (1) It is participation in, and universalization of the ideal values of social life; (2) it is a form of social control constraining, through supernatural sanction, the individual to conform his beliefs and actions to that of his group; (3) it is a consecration of individual life and energies to social ends; (4) it is an affirmation of the reality of the spiritual, and a belief in its ultimate dominance and triumph in human life.

[80] For a more detailed study of these principles and their effect upon society see his *Christianity and Social Science,* especially chaps. i, iii, iv, v.

[81] *Christianity and Social Science,* p. 109.

[82] *Reconstruction of Religion,* p. 77.

nition of the paganism and barbarity of our civilization, the spirit of which must be subordinated by Christian ideals.[83]

Finally, and most important, religion must be "based upon facts and so brought into harmony with positive science." [84] Here again is seen the increasing necessity of Christianity to pass further out of the theological and speculative stage into the positive and social stage.[85] For then religion will take its place in the service of human evolution and retain the religious attitude toward nature and ultimate reality; it will point to Jesus as the "ample and sufficient leader of mankind"; it will free the Bible of "superstition and misunderstanding," making it the "great source book of religious idealism." [86]

In passing into the social stage, religion will accept the fundamental Christian principle, that the "service of God consists in the service of mankind." This, according to Ellwood, requires certain positive and unequivocal doctrines of religion concerning the family, economic life, political life, and social pleasures.[87] For if immoral principles are tolerated in these institutions, a Christian social order is impossible. However, if religion is sufficiently developed on the social side (and such doctrines, no one can doubt, will help to bring about this accomplishment) it will furnish the dynamic for the realization of a Christian world.

Doctrine alone, however, cannot bring about the desired end. There must be an enlightenment of human wills and emotions; a transformation of human ideas, customs, and institutions. This calls for an educational program with the church as the center. Here again, Ellwood says, "the church must make a large use of scientific sociological and psychological knowledge of every sort." [88] The religious leaders of such an educational program must have *social intelligence, sympathy,* and *love for mankind, moral courage, moral enthusiasm,* and *faith* in God and the possibilities of human life. If this system of education is to yield results, it must free itself, as far as possible, from tradition and authority; it must endeavor to train man's rational faculties; it must be systematic and organized; it must connect itself with practical interests and activities of life; it must be motivated by the love of truth and the love of social

[83] For a detailed study of this application to society see Ellwood's *Reconstruction of Religion,* pp. 93–118.

[84] *Ibid.,* p. 119.

[85] This idea is gradually being accepted by religious leaders among the Protestant faiths. It is put forward by such men as D. C. MacIntosh, G. T. Rowe, H. N. Wieman, and J. W. Lee.

[86] *Reconstruction of Religion,* pp. 151–8.

[87] For a detailed study of these doctrines and their application to social life see *Reconstruction of Religion,* chaps. vii, viii, ix, x.

[88] *Ibid.,* p. 304.

justice; and most important of all, it must link itself with instruction in the social sciences.

If such a plan of reconstruction of religion, in part or in all its aspects, is carried out, many feel, with Ellwood, that there will be an increased abundance of unselfishness, mutual forgiveness, mutual sharing, and brotherly love, which is but a continuation of Jesus' teachings in a modern and scientific world.

Sociologists have not only contributed to the re-examination and re-interpretation of the Christian religion of the New Testament; they have also rendered very important contributions to a more realistic social insight into the evolution of the Hebrew religion which provided the religious background of Christianity. We have already referred in this connection to the work of Max Weber on the religion of the ancient Jews. But the outstanding sociological contributor to our understanding of the evolution of Hebrew religion is Louis Wallis. His views are embodied in an extremely suggestive work, *A Sociological Study of the Bible,* which appeared in 1912. In revised and elaborated form it was re-issued under the title, *God and the Social Process* (1935).

Wallis applied the sociological concepts of Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Small to an interpretation of a development of Hebrew society and religion. He showed how Hebrew society and government were the product of successive eras of conquest and subjugation of the peoples of Palestine and made clear the importance of the struggle of racial groups in the social and religious evolution of the Jews. He also explained the manner in which conflicting social interests colored religious development and theological formulations. He thus rendered the Bible a sociological document of first-rate importance, and offered an impressive illustration of the way in which sociology can clear up and render rational even the most sanctified areas of religious dogma.

From the brief survey of the ethico-religious contributions of contemporary sociologists, it has been seen that the sociologist is definitely in a position to make a contribution to religious and ethical thought. Furthermore, the outstanding sociologists believe that religion and ethics are not to be considered as two independent phenomena, but rather as interdependent aspects of culture. Consequently, there is at the present time an increasing tendency on the part of religious leaders not only to regard sociological and scientific data as fundamental to the development of religion, but also as the foundation upon which to build, to a certain degree, their theology and education programs. In this sense religion is breaking away from dogmatic and speculative theology, becoming more empirical, scientific, and practical.

In the light of the influence which contemporary sociology has had

upon religion, what has been the sociological reaction of the religious leaders? Have they made any contribution whatsoever to sociological thought? If so, what has been its nature and results?

IV. The New Humanism in Sociology: Comte Revived and Refurbished

It has been made clear that sociologists like Hobhouse and Ellwood believe that a revitalized Christianity is the answer to our current need for a dynamic social religion. Particularly do they stress going back to the actual teachings of Jesus in order to discover the basis for a new and vital Christianity.[89] This thesis has, perhaps, been most forcefully stated by Kirby Page in his courageous book, *Jesus or Christianity?* (1929). Page vigorously indicts historical Christianity for its bigotry, intolerance and savagery. But he contends that the teachings of Jesus are thoroughly adequate to provide us with the foundations of a program of social reconstruction in the middle of the twentieth century.

But another school of writers goes a step further. Its adherents contend that not only is organized Christianity antiquated and quite inadequate to our present social needs, but that the teachings of Jesus are also far short of what we require today in the way of social vision and human wisdom. They maintain that the only valid foundations of a social religion for the twentieth century must be sought in a thorough knowledge of man and society. Their point of view is reminiscent of the outlook of Auguste Comte, but fortified with the vast amount of historical, sociological, and psychological knowledge which has been added since the days of Comte. Such writers have come to be known as Humanists, because they base their doctrines upon the service of man rather than the worship of God. Most of the adherents of Humanism have come from the Unitarian and Universalist circles. Its leaders have been such men as John H. Dietrich, A. Eustace Haydon, Charles Francis Potter, Curtis W. Reese, A. C. Dieffenbach, John Haynes Holmes, E. Burdette Backus, and A. Wakefield Slaten. The Humanist position has been supported by able philosophers, such as John Dewey, James H. Tufts, J. H. Leuba, Roy W. Sellars, Max C. Otto, and Durant Drake.

The most extended exposition of this point of view which has come from a professional sociologist is embodied in *The Twilight of Christianity* by Harry Elmer Barnes.[90] As vice-president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science he read a paper before that organization in December, 1928, on science versus religion as a guide to

[89] This section was prepared at the request of the editors, and Mr. Williams takes no personal responsibility for the opinions expressed therein.

[90] 1929.

life. This was attacked by reconciling scientists like Henry Fairfield Osborn and by prominent churchmen like Cardinal Hayes. Barnes was thus led to justify his position in a comprehensive work on the subject which appeared about a year later. His book has been frequently compared to Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason,* in twentieth-century dress. It thus affords a good illustration of the progress of rationalism in the century and a half after Paine's book made its appearance. Whereas Paine believed fervently in God, if not in the God of the Old Testament, and paid a high tribute to the teachings of Jesus—the conventional deistic attitude—Barnes reflects the current rationalistic attitude by a frank espousal of agnosticism and a thorough rejection of the teachings of Jesus as at all adequate to the solution of the social problems of our day.

Indeed, the book starts off with an emphasis upon the uniqueness of the religious revolution of the twentieth century. Religious apologists have frequently asserted that the skepticism of our day is wholly comparable to the many earlier periods of reaction against the prevailing orthodoxy. Barnes emphasizes the fact that the unprecedented scientific, historical, anthropological, sociological and psychological knowledge of the twentieth century has produced a religious revolution unique in its comprehensiveness, its potency and its permanence. The earlier skeptics, from the Greeks to Voltaire, rarely questioned the existence of God or the validity of supernatural religion. They had little or no scientific knowledge of the historical and psychological origins of religion. Whereas orthodoxy triumphed over all earlier forms of skepticism, the current skepticism mercilessly reveals the unsound foundations of religious orthodoxy in a manner which defies logical or scholarly refutation.

Turning to the concept of cultural lag, as developed by Ogburn and others, Barnes shows that this is the outstanding social problem of our age. We have made enormous progress in the natural and social sciences, but we have failed to bring our social institutions up to anything like a parity with our knowledge in the realms of science and technology. Unless this gulf between scientific knowledge and technology, on the one hand, and social institutions, on the other, can be bridged, there is little prospect that civilization will endure. Conventional religion is presented by Barnes as not only the supreme example of the gulf between scientific knowledge and social practice but as a potent cause of cultural lag in many fields other than the religious, most notably in the realm of morals.

In a comprehensive chapter on "What Price Religion?" he documents in detail the contention of Alfred North Whitehead that "History, down to the present day, is a melancholy record of the horrors which can attend religion: human sacrifice, and in particular the slaughter of children, cannibalism, sensual orgies, abject superstition, hatred as between races, the maintenance of degrading customs, hysteria, bigotry, can all be laid at

its charge. Religion is the last refuge of human savagery." Following roughly the argument of Kirby Page, he outlines comprehensively the stimulus of orthodox Christianity to human savagery by its encouragement of religious wars and persecutions; shows how religious bigotry has fought stubbornly against the progress of human knowledge in every field; indicates how supernatural morality has promoted unhealthy mental attitudes and social codes; and reveals the powerful support which orthodoxy has given to social inertia.

Taking up systematically the origins of religion, Barnes brings together the contributions of history, anthropology and sociology to our understanding of the secular character of religious origins. Stress is also laid upon the contributions of modern psychology to a full comprehension of the nature of religious experience. Discussing the nature and development of the Christian Bible, he shows how secular scholarship has undermined the orthodox conception that this book is literally "God's word." Summarizing the fundamental tenets of orthodoxy, he reveals the untenable character of the orthodox notions of the physical universe, the nature of God, the character and significance of man, the purpose of life and the destiny of the human race.

Considering the much-debated problem of science versus religion, he makes it overwhelmingly clear that there is a real conflict between contemporary science and the tenets of religion. Relying upon the material set forth by George Herbert Betts, in his *The Beliefs of Seven Hundred Ministers,* Barnes makes it clear that the conflict between religion and science is not limited to the struggles between science and orthodoxy. There is also a very real conflict between contemporary science and the beliefs of most modernists. The latter have, at best, only reconciled religion with the science of the nineteenth century. He thus disposes of the persistent argument of the scientific reconcilers to the effect that there is no fundamental conflict between science and liberal religion.

This critical portion of Barnes' work is, obviously, only a new review of long debated topics in the struggle between rationalism and orthodox religion. It possesses value chiefly because of its comprehensive marshalling of the latest information which can be brought forth in behalf of rationalism. It is this which justifies the statement of John Haynes Holmes, in his review of the book in the New York Herald Tribune *Books,* that "never in any of the literature of 'free thought' was there any such wealth of scholarship, range of observation and criticism, or cogency and power of argument, as are found in Professor Barnes's pages."

The most original and challenging portion of Barnes's work is his vigorous denial of the contention of Ellwood and others that an adequate religion for the twentieth century can be fashioned out of a rehabilitated

Christianity, or even from a revival of the literal teachings of Jesus. He cites with agreement the comments of Paul Blanshard on the notable work of Harry F. Ward, *Our Economic Morality and the Ethic of Jesus:*

> What I object to in his treatment is the constant dragging in of "the ethic of Jesus." Is it necessary for a professor in a theological seminary to pretend that a sound economic morality must come from Jesus? Anyone who reads the Gospels with an impartial eye will discover that Jesus' teaching concerning economic values was confused, fragmentary, and quite inapplicable to a world of tickers, billionaires, and communists. What Mr. Ward really means by the "ethic of Jesus" is the ethic of Harry F. Ward, and I don't see why he should be so modest about saying so.

Examining the latest scholarly information on the subject, Barnes shows the great uncertainty as to the actual facts about the life, personality, and real teachings of Jesus. He points out that, even if we accept as accurate the account in the Gospels, it is evident that Jesus had only a most elementary knowledge of the scholarship and social facts of his own day. Yet, had he been as learned as Aristotle, his knowledge, based upon the wisdom and experience of 2,000 years ago, would be of little value as a guide amidst the mazes of contemporary life. Barnes contends vigorously that the religious teachings of erudite contemporaries such as Harry Ward and Sherwood Eddy are far more valid and valuable than the doctrines of Jesus. Conceding that the message of kindliness and human sympathy, which pervades the teachings of Jesus, is of perennial value and social utility, he shows that such sentiments cannot in any sense be uniquely associated with Jesus and his ministry. He contends that Jesus presents a very important historical lesson, particularly in illustrating how far historical Christianity departed from his teachings, but he holds that the Jesus question is today of purely historical interest to the enlightened sociologist. This chapter on "The Jesus Stereotype" is calculated to be a devastating implied criticism of Ellwood, Page, and others, who seek to rehabilitate the teachings of Jesus and make them an adequate social religion for the twentieth century.

But if Barnes opposes the reconcilers and salvagers he is also frankly antagonistic to the atheists and extreme free thinkers who deny the existence of God and proclaim that society no longer needs any religion. He shows that dogmatic atheism is on an intellectual par with dogmatic theism, holding that an urbane agnosticism represents the only attitude toward the God question which is compatible with our present scientific knowledge and intellectual perspective.

Taking up the views of the extreme free thinkers, who hold that we no longer have any need for even the most enlightened religion, Barnes at-

tempts to refute this contention. He holds that while the more emancipated and enlightened intellects may be guided by knowledge and reason alone, the mass of mankind will always have a need for an organized mass-emotion which will lead them to support decent social causes. It is here that we may find a defensible function for religion in even the most emancipated eras. But this religion must be thoroughly divorced from any notion of literally applying the will of God to human affairs. It must be based upon the best secular knowledge of any time and thoroughly devoted to the improvement of human life here and now. Barnes thus summarizes his conception of the function of religion in a rational age:

> It would seem that the most reasonable field for the functioning of religion in contemporary society is in the way of providing for the mass organization of the group sentiment of mankind in support of the larger principles of kindliness, sympathy, right, justice, honesty, decency and beauty. Just what constitute the essentials of right and justice and the like would have to be determined by the appropriate scientific and aesthetic experts, but these experts have little potency or opportunity in the way of arousing ardent popular support for their findings. Religion has thus far been the most powerful agency in stirring and directing the collective will of mankind. Therefore, we may probably contend with safety that the function of a liberalized religion, divested of its archaic supernaturalism, would be to serve as the public propaganda adjunct of social science and aesthetics. The social sciences and aesthetics would supply specific guidance as to what ought to be done, while religion would produce the motive power essential to the translation of abstract theory into practical action. There would, however, be ever present the problem of restraining this educational propaganda and keeping it in thorough conformity with the recommendations of science and art. The function of religion, then, would be to organize the mass mind and group activities in such a fashion as to benefit secular society and not to please God, at least not God as he has been understood and expounded in the orthodox religions of the past.[91]

This statement is, obviously, a sociological rendition of the religious views of the advanced Modernists or Humanists. It implies the abandonment of the fundamental tenets of both the orthodox and the liberal modernists. Those points which must be abandoned in any rational sociological religion are thus summarized by Barnes:

> (1) Insistence upon dogmatic certainty of the existence of God; (2) any primary interest in the question of God; (3) the doctrine of the divinity, infallibility or unique religious significance of Jesus; (4) absorption with considerations of the Infinite and the Absolute; (5) support of transcendental and idealistic philosophy, which attempts to establish truths and values independent of time and space, as well as of human factors and situations; (6) all assumptions of a supernatural world, alien to man's natural conditions and

[91] Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 443–4.

inscrutable by the methods of science and secular knowledge; (7) the personality obsession, particularly as relates to the effort to personify the cosmos and God, though we may concede the supreme importance of a secular consideration of the human personality and its development; and, finally, (8) the outstanding theological fossils, such as the conceptions of the soul, immortality, sin, the spirit world, prayer, and the sense of sanctity and the sacred.[92]

Barnes's work need not be regarded as one with which all enlightened social scientists must agree in detail, but it is significant as the most resolute and thorough appraisal of religion, divorced completely from the rubrics of orthodoxy and liberal apologetics alike. In similar vein is Clifford Kirkpatrick's *Religion and Human Affairs* (1929). This book is somewhat more outspoken in its critical aspect than Barnes's book. It is especially notable for its devastating criticism of Fundamentalism and for its elaborate elucidation of the elemental conflict between science and religion. Laying particular emphasis on the socio-economic causes of the decline of supernatural religion is V. F. Calverton's *The Passing of the Gods* (1934), perhaps the ablest economic interpretation of the passing of orthodoxy.

V. Some Sociological Contributions to Ethics[93]

Like the writings of sociologists on religion, the sociological contributions to ethics have been expressed in two major ways. First, we find the sociological studies of the Jewish and Christian ethical codes. Sociologists have re-examined these, qualified them in the light of existing knowledge, and recommended them with differing degrees of enthusiasm. We have already surveyed representative examples of this approach in our analysis of the writings of Weber, Hobhouse, Ellwood and others.

The other major sociological contribution to ethical theory has consisted in cultivating a naturalistic approach to ethical problems. Here we find a study of the actual evolution of ethical codes in the course of social experience and the attempt to build up a sound theory of ethics on secular sociological foundations. We shall here concern ourselves chiefly with the contributions of sociologists to a secular notion of ethical theories and practices.

The theory of evolution was quickly applied to the social field and many books were written tracing the evolution of social institutions. Ethics was one of the subjects thus treated. The evolutionary anthropologists, from Morgan on, devoted considerable attention to the question of how ethical codes have come into being. They departed entirely from the orthodox religious notion that these codes were divinely revealed.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 429.

[93] This section was prepared at the request of the editors and Mr. Williams assumes no personal responsibility for the opinions expressed.

They showed them to be the product of the trial-and-error methods of primitive peoples. The most comprehensive and uncritical statement of this evolutionary view of morals was contained in Charles Letourneau's *Evolution of Morals.*

The sociologists were not slow in taking over these doctrines from the anthropologists. Among the first to do so was Herbert Spencer, who set forth his views on the subject in his *Principles of Sociology,* and his *Principles of Ethics.* We shall have more to say about Spencer's ethical theories later on, but we may observe in this place that he wholeheartedly accepted the doctrines of the evolutionary anthropologists concerning the naturalistic origins of moral codes. Perhaps the most voluminous synthesis of the anthropological material by a sociologist was Edward Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* which appeared in two volumes in 1906 and went through many later editions. Almost equally extensive, more precise, and perhaps more valuable, was Leonard T. Hobhouse's *Morals in Evolution* which was first published in 1906. But Hobhouse's book was somewhat broader than the title indicates, since it dealt not only with the evolution of morals, but also the growth of law, government and social institutions as well. Perhaps the best known and most influential of all the sociological appropriations of the anthropological conception of the development of moral codes is that contained in William Graham Sumner's *Folkways.*[94] Sumner's notions are so important that we may profitably summarize them.

Sumner attempts to explain the origin, nature, value, and persistence of the most important and characteristic group habits. Briefly, his theory of the folkways is that, dominated in a general way by instincts inherited from animal ancestors and by the psycho-physical capacity to distinguish pain from pleasure, man has gradually arrived at, by a process of trial and error, certain types of group conduct which have been found by experience to be conducive to a successful conclusion of the struggle for existence. These group habits or folkways operate primarily on a subconscious level, and acquire greater power, as time passes, through the force of tradition, habit, and religious sanction.

When the folkways reach the stage where they are thought about and are regarded as being adapted to assuring the continued welfare and prosperity of the group, they are thereby transformed into *mores.* The mores, as supported by group authority, are the chief agency through which societal selection operates. The mores determine what shall be regarded as right and wrong modes of conduct in any group, morality thus being not absolute and universal, but relative and local. The question of the evolution of the mores is not dealt with by Sumner at any length, but he furnished leading ideas which were developed by his disciple, Albert

[94] 1907.

Galloway Keller, in his *Societal Evolution*. Further, Sumner devoted no extended attention to the problem of whether the mores can be consciously changed by society, although time and again he makes it plain that he did not believe that members of any group are competent to discuss and criticize the validity of their own mores, much less to change them by predetermined action. The following selected and rearranged quotations from *Folkways* epitomize Sumner's theoretical position concerning this point:

"The mores pervade and control the ways of thinking in all the exigencies of life, returning from the world of abstractions to the world of action, to give guidance and to win revivification. . . . At every turn we find new evidence that the mores can make anything right. What they do is that they cover a usage in dress, language, behavior, manners, etc., with the mantle of current custom, and give it regulation and limits within which it becomes unquestionable. The limit is generally a limit of toleration. . . . The mores set the limits or define the disapproval. The most important facts about the mores is their dominion over the individual. Arising he knows not whence or how, they meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit of ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental processes. The mores are therefore an engine of social selection. Their coercion of the individual is the mode in which they operate the selection. . . . It is vain to imagine that a "scientific man" can divest himself of prejudice or previous opinion, and put himself in an attitude of neutral independence towards the mores. He might as well try to get out of gravity or the pressure of the atmosphere.[95]"

Sumner's *Folkways* thus represents an overwhelming proof that there is no such thing as absolute moral standards; the latter are relative to time and place. The only uniformity among the folkways is that, in every case, those who live under any moral code tend to regard it as divinely revealed and absolute. But Sumner's book is in itself the best refutation of such ethical dogmatism.

This theme of the variability of moral codes has been made the subject of a whole book by Edward Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity*.[96] Westermarck examines in detail the common notion that moral codes are absolute, uniform and rational. Drawing upon his vast anthropological knowledge, he utterly eliminates this view of the matter. While truth may be, in theory at least, objective and absolute, this can hardly be the case with morals. The latter are relative, variable, and, at best, only approximations to truth. Moral codes vary because peoples differ in their experiences and in their degree of knowledge. Further, the moral consciousness is fundamentally based upon emotions, and moral values are relative to the emotions they express:

[95] From *Folkways* by William Graham Sumner, used by permission of Ginn and Company, Publishers, pp. 59, 98, 173–4, 521.

[96] 1932.

Ethical relativity implies that there is no objective standard of morality, and objectivity presupposes universality. . . .

The variability of moral judgments largely originates in different measures of knowledge, based on experience of the consequences of conduct, and in different beliefs. In almost every branch of conduct we notice the influence which the belief in supernatural forces or beings or in a future state has exercised upon the moral ideas of mankind, and the great diversity of this influence. Religion or superstition has, on the one hand, stigmatized murder and suicide, on the other hand, it has commanded human sacrifice and certain cases of voluntary self-destruction. It has inculcated humanity and charity, but has also led to cruel persecutions of persons embracing another creed. It has emphasized the duty of truth-speaking, and has itself been a cause of pious fraud. It has promoted cleanly habits and filthiness. It has enjoined labour and abstinence from labour, sobriety and drunkenness, marriage and celibacy, chastity and temple prostitution. It has introduced a great variety of new duties and virtues, quite different from those which are recognized by the moral consciousness when left to itself, but nevertheless in many cases considered more important than any other duties or virtues. . . .

That moral judgments could not possibly possess that universality which is characteristic of truth becomes particularly obvious when we consider that their predicates vary not only in quality but in quantity. There are no degrees of truth and falsehood; but there are degrees of goodness and badness, virtues and merits may be greater or smaller, a duty may be more or less stringent, and if there are no degrees of rightness, the reason for it is that right simply means conformity to the rule of duty. . . .

The moral consciousness is ultimately based on emotions, the moral judgment lacks objective validity, and the moral values are not absolute, but relative to the emotions they express.[97]

Another important contribution of sociology to ethics has been its emphasis upon the fact that true morality, in any secular and realistic sense, is that form of conduct which increases the totality of human happiness, here and now. The sociologist who most emphatically and resolutely set forth this contention was Lester F. Ward. The best statement of his position is contained in his major work, *Dynamic Sociology*. Ward took over very completely the hedonism of Bentham and the Utilitarians. He held that feeling is the dominating drive in all human action. Feeling leads to sensations of pleasure and pain. The pleasure of gratifying our desires is the main impulse which makes it certain that we will perform the nutritive and reproductive functions. On the other hand, the dread of pain underlies all activities which bring about the preservation of life. Social progress may, in one way, be regarded as the increase in the sum total of human happiness through an augmentation of pleasure and a minimizing of pain:

[97] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 183, 187, 218, 289.

The progress of society must depend on the progress of the intellect, and, while the end of social as of individual being is to minister in the highest possible degree to the feelings, this end can only be accomplished by the most thorough cultivation of the intellect. . . . Human happiness, which is the ideal end of all social effort, can only be secured by the elevation and expansion of the reasoning powers of man, which constitute the indirect but sole effective means by which that end can be attained. . . . Happiness is the only object of human effort; . . . utility aims to secure this object alone . . . nothing is useful unless it does so tend.

According to Ward it is the fundamental purpose of sociology to promote organized human happiness. This can only be done on the basis of adequate knowledge, which it is the function of sociologically informed education to supply.

Perhaps the most important contribution of sociology to ethics has been the attempt to work out a science of ethics. The first efforts along this line were chiefly devoted to relating ethics to natural science, especially the theory of evolution. Later, it came to be recognized that scientific ethics must be based upon social science as well as natural science. The first significant attempt to found ethics upon natural science was embodied in *The Principles of Sociology,* and *The Principles of Ethics* by Herbert Spencer. Since Spencer was the outstanding evolutionary philosopher among sociologists, it was natural that his ethical theories should be intimately associated with his evolutionary philosophy. Indeed, his science of ethics represented an effort to set the hedonism of the Utilitarians in an evolutionary framework. In this sense, his work was paralleled by the comparable enterprise of Sir Leslie Stephen.

Spencer took over from the Utilitarians the felicific calculus of Bentham, with its notion that man is moved to action primarily by the desire to enjoy pleasure and avoid pain. But he linked up this conception with biological science and evolutionary philosophy. Pleasurable experiences increase the vitality of the organism and stimulate the efforts of the organism to survive. Pain depresses organic vitality and indicates maladjustment in the life process. The evolutionary process, if unimpeded, tends to increase the sum total of pleasurable processes and to diminish the totality of painful ones. The more perfect the adjustment between man's instincts and the physical and social environment, the greater the amount of pleasure and the less the volume of painful experiences. Therefore, progress consists in increasing this harmony between organism and environment and in promoting a dynamic equilibrium between man and his surroundings.

Spencer recognized the conflict between egoism and altruism, namely, that between the selfish pleasures of the individual and the welfare of the social group. He believed that this conflict could best be resolved by leav-

ing it to be adjusted through the natural processes of evolution. He held that the ultimate ethical ideal and the overpowering moral duty of everyone is to further those evolutionary processes which are slowly but surely operating to produce a better and happier human race. Spencer thus contended that nature and evolution, rather than laws and artificial moral codes, should guide morality and determine justice. He regarded justice as a social condition under which every man is free to follow his own nature and desires and to take the consequences thereof, whether good or evil. He thus elevated the principle of *laissez-faire* to the status of cosmic justice. Spencer's scientific ethics commits our destiny to an evolutionary naturalism which condemns all attempts at artificial control.

Spencer's extreme naturalism was sharply attacked by the great English biologist, Thomas Henry Huxley, in his famous essay, "Evolution and Ethics." While sympathetic with Spencer's evolutionary point of view, Huxley contended that human morality is not the natural product of evolution but the artificial creation of man. While nature plays its part in their evolution, moral codes are chiefly a social product. The fundamental elements in human morality, namely, sympathy, altruism and co-operation, are not only separate from evolutionary naturalism, but are in part antagonistic to it. They represent, in a fundamental sense, a sharp reversal of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, which is the way of evolutionary nature. In this way, human progress seems to be something apart from natural progress. Nature is selfish and brutal, but social codes are becoming ever more dominated by sympathy, kindliness, altruism, co-operation, and a spirit of conservation.

This notion that human society can and should modify the ruthless "tooth-and-claw" procedure of nature was made the foundation of the whole social philosophy of Ward. He contended that mankind now possesses the knowledge which will enable it to terminate the ruthless and wasteful methods of natural evolution. We can substitute for this the conscious control of social evolution in such a manner as to increase human happiness by promoting pleasure and averting pain. A similar attitude was taken by the eminent French philosopher and sociologist, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in his *La Morale et la science des moeurs*. He, likewise, held that from our day onward scientific morals should be founded upon social science rather than upon evolutionary natural science. Scientific knowledge now enables us to produce an applied science of morals which can directly and immediately bring about a state of affairs far more conducive to human happiness than the ruthless methods of nature. The social origins of human values have been analyzed in illuminating fashion by another French sociologist, Célestin Bouglé, in his *Leçons sur l'évolution des valeurs*. (Available in English translation.)

Huxley's suggestion that sympathy and altruism, as contrasted with the ruthless selfishness of nature, are the dominating elements of truly human morality was elaborately developed by certain sociologists. This notion that sympathy is the basis of morality and the social order had been set forth by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. A similar point of view was adopted by the founder of modern sociology, Auguste Comte. He held that sympathy is the fundamental human motive which underlies all commendable social action, and he gave sympathy the basic position in his scheme for social reconstruction. But the most elaborate elucidation of the thesis that sympathy and co-operation provide the foundations of human morality was the work of Alexander Sutherland and Peter Kropotkin. Sutherland devoted his two-volume work, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct,* to an attempt to demonstrate that the sentiment of sympathy has created the moral instinct of man, the sense of duty, the feeling of self-respect, and the essentials of the aesthetic impulse. Kropotkin, in his famous work, *Mutual Aid: a Factor of Evolution,* contended that the co-operative tendency is the basic factor in social growth and the evolution of morality. Toward the end of his life, Kropotkin supplemented this by a later book, *Ethics: Origin and Development,* in which he traced the evolution of ethical practices and theories to vindicate his thesis that mutual aid, justice and self-sacrifice are the three fundamental elements of human morality.

The notion of Huxley that the moral processes of human society differ from the non-moral methods of nature naturally suggested to sociologists that the science of sociology must provide the proper guidance for social morality. Only social science can discover a true social morality. The most ambitious effort to work out this theory is contained in the *Sociology and Ethics* of Edward Cary Hayes.[98] Indeed, this book combines the ethical outlook of enlightened Christianity with scientific sociological theory. Hayes held that a socialized religion, thoroughly institutionalized, must provide the moral code of the future. But this socialized religion must be founded upon a thoroughly rational social ethics:

> From the fact of our social nature it results that neither the thought of God nor the thought of participation in the social life inspires us to our best unless that thought is the common property of our group. The weakness of an age of transition is its lack of social agreement. Neither a residuum of faith, purged of anthropomorphism and superstition, nor the contemplation of the social reality can adequately serve the purpose of inspiration and adjustment unless *institutionalized,* that is to say, rationally adopted as a social agreement.[99]

[98] 1921.

[99] Hayes, *op. cit.,* pp. 25–6.

It is only in a thorough study of society that we can find the proper guidance to create the body of rational ethics which must produce the socialized religion of the future:

If investigation of sociology's general problem, the problem of social causation, seems to threaten destruction of the accepted world-view, there already is promise that investigation of the special problems of ethics by the sociological method will prove to be constructive of a modified world-view not less adapted to afford guidance, motive, and worth to life, having the incalculable advantage over the old world-view of being impregnable to any attacks by incongruous facts, and requiring no blinking of the clear eyes of intellectual honesty.[100]

Professor Hayes' point of view represents the attitude of a large section of contemporary sociological opinion with respect to a science of morals, namely, that we are to find it in a socialized religion based upon sociological principles. A more advanced position is that we are to seek the new morality in mental hygiene, which combines the findings of biology, psychology, psychiatry, and sociology. This point of view has been set forth by Harry Elmer Barnes:

It was inevitable that mental hygiene would become nothing less than a new body of humane and secularized morality. It gives promise of evolving into that dependable guide to life which man has been seeking in vain since the days of the Hellenic secularists of ancient Athens who repudiated the supernaturalism of their age. It represents the only organized campaign to give us the new scientific and aesthetic morality that is so persistently demanded to guide our life competently amidst the confusion and complexity of twentieth century existence. Not a few scientists and educators have already proclaimed that it will supplant theology. Religious liberals have approved and adopted it, not only as a corner-stone of the new ethics but as a technique for understanding religion itself. Applied to education, it is revolutionizing our attitude toward the learning processes of children. Just to the degree that supernaturalism yields before the onslaughts of mental hygiene will man become capable of meeting the new and increased strains and stresses which modern life has imposed upon him. Mental hygiene is not only the one body of knowledge scientifically equipped to handle contemporary issues of right living; it is also the only technique likely to appeal to the skeptical younger generation which has lost its faith in the custodians of the supernatural.[101]

VI. The Contributions of Contemporary American Liberal Christianity to Sociological Thought

It has been seen in the preceding pages that Saint-Simon, Comte, and Ward, the founders of modern sociology of religion, were keenly interested in the social application of Christianity. However, it was not until

[100] Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–9.
[101] Barnes, *Can Man be Civilized?* (1932), pp. 88–9.

the latter half of the nineteenth century that certain religionists realized the necessity of breaking away from a purely individualistic conception of salvation and of re-emphasizing the social aspects of Christianity. The leaders of this movement succeeded in developing a Christian social philosophy without becoming non-theistic Humanists. Without exception, all of these social-religious thinkers in America have been strong religious characters, and even evangelistic; however, they have felt compelled to break away from older Protestant traditions at certain points [102] and to advocate social reforms which, to them at least, would eliminate social evils and build a better world through the social application of Christianity.

Among the earlier, yet less liberal advocates of social Christianity, were Lyman Abbott, Washington Gladden, and Josiah Strong. Following in general the social message of these pioneers, yet more liberal in their outlook, were Francis Peabody, Sherwood Eddy, Harry F. Ward, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Shailer Mathews.

The main purpose of this liberal Christian movement was, and still remains, twofold; to bring in the Kingdom of God by reforming society and to convert the world *en masse* rather than the individual in particular. To carry out such a reform program, even to begin it, was a difficult task. It called for a detailed study and criticism of social and religious conditions and organizations, a revaluation of the teachings of Jesus and their application to social life, a reconstruction of society, and the education of the people to such an interpretation of Christianity. Yet even in the face of the huge task set before them, these reformers have seen the results of their labors, particularly until World War I, when the hope for the Kingdom, which was burning in the hearts of the American people, was crushed. With the War went much of the hope that there are means, other than violence, which may usher into our modern world a new social order more in accord with the mind of Christ, making it indeed a new earth.

Since that war this sentimental and optimistic religious philosophy has continued to be the basic foundation for the religious thought of many Americans. However, the entire period since the War has been, in the religious realm, one in which religious leaders have endeavored to adjust the optimism of the social gospel to the interference which came with the war. Out of this period of adjustment has grown a liberal reaction to the pre-war religious optimism, in the thought of such Americans as Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr, and Walter Horton.

In the light of the historical setting of these two liberal Christian movements in America, just what contributions have their most outstanding

[102] It is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss the reaction of this liberal Christian movement to traditional Protestant theology except in its social implications.

leaders made to sociological thought? In other words, what is the nature and content of their social philosophy, and what is the relation, if any, between their social and their religious thought?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to discuss briefly and separately the more outstanding religious liberals of these two movements.

In the thought of Lyman Abbott (1835–1922), nature is not a machine constructed by a mechanic; it is "the expression of God's thought, the outward utterance of himself." [103] Thus God's existence is demonstrated, for Abbott, in both the material and immaterial universe. Consequently, there is a unity and a continuity in humanity quite as much as there is in nature. However, "Mankind are not mere segregated atoms; . . . there is a natural unity in the human race." [104] Furthermore, God can express himself in history or in terms of moral life quite as well as he can in nature. "This life of God in humanity (as in nature) is one of continuous progressive change, according to certain divine laws, and by means of forces, or a force, resident in humanity (or nature)." [105] Hence, Abbott is able to say that "the Christian religion is itself an evolution"; moreover, "Christianity (like society) is not merely individual; it is organic." [106]

Therefore, according to Abbott:

> Religion is not a creed, long or short, nor a ceremonial, complex or simple, nor a life more or less perfectly conformed to an external law; it is the life of God in the soul of man, re-creating the individual; through the individual constituting a church; and by the church transforming human society into a kingdom of God.[107]

Furthermore, Abbott would hold that Christ is not only the secret of this spiritual evolution, he is also the "type and pattern of that which will be wrought in universal humanity when spiritual evolution is consummated." [108] Consequently, according to Abbott, the true religion which the world is seeking in Christ is "love toward God and love toward man," i. e., the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man.

Nevertheless, there are present with us certain controversies and enemies of the social order which threaten to disrupt the brotherhood. Therefore, the Christian problem, for Abbott, is to solve the controversies and reform the enemies of the social order. Yet, if this problem is to be solved, and the spiritual evolution consummated, the church must interest itself

[103] Lyman Abbott, *The Evolution of Christianity*, p. 245 (cited hereafter as *Evolution*).

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[106] *Loc. cit.*, Abbott, *Christianity and Social Problems*, p. 361 (cited hereafter as *Christianity*).

[107] *Evolution*, pp. 257, 258.

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

in all things that concern humanity, or humanity will not interest itself in what concerns the church. Likewise, in dealing with the enemies of society, Christians must be inspired by love, not by wrath; they must adjust penalties solely for the purpose of reform, and never for the purpose of retribution:

> The church and ministry . . . must be competent to give instruction in the moral laws which govern social and industrial life—the organized life of humanity. The age requires this instruction; the people desire it; the religious teachers should give it.[109]

The ministers should likewise devote themselves to the spiritual study of the Bible and of life, if they are to become leaders of society. Science and Christianity should combine to teach that every man receives his wealth from One higher than himself; and Christianity should "insist on the maintenance of the home unbroken; for the home is the foundation of the social order; . . . it is a divine order, and on its permanence the permanence of society depends." [110]

Abbott contends, therefore, that if the Kingdom is to appear on earth, the law of service and the standards of values must be applied to the industrial order, for industrial peace is to be brought about only by a frank recognition of the partnership between labor and capital, which will establish a greater service to humanity and a more complete development of mankind. This also is the duty of Christianity, a part of its socializing process. For Christianity is the organic force, according to Abbott, which must bring about the necessary changes that presuppose a righteous society. Not until the Christian process reaches the stage of development where it can accomplish the tasks set before it, as mentioned above, will the Kingdom appear.

There is evidence, in the works of Washington Gladden (1836–1918) of a similar note of hope, as was revealed by Abbott. Yet, Gladden's social philosophy is more practical, and the fulfillment of his hope for the Kingdom depends more upon the combined efforts of religious and cultural institutions than Abbott would maintain.

According to Gladden, society "is a living thing; it has some of the characteristics of a physical organism," [111] and the truth of its functioning can best be known by applying to it the laws of biology rather than the laws of mechanics. Society can never be pulled down and rebuilt completely, for it must keep growing out of its own roots, i. e., the vital process is evolutionary. Yet Gladden would hold that there are certain influential factors of society which determine its make-up as well as its destiny.

[109] *Christianity*, p. 364.
[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 361, 366.
[111] Washington Gladden, *Social Salvation*, p. 5.

Gladden refers to social sentiments, such as love for wealth or honesty, social theories, such as slavery or divorce theories, customs, institutions, and the laws and organization of the state.[112] These aspects of society, he contends, may be both Christian and non-Christian. Yet the task of Christianity, since its end is "a perfect man in a perfect society," is to reform and control these vital factors of society which give rise to social conflict and social problems. For, according to Gladden:

> There can be no adequate social reform save that which springs from a genuine revival of religion; only it must be a religion which is less concerned about getting men to heaven than about fitting them for their proper work on earth; which does not set itself over against the secular life in contrast, but enters into the secular life and subdues it by its power and rules it by its law, and transfigures it by its light. For any other kind of religion than this I do not think the world has any longer very much use.[113]

The social question presented in Gladden's general social philosophy leads directly to questions of social organization based on a "revival of religion." Such a religion must "establish and maintain close and friendly social relations" by applying the law of love, "pouring a stream of saving influence into all the various channels of social activity." [114]

Furthermore, if such a reorganization of society is to occur, all religious leaders, according to Gladden, should be acquainted with the problems of economics and sociology, for religion is, and must continue to be, the heart and soul of the questions here involved. Likewise, if society is to be reorganized or Christianized, the factors which shape and control its existence and destiny must be Christianized. This means that "every great department of society is to be pervaded by the Christian spirit and governed by the Christian law," for "Christianity gives a law to society as well as to the individual." [115] However, before such a law is fully realized, the prevailing social sentiments, theories, customs, institutions, laws, and government must be penetrated with the Christian spirit, founded on Christian principles, and ruled by the Christian law.

According to Gladden, some of the methods of administration which should not only be realized but should also be practiced by the Christian people, if the Christian state or society is to be established, are as follows: A certain amount of public instruction should be furnished; provisions should be made for sanitary supervision by which pure air and water will be secured for all people; such social parasites as criminals, paupers, and gamblers should be discouraged and extirpated in so far as possible; the

[112] For a more detailed study of his social philosophy, see *Tools and The Man,* especially chap. i (cited hereafter as *Tools*).

[113] *Social Salvation,* pp. 30, 31.

[114] Gladden, *The Christian Pastor,* p. 277; *Social Salvation,* p. 19.

[115] *Tools,* pp. 4, 6.

hours of labor in many callings should be limited and Sunday labor prohibited altogether; more sanitary conditions should be provided for in all labor institutions; and peace should be sought not only among peoples within institutions and states but also between nations as well.

Until social conditions are understood, until the principles of Jesus are applied to society in the form of reorganization, the new order will not be established. Hence, according to Gladden, all that is needed to bring about the Kingdom is the application of the social and ethical teachings of Jesus to the modern problems of society.

Contemporary with Abbott and Gladden there arose another pioneer in the movement for the social application of Christianity. Working side by side with them in their general mission was Josiah Strong (1847–1916); Strong's method of approach, however, was quite different. On the one hand, Abbott and Gladden stressed man's duty, as a Christian, to bring in a righteous world; whereas, Strong, recognizing man's duty to prepare for the Kingdom, believed that such a social order was included in God's plan, and therefore was to be God's gift.

In 1893, Strong published probably his most outstanding book on social Christianity, entitled the *New Era or The Coming Kingdom*. In this volume he analyzed society and the social conditions of his times from a purely sociological and religious point of view. Furthermore, Strong undertook to establish a sociological theory of society and human nature, pointing out the need for social reform and proposing certain reforms which to him seemed necessary for the upbuilding of the Kingdom.

According to Strong, "human nature has a Godward and manward side. As a person, man sustains relations to God; as a social being, he sustains relations to his fellow men." [116] The two terms which most clearly distinguish these two sides of human nature, for Strong, are religion and culture. Religion, he would hold, is "obedience to the will of God"; culture is "the development of man's nature according to . . . the laws of our entire nature, which are expressions of the divine will." [117] Consequently, Strong would agree with Ellwood that "religion and culture are coextensive; . . . each is concerned with the entire man; . . . each is necessary to the perfection of others." [118]

Consequently, for Strong, the social problem involves two fundamental factors: man and his environment. Even the progress of civilization has always been along two lines, namely, the development of the individual and the organization of society. However, Strong recognizes that these two principles, in the past, have been in conflict, hence the presence of social problems.

[116] Josiah Strong, *The New Era or The Coming Kingdom*, p. 114.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[118] *Loc. cit.*

Therefore, according to Strong, a new and different social organization is necessary if society is to free itself from its present dilemma. Furthermore, there is an "organic law of a *normal* society," which, in view of the increasing complexity of society, is gradually making it impossible for good and respectable men to live in peace and comfort without all people being good and respectable. Consequently, according to Strong, this "organic law of a *normal* society" is gradually leading to a higher social organization, based on love, i. e., an "enthusiasm for humanity" which will show itself in the future in the Kingdom. Such a method of organization does not belong to man, but is rather, for Strong, a part of the divine plan. Hence, "we are beginning to see that God's methods are scientific, and if we would co-operate intelligently with him, our methods must be scientific also." [119]

Furthermore, according to Strong, since "we have come upon the sociological age of the world," we shall not have social peace until we have social righteousness—until a higher and more complete organization of society, in harmony with the laws of historical development, has been established:

> The great need of society today, and the most essential condition on which it can rise to a higher organization, is a larger development of its moral and spiritual life, together with some means by which this highest and rightfully regnant part of the social organism—the social conscience—may be brought into vital and controlling touch with the entire intellectual and physical life of society.[120]

The fulfillment of this need is, for Strong, a task for the church. He realizes that:

> The existing methods of the church are inadequate; and . . . if she would win the masses and mould the civilization of the New Era, . . . she must gain a new conception of . . . (her mission), must make the Kingdom the object of endeavor, must adopt new methods to new conditions, and enter on the work with a burning enthusiasm for humanity.[121]

This "enthusiasm for humanity," Strong contends, "is needed to transform the church; and, thus transformed, the church would soon transform the world." [122] For then she would realize and accept her mission, bridging the chasm between the church and the masses, overcoming all difficulties and successfully applying the three great principles of love, sacrifice, and service.

The church thus transformed will unify all churches, creating a spirit

[119] Strong, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[120] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 348.
[122] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

of fellowship and co-operation between all its members and the members of society. Its mission will be universal; its objective world-wide. Such an organization, according to Strong, will enable "the collective church to perform its function as the conscience of the social organism." Then, and then only, will the "whole church with unbroken line . . . spring forward to offer the *living* sacrifice, until the Kingdom is fully come, and God's will is done on earth as it is in heaven." [123]

No sooner had Abbott, Gladden, and Strong begun their work, than the popularity of their movement began to impress everyone who read their publications. One of the most prominent religious leaders of the late nineteenth century to whom their message was to mean so much for the social-gospel movement was Francis Peabody (1847–1936). He found it in agreement with his own religious philosophy, and immediately stepped forward as another influential leader of the movement. Peabody, unlike most of his contemporaries, advocated a theory of society only in a narrow sense, i. e., he spent less time theorizing and more time analyzing specific and practical social problems. Nevertheless, from his analysis of the various social problems, he reached an organic cultural theory of society.

According to Peabody, there is a unity and interdependence of human society:

> The chief peril of the social order is created by the isolation and hostility of social classes; . . . the first conditions of social security are mutual understanding, fraternalism, cooperation, the spirit of industrial and political democracy; . . . there is a law of the equilibration of characters, as of the equilibration of forces, by which power is transferred from the strong to the weak, and the balance of life restored.[124]

All social questions, therefore, are not merely related to each other in a sequence or expansion, but rather the relation is one of mutual dependence and transferability. Consequently, "no social problem can, in any absolute sense, be dealt with alone." Each problem is "but one aspect of the general evolution of social habits and ideals. . . . The whole social body moves together if it moves at all." [125] Social progress itself, for Peabody, is but "the expression of moral energy." The various social questions are, in the main scope and intent, but "manifestations of the moral life of the time. . . . They appear in a variety of forms, but behind these diversities of form works the one spirit"—the motive power in "human hearts and wills." This spirit or "social energy of the modern conscience finds its

[123] *Ibid.*, p. 363.

[124] Francis Peabody, *Jesus Christ and The Christian Character*, p. 221 (hereafter cited as *Christian Character*).

[125] Peabody, *Jesus Christ and The Social Question*, p. 335.

main channel of expression in social forces of modern reform." [126] Consequently, these questions are at heart not only ethical questions, but religious questions also. And if the social problem as a whole is to be solved, the spirit of rational religion must be applied to it. Religion in this sense "is not one more machine like the mechanism of business or politics, but a power which may work through all the varied forms of social machinery for spiritual ends." This is the mission of the church—the center of religion—"to set life in true perspective, to make the great things great and the small things small, to change a world of contending animals into a world of co-operating souls." [127]

If such a world is to be established, the church must accept and apply its universal mission. Religion must appreciate, as "sociology and economics, politics and philanthropy have been led to appreciate, in an unprecedented degree, the unity and interdependence of human society." [128] Special reforms for particular problems are not inclusive and universal enough, for they arise out of immediate human needs and may not last. What is needed, however, in social reform, according to Peabody, is an analysis of the social disorder to discover its spiritual causes, and a simplified, socialized, and spiritualized church to carry the gospel of spiritualization. If such a church is established, it will re-make society and solve its problems by furnishing the redemptive force which all institutions of modern society need, i. e., "a revival of idealism, a life and power of the spirit, an association with souls who have found their lives in God." [129] All institutions need the reinforcement of this collective righteousness which the church may offer. Such a church will build a cleaner life in the family, a more fraternal and purified system of business and economics, and a more moral political system, uplifting society into the Kingdom of God.

Other important members of this earlier group of liberal Christian thinkers and Christian social reformers were John Graham Brooks (1846–1938), William Dwight Porter Bliss (1856–1926), Vida Dutton Scudder and George Davis Herron (1862–1925). Brooks was a liberal Unitarian minister who studied extensively in Germany after graduating from Harvard Divinity School. His reform interests were many. He advocated municipal socialism warmly, spoke out boldly in favor of free trade, was one of the first to familiarize the American public with German social insurance, and for years headed the National Consumers' League. Among his more important books was *The Social Un-*

[126] Peabody, *op. cit.*, pp. 346–7.

[127] Peabody, *The Christian Life in The Modern World*, p. 224 (hereafter cited as *Christian Life*).

[128] *Christian Character*, pp. 221–2.

[129] *Christian Life*, p. 225.

rest (1903). Bliss, a Congregational minister, was an enthusiastic American disciple of English Fabian Socialism. He was a pioneer Christian Socialist in the United States, organizing the first Christian Socialist Society in the country in 1889. His most important literary contribution to the reform movement was the editing of the immensely useful *Encyclopedia of Social Reform,* which appeared in 1897 and went through many editions. Miss Scudder was a professor of English in Wellesley College and showed much courage for an academician in championing reform and the socialist philosophy. She contributed several important books, such as *Social Ideas in English Letters* (1898), and *Socialism and Character* (1912), as well as others more intimately connected with the Christian spirit and reform, like *Church and the Hour* (1917), and *The Social Teachings of the Christian Year* (1921). More vigorously than anybody else before Sherwood Eddy, Herron, a Congregational minister, proclaimed that the capitalistic system must be replaced by an economic order based on Jesus' teachings concerning the brotherhood of man. From 1893 to 1900 he taught applied Christianity in Iowa College, but was compelled to leave because of conservative pressure. He took a leading part in founding the Rand School of Social Science in New York City for the teaching of socialist doctrine. Some of his representative books were *A Plea for the Gospel* (1892), *The Christian Society* (1894), *Between Caesar and Jesus* (1899), and *Why I Am a Socialist* (1900).

Somewhat later than Peabody in becoming active in the social-gospel movement, was Sherwood Eddy (1871–), who emphasized, probably more than anyone else, the need of a reformation in religion to solve the existing social problems. Moreover, he reached a conclusion concerning society and progress in a manner quite different from his precursors. According to Eddy, society and culture progress in cycles, i. e., they change with social movements. Consequently, if man is to direct the process of social evolution or progress, he must direct the movements within that process, and particularly must he attempt to discover and remedy the outstanding problems existing in society. Such problems as the menace of lawlessness and crime; the break-up of the home, the weakening of the institution of marriage and the rapid increase of divorce; the conditions of our industrial order, the presence of unshared wealth and unrelieved poverty, the materialism of our age—all such problems, according to Eddy, present a challenge to our faith and to our institutions as well. The time is at hand for a social reformation regarding these problems.[130]

But what movement or institution is to lead such a reformation? Just what will be the ultimate character of the reformation in the light of the position of modern society?

In view of what religion is and what it seeks to do, Eddy would hold

[130] Sherwood Eddy, *New Challenge to Faith,* pp. 196–204.

that in religion rests our only hope for such a reformation, and the only complete basis for social reform. For religion is "the effort to find the source, the meaning and the object of life, and vitally to relate our lives to them. It seeks not to drift blindly, but to see life steadily and to make it whole. It aims to integrate, to relate, to harmonize life about its best. It seeks in a world of relative values to find the highest value." [131] Yet, if organized religion is to be the chief agency of such a reformation, religion itself must also be reformed. The whole social and religious situation today demands that we seek to follow Jesus' way in love; *"the new reformation that we seek must be one of love,"* [132] i. e., of Personality, Brotherhood, Service, Liberty, Justice, and Accountability.[133] Before religion can build a reformed society, Christians themselves must *"practice brotherhood toward all," "make peace where there is strife,"* and *"seek a new discovery of God"*—that through Him the social order might be redeemed and the Kingdom of God established.[134] In view of the magnitude of the task of this needed reformation, both in our social and religious life, "we are," according to Eddy, "driven to the conclusion that *nothing less than a spiritual and social passion which can draw upon a dynamic of incalculable reserves of power can make possible such a reformation.*" Furthermore, if such a reformation takes place, according to Eddy, it must be "oriented to our new knowledge as well as our old faith"; it must be *"true to the scientific spirit and genius of the age";* it must *"combine vital personal religion and social application,"* i. e., it must "unite personal faith in God and practical service of man," meeting "the religious as well as the national and international situation of our time." [135]

Only when this type of reformation has been realized will society be reorganized and the Kingdom of God established on earth as it is in heaven.

Intimately associated with Eddy and an even more prolific writer on applied Christianity is Kirby Page (1890–). We have already referred to his *Jesus or Christianity?* in which he draws a sharp contrast between conventional Christianity and the teachings of Jesus, condemns the former and recommends the latter. Page shares Eddy's interest in using Christian ethics as the basis for economic justice, but he has given special attention to exposing the evils of war and urging the virtues of resolute pacifism. He has written many books on the Christian way of life, as applied to current problems, among them *Living Creatively* (1932), *Living Triumphantly*

[131] Eddy, *Religion and Social Justice,* pp. 195–6.

[132] *Ibid.,* p. 211.

[133] Eddy, *Facing the Crisis, A Study in Present Day Social and Religious Problems,* pp. 203–17.

[134] *Religion and Social Justice,* pp. 209, 210.

[135] Eddy, *The Challenge to Faith,* p. 220.

(1934), *Living Courageously* (1936), and *Living Dangerously* (1937). He is rivalled only by Eddy as a popularizer of socialized Christianity.

Probably the best known religious social reformer of this period is Harry F. Ward (1873–). None of the leaders in this movement has contributed more to sociological thought than has Ward. In summarizing his social theory and in estimating his contributions to social reform, it is evident that Ward regards society as being made up of certain institutions, the most basic of which are government, religion, and economic organization. Yet these institutions, composing society, do not constitute a framework external to humanity; they are composed of humanity itself. Consequently, society—the social order, "is the thought and life, the customs and habits of the people; it is not a machine but a living organism, composed of personalities welded together in vital association. Its forms and institutions are not only expressions of life; they are life itself. The family, the school, the church, the state, industry, are all composed of people. . . . At present, every one of these institutions is dynamic with the spirit of change." [136] Society as institutions and man as species are struggling into organic life, reaching out their hands to make the "Great Society." The world itself, according to Ward, is in a process of change—an evolutionary process. Furthermore:

> There are no breaks in the course of progress, the old and the new intermingle until change is accomplished insensibly. . . . In the evolutionary process there occur new kinds as well as new forms of life and . . . sometimes the old must die to bring forth the new. A new order may involve then a new kind of social living, a sharp break from the past.[137]

In view of his concept of society and progress, Ward holds that a new social order will not be conceived until "a sufficient number of people consciously accept a principle or a set of principles that require a significant change in political or economic organization." [138] In any event, Ward contends, the further development of a new order must be "a process of the gradual perception of the meaning and necessary application of its inherent principles." [139]

Consequently, for Ward, "the common pursuit of a universal social ideal . . . requires a religious faith and passion linked with all the unified experience and method that science makes available"; [140] for such a religion will unite mankind for common action against the evils of life and

[136] Harry Ward, *The New Social Order,* pp. 8–9, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

[137] *Ibid.,* p. 28, by permission.

[138] *Ibid.,* p. 29, by permission.

[139] *Loc. cit.,* by permission.

[140] Ward, *Which Way Religion,* p. 213, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

for the increasing realization of all its possibilities. Furthermore, such a religion will necessarily be ethical, finding its central task in Christianizing society, i. e., applying the ethical principles and ideas of Jesus to all social activities and relationships. However, this task "is not the endeavor of a day. It is not the carrying through of any specific social reform." It means more effort to educate and save the individual, "more evangelism, stronger churches, a closer personal fellowship with Jesus, as his followers co-operate more fully with him in his gigantic task of redeeming the whole life. All the reserves of Christian character and training must be drafted for this campaign." [141]

This task of making the whole of life religious is, according to Ward, the ultimate goal of religion. The means of accomplishing this end is by proclaiming, through its prophetic and educational functions, the social principles of Christianity, i. e., "the value of personality, the necessity of brotherhood, [and] the law of service." By these principles, "organized Christianity must continually judge the present social order, . . . in order that the world may be convinced of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, and so seek a better way of life." [142]

This, however, is not all that is needed to bring about a new social order, although it is true, according to Ward, that this religious spirit must furnish the dynamic force which will eventually reform society. Man must master himself as well as the machinery of social organization; and when this is done, man will be in a position to substitute "the spirit of co-operative service for the spirit of strife and conquest, and the choosing of the promotion of the common welfare of humanity as the end of life instead of the pursuit of wealth and power." [143] Unless some such change is brought about, Ward believes that "Western Civilization is headed for complete and overwhelming disaster." [144]

Regardless of what form the new order may take, "its vital breath," according to Ward, "is the sacrificial spirit. Lacking that, it will not be. . . . [Yet] if that spirit can be kept alive and turned to the larger ends of world-wide good, it will soon bring a new day upon the earth." [145]

Ward's deep interest in economic justice has prompted him to write a special work on the subject, *Our Economic Morality and the Ethic of Jesus* (1929). The most important criticism that can be levelled against it is that Ward attributes his own highly sophisticated economic insight to Jesus.

[141] Ward, *The Commonwealth of God,* pp. 13, 14.

[142] *The New Social Order,* p. 334, quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company, Publishers.

[143] *Ibid.,* p. 369, by permission.

[144] *Ibid.,* p. 377, by permission.

[145] *Ibid.,* p. 384, by permission.

Holding in the main the same religious philosophy as his liberal contemporaries, Walter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918) came forth, about the turn of the century, with his unique contributions to sociological thought. He was the outstanding American disciple of the influential German theologian, Albrecht Ritschl. As Eddy was stressing the need of a reformation in religion, Rauschenbusch was preaching and writing on the need of a "revival in religion." This central core of his religious philosophy, however, was but an outgrowth of his sociological thought. Society, Rauschenbusch maintained, in general agreement with Ward, is essentially organic or rather "solidaristic," made up of individuals, customs, and institutions, some of which give unity and growth to society while others give only disunity and retard its growth. Rauschenbusch agrees with "the great historian, Ranke, that 'the only real progress of mankind is contained in Christianity'; but that it is true only when Christianity is allowed to become 'the internal, organizing force of society.'" [146] For progress is not merely "the natural thing"; it is "more than natural. It is divine." [147] However, there are certain social forces, according to Rauschenbusch which resist progress; and in so resisting, they resist the vital forces which make for progress, namely, religious and ethical forces. Consequently, it is with these anti-progressive forces that religion must deal. Hence, Rauschenbusch's entire religious philosophy centers around his concept of organic society and the divinity of progress. For, to Rauschenbusch, the sole purpose of religion is to establish the Kingdom of God, i. e., to save the "social organism" by transforming "all human affairs by the thought and spirit of Christ." [148] However, before this end can be accomplished, there must be a "moral renovation of public opinion and a revival of religion." [149] Rauschenbusch, therefore, holds that a Christian social order must be established which will serve as the spiritual environment of the individual. In such a social order, the faculty and habits of love must be energized, and the faculty of devotion to the common good must be stimulated.

But just how is this revolution of social relations to take place? In view of the declining interest in religious and moral life and the increasing growth of sin and other forces detrimental to social unity, just what is to be done to bring about the revival of religious interest necessary to overcome these evil forces and establish the Kingdom? In other words what social reforms are necessary, according to Rauschenbusch, to Christianize the social order, i. e., to make society conform with the ethical teachings of

[146] Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing The Social Order*, p. 458.
[147] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[148] *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 458.
[149] *Ibid.*, p. 459.

Christ? For Rauschenbusch, the most constant need in Christianizing the social order is for more religious individuals.[150]

Consequently, according to Rauschenbusch, if the churches are to produce religious individuals, they, like society, must be Christianized. They must, first of all, turn their backs on dead issues and face the present tasks; they must become unified; and thus unified the one Church must seek to "emancipate itself from the dominating forces of the present era," and "come out of its spiritual isolation, . . . sending its spiritual power along the existing and natural relations of men to direct them to truer ends and govern them by higher motives." [151]

Once the church is Christianized in this sense, all the moral forces latent in Christian society will be mobilized for the cause of religion; and then the religious force will be in a position to approximate, as nearly as possible in this life, the perfect social order. This means that the ministry must deal with moral questions in the spirit of Christ, that "the force of the religious spirit should be bent toward asserting the supremacy of life over property," that the religious sentiment must "protect good customs and institutions against the inroads of ruthless greed, and extend their scope," that "the keener moral insight created by Christianity should lend its help in scrutinizing all claims to property and power in order to detect the latent public rights and to recall the recreant stewards to their duty," that Christianity should "strengthen the existing communistic institutions and aid the evolution of society from the present temporary stage of individualism to a higher form of communism," [152] and that Christianity should enter into a working alliance with the working class so that industry might be established upon the principle of solidarity and the method of co-operation.

Until the church is Christianized and until the force of Christianity in all its forms is applied to the present conditions of society, according to Rauschenbusch, there will not be any striking growth of perfection for society. Furthermore, until some such social reform is followed the anti-progressive forces of society will continue to break down social solidarity, drawing a line between the present society and the Kingdom of God.

In the works of Shailer Mathews, one of the most outstanding contributors to sociological thought of this liberal Christian movement, there is seen not only a sound application of Christianity to society but also a more distinctive cultural theory of society than was established by any of the contemporaries who took an active part in the liberal Christian movement.

According to Shailer Mathews no man is a mere unit; he is a part of the

[150] Rauschenbusch, *op. cit.*, pp. 465, 460.

[151] *Ibid.*, p. 464; also his *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 412.

[152] *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, pp. 413, 414.

social order in which he lives. But what constitutes a social order for Mathews?

> A social order is not a mere aggregate of institutions. It is the outcome of a complicated social process. Geography and climate, industry and politics, education and social customs, are in its pedigree.[153]

Consequently, Mathews advocates a cultural theory of evolution, i. e., "the past persists in the present and, more or less transformed, reaches into the future. . . . There is no break in history. . . . Institutions have grown out of institutions, customs out of customs, social habits and classes have changed as economic conditions have altered." [154] In such an evolutionary process, civilizations have progressed or declined, as the case may be, as a result of "a sort of trial-and-error method." For Mathews, then, human history is genetic; the social process is simply an evolutionary process.

Religion and morals themselves, for Mathews, are aspects of this social process. Even "the convictions, hopes, fears, customs, and institutions which result from the attempt to satisfy the needs of a social group by appeal to the superhuman are transmitted from generation to generation." [155] Yet, as culture develops, man rationalizes his religious and moral behavior; i. e., man's religion and morality change, according to Mathews, as culture changes; consequently, religion and morals differ as societies differ.

When Mathews attempts to determine the place of Christianity in the social process, he finds that "a sober study of history will show that the Christian religion has been the development of a social movement which has, to some extent, embedded moral and religious values in social process." [156] As an aspect of social behavior, Christianity conserves values. Its sole purpose, according to Mathews, is to improve the world by intelligent direction of the non-religious forces in social change. Moreover, Mathews contends that "the very structure of our social life demands that social forces and social action should be brought under moral control." [157] Consequently, the Christian movement has social obligations. No man is really Christian unless he recognizes his social obligations, i. e., to give Christ and his teachings to the world:

> Once let men and women have faith in God, genuine hope of a Kingdom of God, and Christlike love for their fellows, and any society that ever existed will be transformed for the better.[158]

[153] Shailer Mathews, *Christianity and Social Process*, p. 5.
[154] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.
[155] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[156] Mathews, *Creative Christianity*, p. 15.
[157] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[158] Mathews, *The Social Gospel*, p. 123.

Thus it seems quite simple to transform society; but obviously, Mathews does not think that society is so very easily transformed. The essential thing necessary to transform society, for Mathews, is "an overwhelming loyalty to the principles of the gospel and an enthusiastic, contagious faith that it represents the ideals ultimately to control human life." [159] However, to establish such a faith means more than preaching. The spirit of Christianity must be embodied in the various reform bodies; the educational process must be evangelized; the church must seek "to turn men to God and educate them in the ideals of the gospel, and to fill its members with a passion for righteousness and service"; [160] the church must discover the moral issues in society and champion justice and fraternity in all such issues; its mission must be to extend "to the entire range of social control, the ideal of personal values," for such a mission or faith will "make social trends and control; . . . it will be embodying the creative spirit which Jesus bequeathed to Christianity." [161]

More specifically, the church, in facing the new conception of sex-equality and new freedom in the family, must use all the methods which psychiatry and sociology put at its disposal, for then the church will be able to foster sex-education and, at the same time, make the family "a moral adjustment of equals in a relationship . . . of a love which is a mutual recognition of personal values." Moreover, the church must face the economic issues, finding a place in the economic world for faith in God and the significance of Jesus. For then people will be taught that "economic efficiency is not to be at the expense of human welfare and the opportunity for personal development." When this is done, we shall "have a new freedom and a new world." [162] Furthermore, the church, supported by its Christian members, must become more interested in public affairs, which means that Christians will necessarily have to fight the evils of our political systems, share in political life as something more than reforms and party control, and insist upon the enforcement of laws which are based upon Christian principles. Likewise, according to Mathews, Christianity must moralize nationalism by "establishing a group of nations in which national *morals* can be developed," i. e., nationalism must be made "an element in international morality." [163] The churches, also, must attempt to establish intelligent interracial adjustments; they must develop the economic, intellectual, and spiritual life of all races, regarding them, not as inferiors, but as fellow-persons who deserve help.

When the Christian Church and Christian individuals apply the prin-

[159] Mathews, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
[160] *Ibid.*, p. 150.
[161] *Creative Christianity*, pp. 146, 147.
[162] *Ibid.*, p. 152.
[163] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

ciples of Christ so as to reform all the social problems, society itself will be reformed or reorganized, and social progress will be impregnated with "the faith that love is a predicable basis for human relations because God is love." [164]

Although the social gospel is still upheld by certain American Christian leaders, such as Mathews, there is evidence of a reaction against this general religious philosophy growing in America and other parts of the world. Probably the most outstanding example in America of this opposition to the optimism of the social-gospel movement is Reinhold Niebuhr of Union Theological Seminary.

Niebuhr recognizes that "society in which man lives is at once the basis for, and the nemesis of, that fulness of life which each man seeks." [165] According to Niebuhr, men have not learned to live together without increasing their vices and without taking advantage of their fellow-men, for man possesses an appetite and imagination for wealth which can never be satisfied by nature. Furthermore, "human society will never escape the problem of the equitable distribution of the physical and cultural goods which provide for the preservation and fulfilment of human life." [166] Nevertheless, Niebuhr recognizes in human nature certain endowments which may, if properly used, furnish a solution to the problem of human society. Man possesses, along with his imagination and passion for wealth, a natural impulse which "prompts him to consider the needs of others even when they compete with his own." [167] This natural impulse created the basis for the family; and with man's growing intelligence, imagination, and social conflicts, this small social group necessarily grew into larger "units." Nevertheless, as these "units" expand into nations ("territorial societies"), it becomes impossible for them to maintain peace and justice within and between the "unit," for which the earlier groups were established. The ambition and need of economic groups, which have made the will-to-live the will-to-power, the imperial ambitions of social groups and nations as well, all tend to make permanent peace unattainable. Consequently, Niebuhr contends:

> There is good reason to believe that the sentiments of benevolence and social goodwill will never be so pure or powerful, and the rational capacity to consider the rights and needs of others in fair competition with our own will never be so fully developed as to create the possibility for the anarchistic millennium which is the social utopia, either explicit or implicit, of all intellectual or religious moralists.[168]

[164] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[165] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society, A Study in Ethics and Politics*, p. 1.

[166] *Loc. cit.*

[167] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[168] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

"Society," Niebuhr therefore maintains, "is in a perpetual state of war." [169] This ever-present conflict presents a challenge to society. Just what is to be done?

According to Niebuhr:

> The problem which society faces is clearly one of reducing force by increasing the factors which make for a moral and rational adjustment of life to life; of bringing such force as is still necessary under responsibility of the whole of society; of destroying the kind of power which cannot be made socially responsible (the power which resides in economic ownership for instance); and of bringing forces of moral self-restraint to bear upon types of power which can never be brought completely under social control. Every one of these methods has its definite limitations. Society will probably never be sufficiently intelligent to bring all power under its control. . . . The future peace and justice of society therefore depend upon not one, but many, social strategies, in all of which moral and coercive factors are compounded in varying degrees.[170]

Hence, the Christian ideal, according to Niebuhr, can meet nothing but defeat in the world of nature and history, since it is impossible to rid society of the human nature which is now corrupting and destroying capitalism and democracy. The maxim "Be ye therefore perfect as your father is perfect," although inescapable, is altogether unattainable. Nevertheless, something must be done in order to save the dying societies. There is needed something far more profound than the easy-going sentimental, optimistic liberalism, whether in politics or religion, for the upbuilding of a disturbed world. Consequently, if social morality is to be approximated, religion, Niebuhr observes, must develop better men, the economic life must be socialized, and more promising political methods must be discovered and followed. However, before religious ideals can achieve social and political significance, the "sensitive spirit" must learn "how to use the forces of nature to defeat nature, how to use force in order to establish justice." [171] But even then society cannot be made just. Jesus himself, Niebuhr contends, regarded the Kingdom of God "as impossible of realization, except by God's grace." Therefore, for Niebuhr, "men must strive to realise their individual ideals in their common life, but they will learn in the end that society remains man's great fulfillment and his great frustration." [172] Furthermore, Niebuhr says elsewhere:

> If the whole of our society really understood the human consequences of its heedlessness as well as the social worker must understand them, it might be possible to establish a firm foundation for social justice without passing through the chaos and convulsion which now seem inevitable.[173]

[169] Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[170] *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 21.
[171] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[172] *Ibid.*, p. 82, also his *Reflections on the End of an Era*, p. 283.
[173] Niebuhr, *The Contribution of Religion to Social Work*, p. 81.

But it is impossible to achieve such an understanding because of the impersonal relationships of technological civilizations.

The conflict in society, although essentially one between two aspects of human nature, is gradually showing itself to be a conflict between the religious ideal of love and the political ideal of justice. According to Niebuhr, both the church and religion have a distinct rôle to play in solving this conflict. The church must analyze the economic and political sources of social need; "it must care for the unemployed," and study the causes of unemployment; it must "help its members not only to analyze society objectively, but to analyze themselves." Religion, furthermore, must "deal more rigorously with the psychological and economic problems which underlie our social maladjustment"; it must "deal realistically with the motives which express themselves in philanthropy, and . . . separate the precious from the vile"; it must envisage "the political means necessary for the achievement of a just society." [174] Religious faith, as such, needs a specific symbol of the absolute in history. Radical Christianity, Niebuhr holds, believing that "the Jesus of history was a symbol of the absolute because he personifies 'the highest human values,' " satisfies this religious need.[175]

Hence, for Niebuhr, the establishment of a new society does not mean the establishment of the Kingdom of God or any similar utopia, as many religionists, moralists, sociologists, and educators would hold. For such social analyses and prophecies are not only impractical and unattainable, but they also "lead to a very considerable moral and political confusion in our day." [176] The establishment of a new social order, according to Niebuhr, depends solely upon the interrelationship of the efforts of religion and politics. In the light of the present social conflict, both religion and politics must have a hand in building a better social order. The success of religion, in this task depends, first of all, upon its creativeness, secondly, upon its adoption of what has proven to be the "best in the rights of the past," and finally, upon its ability to "come to terms with the ethico-political problems of modern industrial society." [177] The degree to which politics will be effective in aiding religion in establishing a better social order will depend upon the discovery and adoption of "political methods which will offer the most promise of achieving an ethical social goal for society." Such methods, according to Niebuhr, must not only "do justice to the moral resources and possibilities in human nature and provide for the exploitation of every latent moral capacity in man," but they must also

[174] *Ibid.*, pp. 89, 90, 91.
[175] *Reflections on the End of an Era*, p. 289.
[176] *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. xii.
[177] *The Contribution of Religion to Social Work*, p. 93.

"take account of the limitations of human nature, particularly those which manifest themselves in man's collective behavior." [178]

In concluding this section on liberal Christianity and social reform, at least brief reference must be made to the important work of Jerome Davis (1891–), S. Ralph Harlow (1885–), and David D. Vaughan (1876–). Davis, a professor in the Yale Divinity School, interested himself actively in the labor movement, travelled widely in Russia after the revolution, and lectured extensively on the applications of Christianity to social problems. He edited an important symposium on *Christianity and Social Adventuring* (1927), wrote a comprehensive work on *Contemporary Social Movements* (1930), and vied with Harry Ward as a critic of capitalism, in his *Capitalism and Its Culture* (1935). The latter book played an important part in bringing about his dismissal from Yale in 1937. Harlow, actively associated with the Socialist movement in the United States, and a professor in Smith College, has interested himself in every phase of social reform. Vaughan succeeded Harry Ward as professor of social ethics at Boston University. He has promoted social Christianity mainly in his work as a teacher and as a forum lecturer.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to summarize briefly the contributions of the most outstanding leaders of contemporary American Liberal Christianity to sociological thought. In the thought of all of these religionists, there are certain ideas which have a common significance. For example, each, in his own manner of approach, emphasizes the religious element in the social process; they all recognize religion as a fundamental part of human culture; unanimously, they are aware of the moral unrest and the social pathology of contemporary society; they all recognize the growing need of some dynamic force to organize and save a scattered world; and, without exception, they believe that such a force is to be found in the teachings of Jesus Christ.

Holding these common ideas, there are two distinct groups of religious liberals in America: those who advocate the so-called social gospel and those who oppose it because of its impracticability. The first group stand together in their hope for the Kingdom of God, which presupposes a reconstruction of human society based upon the "law of love." The latter group, of which Niebuhr is a typical example, look for no such utopia, condemning it as easy-going sentimental, optimistic liberalism. For this group, a better society is to appear only when a more radical Christianity of the prophetic sort and a more radical Christianity in politics are established.

It is difficult to estimate the outcome of the present social and religious conflict in America, since neither of these liberal groups has yet been able

[178] *Moral Man and Immoral Society,* pp. xxiv–xxv. See also, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (1935).

to convert the majority of the American population from orthodox Protestantism, which seems destined to remain organized against itself. Nevertheless, certain movements for the unification of churches, the recent unification of the three Methodist Churches, the increasing educational, political and social interests of the churches, the growing equality of races and classes, the rapid growth of labor unions, the increasing attempt to make family life more secure, and similar movements—all clearly demonstrate the influence of these two liberal Christian movements upon social thought. On the other hand, it is possible to mention certain other contemporary social and religious movements which point in totally opposite directions. Therefore, it is enough to say that the influence of both groups of Christian liberals have been felt in American social thought; yet, since we are definitely in a period of transition, to prophesy the religious and social future would be unwise, if not futile.

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* Editorial *addendum.*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX

C. Wright Mills [1]

The items in Section I are primarily intended to provide general orientation to various frontiers of sociological specialization. Section II consists of references to several better-established divisions of the field which are not explicitly dealt with in this volume. It should be noted, however, that no bibliography for systematic sociology has been included. Here the reader should refer to Wiese-Becker, *Systematic Sociology* (1932), and G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology* (1939). Section III is composed of bibliographical appendices to certain of the chapters in the present volume that either have no selected references apart from those in the footnotes, or which it has seemed wise to supplement. In all instances, orientation, rather than complete coverage, has governed the selections. In general, two types of references have been chosen: systematic statements containing further citations, and suggestive monographs and articles. Emphasis has deliberately been placed upon writings in the English language.

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The import of language varies from the political sphere to that of religion, from magic to mind to urban associations. Many problems of wide consequence are fruitfully stateable in terms of lingual processes. In American intellectual traditions, perhaps social psychologists and ethnologists have given it most attention. But out of many diverse sources and interests, sociology of language is emerging as a specialty with a high potential of generalizability. Because of its many angles and because it seems to be involved in all human actions, it promises to become a center of fructifying observation and analysis. Its frontiers are uneven and wide and largely unexplored.

The most adequate analytic characterization of language to date is Morris, C. W., "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,* I, No. 2 (1938). This monograph provides a conceptual scheme for the precise formulation of many of the field's problems, enables systematic description of relations hitherto unseen. Although primarily concerned with methodological usage of information about language, i. e., syntactics (grammar and logic) and semantics, its range of suggestion is by no means exhausted by such concerns.

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